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Party List Representation

Magdalo c. COMELEC 673 SCRA 651
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional
political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National
and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV
(Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo). Taking cognizance of
the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was
to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals.
Issue: WON the MAGDALO Party, which advocated violence against the state during the Oakwood
Mutiny, be registered as a party-list
NO. COMELEC, in denying Magdalos petition, took judicial notice of the Oakwood Mutiny wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage.
According to COMELEC, this and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the
mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve
their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood
standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats
thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
Antonino v. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70
Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the
election for governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support
given by Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which
caused a division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not
Sabotaged and double-crossed them, the LP would have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon
Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers
Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of
Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antoninos Wife.
1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia
2.W/N the Press Release is libelous

YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the
following facts:
1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino.
2. On the press release there was marked For release under the date.
3. It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino
in the same numerical order.
4. The press release indicated that it came from Valencia
5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the
presence of the press
6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and
information he received about Antonino
7. The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time
8. Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him
certain corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially,
malice is presumed and such presumption was not overcome as Valencia did not prove the truth
of his statements or that they were published with good intentions and with a justifiable motive
or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith,
ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filed charges
against Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate for election and that
his term as senator was no yet to expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making
libelous statements. The anomalous transactions charged was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon.
Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossing cannot be considered libelous as
contemporary politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes
political parties.


Duty to Keep Journals and Records

Astorga v. Villegas 56 SCRA 714 [1974]

In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of
offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to
the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to ViceMayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried
out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of

Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted.
When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to
the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was
referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino
made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was
then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the
President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy
signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for
signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was
not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact,
the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and
binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute.
Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive
proof of a bill's due enactment.
Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.
Held: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but
only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures
therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made
into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Pre-proclamation controversies v. Election Contests; Scope of inquiry ; When Proper

Election Contest
Abayon v. HRET GR 189466, February 11, 2010
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of

Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who
was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were
internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioner
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.


Section 18. Commission on Appointments

Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992); MR, 219 SCRA 326 (1993)

Facts: As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed by the following
by parties: LDP IS, NPC 5, Lakas 3. Applying the mathematical formula agreed by parties
they are entitled to twelve seats. On the organization of the Senate, Majority Floor Leader
Romulo nominated eight senators for Commission on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected
on the nomination of Osmea.
Issue: Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12 senators in the
Held: Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 Senators for the Commission
to function. Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform
their functions even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution.


Delegation of Emergency Powers

SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656 [2004]

FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of
rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening,
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.
Whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper
Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise
of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2),
Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commanderin-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was
merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress in accordance with
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, the requirements of which are:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. The President is authorized to declare a
state of national emergency. However, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot
decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take-over of privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power

to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.


Transfer of Funds
Philconsa v. Enriquez- 235 SCRA 506

Facts: Petitioners assail validity of RA 7663: The General Appropriations Act for 1994.
The GAA contains a special provision applicable to Congress. It allowed any member of congress
allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker are
the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of
Congress themselves.
Later, President FVR signed the law, but VETOED certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain conditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the
pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the AFP.

Issue: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art 6. Whether the enumeration is exclusive?
Held: YES. Under the special provision applicable to Congress, the members of Congress are
given the power to determine the necessity of realignment of the savings in the allotment for
their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who
know whether there are savings, or deficiencies in appropriation. HOWEVER, ONLY THE SENATE
Further, 2 conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer is to
be made.
As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chief of Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those who
may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. The AFP-Chief of Staff may not be given such

General Prohibition of Riders

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR 196271, 18 October 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted
through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. "The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its

Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734.
Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734
and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153
was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country. With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus originating from different parties arose as
a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of
said laws.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
on September 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well
as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials
until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office. Corrollary, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the
power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court
agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every
three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by
RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the
Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30,
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in
the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections
to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the
perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."
Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the
article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.
Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty
nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term
suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements
and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a
manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under

these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could
have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of
the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room
for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that
would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover
by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office. "This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated
term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must
be therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize
elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.


Taxation - Progressive System

Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, Oct. 13. 2005

Pursuant to the Phil. Comprehensive Financing Prog. the Sec. of Finance & Debt-Negotating
Chairman enter into the debtrelief agreements w/c include buy-back of loans (re-purchase of
loans w/ discount). Consti: No money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance w/ an
appropriation made by law. Although the power to tax & to spend lies w/ Congress, by virtue of
PD No. 1177, w/c has the force of law, the President is empowered to execute debt-payment
automatically w/o further appropriation. Furthermore RA No. 240 grants specific legal authority to
the Sec. of Finance for the buy-back loans. The Consti further allows President to
contract/guarantee foreign loans w/c include bonds. There is no substantial distinction between
loan and bonds. Certiorari & Prohibition DISMISSED.

