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Zcicschr. f. math. b g i k und Grudlagen d . H d h .

Bd. 20, S. 271 -2260 (1974)

&

PRENEX NORMAL FORM


THE MODAL PREDICATE LOGIC PS*S
AND THE GROSSETESTE ALGEBRA O F SETS GS*S
by ROBERT1;. WILSONin Dundee (Scotland)

Q 1. Introduction
The modal predicate logic PS*S [l] is based on the 6-valued modal propositional
logic S*S [ 2 ] . I n PS we work,with four kinds of provability and rejection: PSik
and P s i + , i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and in the semantics four kinds of validity: PSi-validity.
The formal system PS ( $ 2 ) is based on SMULLYANS
analytic tableaux as applied
to quantification theory [3] (especially Chs. IV, V) but here we present simplified
tableaux which make use of definitional rules. I n 4 3 only a summary of the semantics PS* is given. I n $ 4 we show that every closed wff (cwff) of PS is Psi-equivalent
(i.e. equivalent w.r.t. PsiI-) to a cwff in prenex normal form. We obtain as a simple
corollary the result that every modality de re is PS,-equivalent to a modality de
dicto. I n 9 5 we turn attention to the underlying modal propositional logic S*S
and give a informal account of the idea of a new algebra of sets grounded on S*S:
the GROSSETESTE
algebra of sets GS*S. Throughout this paper i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 and
i = 1,2.

5 2.

The Formal System PS

The syntax of PS consists of the non-modal functors N , G, A , K , E the modal


functors M , L, T ; quantifiers V and 3; denumerable lists of individual variables
x ,y , z , . . ., individual parameters a , b , c , . , . (the set II),and for each positive
integer n , n-ary predicates P,Q , R,. . . (in every case with or without subscripts);
and finally, five signs - T I ,F , , I I (PSC1-signs) and T P ,
F2 (PSC2-signs). The
definition of wff and cwff in PS are along the usual lines. By a signed wff (swff)
in PS we mean a formula XX where X is a wff and X denotes a sign.
We now present the PS-tableaux rules for swff.
PS-Tableaux Rules
Here X , Y , Z are schematic variables for cwff, and a7denotes any parameter
and b any new parameter not already introduced in the branch.

I. D e f i n i t i o n a l R u l e s
1.

XKXY
XNANXN Y

2.

SAXY
XCCX Y Y

3.

11. Non-Modal R u l e s (G, N )

N o t e : in 6. j = 2 delete I I X
I1Y

SEXY
SKCXYCYX

4.

XLX
XNMNX

5.

StlXZ.X
SN3xNZ.r

272

ROBERT L. WILSON

111. Modal R u l e s ( M , T)

TlMX
13.
TiX 1 F i x I I X
T J
14. T,MX
15. F,MX
16.
T,X
FZX
IV. RuIes f o r Quantifiers

12.

18. T , ~ s Z
Tie:

19. Fj3&
FjZ:

20.

I1TX
FIX I I1X
T z T X 17. FzTX
T2X
F2X
(3)

113~2

I1 2:
FIZZ 112:
Definitions of P s i - P r o v a b i l i t y a n d P s i - R e j e c t i o n

Closed PS-tableaux are tableaux in which every branch is closed i.e. every branch
is either incompatible (containing two swff which differ only in sign) or broken
(containing a swff of the form F I M X , I I M X , T I T X or F I T X ) . Let s ( S X ) denote
a tableau with S X as origin.
Let Gstand for there exists a closed tableau. .. and
exists an open branch. . ..

0 stand

for there

Definitions. D1. PS, I- X if @ $ ( F I X )and G $ ( I 1 X ) .

D 2. PS, t. X if Gs ( F , X ) .
D3. PS3 t X if Q $ ( F I X )and Q $ ( I I X ) and Q ( F , X ) .
D4. PS, t- X if G $ ( F I X ) and Q ( I 1 X )or G S ( F , X ) .
and, or
D5. For PS; X , i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , replace t, 6

s,

by i,D, T,or and and respectively in Dl-D4.


3. Summary of the Semantics PS*

The cwff in PS are given both PSC1-interpretations and PSC,-interpretations.


