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Hazardandoperabilitystudy

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Ahazardandoperabilitystudy(HAZOP)isastructuredandsystematic
LookupHazopin
examinationofaplannedorexistingprocessoroperationinordertoidentify
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andevaluateproblemsthatmayrepresentriskstopersonnelorequipment,or
dictionary.
preventefficientoperationitiscarriedoutbyasuitablyexperiencedmulti
disciplinaryteam(HAZOPteam)duringasetofmeetings.TheHAZOPtechniqueisqualitative,andaimsto
stimulatetheimaginationofparticipantstoidentifypotentialhazardsandoperabilityproblemsstructureand
completenessaregivenbyusingguidewordprompts.Therelevantinternationalstandard[1]callsforteammembers
todisplay'intuitionandgoodjudgement'andforthemeetingstobeheldin'aclimateofpositivethinkingandfrank
discussion'.TheHAZOPtechniquewasinitiallydevelopedtoanalyzechemicalprocesssystemsandmining
operationprocessbuthaslaterbeenextendedtoothertypesofsystemsandalsotocomplexoperationssuchas
nuclearpowerplantoperationandtousesoftwaretorecordthedeviationandconsequence.

Contents
1Method
1.1Outline
1.2Guidewordsandparameters
2Team
3History
4Seealso
5Notes
6References
7Furtherreading

Method
Outline
Themethodappliestoprocesses(existingorplanned)forwhichdesigninformationisavailable.[a]Forcontinuous
processes,thiscommonlyincludesapipingandinstrumentationdiagramandprocessflowdiagramwhichis
examinedinsections,chosensothatforeachameaningfuldesignintent(thedesired,orspecifiedrangeofbehaviour
forthatitem,notjustitsdesigndutypoint)canbespecified.Forexample,inachemicalplant,apipemaybe
intendedtotransport2.3kg/sof96%sulfuricacidat20Candapressureof2barfromapumptoaheatexchanger
butaprudentdesignerwillhaveallowedforforeseeablevariationshotter/strongeracid,pumpnoflowpressure
onthelinebeforethedesignreachesdetailedHAZOPand(wherepossible)thatwiderdesignenvelopeshouldbe
explicitlyidentifiedandtakenasthedesignintentbasisforHAZOPstudy.[b]Theintendeddutyoftheheat
exchangermaybetoheat2.3kg/sof96%sulfuricacidfrom20Cto80Cbutitsfulldesignintentwillalso
includeglimpseoftheobviousfunctionsegmaintainingcontainmentofhotacid(andoftheheatingfluid,and
preventingleakageofoneintotheother).Thesizeofsectionsshouldbeappropriatetothecomplexityofthesystem
andthemagnitudeofthehazardsitmightpose.TheHAZOPteamthendetermineswhatarethepossiblesignificant
Deviationsfromeachintent,feasibleCausesandlikelyConsequences.Itcanthenbedecided(attheHAZOP,orby

subsequentanalysis)whetherexisting,designedsafeguardsaresufficient,orwhetheradditionalactionsare
necessarytoreducerisktoanacceptablelevel.Forbatchandothersequentialoperationsalogicflowdiagram
shouldbeavailableforHAZOPstudyaswell:equipmentmayhavedifferentdesignintentsatdifferentpointsinthe
operation(allshouldbeconsidered)andhazardsmayarisefromperformingoperationsoutofsequence.When
HAZOPmeetingswererecordedbyhandtheyweregenerallyscheduledforthreetofourhoursperday.[c]Fora
mediumsizedchemicalplantwherethetotalnumberofitemstobeconsideredis1200(itemsofequipmentand
pipesorothertransfersbetweenthem)about40suchmeetingswouldbeneeded.[2]Varioussoftwareprogramsare
nowavailabletoassistinmeetings.

