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Personal and Family Relations

First Semester, 2014-2015
I. Civil Code of the Philippines
Preliminary Title
A. Effect and Application of Laws
Articles 1-18
a. Effectivity of Laws (Article 2)
1. Revised Administrative Code
2. Executive Order No. 200, Section 2
3. Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute)
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have
no force and effect.

4. National Amnesty Commission v. COA, 437 SCRA 655

5. Garcillano v. House of the Representatives, G.R. No. 170338,
Dec. 23, 2008
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to

manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senates
website, satisfies the due process requirement of law
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of
Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained
by the Senate
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being
the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.

6. Fuestes v. De Roca, G.R. No. 178902, APRIL 21, 2010

On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano
offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and
requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down
payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the
estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he
went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed
January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the
lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the
ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery.
The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed
the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed. On the other hand, the CA reversed the
ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the
sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years.
Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land
to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and 3. Whether or
not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale. RULING: 1. The SC ruled that
there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another document
executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document
which stated consent was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there
was such difference in the handwriting. 2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was
done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at
the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely
void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument
that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes

spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand,
the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the
sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong
since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and
Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As
lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and

b. Ignorance of the Laws (Articles 3)

1. Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 Phil 217

Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover
from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of
the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest
thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that
w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no.
325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that
should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the
land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the
tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend
to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon.
The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of
antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act
No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the contract he
made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was unaware of any flaw in his title
or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by
the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition,
aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based
upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does,
that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter
the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

2. Ambil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175475, July 6, 2011

Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the
Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and
detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governors
1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade
classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.
2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of
Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with a classification of
Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade 27 or higher
can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor
and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of

The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code andAdministrative Code of
1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed
that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at
hand even if the act was not one relative to the granting of licenses and concessions. The provision was meant to
include officers with such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity.
Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude application.
The act employs the phrase private party, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or
a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper.

c. Retroactivity of Laws (Articles 4, 2252 to 2269)

1. Revised Penal Code (Article 22)
2. Article 256, Family Code
3. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation
on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in
reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress
and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically
claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of
the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United
States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were
many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced
to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance
with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be
permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is
disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

3. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96

SCRA 342
Private respondents are original owners of a parcel of land in Ozamis City. They mortgaged said land to DBP. When private respondents defaulted on their
obligation, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage on the land and emerged as sole bidder in the ensuing auction sale.
On April 6, 1984, DBP & PR entered into a deed of conditional sale where DBP agreed to convey the foreclosed property to them.
On April 6, 1990, upon completing the payment of the full repurchase price DBP, private respondents demanded the execution of the deed of conveyance
in their favor.
However, DBP denied the execution & delivery because it had become illegally impossible in view of sec. 6 of RA 6657 (CARL) that upon effectivity of this
act, any sale lease, management contract / transfer of possession of private / lands executed by the original land owner in violation of this act shall be null
& void.
WON the execution & delivery of conveyance is illegally impossible? NO
According to Manresa, it is a rule that if the obligation depends upon a suspensive condition, the demandability as well as the acquisition or effectivity of
the rights arising from the obligation is suspended pending the happening or fulfillment of the fact or event which constitutes the condition. Once the
event which constitutes the condition is fulfilled resulting in the effectivity of the obligation, its effects retroact to the moment when the essential elements
which gave birth to the obligation have taken place. Applying this precept to the case, the full payment by the appellee on April 6, 1990 retroacts to the
time the contract of conditional sale was executed on April 6, 1984. From that time, all elements of the contract of sale were present. Consequently, the
contract of sale was perfected. As such, the said sale does not come under the coverage of R.A. 6657.
Under Art 1181, in conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired depend upon the
happening of the event which constitutes the conditions.
The deed of conditional sale between petitioner & PR was executed on April 6 1984. Since PR had religiously paid the agreed installment on the property
until April 6, 1990, PR is entitled for the land.
The laws RA 6657, was enacted on June 10, 1988 as well as E.O. 407 after the execution of the deed of conditional sale, thus, these laws cannot have
retroactive effect or to the time the contract had on April 6 1984.
Petitioner cannot invoke the last paragraph of sec.6 to set aside its obligations already existing prior to its enactment because the original owner in this
case is not DBP but PR. DBP only acquired land through foreclosure proceedings but agreed thereafter to recovery it to private respondents conditionally.

