You are on page 1of 90


Film-Philosophyforthe Digital Age


William Brown




For all practical purposes, the revolution is upon us,
and we should therefore not shy away from discussion
- wild speculation, even - about its impact on the art of cinema.
- Jean-Pierre Geuens (2002: 16)

Digital technology has changed cinema such that the D-word has now become
an inescapable element of moving image technology’ (Enticknap 2005: 202). For
those ‘born digital’, that this is remarkable might seem strange. As Nicholas Rombes
has suggested, students today are probably already more than femiliar with the
‘secrets’ o f digital cinema, o f DVD, o f YouTube, and of filesharing (Rombes 2009:
77). Indeed, those ‘born digital’ are probably also already aware of, if not steeped in,
the philosophies of chaos theory, simultaneous possible worlds, and the other
curious ideas that one or two generations ago existed only on the margins o f thought
and culture, but which today have proliferated into the mainstream (for a similar
argument applied to contemporary literature, see Murray 1998: 38). But for those
not ‘born digital’, the changes wrought on the (increasingly intertwined) societies
and cultures in which digital technology has expanded, and perhaps irreversibly
falfpn hold, can be daunting, driven by what once were esoteric ideas, but which
now seem indispensable in terms o f how we understand not just digital technology,
but also the world that surrounds us and from which it emerges.
Supercinemct: Film-Philosophy for the Digital Age offers an original theoretical
firamework for understanding the spaces and times of contemporary digital cinema,
together with the beings, or characters, that fill it, and our relationship both to them
and to the images themselves. This is not to say that Supercinema fails to draw upon
previous theories o f cinema, including theories of digital cinema. However,
Supercinema does in certain respects sidestep some of the main arguments that have
preoccupied theorists o f digital cinema up until now - particularly the notion of
indexicality, which I shall discuss below.
Presentiy, however, I shall explain what this book does. In the first chapter,
‘Digital Cinema’s Conquest of Space’, I argue that digital technology has brought
about a conception o f space in cinema that differs from that o f the analogue. If limits
j tile size of film reels and the bulk of the camera have led mainstream narrative and
analogue cinema to cut, then digital cinema seems to be predicated upon continuity.



USA® 9 ^ i S r
^ f
(Mike Figgis,
a \
^ r k (Alebandr Sokurov, Russia/Germany,
2002), ^rvA Enter the Void (Caspar N o4 France/Germany/Italy/Canada, 2009), we
are to differing degrees - presented with continuous spaces rather than spaces that
are necessarily fragmented into different shots. In some of these films {Fight Club and
Enter the Votd most particularly) the (virtual) ‘camera’ passes through ‘filled’ space
( .e. solid objects) with the same ease with which it passes through ‘empty’ space By
showing space and all that fills it as a single continuum, as opposed to a space
gmented by objects, digital technology suggests the inherently connected namre
Ox those objects and their surroundings.
If space becomes indistinguishable from all that fills it, then this brings about a
fendamental decentring o f the figures that fill that space. That is, characters in
igital cinema no longer stand out as unique agents against the space that surrounds
em, but instead become inseparable from that space. The result o f this ‘decentring’
is a minimizing of anthropocentrism in digital cinema. This logic is not only
expressed by the way in which digital cinema increasingly features prominent
characters o f a nonhuinan nature, but also by the way in which environments take
on prominent roles in films, including mainstream films. Furthermore, the human
aracters that do feature in digital cinema seem concomitantly to have unstable
1 entitle^w hich reach their most acute manifestation in the form of the digital
morph. The unsettling o f figure-ground relationships that I wish to bring to light in
the second chapter, ‘The Nonanthropocentric Character o f Digital Cinema’,
therefore also interferes with the proposed processes of audience identification that
have been theorized within film studies up until now.
A foil exploration o f the viewer’s role, however, will only take place after a
consideration of nme m digital cinema, which is the topic o f the third chapter,
torn Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema’. If digital cinema does not need to
cut, thereby suggesting a continuity o f space, and if analogue film was required to
cut, then a similar logic applies to time. In films such as Russian Ark, Eternal
unshtne o f the Spotless M tn d (Michel Gondry, USA, 2004), and Enter the Void
nme, like space, becomes a continuum that can be traversed in any direction - and
m a continuous manner. That is, time becomes ‘spatialized’ in a certain way, such
hat we can pass from real to ‘imagined’ or ‘remembered’ moments without
necessarily seeing a marked division between them. In this way, time - both lived,
real time and imagined time - also form a continuum.
I should signal that spatial and temporal continuity, together with the unsettling
of the relationship between figure and ground, all have important precursors in
cinema - and it is not my intention here to deny this. In fact, I shall be drawing
upon canonical films from modernist cinema, as well as from animation, to explor^
^ e ways in which this is so. However, while various modernist and art house
classics have suggested a similar conception o f time, now we are seeing a shift from
the margins to the mainstream o f such tropes. Furthermore, I shall be arguing
provocatively, that these tropes reflect our increasing (theoretical) understanding of



space, time, and our place in the universe. That is, contrary to common debates
surrounding the nonindexical and simulated nature of the digital image, I shall be
proposing a new conception of realism that emerges from digital cinema as I explain
it here.
Drawing upon theories and findings in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and
physics, I shall propose that digital cinema reflects an ‘ecological’ logic that seems to
have arisen since the 1970s, and according to which humans are indeed inseparable
from their environment and that they are, like a digital morph, always in the process
o f becoming. That is, human subjeaivity is not fixed, but constantly being produced.
This in turn leads to my fourth chapter, ‘The Film-Spectator-Wbrld Assemblage’, in
which I argue that not only does the ‘digital’ logic developed here apply as a
framework for understanding digital cinema, but it also applies as a framework for
understanding the cinema experience more generally. The late twentieth century has
seen an evolution away from the belief that humans can objectively observe the
world and consciously/rationally survey all that they see. Instead, it would appear
that not only are humans profoundly embodied, but that our bodies are also
profoundly in, or with, the world. If humanity’s claims to ‘objectivity’ have been
challenged by discoveries in the physical and cognitive sciences, then this might
suggest a reaffirmation of the subject, in that knowledge becomes the realm uniquely
of personal experience. However, the challenge is not to objectivity such that there
is recourse to subjectivity, but rather to the entire subject-object binarism. W ith
regard to cinema, it seems that we are not just subjects in, or with, the world, but
that the cinema is also in/with the world. N ot only does our engagement with the
world mean that we are constantly becoming other, but our engagement with
cinema also emerges as a specialized (and multiplicitous) mode o f becoming.
Finally, in the book’s conclusion, entitled ‘Concluding W ith Love’, I shall argue
that the nonanthropocentric spaces and times of digital cinema, together with the
specialized mode of becoming that the cinema experience entails, point to an
‘ecological’ understanding of the world. That is, although digital images do not have
the indexical relationship with the world that analogue images do, digital cinema
does suggest what I term ‘enworldment’ - a sense of being with each other and with
the world. Since we are always only ever with each other and with the world (since
we are always only ever enworlded), then perhaps there is an ethical imperative to
act with a sense of what Jean-Luc Nancy and Michael H ardt and Antonio Negri
might term love.

Difference machines {Digital Deleuze)
Supercinema’s fourth chapter takes us away from digital technology per se, but the
‘film-spectator-world-assemblage’ discussed in that chapter nonetheless reflects at
least in part the logic o f the digital age. Before I explain what this ‘digital logic’ is in
the next chapter, I should perhaps explain what it is not. The logic of the digital is

important theoretical influence on Supercinema. It took modern cinema to re-read the whole of cinema as already made up of aberrant movements ^ d false continuity shots. the movement-image and the time-image. However. and say that Deleuze himself was something of a ‘difference machine’. The decision to use the term film-philosophy instead o f film theory is deliberate.’ Deleuze says early in his career (Deleuze 1991: 28). whom D. indeed. ‘To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman. he says that ‘[t]he electronic image. This intensification is something that Deleuze himself called for in his second Cinema book. As such. in that he advocated Introduction 5 the continual invention o f difference(s). I shall argue that many o f the images that we see m it are the (virtual) embodiments o f phantoms that have always haunted cinema. to go beyond the human condition: This is the meaning of philosophy. Thomas Elsaesser and Warren Buckland. by extension. or taxonomy.. what I am calling ‘digital logic’ o f course preexists digital technology as we know it today. although I personally share philosopher Berys Gant’s position in saying that the two are . I shaU take the name o f Muller’s invention.H .and the time-image. depending on which Deleuzian text one takes as one’s inspiration (Elsaesser and Buckland 2002: 266). although I shall also make use of such ‘post-Deleuzian’ scholars as Manuel De least to Charles Babbage’s initial proposals in 1822 to realize J.N. but it is applicable not just to digital cinema. Such a multiplicity of Deleuzes might make for some disorientation with regard to what Deleuze can do for film-philosophy and/or for film theory (about the distinction between which. to mark its death.and has often realized —its potential for ‘opening us up to the inhuman’. but it is a way. and that through digital technology different qualities of cinema are crystallizing. and Michael H ardt and Antonio Negri. have highlighted how there are various different ways in which Deleuze is useful for film theory. In this sense. if not cinema more generally. if not significantly further. This mode takes as its inspiration the content o f digital cinema.4 Introduction not intended as a teks. argued that the idea o f digital. more below). Again. Rodowick also brings into contact with Deleuze in his excellent Gilles D ekuze’s Time M achine (1997: 188209). of digital cinema. as well as M artin Heidegger. To ^ p la in ‘why Deleuze’. I will propose that digital logic is not necessarily a catalogue. but it also helps to illustrate how a Deleuzian (or post-Deleuzian) reading o f digital cinema involves not so much a reification of what digital cinema is. indicating their effects. but also to other phenomena. The direct time-image is the phantom which has always haunted cinema. which would be beyond our aims. but it does realize yet further potential regarding what cinema is. Being a philosopher o f difference. William Boddy (2008) has.. or rather what it can do. but that the realization of this potential has been intensified since the advent of digital technology and its application to cinema. Gilles Deleuze is an. The Time-Image (referred to henceforth as Cinema 2). not least through his conceptualization of the world as being made up o f machines. for example. Gilles Deleuze has stated that the latter was always present in the former. perhaps even the world itself Writing o f his two most famous image-types. digital cinema is a ‘philosophy machine’ that allows us to go ‘beyond the human condition. And: ‘electronic images will have to be based on still another will to art. but I am using this term because digital technology seems to have allowed this logic to move from the margins and to take a more prominent role in contemporary thought and. then. cinema has been around for at least a century. Since the digital logic’ that I vtish to espouse here predates the widespread proliferation o f the technology from which it takes its name. though. Such a teleology might seem to be suggested by the incorporation into my argument o f references to modernist films and predigital’ film theorists. to which I shall not make reference as much as perhaps I should. but it took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom (Deleuze 2005: 39) W ith regard to digital cinema. Film-philosophy or film theory? The subtitle to Supercinema is Film-Philosophy fo r the D igital Age. Supercinema analyses electronic/numerical/digital images. relating them to both the movement. or perhaps better. if not the most. but only to indicate certain effects whose relation to the cinematographic image remains to be determined’ (Deleuze 2005:254). Muller’s ‘difference engme (see Lindgren 1990). but it is certainly one of the potentialities. In other words. except on rare occ^ions to differentiate my understanding o f Deleuze from Rodowick’s. For example. Jean-Luc Nancy. Brian Massumi. a mode o f seeing. and. o f image-types. even though Deleuze queries the benefits of digital technology. digital technology does not help cinema to achieve some preordained destiny (which would be to think teleologically). for example. Deleuze was something o f a ‘digital logician’ himself. the numerical image coming into being. a technologically determined goal towards which cinema has always been heading. or what he terms electronic images. or electronic. He writes: We can choose between emphasizing the continuity of cinema as a whole. I shall say that such an ‘opening up to the inhuman and the superhuman’ is not necessarily the ‘meaning’. In other words. on cinema. that is the tele and video image. I make references back to precursors to the digital in order to suggest that what I am calling the ‘digital logic’ o f our age has roots that go back significandy further than the development o f the home computer . cinema. We do not claim to be producing an analysis of the new images. had either to transform cinema or to replace it. or emphasizing the difference between the classical and the modern. As such. though. it is worth acknowledging that cinema has always had . or on as yet unknown aspects of the time-image’ (Deleuze 2005: 255). but a mode o f seeing that allows us to understand what digital cinema can do. David Martin-Jones and I have taken this ‘multiplicity of Deleuzes’ a step further by arguing that there are perhaps even as many ‘versions’ o f Deleuze as there are films in the world (Martin-Jones and Brown 2012). In Supercinema. makes Deleuze hard to pin down.

