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Facts:

Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as
Manager of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May
1986, at which time Toledo was already more than 57 years old. Toledos
appointment papers and his oath of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the
CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for
exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich
prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into government service
without prior CSC approvalwas secured. Petitioner then reported for work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC
Memo Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the
beginning Toledos appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered him
a de facto officer and his appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but
was denied, hence the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
Held:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC,
contained no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government
service of any person already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service
Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and
superseded RA 2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become
effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general
circulation. The new CSC adopted the CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of
appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807; prohibition was purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the
law which it was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its
function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may
legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law
into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a factor in
employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule
on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into
effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the
application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never

published as required by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a
mere reiteration of existing law and circularized cannot stand as formerly
discussed.
Also, Toledos separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition
granted.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989 CASE
DIGEST
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by
respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications
Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.
Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications
Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to
Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order
was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme
Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rateswhen such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost
is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasijudicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary
since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents
may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent
has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt
scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest


PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor &
Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of
1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order
DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound
workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and


recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the
business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a
petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit
implementation.

ISSUES:
1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of
the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the

Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to


wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the
coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is
hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative


bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the
modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its
parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such
rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement
of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the

date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law


not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or
specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).

Prohibition granted.
Title
MICHAEL

Citation

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY


DEFENSOR
:

G.R. No. 163980

August 3, 2006
Ponente

Facts

TINGA, J.:

A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207,


authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a
little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President
Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the

vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families


who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing
program.
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal
capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC)
Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue

Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee
was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be
declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rulemaking power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasilegislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the
theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it
is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement.
Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power,
the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. et al.vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS et al.


G.R. No. L-26803; Oct. 14, 1975; Antonio.
Digest by Ian.

Facts: This case involves the validity of the amendment made by the Director of
Patents to Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademarks.

1. The Trademark Law (RA 166) vested the Director of Patents with jurisdiction over
inter partes proceedings (i.e. hearing of opposition of registration of mark or
tradename, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and use of a trademark, tradename or servicemark,
and cancellation of registration of trademark and tradename pending at the Patent
Office).

2. The Director of Patents drafted and promulgated the Rules of Practice and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Rule 168 of the Rules
embodies the jurisdiction provided under the Trademark Law. Subsequently, the
Director with the approval of the Secretary amended Rule 168:
Previous
168. Original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings. The Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction
over inter partes proceedings. In the
event that the Patent Office should be
provided with an Examiner of
Interferences, this Examiner shall have
the original jurisdiction over these cases,

Amended
168. Original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings. The Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction
over inter partes proceedings. [In the
event that the Patent Office is provided
with an Examiner of Interferences, this
Examiner shall then have the original
jurisdiction over these cases, instead of

instead of the Director. In the case that


the Examiner of Interferences takes over
the original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings, his final decision shall be
subject to appeal to the Director of
Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice of decisions. Such
appeals shall be governed by sections, 2,
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and
22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
insofar as said sections arc applicable
and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall
be P25.00.

the Director. In the case that the


Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings, his final decisions shall be
subject to appeal to the Director of
Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice of decision. Such
appeals shall be governed by Sections 2,
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and
22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
insofar as said sections are applicable
and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall
be P25.00.] Such inter partes
proceedings in the Philippine Patent
Office under this Title shall be heard
before the Director of Patents, any
hearing officer, or any ranking official
of the office designated by the
Director, but all judgments
determining the merits of the case
shall be
personally and directly prepared by
the Director and signed by him.

2. Petitioners in this case are parties in inter partes proceedings. Due to the
amendment, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners cases to
hearings officers Attys. Marquez, Velasco, Casia, and Buenaluz.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because
under the law the Director must personally hear and decide the cases.

Issue: WON it is within the powers of the Director of Patents to delegate the
hearing of the cases.

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

1. The Revised Administrative Code, Trademark Law (RA 166), and Act creating a
Patent Office (RA 165) provide such discretion in the exercise of the power of
Director of Patents.

Sec. 3 of RA 165 empowered the Director to obtain the assistance of


technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees when deemed
necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative
to the enforcement of the provisions of the said Act.

Sec. 78 empowered the Director to promulgate the rules subject to the


approval of the Secretary.

There is no provision in either RA 165 or 166 negativing the existence of the


authority to designate hearing examiners. Nor can the absence of such
authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive
interpretation of the Act.

2. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents
suggests that the laws should be construed so as to give him the administrative
flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties. It could
hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to
hear personally each and every case pending his office.

3. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis
of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. This sub-delegation
of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that
"those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more
important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as
possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of
detail."

4. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
discretion does not preclude him from utilizing as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him
the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by
law.

5. There is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as


the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the
myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on
the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST


FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92),
LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT
TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND
THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS,
QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED
THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION
WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK
DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO
FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR,
NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE
WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE
AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS

QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR


LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE
AND HEARING

THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A aPROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE


NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92
UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION
BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT