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Journal of

Peace Research

Gendered Conflict
Mary Caprioli
Journal of Peace Research 2000 37: 51
DOI: 10.1177/0022343300037001003
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feminist theory is used as a general term while recognizing the breath within feminist theory and the dialogue between feminist theorists and disciplines. in many cases. Independent variables for gender equality include percent women in parliament.umassd. 1990).. Togeby. at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. CA and New Delhi) [0022-3433(200001)37:1.journal of peace R E S E A R C H © 2000 Journal of Peace Research. and fertility rate. vol. 53 Downloaded from jpr. This study substantiates the theory that domestic gender equality has a pacifying effect on state behavior on the international level. University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth This study quantitatively tests the relationship between state militarism and domestic gender equality. Frankovic. the potential impact of domestic gender equity on international behavior. Ample work also exists within international relations literature linking domestic factors and state bellicosity in that states externalize domestic political culture to international behavior (Doyle.html 1 There exists a wealth of feminist theory across disciplines. 1986. resulting in women’s equal political. pp. feminists advocate the analysis of relationships between and within states to explain 2 The speculated change in policy outcome would not be limited to foreign policy. 53–68. therefore. The debate rages within and beyond feminist theory1 as to the existence of a gender gap between women’s and men’s support for the use of violence to resolve international disputes. * The data used in this project can be found at http://www. Shapiro & Mahajan. 1993. 1. will result in more pacific foreign policy behavior. 1982. percent women in the labor force. economic. in relation to men. Several control variables (alliances. 1984. Thousand Oaks. and social power. contiguity. 2014 . McGlen & Sarkees. Russett. Other research indicates that a domestic environment of inequality results in state militarism on the international polisci/Caprioli. no. Mueller. 1986. 37. Similarly.2 The inclusion of women as equal members of society will. Fite et al. and all four hypotheses are confirmed. International relations scholars studying the impact of women on foreign policy suggest that increased gender equality. 1994). The Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is used with hostility level as the dependent variable to measure the level of militarism employed by any given state to resolve international conflicts. and the impact or.sagepub. 1990. 011269] Gendered Conflict* MARY CAPRIOLI Department of Political Science. 1992. 53–68 Sage Publications (London. which is the focus of this research. and four hypotheses are developed to test this relationship. Specifically. wealth. scholars have identified women. In this project. Both lines of inquiry suggest that a domestic environment of equality between women and men would lead toward greater state pacifism. duration of female suffrage. International relations literature on the impact and potential impact of women on foreign policy suggests that women are more peaceful in that they are less likely than men to support the use of international violence. 1973. 1985. 1994. Maoz & Russett. Smith. as being less likely to support the use of force (deBoer. and democracy) are added to the multivariate logistic regressions. result in fewer and less violent militarized international disputes.

Ruddick. MacCormack & Strathern. 1986. 2014 . 1992. An analysis of gender should begin with a common understanding of the term. Biological determinism posits physiological differences between men and women as the basis of social roles. responsibilities. Griffin. theoretically. rely on the same tools in the international arena. This domestic–international political link is based on the premise that states duplicate patterns of domestic politics in the international arena and apply the same political norms in both domestic and international politics. According to the social constructivist perspective. 1994). 1992). 1981. 1997). social constructivists argue that gender differences are socially constructed and that gender is not synonymous with sex differences (Gailey. my empirical analysis will examine the degree to which domestic gender equality impacts states’ international behavior. The inclusion of women in foreign policy decisionmaking. After first laying out the basic theoretical and conceptual material of relevance to this study. Gender is viewed as the product of social relationships within society (Rosaldo. Tickner. Tickner. 1990. Although the power and role of women vary across cultures. Rich.sagepub. there is no inherent difference based on gender. women’s behavior is instinctive and not learned. According to this perspective. Rubin. We may. Rossi. Ortner & at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. The Downloaded from jpr. 1997). Fite et al.54 journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H international relations (Harrington. 1980. foreign policy would be altered with less gender-based value systems.. Gender issues determine access to resources and control – as a result volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000 of gender-defined rights – roles. 1981. the assumption that women differ from men in their support for international violence necessitates identifying these value differences. but for different reasons. 1976. On the other hand. McGlen & Sarkees. 1992. as both males and females are forced into stereotypical roles. 1992. 1986: 1069). the gender gap will be explored. Scholars explain the gendered power deficit with two competing theories: biological reductionism or biological determinism versus social constructivism. Peterson. research suggests that domestic social factors may have greater explanatory potential in predicting state militarism than do traditional measures (Brandes. Theorists seeking to understand women’s relative lack of power compared to that of men subscribe to one of two general schools of thought. 1970. 1975. 1980. would alter policy output – not women’s nature. This analysis draws on both feminist research and conflict studies in an attempt to lend greater predictability and accuracy to the study of peace. Forsythe. and expectations (Sadik. expect the international behavior of states to vary among states with more gender-neutral value systems. thus making gender equality a useful crossnational variable. Sadik. power relationships. Stacey. According to both theoretical perspectives. 1987). This research will analyze the fundamental question as to whether domestic gender equality correlates with fewer and less violent military solutions to resolve international disputes. therefore. Next. 1993. which is biologically determined. States that typically exhibit discrimination and violence in their domestic affairs will. women are always unequal in both the economic and political spheres (Scott. Elshtain. Iannello. Gender It is on the basis of gender that access and power are limited and inequality is justified and maintained. 1986. therefore. 1992). Scholars supporting the concept of biological determinism argue that women have an essential nature that is based on their natural reproductive capacity (Daly. Lastly. 1994. 1987. 1992. Togeby. 1984. Indeed.