while Supercinema embraces cognitive approaches to film. and Carl Plantinga (2009). not least because it allows us to teesse a distinction between the two (between film theory and film-philosophy).a d o ao r of philosophy). In some senses. even if many films do many similar things). w h d ie r or not all films do the same thing (and I would argue that no two films do do exacdy the same thing. Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies (1996). if I can dare to be a film-philosopher perhaps I can also dare to be a philosopher when I argue that one of the things that cinema can do is to bring about new thoughts. Ramachandran says that ‘in neurology. That is. film and philosophy. to think . 2008). Ihe method employed in Supercinema is to take salient examples from both mainstream and art house films from across the world in order to show what digital cinema as a whole ran do. I might suggest that I could never be so pr^um ptuous as to put myself on a par with Plato. If I am a (film-)philosopher and if Supercinema is a work o f film-philosophy. according to Bordwell. from which my film-philosophy/theory emerges. I understand. In the same way that only one talking pig is needed to prove that pigs can talk (which is Ramachandran’s own b:ample). If Paisley Livingston argues at few are the films that can ‘do’ philosophy (see Livingston 2006. For this reason. I come from a literature and film background. Now. I hope to show that the digital logic that I expound here is not founded upon a ‘lone case’. As such. I hesitate to call myself a philosopher since I still hold in reverence those philosophers to whose level I aspire but which I am uncertain I have the wherewithal to achieve . Torben Grodal (1997. then similarly. among others. I wish to embrace the cognitive approach to film that Bordwell has been keen to promote since at least the publication o f Narration in ihe Fiction Film (1985). Rushton and Bettinson 2010). as Robert Sinnerbrink (2011: especially 1-10) has explained. I do not want to do away with the ‘subject of film’. it IS nonetheless useful for us to consider the fate not o f em -philosophy but o f film theory in early twenty-first-century film studies. indeed. Joseph Anderson (1996). However. I might normally feel more comfortable calling myself a film theorist as opposed to a film-philosopher. then. even if Gaut and I both believe those differences ultimately to be merely semantic. a lone case cannot establish a theory’ (Bordwell 1996: 19). even moments from individual films). involve the words ‘film theory’ in their title (e.even if I give to my ook the portentous-sounding tide. then perhaps Bordwell’s argument ran nonetheless be o f some use. then perhaps it can form the basis for film-philosophy . however. it m i ^ t be worth trying to nuance the potential differences between him theory and film-philosophy. but that in fa a it has as its basis a multiplicity o f ‘lone cases’.. I maintain the aforementioned position that film theory and film-philosophy are basically the same thing. Elsaesser and Hagener 2010. I might similarly hesitate to suggest that my work is philosophy/philosophical. But I am also hopeful that Supercinema wiU present to its readers a system of thought that allows us to reconceive the cinema experience. Neurologist Vilyanur S.and I marvel with envy at people who dare like Prometheus to place themselves in the category o f these intellectual demigods. Edward Branigan (1992). I shall continue to suggest that it is also a book of film theory. which are all commonly used. there is a distinction to be made between a philosopher like Livingston who enquires whether film can ‘do’ philosophy. Kant. Trifonova 2009.because a single example is all that is needed to show what film can many o f my coUeagues in film studies . if a single example does not form a solid basis for a theory o f all cinema (a single theory cannot apply to all films). situations and characters that films show to us (although I shall offer an original reading of these. I am just not that intelligent. And yet. exceptional examples do not. Indeed. in fact. not least because both the digital and . Aristotle. taking its place among a significant number o f books published in the late 2000s/early 2010s that. and a film-philosopher who investigates what cinema can do. Carroll et al. on the level of the stories. and thus as a philosopher I ^ an autodidact with little to no formal training (even if I have a qualification that declares me . Even though I hold that only single examples are required to show what film can do. and which are not necessarily interchangeable. Supercinema (about which more below). particularly with regard to characters). and which in general takes a decidedly ‘anti theory’ stance. Now. pace Bordwell. In that collection. I wish to take issue with Bordwell’s contention. it is ostensibly a work o f film theory because it ta lk about a whole’ (digital cinema) as a result o f the consideration o f ‘parts’ (individual films. and film osopy. which is to say nothing of the potential distinction between these terms and the philosophy o f film. which has been backed up by/Work by. Film theory is not ‘dead’. that many might not share Gaut’s position. I say to myself . then similarly only one example is needed to show what film can do. 2010). constitute safe grounds to construct a theory. To this end.g. but I do want to put forward the possibility that film should be conceived as a subject in its own right. For.because t e creation of new thoughts and thinking are precisely the basis o f philosophy (mey are what philosophy is’) for thinkers like Deleuze and Guattari (1994). out o f modesty and fear. based on single-case studies and demonstrations’ (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 2005: xiii). most o f the major discoveries that have withstood the test of time were. 2009). in 1996 film scholar David Bordwell and philosopher Noel Carroll announced something like Introduction 7 the ‘death’ of film theory when they published their anthology. Hegel and the other giants o f philosophical thought. As a result. Colman 2010.6 Introduction basically the same thing (Martin-Jones et al. However. and given that some (analytic) philosophers might not even recognize continental philosophy as philosophy ‘proper. Given my bent towards continental philosophy (Deleuze and his ilk). I am wary that Supercinema could be one o f Bordwell and Carroll’s reviled ‘systems o f thought that overwhelm the subject o f film (Harbord 2007: 3). 2012. Patrick Colm Hogan (2008). Bordwell in particular rails against what he terms ‘grand theory’ by saying that ‘just as one swallow does not make a summer. even if not all philosophers agree with them or with this definition. But if we do wish to make a distinction between them. to help us. As such. Buckland 2009a. and one that has its own role to play in film viewing. Furthermore.

that he is a fan o f comic books.p . m. Supercinema does not restrict its understanding of digital cinema to a unique set o f qualities. 2004). 'thtongh the aenro.m e d a iL p L o n ~ ^ be said for theoretical and c-cy„r. provides a willing acceptance o f the innovations that can be found in a broad range o f films from a variety of national and transnational contexts. and James E. Clark Kent. Vs. the g y mey accept the innovations offered to 9 them [by cinema]’ (Tsivian 1990: 251). V . but these are nonetheless in the services of. cinema might well have been characterized in part by a history of films that have tried to surpass or at the very least hide the limitations o f the analogue technology used to create it.v ^ Introduction Why'supercinema’? Supercinema primarily takes its name from a theory explained by Bill (David Carradine) to the Bride (Uma Thurman) in Quentin Tarantino’s K ill B ill Vol. S . is his alter ego. (2010) have all argued that there are now more.' by Ela. o f film-philosophy. I should film viewing experience in the b n X “PP^^ches to film. as I shall o f dae spectators. Cutting does. ^ ^26). 1948). " “ ™ “ ta. including some o f the ‘film tb this perhaps also mention phe^ornennl " ’“ d°ned above. digital cinema is Superman compared to analogue cinema’s Batman. The same might W t eidica haa a T r™ ? N o fd “ ' f •imply 'high' or ' W baow Bma. it would help the ^ " “^"“ cal. peahapa a m T l ■‘ “ 'P' the way in which film-phlIc»ophy p i „ „ L i t t phenomenological and Other approaches to film. That is. to apply Tsivian’s terminology. USA. continuity). o f a ‘higher cultural level’). Barry Salt (2004). ” W ? “ ) I T f m p e a the c o g „ „ i„ I *>U »ot have arisen. Supermans true identity is Superman. thereby implying that all films that do not conform to such qualities are somehow not (super)cinematic. ^ ® tradition in Procedures as competing rather n o r m r o . digital cinema is defined by spatial and temporal continuity and by a rejection o f the cut. In what is the film’s final showdown. for example. offers u p " ^ 2 2 u r^ T s M M ^ ^ Ba. Aside from the fact that I shall emphasize the continuity aspect o f the intensified continuity that Bordwell proposes as characteristic of contemporary cinema (that is. 2 (USA. whose other name is Beatrix Kiddo.iustificarion a • ^ u ^ human.. both from Hollywood and elsewhere. then it is perhaps less agnostic in its understanding of what digital cinema can do. Tryon 2009) o f all c k (see Jenkins 2006. on the other hand.„ m a i Z a L u 1 7 ' " " ” “ lavonaites. cognitive. come' Cqtto. precisely.eaa. a H iy “ “ “ I-” "oii«st ml ^ T n f t a T h ” " ' ’" '™ d te o t. the mythology o f which he finds fascinating. which also ground the Vivian Sobchack (1992.8 Introduction d n e m f a n d d. 2 a : 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ film studies o f seeing analvtical and than complementary. Rope (Alfred Hitchcock. . Supercinema. .2004) I o f which include work by (2009). distribution and exhibition. That is to say..2 f “ S ' S l d " " ““ ‘' “ '1 [in the new media environment] ro keen ua ■■ * « '« =nough work d . m some quarters) to each other. not least in terms o f nrovidini^ •° mutually inform conceive the film viewing ° T direction.« d e a t .ed in S . and as such it is to include the term film-philosoohv as subtitle o f the book W eed .d view c and h . but instead I shall look at how tbe-cea f. In.e P ^ n g a t.e m d o „ J . 2006: 117-89). and as it would perhaps have remained without the shift from analogue to’s f o u n d i n g q u e L n . His superhero persona is not his alter ego. Bordwell sees that there are more cuts in contemporary cinema. Whereas Batman and SpiderMan have respectively as their true identity Bruce Wayne and Peter Parker. Supercinema offers up an agnostic’ answer to what cinema in the digital age than the others.L J d o » p . however. rather his everyday persona. „ c a n /d o : S ^ v t ^ o n T I : h " ^ profoundly ‘philosophical’ . As per the brief synopsis above. Although thcae is an oarcndbl u m to aat house/festivaj do not considea any o f these to be more’ ‘ 7 * ’’ mamstream blockbusters. remain a key component o f much contemporary cinema with very few exceptions {Russian A rk and TimeCode being among the more prominent). then my argument concerning continuity does not necessarily hold. fact. As I have argued elsewhere (see Brown 2009a). 2005. Bill tells the Bride. I shall clarify my understanding o f the continuity of digital logic by explaining the reasons behind the main title of this book. if David Bordwell (2002a. and which are united through their use o f digital technology and its effects on cinematic production. not fewer.a n w i . I make clear below. In some w a ^ W ^ ^ H s gained much culmral capital since the S o o T * ’ ^ metaphor that has Keane 2007. both popular and more specialized (or. cuts in contemporary cinema. But it does emphasize certain qualities o f digital cinema that take this medium — cinema — beyond the cinematic as traditionally it has been understood. Cutting etal. especially superhero comic books.

As a pessimistic counterpoint to Dudley Andrew. has also proposed. limited to films that have had theatrical releases of one kind or another). and other large-format screen sizes). Salt. digital cinema only pretends to have them. I have watched and will no doubt continue to watch many films.10 Introduction stands out as a film that seems to be a ‘real time’ movie with no (or rather. In contradistinction to such interventions.and rightly so since each does involve a different experience. two) cuts. But where analogue cinema could never quite transcend its own limitations. A medium. or as the end of celluloid (Hanson 2004) —even though celluloid ‘has not been used in the manufacture o f photographic film since February 1950’ (Enticknap 2009: 418). that ‘“animation is cinema in its purest form. then perhaps here I hope to look more specifically at what those modes of existence have in common.N. but with regard to my use of terms. what it can do. as David H. I am hesitant to agree with any claim for that which is ‘pure’ cinema. Supercinema will therefore take us into a net^ realm of understanding what cinema is. and various other opportunities and/or devices that we have for seeing films. in this way (and wiU certainly stiU claim to have ‘seen’ them foUowing such viewings). Rodowick differentiates film from video from DVD ftom videogames . Cinerama. 2006) because ‘it was clearly intended to be viewed in a movie theatre (Shaviro 2010: 70). such as cinema and film. digital cinema might look like analogue cinema (Clark Kent). which are held back by the drag o f ordinary space and time’ (Andrew 2010: 30). but not entirely. more provocatively. in fact. live action analogue film is now the subset. Noel Carroll (1996) has argued against medium specificity. Germany. D. it does not need to. preferring instead to use the term ‘moving images’ to span the products of audiovisual media in a wide sense o f the word (film.even it those effects are arguably diminished by the feet that our attention might. Shaviro 2010). including ‘classics’. video and Introduction 1 1 television. Germany/ USA/France. it is also a skeuomorph (Fleming and Brown. I agree with Rodowick that watchingAf (Fritz Lang. Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin convincingly argue that all new media —at least in their infancy . Since cinema predominandy involves products made without film as a material. for diverse reasons. to give him his due. or what a film can do do not necessarily disappear when we watch it on television or an iPod . post-filmic (Stewart 2007). O ne of the core debates surrounding digital cinema has been whether traditional terms. I cannot disagree with Bolter and Grusin. W ith digital cinema. in order to make us rethink both film and cinema in terms of what they can do as opposed to in terms of what each word means. 1931) on DVD . for example). who explores what cinema is. even though my final chapter is nominally about the specifically theatrical experience. characters and time are depicted not just in cinema. For the sake of fitting in. when in fact it is made up o f multiple shots. it is equally form. that is to say. and pose questions of existence to us’ (Rodowick 2007: 42). even if nominally we are seeing the same product. If Rodowick speaks of the ‘modes of existence’ that w o r^ of art have across different media. has argued that the relationship between animation and film has been reversed following the advent of digital technology.even if. Fleming and I argue elsewhere. as per Bordwell. not the same as watching it in the cinema . Rodowick explores what cinema was (Rodowick 2007: 25-89) .particul^ly on my laptop . That is.copy the conventions o f older media. aesthetic experience. or better. In fact.. disagrees with Carroll on this issue. in preparation). use the word ‘film’ to describe products that do not have a material film (or a polyester) basis. he does say that ‘film may disappear. perhaps the most insightful scholar of digital cinema. medium is not simply a passive material or substance. W ith regard to medium specificity and the use of the terms film and cinema in Supercinema. however. ‘inspires or provokes sensual. but I raise this point to address both medium specificity and my use o f terms. I shall persist with film and cinema as terms because. the potential effects of a film. By showing that many o f the conventions of analogue cinema remain in digital cinema simply out of convention. in an inverse manner o f certain strands o f analogue cinema that tried to deny their analogue nature (as per the example o f Rope). however. in the same way that Steven Shaviro continues to use the word movie to describe ‘post-cinematic films such as Southland Tales (Richard Kelly. And I shall use the word ‘cinema to describe products that have not necessarily played (and which certainly have not always been seen) in a theatrical venue I do this in part deliberately. but I would like to propose that digital cinema is not just a remediation of analogue cinema. Unlike Carroll. Films may well still cut. I sympathize with Carroll in wanting to be able to talk about moving images (and continuous sounds) that span theatrical cmema (includmg IMAX. Or.” for unencumbered moving images outrun photographically generated shots. with cinema dominated by (digital) animation (Manovich 2001: 302). idea. after Adam Rosadiuk. but it is in fact o f a different nature (Supercinema). I must explain that I shall. there is a reversal. home viewing on online and television. and Cutting et al. films cut now even more than they used to. [but] cinema nonetheless persists’ (Rodowick 2007: 30). are still appropriate to describe a medium that no longer relies on film as a material. I am inclined to agree with both Rodowick and Carroll. such that if animation was once a subset o f cinema. And yet. various scholars have described contemporary cinematic practice as post-cinematic (Stam 2000. But digital technology’s effect on cinema is such that while cutting remains as a convention. out of respect for linguistic convention. I shaU talk o f film and cinema in this ‘expansive’ manner because the arm of Supercinema is to describe the ways in which digital technology has changed how space. in offering an answer to Bazin’s question on what cinema is. but across all of these media (though my focus here is almost. digital cinema deliberately looks like analogue cinema. Rodowick. for Rodowick. I shall elaborate mote on medium specificity below. meaning that the evolution o f media forms is defined by remediation (Bolter and Grusin 2000). as Aylish .although. Dudley Andrew. a medium is a terrain where works of art establish their modes of existence. not least because some theorists still hold to specific meanings of the terms ‘cinema’ and ‘film’. Lev Manovich.

