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Costa c.

ENEL

Su influencia en la “primauté del
Derecho Comunitario

Su influencia en la
“primauté del Derecho
Comunitario

Universidad Central de Venezuela
Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas
Centro de Estudios de Postgrado
Especialización en Derecho y Políticas Internacionales
Responsabilidad Internacional

Lic. Luis Miguel Romero R.

Podemos concebir. obtener criterios valorativos. para internalizar el cómo y los porqués el sentido de supranacionalidad rebosa la esfera política e influye también en el estadio jurídico. pues. de tal contraste. social) 1993 Tratado de Mastrich Gráfico explicativo de la evolución del Derecho Europeo desde 1951 Con la firma en 1951 del Tratado de la Comunidad Europea del Carbón y el Acero. Enel (Primacía Derecho Comunitario) 1965 Creación de la Comisión y el Consejo Europeo 1993 Se amplían las competencias de la Comunidad (ambiente. desde qué perspectiva acometer una valoración del mismo. nace la CEE 1964 Decisión Costa c. una aproximación de pura política del Derecho: ¿dota este Tratado a la Unión Europea (en ese momento Comunidad Económica Europea) de los instrumentos necesarios de acción para afrontar los actuales retos nacionales e internacionales? O bien. 1951 Comunidad Europea del Carbón y Acero. o bien. fecha en que se firma el Tratado de Roma que le da nacimiento a la Comunidad Económica Europea que se amplía la competencia de el referido tribunal. No fue hasta 1957. Este Tratado plantea qué parámetros establecer para resolver controversias. así.Introducción Antes de comenzar a referirnos directamente a los asuntos de fondo con respecto a la incidencia que tienen las decisiones judiciales comunitarias en el Derecho interno de los Estados miembros de la comunidad. . En ese momento el Tribunal o Corte de Luxemburgo llevaba por nombre: “Tribunal de las Comunidades Europeas). Constitución del Tribunal Europeo de Justicia 1952 Comunidad Europea de Defensa 1957 Tratado de Roma. es menester explicar brevemente la evolución que ha tenido la hoy “Unión Europea”. referir el Tratado a la teoría constitucional para. podríamos. las partes acuerdan la creación de una instancia especial para solucionar las controversias relativas al mero intercambio económico de estos dos rubros minerales.

por vía de interpretación. sin embargo. Enel el que nos permitirá aclarar. Como a continuación se expondrá. tal forma de proceder es incitante. nos obliga a hacernos una composición de lugar. la jerarquía y supremacía que el iusinternacionalista o jurista comunitario le han sabido dar a las decisiones judiciales del Tribunal de Luxemburgo. creando un gigantesco debate con los administrativistas o constitucionalistas de cada uno de los Estados que conforman la comunidad. sino en normas jurídico – positivas parte integrante del acervo común europeo. Es precisamente el caso Costa c. . de un inconveniente: si la distancia entre ideal y realidad se evidencian como demasiado grandes. y a definir qué Unión Europea desean y por qué razones. los parámetros elaborados a partir de las “tradiciones constitucionales internas” son asimismo de utilidad cuando se trata de amortiguar. la crítica o las eventuales propuestas de reforma amenazan. Sobre todo. las mismas permiten inferir claros parámetros normativos para el enjuiciamiento del Derecho europeo. Una tal metodología adolece. haciendo a veces incidencia y críticas sobre los principios de democracia y soberanía nacional. a falta de puntos concretos de apoyo. a la luz del Derecho Europeo. en medio de la confusión reinante. las tensiones entre el Derecho europeo y el Derecho constitucional nacional. caer en el vacío. Lo cual no es poco. Las “tradiciones constitucionales internas” tienen una doble ventaja: por un lado.Para algunos juristas europeos. no consisten en presupuestos ideales. por otro.

