Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250

DOI 10.1007/s11562-009-0096-9

The making of public Islam: piety, agency,

and commodification on the landscape of the Indonesian
public sphere
Noorhaidi Hasan

Published online: 24 October 2009

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Over the last three decades, Islam has demonstrated its vitality as a system
of symbolic and collective identity that informs the social and political dynamics of
Indonesian society. It has increasingly served as the most important frame of
reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political and cultural
system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable
development. Keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam among the
emerging Indonesian Muslim middle class, it has even gradually emerged as a
symbol of elitism, associated with the road to success. Its strength lies in the fact that
it has developed into some sort of network that enables large numbers of people
from different social backgrounds to share and make contacts, both real and virtual.
Through this network, the Islamic revival messages have resonated loudly,
influencing multiple social and political fields. The network, in turn, provides
credible paths for upward mobility and also a market for commercial products.
Keywords Islam . Indonesia . Identity . Network . Commodification

Introduction
The fact that Islam has become more publicly visible and articulate as Indonesia
went through a process of modernization and globalization constitutes one of the
most remarkable developments currently occurring in the worlds largest populous
Muslim country (Hefner 2000; Lukens-Bull 2005; Azra 2004). Over the last three

N. Hasan (*)
Post-Graduate Faculty, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University,
Jl. Marsda Adisucipto, Yogyakarta, Indonesia 55281
e-mail: Noorhaidi@hotmail.com

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decades, it has demonstrated its vitality as a system of symbolic and collective

identity that informs the social and political dynamics of the Indonesian society,
more than 80 per cent of whom are adherents of Islam. In tandem with the seemingly
rising consciousness of Indonesian Muslims to demonstrate their religious self in the
public sphere, Islam has increasingly moved to the centre and become part of
political expressions, legal transactions, economic activities, as well as social and
cultural practices. It has even emerged as a rallying cry behind the major social and
political changes in the aftermath of the collapse of the Suharto-led New Order
regime in May 1998, marked by mounting demands for the comprehensive
implementation of the sharia (Islamic law) (Hasan 2006; Abuza 2007). The calls
for the sharia which function as the discursive medium for envisioning Islam as an
alternative to the existing systems have to some extent materialized with the
enactment of sharia bylaws (perda) in several provinces and districts in Indonesia,
including Aceh, Solok, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Maros, Gowa, Bulukumba, and
Martapura (Salim 2007; Bush 2008).
The rising tide of Islamic militancy in the Indonesian public sphere has
corresponded with the accentuation of religious symbols and the proliferation of
Islamic institutions and new life-styles. Marvellous mosques with new styles of
architecture have been constructedand they are full of congregations attending
collective daily and Friday prayers as well as Quranic reading sessions (pengajian).
More and more people are performing the hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca, some of whom
travel on expensive tour packages offering five-star services. Typical Muslim
fashions, such as jilbab (headscarf) for women and baju koko (Muslim shirts) for
men with their trendy and colourful styles, have sprung up and begun to dominate
the cultural landscape of every corner of the country. Special makeup and skin
products with the halal label are largely advertised and sold both in traditional
markets and in the Muslim section of luxury goods department stores.1 Complementing the more traditional Islamic qashida music, nashid has gone to the top of
the national popular music charts. It is a form of religious singing to praise God and
the Prophet Muhammad, whose style can vary from pop music, using drums and
electric guitars, to reggae music.
Islamic print media, such as magazines, bulletins, pamphlets, books, and novels,
have achieved prominence.2 Radio and television channels have competed to
broadcast dawa (Islamic proselytizing) programmes, including Islamic soap opera
series. New dawa genres, such as cyber dawa and cellular dawa, have offered
instant religious messages through the SMS and web-based services, which serve to
bring Islam into the everyday life and personal convenience, accessibility and
immediacy (Fealy 2008). The so-called integrated and quality Islamic schools have
expanded with full-time and boarding school system. Side-by-side with institutions
for collecting an increasingly large sum of religious alms and donations, Islamic
financial institutions, including Islamic banks (also known as Sharia banks), Islamic
insurance (Takaful), Islamic peoples credit unions (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat
Syariah), and Islamic houses of treasury (Bait al-Mal wa al-Tamwil), have
1

Halal is an Arabic term meaning "permissible". It refers to anything that is permissible under Islam.
Dawa is derived from the Arabic root daa, to call, which generally refers to the proselytizing that is
incumbent upon every Muslim.
2

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flourished across the country, reaching remote areas of villages in the countryside
(Juoro 2008; Sakai 2008).
The development of an Islamic pop culture has taken place in Indonesia where
Islam has become part of an extensive consumer culture and served as much an
important identity marker as a sign of social status and political affiliation. It has
even gradually emerged as a symbol of elitism, associated with the road to success.
Its strength lies in the fact that it has developed into some sort of network that
enables large numbers of people from different social backgrounds to share and
make contacts, both real and virtual. Through this network, the global Islamic
revival messages have resonated loudly, influencing multiple social and political
fields and encouraging a collective identity. Purchasing a cheap pamphlet from a
street vendor on proper Islamic dress for women, watching an Islamic soap opera,
veiling, attending study circles with popular preachers, or making the pilgrimage to
Mecca link an individual, indirectly perhaps, to a larger social group and umma
(global Muslim community) in a general sense. The network, in turn, provides
credible paths for upward mobility and also a market for commercial products.
This paper examines the transformation of Indonesian Islam towards the creation
of new Islamic public spaces and markets that open up a realm of opportunities for
emerging Muslim youth, intellectuals, middle classes, and professional groups to
seek the visibility and legitimacy in the national public sphere. Through a study of
relevant literature, observations and in-depth interviews, it discusses the way Islam
carves out a public space of its own, in conformity with the requirements of Muslim
faith and embodied in new Islamic language styles, corporeal rituals as well as
spatial and bodily practices. It also examines the cultural process of religious
commodification, occurring through an intensive commercialization of symbolic
religious goods.