The underlying modal logic S*S is 6-valued: 3-valued under C1, [4] with C1-truthvalues tl , f l , il, and 2-valued under Cz, with C2-truth-valuest 2 , f, . The Cj-truthtables for the modal functors M . L and T are as in the tables.

Here M 7 , L and T are the absolute possibility, absolute necessity and


absolute verum operators respectively. Also, as in [ l ] and [2]:

Mp is interpreted as It is possible that p is C,-true.


L p ? is interpreted as It is necessary that p is (&,-true.

Tp is interpreted as p is C,-true.

PRENEX NORMAL FORM IP*THE MODAL PREDICATE LOGIC PS*S

273

From [l] we recall the basic definitions of PSCj-satisfiability and PSCj-validity :


1. A cwff A of PS is PSCj-satisfiable if A is C,-true under a t least one PSCj-interpretation (i.e. in a t least one universe U of constants).
2. A cwff A of PS is PSC,-valid if A is Cj-true under every PSCj-interpretation
in every universe U of constants.

The semantic rules for the quantifiers V and 3 are such that under any PSCj.
int,erpretation :

VxPx is
2 . VxPx is
3. 3xPx is
4. 3xPx is
1.

Cj-true iff
Cj-false iff
Cj-false iff
Cj-true iff

for every k E U,Pk is Cj-true.


for some k E U, Pk is Cj-false.
for every k E U, Pk is Cj-false.
for some k E U,Pk is Cj-true.

Also under any PSC1-interpretation :

5. VxPx is C,-indeterminate iff for some 1 E 12, PI is Cl-indeterminate and for


every k E U , Pk is C1-true or C1-indeterminate.
6. 3rPx is C1-indeterminate iff for some 1 E U , PI is C,-indeterminate and for
every k E U , Pk is C1-false or C1-indeterminate.
Under C2, the quantifiers behave as in quantification theory [3] Chs. IV, V,
while under C1, the significant semantical feature of the quantifiers V and 3
is their connection with the semantics of and and or respectively in the %valued
logic. Thus, for a denumerable universe U of constants say 11 = {kl, k 2 , . . .>,
under C, (and C2 as well):

VxPxis semantically equivalent to PkIand Pk2and . . . where kiE U, and


3xPx is semantically equivalent to Pk,or Pk2or . . . where ki U.
We define the four kinds of validity in PS as follows:

1. PSI- and PS2-validity are defined by the two fundamental kinds of validity in
PS, PSCl- and PSC,-validity respectively.

The two derived kinds of validity are:


2 . X is PS,-valid if X is PSC,-valid and X is PSC2-valid.

3. X is PS4-valid if X is PSC,-valid or X is PSC,-valid.


We can also speak of sub-logics PS,*Sj, each associated with PSj-validity (and
Psi-invalidity) and PSi-provability (and Psi-rejection).
Considering now the semantical interpretation of PS-tableaus, PSC1-tableaux are
given only PSC,-interpret,at,ions, whereas PSC,-tableaux are given only PSC2interpretations.
We can prove the semantical consistency and completeness for PS*S along the
same lines as [l]. We state here the general theorem (GT).
Yemantical C o n s i s t e n c y f o r PS*S
(1) If PSj 1 X then X ia PSj-2-aZid.

(2) If PSj X the?&X is PS,-invalid.


18

Ztschr. f. math. Logik

274

ROBERT L. WILSON

S e m a n t i c a l C o m p l e t e n e s s f o r PS*S
(1) If X is PSi-vulid then

Psi k X.

(2) If X i s PSi-invaZid then Psi 4 X .


Proof. The proof of GT is omitted (same lines as given in [l]).The new feature
in our treatment here is that we have introduced definitional rules I Q 2 . We illustrate here the key semantical property used in the proof for rule 5 of I Q 2, case
S = I l . Under any PSCl-interpretation we have:

IIVxPx is tl iff

VxPx is il

iff

for some 1 E U, PI is il and for every k E U , Pk is tl or Pk is il


(see rule 5 9 3)

iff

for some 1 E U , NP1 is il and for every k

iff

3xNPx is il (see rule 6 0 3)

iff

N3xNPx is il

iff

IlN3xNPx is tl.