Esta decisión judicial a su vez es contraria al mismo Tratado de Roma. de personalidad. Es obligatorio en todos sus elementos y es directamente aplicable en todo Estado miembro. encontrar un límite en cualquier medida interna sin perder su propio carácter comunitario y sin que resultara removido el fundamento jurídico de la misma Comunidad. de capacidad de representación nacional y más particularmente de poderes reales nacidos de una limitación de competencia o de una transferencia de atribuciones de los Estados a la Comunidad. actos que estaban limitados por el mismo Tratado. estableciendo dos principios jurisprudenciales en la decisión. el Consejo y la Comisión establecen reglamentos y normas. aunque en ámbitos restringidos sus derechos soberanos y han creado.) (todo esto) tiene por corolario la imposibilidad para los Estados de hacer prevalecer. a las instancias nacionales la competencia en cuanto a la forma y los medios. el cual establece en su artículo 189 (ahora 249): “Para el cumplimiento de su misión y en las condiciones previstas en el presente Tratado. dotada de instituciones propias. con el fin de solicitar el cumplimiento de la norma comunitaria. “Al constituir una comunidad de duración ilimitada. así. contra un ordenamiento . El reglamento tiene un alcance general. fue nacionalizada por un decreto general del Jefe de Gobierno de la República Italiana. ya que la nacionalización ocasionaba una disminución de valor de las acciones de la compañía. La decisión es obligatoria en todos sus elementos para los destinatarios a que se refiere. toman decisiones y formulan recomendaciones o dictámenes. La norma obliga a todo Estado miembro destinatario en cuanto al resultado a alcanzar. Las recomendaciones y los dictámenes no obligan. El Tribunal Europeo dicta sentencia en julio de 1964. los cuales hoy son doctrina del Derecho Comunitario: 1) Sobre la supremacía del Derecho Comunitario: “(…) el Derecho nacido del Tratado no podría.. quien se niega a cancelar su servicio eléctrico como reclamo por la inconsulta acción de gobierno. se dirige a los tribunales italianos para reclamar la nulidad de la nacionalización por estar en contra del Derecho Comunitario y por ser esta una medida que distorsionaba el mercado y aumentaba los precios. Amintore Fanfani. la compañía privada Ente Nazionale per l´Energía eLettrica (por sus siglas ENEL). por lo que éste (tribunal) debe decidir apegado primero a la Ley nacional. disminuyendo el valor de las acciones. basado en el artículo 2 del Tratado de Roma. Costa decide dirigirse al Tribunal Europeo de Justicia (Corte de Luxemburgo). incluso si es contraria al Tratado). dejando. no obstante. por lo que se veían directamente afectados por la decisión guernamental. En febrero de 1963. de capacidad jurídica. basándose en la teoría dualista infraconstitucional y expresa: “No se puede alegar primacía de la Ley comunitaria sobre la doméstica.” En este sentido. en razón misma de su específica naturaleza. Entre estos accionistas se encontraba el abogado Flaminio Costa.Narración de los hechos En 1962.. éstos han limitado. Este hecho generó controversias con los directivos y accionistas de la referida empresa. un cuerpo de derecho aplicable a sus súbditos y a ellos mismos (. el Tribunal Italiano se pronuncia. Sin embargo.

en efecto. una medida unilateral ulterior que no puede.jurídico aceptado por ellos sobre una base de reciprocidad. en consecuencia. sino que deben acudir ante la instancia de la Comisión la cual actuará según el caso. serle opuesta.” . 2) Sobre la actuación de personas naturales o jurídicas en el Tribunal Comunitario: “El Tribunal resuelve que en ningún caso el Tratado de Roma especifica que las personas naturales o jurídicas de un Estado pueden retar directamente al Estado en juicio por decisiones que vayan en contra del Derecho Comunitario. ni provocar una discriminación prohibida por el artículo 7 (…)”. que la fuerza ejecutiva del Derecho Comunitario no puede. variar de un Estado a otro al amparo de medidas legislativas internas ulteriores sin poner en peligro la realización de los objetivos del tratado contemplados en el artículo 5 (2).

porque cada vez resulta menos nítida la diferencia entre asuntos de relevancia nacional y relevancia comunitaria. a su vez. El Derecho comunitario es configurado por la jurisprudencia como Ordenamiento y en torno a “principios generales”. pero. Ello impone ordenaciones jurídicas que trascienden el alcance de los Estados soberanos tradicionales. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia. Los diferentes ordenamientos jurídicos de los Estados miembros cobran unidad a través de la jurisprudencia de Luxemburgo. No temía que las constituciones nacionales fueran a perder significado en el proceso europeo de integración. incluso. desplazando con frecuencia al Derecho propio de los Estados. Las funciones que en la teoría clásica identificaban materialmente a la Constitución. Ahora bien. por la recíproca dependencia de ambos. a su vez. Ello se pone de manifiesto ya desde una elemental consideración: mientras que la Constitución aspira a regular los procedimientos y límites en la producción ordinaria del Derecho. adicionalmente. y explica la Unión Europea como “comunidad de Derecho”. normas y procesos comunitarios se cruzan con ellos en relaciones diversas. de otro. entre el Derecho europeo y el Derecho constitucional nacional. permea. de un lado. una progresiva unificación de los Derechos nacionales en la dirección señalada por las instituciones comunitarias y el Tribunal de Justicia. en el cual el Derecho comunitario ocupa un lugar por demás relevante. en primer lugar. así. sino que tampoco está sujeto a las reglas constitucionales – al menos. entre el Derecho constitucional de los Estados miembros. se cumplen ahora a través de un nuevo entramado jurídico. porque el principio democrático sólo está rudimentariamente presente en el orden fundamental de la Unión. En particular.Análisis jurídico La primacía del Derecho europeo es ineludible. en cuenta los criterios y principios vigentes en los diversos Estados miembros. de modo semejante a como lo está el resto del ordenamiento jurídico. la jurisprudencia comunitaria toma. materias en las que no estaba previsto que incidiera aquél. Las tareas de los poderes públicos y el Derecho que rige las conductas de los ciudadanos no derivan ya simplemente de mandatos o de procesos regulados por la Constitución. influidos por el Derecho comunitario. . siendo éstos recogidos precisamente en una interpretación armonizadora de las “tradiciones constitucionales de los Estados miembros de la Comunidad” Konrad Hesse constataba ya en 1999 una creciente concordancia. mediante su adopción como pauta interpretativa general del Derecho comunitario. y no sólo se impone a la libertad de configuración del legislador nacional. le queda extramuros el Derecho comunitario – un acervo cuantitativa y cualitativamente fundamental del Ordenamiento. El contenido de sus constituciones y su fuerza normativa se ven. Parece irreversible. ya que hoy día la realización de intereses y la conciliación de conflictos se despliegan cada vez más en marcos supra estatales.