Islamic resurgence
Despite Suhartos New Order steadfast determination to marginalize potential
sources of Islamic political power, Islam has begun to gain a spectacular presence
in the public lives and debates of Indonesian Muslim society in the mid-1970s. In
the states attempt to maintain a delicate balance and eradicate the remaining forces
of alleged communists, it acknowledged and to some extent encouraged the
proselytizing of Islamic moral and the promotion of personal piety among the
population (Pranowo 1994). Within this context it accommodated Islamic interests
by supporting a wide variety of Islamic institutions. As Islam was seen as the key to
maintaining an ethical and disciplined society, the policy to enhance dawa was also
deemed crucial to mobilize peoples support for the accelerated process of
development (Hefner 1993; Brenner 1996). In fact, it is intensifying as Indonesia
becomes increasingly integrated into the rest of the Muslim world, which has
witnessed the failure of its ruling regimes to cope with widespread poverty,
unemployment and corruption. Amid the growing resentment toward the blatant
opportunism of government functionaries and elites unabashed displays of wealth
and power, various forms of religious activity, including halqas (Islamic study
circle) and dauras (workshop), flourished across the country and provided an

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opportunity for a younger generation of Muslims to learn and discuss Islamic texts
so as to better comprehend their meaning and their relevance to daily life. The
activities were prominently visible and assertive among university students, who
were looking for a viable alternative to deal with current challenges and difficulties.3
This so-called Campus-Islam phenomenon started with mosque-based dawa
activities pioneered by youth activists of the Salman Mosque of the Institute of
Technology in Bandung. Under the leadership of Imaduddin Abdurrachim, who had
been appointed the general secretary of the Kuwait-based International Islamic
Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), they introduced the programme of the
Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training of Dawa Strivers), which was aimed at training
new cadres among university students prepared to undertake dawa activities (Husin
1988; Rosyad 2006). Thanks to the support of Muhammad Natsir, the programme
developed very fast. He was the leader of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia
(Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), a dawa organization which served as
the local representative of the Saudi Arabia-based Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (the
Muslim World League) responsible for the institutionalization of the kingdoms
influence in cultural and religious activities all over the Muslim world.4 The Dewan
Dakwah not only provided a model for Islamic activism on college campuses, but
also facilitated the popularity of a variety of programmes for the study of Islam
organized by religious activity units. These include Mentoring Islam (Islamic
Courses) and Studi Islam Terpadu (Integrated Study of Islam) (Aziz et al. 1989;
Rosyad 2006).
Suhartos depoliticization of university campuses through the implementation of a
restrictive policy known as the Normalization of Campus Life (Normalisasi
Kehidupan Kampus) in 1978 prohibited university students from playing an active
part in politics. This policy stimulated growing numbers of students to turn toward
Islamic dawa activities. In tandem with the efflorescence of the so-called campus
Islam phenomenon, the slogan Islam is the solution began to gain ground among
Indonesian Muslims. This vague call puts an emphasis on the need to return to the
model of the Prophet Muhammad and the example of the first generation of Muslims
(Salaf al-Salih), considered to be the purist form of Islam. In this context Islam is
underscored as a complete system governing all religious, social, political, cultural
and economic orders and encompassing all things material, spiritual, societal,
individual, and personal. Battles over dress, morality, marriage, celebrations,
entertainment, sexuality, and faith as well as conflicts over governance and law are
thus at the centre of the call (Ayubi 1991; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Azra 1996
and Kepel 2002).
The growth of the Islamic activism among university students reached its pinnacle
following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. There can be little doubt that the spirit and
euphoria inspired by the success of the revolution affected Muslims around the
world. The revolution provided not only an inspiration, but also a blueprint for
Halqa, literally meaning circle, is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which an ustadh, a
teacher or preacher, gives lessons based on certain books and his participants sit around him to hear and
scrutinize his lessons. It is distinct from daura, literally meaning turn, which is a type of workshop held
for a period ranging from one week to one month, during which its participants gather and stay in one
place and follow all the designed programs.
4
On the Rabitat, see Schulze (1990: 215-216) and Kepel (2002: 46).
3

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Muslims to struggle for the creation of Islamic states. In the years that followed, they
saw the so-called Islamic resurgence, marked by an increasing prominence and
politicization of Islamic ideologies and symbols in Muslim societies and in the
public life of Muslim individuals (Dessouki 1982: 4; Esposito 1983: 1720). The
impact of the revolution affected Indonesia too. More and more people are becoming
so keen in their endeavours to cleanse and purify society from the alleged vices
and evils of modernity and to lead their lives according to Islamic ideological and
social values (Naipaul 1981: 350). The revolution convinced many young
Indonesian Muslims, especially university students, about the strength of Islam as
an ideology that could challenge established world orders (Jones 1980). Admiration
toward Khomeini as the leader of the revolution was remarkably widespread and his
close-up photos were hung on the wall of young Muslim activists rooms and youth
organizations offices. Some female activists did not hesitate to adopt enveloping
black clothes popular among Iranian women.
The spread of the Iranian influence was reinforced by the distribution of books by
Shiite authors, including Ayatollah Khomeini, Murtada Mutahhari, and Ali Shariati.
Their ideas of a revolutionary Islam, defending the rights of the weak and oppressed
(mustad`afin) and recognizing women as subjects and political actors, and the
allegorical interpretations of the Quran and other scriptures became a source of
admiration among many young people. Thousands of them reportedly converted to
become the followers of the Shii movement (Bruinessen 2002; see also Zainuddin
and Basyar 2000). Interestingly the ideas of the Shii thinkers spread side-by-side
with those by Sunni Islamist ideologues, such as Hasan al-Banna, Abul Ala
al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Mustafa al-Shibai (Aziz 1995; Rosyad 2006;
Damanik, 2002). This situation undoubtedly provided a precondition for the growing
influence of a new variant of Islam imbued with the zeal to set up a society of
upright, moral, pious individuals who have a thorough understanding of Islam and a
desire to live according to its principles.
The campus variant of the orthodox Islam emphasizes the formalization of
religious expressions and the need to establish an exclusive moral order
characterized by a strong commitment to Islamic beliefs, rituals, religious devotion
and experiential religiosity.5 Concern with the basic faith (tawhid) was expressed as
the most important aspect of Islam and the foundation of all Muslim thoughts and
activities. It constitutes a complete system of life on the basis of which behaviour,
language, and dress codes are ideally regulated. The concept of the totality of Islam
in turn required young Muslim activists to make their religious difference visible in
public through micro-practices. Not only did they prefer to wear Muslim dress, as
indicated before. They also began to address their fellow activists with Arabic terms,
such as akhi-ukhti (brother-sister), or ana-antum (me-you). The emphasis on Arabic
symbols manifested in the current of the campus Islam provoked reactions from
moderate Muslim leaders. Abdurrahman Wahid, the former leader of the Nahdlatul
Ulama and Indonesian president, for instance, has actively campaigned for what he
calls pribumisasi (indigenisation) of Islam since the 1980s. In his opinion, Islam has
spread to Indonesia not to destroy the wealth of traditions and local cultures of
Indonesians and the minority rights. But it appears to be the part of the traditions and
5

On the definition and discussion of religious orthodoxy, see Hassan (2007).