E U , NPk is f l or NPk is il

Hence under any PSC,-interpretation :

IIVxPx is PSC1-valid iff

11N3xNPx is PSC1-valid.

We also have analogous properties for all the PS-tableaux rules given in Q 2 (see
also SMULLYAN
[3] Chs. IV, V).
Q 4. Some Properties of the Formal System PS
The three derived rules DR1, DR2 and RDR2 [5] hold in PS. I n stating the
various properties we will speak of sub-systems Psi but it is important t o keep in
mind the fact that these are results that hold w.r.t. PSik in the full system PS.
The proofs, which are by PS-tableaux 4 2, are omitted.

4.1. Prenex Normal Form


We discuss only the equivalences involving N and the modal operators M , L
and T.The theorems listed here hold w.r.t. PSik and we omit this prefix.
For negation N , we have:
1. h'QxNPxN3xPx

2. E 3 x N P x ~ x P x

For M , L and T,we have:

3. E3xMPxM3xPx

4. E3xLPxL3xPx

5 . E3xTPxT3xPx

6. EYxMPxMVxPx

7. EVxLPxLVxPx

8 . EVxTPxTVzPx.

The additional equivalences involving the non-modal functors C, A , K , and E needed for our result (e.g. SMULLYAN
[3] p. 117) all hold in Psi. Hence we have the
result :
T h e o r e m P N F . Every cwff in Ps is PS,-equivalent to a cwff in prenex normal
form.

PRENEX NORMAL FORM I N THE MODAL PREDICATE LOGIC PS*S

275

4.2. The Properties of M, L and T with K and A in S*S

If we examine some propositional theorems involving the modal operators M , L, T


with K and A in the underlying 6-valued propositional modal logic S*S it will help
us to see why 3-8, 4.1 hold. I n S*S (and PS*S), we have:
9. EMApqAMpMq

10. ELApqALpLq

11. ETApqATpTq

12. EMKpqKMpNq

13. ELKpqKLpLq

14. ETKpqKTpTq.

If we examine 9-14 in the semantics S*: first, under 4 , M X = t l , L X = f l and


T X = il for any wff X. Also, under C , , M X = L X = T X = X for any wff X .
This together with the semantical connection between Q and K and 3 and A
accounts essentially for 3-8. Concerning 1 and 2 we also have in S i :
15. ENApqKNpNq and 16. ENKpqANpNq.
The other main reason why the results hold in 4.1 is that the modal functors, although many-valued in S*S, are nevertheless truth-functional operators.

4.3. The Barean Formula: modality de dicto and modality de re


I n recent modal predicate logics, the BARCAN
formula (and related ones) has
been a focal point of interest (e.g. [6] Ch. 10). The BARCAN
formula in our notation
is CVxLPxLQxPx,and it is a theorem in Psi. The contemporary interest in the
BARCAN
formula has been connected with an explication of some older distinctions,
namely modality de dicto and modality de re. I n 3-8, 4.1 for example, the RHS
of the equivalences are said to express a modality de dicto and the LHS of these
equivalences are said t o express a modality de re ([el p. 183). HUGHESand CRESSWELL also note that VON WRIGHThas suggested that in a satisfactory modal
predicate logic all modalities de re would be eliminable in favour of of modalities
de dicto. For the modal predicate logics based on systems like T , S 4 and S 5 , however, this property would seem to be an elusive one. We have for PS*S, as an immediate corollary to PNF, 4.1 that every modality de re is equivalent in Psi to
a modality de dicto.
Q 5. The Grosseteste Algebra of Sets GS*S

Before proceeding to the algebra GS*S we look first a t the modal propositional
logic associated with it, S*S. I n the next section we introduce two formal operators
into S*S, W and r, as these are needed for algebraic formulations.

5.1. S*S and the Formal Operators W and

Considering the tableaux rules for S (the propositional part of PS 5 2) we introduce two modal operators W and r with the following rules added to the S-t)ableaux
rules.
BrX
TIWX FlWX
I1W.X
TZWX
S N W N X T I X FIX I1X T , X ( F Z X .