Gilligan. and theorize that gender and power hierarchies are inextricably intertwined (Tickner.. For the majority of women. 1982. 1994). infinite resource and/or as the ability to reach goals (Iannello. Smith. foreign policy output might become less bellicose as both genders become free to act on their beliefs rather than being tied to roles that require males to be aggressive and females passive. Fite et al. Page & Shapiro (1992: 295) declare that ‘[I]n practically all realms of foreign and domestic policy. GENDERED CONFLICT differences. Gender Gap Thus far. In which case. women are less belligerent than men. defined as equal access. value differences4 between women and men result in a gender gap in support for the international use of violence. 1992). therefore. Frankovic. relying on assumptions about feminine and masculine qualities. 1978. 1993. 1988. This project. scholars have concentrated on measuring gender differences in public opinion. 1982). whereas men favor justice.Mary Caprioli inclusion of women in foreign policy. 1995. Most of the research testing for the existence of a gender gap focuses on the difference between the level of female and male support for war and willingness to use force (de Boer. 1984. regardless of differences. therefore. therefore. 1985. with equal pol4 These value differences may be either the result of biology or socialization.sagepub. to share resources. Feminists claim that power should be conceptualized as a divisible. and of their valuing community and connectedness over autonomy and individuation (Flax. According to some feminist literature. and other forms of exploitation (BrockUtne. equality. If women are less likely to support the use of force. may yield increased state militarism on the international level. the feminine qualities are assumed to predominate. the inclusion of women as equal members of society. In general. 2014 55 . Control is often used as the rationale for female subjugation. scholars have identified distinct values for women and men. Domestic gender inequality. is focused on women. 1990). Tickner. In either case. Feminists analyze power. 1992: 19). however. whereas females attempt to minimize power 3 Combinations of masculine and feminine qualities exist in all people. White (1988) corroborates studies highlighting the egalitarian nature of women with her research showing that males engage in power struggles for personal gain. 1990. gender. 1985) and rejects hierarchical at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. as equal and due equal treatment. and selfgovernment (Dietz. At the most basic level. Ford & Lowery (1986) argue that women prioritize care and mutually acceptable solutions. Some studies. women are less competitive and more focused on issues of interdependence and egalitarianism (Gidengil. Miller. 1992: 43). Shapiro & Mahajan. Downloaded from jpr.3 suggest that the inclusion of women in foreign policy analyses will affect outcomes (Peterson. 1992). Similarly. Welch & Hibbing. ethnicity. 1986. would not necessarily alter policy output unless society were freed from gender stereotypes. Feminism involves a commitment to freedom. or caste. McGlen & Sarkees. Gender Values Both perspectives – social constructivist and biological determinism – lead to the conclusion that gender equality would affect foreign policy decisionmaking and would account for the existence of a gender gap. and to treat others equally. value differences would exist. States that are not organized according to strict hierarchical models based on gender5 would be socialized to treat others.’ Women’s relative pacifism may be a result of women seeing moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities rather than competing rights. 1992. Togeby. the use of military force. 5 This argument applies to any hierarchical organization based on any number of factors including race.