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cultures, which together function to strengthen the national identity of Indonesians

(Wahid 1998).
Despite this criticism, the campus variant of the orthodox Islam has continued to
spread. Based on the concept of the totality of Islam, it insists that to be Muslim
alone is not enough to guarantee success in dealing with future challenges. There is
no choice for any Muslim but to become a Muslim kaffah (total Muslim) that
practices and applies Islam in all aspects of his life. The identity as a total Muslim is
quite crucial, in a sense a Muslim cannot be considered a (faithful) Muslim without
believing in and applying the totality of Islam. A total Muslim is in turn required to
show his commitment to uphold the principle of amar maruf nahy munkar, a
Quranic phrase meaning enjoining good and opposing vice and become the most
committed defender of Islam.6 Unlike the earlier reformist Muslim organizations
such as the Muhammadiyah and the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), the campus
variant of the orthodox Islam not only emphasizes an internal Muslim transformation
in response to the challenges of the globalizing world. It also requires Muslims
commitment to the sharia as a holistic, totalizing system whose prescriptions
permeate every aspect of daily life. It is believed that this commitment is badly
needed in a situation when Islam is under attack by the Western world, glossed
variously as secularism, a Jewish conspiracy, communism, Christianization, and
American domination. This variant of the orthodox Islam is indeed indubitably
associated with the mounting significance of Islamism which calls for the
establishment of an Islamic political order and reinforces the notion of a single
Muslim community (the umma).
The governments attempts to accelerate the process of modernization and
globalization which paved the way for mass education and urbanization may help
explain the appeal for such a strictly ordered life. Even though this process has
opened up social, economic, and cultural possibilities, it has simultaneously ushered
in a plethora of problems and uncertainties that were previously undreamed of and
insurmountable by individuals or even communities (Giddens 1990). No doubt, it
has created a risk society facing the problem of dysfunctional, dangerous, and
sometimes life-threatening environments.7 Especially for youth who live in a phase
of in-between and have to be mobile, ready to reap opportunities, living in such a
condition is often frustrating. The core of the problems lies in the fact that the
horizon for upward mobility is quite limited (Leccardi and Ruspini 2006). The
government has seemingly failed to balance the supply of and demand for workers,
engendering rising competition in job markets. Exacerbating the feeling of
dispossession afflicting many people is the climate of widespread corruption,
economic stagnation, and bureaucratic incompetence.
Within this context youth appeared to be the pioneers that played a pivotal role in
intensifying dawa activities, either in mosques or other religious venues. Under the
auspices of various mosque-based youth associations, they developed mosques
function, no longer simply as places to pray, but also as centres for a diverse set of
religious-social activities, including Quran learning sessions, seminars, workshops,
discussions, religious festivals, and various associations. Those participating in these
6
7

For this term, see Cook (2001).

On the concept of risk society see Beck (1992).

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activities have been provided with updates of the latest issues around the Muslim
world, especially conflict in the Middle East, plus various religious texts and
pamphlets distributed free of charge, and this resulted in an increase in antiChristianization and Zionist sentiments (Bruinessen 1994; Siegel 2000). The Dewan
Dakwah, which enjoyed generous financial support from the Rabitat al-Alam
al-Islami, facilitated the dispatching of young talented Muslim preachers to study in
the Middle East, who were upon return expected to spearhead the expansion of
dawa activities to reach remote areas in the countryside.8 This attempt accelerated
the process of Islamization in the hinterlands of Java and other Indonesian islands,
believed to be the bastions of the abangan (nominal Muslim) culture.9 There,
mosques have also been constructed, complete with madrasas (Islamic school)
teaching exclusively Islamic subjects, often under the sponsorship of Middle Eastern
funding foundations (Hasan 2006).
It was not until the shift of state policy towards political Islam, however, that the
influence of the Arabised version of the orthodox Islam reached a large segment of
Indonesians and facilitated a significant greening (Islamicizing) of the country. At
the end of the 1980s Suharto introduced an Islamisation strategy focusing
particularly on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse and
accommodating religious socio-political powers. In this context, the Directorate
General of Elementary and Secondary Education, for instance, issued a new
regulation on student uniforms, allowing female students to wear jilbab while
attending school. This regulation automatically overturned the state ban on veiling in
public school. Over the first two decades of Suhartos rule, veiling was linked with
forms of Islam deemed threatening to political stability of the state (Brenner 1996:
676). Interestingly, Suharto himself and his family went to Mecca to perform the hajj
pilgrimage in 1991. Upon return from Mecca, Mbak Tutut, Suhartos eldest daughter
and a popular figure, began to demonstrate her piety publicly by wearing colourful,
elegant jilbab. The model and the way she was wearing her jilbab provided the
ultimate example for the whole nation (Marcoes-Natsir 2004). Since then cabinet
members and high ranking officials have no longer hesitated to declare the Islamic
greeting, assalamualaikum, in the opening passage of their speeches and this
greeting is becoming increasingly popular. They also sought to demonstrate their
concern with various Islamic affairs by, for instance, participating in religious
festivals and celebrations. During the Ramadan month, they even competed to
8

Interview with Misbach Malim, the head of secretariat bureau of DDII, February 2003.
I use the term santri and abangan in reference to the concept introduced by the American anthropologist
Clifford Geertz, who divides Javanese societythe majority of Indonesian Muslimsinto santri,
abangan, and priyayi. In a simple way, the term santri is applied to puritanical Muslims committed to a
more or less normative profession of the faith, as opposed to the abangan, nominal Muslims, who felt
comfortable with local customs influenced by Animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. See Geertz (1960).
Despite some criticisms, I consider this concept still relevant to understand Indonesian Islam. The
opposing concepts santri and abangan can be used to look at two competing extremes in the religious
understanding and praxis of Indonesians. Although the current of Islamization has increasingly forced
Indonesians to identify themselves as santri and its religios symbols, resistences against the on-going
penetration of an orthodox version of Islam that is puritan, inflexible, anti-feminist, intolerant of other
cultures and faith, rejecting of local culture and opposed to mysticism continue to take place. As Ricklefs
(2008) points out, between these two extremes we can see multiple combinations and permutations of
them.

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conduct the so-called Safari Ramadan, a tour of mosques and participation in

collective prayers across the country utilizing the heightened religious atmosphere of
the fasting month of Muslims.
A number of organizations and institutions that made use of Islamic symbols
appeared on the scene, including the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesian
(Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association, ICMI), which was established under
Suhartos patronage (Hefner 1993). The ruling party, Golkar, began to align its cloak
with Islam as more and more Muslim intellectuals and bureaucrats were absorbed
into its body. While thousands of mosques were built under the sponsorship of the
state, the Islamic Court Bill was introduced, followed by the Presidential Decree on
the Compilation of Islamic Law.10 The Bank Muamalat Indonesia which holds as its
slogan the words pertama sesuai syariah, or the first [bank in Indonesia] in
accordance with the sharia was set up and its establishment initiated the
mushrooming of sharia banks and insurance companies (Liddle 1996; Bruinessen
1996; Mller 2005).