---

(Signed wff of the form F,WX will yield broken branches.) I n the semantics S* we
give W, r the truth-tables shown in the following tables, and we add the tables
18*

276

ROBERT L. WILSON

for M ,L and T,the absolute possibility, absolute necessity and absolute verum
operators respectively.

We can refer to W and r as analogical operators (cf. Jll,7 ,J in EM*E [5]). We


write reduction sets in MS, (S, with W ,r) as mG,(cf. [5]).

MSl: mGl = {P,N P ,M P ,J P ,FP}


MS,: mG2 = ( p ,Np,wp,r p )
MS3: mG3= (p,Np,Mp,Lp,Tp,NIMp,NLp,,ZrTp,Wp,rp,,NWp,NTp,MWp,
Mrp , T W P ,Trp, L W P ,L o } .
The six mixed modalities always take the 6-values in the order t l t z , t l f z , i l t z ,
ill,, f l t z , f l f z . Comparing these mixed modalities with their counterparts in
ME*E [6], we see that these 6 values are the same in ME*E. The reduction sets

mE,u ( k = I , 2 , 3) are irreducible and specify a set of irreducible modalities in


MSL ( k = 1 , 2 , 3 ) .
MS.,: mGl or mGz is a reduction set for MS4, but both are reducible. I n fact, all
the proper modalities are reducible. The set { p , Np} constitutes a set of irreducible
modalities in MS4, but does not give us a reduction set e.g. MS4 4 E p M W p and
MS, -i E N p M W p .
5.2. The Algebra of Sets GS*S: An Informal Account
The algebra of sets associated with the %valued propositional logic is of course
a Boolean algebra. The principle feature in our semantics S* is that we work with
a peculiar notion of a proposition. As for ME*E [5] our semantics S* is linked to
the GROSSETESTE
semantic formula. ROBERTGROSSETESTES
[7] notion of truth as
adequation of thing t o the understanding consists of two parts, because there
are two qualitatively different kinds of adequation. I n the semantics S* (and the
transcendental logics generally) these distinctions are explicated as the I Jative
aspect (truth under the relative category i.e. C1-truth) and the absolute aspect
(truth under the absolute category i.e. Cz-truth).I n S*,under C1, propositions
can be C,-true or C,-false or C1-indeterminate and under C z , propositions can be
Cz-true or C2-false. Thus in particular our set theoretic statements will be 3-valued,
under G I , and %valued under Cz.
Recent workers in modal logic have also been interested in algebraic interpretations of modal logics. A significant contributor (and one of the initiators of our
subject in recent t,imes) to this end is C. I. IAEWIS [9]. The importance LEWIS
attaches both to the question of modal logic as a universally valid logic and the
related problem of an algebra of sets as a universally valid algebra is noteworthy
in [9] and particularly in his Appendix 111:Final Kote on System S 2 . We do not
discuss LEWISScontributions here but merely note two important differences between the LEWIS Systems and the transcendental logics:

PRENEX NORMAL FORM IN THE MODAL PREDICATE LOGIC PS*S

277

1. LEWISSsemantics of possibility and necessity in [9] are related to his


presupposition of the synthetic/analytic division of propositions. I n the transcendental logics we do not link the semantics of possibility and necessity with this
division of propositions, but rather with the semantic categories Cl and C2.
2. Recent semantical analyses of the LEWISSystems S2-S5 [12] indicate that
these systems presuppose alternative possible worlds i.e. many worlds but still
only one logical aspect. For S*S and [I] generally, we presuppose only one world,
but two logical aspects. These latter two features are also seen in PS*S above (i.e.
in PS we presuppose only one class of predicates, and one class of individuals, but
in the semantics PS* two logical aspects).
The GROSSETESTEalgebra of sets can be presented informally by making the
following translations from MS*S to GS*S :
propositional variables p , q , T , . . . -+ variables for sets a , 6 , c , . . .
functors N , A , K + operations on sets N , v, n
functors C, E -+ relations between sets c ,=
modal functors M , L, T , W, r + modal operations on sets 01,01, 0 1 , (I., O2
semantic categories Cl , C, + semantic categories C, , C,
MSi-provable wff + GSi-theorems of sets, i = 1 , 2, 3,4.