17. N ot only does Hollywood play a key role in the development o f digital cinema. That is. USA. USA.with visual effects designer Scott Billups being credited as ‘a major figure in bringing together Hollywood and Silicon Valley by way of the American Film Institute’s Apple Laboratory and Advanced Technologies Programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s’ (Manovich 2001./«nzfric Park (Steven Spielberg. The development o f many of these digital technologies and techniques took place in and around Hollywood. t l r S “ L lrL h “ Jnring the A m V S t then. 10). should they In due co“ e b e 'p r ^ ^ e d ®“ ' ” What it always should W b e c tm e . digital sound became widespread by the late 1980s. TAOA’ (Steven Lisberger. however. and action movies. in aU media. 1968) (Willis 2005. 293). ™ w ing o f film! in t W 0 * ^ t „ “ “ ^ r d different‘modes o f existence’ To h . Firsdy. 1993). science fiction. 2009) as among the most prominent examples of films featuring/pioneering CGI. USA. 1976).either as a geographical location or as an industrial system. Finally. 194. However. Titanic Games Cameron.^ lS w r ' u computer. the technique became digitized only in 1977 when John Dykstra created his Dykstraflex system for Star Wars: Episode TV .7 „ s . Looker (Michael Crichton. trilogy (Peter Jackson. Manovich 2001..1 2 Introduction pla>ing* b = l» « n the screen on which the film is tetting in which w e L v S ^ ^ r t r “ which our e x p e n w " f tovind. 1997). USA. Silicon Valley’s proximity to Hollywood undoubtedly contributed to this . then. USA. Star Wars: Episide L . with disk/computer-based digital audio and video editing becoming widespread in the mid. 1984) as early examples o f films featuring computer generated imagery (CGI) (Darley 2000. as per Time Warner AOL and Sony. with D TS. Futureworld (Richard T. 111). I consider L product viewed in a particular ftheM.„l?Ztr“ finlsS^^^”-"U“ supercinematic’ will perhaps tomorrm!^ h again. digital cinema as manifested via films featuring CGI is not limited to Hollywood . to portray digital cinema. ‘vapid’ would be to mischaracterize it. New Zealand/USA. 1982). which evolve hete to a c c o m m o d T '^ r" '" ^ . p p ^ What is digital Cinema? . 1999). USA. has changed such that we hav 7 ^ '^fias converged with the was latent. I will be han^v t^^^ e products. USA. m large part and cinema to b e ^ l T a t d ~ e n t ’. but also with genres that are sometimes thought to be ‘vapid’ (Kipnis 1998. 1981). citing Westtuorld (Michael Crichton. 604). USA. 1991). USA. or at least visible in anal ^ cmema. degrees o f intensity. Heffron. The Lord . 2001-2003). Meanwhile. No doubt also contributing to Hollywood’s preeminence as the locus o f digital cinema is the fact that the major Hollywood studio is typically part o f a vertically and horizontally integrated corporation that not only involves itself in all stages of film production and distribution. USA. 73). but many o f its most important developments have taken place in blockbusters. M otion control.A New Hope (George Lucas. and The Last Starfighter (Nick Casde. 1999-2004).’ 1979). We might name The Al^ss Qames Cameron. the digital logic o f which h a sn o w c o m e (d o se r)to tt’L F T “ ” ' ' ” " T " ^ " ‘° ° ^ ‘’"‘^^°'^'dbutw hich V o n d ’ itself T I I ro T serves to signal n o " r e v t w n ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ fact that it L iv e s n T a T ™ a f g u e sn ^ rZ s “ le Z Z " Z Z ^ P -’ but the r e tZ aTp^:. USA. Andrew Dmiey. USA. UK/USA. what I hope to describe as the ‘cin (or mobiie) ' “ »• the way in *'■“ ^ ^ »" P --. including computer software and hardware. The M atrix trilogy (Andy and Larry Wachowski. lev T T ' ”’ u 'Z r ’h ^ ^ characterize today as “ ” ™ c ’once * “ 8«4 even if Introduction 1 3 digital effects from this period. T i 7 r cinema . Austin 2004. 1982). and Avatar Games Cameron. 1973). USA. USA. outstrip their terms.The Phantom Menace (George Lucas. 294). 1977) (Konigsberg 2000. Terminator 2: Judgement Day Games Cameron. Star Trek 2: The Wrath o f Khan (Nicholas Meyer. nonlinear videotape editing had been introduced in 1970 (after‘videotape editing itself had begun in 1956). Dolby D igital SR-D and SDD S being the first three digital sound systems in place (Sergi 1998). 2000).to late 1980s (Ohanian and Phillip. was pioneered by John W hitney in the 1960s before being put to use in 2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick. But for the time b j ^ Z Z skeuomorphioJIy Ureudm i e .: 2000.n * e . Gladiator (Ridley Scott. but also.and I b d f ^ film being able to e m ™ t t U t " r die work o f art’s films at the chances o f a specific subjectivfty or c o n sc io u L " ^ u T r f " f t " r " ’ ^ that I will never see in a theatrical ’ ^ cinema as often L l ^ ^ because the Greek word Kivtiua simni m this book. The Black Hole (Gary Nelson.^ ^ particular material-based that span a range of the above mate ^ “ "ds then. UK/USA. 1989). or the ability mechanically to repeat the movements of a camera across various takes. and not the products that appropriare other. there is a risk of confusing digital cinema not only with Hollywood.!’ film and cinema. In other words.

1994). In other words. unnoticed and even Introduction 15 unnoticeable: ‘Perhaps one of the most disturbing aspects of the new wave of digital effects films is that they do not seem . such as Toy Story Qohn Lasseter. and France (BUF). To give just a few examples. So deceptively obvious is it that ‘[i]t is perhaps time to stop condemning the [New Hollywood] blockbuster and to start. China. correct period detail in location shoots {Devil in a Blue Dress [Carl Franklin. among others. nor to Hollywood as a location or as an industry. Uruguay. 2010). As such. Even if CGI were limited to Hollywood blockbusters. better. Russia. after Rick Altman. which reminds us that Hollywood is now ‘globalized’ (see Miller et al. 2008). are today digitized and then manipulated using the DI. might feature hordes of CGI monsters. given the panglobal provenance o f these films. USA. Convergent digital cinema If CGI in blockbusters is the most salient manifestation of digital cinema.but it is also thanks to digital technology that the camera (or. I would like to propose that sudi films are not ‘vapid’ and that. Murugadoss. Hollywood is not ‘an excessively obvious cinema’ but instead. like The Lord o f the Rings. filmmakers may be able to depict a dinosaur photorealisticaUy . either. pardy shot in New Zealand. digital technology not only helps to produce the spectacular battle scenes. digital special effects play a prominent role in films such as Le fabuleux destin d'Amelie Poulain/Amelie (Jean-Pierre Jeunet. [and create] the Norwegian army in the snowy landscape o f [Kenneth] Branagh’s HamUt ([UK/USA]. while CGI might be most salient in the monsters and explosions o f blockbuster. W hat is more. and Trolljegeren/ TrollHunter (Andre 0vredal. TJie use o f computer manipulated/digitized images is not limited solely to the level of content. ‘we now need to think o f cinematography. it is worth mentioning that such mainstream/Hollywood films do provide the bulk o f the ‘supercinematic’ examples given in this book. 1995]). therefore. they are also not limited to blockbusters at all. battles. to understand it’ (Buckland 1998: 175). sci-fi and/or action films. through bodies. 2009).a realism that Andrew Darley characterizes as a super realism (Darley 2000: 115) . 2008). To provide a second example. If digitally/computer generated images are not limited to spectacular action set pieces within action/sci-fi blockbusters. but can we distinguish those myriad monsters in the batde of Mordor from the M ordor setting itself if both are digital creations? As David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson explain. Digital effects are not just special effects. New Zealand (Weta Digital). O f the painted light effects in True Lies (James Cameron. nor to the spectacular moments within any film regardless of genre. USA. 2004). USA. ‘a deceptively obvious cinema’ (Altman 1999: 135). we should recognize that there are other digital forms and filmmaking practices. 1996]) or to air-brush in or out wanted or unwanted details in the cinematographic image’ (Cubitt 2004: 258). monsters and space ships. New Zealand/USA. as image-capture processes’ (Prince 2004: 30). and even directing. while I shall briefly explore the wider manifestations o f digital cinema below. 1995).as we shall see in the first chapter. Casshem (Kazuaki Kiriya. which has been analysed by both Aylish Wood (2007a) and John Belton (2008). 1994) into ‘the same space as President Kennedy. Canada (Hybride Technologies). 2006). GwoemuUThe Host Qoon-ho Bong. especially with regard to the camera’s movement through a given space. As such. as Scott McQuire has explained (see McQuire 2000: 41). Avatar was. Computers have rJso greatly broadened the techniques available to a director. and films created using analogue cameras but subsequently altered through the use of the digital intermediate (DI).at first glance . 2001). Norway. for example. Furthermore. digital technology can also put Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis. South Korea. [and remove] Gary Sinise’s legs by digitally painting out his limbs frame by frame. That CGI is not limited to Hollywood blockbusters only reinforces the need to consider this global phenomenon. ‘effects are now routinely used to brighten or darken skies. including digital animations. Similarly. then it is also worth remembering that digital cinema is neither limited uniquely to films featuring CGI. If digital special effects/CGI cannot be limited to blockbusters and/or action films. and it featured the work o f various digital effects companies from. Given that nearly all films. For this reason. then nearly every film made today is in some respects digital . Stephen Prince says that they are ‘a digital manipulation so subtle that most viewers probably do not notice the trickery’ (Prince 1996: 30).even if not obviously so. 2004). the use o f digital special effects/CGI in cinema is not even limited to a globalized Hollywood. Japan.R. USA. it would still be worthy of study. instead. and speed not only past. it is worth remembering that CGI is not limited to spectacular action set pieces. France/Germany. They are ubiquitous. Chi hURedC /^ Q o h n Woo. since the digital/digitized image will more or less always be ‘captured’ on a computer and edited/manipulated/ changed in the digital environment. problematic and misleading. the USA (Industrial Light and Magic). but also through oncoming vehicles . 1996)’ (Allen 1998: 126). to say that digital cinema is equal to Hollywood as a location is. However. if they were not shot digitally. within the context o f globalization. the UK (Framestore). Ghajini (A. for example.14 Introduction o f the Rings were partly produced in New contain any effects at all’ (Dixon 1998: 23). 2005). digital special effects/CGI are not limited to Hollywood. as Stephen Prince points out. ‘live’ action films shot using digital cameras (as per the infamous Danish dogme 95 films). turn small groups o f extras into swarming crowds (as in the concert scenes in That Thing You Do! [Tom Hanks. India. Nochnoy dozor/Night Watch (Timur Bekmambetov. the computer) can pass through walls. Thanks to CGI. USA.lAtaque de PdnicoUPanic Attack! (Federico Alvarez. The Lord o f the Rings: The Return o f the King (Peter Jackson. precisely because o f its ‘excess’ material. . but it also shapes the entire texture of the Lard o f the R in ^ films (Bordwell and Thompson 2004: 249-51). For aside from explosions. 2003). but are distributed in a truly global manner.