Public Islam
Suhartos openness towards Islam provided the opportunity for an emerging
generation of Muslim middle class to exhibit Islamic symbols and languages more
explicitly in the Indonesian public sphere. They were educated Muslims from the
santri (devout Muslim) background who enjoyed upward mobility owing to the
mass education initiated by Suharto in 1969. Some of them were no doubt CampusIslam products, who had been spread into various sectors of governmental services
and modern business structures (Mahasin 1990). Witnessing the shift of the state
attitude towards Islam, they initiated various activities aimed at demonstrating the
victory of Islam as the solution to all current problems. As they believed that religion
could play a significant role in the public arena, they were highly assertive in their
efforts to implement various Islamic visions in the educational, social, economic,
and political spheres. They were also concerned with expanding economic
development, adopting high technology, and using new media as a means to
communicate their visions and messages.
Sociologist Jose Casanova (1994) was the first to note the revival of religions in
the public life of the modern world. He challenged the secularization thesis,
indicating how religions have undergone a process of repoliticisation and
deprivatisation and played a concrete role in directing the transition from
authoritarianism to democracy and in intervening in the public debates, and thus
contributing to the growth of civil society. Despite its focus on Spain, Poland, Brazil,
and the United States, this observation is certainly not confined to Catholicism and
Protestantism. Its horizons can be widened to include other parts of the world living
with other religious traditions, such as Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism. Salvatore and
Eickelman (2004), for instance, observe the appearance of so called public Islam
in the Muslim world, an Islamic public sphere which enables a large segment of
10

The passing of this bill reinforced the existence of the Islamic courts within the Indonesian legal system.
Previously, it ranked the second class court after the public, military, and administrative courts.

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diverse Muslims to make their voices heard in civic debate and public life, thus
facilitating modern and distinctively open senses of political and religious identity.
In a changing socio-political atmosphere at that time intellectuals like Nurcholish
Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, to mention but a few names, sought to contextualize
Islam by adopting a more inclusive approach, particularly evident in the way they
expressed their socio-political ideas and endeavours to realize the socio-political
objectives of Islam. They were at the forefront of proposing interpretations of Islam
which did not necessarily clash with the interests of the Indonesian nation-state, in
such a way that they assured a relatively easy relationship between Islamic-ness and
Indonesia-ness. They translated Islamic teachings into several agendas pertinent to the
interests of Indonesian society in general, covering a number of broader issues such as
democratization, religious and political tolerance, socio-economic egalitarianism, and
political emancipation (Abdillah 1997; Effendy 2003).
The pioneering efforts of both intellectuals to contextualize Islamic teachings have
had a direct impact on the societal discourse of the Indonesian Muslims. Debates and
discussions on Islam and its relatedness with various aspects of life have abounded in
mosques, markets, offices, universities, schools, as well as newspapers, magazines,
and televisions, and involved (retired) high-ranking officials, executives, professionals, artists and other members of the middle class. Unlike religious discussions
held in traditional Islamic school (pesantren), which constitutes a typical Islamic
boarding school run and often owned by an individual religious teacher (kyai), the
debates rarely made a reference to classical Islamic discourses. While the pesantren
requires its students to master Islamic subjects using the kitab kuning (yellow books,
referring to classical Arabic texts) (Bruinessen 1990; Dhofier 1999; Lukens-Bull
2005), new centres of Islamic teaching that thrived among urban middle class are
inclined to offer a sort of instant Islam and practical guide much needed by
participants for their everyday life.11 Relying on any accessible texts, the debates
were yet assertive in an attempt to objectify religious messages. What Eickelman
(1992; 1999) calls objectification process signifies the emergence of a distinctive
style of religious activism oriented to a broad, mass educated (national) public
rather than a narrow circle of religious adepts (Hefner 1997).
The rising consciousness of the new Muslim middle class to engage in debating
and objectifying their religion entailed the availability of religious spaces in the
urban landscape of metropolitan and big cities. In view of the growing demands for
such spaces, governmental and business offices built mosques and musallas, small
places to pray. Elite housing complexes and shopping centres provided meeting
places for listening to public lectures on Islam (majlis talim). Convention centres
and five star hotels advertised venues for religious programmes and Islamic study
packages. Luxury Islamic centres, with a big mosque as the main building and
surrounded by training and educational buildings, shops, and a hotel, have been built
on huge pieces of land in big cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar. In those
sites the new Muslim middle class came to engage in reciting the Quran, chanting
dhikr (confession of the faith), and the like, while discussing various aspects of
Islam. In this way Indonesian Islam has experienced a process of gentrification in
11
Observation in Paramadinas executive Islamic class, September 2006, and interviews with M. Rahmat
and Bambang Isnanto, participants of the class, September 2006.

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favour of global high-technology and consumerist Islamic appetites (Abaza 2004).

While dawa has somehow become urbanized, new creative agents and young,
popular preachers emerged and worked in both public and private settings. They
offered a variety of innovative dawa programmes in the interests of the new Muslim
middle class.
One remarkable effect of these developments is the proliferation of forms of piety
that seem congruous with the principle of individual freedom and democracy, and
apart from their traditional religious mooring. Islam in presented in a way that is
sophisticated, fresh and hybrid in order to make it an appealing alternative to urban,
capitalist cultures. A sense of personalized Muslimhood has arisen out of this
context and allows an individual to demonstrate his religious identity through bodily
purchased practices and goods (White 2005; Bayat 2007). The Muslimhood model
provides both a challenge and an opportunity to rethink the established boundaries
between the private and the public. Now individual can choose a widened range of
options among a wide assortment of religious representations, both the traditional
and the secular, manufactured, packaged, and sold by specialized service agencies.
The free choice, in turn, provides the individuals an opportunity to patch together the
religious fragments into a subjectively meaningful whole and transform them into a
powerful symbol to act in public. It is worth noting that the spread of such forms of
piety have apparently never been pervasive as it is, if not bolstered by the development
of mass media. As Habermas put it, mass media, publicity, and spectacle constitute the
forms that drive the culture-consuming public that has significantly displaced the
culture-debating publics of earlier periods (Habermas 1991).

Piety and agency

The pioneer that offered the means for cosmopolitan Muslims to explore and enjoy the
magnificence of their faith was Paramadina, an Islamic non-governmental
organization established by the prominent theologian Nurcholish Madjid and a number
of other progressive Muslim intellectuals in collaboration with Muslim entrepreneurs.12
An independent organization, Paramadina is culturally oriented and committed to
openness, in the sense that it is not inclined to politics, but rather asserts Islam as a
cultural power that can provide alternatives and answers to contemporary challenges,
without falling into the trap of exclusivity. It maintains an approach that can be
characterized as nationalistic-Islamic, promoting Islamic revivalism within the
context of Indonesia where Islam has been accepted and practiced broadly as a
primary source of building common values. Islam is thus presented as a main source
for Indonesian values, yet also as a culturally productive force that can aid the
development of constructive alternatives for the nation (Hasan 2000; Bakti 2004).
Located in the prestigious middle-class suburb of Pondok Indah in the southern
part of Jakarta, Paramadina has launched the so-called Paramadina Eksekutif,
intensive Islamic courses specifically designed for executives, professionals,
practitioners, functionaries and other members of the upper-middle class. The
12

These include Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, Abdul Latief, and Fahmi Idris, all of whom came
from the HMI, Indonesian Muslim Student Association, background.

