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Sidgwick, Henry
Bart Schultz

Life and Outlook
Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) spent his entire collegiate and professional life at
Trinity College, Cambridge University, from 1883 as Knightbridge Professor of
Moral Philosophy.
As an undergraduate, he had been elected to the “Apostles,” the secret but influential
Cambridge discussion society; allegiance to this group and the free and open inquiry
for which it stood helped form his philosophical outlook. The 1860s, which he
described as his years of religious “storm and stress” when he lost his Anglican faith,
were also the years in which his identity as an academic liberal took shape, and he got
caught up in fighting for better and broader educational opportunities, greater academic professionalism, and wider religious freedom. He famously resigned his fellowship in 1869 because he could not in good conscience subscribe to the Thirty-Nine
Articles of the Church of England. As explained in his pamphlet on the issue, “The
Ethics of Conformity and Subscription”: “we only accept authority of a particular
sort; the authority, namely, that is formed and maintained by the unconstrained
agreement of individual thinkers, each of whom we believe to be seeking truth with
single-mindedness and sincerity, and declaring what he has found with scrupulous
veracity, and the greatest attainable exactness and precision” (Sidgwick 1870: 14–15).
Sidgwick’s masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics, was first published in 1874, and
according to the conventional wisdom it marks the culmination of the classical and
nontheological utilitarian tradition – the tradition of Jeremy Bentham and the two
Mills (see bentham, jeremy; mill, john stuart), which held “the greatest happiness
of the greatest number” as the fundamental normative demand. Sidgwick’s account
of that position is indeed canonical, but the Methods has also served as a general
model for how to do academic ethical theory, providing systematic, historically
informed comparisons between utilitarianism and leading alternatives. Although
Sidgwick did personally favor the utilitarian view, his arguments were heavily
qualified and nuanced, and he allowed that he had not conclusively defended that
position. Consequently, both critics and defenders of utilitarianism – for example,
John Rawls (see rawls, john) and Peter Singer – have found support in Sidgwick’s
work. C. D. Broad went so far as to say “Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics seems to me to
be on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written, and to
be one of the English philosophical classics” (1930: 143).
Sidgwick was not only a preeminent moral philosopher, but also an
accomplished epistemologist, classicist, economist, political theorist, political
historian, literary critic, parapsychologist, and educational theorist. With his
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 4888–4897.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/ 9781444367072.wbiee320

has been the subject of intense debate (Larmore 1996). and its relation to various kinds of Desire and Aversion. Ethics The Methods is best understood in the context of Sidgwick’s theological concerns and his sense of the history of ethical and political controversy. Although Sidgwick’s own theory appropriates much from the ancients. He was also. into the part taken by Intellect in human action. of the Cambridge school of political theory. in Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (1886). (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will. more jural approach construing ethics as “concerned primarily with the general rules of Duty or Right Action – sometimes called the Moral Code – viewed as absolutely binding on every man. This construction of the conflict between an ancient. As in the Methods. The Principles of Political Economy (1883) and The Elements of Politics (1891). née Balfour. “attractive” notion of ethics. and many essays and reviews. and properly to be obeyed by him without regard to his personal interests. which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general nature and particular species of (a) Virtues or (b) Pleasure. (2) an investigation of the principles and most important details of Duty or the Moral Law (so far as this is distinguished from Virtue). most comprehensively understood. a collection of short pieces on Practical Ethics (1898). he begins with an overview of the work as a whole and a confession that he hopes to achieve a more impartial standpoint on the subject. with the right taking priority (and the issue of Conscience coming to the fore). with the latter. As he sums it up: the subject of Ethics. Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick. a short introduction to the history of ethics. rather than press any particular approach. Some important works appeared posthumously. he published two other major treatises. On the latter. . the relation of duty to the agent’s private happiness being regarded as a matter of secondary concern from an ethical point of view” (Sidgwick 1886: 6). During his lifetime. Cambridge. with such colleagues as Oscar Browning and Sir John Seeley. and the chief means of realizing these ends.2 wife. He urges that there is a divide between ancient and modern ethics. one of the first women’s colleges (Tullberg 1998). includes (1) an investigation of the constituents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered individually. he was a founder of both the British Society for Psychical Research (Gauld 1968) and Newnham College. and a modern “imperative” or jural notion of ethics. (3) some inquiry into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognized and. with Alfred Marshall. Sidgwick provided an historical sketch of the subject to which the Methods was a contribution. a founder of the Cambridge school of economics and. in the end it falls decidedly in the modern camp. (1886: 10–11) Sidgwick conducts a concise review of the historical contingencies that have brought one or another element of ethics so construed to the fore in one context or another. more generally. with the good taking priority.