Cuando cobramos conciencia del déficit democrático y de la pérdida de los derechos. Desde la fundación de la Comunidad. Sin embargo. de hacer de los derechos el fin de la Unión y no simplemente un medio para otros fines. en que se otorga primacía al Derecho europeo sobre el Derecho constitucional. es importante analizar jurídicamente la importancia que trae como consecuencia de la decisión Costa c. como no sea proyectando los propios principios constitucionales sobre el Derecho comunitario. pues. En la medida. desde la Revolución francesa. Frente a tal evolución. Francia. se trata de extraer del postulado de la “homogeneidad constitucional” entre los Estados miembros y la Unión Europea Apartándonos entonces de la crítica constitucional de la “primauté” del Derecho comunitario frente al doméstico.Pero es que. Sin embargo. Declaración de Derechos del Hombre y del Ciudadano. los tratados de Niza (2000) y Roma (2004) ciertamente han incluido el reconocimiento de la Carta de derechos en el Derecho europeo. no acaba de tener lugar el giro copernicano. conocida como “dualismo”. Italia o España –. En este sentido. en configurar el Derecho comunitario desde la experiencia del Derecho constitucional. que. sin embargo. determinados derechos y libertades han sido concebidos como condiciones funcionales de una economía libre de mercado y no a la inversa. de Alemania. conjuntamente con la Costumbre) es la manifestación y perfeccionamiento del consentimiento de un Estado podemos dilucidar que es ilógico que la norma interna e internacional de un Estado sean contrarias. 1789). Enel en la normativa europea. que el mercado esté al servicio de la realización de los derechos. En definitiva. El reto consiste. nace la creencia que el Derecho Internacional pudiera ser contrario a la norma interna de los Estados. éste no es el caso del Derecho comunitario. subjetividad y carácter coercible. no habrá modo de preservar el orden fundamental de los Estados miembros – en concreto. a partir de un punto de vista iusinternacionalista. Nuestras constituciones han satisfecho hasta ahora tal parámetro. es decir. una conclusión se nos impone: si de lo que se trata es de constituir poder público y un orden social en Europa conforme a los postulados del imperio del Derecho. al revisar que un Tratado Internacional (fuente primaria de Derecho Internacional. en el cual se afirma que el Derecho Internacional (en este caso supranacional) es distinto al Derecho doméstico por su naturaleza. “el fin de toda asociación política es la realización de los derechos naturales e imprescriptibles del hombre” (artículo 2. Primeramente hay que traer a colación aquellos postulados de Triepel y Anzilotti sobre la división que existe entre la norma internacional y la interna. hay que considerar también como rudimentario al menos otro aspecto importante del Derecho europeo: la teoría constitucional clásica nos dice. la teoría clásica de la Constitución es portadora de un legado que bien podría inspirar la forja del nuevo “Derecho común”. .

lo que quiere decir. Por otra parte. sin embargo hace énfasis en que se debe considerar la norma comunitaria como regla máxima. su práctica forense y redacción es distinta y su coercibilidad es relativa a asuntos estatales. La decisión 6/64 ECR 585 583 del Tribunal de Justicia Europeo nos aclara que en realidad se deben considerar las normas comunitarias e internas como dos reglas distintas porque obligan a sujetos diferentes. . no pudiendo los particulares asumir un rol protagónico en la petición de justicia por ante el Tribunal de Luxemburgo. Otro de los aspectos fundamentales que marca esta jurisprudencia un precedente importante es en la obligatoriedad del cumplimiento de las normas comunitarias por parte de los Estados.Pero el verdadero debate que estaba en juego en el caso de estudio era la ubicación del Derecho Comunitario dentro de la normativa interna. es esta decisión la primera oportunidad que tiene la “comunidad” de demostrar verdaderamente su incidencia de organismo supranacional al retar una sentencia definitiva de un Estado soberano. el Consejo y la Comisión (y hoy en día el Parlamento). que se trataba de interpretar si la norma comunitaria estaba por encima del conjunto normativo interno o estaba subsumido a éste. aunado a esto todas las decisiones del Tribunal europeo.