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courses resemble university lectures or workshops and take place in prestigious

venues, such as five-star hotels and convention centres. A limited number of
participants are required to register and they pay a significant amount of money.
Paramadina has also offered short courses and public lectures on various aspects of
classical Islam, the relation between Islam and politics, Islam and gender issues, and
inter-religious harmony. Interestingly perhaps, it has accommodated elements of
Sufism, which is frequently associated with traditional Islam, into its curriculum
(Howell 2001). One particular course of Sufism comprising six lectures on Sufi
thought and practices has even been offered and this course attracted a large number
of participants. This kind of phenomenon exemplifies the growing popularity of
what Bayat (2002) refers to as post-Islamist piety. Being marked and framed by the
taste and style of the rich and kept away from the traditional mosques located in the
lower class area, it enables the upper middle class to be pious while maintaining their
power and prestige.
The success of Paramadina inspired the emergence of similar foundations, such as
Tazkiya Sejati, IIMAN (Indonesian Islamic Media Network), and ICNIS (Intensive
Course and Networking for Islamic Sciences). Tazkiya Sejati has specifically
developed contemplative reading circles and religious sessions oriented to members
of the upper middle class in Jakarta. Set up in 1997 by Jalaluddin Rahmat, an
Australian university graduate and celebrated lecturer of communication at the
Padjadjaran University of Bandung, this foundation focuses on the introduction of
Islam by offering a series of Islamic courses, with a particular emphasis on Sufism
(Howell 2001). Based in Patra Kuningan, an elite area in Jakarta, it has been closely
associated with the Shiite-inclined Muthahhari Foundation, which exposes the theme
For the Enlightenment of Islamic Thought. IIMAN and ICNIS, which also offer
broadly based courses on Islam with a component on Sufism and programmes of
instruction in devotional exercises, are slightly different in nature. Both do not rely
on particular figures, but mainly act as the facilitator making their own choices of
whom they will invite to lecture and how they adapt materials of interest to them
(Howell 2001).
Complementing the proliferation of the new dawa institutions that provide an
outlet for urban Muslim middle class who felt a sort of spiritual void, many young
preachers came to the centre stage to engrave themselves as the most rising religious
actors and celebrities whose faces often appear on Indonesian TV screens. By
performing in interactive communication skills on TV screens, they have become the
marketing agent through which Islamic symbols and messages are offered and
transmitted for mass consumption. This so-called Islamic televangelism has made
religion more acceptable to a larger audiences, and hence has become more popular
(Muzakki 2008; Howell 2008). It is worth noting that unlike the previous popular
preachers who were academically trained in the traditional Islamic school
(pesantren), they studied economics, political sciences and communication, among
other disciplines, in secular universities. But no doubt, they have the capability in
mass communication and this allows them to move from the lower or middle class to
the upper in socio-religious hierarchy and thus become a new group of religious elite
(Howell 2008; Muzakki 2008).
One such example is Abdullah Gymnastiar, more commonly referred to as Aa
Gym, who played a crucial role in intensifying the expansion of urban dawa

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activities by utilizing a new political climate in the aftermath of the fall of Suharto in
1998. A far-reaching process of democratization and liberalization that followed
facilitated a sudden flowering of the press and new television channels. With his
masterful command of the media and the availability of new technology he has
organized religious lectures and sessions, and, thus, marketed the beauty of Islam
(Watson 2005). Aa Gym is the founder of the Darut Tauhid pesantren in Bandung,
West Java, in 1987, and a young talented preacher trained in economics and
technical courses at the Padjadjaran University and Ahmad Yani University
respectively, both in Bandung. Being more interested in Islamic knowledge,
however, he never finished his degree. Instead, he studied Islam with a number of
traditional ulama (Gymnastiar 2006). Aa Gym claims that the Darut Tauhids
primary mission is to facilitate the development of Islamic educational, economic,
social, and cultural activities. It aspires to become a miniature of society where
Islamic teachings can be practiced and enriched by education, training, management,
art and culture, economy and technology initiatives and its benefits can be felt by the
Muslim umma (Darut Tauhid 2000).
The basic doctrine of Darut Tauhid includes dhikr (confession of faith), fikr
(thinking), and ikhtiyar (free choice). Among the Darut Tauhid members dhikr is the
primary principle on which Muslims should rely, in the sense that God is the only
focus and target in Muslim activities. Aa Gym, however, argues dhikr alone is not
enough; Muslims should also think and optimize Muslim initiatives and efforts to
compete in a challenging era. Dhikr, fikr, and ikhtiyar are thus the three key
principles that should be taken into account by all members of the Darut Tauhids
community. This method is called by Aa Gym Manajemen Qalbu (the
management of heart). The basic notion is to manage and maintain purity of heart
in the way of knowing God (Gymnastiar 2005a, b). With his characteristic style
baju koko, sarong and typical (Aa Gym) turbanand admirable rhetoric, he delivers
his sermons, which are rather emotional and frequently move people to tears. He
believes that spiritual values such as patience, generosity, resignation and honesty,
once nurtured, will pour out of peoples hearts (Gymnastiar 2005a, b). Only recently
has Aa Gyms fame been shaken and with that, his business empire started to
crumble, as a result of his decision to take a second wife (Hoesterey 2008).
Muhammad Arifin Ilham followed in the footsteps Aa Gym had initiated and
surpassed his predecessor as the most rising celebrity preacher. He engraved his
name in the Indonesian media as a charismatic, young preacher who further
popularized dhikr, claimed to be the only effective way to purify Muslims hearts,
and thus the solution to the spiritual, moral, cultural, and social backwardness of the
umma. Dhikr is considered the foundation of any struggle of Muslims. Ilham argues
that whatever Muslims attempt to do will be fruitless unless it is based on the purity
of their hearts (Ilham 2004). Under the auspices of the Majlis al-Dhikra (dhikr
council) set up in 1997, he organized mass dhikr programmes (dhikr akbar)
throughout Indonesia. In those programmes thousands of people gather in one big
mosque and sit together to recite certain formulas of dhikr led by Ilham himself.
These programmes were also aired broadly by several private television channels.
On one occasion he led such a programme with the presence of the then Vice
President of Indonesia, Hamzah Haz, and a number of other high-ranking officials.
This programme was entitled Reciting Dhikr for My Country and taken place in