he had far more developed religious sympathies than either Bentham or Mill. Thus.” particularly William Whewell (see whewell. E. among the ancients. Sidgwick rejected the utilitarian tradition on many counts. but the Methods deviated from some stock features of such views. to define the issue as much as possible” (Sidgwick 1907: vi). 1999. e. by comparing it with such leading alternatives as rational egoism and the intuitionism characteristic of the “Cambridge Moralists. With Clarke and Whewell. but Aristotle. and associationism. “to expound as clearly and as fully as my limits will allow the different methods of Ethics that I find implicit in our common moral reasoning. william). The influence that Kant and Kantianism – and the Cambridge Moralists – exercised on Sidgwick is patent. and these informed his overall philosophical outlook in ways that are less than immediately apparent from the Methods itself. Plato and Aristotle. that the conduct approved is ‘really’ right – that is. reduced to consistency by careful comparison: given not as something external to him but as what ‘we’ – he and others – think. arguing that. and moral approbation is “inseparably bound up with the conviction. whose Ethics gave us “the Common Sense Morality of Greece. in addition to political philosophy and legislation. His later student G. he held that ethics needed to be grounded on fundamental cognitive intuitions. and highly general notion of “ought” or “right” that is sui generis. irreducible. How this squares with Sidgwick’s intuitionism. The basic concept of morality is this unique. and whether it also amounts to something akin to Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium” have been long debated (Schultz 1992. Although he certainly claimed Bentham and Mill as major influences. and this is the proper sphere of ethics. and it is difficult to see how he could have thought it did justice to all the important “methods of ethics” and related issues. Whewell. As Schneewind (1977) has stressed. to point out their mutual relations. implicit or explicit.).3 The Methods is narrower in scope than Sidgwick’s general definition of the subject of ethics might suggest. psychological egoism. The book itself repeatedly affirms that its aim is less practice than knowledge. ascertained by reflection” (Sidgwick 1907: xix). that it cannot without error. he claimed many others as well. Kant. whatever its source. rejecting the issue of free will as largely irrelevant to ethical theory and taking a compatibilist stance. The model for this approach is not Bentham or Mill. be disapproved by any other mind” (1907: 27). Butler. he held that humans were capable of genuinely disinterested and benevolent action.” good or right conduct attainable by individual action. As Schneewind explains. the Methods is less a defense of utilitarianism than an attempt to consider that position in a more (albeit not fully) impartial way. Sidgwick was far more concerned with “private ethics. Moore was consequently willing to declare the Methods free of the “naturalistic fallacy” – of defining “right” or “good” in terms of natural properties (see moore. and. g. “the central thought of the Methods of Ethics is that morality is the embodiment of the demands reason makes on practice . in any given situation. Shaver. with Butler. And for all his doubts. he dismisses concern with the “moral faculty” and moral psychology. including Clarke and Cumberland. and where they seem to conflict. including its characteristic empiricism. there is something that one ought to do that is right. Moreover. Skelton 2007).