o f music. then. or even w lnted to distinguish between digital creations and other living and/or human beings the extremely convincing realism o f the digital creature Gollum in The Lord o f the mntrs ms. Brown 2009b). (for more on 2 0 0 % r m . Henry J e n k i n s argues that what counts as digital media (and which therefore ‘digital theory’ addresses) is anything involving a computer. cameras. primarily understood in terms o f information storage and numerical calculation. To work through the relationship between cinema and other media. the prefix digital opens dnpm a up to an array of further influences that make it very diflScult to define. appear ot to be kgital. together with some of the aged and rejuvenated Brad Pitt sequences in ^ d T e ^ a ff question ? f T r Manovich argues. lighting and other details that were modified in postproduction Z frmul Introduction a appearances. and even though digital technology alone could a n ^ the colours. While fiIm m ^ers may up until now not have crossed. shooting a film and then editing it in postproduction. nowadays filmmakers often write.| fil” ? 2009. making it easier to define. If Bazin’s question ‘what is cinema?’ haunts film scholars in the face of the digital. as Walter Benjamin (1991) has so famously pointed out. to talk o f digital cinema as all cinema involving computers is to discuss so many converged. o f theatre and dance. cinema has since its inception been a convergence of engineering (mechanical reproduction) and art. in fkct. 2005h together with Russian Ark.Russian Z t h U Z ^ W‘^rs movies which abound with digital monsters. o f reality itself. Ganonf n o t ^ k di H “ ™ ofimage resolution. T W o f the Sith (USA. expanded. with no need for cast. one can create a photorealistic digital animation using only a computer. the computer can now be used to distribute films. Thomas 2003: viii). Vimeo. with countless websites such as YouTube. which their own fates on a digital video (DV) containing millions of (predominandy short) films that any computer user with access to the internet and the correct software can upload. War o f the WorUs-scfe. then to add the word ‘digital’ to the question ‘what is cinema?’ does not simply establish a genre o f film that is ‘smaller than’ cinema and which we could thus define with relative ease. The term convergence is also helpfiil for articulating the relationship between cinema and other media. Similarly. particularly since there has been ‘a shift from the computer as a tool. perhaps better. A e development o f Motion Capmre (or MoCap) technology 2m ) td j" The Polar Express (USA. Historically speaking. even though only digital technology could allow such a singlet-take ninety-eight-mmute film to exist. that it is not a ohm I animations from seeming S r bf uT^ downgraded in order to be m or! bd^vable (Manovich 2001: 201-202). 201 l)!arenow also lite T f i f a n i m a t i o n and live action.l6 Introduction To borrow Henry Jeoldnr. download and/or view at leisure . and. the image resolution o f which is barely distinguishable from an analogue one (whic^ is to say nothing of the many films L d e in k e early 2010s using v^ious digital cameras produced by companies like Arri. a short Uruguayan film in which alien robots attack Montevideo. were all filmed with the Sony 24p high resolution digital camera. and Atom. perhaps we can turn to Jean-Luc Godard. But more happened with the aforementioned Panic Attack!. media that the original question (‘what is cinema?’) might seem simple in comparison. . Furthermore. together with Steven Spielberg’s The as ^ X lth T o ff (U S A ^ ^ Z e a la n d . since the boundaries between cinema and other media have become even more blurred on account o f this single adjective: digital. even though none features the k e r d hybrid of the two ^ in The Lord o f the lUn^s films and L r . Instead. who started to use video in his work with . of various precinematic’ imaging and animation technologies. 2004). o f course. Ohanian and Philhps 2000: 4. the point o f convergence for many things. o f the novel. Beounslf{\JSA. Orere ir convergence between the ( M m r e L “ X ‘1o08)‘“* 'h b “sees ' “ a monster terrorize New Yorkers who film 2008). 2007). the computer is central to all o f the filmmaking practices mentioned above. as Holly Willis proclaims. Rather than close cinema off. shoot and edit all at the same time. merges the type o f c lm p u t« fhT‘D v 1 e S " ^ ^ o f 35m m /CG I ^ b r id films with the D V realism (Manovich 2000a) o f the dogme 95 films. Indeed. leaving mass destruction in their wake. the influence on (ot the confluence m) cinema o f graphic art (including photography). as Jon Lewis (2004) has suggested. ‘we are witnessing the most extensive reworking o f the role o f images since the inauguration o f cinema’ (Willis 2005: 4). a relationship that has become still more complex in th e ' digital age. crew. Digital cinema is also characterized by a temporal convergence in the filmmaking process. Or. the question ‘what is digital cinema?’ is perhaps equally difficult to answer. Ginema is no longer the linear process o f writing a script.. means that cinema has perhaps always been a hybrid medium. Manovich writes elsewhere k a t wWe most live action films ^ d animated features do look quite distinct today the result of deliberate choices rather than the inevitable consequence o f erences m production methods and technology’ (Manovich 2006: 26) ^ the fi r connection to digital imagery in the first chapter. However. then. or. or editing suites: all equipment and personnel potentially converge on the one machine.(2006) rernr. and A C h r t s ^ Carol (USA. but I mention the increasing realism o f digital animation hefe so as o suggest another way m which digital animation and live action seem to be t r a r '^ 'T a f ^ ' o f nearly an equal resolution to (ulrjlt . O n the contrary. sets and action sequences. Similarly. to the computer as a medium o f communication education and entertainment’ Genkins 2004: 236). 2009). as George Lucas has explained (see Kelly and Paris! 1997. For this reason.

where ‘cinema’ specifically begins and ends is not necessarily important. playfhlly. and to isolate those elements o f moving image and sound production. but related and interlinking. it is here that I m ust part ways w ith the term convergence. online films that rework old material in order to create something new (‘mashups’). and animations. 2007) were also shot on DV . many of whom have the occasional stab at making amateur films. the use of digital film (particularly DV) in art installations by the likes of Bill Viola. and more and more types of film. and the work o f resolutely experimental. 2001) on DV. While in some senses this book is about digital cinema. Supercinema returns W hile the onset o f digital cinema seems to have thrown many theorists into a panic as they scramble to work out what cinema is or was. 2005) and Quiet City (USA. 2008). Nor need we dismiss online were many works by the so-called Sixth Generation of Chinese filmmakers. which was shot digitally. Malcolm Le Grice and Steve McQueen. be they posted onhne. Rodowick (2007: 90-93) argues that Godard uses just Video’ for that film. and fan films. such as the so-called ‘mumblecore’ directors Joe Swanberg and Aaron Katz. we need not think about these as separate from IN L A N D EM PIRE (France/Poland/USA. 1980) Godard himself proclaimed the relationship between (polyester) film and (electronic) video as being like that between Cain and Abel. or expansion. and Darley 2000: 147-66) when we consider that Andy and Larry (now Lana) Wachowski not only wrote and directed the original M atrix trilogy of theatrical films. and Latin America.500) feature films Kissing on the M outh (USA. but also Enter the M atrix (USA. as well as The M atrix Online (USA. which take concepts. 2003). this approach also helps to explain why this book is called Supercinema and not D ista l Cinema. 2006). the two seem through digital technology to have converged. At the time. 2005) and D r Horrible’s Sing-a-long Blog (Joss W hedon. shown theatrically. working almost exclusively with this format or with a combination o f film and video between 1974 and 1979. Film Socialisme (Switzerland/France. further reinforces the expansive aspects o f digital cinema. such as Rabbits (USA. who suggest in the tide o f their edited collection that digital cinema might be neither Cain nor Abel but. no doubt in part because o f the lower costs involved in production. low. If a filmmaker like David Lynch makes movies specifically for the internet. according to Holly Willis (2005: 38). the stock used by countless home video camera owners the world over. That is. Problematic as some readers no doubt will find the retention of the term ‘cinema. when supercinema is considered as a process rather than as a thing. Thinking about cinema not in terms of what it is but rather in terms o f what it can do allows us to cut across what up until now have been considered different. come into existence. such as Four-Eyed Monsters (Susan Buice and Arin Crumley. ‘Cable’ (see Elsaesser and Hoffinann 1998. inter alia. distributed locally via DVD. shot part o i Eloge de Vamour/ln Praise o f Love (France/Switzerland. and other notable filmmakers such as Abbas Kiarostami and Brillante Mendoza. as more and more films. or just kept at home but viewed on home cinema systems. namely the aforementioned simultaneity o f being able to write. China/Hong Kong. including parts o f Africa. Introduction 19 For. and which incorporates elements of Rabbits into its containing experimental short films. useful though it is. supercinema designates not just the capacity but also the plain reality that what constitutes cinema is always changing. but also because it allowed him something that film did not. 2002). Haddon 1988. specifically Elsaesser 1998: 26). whose respective microbudget (cUS$2. not in a way that implies that cinema is ‘lost’. including Jia Zhangke (e. Convergence implies that all things move towards a central point. Godard has. he posited video as the future o f cinema. 2010) was certainly shot in part on DV and various other digital devices. forasmuch as the above are all examples o f how we can think o f convergence in relation to digital cinema (the computer is central). an online game that in part takes the form of a Massively . As such. Sanxia haoren! Still Life. it suggests the moving ‘beyond’ that which cinema originally was. because even if the computer emerges as the point of convergence in digital cinema and digital media more generally. with davidlynch. films shot on mobile phone cameras. And it is in respect o f these expansive aspects that I again propose supercinema as an alternative term to convergence. shoot and edit all at once (see Silverman and Farocki 1998: 142). media.i8 Introduction Anne-Marie Midville in the mid-1970s. We might include amateur webcasts and films shot on MiniDV. Cinema might also overlap with video games (see. However.g. the aim here is to shift the analysis of film away from essences and towards zero-budget filmmakers. as indicated by Thomas Elsaesser and Kay Hoffinann. I might also suggest how the adoption o f D V f i l m m o V i n g in countries all over the world. 2003). 2006) and Wang Bing {Tie X i QufWest o f the Tracks. while in Sauve qu ip eut (la vie)/Slow M otion (France/Austria/West Germany/Switzerland. Either way. In other words. 2002). convergence does not capture the expansive aspects o f the evolution o f film I have aheady suggested these expansive aspects by suggesting the global reach of digital special effects. As video has developed into digital video. as Jenkins this or telos^ was not written in advance. In this sense. a computer game that explains the action that takes place between the first film and its sequels. characters and premises from preexisting material and rework them in their own way (see Jenkins 2006: 131-68). USA. such as D um bland (USA. although D. including mobile phone cameras. the Middle East. China. Asia. distribution and exhibition that pertained uniquely to film and to no other medium (as if such a task were possible in light of the longstanding convergent history o f cinema). convergence does suggest inward movement towards a point o f centrality. while digital cinema is equally defined by outward movement. 2005). but that cinema has simply changed. as follows: It is not that the term is teleological.

Instants later. To consider cinema according to its abilities is not to say that this is cinema and that is not. seemingly without a cut. aggressive electroindustrial music (‘Stealing Fat’ by the Dust Brothers). while jets o f blue-grey liquid or gas (we cannot really tell). with large black protrusions spiking upwards and with what seem to be giant droplets of water rolling o ff to the side. After an instant. as the narrator explains to us a terrorist plot called Project Mayhem. to consider cinema according to its abilities is to say that cinema can do this —not to the exclusion o f those films that do not do the same thing.along a black trough and away from the flesh-coloured expanse behind it.still backwards . but ‘supercinematic’ thinking (thinking ‘beyond’ cinema as an essence) can allow us to consider these together . supercinematic thinking allows us to categorize films diflFerently. There is a sound o f bubbling water. some o f which occasionally flash an electric blue. framing the grooved black surfece along which we have just travelled. we pass backwards on to a curving surface the pink-cream colour of a white human’s skin. the camera rushes down alongside the exterior o f a glass-fronted office block. examples o f ‘transmedia storytelling’ (see Jenkins 2006: 93-130). The camera then comes to a rest and the music ends with the bizarre distension o f a final note that warps into a strange crescendo. two white dots on two parallel and upwardjutting black rectangles appear. These are. tubes and floating objects. who has a handgun in his mouth. but in addition to them. 1 Digital Cinema’s Conquest of Space The opening moments of Fight Club provide one o f the clearest examples o f how digital technology has changed film aesthetics in terms of the depiction of space. let us move on to the first chapter. down . and the various discourses that surroimd them. The camera switches focus to show us the tortured face o f Fight Club’s unnamed narrator (Edward Norton). and which were originally available online before being released on DVD. His voiceover replaces the music: ‘People were always asking me if I knew Tyler Durden. and clumps o f green globules and other unrecognizable forms float past. Backwards we travel along a darker section of this fleshrcoloured surface until we run . This accompanies a vertiginous backward tracking shot through a dark space inhabited by strange green-grey shapes that come to resemble a series of pipes. before. several o f which were also scripted by the Wachowski brothers.even if we should of course bear in m ind the differences between cinema. Although this study looks mainly at digital films that have had theatrical releases. but to what they do. Having established that Supercinemet is about what (digital) cinema can do. according not to what they are. games and other media. before we hear a record needle hit a groove and zip into pulsing. as Henry Jenkins has said. This is not to mention the various Anim atrix films. The names o f the film’s creative personnel materialize on the screen and then dissolve. which considers how we are to understand space in films made through the use o f digital technology. Answering the question ‘what can [digital] cinema do? means that one is not confined by the same constricting categories that address what cinema is’.2 0 Introduction Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG).