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241

Indonesias largest mosque, Istiqlal, in August 2003 (Ilham and Yakin 2004). Over
the last three years Ilham has regularly appeared on various national television
channels presenting short lectures on Islam. He also has been the host of Saturdays
morning lecture at TPI, a private television channel that belongs to Mbak Tutut, and
of several radio programmes. Ilham is a graduate of political science at the National
University of Jakarta. His insights into Islam were forged when he enrolled in a
modern Islamic boarding school in Jakarta. His name skyrocketed, as he himself
claimed, after he recovered from a ten-day coma after being bitten by his own
poisonous snake (Yakin 2003).
Another young, popular preacher, Jeffry al-Buchori, began his career just recently
but succeeded in putting himself on the map of the most popular Indonesian
religious figures. With his outstanding rhetoric and ability to recite the Quran
fluently he mesmerizes congregations of Islamic sessions and religious gatherings
held on various occasions and aired by different national television channels. He is
known as a friendly religious teacher (ustadh gaul), who prefers to address his
congregation not only with assalamualaikum but also with friendly greetings
popular among urban youth, such as Hello Friends! or Hello Choy! Wearing his
distinctive baju koko motifs and white cap, he also appears on television screens
almost every day, delivering short religious lectures full of improvisations.
Sometimes he sings and laughs and another time he cries. He works with the
slogan have fun with religious wisdom. Under the auspices of the Majlis Mim, he
serves as the host of numerous religious programmes on television, including I like
Monday aired every Monday (Bakri et al. 2005). It is important to note that he grew
up as a delinquent youth addicted to drugs. Having completed his primary and
secondary education in an Islamic school in Tangerang, he went to a private
communication school in Jakarta to study broadcasting. Here he became acquainted
with night-club life spending most of his time in discotheques, casinos and other
reputed dens of iniquity. In 2000 he claimed a new reborn and decided to return to a
normal life. He made his debut on television in 2003 after having delivered religious
lectures from one mosque to another (Samantha 2005).

Commodifying Islam
The emergence of a new breed of young, celebrity preachers engaged in the production
of various religious programmes on TV has significantly changed the face of Islam in
the Indonesian public sphere. Islam appears to be no longer simply a set of rituals,
beliefs and doctrines, but it is also a symbolic commodity relevant to social class
demands for lifestyle, modesty and enjoyment. In sociological debates on this sort of
phenomenon, consumption in the modern age is conceptualized as one of the most
crucial, defining experiences of the class. It is also an expression of identity and
representation of the self. This is related to the notion of embodiment which suggests
that all the fundamental processes of conception, perception, evaluation and
judgement are connected to the fact that human beings are embodied social agents
(Turner 1994). Since religion has even gradually emerged as a symbol of elitism
associated with the road to success, a statement of ones personal identity can involve
the use and consumption of religious symbols, as happened in the Indonesian public

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sphere friendly to Islam. Through the diverse creative agents of the urban dawa the
symbols have become commodified in conformity with ones social status. Miller
(2004) suggested that commodifying religion has reduced religious beliefs, symbols,
and values into free-floating signifiers to be consumed like anything else. As such, it
takes them from their original contexts and throws them into a cultural marketplace
where they can be embraced in a shallow fashion but not put into practice.
Here my concern is not with the impurity or in-authenticity of commodifying
Islam as presented by the new dawa agents. Religious commodification should not
be confused with commercialization. It is not a phenomenon that exists solely to
make money. Religious commodification entails ideologization of commodities and
commoditization of religion, as it is as much about selling ideology as it is about
selling products (Lukens-Bull 2008). Religious commodification has in fact very much
to do with the way religion, in this case Islam, is packaged and offered to a broader
audience and how this has served to produce a framework for the moral order of society
through the objectification and systematization of Islamic values and practices as a
normative model. Through the process of commodification dawa appears to be more
impressive and, at the same time, modern, progressive, and inclusive. It is no longer
dominated by long homilies on religious doctrines and the life in the hereafter, or calls
for a return to true Islam which nurtures some hatred of global popular culture trends,
which is claimed to have led to the moral decline of Muslims and threatened Islamic
cultural values, and which is thus conventional, rigid, and exclusive in character. In
other words, dawa is now imbued with practical messages about the way to live in
harmony delivered through Islamic study programmes packaged in interactive
discussions or features in newspaper and Islamic soap operas on TV.
The growing interest of the upper middle class in the current wave of urban dawa
activities has radiated into a large segment of diverse Indonesian Muslims, and this
means market opportunities for commercial products related to these activities. It is
logical that while the new dawa agents are continuously challenged to develop
innovative models for their religious sessions, Indonesian fashion designers, the
garment industry and other business players are geared up to launch various
products. If Paramadina limited itself to publishing quality books and reading
materials or anthologies of Nurcholish Madjids speeches and lectures, Darut Tauhid,
which announced that economic development is the primary pillar of devotion to
God, made a step further by systematically developing economic activities. These
activities gradually expanded into such fields as garment production, supermarket,
publishing, and Islamic banking. Since 1997, the area of Gegerkalong, where Darut
Tauhids headquarters is located, has changed to become a Darut Tauhid village; full
of Islamic business symbols, including supermarket and Islamic cottage named
Darul Jannah, the House of Paradise, which offers a sort of spiritual vacation for
executives (Darut Tauhid 2000).13
Concern with the growth of market demands for so-called Islamic products as
well as economic empowerment for the Indonesian Muslims encouraged Ateng
Kusnadi, a Chinese convert and former banker, to establish Ahad-Net, the first
Sharia-based multi-level marketing in Indonesia, in 1997. The headquarters of this
institution is located in the area of Atrium Senen Business Center in Central Jakarta.
13

See Darut Tauhids Profile; for the updates see www.cybermq.com.

Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250

243

It has served as the national distributor of different kinds of Islamic products named
like Zahra, Wardah, Fairuz, Nazhif, al-Syifa, and Habbatussauda. These include
halal foods, skin, body and mouth care products, cosmetics, perfumes, herbals,
reading materials, comics and novels, toys, and VCDs (Ahad-Net 2005). Utilizing its
huge network, comprising 300 distributors and 220 thousand members acting as
consumers and retailers altogether, Ahad-Net could reach almost all parts of
Indonesia, from Aceh in Sumatra to Sorong in Papua, with more than 4 billion
rupiah cash-flow every month (Ahad-Net 2003).
Ahad-Net is an example of how the global multi-level marketing system invented
in the United States has been localized and somehow Islamized. It is claimed to be
the abbreviation of Al-Quran, Hadith (Prophetic Traditions), Akhirat (Hereafter),
Dunia (this world), and Network, indicating the mission of the institution to achieve
the balance between the life in this world and that in the hereafter, based on the
guidance of the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (Kusnadi 2004).
Ahad also means one, which is associated with the principle of tawhid (the Oneness)
in Islam, the first pillar of Muslim belief. With the slogan Economic Jihad for the
Prosperity of the Umma, Ahad-Net has operated to realize the five primary visions
that include: (1) conducting jihad or the ultimate struggle to revive the victorious
belief, economy, and politics of the Muslim umma; (2) emphasizing ukhuwwa or
solidarity to unite the Muslim umma; (3) taking al-Quran and the Hadith as the
basis of Muslims thought and praxis; (4) building the community concerned with
halal and tayyib (good) products; and (5) facilitating attempts to empower the
economy, behavior, and professionalism of the Muslim umma (Kusnadi 2004).14
The very existence of commercial agents for Islamic products has facilitated, for
instance, the transformation of jilbab into a new uniform for Indonesian Muslim
women. Various kinds of jilbab designed elegantly are available in commercial
markets. A sense of newness distinguishes this popular jilbab with the traditional
one which is often perceived by Western feminists as a symbol of womens oppression
especially in the context of a patriarchal society prioritising male interests in
government, law and the economy (Ingham and Dirgantoro 2007). Worn frequently
in combination with a long grey skirt or jeans, the new veil appears to be a symbol of
modern Muslim womanhood as expressed in varied modern environments. In helps
women deal with their own insecurities while moving into what were, just a few years
ago, predominantly male social spaces (Smith-Hefner 2007).