more firmly established on a basis of common consent” (1907: 100). moreover. he moves decisively away from Kant. while also holding that the appropriate guide for practical reason is enlightened selfinterest. which is taken to cover both more deontological views and those non-hedonistic teleological ones taking virtue as simply the thing to be done. or even ethical decision procedure. as is shown by his  very un-Kantian hedonistic and teleological conclusions” (Schneewind 1977: 419–20). Thus. though it is more like an abstract and purified version of the latter. and “in refusing to base morality on pure reason alone. The other method is variously called dogmatic or intuitional morality. hold that the moral order of the universe is utilitarian. . one might. “reflective persons. But Sidgwick rejects the whole apparatus of the Kantian critical philosophy. one’s “method of ethics” would be rational egoism. come to appeal “to general rules. Sidgwick does seek a defense of the ultimate principles of practical reason.” though it is the job of the moral theorist to set them out with proper precision and “to arrange the results as systematically as possible. and. in a more philosophical form. whatever the consequences. with God willing the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But intuitionism figures in both the second method of ethics. In this case. These duties are “unconditionally prescribed” and discernible with “really clear and finally valid intuition. since utilitarian calculations are God’s business and God has ordered the cosmos to insure that enlightened self-interest conduces to the greatest happiness. But there is another phase of intuitionism. On this method. which is somewhat ambiguously construed as either commonsense moral duties or the refined versions of these set out in the intuitionisms of Whewell or Henry Calderwood. Thus. promise-keeping. A method is a way of “obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done” and thus it might reflect an ethical principle or principles as the ultimate ground of one’s determination of what one has most reason to do. Sidgwick’s approach is quite historically distant. Yet despite this emphasis on the idealized reasoning process between principles and practical conclusions. Sidgwick explains that although some might think that conscience delivers immediate judgments on particular acts. conformity to such moral duties as truth-telling. His notion of a “method” of ethics is not the same as an ethical principle. In some respects. ethical theory. with theological utilitarians. but the ultimate philosophical justification for this method would appeal to utilitarian principles. while allowing that one might ordinarily be reasoning from such principles either directly or indirectly (1907: v).4 under the conditions of human life” (1977: 303). in the treatment of all the methods of ethics. and so on is held to be “the practically ultimate end of moral actions” (Sidgwick 1907: 96). Hence we have dogmatic intuitional morality. egoistic hedonism (or rational egoism) and universal hedonism (or utilitarianism). And Sidgwick does deploy a hedonistic theory of the good for two out of the three methods with which he is chiefly concerned – namely.” in proportion to their reflectiveness. particularly in the discussion of fundamental principles. and by proper definitions and explanations to remove vagueness and prevent conflict” (Sidgwick 1907: 101). temperance. reflecting its Victorian Cambridge context.

“the complete fulfillment of which would establish a significant proposition. for Sidgwick. “while accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound. how could we weigh one virtue or perfection or duty against another? Still. Justice.5 Without “being disposed to deny that conduct commonly judged to be right is so. still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer: to get one or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident.” insists that the “terms of the proposition must be clear and precise. and in part provide the precise axioms of the utilitarian position needed to straighten out confused common sense. that future good is as important as present good. that pleasurable consciousness is the good is an informative. and further. have only a dependent and subordinate validity: arguing either that the principle is really only affirmed by Common-Sense as a general rule admitting of exceptions and qualifications. Furthermore. despite Sidgwick’s claims that this morality is his morality too. as in the case of Truth. and again. Without some such metric as the hedonistic one. Philosophical intuitionism. and that it is right to promote the good generally. where. This is not to deny that there are better candidate intuitions. non-tautological claim. that the different rules are liable to conflict with each other. the relentless critical reflection has the utilitarian repeatedly demonstrating to the dogmatic intuitionist that the principles of Truth. that what is right for one must be right for anyone similarly circumstanced. as in the case of Justice. we may yet require some deeper explanation why it is so” (1907: 102). from which the current rules might be deduced. But these. in the highest degree of certainty attainable” (1907: 338). Such axioms allow that the good of one is no more important than the good of another. or that the fundamental notion is vague and needs further determination. either just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications” (1907: 102). and that these differences admit of no Intuitional solution. apparently self-evident. etc. or is revealed as requiring something very like it. and that we require some further principle for systematising these exceptions and qualifications. The ascent to philosophical intuitionism is evident in the treatment of commonsense or intuitional morality. while they show the vagueness and ambiguity of the common moral notions to which the Intuitionist appeals. are at a more abstract and general level than those of the dogmatic intuitionist. “Cartesian Criterion. Sidgwick holds.” and the second requires that the “self-evidence of the proposition must be . that the rules are differently formulated by different persons. he admitted that the hedonistic account of ultimate good was scarcely self-evident and there were feasible alternatives. or is shown to presuppose it. and that we require some higher principle to decide the issue thus raised. The difference here between “right” and “good” concerns how judgments of ultimate good do not in themselves involve definite precepts to act. Sidgwick’s reconciliation of intuitional morality and utilitarianism relies on a fallibilistic form of intuitionist epistemology with four criteria or conditions. (1907: 421) Common sense thus collapses into utilitarian thinking. The first.