Tecnos.es/~redce/REDCE5pdf/08. Disponible en línea: http://debate. Disponible en línea: http://www. K.taniagroppi. . Relaciones Internacionales. 1987.htm Real Instituto El Cano. Madrid: Ed. U. 2005.pdf Orlandez. Hesse. Madrid.realinstitutoelcano. Política Exterior de la Unión Europea. Editorial Tecnos. C. Evolución del concepto de soberanía en la Unión Europea. Barbé.Referencias Groppi T: La “primauté” del Derecho Europeo sobre el Derecho Constitucional nacional: Un punto de vista comparado. E. Referencia a la Constitución Europea.mx/numero04/articulos/soberramonnavarro. Disponible en Línea: http://www.ugr. El texto constitucional como límite de la interpretación en División de poderes e Interpretación. Hacia una teoría de la praxis constitucional.org/especiales/constitucioneuropea/nuevo/ Del Arenal.iteso.

TO ACCORD PRECEDENCE TO A UNILATERAL AND SUBSEQUENT MEASURE OVER A LEGAL SYSTEM ACCEPTED BY THEM ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY .Anexo DECISIÓN COSTA V. SUCH AN OBLIGATION BECOMES AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES. HAVING ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS. THE INTEGRATION INTO THE LAWS OF EACH MEMBER STATE OF PROVISIONS WHICH DERIVE FROM THE COMMUNITY AND MORE GENERALLY THE TERMS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY. TO THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURE EITHER BY THE STATES OR BY THE COMMISSION. ITS OWN PERSONALITY. Disponible en línea en: http://eur-lex. AS REGARDS ITS EXECUTION OR EFFECT. NEVERTHELESS. COULD NOT BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL AND ORIGINAL NATURE. BE OVERRIDDEN BY DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS. ARTICLE 93 OF THE EEC TREATY CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . 6 . THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXTRACT FROM A QUESTION IMPERFECTLY FORMULATED BY THE NATIONAL COURT THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH ALONE PERTAIN TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE STATES. ENEL (CASO 6/64 ECR 585 583 – 15 DE JULIO DE 1964) Fuente: EURLEX. THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION EITHER TO APPLY THE TREATY TO A SPECIFIC CASE OR TO DECIDE UPON THE VALIDITY OF A PROVISION OF DOMESTIC LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY. BY CREATING A COMMUNITY OF UNLIMITED DURATION. HOWEVER FRAMED. 5 . ON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY. THE MEMBER STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND HAVE THUS CREATED A BODY OF LAW WHICH BINDS BOTH THEIR NATIONALS AND THEMSELVES . IN COMMUNITY LAW OR UNDER ARTICLE 177. AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF LAW. SUCH A MEASURE CANNOT THEREFORE BE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT LEGAL SYSTEM . 2 . A MEMBER STATE'S OBLIGATION UNDER THE EEC TREATY. BY CONTRAST WITH ORDINARY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES. AND THUS FORMS PART OF THEIR OWN LAW. AS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR IT TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 169 .europa. THE COMMISSION HAS THE DUTY OF SEEING THAT THE MEMBER STATES RESPECT THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN IMPOSED UPON THEM BY THE TREATY AND WHICH BIND THEM AS STATES WITHOUT CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. 3 . THE LAW STEMMING FROM THE TREATY. BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND WHICH THEIR COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY . EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION . ARTICLE 102 OF THE EEC TREATY CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. IN THE CONTEXT OF REQUESTS FOR PRELIMINARY RULINGS. AS A COROLLARY. 4 . THE EEC TREATY HAS CREATED ITS OWN LEGAL SYSTEM WHICH. . AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT HAS CREATED INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . IS LEGALLY COMPLETE AND CONSEQUENTLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND INDIVIDUALS . WHICH IS NEITHER SUBJECT TO ANY CONDITIONS NOR. 7 . MORE PARTICULARLY. REAL POWERS STEMMING FROM A LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR A TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM THE STATES TO THE COMMUNITY. WITHOUT BEING DEPRIVED OF ITS CHARACTER AS COMMUNITY LAW AND WITHOUT THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY ITSELF BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION .do?uri=CELEX:61964J0006:EN:HTML Summary 1 . ITS OWN LEGAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE AND. THE TRANSFER BY THE STATES FROM THEIR DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER THE TREATY CARRIES WITH IT A PERMANENT LIMITATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS . ARTICLE 177 IS BASED UPON A CLEAR SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND CANNOT EMPOWER THE LATTER EITHER TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR TO CRITICIZE THE GROUNDS AND PURPOSE OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION . BUT THIS OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION DOES NOT GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO ALLEGE.

. WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKINGS . THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE OF MILAN. AS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR IT TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 169 . THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY. . 93. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) OF THE EEC TREATY HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT THE PROHIBITION OF ANY NEW MEASURE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ). FIRST. 11 . Parties IN CASE 6/64 REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE. 1203 OF 14 OCTOBER 1957. IT IS A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION TO ASSESS IN EACH CASE WHETHER THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNDER REVIEW RELATES TO SUCH A PRODUCT WHICH. A RULING ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF A NATIONAL LAW WITH THE TREATY . BY VIRTUE OF ITS NATURE AND THE TECHNICAL OR INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS TO WHICH IT IS SUBJECT.. FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN FLAMINIO COSTA AND ENEL ( ENTE NAZIONALE ENERGIA ELETTRICA ( NATIONAL ELECTRICITY BOARD ).INFRINGE ARTICLES 102. AS IN THE PRESENT CASE. DULY SENT TO THE COURT. AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE . 1643 OF 6 DECEMBER 1962 AND THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREES ISSUED IN EXECUTION OF THAT LAW. NATIONAL COURTS AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS. HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES. ARTICLE 53 OF THE EEC TREATY CONSTITUTES A COMMUNITY RULE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . AND HAVING REGARD TO THE ALLEGATION THAT LAW N . 53 AND 37 OF THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY '. STAYED THE PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERED THAT THE FILE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE . ' HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY OF 25 MARCH 1957 ESTABLISHING THE EEC. BY THE TERMS OF THIS ARTICLE. 9 . HOWEVER. BY MEANS OF MONOPOLIES OR BODIES WICH MUST. THIS PROVISION GIVES THE COURT NO JURISDICTION EITHER TO APPLY THE TREATY TO A SPECIFIC CASE OR TO DECIDE UPON THE VALIDITY OF A PROVISION OF DOMESTIC LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY. IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING SUCH A PART IN IMPORTS OR EXPORTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER STATES .8 . MUST REFER THE MATTER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE SO THAT A PRELIMINARY RULING MAY BE GIVEN UPON THE ' INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY ' WHENEVER A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION IS RAISED BEFORE THEM . INCORPORATED INTO ITALIAN LAW BY LAW N . 10 . ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) OF THE EEC TREATY CONSTITUTES IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS A RULE OF COMMUNITY LAW CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . ARTICLE 53 OF THE EEC TREATY IS SATISFIED SO LONG AS NO NEW MEASURE SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT. ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 177 ON THE SUBMISSION REGARDING THE WORKING OF THE QUESTION THE COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE INTENTION BEHIND THE QUESTION POSED WAS TO OBTAIN. MILAN. 53 AND 37 OF THE SAID TREATY Grounds BY ORDER DATED 16 JANUARY 1964. BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177. 93. FORMERLY THE EDISON VOLTA UNDERTAKING ) Subject of the case ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 102. THAT IS ANY MEASURE HAVING AS ITS OBJECT OR EFFECT A NEW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED.