Islam on the new media

The intimate relationship between commodification and consumption require the
mediator that can act as the bridge that communicates and interlocks the interest of
both producers and consumers. To introduce their products to a broad market,
producers need to use the media, whereby consumers become aware of their
products. Frequently, media plays a crucial role in dictating market tendencies, by
mainstreaming certain fashion and lifestyle trends. The media itself has a direct
effect, i.e., the increase of audiences that need fresh references to the latest and most
14

Ibid; see also http://www.ahadnet.com.

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popular fashions and lifestyles. The significance of Islamic (print and electronic)
media lies in its capacity to accelerate the process of distributing and consuming
Islamic products, thus, the burgeoning of public Islam.
Print media that advertises Islamic pop culture began proliferating in Indonesia in
the mid-1980s. Its forerunner was perhaps the monthly Amanah, from the Arabic
word meaning trust, which has appeared regularly since its first edition in 1987
and contested the only pop culture magazine hitherto available in Indonesia, Kartini.
Unlike Kartini, however, Amanah displays beautiful female models wearing jilbab
on its covers, complete with features about the life experiences of young women or
models themselves when they decided to wear jilbab and left behind their previous
lifestyles.15 It also contains fiction around the psychological struggle of the women
when they acquired enlightenment and were born again as devoted Muslims. This
magazine targets women as its main audience, as it has special features on women,
family and children, plus consultation with specialists in the matters concerned. The
so-called true story is another permanent feature in Amanah, reporting primarily the
life experiences of Muslim converts and those atoning from their previous dark lives.
At the same time, Amanah serves as a window for its readers to get to know the
latest Islamic products. In addition to diverse advertisements, ranging from
cosmetics to housing and apartments with veiled women as models, it contains
special features, such as fashions, lifestyles, celebrities, Islamic soap operas, spiritual
experiences, and Islamic books. Choosing pop culture with luxury and expensive
performances, Amanah has succeeded in attracting a relatively established urban
Muslim middle class, and this has become the key to its continued existence amidst
the influx of new similar magazines.
In 1990 Annida, an Arabic word literally meaning call, appeared to deliberately
target the segment of Muslim teen girls hitherto untouched by any other
publications. Initially this magazine belonged almost exclusively to its founders,
Dadi Kusradi and Dwi Septiawati, who happened to be a couple, working with the
assistance of their staff, before it became associated with PT. Ummi Group Media,
which publishes the monthly Ummi. Annida has very much focused on fictions
exploring the life experiences of Muslim teen girls in the face of the hurly-burly and
temptations of modern urban life. Supportive in nature, these fictions attempt to
foster the piety of Muslim teen girls so that such good characteristics as honesty,
perseverance, and consistency are embedded in their daily life.16 Annida claims to
have five main missions that indicate its attempt to assist Muslim teen girls to
maintain their religious identity, on the one hand, and draw upon global popular
culture trends, on the other hand.17 It has become an example of how a synthesis is
created through cultural hybrid practices.18

15

For the profile of Amanah, see www.amanah.or.id.

For the profile of Annida,see www.ummigroup.co.id/annida.
17
These include (1) to introduce Muslim teen girls into Islamic values and provide readers with religious
insights; (2) to highlight the image of quality Islamic media and serve as the means for young, creative
talents to express themselves; (3) to provide standards of good conduct for Muslim teen girls; (4) to
facilitate the need of Muslim teen girls for good and healthy entertainment; and (5) to contribute to the
development of Indonesian literature, especially Islamic literature.
18
On complex hybridity of Indonesian Muslim youth cultures, see Nilan (2006: 91110).
16

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245

The corporate sister of Annida, Ummi, also from Arabic word which literally
means my mother, has targeted Muslim women and household wives as its
audiences and upheld the slogan the Identity of Muslim Women. Besides the
regular headlines discussing current (heated) issues related to Muslim woman affairs,
Ummi has special features called Islamic Jewelry (Mutiara Islam), which consists of
detailed discussions on Fiqh Wanita (Islamic Jurisprudence for Women), Marah
Shalihah (Pious Women), Mutiara Dakwah (Jewelry of Islamic Dawa), Quranic
Exegesis and Prophetic Traditions, and the Exemplary of the Prophet Muhammad. It
also covers miscellaneous articles and features on the Muslim world as well as
regular features on halal foods, health, psychology, family, and household financial
management, plus features on beauty and Muslim fashions. The magazine includes
short stories and novel series as supplements.19 The popularity of Ummi is equal to
that of Sabili, the most prominent of Indonesias Islamist magazines. Its distribution
reaches 80,000 copies per edition (Muhammad 2005).
Recently, similar magazines have emerged with smaller scales and different
focuses of coverage. Noor, Paras, and Anggun are three examples of this category
offering alternative readings on Islamic pop culture. Noor has some similarities with
Amanah, in terms of lay-out, content, and coverage, while Paras with Ummi, as a
magazine specifically concerned with Muslim women. Anggun constitutes an
Islamic wedding party magazine, advertising the latest and trendy Muslim wedding
costumes characterized by colorful jilbab and other Islamic accessories. It also
contains articles and features on the wisdom of marriage according to Islam and how
to be prepared before one decides to get married. It also advertises wedding party
packages in luxury hotels. Paras and Anggun are under the same umbrella, PT
Variapop Group, which also publishes the monthly Hidayah (Intisari Islam). The
latter focuses its coverage on stories about death and harsh punishments for those
committing big sins. Surprisingly perhaps, in the first quarter of 2006, this magazine
was ranked the top, according to the Nielsen Media Research rating survey, leaving
behind its competitors in this particular segment, especially Hikayat, Ghaib, and
Taubah (Cakram 2006).
The expansion of new communication technologies such as radio and television
has accelerated the process of commodifying Islam through the production and
appropriation of religious goods, and thus opening up new spaces for the
mushrooming of Islamic pop culture. The strength of communication technology in
boosting religious commodification has become increasingly visible after the fall of
Suharto in 1998, when new players of media business have arisen and contributed to
a further expansion of private television channels, whose number has multiplied over
the last ten years.20 In their race to book rating ranking and thus advertisement
portions, the channels seek to offer various kinds of pro-market broadcasts,
including religious programmes. New religious programmes are introduced and the
existing ones have creatively been modified in order to attract broader audience.
19

For the online version of this magazine, see www.ummigroup.co.id/annida.