since it involves the physical-chemical effects of light on celluloid at a particular instant in time. by the laws o f Newtonian physics. though. this is an anachronism if ever there was one (Carroll 1996: 55)! The point is. here Fincher takes us direcdy there and.and this is o f crucial importance. down his fece and along the barrel o f the gun that is in his mouth. The second shot described above. I shall turn my attention to indexicality before irguing for digital cinema’s perceptual and spatial realism. which turn electric blue as the narrators neurons fire. again at breakneck speed. As noted by Noel Carroll. I shall also argue this in spite of the common objection that computer generated images are not indexically real. even if in other respects they show us impossible (and therefore unrealistic) feats. be those objects simply background details or moving creatures such as dinosaurs. The camera then changes trajectory and heads sideways. so. and which is set to destroy the buildings through which we have rapidly and impossibly just travelled. Narrative is diminishing in importance. significantly. arguing for the perceptual and spatial realism of digital images. As such. The image and the index I shall argue for the realism o f the opening shots of Fight Club. therefore.related to contingency. since objects can appear in the image that were never there. the question o f indexicality. Mitchell (1992) has provided a convincing history o f how artists and forgers have feked analogue photographs via various means since soon after photography’s inception in the mid-nineteenth century. on the human scale. a trace. becomes more significant’ (Cubitt 2002: 26). too. for example.cinema. I shall limit myself to perceptual and spatial realism. Analogue photography. analogue photographs convey a ‘thisness’ of the objects that they depict prior to any interpretations that we as viewers may assign to them (Doane 2002: 25). Siegfried Kracauer (1997) and R o l^ d Barthes (200t)) -emerging as the three best known champions of this ‘realistic’ approach. that is.. through areas o f solid earth until it reaches another subterranean car park that houses a bomb nesded alongside a concrete column. For this reason. with the flourishing o f digital techniques and technology in film. but in order to do so I must establish what cinematic realism is or might mean. the globules of water are droplets o f sweat that roll along his scalp and past his military-style crew cut. is. how it is depicted has also changed . Italy/USA/UK. William J. also illustrates how digital cinema can and does depict space. that analogue photography for better or for worse captures what was before the camera. Since the link to or trace o f reality is lost when the object depicted did not stand before the camera. various scholars have argued that film is a' transparent recording of reality. but is in feet a digital fabrication. space has usurped the privilege o f time. and in terms o f its charaaers behaviour/ psychology. But while space is of renewed importance in digital cinema. Indeed. the indexical link to reality is more profoundly lost. walls and other aspects o f the physical world are no longer the obstacles that they used to be. in terms of its premise. many o f the older obstacles that stopped filmmakers from achieving such shots in the past have now been removed.. Laura Mulvey (2006) and D . I shall argue that the question o f indexicality has unduly dominated discourse surrounding digital cinema. For each of these theorists.. Photographic (analogue) film is thought to be an index of reality. El Cid (Anthony Mann. in which the camera races towards a van. on to his sweating scalp. In the shots from Fight Club. film stock used and development procedures undertaken. with Andre Bazin (1967). it is a frozen moment of time whose contents are to a certain extent immutable.N . the opening shot sees the camera progress from the fear centre o f the narrators brain. There are several competing levels at which a film might be deemed realistic: perceptually. without a cut. tVhich relied/relies precisely on the traces left on the filmsmp by reality itself in order to convince audiences of the physical reality o f what it depicts. the photographic image remains an imprint. Bor example. however. 1961). If the contents o f digital images have . Sean Cubitt has noted how ‘[i]n the neo-Hollywood o f the 1990s and 2000s. However. Mary Ann Doane (2002. 2007). Since it bears a relation on the issue of realism in digital cinema. Here. chance. through a bullet hole in the windscreen. which takes us on a tour of the Project Mayhem bomb sites. has there been a revolution in how and what cinema can and does depict. the imaginary worlds created by films. exposure time. in which films can be made with a virtual camera. In Mary Ann Doane’s terms. That this happens in one unbroken and continuous movement suggests that in the digital age. The green-grey tubes that we see are synapses.22 Supercinema through the earth and into a basement car park. while diegesis. backwards through his cerebral architecture. Regardless of framing. spatially. including how it depicts space. Digital Cinerfia's Conquest of Space 23 temporally. This indexical relationship between image and world is the cornerstone of analogue cineiha. In the era of digital imaging. Although it is hard for audiences to know when they first watch Fight Club. evidence of reality. Where once filmmakers might have had to cut to the basement car parks in which the bombs are housed. or an index of what was before the camera at the time of the photograph’s being taken. indexicality is. in the same way that there has sin'ce Albert Einstein been a revolution that in many respects supersedes Sir Isaac Newton’s understanding o f the physical universe. we normally take walls to be solid and an analogue camera cannot pass through walls by virtue o f its own status as a solid object in a world governed. Rodowick (2007). plays a prominent role in work by Philip Rosen (2001). as Cubitt identifies. regardless of what solid barriers would normally prevent the camera from doing so. questions o f indexicality have loomed large in discussions of realism in connection with digital. and into a circling closeup o f a bomb that is waiting to explode. and temporality. or the supposed lack thereof in digital cinema. features a shot showing a Boeing 747 alongside the eleventh-century Castilian history that the film otherwise claims to portray.

For this reason.cinema was not ther^ore a transparent depiction o f‘raw reality. However. as we shall see. and secondly. even an image captured on a DV camera. contrary to the above. W hile indexicality is considered to be a direct registration of reality —whether it is light on polyester or wind on weather vane —this is not necessarily the same as realism. we can perceive in their work some uneasiness with the ‘transparency’ o f the photographic image. when in fact.since it is the very indexical nature of the images that helps to convince viewers that they are not looking a coded images. This realism was held by Bazin in particular to be truly brings us to a discussion of the ontological nature o f the digital image. 82).24 Supercinema no ontological reality in the way that the contents o f analogue images do.. it did not have thisness. . Indeed. 2007) has pointed out. Laura Mulvey and others cinema was made up of signs .. However. firstly. Mclver Lopes 2003). Marks recognizes that indexicality in the usual sense is lost in the creation of a digital photograph. for theorists. then this description of indexicality might seem irrelevant. not its Digital Cinema’s Conquest of Space 25 documentary properties. Cohn MacCabe posited in 197 ‘N arrative must deny the time o f its own teUing . so as to take us closer to what their psychoanalysis-mspired theory might term the Real (MacCabe 1991. but rather a style. together with the argument that realism is a style. an approach that some philosophers also folldw (see. redism was not inherent for Screen theorists. Nonetheless. then. the computer registers only ‘mass’ behaviour on the part o f light waves —again regardless o f the resolution of the image. If for Bazin Russian montage is ‘unthinkable in any film after 1932’ (Bazin 1967: 32). Far from being experiential. on one level. felt that montage was the truly cinematic element of film. r If the digital image. rather than light imprinted directly on to polyester. Arnheim also states th^t ‘nothing has been achieved by simply imitating real things (Arnheim ^^^Beyotd Arnheim. be realistic at all. for example the films o f Sergei M. However. Intriguingly. Bazin’s sense of cinema as a t r a n s p ™ i n d ^ of reality did not garner much credibility among the Screen theorists of the 1970s If for Cohn MacCabe. complete knowledge (MacCabe 1991: 87). before we can reach any conclusions on this matter. N ot all theorists o f cinema have historically agreed with Bazin’s position.hence the use of semiotics as a theoretical framework through which to consider it -. they are. I shall take inspiration from Marks’s appeal to physics in this and the final chapter. or. . then digital images cannot. Laura U. not an index of it (see also Cubitt 2010). the in tro d L io n of the ‘coded’ nature. while for the theorists (if I may be permitted to'generalize) ‘realism’ in cinema is a style that induces us not to constructed nature of what we are seeing (and which must therefore be chaUenged) Rather than deny the indexical link between image and the real-world object that it depicts. such as breaking the fourth wall via direct address to cameta. or pixels) that conforms to the conventions of photography. we must weave into the debate questions surrounding the realism of digital images.. It is the transcoding o f light into information that causes this indexical loss. For Arnheim. wind directly turning a weather vane. [Sound is] a radical artistic impoverishment if Lm pared with the available purer forms’ (Arnheim 1983: 164-89). For Arnheim. the approximation takes place because computers cannot tolerate states between 1 and 0. Let us make clear that this loss of indexicality pertains to images recorded with digital cameras as well as to digital images animated on a computer. with digital images the incident light is translated into a symbol (consisting of Is and Os) that is an approximation of the light’s wavelength.. is relevant to our thinking about digital cinema. Marks (1999) has argued that. That said. the realism of continuity editing is also a deliberate manipulation of r ^ i t y A at seeks to give expression to a certain point of view/ideology. for must refose its status as discourse (articulation). and in this sense were not images of real objects.tif the image. in fevour o f its self-presentation as simply identity. but rather pointed to a ‘second’ meaning that could be read m the im ^ e . rather than registering ambiguity. but it is not totally lost. hence his predilection for films in which the real world could manifest itself in contradistinction to the manipulated series of images put together in Russian montage. meaning that the digital image’s connection with reality may be simplified/ approximated. This has nothing to do with image quality or resolution. the behaviour o f electrons in the silicon circuit does have what Marks calls a ‘micro-indexicality’: the behaviour of some electrons determines the behaviour o f others within the circuit. its images represented objects. m use Doane’s term. as Tom G unning (2004a. ^ 'i t is important to note that neither Arnheim’s nor Screen theorys approach to cinema denies indexicality. Eisenstein. MacCabe and his peers in the Screen stable approved ‘Brechtian’ techniques. it is useful for at least two seems . because. as Jean-Luc Comolh ^ Narbpni (1991) have argued. but I must also mention Marks’s concession to micro-indexicality simply to suggest that there is potentially some indexicality in the digital image. for Andre Bazin and Roland Barthes indexicahty is an undeniable sign of the realism of the analogue image. light in a digital photograph is transmuted via a computer into Is and Os andis then given an output format '(the assignation of colours to various picture elements. cinema was representational. because. indexicality is a sign not o f realism but of the reality o f what is in the image. Whereas even an electronic image is indexical because the image is created by a photoconductor that is ‘excited’ at the same frequencies as the incident hght that falls upon it. imitating reality simply does not equate to art. is not an index o reality. For this reason. in some senses these arguments rely upon it . Rudolf Arnheim. but simply the fact that an extra step has been inserted in between capture and production. The dialogue paralyses the visual action. More than that. to take a famous example from Charles Sanders Peirce (quoted in Rosen 2001: 18). digital images do have a sort of quite as detailed a way as the interconnection o f electrons that Marks tentatively posits exists in the real world. the prolifetation o f mrns led by dialogue following the development of film sound ‘narrows the world of film . . In other words. for example. although not .

2000). 1991) and Loose Change: Second Edition (Dylan Avery. downgraded in order to be believable. and which Stampede into an oncoming car. or digiri7 Pd from analogue via the DI. And yet neither the dinosaurs from Jurassic Park. It may also be that some/many people genuinely do not/cannot see how a special effect has been achieved when they watch contemporary cinema (or cinema throughout its history). W ithin animation history. Coyote as they have been falling from a cliff top —in much the same way that the camera drops from the tower where the narrator and Tyler Durden discuss Project Mayhem in Fight Club. and that the aeroplane crashes of 11 September 2001 were an ‘inside job’ . and photorealism In 1996. as suggested in the introduction via Lev Manovich (2001. as Prince also points out.even if mythsdike Bigfoot. are simulations. The perceptual realism of digital images/CGI is an important achievement. 1896). 216^ In O Brother. were so realistic that the American Humane Society allegedly had to re-view the sequence ten times in order to be convinced that it was a digital creation (Anonymous 2000. The simulacral nature of photorealistic digital images also speaks of digital cinema’s ‘remediation (Bolter and Grusin 2000) o f analogue cinema. then. To create perceptual realism in digital images. for us to descend alongside the Roadrunner or ^^ile E. they often have to-add details such as motion blur to moving objects. believing it would erupt from the screen. Many might see in their perceptual realism a reason to argue that we now truly live in a postmodern world in which the diflFerence between reality and illusion has become eroded to the point of indiscernibility. the new medium (here.. such myths seem to pursue cinema. 25). then. 2006).not least because there exist films that make these claims. Rather. 2010). but like photographs o f reality. 20 1 202). Animation has always been able to achieve those things that would be much harder to achieve in live action without endangering human lives and/or filmmaking equipment. or simulacra. According to Stuart Minnis (1998). it was alleged that when the Lumi^re Brothers first showed L’arrivee d ’un train k la Ciotat/Arrival o f a Train a t La Ciotat (France. But what Chuck Jones s Roadrunner lacks —whether it wants it or not —is the perceptual realism of the animation constructed through the use o f digital technology. i. It may be that in the case of O Brother. . \ We can read photorealism. is not to rehearse apocalyptic or hysterical scenarios about humanity gone insane because we believe that the Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 27 balrogs and ores from The Lord o f the Rings are running around on our planet . digital images are made not to look like reality. And it has also been possible. texture. even if perceptually they appear realistic. In fact. including the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park (Prince 1996. digital entities are entirely unreal. as being firsdy an affirmation o f the simulacral nature of digital images. such as Winsor McCay’s Gertie the Dinosaur (USA. as Pliny the Elders recounting o f the myth o f Zeuxis’s grapes (and Parrhasius’s painting that was so realistic it fooled human eyes) makes clear (see also Manovich 1998). such as JF K (Oliver Stone. 30). seeing digital images can have real effects. Similarly. but also to their photorealism. brush against other (profilmic) objects. Indeed. and myriad other examples o f digital characters and monsters in contemporary cinema. like photographs. But. this does not deprive them of perceptual realism. and art more generally. whereby people genuinely believe that JFK was shot by the CIA. Let me make clear that perceptual realism is not necessarily the same as showing things as they appear in real life. even if they look realistic. Perceptual realism could be achieved by making digital objects appear to have solidity. Both motion blur and this downgrading point not only to the perceptual realism o f digital images. since it helps us to differentiate digital animation from traditional animation. most (all?) film viewers are endowed with ‘instrumental reasoning’. Stephen Prince saw digital artists and animators as having almost fulfilled the goal o f achieving perceptual realism. it has long been possible to bring dinosaurs. which makes digital images copies of copies.? axe real. 219) writes about the sharpness and perfection of digital images. the digital cows that get shot by George ‘Baby Face Nelson (Michael Badalucco). and mobility. both o f these. the reason to mention this debate is to say that while predominantly we do not believe that digital images are real. Nessie. to life . and have their fur ruffled by the wind. or real life.. digital) in its early stages remediates the old medium (analogue). USA. but like copies of that reality. such that they cast shadows. shot ort DV. be that world digitally animated. While Katherine Sarafian (2003. Furthermore. Bat on the whole it is worth noting that most humans do not believe in Superman or Spider-Man or the morphing T-1000 (played predominantly by Robert Patrick) from Terminator 2: Judgement Day. As simulations of reality. on us aS audience members (see the final chapter). they inhabit the space o f the eponymous park such that they seem to share the same ontological status as the real (indexical) world that surrounds them (see also Elsaesser and Buckland 2002. simulations. 1914). filmmakers must. so that digital objects appear to be fully embedded within the world that surrounds them. The reason for evoking the simulation debate. audiences fled the oncoming vehicle. nor the cows from O Brother. N or is it to explore the related conspiracy theory phenomenon. but that perceptual realism could now be achieved was important (see Prince 1996. Where A rt Thou? (Joel Coen. The digital dinosaurs in Jurassic Park are a common example o f this. That is. and the Himalayan Yeti persist.e. but wanted to be absolutely certain that this was so (thereby engendering a promotional news story for the film). they look not like original reality. or affects. whereby they can tell that such things are not that through drawings or models.26 Supercinema Perceptual realism. even though Tom Gunning (1989) contends that this story is apocryphal. Where A rt Thou? the American Humane Society representatives knew that the Coen brothers had not literally killed a cow. Falling alongside the Roadrunner is not rendered with the perceptual realism o f falling through the air alongside the office block in Fight Club. as Stephen Prince acknowledges. USA. JJK/France/USA. for example. It is not that perceptual realism was an explicitly stated telos for all digital artists and animators. weight. make objects and entities that are physically consistent with the world around them. many are.