Concerning the functors N , C, A , K , E in S*S, PS*S in [l] and above, we have


referred to them as non-modal. Strictly speaking, since the logic is 3-valued under
C, , and 2-valued under C2, then these functors should perhaps also be referred t o
as modal ones. (By contrast in ME*E, E*E, the functors N , C, A , K , E can be
referred t o as strictly non-modal.) I n GS*S then, under C1 i.e. in GSl, we work
in a three-valued logic and so , V, n, c ,= , do not conform to Boolean semantics.
I n GS, i.e. under C,, we work in a 2-valued logic and so -, v, A , c ,=, take on
a Boolean meaning. We turn to the modal operations on sets 01,01,0 1 , 0 2 , 0 2 .
I n Boolean algebra the universal set U corresponds to statements in 2-valued logic
which are always true and the empty set E to statements in 2-valued logic which
are always false . I n GS*S, under C, , as well as U1 and E l , we will also have a new
creature - the indeterminate set IT1, which corresponds to statements in the
6-valued MS*S which are always Cl-indeterminate. I n GS*S, under C,, we will
just have the Boolean situation: the universal set U2 and the empty set E 2 . We
now discuss how these sets are accomodated in each sub-algebra GSi by means of
these modal operations :
N

I n the logic MS1, 5.1 the irreducible proper modalities are M p , Lp and T p .

ula

I n GSl, O l a = U 1 ,
= El and Ola = Il for every set a . Also
0 , a = O z a = a for every set a .
In MS, the proper irreducible modalities are Wp and r p . I n GS, &a = 11,
D 2 a = E,, O,a = O l a = Ola = a for any set a .
I n the logic S*S, the S,-tautology defining a n always true statement is
a derived one. Likewise in GS,, a sct thcorctie statcmcnt is a GS,-thcorcm
if it is a GS1-theorem and a GSz-theorem. I n GS3, the irreducible modal
operations are
01, 01, 0 1 , -01, -01,
0 1 0 2 , 0 1 0 2 , 0 1 0 2 .

-01,

0 2 , 0 2 , -02,

- 0 2 ,

0 1 0 2 , 0 1 0 2 , 0 1 0 2 ,

278

ROBERT L. WILSON

When we ask the meaning of a hybrid set like Ol&a in GS3 we can say
that, under C,, i.e. in GS1, O I O z a= O l a = I , the indeterminate set, and
under C2, i.e. in GSz, OIOza = O z a = Uz the universal set.
GSI: Like GS3, a set theoretic statement is a GS4-theorem if it is a GS1-theorem
or a GS2-theorem. (The feature of note is that the sub-logic MS4 is formally
inconsistent w.r.t. the functor N . ) If we return now to the semantics in GS1.
L4 statement x is a member of a set a is written as x E a and is C1-true,
C1-false or C1-indeterminate ( t , , f l or i l ) in GS:. For the complement - :
sE

NU

is t ,

iff

xEa if

fl

xE N U is f l iff x E a is tl
xE -a is i, iff x E a is i,.
For hhe operation of intersection n (Polish notation except for relations) :

xEn a b is t , iff x E a is tl and xCi b is tl


xEn a b is f l iff x E a is f l or x C b is f l
x E n a b is i, iff xE a is t , and x C b is il, or xE a is i,
and xE6 is t l , or x E a is i l and xEb is i,.
For the relation c,
set inclusion, we have:
a c b

iff

If x E a then x E b.

For the relation =, equivalence of sets, we have:

a = b

iff

If x E a then x E b and if x E b then x E a .

For these relations we use the 3-valued If-then and and.

We present some theorems holding in GSi ( i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) and then we illustrate


some features of each of the sub-algebras GSi. Rejected theorems are indicated
by *. I n some laws we make use of functorial variables. V denotes 01,U1,
O1, O2
or n2.v1 denotes 0, 0,
or o1and v2 denotes o2 or n z .I n laws involving
V , v1 or vz we replace these uniformly throughout by an appropriate modal
operator. I n these laws a , b , c denote arbitary sets.
A s s o c i a t i v e L a w s (v,
1. u a

bc

2. n a n bc

= vvabc

Distributive Laws
3. u a

n).