took intention as covering all foreseen consequences. such views can scarcely be called uncontroversial. 2009). Sidgwick allowed the moral standing of nonhuman animals. coherence. non-reductive moral realism. In more purely epistemological works. Yet in many respects. and the fertility of the Methods in sparking valuable philosophical controversy seems to grow with the years. Sidgwick collapsed the first two conditions into one. Although Rawls emulated Sidgwick’s comparative approach. Green. 1999. at the present point of time. also that he was prejudiced in his treatment of perfectionism (Hurka 2001) and of Aristotle and of the idealism of his friend T. or in both” (1907: 341). and it requires careful contemplation to detect the illusion” (1907: 339). rejected retributivist forms of punishment. even defending the possibility of utilitarianism entailing a self-effacing. The third.” which is especially important in ethics because “any strong sentiment. or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole. and was also apt to explain that these conditions only afforded the best means for reducing the risk of error. consensus of experts. the denial by another of a proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence in its validity” (1907: 341–2). however informed. 2007. has it that the “propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent. S.” since it “is obvious that any collision between two intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other. on Utilitarian principles. And like so many utilitarians. The problem of justice for future generations and optimal population growth also came from him (1907: 415–16). not least in casting utilitarian conclusions as imperatives of impartial moral reason and defending what today would be called a substantive. H. even esoteric morality: “a Utilitarian may reasonably desire. 2011). is also crucial. in so far as the inevitable . that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally. Parfit 2011). Parfit 1984. And the fourth. and held a cosmopolitan (rather than nationalistic) outlook. Of course. however purely subjective. he pitted his own theory of justice as fairness against Sidgwick’s utilitarianism and his Kantian constructivism against Sidgwick’s “rational intuitionism. rather than establishing indubitable truth. Sidgwick’s critique and assimilation of commonsense moral rules thus went far beyond the efforts of J. Rawls also claimed that Sidgwick “characterizes a person’s future good on the whole as what he would now desire and seek if the consequences of all the various courses of conduct open to him were. Although it is not always easy to apply the (anachronistic) classification of “act” or “rule” utilitarianism to Sidgwick.” claiming that the Methods failed to grasp Kant’s best insights (Rawls 1971. missing how it could be improved in its own terms (Donagan 1992). But Sidgwick allowed that some desires. may be rejected as irrational or unreasonable (Schneewind 1977. Critics have argued that Sidgwick begged the question against Whewellian intutionism. Mill and reflected an intuitionistic epistemology that the earlier utilitarians had mostly rejected. he plainly defended an “indirect” form of utilitarianism. accurately foreseen by him and adequately realized in imagination” (1971: 366).6 ascertained by careful reflection. since: “it is implied in the very notion of Truth that it is essentially the same for all minds. is apt to transform itself into the semblance of an intuition. allowing his utilitarian sympathies and a fixation on the determinacy of practical reason to mislead him (Irwin 1992. it has served as a model for utilitarian analysis ever since.