Wilden argues that ‘there are no identities in perception. It is not objective because we humans are fundamentally in. As such.of knowledge. because realistic. However. we may perceive real things. or on that scale. Furthermore. > In other words. The reader will almost certainly be thinking: but we do know what microscopic d macroscopic phenonena on our planet and in our universe look like because we have various technologies that allow us to image these things. is that there is no neutral medium. light hits a microscope or a telescope. then. By and large. perception itself relies upon the “man race having evolved a probabilistically and not necessarily ‘correct’perspective things‘(see-Purves and Lotto 2003). we perceive correcdy enough. And this digitization o f reality is. do not typically perceive droplets o f sweat from as close up as in the S t shc)t o f Fight C/«A Since humans do not see objects from this close-up. then claims to realism are cast into doubt when we try to . As such. since we know that humans only see some five pencenLof the light spectrum (see-Vogel 2005: 12-19). I shall endeavour to e x p ^ n why this is so. attribute ‘identities’ then* we digitize reality. or digitizing it. because these shots have been created on a computer their perceptual realism.s seen most dearly in th T l ^ 'n Trek (JJ. but we only represent these things to ourselves as a ‘digitized’ and probabilistic rendering. is not entirely analogue. However. Human perception itself. including that most sensitive part that has evolved into our eyes). but not necessarily a complete one . even if it is an indicator of reality. information. This is true. Abrams. even if the ‘raw data’ that we use to create .or in Wilden’s terms to. even if T b ''" ^ ^ ' seen them for ourselves. but perception is by analog[ue]s. the lens flare in Star Trek hdps to challenge the role that mdexicality IS held to play in understanding cinematic realism. is. but also because o f their photorealism. therefore. argues that humans are always digitizing reality in every instant that they exist. inevitable: ‘the punctuation o f the analog[ue] by the digital is irresolvable for humankind’ (Wilden 1980: 123). is therefore usceptible to criticism: the shot involves an imagined rendition o f the inner orkmgs of the brain but since we do not know what the dynamic insides o f a u i ^ brain look like. However. for Wilden. the opening shot F g h t Cluh.analogue. Accepting something like a Darwinian evolution of the human fact. w h a t'd °"’ ^ We don’t know t dinosaurs. The lens flare in S. That is. induding film stock m d no lens.these perceptions are undeniably Yeal. Anthony Wilden. be they analogue or digital. ^ i Cinema's Conq uest of Space 29 is is pot intynded'as a shocking revelation. indicator o f realism. even if in many cases it is not an indicator of reality. or him from her . we have had to learn to perceive as best we can in order not to see reality as it is/ but in order to survive. but ultim atelf a «mulacrum.. in which lens animations o f spaceships. by taking a detour into the area of human perception. when we begin to tell this from that. then one might argue that the shot is by definition somewhat unrealistico Z iii close proximity? U e same is true of images o f dinosaurs. regardless o f their nonindexical nature. We have an indexical link to reality ourselves (light hits the photosensitive part of our skin/brain. then what we do perceive is only a probabilistic representation o f reality. Scales of realism Lens flare captured with an analogue camera is still indexical . even if it does not re d k rl!? ifn h t“ ^ P™Pose that the perceptual m lr enable digital images to do what an/ogue ages can do. wisdom and so on. Perception alone. Identities require boundaries and discreteness. After David Hume. an issue that I shall explore further in the final chapter. which have no intrinsic boundaries’ (Wilden 1980: 24). but they can only mediate it. which tracks backwards out o f the narrator’s brain. in some respects involves turning a continuous reality into discrete units.a result of real light hm m g the camera lens. digitality. nor is it objectively realistic. If humans’ sense"of reality is itself based upon a probabilistic ‘digitization’/rendering. we are not really in a position to class this shot. and more. W hen we begin'to analyse/interpret reality in a ‘top-down’ fashion. and synaptic firings in the brain look like. Perception itself is probabilistic in that at no Jpoint in human evolution were humans handed perception by God in such a way ishat we saw ‘perfectly." ^ ™ages. since compartmentalizing reality into Trek is photorealistic. galaxy clusters. USA. says Wilden. g a la ^ clusters. But if perception is something that has evolved and was never handed to us ‘whole’ or ‘perfect’. the world and we cannot separate ourselves from it. which then hits the observer’s eye) each imaging technology also plays a role in defining how the object looks to us My contention. there is no light inside the of "Microscopic. or entangled with. what is perhaps re contentious as a claim is the fact that humans themselves do not perceive ity as it is‘. I would ^so like to try to chip a w y at the predominant position that indexicality holds in ebates surrounding digital images and to propose that indexicality is ultimately the e x n i? n '^ T “ t. Since.. 2009). indexicality is not a necessary. and indeed what it is that they want to will have some effect on what the image looks like. how they design the machine. But we must dso admit that these imaging technologies are media that stand between us Z t M r ~ these imaging technologies an indexical link similar to that found in analogue photography (for example. or we must presume that we do since we are still here. for example. allegedly.28 Supercinema Perhaps th. Scientists in particular know that m humans design machines to detect objects or forces otherwise invisible to the lan eye. certainly not a complete one. synapses firing. is not a necessary indicator of nonrealism. we do not often (need to) question whether we see ‘reality’ itself.

the space which is itself part o f that action in its economy. Scientific visualizing technologies such as microscopes or telescopes offer us perspectives that can challenge human expectations: a subatomic particle looks vasdy different from the static segment o f wall that it otherwise helps to form. but they do help us to r e lin k how notions o f realism are dependent on probability. To illustrate this latter approachj I shall give two brief examples drawn from well-known works. digital images are often no less obvious in their status as animation (dinosaurs do not walk the Earth anymore. nor is digitality. then a probabilistic rendering o f the inside of a human brain has as much realism as might have a ‘real’'im j^e o f the inside o f a human brain. a toehold on the slopes of realism? Can this toehold become a foothold when we argue that. which may or may not have a real world referent (for example. the space o f the screen. the reductio ad absurdum o f this argument might be to propose that even the most ‘unrealistic’ animation .or macroscopic) perspective.e. seem quite happy to use digital images (e.some level of ‘realism’. then. and then the space o f the bridge or transport between the village and Manila —figured by the jeepney that conveys passengers back and forth’ (Jameson 1995: 197). as I shall argue later in more detail. even if not shot on location). Coyote is realistic. Probabilistically speaking. USA. 1941). abstract pattern o f light and shade. its own legality’ (Heath 1981: 20). because he is not indexical. they are no more indexical than Wile E. talks o f ‘the space of the village. even if only Jameson (here) names th at setting (a village. Could we not propose. we might think of Abel Gance. Indeed. their photorealism. o f the medium (I shall argue that audiences always know that they are seeing images. or on their relation with the viewer. such as a globe o f sweat.with the third perhaps the most common in film studies. We can make the case. However. Furthermore.g. then. Coyote. Furthermore. while a star in formation similarly challenges our everyday perspective on the matter that surrounds us. then so is our sense of nonrealism. And it is easy for us to say that the reason that we do not attribute realism to Wile E.this despite the fact that there are ‘defamiliarizing’ images (i. if perception itself is not a view of reality but a probabilistic interpretation of reality. I should like presently to consider existing debates concerning space in cinema. That is. Fredric Jameson. But if our very sense o f realism is based upon probability. images that go against our everyday sense/human scale perspective) o f familiar places and of the Digital Cinema’s Conquest of Space 31 micro and macro levels o f the universe.has . especially when tied to the depiction o f objects as seen from an inhuman (micro. that audiences know full well that these are ‘just images’ and that ‘transparency’ can also be challenged as a criterion for measuring realism. weight.but it does provide an important foundation for arguing for the realism o f space as depicted in digital cinema.and microscopic scale. but also why it happens. su^ests. Therefore. Stephen Heath discusses Suspicion (Alfred Hitchcock. to the point that we would ridicule anyone who believes this to be true .. who shot and projected Napoleon [France. from the Hubble telescope and other scanning devices) as the basis for measurements concerning objects on both the macro. in discussing the films o f Filipino director KidlatTahimik. scientists. including those inside the human well as how it is depicted —is of course important in helping us to understand not only what happens in a film. but which go against our human scale understanding of what objects look like. That these images are to an extent the computer’s interpretation o f mathematical data is no reason to doubt that the object as seemexists. texture and consistency contribute to our assigning realism to a particular object. regardless of its nonindexical nature. which involves issues such as how images are framed and/or projected (beyond the one camera-one projector convention. o f Wile E. These are not indexical images — but they are understood as realistic. or o f that which is unrealistic. but instead a strange. and balrogs never have). it is highly unlikely that Wile E. and the space in which the film that we watch unfolds ^ or the diegetic space of the film. Cinematic space The discussion above o f indexicality and realism has perhaps taken us a long way from discussions o f cinematic space . and not on indexicality per se. in that realism is measured by the presence. on this or any planet. There are various spaces that can be discussed in relation to cinema: the space of the cinema both in an architectural sense and in terms o f where the cinema is located. unlike film scholars. a film might be set in Los Angeles. 1927] with three cameras/ projectors set side by side). Photographers working with the medium as an art form have long known that they can use different lenses and focal lengths in order to make the everyday seem strange: an extreme closeup o f a wall may not look obviously like a wall at all.30 Supercinema adopt a nonanthropocentric perspective. also integral to their overall realism. Coyote . We are .e. A film’s setting . My point here is not that such photographs are not indexical. Coyote is because he is obviously an animation.e.’ and that the medium is never ‘transparent’ to the point o f invisibility). In both cases ‘space’ refers to the setting of the film. that Fight Club's depiction of the inside o f a human brain has. before arguing for a different approach to this issue. Manila). indexicality is not a guarantee of realism. and yet their physical consistency with the world that surrounds them lends them a perceptual realism that demonstrates a sense o f realism divorced from indexicality. talking about ‘the space in which the action takes place. a guarantee of nonrealism. that optical/lensing tools offer us perspectives that are perhaps indexical. Scholars have discussed all three approaches to space . given that this ‘real’ image would only be achievable at the same scale as the image in Fight Club through the use o f machines that themselves were designed to show the inside o f the hum an brain in a probabilistic manner that conformed to our probabilistic expectations of what it looks like? This may seem a weak argument as I try to chip away at the reliance on indexicality that is central to so much discourse on digital cinema. its intelligibility. not the absence.g. i. Probabilistically speaking. Similarly. even when we see it at scales that are inaccessible to the ‘naked’ eye.

T " instead ’ Z inserting into it shots o f statues from Moscow Odessa as aa setting and the Crimea. the film place (be it Stockholm. ” “ *■ o r . overlap to some extent with the a p p X S X t T ^ ‘ will respects it also differs.P “ hatever and Auge’s non-places both provide examples of ^ d c e deprived o f a specific location and/or ‘meaning’.3 2 Supercinema detail in the next chapter. Bazin favoured films that depicted time and space in their continuity. as a Sweden. perhapswe worldness o f the Phillipines are precise! ’ ' ^ kitchen and th6 third or essential meanings. I wish instead to mlk h ^ ®^“ mgs/places endowed with approach to space X o v e r ll X Gfile t “ri. the any-spacethe real or fictional X m Z ^ X e P'^“ ™ (W i o n ’ here fimctioning as a b i n T r L ^ Z w DigitaiCinema's Conquest of Space “ d iT ’ Plemmg and I have fiX Z “ “ . Bereft o f the m e a X ^ ^ ’Z inherent whatever cannot be measured in terms f ^ ° ^ loration/place. Like Deleuze and Z g e . Rather than (geo)political meaning.andvariousothernodesofpublictranspon :• are ^W epnved o f particularity/individuality. the Golden Gate and instead w e s e e a s p a c e d e v o i f o ^ p ^ in such a way that we are reminded forcefiilly o f the we see not what is represented on rb^ ^ ^ P ’ Stockholm a s a fir s tw o S Z Z a Z h T T ^^e place T iird World space . which in turn leads to the Odessa uprising that kickstarts the A r Z T r"Z ’ and.Z m which the set) are lost. shopping malls r -dergroundM etrohnes. a abstract approach than either o f them and to '“ ‘f - ■» Back to Bazin “P t . Contrary to the story o f the film. For this reason. Airports. As such. ^ various talking about space in terms o f multiple TZ* o f places. and a lion rising to Its feet. In the case o f Eisenstein. Since settines a n V our lives. W ithin the context o f the film the shots o f the S lT a m a X T \ of revolution in the people of Odessa. a lion awake with its head still on its paws. I even if briefly . V. he changes the order of space (Moscow is not Odessa. Gilberto Perez differentiates Eisenstems approach from that o f his contemporary. 2008) and Van Helsim the Right One In (Tomas escape the notion o f location. m that Auges non-places refer to public spaces in which people can feel anonymous as J e s e are locations without identity. . but is made to appear so) to create meaning (the people’s revolutionary spirit is awakening) U e ftct that Battleship Potemkin is a propagandist movie helps to illustrate this point. and r a f h l r X S n S S « produces an any-space-whatever. not least beZuse of their repeambihty/mterchangeability (Auge 1995). w i Zh Z progression: a lion lying asleep ith head on its paws. meaning’ o f a setting (that is the Ive 1 I' . For Bazin. in which the Potemkin mutiny leads to a general naval mutiny. Perkins describes the film as ‘an example o f the mprecision which des^nds upon attempts to make images do the work o f slogans or verbal metaphors (Perkins 1972: 119). The film re ^ ^ specific place.. montage fragments space. its head now aloft. is because Baein 6voured tsjisu c films. which we might also d istin g u isZ o m that . In short Z f . W hat Eisenstein ^ e s here is actively to fragment space. ’) '" '“ •[£ 1 /1 1 » f >°»"A ihi. the settings and surrounHi ^ U ‘" ‘‘k "p“ “ S^-eater influence the fabricof the lives th a tw e s e e p C d ou3^^^^^^^ T “ A -n c e the fabricof demands a difi'erent kind o f vampire fflm ^ suburb comparison between Zir^aSfwnzrrei’/j • /r° ^ Transylvanian casde. tu that the space/spaces o f a film are ofttn t L This third approach to a X l f ^OOd)’ as the period in "^ich ^h X X * ’ ^ its setting/settings. we might think o f the ^o us> m onm ge sequence from Branenosets Potyomkin/Battleship Potemkin (USSR. The manipulation o f reality in order to so X t “ th e n o X L X r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ shown that Deleuze was not thinking o f Mar 33 ^ W hat Deleuze means by t h h L X Z r f 8). ^ a t IS. changing its order L s Z r f for o rhis Z filni.F. and instead become non-places sn.- bv L l r f i i r * ? " " X Z and execution offered by Soviet filmmakers m terms o f their use o f montage. Alexander Dovzhenko (see Perez 1998:167-69). itself. O f c o u r l ^ t S f which the fllm is set and the visual srvl f t. For example. place and (geo)polidcal S n S a ? ■T ’ ^ » .c “ 7 -.T ta •” ““It “p“"'p“p““‘ measurements o f l a t it u d : l J d 4 L r . might suggest. X : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ common ground.but insmad w e t “ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ see that the first worldness o f Stockholm *mage. unlike ?00m Z rh wu 1 (Grace 2000)..