Guidewordsandparameters
Inordertoidentifydeviations,theteamapplies(systematically,inorder[d])asetofGuideWordstoeachsectionof
theprocess.Topromptdiscussion,ortoensurecompleteness,itmayalsobehelpfultoexplicitlyconsider
appropriateparameterswhichapplytothedesignintent.ThesearegeneralwordssuchasFlow,Temperature,
Pressure,Composition.Thecurrentstandard[1]notesthatGuidewordsshouldbechosenwhichareappropriatetothe
studyandneithertoospecific(limitingideasanddiscussion)nortoogeneral(allowinglossoffocus).Afairly
standardsetofGuideWords(givenasanexampleinTable3of[1])isasfollows:
GuideWord

Meaning

NOORNOT

Completenegationofthedesign
intent

MORE

Quantitativeincrease

LESS

Quantitativedecrease

ASWELLAS

Qualitativemodification/increase

PARTOF

Qualitativemodification/decrease

REVERSE

Logicaloppositeofthedesign
intent

OTHERTHAN

Completesubstitution

EARLY

Relativetotheclocktime

LATE

Relativetotheclocktime

BEFORE

Relatingtoorderorsequence

AFTER

Relatingtoorderorsequence

(Thelastfourguidewordsareappliedtobatchorsequentialoperations.)Whereaguidewordismeaningfully
applicabletoaparametere.g.NOFLOW,MORETEMPERATURE,theircombinationshouldberecordedasa
crediblepotentialdeviation.Thedistinctionbetweensomeguidewordsmaynotalwaysberememberedbytheteam
(LESSCOMPOSITIONshouldsuggestlessthan96%sulfuricacid,ASWELLASCOMPOSITIONshouldsuggest
acontaminantwhereasOTHERTHANCOMPOSITIONshouldsuggestsomethingelsesuchasoil)orbewell
observedbytheplant(ifa60%sulphuric/15%nitricacidmixturecouldbefedinstead,thepossibilitycouldbe
flaggedupagainstLESS,ASWELLAS,OTHERTHAN).
HAZOPtypestudiesmayalsobecarriedoutbyconsideringapplicableguidewordsandidentifyingelementsto
whichtheyareapplicable[1]orbyconsideringtheparametersassociatedwithplantelementsandsystematically
applyingguidewordstothemalthoughthislastapproachisnotmentionedintherelevantstandard,itsexamplesof
outputincludeastudy(B3)recordedinthisway.[1]Thefollowingtablegivesanoverviewofcommonlyusedguide
wordparameterpairsandcommoninterpretationsofthem.

Parameter/
Guide
Word

More

Less

None

Flow

highflow

lowflow

noflow

Pressure

high
pressure

low
pressure

vacuum

deltap

Temperature

high
low
temperature temperature

Level

highlevel

lowlevel

nolevel

different
level

Time

toolong/
toolate

tooshort/
toosoon

sequence
missing
step
backwards
actions
skipped

Agitation

fastmixing

slow
mixing

no
mixing

Reaction

fast
reaction/
runaway

slow
reaction

no
reaction

Startup/
Shutdown

toofast

tooslow

Draining/
Venting

toolong

tooshort

none

Inertising

high
pressure

low
pressure

none

Utility
failure
(instrument
air,power)

reverse
flow

Aswellas

Partof

Other
than

deviating
deviating
contamination
concentration
material
explosion

extraactions

wrong
time

unwanted
reaction
actions
missed
deviating
pressure

wrong
recipe
wrongtiming
contamination

wrong
material

failure

DCSfailure
[e]

failure

Maintenance

none

Vibrations

Reverse

toolow

toohigh

none

wrong
frequency

Oncethecausesandeffectsofanypotentialhazardshavebeenestablished,thesystembeingstudiedcanthenbe
modifiedtoimproveitssafety.ThemodifieddesignshouldthenbesubjecttoanotherHAZOP,toensurethatno
newproblemshavebeenadded.[f]

Team
AHAZOPstudyisateameffort.Theteamshouldbeassmallaspossibleconsistentwiththeirhavingrelevantskills
andexperience[g]Aminimumteamsizeof4[1]5[3]isrecommended.InalargeprocesstherewillbemanyHAZOP
meetingsandtheteammaychangeasdifferentspecialistsandpossiblydifferentmembersofthedesignteamare

broughtin,buttheStudyLeaderandRecorderwillusuallybefixed.Asmanyas20individualsmaybeinvolved[4]
butisrecommendedthatnomorethan7[1]8[3]areinvolvedatanyonetime(alargerteamwillmakeslower
progress):eachteammembershouldhaveadefiniteroleasfollows[1](withalternativenamesfromothersources):
Name