Even though both men’s and women’s identified goal was the same (to get Iraqi troops out of Kuwait).56 journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H itical. the more peaceful that state is likely to be. but only slightly more opposed to it. as Carson (1993) offers evidence that the police force has become less violent with an increased number of female officers integrated at all levels of the police at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. 1993. Furthermore. on the other hand. find that individuals who are more supportive of 6 It is important to remember that these studies analyzed the USA or Great Britain – two countries in which all receive public education and have a certain standard of living that is not necessarily representative of other countries. Welch & Thomas (1988) studied the British experience. 1990. nuclear determent. They found no gap in ideology or partisan affiliation between men and women. And there is support for this supposition. Similarly. Gallagher. the Vietnam War. This implies that the higher a state’s level of gender equality.sagepub. Controversy does exist within international relations literature between those who hold that women have similar values to those of men and those who identify a gender gap (Holsti & Rosenau. 1997. rather than having the female officers become more violent. To extend the gender gap study beyond the US experience. (1990) found a difference in men and women’s support for the use of force. Grant & Newland (1991) argue that any current gender gap associated with support for the commitment of forces or for war would be eradicated by the inclusion of more women in active duty within the armed forces. The absence of a gender gap within the State and Defense Departments may be a result of pressure to conform to traditional institutional perspectives or may be tied to socioeconomic status. there existed a distinct difference in support for attacking Iraqi forces. Fite et al. that not voicing support for a war is not the same as opposing it. the scope of the observation that a gender gap exists on the use of military force regardless of socio-economic status cannot be considered valid in a cross-cultural analysis. have failed to alter the size of the resultant gender gap. when found. Downloaded from jpr. are many. Tessler & Warriner. 1983). Hart & Teeter (1991) also found men to be more likely to support war continuation.6 thus suggesting a more robust relationship than critics believe (Fite et al.. In a study of the Gulf War. the Korea War. or military spending. 1988). The inclusion of women in the armed forces. Mueller (1973) cautions. McGlen & Sarkees volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000 (1993) found varying degrees of a gender gap amongst the masses but none with women working within the State Department or the Defense Department. but only slightly more in favor of it. Wittkopf & Maggiotto. The hypothesized reasons for the gender gap. They do. 2014 . In addition. In a public opinion study on support for war in the USA. Thus. would impact foreign policy. might result in an alteration of the armed forces. Welch & Thomas. Mueller (1973: 146) concludes that ‘[W]omen generally are less favorable to escalation than men. and with women opposed to attacking Iraqi forces at 73% versus men’s 48%. however. and economic access. social. In a study conducted in the USA. 1988. however.’ This observation held for World War II. Gallagher identified a large gap. not of women’s opinion. with women in support of attacking Iraqi forces at 22% versus men’s 48%. as did Wilcox et al. Tessler & Warriner (1997) argue that there is no evidence that women are less militaristic than men. yet discovered a substantial difference toward the use of force but not in maintaining military power. and the Gulf War. Conover (1988) suggests that the gender gap is created only by those women who identify with the women’s movement. however. (1996) and Gallagher (1993). Studies controlling for socio-economic status. and women are less opposed to withdrawal than men.