59-62). Welles was no different in this respect: Citizen Kane is a studio made film. Welles and Renoir did not invent deep focus. for instance. is by breaking the shot down into three separate shots and using models. both filmmakers were interested in showing not just action in their films. or to montage as a whole. Hdwever. 1940) (see . The common practice in filmmaking was to build sets in a studio and to shoot the action there.’ In other words. Renoir’s camera performs a 360° panorama. a term applied to the editing system of narrative cinema. as if to say ‘she stinks’. However. we should remember that montage is also. hbwever. is a cinema that not only tries to hide the cut. not least because it yoked the image to those objects. and Welles’s cinematographer for Citizen Kane. filmmakers normally shot characters in sound films from the knee upwards. In addition. Miinsterberg 1970). As Bazin said of La regie du jeu /lh e Rules o f the Game 0ean Renoir. decided to add ceilings to his sets and to record sound via hidden microphones. does not cut. (Soviet) montage stands in opposition to (American) continuity editing. USA. In the same way that Welles’s ceilings were innovative. Welles and Renoir W hat for Bazin marks out both Welles and Renoir is their decision to reject cutting and a large number of shots to tell a story. or beings the sound of which was also being recorded (Arnheim 1933: 164-89. 1935). Eisenstein here serves as an exemplar of the ‘manipulative’ system of montage editing. 1941). It is noteworthy in Citizen Kane (Orson Welles. However. such as LevManovich (2001) and Francois Penz (2003: 159). 1939). Owing to the need to capture dialogue. The use here of the term montage to describe both styles .Soviet montage and American continuity editing . make "the characters seem more important). A practical reason for a set to have no ceiling was precisely because o f the logistics o f sound recording: with no ceiling. and either to hold the camera on characters and scenes. in fact. spaces. we cut to a miniature. As she starts to sing. however. that Welles regularly employs the low angle shot. on John Ford’s The laist Voyage Home (USA. from which we cut again as the camera wipes past a wooden beam below the catwalk. not least for the development o f parallel storytelling (we see action in one location intermixed with action in another location until the two come to a head). Welles. Bazin championed sound because of the realism and continuity that it brought to cinema: ‘The sound image. see also Armes 1974:. whom they differentiate from American filmmakers in that. Gregg Toland. continuous space.W. However. Welles was Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 35 a pioneer in insisting that his sets had ceilings . Bazin would go on to favour those filmmakers who portrayed continuous times and spaces. it had existed sipce soon after the inception of cinema. far less flexible than the visual not supposed to mislead. for Manovich and Penz. reserve the term montage for Soviet filmmakers. Bazin 1978: 74). in some special instances. In contradistinction to both styles. By showing ceilings. among others. deep focus ‘is admired not only as the most advanced expression of prewar French realism but also for its prefiguration o f the most original elements of the cinematographic evolution of the next fifteen years’ (Bazin 1974: 73.though some scholars. increasingly eliminating both plastic impressionism and the symbolic relation between images’ (Bazin 1967: 33). but also the spacetin which the action unfolds. the filmmaker could easily hold a microphone above the scene being shot in order to record the dialogue. however. even if one system (American) favours trying to ‘hide’ the cut by following a continuous story. had also used the technique a year prior to making Kane. would carry montage in the direction o f realism. the low angle adds a further dimension to the space o f the set (see Truffaut 1978: 11. including Jean Renoir and Orson Welles. How Welles manages to perform such a feat. see also Rotha 1930. in which the camera also dollies down from a window as we follow Lange out of a building and around a courtyard. This shot would be extremely hard to achieve in one single and continuous shot: manoeuvring a heavy and bulky camera through so much space is difficult and expensive — particularly when moving on a vertical axis. Susan Alexander (Dorothy Comingore) is making her opera debut. In Le crime de monsieur Lange/Ihe Crime o f Monsieur Lange (France. Renoir’s 360° camera movement also brings a greater sense of spatial realism to the film. while the other (Soviet) tries to make the cut prominent and to use the cut to create meaning. the camera could be placed lower and look up at the characters. Renoir.even . Griffith .something that had rarely happened before. France.34 Supercinema Dziga Vertov (see Vertov 1984). where two crew members from the theatre look at each other. Welles depicts the space in which the film’s action takes place with a greater level of realism.^ Movement of the camera also plays an important part in suggesting that space is continuous and not fragmented. Eisenstein himself speaks of Griffith as th e ‘inventor’ of montage (Eisenstein 1969:195-255). the one commenting on the performance to the other by holding his nose. Rudolf Arnheim. Bazin also talks of Griffith as the creator o f parallel montage (Bazin 1967: 25). but which also. we dolly up to a high catwalk above the st^ e . In Citizen Kane. Regardless o f the ‘meaning’ of'such a shot (a low angle might. Welles and Renoir also achieve a heightened level o f spatial realism through their use of deep focus. This subde use of cutting means that Susan Alexander and the stagehands appear to occupy the same. It is ironic that something as false as a miniature model allows Welles to achieve a greater level of spatial realism. with the ceiling forming a part of the shot. felt that the introduction o f sound m ade cinema less ‘artistic’. There are in fact two cuts: as we move past the curtains on the stage. a technique that allows both foreground and background to be in focus at once (see Bazin 1974: 192). As a result. with the camera starting high up before descending and turning until making a complete revolution. here understood as the depiction o f continuous space(s). and perhaps more often. as devised in early Hollywood by D. or to move the camera in order to follow the action that we see. therefore. rather it shows that both forms o f m o n t^ e are linked by the use o f cutting in cinema. therefore. As mentioned above. presents us with a continuous space.

we can m L e he camera from one room where the action is close by. thereby providing a more continuous. is central to Bazinian cinematic realism. having discussed the work of Bazin. Total cinema would'involve no editing and litde meaningful narrative.) In fact. wholly disappear from the films of Welles and Renoir. we might also mention that William Randolph Hearst. and tools such as deep focus serve to evoke an ambiguous reality. tried to h a v e . because it does not preach to viewers where to look (see Bazin 1967: 36-37). one that has no obvious meaning. W ith such criticism in mind. however. the reconstruction o f a perfect illusion of the outside world in sound. who. I should now like to offer a reminder o f the role that technology has played . ^ The tension between narrative and its alternatives is an issue that I shall explore in the third chapter on time in digital cinema. which fragments space. and therefore to depict a continuous and realistic space. an opinion that Noel Carroll echoes (Carroll 1998: 9 9 ). deep focus lends itself to the movement of the ^m era. After Italian screenwriter and filmmaker Cesare Zavattini. were trying to order the ‘chaos of raw experience’ through editing (see Thomson 1972: 116). however. Bazin praised highly the Italian neorealists. The significance of Welless and R e n o irs^ e of deep focus. a criticism also levelled against Bazin by Peter WoUen (1998: 26-29). However. since the studio was already broke . Montage. to borrow a term from Boris Thomson. or fragment space. After Bazin. meaning that the fi^ m a k e r need not split the scene up into different shots. who wanted to develop a more spontaneous kind o f cinema. In single Z i a move away from montage and a move towLds the gle shot as a means o f depicting a scene. but still in focus. both Citizen Kane a^A La rlgle du jeu a tZ Z e would today term commercial flops: Citizen Kane lost US$150.on William Wyler’s K . we should remember that editing does not. As Bazin explains: Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 37 In addition. thereby rendering space/reality in a more realistic m ^ n e r. of course.38) . through a door to another om.000 . depiction of time. in which actors and plot would have little place’ (Bazin 1967: 143).a switch that required slick editing and clever wipes? But Welles and Renoir sought at times to hide the editing/cutting in their films (as we see with the shot o f Susan Alexander). we might describe this as a realist aesthetic.. since actions can take place in the foreground and in the background and in fo rm 's tS 7 ^ of formation that the viewer can see in frame at any one time. W ith regard to space. means that there is no need to cut. Carroll does criticize Bazin for looking at only fragments o f films in constructing his theory o f realism (Carroll 1996: 78-93). where the action is far away.36 Supercinema ^ rd w e ll. who was generaUy m T b ln “d H Charles Foster Kane. Veary o f our Lives (USA. all the while showing that all o f this action takes place in a single space. After all. Deep focus gives depth to the cinematic age by expanding the dimensions o f the screen. deep focus also lends itself to the long take. His vision o f realism would involve unftagmented films that could transfer to the screen the continuum of reality’ (Bazin 1967: 37).while Georges Sadoul sums up La r^le dujeu s commercial life as ‘a complete failure’ (Sadoul 1953-87) ^ Deep focus allows the « m era simultaneously to depict more than one event at n a . In this vein. For. and relief. Bazin’s role in the present argument is simple. Total cinema would be ‘a total and complete representation o f reality. 946). Welles and Renoir try to reflect some of the very chaos that raw experience has to offer. However. see also Armes 1971: 171). if not plainly to reject it. the movement o f the camera through the corridors o f the chateau in regie du jeu is a good example o f deep focus allowing the camera to move more freely. Dudley Andrew praises Renoir for his overfilled shots that contain unused diegetic material’ (Andrew 1995:275-317). (Bazin 1967. a recreation o f the world in its own image. In contrast to Soviet montage filmmakers like Dziga Vertov. Bazin evoked this total cinema through the theoretical example o f a ninety-minute film o f ninety minutes in the hfe of a man to whom nothing happens (Bazin 1967: 3 7 . since the ability to capture ’ particularly when combined with camera movement. would never achieve this. Indeed aLv S e a T ^ ^ “f ' ' ''' “ ^ with ^ y great degree o f succ«s . given that we can focus on both near and far. Bazin conceived o f the ‘myth o f total cinema (Bazin 1967: 17-22). Given the five-year ean Kane The Best Years o f our Lives.S fil C arranged for his newspapers to boycott RKO films. how could Welles make the camera perform such elaborate movements if not through switching between ‘real’ action and models . with Welles doing in one shot what other filmmakers would do in five or six (see Bazin 1978: 77-78).deepening s problems. therefore. See Bazin 1978: 53-57. Bes. color. Furthermore. He [Renoir] done in his searchings as a director prior to La rkgle dujeu forced imself to look back beyond the resources provided by montage and so uncovered Bazin reloaded the ' 7 d everything to be said without chopping he world up into little fragments. who came to prominence at the end o f the Second World War (Bazin 1971: 16-101). Staiger and U om pson 1985: 221-23 and 340-52).I 9 9 ) _ m t t r ^ ' T r '' the same adulation from die going public as it did from the critical fraternity. Ambiguity. and foerefore realistic. rather than in a fragmented one By xtension. which again sees Toland as director o f photography. comes from the feet that they were it t ° economy (see Bazin 1971: 28). an image unburdened by the interpretation o f the artist or the irreversibility o f time’ (Bazin 1967: 20-21). that would reveal the hidden meanings in people and thmgs without dismrbing the unity natural to them. enablmg a filmmaker to show in one continuous shot a single continuous space.. For this reason. (In the case of Citizen Kane though. be judged ahead o f their time (Renoir 1974. alRenoir himself immodesdy suggests. both it and La regie dujeu can.