4. Aruego v. CA, 254 SCRA 711

Antonia Aruego and her sister Evelyn filed a petition in the courts seeking Jose Aruego, Jr. And his five minor children to recognize them as illegitimate children and
compulsory heirs of Jose who died on March 30, 1982. They claim there is open and continuous possession of status of illegitimate children of Jose who had an amorous
relationship with their mother Luz Fabian until the time of his death. The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter of the deceased with Luz Fabian while
Evelyn is not. Antonia and Evelyn contested the decision citing provisions of the Family Code particularly Art. 127 on Filiation, Art. 172 on illegitimate childrens filiation, and Art.
256 on the retroactivity of the code.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively and will it impair the vested rights of the respondents.

Held: The meaning of vested and acquired rights under Art. 256 was not defined by the Family Code, hence the court will determine it according to issues submitted to them.
The action must be governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code and not by Art. 175 (2) of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given any retroactive effect since its application
is prejudicial under Art. 285. The supreme court denied the petition and upheld the court of appeals decision.

5. Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011

February 23, 2011

Eduardo Simon was charged by Elvin Chan of violating BP 22. Chan then commenced a civil action in the MTC for the collection of
the principal amount. Chan argued that BP 22 falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code in fraud, for such offense to be civilly tried
The RTC first denied it but the CA later affirmed the action.
ISSUE: Whether the independent civil action is valid.
The SC granted the petition and reversed the CA's decision.
Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court states clearly that the criminal action of BP 22 also includes the corresponding civil action. This
provision was also in the Supreme Court circular. For Chan to file an independent civil action, the case should have an estafa
charged with it.

7. Llave v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169766, March

30, 2011
8. Araneta v. Doronilla, 72 SCRA 413
d. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws (Articles 5 and 17 (3))
e. Waiver of Rights (Article 6, 2035)
1. Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9,
1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.


Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.


Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of

the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,



The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima

facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence
arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.


The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law,

to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens Compensation law, the
claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar
came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

2. Ferrer v. Diaz, G.R. No. 165300, APRIL 23, 2010

f. Repeal of Laws (Article 7)

1. Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, 16 AUGUST 2004, 436

SCRA 550
2. Lledo v. Lledo, A.M. No. P-95-1167, February 9, 2010
g. Judicial Decisions (Article 8)
1. People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 (1976)
2. Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, APRIL 17, 2001
3. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, April 20,
h. Duty to Render Judgment (Article 9)
1. Revised Penal Code, Article 5
2. People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690
i. Presumption and Applicability of Custom (Articles 10 to 12)
1. Co Giok Lun v. Co, G.R. No. 184454, August 3, 2011
2. Barcellano v. Banas, G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011
j. Legal Periods (Article 13)
1. Gavida v. Sales 271 SCRA 767
III. Conflict of Laws
a. Article 14
1. Revised Penal Code, Article 2
b. Article 15
1. Family Code, Article 26 par. 2
2. ATCI Overseas Corp v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11,
c. Article 16
1. Aznar v. Garcia (in re: Edward Christensen), 7 SCRA 95 (1963)
2. Amos v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358 (1967)
3. Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, G.R. No. L-23145, November
29, 1968
d. Article 17
1. Kasuhiro Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November
23, 2007

2. Raytheon v. Rouzie, G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008

e. Article 18
1. Zamoranos v. People, G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011
B. Human Relations
Articles 19-36
1. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals 219 SCRA 115
2. Pacific Merchandising Corp. v. Consolacion Insurance 73 SCRA
3. Republic v. Ballocanag G.R No. 163794, Nobember 28, 2008,
572 SCRA 436
4. De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co. 160 SCRA 70
5. Mendoza v. Alcala (2 SCRA 1032)
6. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortuno Tabacco Corp. G.R. No.
141309, December 23, 2008 575 SCRA 23
7. Aberca v. Ver (160 SCRA 590)
8. Lim v. Ponce de Leon (66 SCRA 299)