MORE PARTICULARLY. APPLICATIONS. BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL AND ORIGINAL NATURE. ARTICLE 177 IS BASED UPON A CLEAR SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE. WHICH IS SUBJECT TO NO RESERVATION. THE INTEGRATION INTO THE LAWS OF EACH MEMBER STATE OF PROVISIONS WHICH DERIVE FROM THE COMMUNITY. MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE STATES. REAL POWERS STEMMING FROM A LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR A TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM THE STATES TO THE COMMUNITY. COULD NOT. 223. AND MORE GENERALLY THE TERMS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY. IT DOES THIS BY CLEAR AND PRECISE PROVISIONS ( FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLES 15. INASMUCH AS A NATIONAL COURT WHICH IS OBLIGED TO APPLY A NATIONAL LAW CANNOT AVAIL ITSELF OF ARTICLE 177 . IT CANNOT EMPOWER THE LATTER EITHER TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR TO CRITICIZE THE GROUNDS AND PURPOSE OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION . HOWEVER FRAMED. AGAINST WHICH A SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL ACT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNITY CANNOT PREVAIL . ITS OWN PERSONALITY. WHEREVER THE TREATY GRANTS THE STATES THE RIGHT TO ACT UNILATERALLY. THE EXECUTIVE FORCE OF COMMUNITY LAW CANNOT VARY FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER IN DEFERENCE TO SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC LAWS. BY MEMBER STATES FOR AUTHORITY TO DEROGATE FROM THE TREATY ARE SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE ( FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLES 8 ( 4 ). WHEREBY A REGULATION ' SHALL BE BINDING ' AND ' DIRECTLY APPLICABLE IN ALL MEMBER STATES '. ON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY. CONSEQUENTLY ARTICLE 177 IS TO BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF ANY DOMESTIC LAW. 73. ON THE SUBMISSION THAT THE COURT WAS OBLIGED TO APPLY THE NATIONAL LAW THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SUBMITS THAT THE REQUEST OF THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE IS ' ABSOLUTELY INADMISSIBLE '. SINCE. AND 226 ) WHICH WOULD LOSE THEIR PURPOSE IF THE MEMBER STATES COULD RENOUNCE THEIR OBLIGATIONS BY MEANS OF AN ORDINARY LAW . BUT MERELY CONTINGENT. HOWEVER. ALBEIT WITHIN LIMITED FIELDS. BY CONTRAST WITH ORDINARY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES. 224 AND 225 ). IF THEY COULD BE CALLED IN QUESTION BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE SIGNATORIES . WITHOUT BEING DEPRIVED OF ITS CHARACTER AS COMMUNITY LAW AND WITHOUT THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY ITSELF BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION . BUT ONLY UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED ARTICLES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POINTS OF LAW STATED BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE . THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXTRACT FROM A QUESTION IMPERFECTLY FORMULATED BY THE NATIONAL COURT THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH ALONE PERTAIN TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . CONSEQUENTLY A DECISION SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE COURT NOT UPON THE VALIDITY OF AN ITALIAN LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY. 17 ( 4 ). THE TRANSFER BY THE STATES FROM THEIR DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER THE TREATY CARRIES WITH IT A PERMANENT LIMITATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITY WOULD NOT BE UNCONDITIONAL. 26. WOULD BE QUITE MEANINGLESS IF A STATE COULD UNILATERALLY NULLIFY ITS EFFECTS BY MEANS OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE WHICH COULD PREVAIL OVER COMMUNITY LAW . WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY SET OUT IN ARTICLE 5 ( 2 ) AND GIVING RISE TO THE DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE 7 . ITS OWN LEGAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE AND. THE THIRD SUBPARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 93 ( 2 ). 25. THE MEMBER STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. AS A COROLLARY. BE OVERRIDDEN BY DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS. THE PRECEDENCE OF COMMUNITY LAW IS CONFIRMED BY ARTICLE 189. TO ACCORD PRECEDENCE TO A UNILATERAL AND SUBSEQUENT MEASURE OVER A LEGAL SYSTEM ACCEPTED BY THEM ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY . AND HAVE THUS CREATED A BODY OF LAW WHICH BINDS BOTH THEIR NATIONALS AND THEMSELVES . BY CREATING A COMMUNITY OF UNLIMITED DURATION.NEVERTHELESS. HAVING ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS. AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF LAW. THIS PROVISION. IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THESE OBSERVATIONS THAT THE LAW STEMMING FROM THE TREATY. THE EEC TREATY HAS CREATED ITS OWN LEGAL SYSTEM WHICH. WHENEVER QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY ARISE . BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND WHICH THEIR COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY . 93 ( 3 ). ON THE SUBMISSION THAT AN INTERPRETATION IS NOT NECESSARY THE COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE MILAN COURT HAS REQUESTED AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WHICH WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE IT . . SUCH A MEASURE CANNOT THEREFORE BE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT LEGAL SYSTEM .