Erchak & Rosenfeld. 1989). 1991. manifested by women’s inequality in relation to that of men (Brownmiller. which ‘means that no illegitimate criteria are imposed and no indefensible and avoidable background conditions are permitted that impede. Ember & Ember (1994) depict the causal relationship between international GENDERED CONFLICT behavior and domestic behavior by arguing that the nature of a state’s international behavior both legitimates and is reflected in its domestic behavior. not a simple unidirectional causation. 1995. 1987: 100). ethnicity. and particularly for equality between women and men. Reardon. Although the link between international behavior and domestic behavior may be driven by a myriad of inequalities and violence within society. Those who express greater concern for the status and role of women. 2014 57 . 1994. This suggests that the relationship between more pacifist attitudes and international conflict rests upon the degree of gender equality that characterizes a society (Tessler & Warriner. e.Mary Caprioli equality between women and men are also less supportive of violence to resolve conflict. be a mutually supportive relationship between international and domestic behavior. scholars have found in particular a correlation between a state’s level of militarism and sexism. 1994. are more likely than other individuals to believe that the international disputes in which their country is involved should be resolved through diplomacy and compromise (Tessler & Warriner. 1988. Based on these theories.’ Indeed. Conover & Sapiro. 1989. however. There may. or some cultural division [gender?]. 1983). Levinson. All citizens should benefit from social. 1985. we would expect a state’s level of militarism – use of military action – to decrease in conjunction with increased gender equality. Enloe. nondemocratic. domestic behavior might legitimate and be reflected in a state’s international behavior. 1989). Elshtain. In other words.sagepub. The hypothesized link between masculinity and militarism is maintained by men’s higher social status in relation to that of women. Dietz. 1993. Equal participation relies on equality of opportunity. and social access in order for each person to be able to participate equally in society. religion. Conover. then collective violence is also highly likely.g. Pateman (1970) defines equality to mean that all people must have equal political. Equality Both theories – gender gap and the domestic–international violence link – rely on a concept of equality. Downloaded from jpr. 1985. Ruddick. restrict. 1997).com at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. Cook & Wilcox. Violence Begets Violence Beyond the existence of a gender gap over the use of force to warrant an analysis of women’s impact on state bellicosity lie theories linking domestic and international violence. Gidengil. societies that have internalized values that are less gender-based and apply them to their interstate and interpersonal relations should exhibit less militaristic international behavior. be it race. Other scholars have linked masculinity with militarism (Cohn. Societies with high levels of family violence are more likely to rely on violent conflict resolution and are more likely to be involved in wars compared to societies with lower levels of family violence (Brumfield. 1987. or deny a person a chance to compete for or enjoy some good that is available to others’ (Cauthen. Ruddick. economic. 1989). 1975. 1991. Higher levels of societal violence may be explained by Rummel’s (1997: 170) conclusion that ‘when political power is centralized. and highly dependent upon one’s social group membership. see also Boling. 1997: 280.

race. 2014 . MID identifies 2187 incidences of states involved in international disputes. and the 1992 end year is a constraint of the dataset. Even when not overtly subordinated. Gender equality must be measured based on social equality. Similarly. as statistics for gender equality are neither widely available nor reliable prior to 1960. Militarism is measured by the level of military action employed by a state for each militarized international dispute in which it becomes 7 The SAS statistical package is used to run the analyses. lineage. it is difficult to determine if women choose to become homemakers or if being a wife and mother is their only alternative. Formal access to the political and economic spheres translates into power and opportunities that enable a person to choose a way of life and to experience equality of opportunity. and economic equality. and militarism as the dependent variable in this analysis. a dispute between two states counted twice. In theory. quite difficult to measure in a cross-cultural study. to aid in interpreting the results and to conform with other statistical packages. A person’s social position accords not only status. This project tests whether higher levels of gender equality yield lower levels of militarism. The parameter estimates given in the tables have been multiplied by 1. People must have equal access and equal influence. once for each country involved. all people must be assumed equal. social. she is unlikely to gain political office. political. measured by the use of military action as a foreign policy tool from 1960 through 1992. 1984: 17). for example. There were a total of 159 states involved in militarized international disputes. As a result. Research Design This research is based on the theories that women and men’s values differ in that women are less likely to advocate a military response to resolve international disputes. the three measures are highly correlated. Women. political. women operate in a society that gives men vast influence. political. or economic. representing the total number of militarized. international disputes by country during this time-frame. or economic equality but represents a volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000 combination of all three. however. i. and economic access. No adequate measures exist to gauge the social pressures that keep women from certain employment or out of the labor force entirely.58 journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H political. Social equality is. but also access to political and economic systems (United Nations. may earn high wages but may not be allowed to control their wealth. each measure of gender equality captures a different aspect of equality – at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. Data availability and reliability limit the time-frame for this analysis. In most societies. If a woman has low social standing. and gender) will necessarily violate the equality assumption. there exists a wide disparity in political. Downloaded from jpr. which can be understood as the relationship between and among individuals in which individuals do not constrain one another (Oppenheim. In practice. each gender equality variable does not represent a discrete measure of social.e. Those states in which access is restricted by any measure (wealth. for example. with each measure having a different emphasis. unfortunately.sagepub. which measures interstate conflict. Definitions and Measures of Variables Independent Variables Gender equality serves as the independent variable. for social. and economic access are interdependent. 1961). Multivariate logistic regression7 is performed to test the hypothesis using the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (MID) (Bremer. 1996). and that gender equality correlates with lower levels of state militarism internationally.

Indeed. and economic aspects of women’s lives. This relation between education and fertility holds regardless of region.Mary Caprioli involved. Social Equality Fertility Rate This variable represents a complex combination of interrelated social. and decisionmaking in both GENDERED CONFLICT the family and community (UN. therefore. In general. The longer women have had the vote. the greater should be their influence. UNFPA. economic. and political access: ‘women’s access to reproductive health services is constrained by their broader social deprivation. Suffrage The suffrage variable is derived by subtracting the year women gained suffrage from the start year for the militarized dispute. resulting in little variation among states. employment. 1997). Level of education is a potential measure of women’s social status. and studies conducted by the UN. of opportunities beyond motherhood. 1997: ch. any changes in the independent variables are determined yearly. and limited access to information due to illiteracy’ (Sadik. culture. 2). The independent variables do not change significantly over the course of each dispute and are coded for each country for the start year of each dispute. In addition. Women’s lives are generally described in terms of motherhood in societies in which women have low social status. and lower levels of education. 1995: 111). The resulting figure is the number of years women have had political influence via voting at the onset of the militarized dispute. Thus. political. Fertility is related to women’s status in that high fertility rates result in poorer health. their confidence. and the UNDP have linked women’s education to lower fertility. political. becomes an important measure of women’s social equality. 1993: chs 5 and 6). The upper house of parliament is used as it has a greater impact on foreign policy than does the lower house and is most comparable to those states that are unicameral. with independent variables calculated for each calendar year. The unit of analysis is a state in a particular militarized dispute matched. including the lack of resources for or priority to their health. for each dispute. women who have no control over their own fertility rate are less likely to participate in the labor force than women who exercise more control over their reproduction (Dixon-Mueller. and democracy. restrictions on social participation. wealth. fertility rate captures the interrelation among social. Measures of Gender Equity The level of gender equality is determined by evaluating women’s social. The InterParliamentary Union compiles statistics on women in parliament and provides dates for the year suffrage was extended to women. Fertility rate. Access to reproductive health services ‘enhances women’s self-esteem. A strong relationship between control over fertility rate and economic standing also exists. and economic equality in relation to that of men. has increased worldwide. 2).com at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. Several control variables are used: contiguity. 2014 59 . Downloaded from jpr.sagepub. yet education. their decision-making power and their position in the family’ (Sadik. as a whole. or level of development and is a result of five or six years of schooling (Sadik 1997: ch. 1995: 15). their participation in political and community life. and is available from the World Bank. alliances. Political Equality Percent Women in Parliament The percent women in parliament variable reflects the percentage of women in the upper house of parliament. lower fertility rates result in women’s empowerment in that they have greater control over their own lives and more free time (UNDP.

at least in democratic states. Women such as Margaret Thatcher. However. Rummel. as income was not found important in explaining the hypothesized dovish nature of women (Fite et al. The more politically powerful women are as a group. women obtain formal political power by serving as members of government. which ensures their continual and broadening participation in multiple spheres of their lives. Fukuyama. The number of neighbors variable is used to control for contiguity. No perfect measurement of women’s economic access exists cross-nationally. 1970). Goertz & Diehl. not on income or type of employment. and Golda Meir who emulate men are often described as acting as though they were men. Female leaders were not used as an independent variable.sagepub. Diehl. the more influence they should have on the decisions of leaders. Gallagher. not the type of employment. average wage. 1995. This need to conform to traditional male styles may explain McGlen & Sarkees’ (1993) finding that no gender gap existed between women and men working within the State Department or the Defense Department as noted earlier.60 journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H Formal political power best captures women’s political equality. 1993. thus representing an inadequate sample. 1992. These female leaders. is the key to gaining a sense of efficacy that will translate into participation in the political arena (Pateman. 1998. They prove more likely to succeed as national political leaders and are more likely in male-dominated societies to gain political power (Astin & Leland. Theoretically. 1992. 1991). Maoz & Russett. 2014 . 1993). or unpaid labor. women’s political power would increase with their level of equality within society. Indira Gandhi. 1991). 1993). for two important reasons. 1990. the World Bank’s statistics on female percent share of the labor force are used. economic access is measured by women’s share of the adult labor force. The second aspect of women’s political influence is suffrage. The data come from the Correlates of War (COW) contiguity dataset (Gochman. do not necessarily represent the female gender or the possible effect of domestic gender equality on foreign policy. which increases individual political efficacy. thus fostering political participation.. Women gain a sense of empowerment through participation in industry. the focus of this project is on economic participation. few women have held the position of president or prime minister. Siverson & Starr. Control Variables Contiguity This variable is the total number of neighbors that are contiguous by land. States are more likely to become engaged in an international dispute with a contiguous state (see Bremer. though these too offer no indication as to whether women have control of their wages. 1991. Gleditsch. Economic Equality Percent Women in the Labor Force In this project. therefore. 1988). women in positions of power are compelled to use a style that conveys strength in traditional male terms (Sykes. at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. Welch & Thomas. First. Beyond influence gained through voting in democracies. Perhaps more important. participation in industry. 1992. Active participants in society develop a new sense of efficacy. Sykes. Recognizing that economic access is volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000 largely determined by social access. 1993. as the probability of Downloaded from jpr. Labor statistics are the most reliable and are widely available. Labor statistics measure the number of women working. such as housework and child rearing. 1991. Often. within the workplace.