Later editions of the work put the point more gently. [If] we may assume the existence of such a Being. critical versus everyday. Korsgaard 2009). it seems that Utilitarians may legitimately infer the existence of Divine sanctions to the code of social duty as constructed on a Utilitarian basis. but it was the same point. of course. (1907: 509) Second. by the consensus of theologians. is what has been called “the dualism of the practical reason. there is a “fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct” such that “the ‘Cosmos’ of Duty is thus really reduced to a Chaos. could not be reconciled with utilitarianism. and Korsgaard has argued that Sidgwick could not distinguish genuine communication from “spin” (Williams 1995. is conceived to be. [If] we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true. Sidgwick considered two possible solutions to the problem: a weakening of epistemological standards or a theistic postulate about the coherent moral government of the universe. with a still greater role for consensus and coherence. without opening the door to universal scepticism. and the prolonged effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to have been foredoomed to inevitable failure” (1874: 473). notably in areas of sexual ethics and with oppressed minorities. as God.7 indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands” (Sidgwick 1907: 490). And in a remarkably bold and direct challenge to the Kantian publicity criterion that goes to the heart of these debates. though it may reflect a consistent interpretation of the different “levels” of moral thinking. But the single most important issue in Sidgwick studies. Williams charged that in this Sidgwick was a “Government House” utilitarian whose views comported well with colonialism. rational egoism. and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs. – it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics. But Parfit (1984) has treated self-effacing theories very seriously. and such sanctions would. (1907: 506) Sidgwick devoted more energy to the second possible solution – hence the importance of his theological interests – but what he said about the first pointed to the possibility of developing his epistemology in a more holistic way. unlike intuitional morality. Singer and De Lazari-Radek (2010) have maintained that Sidgwick’s indirect consequentialist approach to esoteric morality is in fact defensible. This contradicts the Kantian insistence on the publicity of fundamental moral principles. The first edition of the Methods concluded that rational egoism and utilitarianism end up in a stand-off. which seem to rest on no other ground than that we have a strong disposition to accept them. and for Sidgwick himself.” On Sidgwick’s view. suffice to make it always every one’s interest to promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge. and Schultz (2004) has explored some of the contexts in which esoteric morality has carried weight. and that. . as a result. First.

Sidgwick’s dualism has led some recent commentators to urge that he is better termed a “dualist” or “dual-source theorist” or “two standpoints” theorist than a utilitarian.” in P. pp. “Sidgwick and Whewellian Intuitionism: Some Enigmas. Roger 2006. New York: Cambridge University Press.). and that this dualism motivated him to pursue both other philosophical inquiries and parapsychological research. john stuart. e. Sidgwick often departed from the careful language of the Methods. This broader view of Sidgwick’s project has inspired a great deal of original work in recent years (Schultz 2004. vol. Five Types of Ethical Theory. mill. and Bart Schultz (eds.8 In other works. intuitionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. jeremy. (1889: 483) Each of these convictions has as much clarity and certainty “as the process of introspective can give” and finds wide assent “in the common sense of mankind” (1889: 483). Catania: Università degli Studi di Catania. “Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism. Bucolo. 1: Happiness and Religion. vol. For his part. Roger Crisp. Bucolo et al. utilitarianism. 2006) has defended not only such a dualism but aspects of Sidgwick’s intuitionism and hedonism as well. Proceedings of the World Congress– University of Catania on H. C. Donagan. not merely a conflict with egoistic reasons. 2007. D. which is agent neutral. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. william REFERENCES Broad. Roger Crisp. and Crisp (2002. egoism. 2: Ethics. .” but which is none the less fundamental – that it would be irrational to sacrifice any portion of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some time compensated by an equivalent addition to my own happiness. but there are many such conflicts in the larger field of less than pure practical reason. simply explaining that along with (a) a fundamental moral conviction that I ought to sacrifice my own happiness. in the hope that he might find evidence to support a theistic argument. Crisp. Reasons and the Good. 2011). Bucolo. but Smith (2009) has defended Sidgwick’s construal of the problem. Placido. I find also (b) a conviction – which it would be paradoxical to call “moral. and Politics. Parfit (2011) has also argued that Sidgwick failed to see how egoistic reasons might nonetheless be weaker than omnipersonal ones. Crisp. Sidgwick.” in Bart Schultz (ed. Stratton-Lake (ed. whewell. g.. moore. Sidgwick. Roger 2002. Sidgwick in his private writings made it clear that his devotion to free and open inquiry had not yielded results that he found satisfactory. if by so doing I can increase the happiness of others to a greater extent than I diminish my own. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See also: bentham. 1930. Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Placido. Skorupski (2001) has forcefully argued that there is no dualism of the “pure” practical reason. Catania: Università degli Studi di Catania. Ethical Intuitionism.) 2007.) 2011. john. and Bart Schultz (eds.). Psychics. rawls. Proceedings of the World Congress– University of Catania on H. 123–42. Alan 1992.