BY VIRTUE OF THIS PROVISION. THE OBLIGATION THUS ENTERED INTO BY THE STATES SIMPLY AMOUNTS LEGALLY TO A DUTY NOT TO ACT. ON THE OTHER HAND. IN ARTICLE 93. ON THE OTHER HAND. ARE DESIGNED. BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ). ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 102 ARTICLE 102 PROVIDES THAT. THE MEMBER STATES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH AIDS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET AND HAVE THUS IMPLICITLY UNDERTAKEN NOT TO CREATE ANY MORE. AND IS REQUIRED. THE MEMBER STATE DESIRING TO PROCEED THEREWITH SHALL ' CONSULT THE COMMISSION '. 53. TO KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW EXISTING SYSTEMS OF AIDS . TO PREVENT THE INDIVIDUAL STATES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS FROM INTRODUCING NEW AIDS ' IN ANY FORM WHATSOEVER ' WHICH ARE LIKELY DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO FAVOUR CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS OR PRODUCTS IN AN APPRECIABLE WAY. THE COMMISSION. WHERE ' THERE IS REASON TO FEAR ' THAT A PROVISION LAID DOWN BY LAW MAY CAUSE ' DISTORTION '. THEY HAVE MERELY AGREED TO SUBMIT THEMSELVES TO APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING AIDS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW ONES . NOR. WHICH BINDS THEM AS STATES BUT CREATES NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE FINAL PROVISION OF ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ). THESE PROVISIONS. OF A POSSIBLE DISTORTION. WHICH IS NEITHER SUBJECT TO ANY CONDITIONS. IN SUFFICIENT TIME. ON THE ONE HAND. AND WHICH THREATEN. AND. TO ELIMINATE PROGRESSIVELY EXISTING AIDS AND. THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. THE STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN AN OBLIGATION TO THE COMMUNITY WHICH BINDS THEM AS STATES. AS REGARDS ITS EXECUTION OR EFFECT. GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO PLEAD. HOWEVER. MEMBER STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR FREEDOM OF INITIATIVE BY AGREEING TO SUBMIT TO AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE OF CONSULTATION . OF ANY PLANS TO GRANT OR ALTER AID. CONTAINED IN THE SECTION OF THE TREATY HEADED ' AIDS GRANTED BY STATES '. BY SO EXPRESSLY UNDERTAKING TO INFORM THE COMMISSION ' IN SUFFICIENT TIME ' OF ANY PLANS FOR AID. IN COOPERATION WITH MEMBER STATES. FOR ITS PART. BUT WHICH DOES NOT CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . IS TO ' KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW ALL SYSTEMS OF AID EXISTING IN THOSE STATES ' WITH A VIEW TO THE ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE MEASURES REQUIRED BY THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET . ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 53 BY ARTICLE 53 THE MEMBER STATES UNDERTAKE NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THEIR TERRITORIES OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES. SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY. THE COMMISSION IS TO BE INFORMED. AND BY ACCEPTING THE PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 93. SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY . WHICH IS NOT IN QUESTION IN THE PRESENT CASE . THE STATES HAVE ENTERED INTO AN OBLIGATION WITH THE COMMUNITY. IF NECESSARY. HAVE BEEN COMPLETED . THIS ARTICLE. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 93 UNDER ARTICLE 93 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ). WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW AND BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177 EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION . EVEN POTENTIALLY. BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 92. THIS OBLIGATION DOES NOT.THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE REGARDING ARTICLES 102. AND. IN COOPERATION WITH MEMBER STATES. IF SO. WHAT THEIR MEANING IS . EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION . THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LEGISLATION OF THE DIFFERENT NATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY FROM BECOMING MORE PRONOUNCED . THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED NOT BEING ENTITLED TO PUT ITS PROPOSED MEASURES INTO EFFECT UNTIL THE COMMUNITY PROCEDURE. IT IS THEREFORE LEGALLY COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND IS CONSEQUENTLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND INDIVIDUALS . 93. FOR ITS PART. HOWEVER SLIGHT. TO THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURE EITHER BY THE STATES OR BY THE COMMISSION . AND 37 ARE DIRECTED FIRST TO ENQUIRING WHETHER THESE PROVISIONS PRODUCE DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW AND BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177. SUCH AN EXPRESS PROHIBITION WHICH CAME INTO FORCE WITH THE . BUT THIS OBLIGATION DOES NOT GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO ALLEGE. PLACED IN THE CHAPTER DEVOTED TO THE ' APPROXIMATION OF LAWS '. TO DISTORT COMPETITION . BY BINDING THEMSELVES UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMISSION IN ALL THOSE CASES WHERE THEIR PROJECTED LEGISLATION MIGHT CREATE A RISK. THE COMMISSION HAS POWER TO RECOMMEND TO THE MEMBER STATES THE ADOPTION OF SUITABLE MEASURES TO AVOID THE DISTORTION FEARED . ANY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE.