Banda v. Ermita
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010

President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 285by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office)
over the printingservices requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source
their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that theservices offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what wasoffered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378
also limited NPOs appropriation in the GeneralAppropriations Act to its income. Perceiving
Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO,petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by
former President Aquino when thelatter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order
No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
J. Leonardo-de Castro
. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No. 292
or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
the said Code, is explicit: The President
, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President
.It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary
(which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary
or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the
President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not
include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated
bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to
reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.
J. Carpio:
RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities of the
government including the acquisition of items, supplies, materials, and general support
services x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit
of any government x x x activity save for limited transactions. By opening governments
procurement of standard and accountable forms to competitive bidding (except for documents
crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely by government), EO 378

merely implements RA 9184s principle of promoting competitiveness by extending equal
opportunity to enable private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in
public bidding

383.Tecson vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and
deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7) ,
Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction
over the qualifications of presidential candidates?
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically
speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only
a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

397. Cecilio Rafael vs Embroidery and Apparel Control & Inspection Board
October 31, 2011
21 SCRA 336 Political Law Appointments When Not Bypassed by a Law
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board shall be composed
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the
Secretary of Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and

(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and
Apparel Exporters of the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against Cecilio
Rafael but the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA 3137 is
unconstitutional for while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed
therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be appointed by the President in accordance
with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and
members of the EACIB should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by
Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the constitutional power of the
President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed the appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except
those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments
and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department Heads.
They are merely going to be designated hence whoever was designated was merely sitting as an
ex officio member. It must also be noted that Congress took care to specify that the
representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of
Commerce and Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be
because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to the
importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and apparel products and
their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in RA 3137 to deprive the President of
his power to make appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.

412. Pimentel vs. Ermita

Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
(Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as
acting secretaries of their respective departments.

On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their

respective departments.

Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad

interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were
previously appointed in an acting capacity.


Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?

Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the
executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an
appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint
any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the

exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does
not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting
secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an
Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego
of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically
the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications
to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent

The law expressly allows the President to make such actingappointment. Section 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officeralready
in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not
yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this
safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to
circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of

them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

352. DIAZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS SC jurisdiction over ERB case Davao Light & Power Co.
appealed the decision of the ERB (deducting assessments from their property) directly to the SC.
SC remands the case to the CA for disposition, w/c dismissed it for failure to comply w/ Circular
Nos. 1-88 & 2-90 (providing for dismissal of erroneous appeals). EO No. 172, creating the ERB
was enacted when the 1987 Consti was already in effect, hence its vesting upon the SC of
jurisdicrion over ERB w/o its advice & concurrence is inoperative. Judicial Reorganization Act
remains in effect, as well as said Resolutions enacted pursuant thereto. Petition DISMISSED.
No Law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
the Constitution without its advice and concurrence




Petitioner Roque allege that he had been in occupation of the disputed portion since 1937, for
the whole of Lot No. 4507. Likewise Respondent Facun filed his homestead application on the
same land in 1935 and submitted the final proof therefore in 1939.

In settling the dispute, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources decided in favor of
Roque but upon re investigation it is found out that Roque submitted his sales application for the
disputed portion in 1948, only during the course of the investigation of his protest and it was
verified during the re investigation of this case that the appellee (Roque) entered upon the
disputed portion in 1951 only. So the President, through respondent Assistant Executive
Secretary awarded the land in favor of the respondent Facun.

The petitioner prayed that the order of the respondent Honorable Director of Lands and the
decision of the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary, be set aside on the alleged
ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
consisting of unqualified reliance and the biased report and recommendation. And said that the
decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave
abuse of discretion disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein
petitioner having already paid is for the price of the same, and praying further that the decision
of the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained.

Respondent Jose Facun, through Atty. Cipriano A. Tan, filed an answer to the petition denying
specifically the allegation of abuse of discretion, arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction of the
Honorable Director of Lands and Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly valid.


Whether or not Assistant Executive Secretary lacks the power to overrule the descision of
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources?


No, to contend that the Office of the President, through respondent Assistant Executive
Secretary, lacks the power to overrule the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is to
betray lack of awareness of the implications of what Justice Laurel referred to in Villena v.
Secretary of the Interior as " As was further stressed by him: "Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed

and Promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptive the acts of the Chief Executive.

The President has control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices and under Pelaez v.
Auditor General "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers." Clearly then, there is nothing to prevent the President to disapprove the act of a
department head.

Assistant Executive Secretary of the President is correct for sustaining the award by the Director
of Lands of a homestead application and thus overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, because it is in conformity with the policy of the law. Petitioner, himself a previous
beneficiary of the statute, would seek to add to his holding by a sales application. The prevailing
party, private respondent Jose Facun, on the other hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a
homesteader as far back as 1935, and had submitted his final proof in 1948

442. (Malaria Employees & Workers Assn. of the Phils., Inc., et al. v. The Hon. Exec. Secretary, et
al., G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007).

The President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or
agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. R.A. No. 6656 provides for the
circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service
employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in
the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b)
where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

453. IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the

deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP



February 9, 1989 (G.R. No. 78239)
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of
the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment
and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of
a new appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public
officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of
his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he
can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact
that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this
Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant
city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent
upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which
is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit
full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone

deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

483. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)

Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto, Dr.
Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario
Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr. Nemesio Gako

Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.
One of the preambular clauses of TMC the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA
(World Health Assembly) in 1981.
In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of
the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality and
should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
From 1982 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should
be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
May 15, 2006 DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. The RIRR imposes a
ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
June 28, 2006 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.
August 15, 2006 the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents
from implementing the assailed RIRR.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of the said law.

DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international
instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the
DOH in the RIRR.

Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?

Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent international agreements
entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus be implemented
through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with such international agreements?

Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case maam asks) are at
the bottom of the digest.

Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is
based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions
however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.