Television was introduced to Indonesia in 1962, and the state television foundation TVRI was placed
under direct control of the President. Towards the late 1980s TVRI monopoly ended with the introduction
of commercial television. The dissolution of the Ministry of Information by Abdurrachman Wahid spurred
television potential for expanding its public role in civil society (see Kitley 2003: 97114).

20

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Owing to the mushrooming of private TV channels, the so-called Islamic soap

operas (sinetron Islami) which explore religious themes have achieved a prominence. TPI began the phenomenon by airing the series of Rahasia Ilahi (Secrets of
God). This series immediately skyrocketed, being watched by between 40 and 50
percent viewers, surpassing the popularity of any other television soap operas,
including the popular Latino and Bollywood productions (Herfanda 2005). Other
private television channels followed in TPIs footsteps. SCTV aired Astaghfirullah
(God, Please Forgive Me) and Kuasa Ilahi (Gods Will); Trans-TV Taubat
(Forgiveness), Insyaf (Return), and Istighfar (Asking Forgiveness); Lativi Azab
Ilahi (Gods Punishment), Pada-Mu Ya Rabb (Upon You, Oh Lord), and Sebuah
Kesaksian (One Witness). RCTI aired Tuhan Ada di Mana-mana (God is
omnipresent); ANTV Azab Dunia (Punishment of this World) and Jalan ke Surga
(Path to Heaven); and TV7 Titik Nadir (Zenith). TPI itself intensified its religious
soap operas by airing Takdir Ilahi (Destiny), Allah Maha Besar (Almighty God), and
Kehendak-Mu (Your Will). Involving big productions houses, such as Multivision
Plus, MD Entertainment, and SinemArt, the making of these programmes has even
changed the ratings ranking of the private television channels (Nurdiansyah 2005).
Some of these soap operas dig up features in the Islamic magazines as the sources
for their stories. Rahasia Ilahi, for instance, is almost a visualization of the stories in
the monthly Hidayah (Intisari Islam). Astaghfirullah presents the so-called true
stories in the monthly Ghaib and Taubat explores the stories in the monthly Insting
(Furkon 2005). It is not surprising then that these soap operas are full of dreadful
scenes about curses and punishments plummeted onto those committing big sins,
such as murder, adultery, robbery, gambling, and corruption. Other operas present
the stories taken from the classical Islamic sources, especially the collections of the
Prophetic Traditions. Takdir Ilahi belongs to this category as it claims that it explores
the collections of Prophetic Traditions compiled by Muhammad Amin Al-Jundi
Al-Muttaqin in his Miah Qissah wa Qissah fi Anis al-Salihin wa Samir al-Muttaqin
and by Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah in his Madarij al-Salikin (Ruslani 2005). It is
interesting to note that every episode of almost all the soap operas closes with a
summary and a kind of short lecture by popular preachers about the lessons and
wisdom Muslims can learn from the stories.
In tandem with the increasing popularity of Islamic soap operas, religious music
albums have flourished and added some nuance to the existing atmosphere of
popular piety. Ungu Pop Band, known for their powerful love songs, has recently
released a new album, Surgamu (Your Heaven), containing religious songs with
lyrics expressing the blessings on the Prophet Muhammad. Chrisye, an almost
legendary Indonesian pop singer, did the same, releasing Damai BersamaMu (Peace
with You), which contains traditional blessing songs on the Prophet. Gigi, another
pop band group known for their modern rock music, released Raihlah Kemenangan
(Grab the Victory) and Pintu Sorga (the Gate of Heaven). Having been awarded
platinum status for his first and second religious albums, Tombo Ati (Heart Cure) and
Istighfar (Forgiveness) respectively, Opick (Aunur Rofil Lil Firdaus) produced a
third album, Semesta Bertasbih (Universes Remembrance of God), which has also
received wide currency in the Indonesian song market. There are also religious
albums with jazz and blues characters, such as those released by Tompi (Teuku
Aidilfitrian), Trio Sakha, Bintang Indrianto, Idang Rasjidi, Arief Setiadi, Mates, and

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Soegeng Sarjadi (Ivvaty and Sartono 2006). No less important are religious albums
released by the popular preachers mentioned above, including Aa Gym, Arifin
Ilham, and Jeffry al-Buchori.
Television has not been the only medium for the widespread distribution of
religious programmes, however. Video cassettes, compact discs and digital
video discs came to furnish the Islamic media market with handy religious
homilies, religious preaching, music, and soap operas. For those who prefer to
spend time browsing in the cyberspace, they do not need to collect all the
materials; they can simply go to thousands of Islamic websites offering
different, often competing, versions of Islam The interactive natures of the
Internet affirms new senses of interpretive freedom to go beyond previous
forms and responsibility to speak for Islam in a civic public (Anderson 2003:
50). Facilitated by the advancement of mobile phone technology, the so-called
Cellular Quran recently came to offer a service for customers to listen to the
recitation of certain Quranic verses and explanations. There is also a mobile
dictionary of Islam called Islamic pocket, which provides its users with
practical information about Islam.

Conclusion
It has been argued that the burgeoning of public Islam cannot be disassociated with
the wave of Islamic revival which has engulfed the Muslim world since the mid1970s and the development of mass education and communication. This phenomenon provided the opportunity for a large segment of diverse Muslims to become
involved in public debates and, thus, express their political and religious identity.
One consequence of this is that popular piety has achieved a prominence to the
extent that it has become a new symbol of elitism. Like many other Muslim
countries, Indonesia has also witnessed a wave of Islamic revival marked by the
accentuation of religious symbols and the proliferation of Islamic institutions as well
as new life-styles. Jilbab, for instance, has developed into an indispensable part of
Indonesian Muslim fashion. Its use as part of ones outfit has permeated, for
instance, other costumes that had previously not included a veil, such as some of the
regional and other traditional Indonesian costumes.
The increase in popular piety has certainly involved a certain kind of agency.
Herein lies the importance of new dawa agents which creatively translate and
package Islamic messages for mass consumption. Owing to their creative efforts,
Islam has emerged in the Indonesian public sphere with a novel face, which is
tolerant, inclusive, modern and progressive as well. The success of these new dawa
agents in popularizing a new type of sympathetic Islam has opened up market
opportunities for so-called Islamic products. As a response to the mounting demand
for such products, Islamic business institutions have proliferated, including
Islamized American-style multi-level marketing.
Commodification which occurs in tandem with rising market demands for Islamic
products does not primarily mean commercialization. It is more an attempt to offer
and package Islam so that it can be accepted by a broader market. This attempt has
been interpreted by the players in this business as form of packaging dawa in such a

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way that dawa might resonate more loudly to reach a much broader audience, and
thus contributing to the proselytizing of Islam. In addition to Quranic reading
sessions and religious study programmes held in five-star hotels and luxury
convention centres, dawa messages have diffused through advertisement pages of
Islamic magazines, novels, Islamic soap opera series, and religious songs.

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