THIS CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE ' ELIMINATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES '. BY REASON OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE WORDING AND THE FACT THAT ARTICLES 37 ( 1 ) AND 37 ( 2 ) OVERLAP. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 37 ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) PROVIDES THAT MEMBER STATES SHALL PROGRESSIVELY ADJUST ANY ' STATE MONOPOLIES OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER ' SO AS TO ENSURE THAT NO DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED EXISTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES . THIS PROHIBITION IS ESSENTIALLY ONE WHICH IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE LEGAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR NATIONALS . MEMBER STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN A DUAL OBLIGATION : IN THE FIRST PLACE. ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) SETS OUT THE WAYS IN WHICH THIS OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE THWARTED IN ORDER TO PROHIBIT THEM . THE INTERPRETATION REQUESTED IS OF THE SECOND OBLIGATION TOGETHER WITH ANY ASPECTS OF THE FIRST NECESSARY FOR THIS INTERPRETATION . WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKING . THIS IS DEALT WITH BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 52. A PASSIVE ONE TO AVOID ANY NEW MEASURES . IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . AN ACTIVE ONE TO ADJUST STATE MONOPOLIES. THERE REMAIN TO BE CONSIDERED THE MEANS ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ). ON WHAT CONDITIONS THE NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES HAVE A RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT . ARTICLE 53 IS THEREFORE SATISFIED SO LONG AS NO NEW MEASURE SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT.BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES '. TO FALL UNDER THIS PROHIBITION THE STATE MONOPOLIES AND BODIES IN QUESTION MUST. THEREFORE. BY VIRTUE OF ITS NATURE AND THE TECHNICAL OR INTERNATIONAL . HAVING SPECIFIED THE OBJECTIVE IN THIS WAY. IT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE CREATION OF ANY STATE MONOPOLIES. ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) CONTAINS AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION : NOT AN OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING BUT AN OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM DOING SOMETHING . THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 53 WHICH IS SOUGHT REQUIRES THAT IT BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN WHICH IT OCCURS . FIRST. AND THEN ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY TEND TO INTRODUCE THE CASES OF DISCRIMINATION REFERRED TO . THUS. SUCH A CLEARLY EXPRESSED PROHIBITION WHICH CAME INTO FORCE WITH THE TREATY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY. BUT MERELY THOSE ' OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER '. IT IS A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION TO ASSESS IN EACH CASE WHETHER THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNDER REVIEW RELATES TO SUCH A PRODUCT WHICH. BY THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ). AND SO BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES. THE MEMBER STATES ARE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM INTRODUCING ANY NEW MEASURE WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ). IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT HAS CREATED INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . FORMS PART OF THE LAW OF THOSE STATES AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS. THE QUESTION IS. ANY NEW MONOPOLIES OR BODIES SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) ARE PROHIBITED IN SO FAR AS THEY TEND TO INTRODUCE NEW CASES OF DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED . THE INTERPRETATION REQUESTED MAKES IT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THEM AS PART OF THE CHAPTER IN WHICH THEY OCCUR . THUS. HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES.. THAT IS WHETHER ANY NEW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED RESULTS FROM THE DISPUTED MEASURE ITSELF OR WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE THEREOF . THIS CHAPTER GOES ON IN ARTICLE 53 TO PROVIDE THAT ' MEMBER STATES SHALL NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THEIR TERRITORIES OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES '. AFTER ENACTING IN ARTICLE 52 THAT ' RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE SHALL BE ABOLISHED BY PROGRESSIVE STAGES '.. IT IS THEREFORE A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION FIRST TO EXAMINE WHETHER THIS OBJECTIVE IS BEING HAMPERED. AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE . FORMS PART OF THE LAW OF THOSE STATES AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS. AND THUS BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES. THIS OBLIGATION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY RESERVATION WHICH MIGHT MAKE ITS IMPLEMENTATION SUBJECT TO ANY POSITIVE ACT OF NATIONAL LAW . WHERE IT IS STATED THAT FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT SHALL INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP AND PURSUE ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS AND TO SET UP AND MANAGE UNDERTAKINGS ' UNDER THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITS OWN NATIONALS BY THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE SUCH ESTABLISHMENT IS EFFECTED '. IN THE SECOND PLACE. THE OBJECT OF THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) TO ' THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN PARAGRAPH ( 1 ) ' IS THUS TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW ' DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED. BY ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ).TREATY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY.

FIRST. 2 . THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT . ANY MEASURE HAVING AS ITS OBJECT OR EFFECT A NEW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED. HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES. Decision on costs THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE. MILAN . AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE. 4 . A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE. IN SO FAR AS THE QUESTION PUT TO THE COURT IS CONCERNED. ARTICLE 53 CONSTITUTES A COMMUNITY RULE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . . WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKINGS . IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED. ARE NOT RECOVERABLE AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE. THOSE INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS OF ARTICLE 93 TO WHICH THE QUESTION RELATES EQUALLY CONTAIN NO SUCH PROVISIONS. AND ALSO RULES : 1 . ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) IS IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS A RULE OF COMMUNITY LAW CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . ARE ADMISSIBLE IN SO FAR AS THEY RELATE IN THIS CASE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY. ARTICLE 102 CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT. Operative part THE COURT RULING UPON THE PLEA OF INADMISSIBILITY BASED ON ARTICLE 177 HEREBY DECLARES : AS A SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL MEASURE CANNOT TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER COMMUNITY LAW. MILAN. WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT. IT PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY NEW MEASURE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ). IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING AN EFFECTIVE PART IN IMPORTS OR EXPORTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER STATES . THAT IS. MILAN. IT PROHIBITS ANY NEW MEASURE WHICH SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT. BY MEANS OF MONOPOLIES OR BODIES WHICH MUST. AND FURTHER DECLARES : THE DECISION ON THE COSTS OF THE PRESENT ACTION IS A MATTER FOR THE GUIDICE CONCILIATORE.CONDITIONS TO WHICH IT IS SUBJECT. 3 .