1998: 3). This is necessary as China has an Downloaded from jpr. thus necessitating a control variable to test whether democracy is affecting state mili- China A dummy control variable is included with fertility in the logistic regression. more likely to become involved in wars (Bremer. 1993. Mueller.. 1992. 1984). Lemke & Reed. Wealth has been identified as an important variable in predicting war both as a direct factor (see Maoz & Russett. Kacowicz. while others (Rousseau et al. have done so against states with inferior military. A relative measure of power between states is not as important as wealth in predicting war. Democratic states. Weede. 1995) hints at a possible monadic relation between democracy and militarism. Gartzke. Number of Alliance Partners This variable represents the number of states sharing membership in a defense pact or an entente. 1980. 1996. Indeed. Major powers at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. 1992. Weede. 1992. Wealth The PENN World Table (Mark 5. 1991) provides a variable for real GDP per capita in constant dollars using Chain index.6) (Summers & Heston. 1990). yet these power disparities do not often result in war or militarized disputes (Gochman. and political capabilities (Forsythe. other research (Benoit. Russett. thus requiring a control variable for wealth. 1993. 1996) report that alliance ties do not decrease the likelihood of conflict. thereby reducing the number of militarized disputes. 1995. 1998). 1995. Small & Singer. economic. Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman. In addition. 1992. 1998. Maoz & Russett. tarism internationally rather than domestic gender equality. 1984. is included based on elements of the democratic peace literature indicating that democracies may be less bellicose. Maoz & Russett. 1995). 1985 international prices calculated yearly by state. in general.. or may increase the number of militarized disputes as alliance partners are drawn into an ongoing dispute. the power capabilities variable has little explanatory capability. 1992.Mary Caprioli GENDERED CONFLICT conflict is dependent on the number of neighbors (Gleditsch & Hegre. with 10 being the highest score for democracy. In addition. On the contrary. many of the gender equity variables may be higher in democracies. 1992. Rousseau et al. 1991. Some scholars have found alliance ties to diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer. as wealthy states have much to lose from violent conflict and little marginal utility to gain (Maoz & Russett. therefore. James & Mitchell. The continuous score was calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score ([democracy score] minus [autocracy score]). 1989). The number of alliance partners may be sufficient to deter attack. Relative power also matters. Bremer. for every state is in a relative power position with regard to other states. Rummel. These data are available from the COW Alliance dataset (Singer & Small. Morgan & Campbell. A measure of democracy. Gleditsch & Hegre. the gender equity variables may be higher in wealthier states. 1993. 1983). 1997. Small & Singer. 1993). with a preponderance of power generally accepted as preventing war (see Sullivan. 1992) and as a factor in classifying major powers.sagepub. 1982). Ray. 1990. 1996. 2014 61 . 1976. when initiating military violence. Although some research indicates the democratic peace thesis to be dyadic (Chan. satisfied powers and developed states have been found to be less bellicose (Brawley. however. 1996). Democracy This variable is calculated from Jaggers and Gurr Polity III dataset (1996) and is a continuous term from 10 through 10.

2014 . international dispute is listed twice. which failed to show significance (p  0. not be coded more than once for each state involved. and high levels of domestic gender equity have been linked to lower levels of state militarism internationally. Before analyzing the data. one of the better indicators of peace and is analogous to its emphasis on force as a means of international conflict resolution (Latham. the Falklands War involved both Argentina and the UK. (3) display of force. contiguity. female percent of parliament. the lower the level of militarism.sagepub. 9 Each variable was systematically dropped from the equation and the coefficients and standard errors were affected. Because the Falklands War was a war between two countries. Hypothesis 2: States with a longer duration of female suffrage will experience lower levels of international violence. duration of female suffrage. 8 These results were replicated with mulitvariate regression (SPSS statistical package) using the COW data set (Singer & Small. the independent variables are fertility rate. 1993). This may be attributed to a small N (49). used in this analysis. a multiple-year war would • Political equality Hypothesis 1: States with a higher percentage of women in parliament will experience lower levels of international violence. once for each country. A state’s emphasis on force. offer five different hostility levels coded as follows: (1) no militarized action. female percent of the labor force. Although the Falklands War occurred only during one year. • Economic equality Hypothesis 4: States with higher female participation in the labor force will exhibit lower levels of international violence. A single dispute involving two states would be coded twice because this analysis focuses on the level of international militarism employed relative to the level of domestic gender equality. The four measures of gender equality are correlated and introduce multicollinearity in the regression. thereby indicating that multicollinearity was biasing the equation. 1993) with identical independent variables and with a dependent variable of fatality level. (2) threat to use force. This project tested the following operationalized hypotheses with regard to gender equity – all of which were confirmed:8 Militarism Hostility Level The Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Bremer. The militarized. The only notable difference was with economic equality/labor force. Once again. alliances. For example. Dependent Variable Results The level of military action employed by a state creates a useful measure capturing a state’s level of militarism through its reliance on force as defined by various levels of. wealth. military action. should be inversely related to the level of gender equity – the higher the level of gender equity.9 In order to correct for the bias of multicollinearity. As outlined above.117).com at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. therefore. perhaps. Downloaded from jpr. and (5) war. each state’s level of military force was coded ‘5’ for war. A state’s level of militarism is. (4) use of force. or absence of. • Social equality Hypothesis 3: States with lower fertility rates will exhibit lower levels of international violence.62 journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000 artificially low fertility rate that is not necessarily a product of female equality. and democracy. 1996). women are less likely than men are to support the use of militarized force as a means of international conflict resolution. a few matters should be discussed concerning the variables.

The percent women in parliament variable also showed significance.0156 .94) times as likely to resolve international disputes without military violence.00376 .com at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. the German Democratic Republic.0126 . Contiguity.0121 .Mary Caprioli GENDERED CONFLICT Table I. Downloaded from jpr.0263 . the state having twice the number of years of female suffrage will be nearly five (4. 2014 63 . Sweden. for example.1841 .18E4 .0001 * p  .1952 N  1098 Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  69. Only eight10 of 10 These states are the former Soviet Union.0276 .0186 . a 5% decrease in the proportion of women in parliament renders a state nearly five (4.1883 N  1316 Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  75. Romania.01. 1960–1992 Independent variables Parameter estimates . Norway. and Wealth.00928 *. Political Equality The results showed significance for the length of female suffrage prior to the dispute.0212 .0047 . Cuba. **** p  .3090 Model significance  p  . Given two states. This variable may become even more important in the future.001 four separate logistic regressions are run with each having the four control variables.05.1359 .0158 .6395 . Military Disputes as a Function of Political Equality.00421 . as states currently have a relatively small percentage of women in parliament.01.91) times as likely to resolve international disputes using military violence.6871 **.1107 Model significance  p  .001.7498 % women in parliament Democracy score Contiguity # of alliance partners Wealth Intercept 1 Intercept 2 Intercept 3 Standard error ***. Alliances.02E3 3. ** p  .5477 2.4427 2. Contiguity.00924 ****. As an illustration. and Wealth. *** p  . Albania.00913 ***.1840 . which was not significant in this analysis. with states having lower percentages of women in parliament being more likely to use military violence to settle disputes. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.7412 1.29E4 .1407 .00769 **.0102 .sagepub.0001 ** p  .17E4 . Military Disputes as a Function of Political Equality. 1960–1992 Independent variables Parameter estimates Standard error Suffrage Democracy score Contiguity # of alliance partners Wealth Intercept 1 Intercept 2 Intercept 3 . *** p  . Alliances.0001 Table II. An additional dummy variable for China is introduced into the social equality model with fertility rate. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates first-order autocorrelation.