5. u a b = u b a

nnabe

(w, n ) .

bc = n u a b W a c

Commutative Laws

(w,

4. n a v be

= nab

ac.

-1.
6. n a b = n b a .

D e Morgan Laws a n d Double Complementation.


7. ~ w a =
b nNa

8. - n a b = u - a -

D i s t r i b u t i v e L a w s of M o d a l O p e r a t i o n s o v e r

10. V u a b = w V a V b

11. V n a b =

nva V b .

= a.

9.

b
u

and

n.

279

PRENEX NORMAL EORM IN THE MODAL PREDICATE LOOIC PS*S

C o m m u t a t i v e Law f o r Modal O p e r a t i o n s .
12. VlV2U =

V2VlU.

L a w s of A b s o r p t i o n .
14. u a Ola = a
17. ~ a O =~ 0a2 a

15. n u O l a = a
18. ~a Oza = Oza

19. nuO2a = a

20. n u 0 2 a = Oza

21. u a O ~ O ~
= b0 1 0 2 c

22. uu 0 1 O 2 b = a

23. n u 0 1 0 2 b = a

24.

Ola
Ola = Ola

13. u a O l a
16.

*U

OiU2b

010~~-

Some Relations.
25. u c OiOzb

26. O1Ozac b

27. a c O l a

28. Ola

29. Ola c O l a

30. Ola c o l a

31. a c 0 2 a

32. U 2 a c a .

L a w s of C o m p l e m e n t s w i t h Modal O p e r a t i o n s .
33.

34.

O l U = 01-a

DlU =

35. - O l a

01-a

36. - 0 2 a = 0 2 - a

37. - 0 2 a = 0 2 - a

39. wO1Oza = OiOzb

40. -0iOza =

38.

01-a

-olo2a= n1o2b

0102b.

S o m e R e d u c t i o n Laws.
41. V V a = V a

42.

4O I U

0101~

43. rJIO1a = Ola.

We turn now to each sub-algebra:

GSI:

44. O2a = u
47. n 1 V a = a l a

45. u2a = a
46. O l V a = O ~ U
48. 0 1 V a = O ~ U 49. a c Olb

50. O1a c b

51.

53. - o l a = Olb

54. - O l a

56*. n u

a =

66.

0101~
=

Ola 57*. a

GS2: 59. V l a a
62. a c Ozb
65. O z a = n b - b

G&:

c ~O1b

O ~c
U Olb

52.

O1b
Ola
=

55*. u a
58*.

a = Ola

Ola c a.

60. OzVa = O ~ U

61. n 2 V a

63. O2b c u

64. O ~ U u b

68. O i O i a

Oia

Ola

69. OIOla = O l a

67. OiOia

Ola

70. 0 2 0 2 a = O2a

72. OzOiO2a = OzOib

73.

020102a

U201b

75. o z O l U 2 a= o201b

76. OzOiOza

OzOib

77. OzOlOza

80. 0 1 0 2 a c 0 1 0 2 b .
In GS3, O 1 0 2 aand ~
respectiveIy .

= O20lb

78. OiOza c OiOzb

71. n20za
= n2a

n20102a

74.

= 0

O2Olb

79. O102a c OiO2b


1

~ are2 our
b hybrid universal set and empty set

280
GS,:

ROBERT L. WILSON

84.

&a = a

87. n a

=~

83. Ola = a

82. O l a = a

81.

85.

0 2 a= a

86. a c " 6

88. N o l a = O l a 89. U l a = Ola

a cb

90. - O z a = 0 2 a

91. a z a = 0 2 a

93. O l a = -Ola

94*. a = - 0 l a

95*. If a = b and b

c then a

92. a = O l a

= C.

96*. If a c b and b c a then a = b .


97. wa

c Olb

99*. Olb = w a

98. Olb c Wa

loo*.

Ola

a.

Oza.

References
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(Eingegangen am 3. April 1972)