Alternative

Role
someoneexperiencedinHAZOPbutnotdirectlyinvolvedin
thedesign,toensurethatthemethodisfollowedcarefully.
Responsibleforensuringthatdiscussionleadstoadefinite
conclusionandisadequatelyrecorded,problemsare
documentedandrecommendationspassedon

Studyleader

Chairman

Recorder

torecorddiscussions(accuratelybutcomprehensibly),to
Secretaryorscribe alertStudyLeaderwhenthisbecomesimpossible,[h]to
documentproblemsandrecommendations

Designer

(orrepresentative
oftheteamwhich
hasdesignedthe
process)

Toexplainanydesigndetailsorprovidefurtherinformation

User

(orrepresentative
ofthosewhowill
useit[i])

Toconsideritinuseandquestionitsoperability,andthe
effectofdeviations

Specialist

accordingto
specialismeg
ChemistHuman
FactorsSpecialist

someonewithrelevanttechnicalknowledge,egknowledge
abouteffectofvaryingreactionconditionstrainingin
humanreliabilityanalysis,andhumanerroridentification

Maintainer

(ifappropriate)

someoneconcernedwithmaintenanceoftheplant.

InearlierpublicationsitwassuggestedthattheStudyLeadercouldalsobetheRecorder[4]butseparaterolesare
nowgenerallyrecommended.SoftwareisnowavailablefromseveralsupplierstoaidtheStudyLeaderandthe
Recorder.

History
ThetechniqueoriginatedintheHeavyOrganicChemicalsDivisionofICI,whichwasthenamajorBritishand
internationalchemicalcompany.ThehistoryhasbeendescribedbyTrevorKletz[4][5]whowasthecompany'ssafety
advisorfrom1968to1982,fromwhichthefollowingisabstracted.
In1963ateamof3peoplemetfor3daysaweekfor4monthstostudythedesignofanewphenolplant.They
startedwithatechniquecalledcriticalexaminationwhichaskedforalternatives,butchangedthistolookfor
deviations.Themethodwasfurtherrefinedwithinthecompany,underthenameoperabilitystudies,andbecamethe
thirdstageofitshazardanalysisprocedure(thefirsttwobeingdoneattheconceptualandspecificationstages)when
thefirstdetaileddesignwasproduced.
In1974aoneweeksafetycourseincludingthisprocedurewasofferedbytheInstitutionofChemicalEngineers
(IChemE)atTeessidePolytechnic.ComingshortlyaftertheFlixboroughdisaster,thecoursewasfullybooked,as
wereonesinthenextfewyears.Inthesameyearthefirstpaperintheopenliteraturewasalsopublished.[6]In1977
theChemicalIndustriesAssociationpublishedaguide.[7]UptothistimethetermHAZOPhadnotbeenusedin

formalpublications.ThefirsttodothiswasKletzin1983,withwhatwereessentiallythecoursenotes(revisedand
updated)fromtheIChemEcourses.[4]Bythistime,hazardandoperabilitystudieshadbecomeanexpectedpartof
chemicalengineeringdegreecoursesintheUK.[4]

Seealso
CybersecurityHAZOP(CSHAZOP)