com at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13.00954 ****.00434 .001 which exceed or meet the 30% threshold established by the UN Commission on Status of Women 1990 in order for women to influence outcome – to influence key decisions and be taken seriously (UNDP. but also a measure of self-empowerment through control over her own life.59E4 3.00477 . a general sense of efficacy – political. Military Disputes as a Function of Social Equality. fertility rates best measure a woman’s overall status by capturing not only an aspect of education. **** p  .5087 3.0408 .1435 .9355 Model significance  p  . 2014 .0001 Table IV.00910 . Expanding on Pateman (1970).2105 N  1310 Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  67.1717 .0165 . available economic opportunities. thus indicating its importance.0001 * p  .sagepub. 1995: 108). the percent women in parliament shows statistical significance. Alliances. As discussed above. those states with high fertility rates.00320 . which represent a low social status for women. For example. Nevertheless.0140 . 1960–1992 Independent variables Parameter estimates Standard error % women in labor force Democracy score Contiguity # of alliance partners Wealth Intercept 1 Intercept 2 Intercept 3 . Social Equality As expected. and overall social status. Contiguity.5808 *. 1960–1992 Independent variables Parameter estimates Standard error Fertility rate Democracy score Contiguity # of alliance partners Wealth China dummy variable Intercept 1 Intercept 2 Intercept 3 . political rights. Military Disputes as a Function of Economic Equality.2603 . economic.26E4 . and Wealth.5885 2.4092 .3053 N  1281 Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  75.64 journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000 Table III. Alliances.00933 **. and Wealth.00879 . As such.01.00948 . ** p  .02E3 . decreasing the fertility rate by one-third makes a state nearly five (4.001.67) times less likely to use a military solution to settle international disputes.7294 1.6217 Model significance  p  . *** p  .1277 2.6744 . and Downloaded from jpr.2073 .00698 .05. were more likely to use force in international disputes.2829 . fertility rate encompasses a broad range of concepts including level of education.7092 ***.17E4 .00423 ***. Contiguity.0001 *** p  .0130 .0104 .

1990. women’s domestic equality impacts foreign policy. each shows statistical significance. Lemke & Reed. This analysis lends credence to the domestic–international violence theory in that domestic inequality 11 This result is likely a function of multicollinearity between fertility rate and the wealth at UNIVERSITE LAVAL on September 13. Rousseau et al. 1988). Wealth Wealth showed significance in all but one multivariate logistic regression. Downloaded from jpr. These results are in keeping with literature identifying participation in the labor force as an important factor in explaining the hypothesized dovish nature of women (Fite et al. however. Presumably. including voting and other forms of political activism. Further analysis would be necessary to draw any conclusions regarding contiguity. When contiguity. participation in the labor force results in other types of participation. the greater level of militarism exhibited. Kacowicz..95) times less likely to use military force to resolve international conflict. 1967). Even at the most basic level. In reference to the contiguity variable. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this project. is that higher levels of gender equality correlate with lower levels of military action to settle international disputes. Gochman (1998: 3) argues that a ‘static condition cannot. The better specified model. Increasing the proportion of women in the labor force by 5%. renders a state nearly five (4. The conclusion. This finding fits well with theories arguing that satisfied powers and developed states are less bellicose (Brawley. This research confirms that the inclusion of women as equal members of society will effect foreign policy.sagepub. 1991. and recent research argues that economic interdependence significantly counteracts the influences of contiguity on the likelihood of war (Oneal et al. Proximity in itself is not the cause of military disputes or wars. Conclusion As evidenced by the statistical significance of all three measures of gender equality – political. 2014 65 . includes both variables. yet states are not always in conflict with these neighbors. wealth. 1993. and economic – gender equality is an important predictor of a state’s level of international militarism. Welch & Thomas.Mary Caprioli social – is gained from self-empowerment. those states with higher levels of gender equality were less likely to rely on military force to settle international disputes. by itself be the cause of a nonstatic outcome’. 1995. Economic Equality The percent women in the labor force showed statistical significance in explaining state bellicosity. and democracy were controlled for. 1996). The significance of percent women in the labor force seems to indicate that participation in the workforce alone is sufficient to empower women. Furthermore.. alliances. When run separately. in that their domestic equality correlates with lower levels of international militarism. Gallagher. GENDERED CONFLICT Number of Alliance Partners This variable showed statistical significance in all four logistic regressions. therefore. 1996. for example. The fewer the number of alliance partners. social. Morgan & Campbell..11 indicating that countries with higher levels of wealth as measured by real GDP per capita are less likely to rely on military solutions to international disputes. 1996: 23). contiguity is linked with economic interdependence (Russett. being able to choose the number of children to have or deciding how far apart to space births. because every state has neighbors. Control Variables Number of Neighbors Contiguity shows no statistical significance. 1993.

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