The Founders of Psychical Research. Bernard 1995. and A. Cambridge. John 1971. Bart 2004. Irwin. ed. vol. 279–310. pp. Korsgaard. Skelton. Rob 1999. Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays. pp. H. Collected Papers. vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press. “The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics.. Irwin. Rational Egoism. and the Dualism of Practical Reason. and Katarzyna De Lazari-Radek 2010. Henry 1907 [1874]. New York: Cambridge University Press. Marcus G. Peter. Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir. 153–71. Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. Rawls. 34–58. Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. “A ‘Fundamental Misunderstanding. pp. Oxford: Clarendon Press. On What Matters. 1992. B.” in R. Christine 2009. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.” in J. vol. T. Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers. Reasons. Schultz. Henry 1889. pp. Skorupski. Reasons and Persons.. Suikkanen and J. Henry 1870. Henry Sidgwick. MA: Harvard University Press. Tullberg. Shaver. 3.” Utilitas.). Derek 2011. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 91–103. Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Schultz’s Sidgwick. “Three Methods and a Dualism. Hurka. Irwin. John 1999.9 Gauld. 473–87.” Mind. London: Swan Sonnenschein. “Eminent Victorians and Greek Ethics: Sidgwick. Bart 1992. H. 23. New York: Schocken Books. T. 19. London: Macmillan. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomas 2001. The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription.). Henry 1898. Charles 1996. Williams. Schultz. Henry 1886. . 116–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith.” in B. Rita McWilliams 1998. pp. Cottingham (eds. vol. Sidgwick. Rawls. Parfit. 7th ed. Freeman. 56. Vice. 1977. New York: Cambridge University Press. H. Singer. Sidgwick. Green. FURTHER READINGS Sidgwick. Sidgwick.). Virtue.” in Bart Schultz (ed. 61–81. The Morals of Modernity. S. and Aristotle. London: Macmillan. ed. M. Essays on Henry Sidgwick. vol. London: Macmillan. 2009. Values. New York: Cambridge University Press. John 2001. Self-Constitution. Essays on Ethics and Method. New York: Cambridge University Press. Harrison (ed. Henry 2000. J. Cambridge. rev. Michael 2009. Sidgwick. New York: Oxford University Press. Sidgwick.). ed. Anthony 2007. “Desires. and Value.” Ratio. Essays on Derek Parfit’s On What Matters. pp. pp. “Secrecy in Consequentialism: A Defense of Esoteric Morality. Derek 1984. Women at Cambridge. London: Williams & Norgate. 78–90. Parfit. Sidgwick 1906. 2007. Making Sense of Humanity and Other Essays. MA: Harvard University Press. Sidgwick. Schneewind. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies. 19. A Theory of Justice. Alan 1968. Williams (ed. T. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oxford: Oxford University Press.’ ” Utilitas. Oxford: Clarendon Press. E. Singer. Larmore. pp. The Development of Ethics. The Methods of Ethics.