Hazardanalysis

ProcessSafetyManagement

Safetyengineering

HazardAnalysisandCritical

Riskassessment

HAZID

ControlPoints

Notes
a. TheHAZOPtechniquecanalsobeappliedwheredesigninformationisnotfullyavailableanddoingsomaybeusefulin
knockingbadideasontheheadbeforetoomuchtimeiswasteduponthembutameetingcarriedoutonthatbasisisnota
'HAZOP'withinthemeaningofthestandardwhichnotesitsrestrictiveredefinitionoftheterm"ThetermHAZOPhasbeen
oftenassociated,inagenericsense,withsomeotherhazardidentificationtechniques(e.g.checklistHAZOP,HAZOP1or
2,knowledgebasedHAZOP).Theuseofthetermwithsuchtechniquesisconsideredtobeinappropriateandisspecifically
excludedfromthisdocument."[1]
b. OtherwisetheHAZOPgetsboggeddown
c. Hourswererestrictedforanumberofreasons:toallowthesecretarytimetomanagetherecords,toallowattendanceby
busypeoplewithvaluableinsights,andbecauseHAZOPmeetings(andHAZOPteammembers)tendtolosefocusifthey
goontoolong.Thelasttwoconsiderationsstillapply:ThesuccessoftheHAZOPstudystronglydependsonthealertness
andconcentrationoftheteammembersanditisthereforeimportantthatthesessionsareoflimiteddurationandthatthere
areappropriateintervalsbetweensessions.Howtheserequirementsareachievedisultimatelytheresponsibilityofthestudy
leader.[1]
d. Ifanindividualteammemberspotsaproblembeforetheappropriateguidewordisreacheditmaybepossibletomaintain
rigidadherencetoorderifmostoftheteamwantstotakethediscussionoutofordernogreatharmisdoneiftheydo,
providedtheStudyLeaderensuresthatthesecretaryisnotbecomingtooconfused,andthatallguidewordsare(eventually)
adequatelyconsidered
e. ThisrelatestotheDistributedControlSystem(DCS)hardwareonlysoftware(unlessspeciallycarefullywritten)mustbe
assumedtobecapableofattemptingincorrectorinopportuneoperationofanythingunderitscontrol
f. iethemodifications(andtheirpossibleeffectonotherplantitems)shouldundergoreHAZOP
g. andaffiliationWhereasystemhasbeendesignedbyacontractor,theHAZOPteamshouldcontainpersonnelfromboth
thecontractorandtheclient.[1]
h. egheisunclearwhatconclusionhasbeenreachedagainstaguideword(orhesuspectstheStudyLeaderhasmissedone)
i. Ifsimilarplantexists,itsusersshouldalsoberepresented

References
1. BritishStandardBS:IEC61882:2002Hazardandoperabilitystudies(HAZOPstudies)ApplicationGuideBritish

StandardsInstitution.ThisBritishStandardreproducesverbatimIEC61882:2001andimplementsitastheUKnational
standard.
2. Swann,C.D.,&Preston,M.L.,(1995)JournalofLossPreventionintheProcessIndustries,vol8,no6,pp349353
"TwentyfiveyearsofHAZOPs"
3. Nolan,D.P.(1994)ApplicationofHAZOPandWhatIfSafetyReviewstothePetroleum,PetrochemicalandChemical
Industries.WilliamAndrewPublishing/Noyes.ISBN9780815513537
4. Kletz,T.A.,(1983)HAZOP&HAZANNotesontheIdentificationandAssessmentofHazardsIChemERugby
5. Kletz,T.,(2000)ByAccidentalifepreventingtheminindustryPVFPublicationsISBN0953844005
6. Lawley,H.G.,(1974)ChemicalEngineeringProgress,vol70,no4page45"Operabilitystudiesandhazardanalysis"
AIChE
7. ChemicalIndustriesAssociation(1977)AGuidetoHazardandOperabilityStudies

Furtherreading
Kletz,Trevor(2006).HazopandHazan(4thEditioned.).Taylor&Francis.ISBN0852955065.
Tyler,Brian,Crawley,Frank&Preston,Malcolm(2008).HAZOP:GuidetoBestPractice(2ndEditioned.).
IChemE,Rugby.ISBN9780852955253.
Gould,J.,(2000)ReviewofHazardIdentificationTechniques,HSE
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/hsl_pdf/2005/hsl0558.pdf)
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5211/docs/RBDM_Files/PDF/RBDM_Guidelines/Volume%203/Volume%203
Chapter%2010.pdf
HazardandOperabilityStudies(http://www.lihoutech.com/hzp1frm.htm)Explanationbyasoftwaresupplier
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/plansforaction/pdf/hazards/haz_hipap8_rev2008.pdf
Whitty,SteveFoord,Tony."IsHAZOPworthalltheeffortittakes?"
(http://wildeanalysis.co.uk/casestudies/hazop).Retrieved5March2015.PotentialproblemswithHAZOPs
(authorssellHAZOPexpertise,sopresumablysomepromotionalintent,buttheissuesdescribedare
genuine/recognisable)
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