as per the opening sequences o f Fight Club. compositing is based upon seamless continuity and. Mulvey. and then through walls. such as sound and deep focus. This latter approach to Bazin is also made by Mary Ann Doane (2002). but also in many other digitally enabled films . 1964). However. Historicity. as mentioned. achieves its single-take look through the use of clever wipes. Theory.38 Supercinema in allowing a filmmaker to shoot in a more continuous fashion. what concerns us is what these images do. The myth o f total cinema is. who fell out of favour during the 1970s and onwards. while Daniel Morgan. and fewer still make reference to Bazin in relation to space. a conception of space that is different from the fragmented spaces of analogue cinema. while Sleep's five-hour duration was achieved by looping footage taken with a 16mn> Bolex camera. Laura Mulvey (2006). while Screen theory dominated (anglophone) film studies. with Roland Barthes more often than not being mentioned in the same breath. For. in that the (virtual) camera does not distinguish between them. by which he means that photography has the capacity to capture ‘duration . Stewart and others have emphasized. now that digital technology can enable films to depict space as a continuum.d. Whereas montage was based upon contrast between images. Doane. in which elements from various sources are put together ‘to create a singular seamless object’ (Manovich 2001: 143). 1963) and Empire (USA. which are so long as to be ‘unwatchable’ (Shaviro 1993: 214). Philip Rosens Change M ummified: Cinema. for example. takes its title from Bazins ‘Ontology o f the Photographic Image’ essay. before looking at the role that time plays in digital cinema. a filmmaker must fragment reality if she is making a ninety-minute film fit for theatrical distribution. and bullet holes . this continuity is almost certainly not as Bazin would have wanted it. underground terrain. was shot with an Auricon camera. It is the very nature o f analogue film to be fragmented. meanwhile. Even if one shoots scenes that last ten minutes. but he likpd those films and filmmakers who employed techniques. key to Bazin’s theory was precisely the indexicality o f the photographic image that Rosen. This logic of equality is visible not only in the seamless continuity of the opening moments of Fight Club. For Bazin. with the film consisting not so much o f loops as ellipses during the changing . (analogue) cinema cannot necessarily depict reality as a continuum. Bazins myth o f a total cinema involves cinema overcoming the limitations that are inherent in analogue technology. Even Dudley Andrew. Rodowick. Undoubtedly aware o f the impossibility of this. involves a change of logic. Rodowicki(2007). Andy Warhol’s Sleep (USA. neither solid objects nor humans are privileged above ‘empty space’ in these shots in Fight Club. ‘equality among its elements’ (Shaviro 2010: 77). Rather. in his essay‘Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics’ (2006). the posthuman continuity tharsees humans. as John Andrew Berton Jr (1990: 9) suggests. which could shoot for thirty-five minutes at a time (Malanga 2002: 90.Bazin naturally springs to mind. thereby calling into question its novelty (Rosen 2001: 307-12).N . Rope.although perhaps most ostentatiously in single-take films. and classical editing rejoins chopped-up bits o f that continuum into an illusory but dramatically fiill continuity’ (Rosen 2001: 4). few have offered sustained analyses o f Bazins work. in which Bazin argues that ‘the image o f things is likewise the image o f their duration. Examples o f predigital films that seem to involve a single take include Rope. in that the digital ‘mimics’ the analogue. the fact remains that what we see in Fight Club is not an index of reality. That is. objects and empty space all seemingly sharing an equal ontology. it seems that scholars perceive the need to return to Bazin. his consideration o f Bazin centres on the subjectivities that film might produce and on the indexical nature of the photographic image such that change is jnummified. while the unbroken continuity of these shots in Fight Club may be ‘Bazinian’.^ However. Bazin offers his praise to those who at least try. indexicality is therefore something o f a ftlse lead with regard to digital cinema.or the changing nature o f objeas. Given the photorealism and perceptual realism o f the images. does not really relate Bazin’s predilection for continuity to digital cinema.all without a cut . as discussed. change mummified as it were’ (Bazin 1967: 15). in which one image follows another over time. Single-take films and long-take films Lev Manovich has argued that the shift from analogue montage. precisely that: a myth. but beyond this. even if it is perceptually and photorealistic. But the shot nonetheless shows space as a continuum and in a way is reminiscent of Bazin. A typical 35mm camera can hold a 900-foot reel o f unexposed film that lasts about ten minutes (Katz 1994: 1132). for Bazin. in that the camera passes through empty space as well as the objects that'jill it with equal ease. that better evoke reality in this way. D . which could only shoot for four minutes at a time. Comenas n. whose W hat Cinema Is! (2010) enjoys as its subtitle Bazins Quest arid its Charge. Steven Shaviro (2007) also mentions both Bazin and Barthes in relation to the digital. offers us. Many scholars have namedropped Bazin in reference to the digital. the camera passes from within to without the body o f the narrator. in which we pass from inside to outside the head o f the narrator without so much as a cut. and Garrett Stewart (2007). Perhaps this oversight is as a result o f the seeming obviousness of the point th at I wish to make. But when. as Steven Shaviro reminds us. similarly does not rethink Bazin’s work in association with space. it is not their actual nature that is o f concern here. Fight Club here shows a continuity o f space that is digitally enabled and Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 39 posthuman. to digital compositing. but instead each equally forms part of the continuum o f space. Empire. And in Fight Club. as a result. Although Rosen notes that the divide between the digital and the indexical is not as pronounced as some theorists make out. o f these. Rosen does remind us that ‘[ejditing inevitably interrupts the real spatiotemporal continuum imprinted as a shot on a strip o f film.). He is not so obstinate in his criticism as to deem all films failures because they cannot match his demand o f realizing the impossible.

but their rarity weakens their impact. the film was heavily manipulated. Dan N orth (2008: 166-78) meanwhile argues that films like H ulk (Ang Lee. are films that feature long takes any more so? Like Galloway with single-take films. Time becomes fluid in Russian A rk as the film passes in a seemingly arbitrary fashion from scenes set in the present back to the 1700s. the camera enjoys extreme mobility. Jean-Luc Godard and Alain Resnais. France. m discussing ‘the preponderance of continuous-shot filmmaking today’ in relation to the aesthetics o f continuity found in gaming. Furthermore. Andrei Tarkovsky. a high definition digital camera can normally hold only forty-six minutes o f footage. which is key to the depiction of continuous space. As reported (see Macnab 2002..300 metres during a single. as opposed to seemingly single-take films. In order to capture roughly the same image quality as a 35mm analogue camera.000 ‘digital events’were added to modify the film.N. A list of filmmakers who continue to use long takes today might also include Gus van Sant. which ‘offered the visual quality and portability to make this film for cinema’ {Rotten Tomatoes). and as such arguably do not constitute sufficient evidence for a shift in aesthetics marked by cinema’s digitization. Hitchcock and Warhol. Michelangelo Antonioni. including the depiction of time in Russian Ark. 2004). These films are important. quite simply. which does imply that the refusal to cut. Given the overwhelmingly a n house bent of both of these lists of directors. with D. in that computer games are (typically) purely digital animations. while the long takes featured in Cuardn’s Children o f Men (USA/UK. Furthermore. In Russian Ark. A film shot in a single take and which has no obvious narrative naturally recalls Zavattini’s plotless film.a peak reached thanks only to digital technology? SokurovSeemed to think so when he declared that ‘I am sick of editing.the DI. single-take films remain relatively rare. 1971). during which the ageing Marquis de Custine (Sergey Dreiden) guides an unseen narrator (whose voice is provided by Sokurov himself) through the museum. Apichatpong Weerasethakul and Quentin Tarantino. in. Bernardo Bertolucci. PVC-1 (Spiros Strathoulopoulos. Paul Thomas Anderson. and E rshi chi chengjU24 City (China/Hong Kong/Japan.40 Supercinema o f reels. for example. unbroken take. The initial answer to this question. BelaTarr. it is also arguably a simulation because it has been both recorded and modified digitally. Renoir. the refusal to cut does not seem to be specific to digital cinema. Cologne-based company Director’s Friend put together ‘a prototype hard disk recording system adapted to be portable and equipped with a special ultra-stable battery. which has become a refiigee camp in the film’s diegesis). Rodowick noting that 3. 2006) might feature digital effects that help to depict the dystopian London and other locations in which the film is set (including a notable sequence set in Bexhill. but otherwise the film follows no obvious narrative. 2007) and La casa m udatihe Silent House (Gustavo Hernandez. This system could record up to 100 minutes of uncompressed image. Num iro Zero 0ean Eustache. Russian A rk is also unrealistic. the camera travels some 1. therefore. if single-take films are achieved with greater ease (or. 2008) among other of his films using . However. In the digital age. ensuring the film’s longer running time o f 485 minutes. since it skips between different time frames without any coherent indicators (except perhaps that we drift from one room to another). achieved) thanks to digital technology. but had it projected at sixteen frames per second. a ‘real time’ analogue film with which Rodowick compares it (Rodowick 2007: 73-87 and 163-74). Jean Renoir may have said o f La regie du jeu that ‘I wanted the audience to have the impression they were seeing a single shot following the people and that there had not been any cutting (Renoir 1989: 191-92. I shall deal more specifically with time. but only once’ {Rotten Tomatoes). although the Hermitage that we see is convincing and photorealistic. then. which is the equivalent distance o f 33 film studio lots (Tugend 2003). Indeed. Let’s’not be afraid'of time’ {Rotten Tomatoe^.. is a ninety-eight-minute wander through the Hermitage in St Petersburg. TimeCode. Bruno Dumont. Peter the Great and Nicholas II. thereby Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 41 making it less indexically realistic than. But if single-take films are not preponderant. Russian Ark.some characters see and interact with him while others do not.. my italics). Tuchinskaya 2002). USA. but these undermine his argument since such films are simply not preponderant. we see the space of the Hermitage in all its continuity —and not fragmented into different shots and scenes: And yet. In this sense. the film is apparently unrealistic in its depiction of time. Indeed. There are plotless appearances from historical figures such as the Hermitage’s founder Catherine the Great. However. >in digital single-take films. but in these digital films there is no cutting. in the third chapter. or the embracing of continuity. The finished-film. H ou Hsiao-hsien. is somehow tied to the digital. say. Alexander R. does cinema reach a new peak in Bazinian realism . Still Life. we might say that the long take is a trope of art house cinema. which are technologically-enabled and technically accomplished. Michael Haneke. I have already mentioned Welles. 2003) and The Lord o f the Rings adaptations also enjoy longer takes thanks to digital technology. but the long take (and the concomitant rejection of the cut) characterizes the films of m ^ y other analogue directors. Galloway. Jia Zhangke. namechecks TimeCode and Russian A rk as examples (see Galloway 2006: 65). however. regardless of its technological provenance. Russian A rk was only made possible thanks to the development of the afore-mentioned Sony 24p high •definition digital camera. Colombia. particularly during action sequences that would normally have been cut into multiple shots. Yasujiro Ozu. 2010) are exceptional experiments. Furthermore. while the camera is static in the Warhol films. W ith Russian Ark. and while Jia Zhangke might have shot Shijie/Jhe World (China/Japan/France. and a specific hard drive that could hold the uncompressed images. is'yes. A brief list might include Chantal Akerman. but various o f those that exist are truly single-take films. I should first address the fact that single take films are exceptional and rare. Warhol shot Empire at twenty-four frames per second for six and a half hours. The Marquis is perhaps dead . Will Brooker attributes long-take films to the lack of cuts in computer games (see Brooker 2009: 128). Uruguay. Alfonso Cuaron.

but instead in which all space is (inter)connected. But while HoUywood has become more ‘rapid’ in terms o f its cutting. As such. been displaced by ever more rapid cutting in HoUywood. It is the (virtual) camera’s ability to move through space with total mastery that is important.rroro: ave™T^dL°?^S‘* f ' * f " “ ^ ^ as . techniques such as matches on action and eyeline matches) more than by simply the ra p iity o f the cuts (see Brown 201 la). cu ttin g et ai. This is not simply a question o f speed. As we/the camera rushes through the streets o f London in a vertiginous and. even in shots o f relatively short duration. we might argue. while it is important to bear in m ind the continuous spaces brought about by the single-take film. While films may feature more cuts now than ever before. 2007). As BordweU puts In orh A“ ^ ( B o r d w e U 2006-135) appears m contemporary cinema.e.8 seconds (see Smith and Henderson 2008). however. importantly. Henderson (2008). after Edgar Reitz (1998) and Steven Shaviro (2010: 136). a conception o f space as a continuum.n f = 3pS = = 5S iE = =a5==SE5s=?S r a t i n g camera that moves more ‘ostentatiously’ than ever before. Duration in the long take is of course important. one should not discuss the long take independent o f considerations of editing. ‘1 ■ ^ seconds. in that long takes do not exist in isolation. According to the cognitive work on film perception by Tim J. leading Smith and Henderson to posit the existence o f edit blindness. the continuity of contemporary HoUywood cinema leads us to a conception o f space that approaches that exemplified in the sequences described from Fight Club-. (2010) have all argued that there are now more rather th.^ “”. 2006: 117-89). the continuity I am speaking about is not uniquely an issue of duration. As I have argued elsewhere. digitality is not explicidy connected to long-take films and m pam culat what King terms the ‘following’ camera] more generally into d. but in which empty space and the objects that fill it share an equal ontological status. as ‘palpable. so that a film like Requiem fo r a Dream (Darren Aronofsky. Barry Salt (?( )()A^ a t Cuttinp’ef al ^9 ^ 1 u II i i » /> oalt (2004). here I wish to suggest that it is the continuity aspects o f mainstream HoUywood cinema that ate important for understanding the logic of the digital. since it depicts space as a continuum that is not fragmented into empty space and the objects that fill it. In this way. viewers find it easier to detect the cuts in October than they do the cuts in Requiem fo r a Dream. that is.4 2 Supercinema lightweight digital cameras. even relatively brief shots can portray what after BordweU. continous fashion during the opening moments o f Sweeney Todd: The Demon Barber o f Fleet Street (Tim Burton. and Janies E. though with a different emphasis. this edit blindness is brought on by the continuity o f the editing (i. Smith and John M. almost like a silenL a m l^ r ’ r open space we are unaccustomed to’ (Kissel 2008.e Continuity intensified David BordweU (2002a. and. 2005. rather than the expressive montage o f Eisenstein. as well as by the continuous spaces depicted in films featuring long takes. remains the predominant style..354) It is al f ’ U. The comparatively ‘slow’ cutting rate o f Citizen Kane has. it is important to note that continuity editing. USA/UK. in which space consists not of discreet units. 2000) has an ASL of 2. it depends on how (much) such shots move through space. or the inability of viewers to spot cuts in films. except in the digital era (and after Henderson made his point) in single-take movies like Russian Ark. or points. While in that essay I argue that viewers should ' resist their blindness to the very techniques that keep us looking at the screen as a result o f humans’ innate tendency to pay attention to moving objects/ changes in our environment. that digital cinemalinvolves an acceleration not only o f edits. However. while G ft 2 r^« which can stand here classical (if m many ways atypical) HoUywood production has an ASL of^6 4 Digital Cinema’s Conquest of Space 43 seconds. I am terming an intensification o f continuity. what I wish to concentrate on are the continuous spaces that are depicted through the continuous movement of the camera. USA. as Brian Henderson (1976: 316) has suggested. but also .

1997) znAEvent a o X 1?5 3 n ^ By AngelaNdalianis w T o X h W 2 ' /e P/oliferation o f ‘cosmic zoom’ shots in films such as War o f the Worlds (Steven Spielberg. that digital portraying ‘hyperbolic slow motion’ (Purse UUJ. As in GreatExpectations. but it also moves through the various windows of the car without breaking them or clunking against the car’s frame. whereby the speed o f the action varies within the same shot. is driving. Gonsidered purely in terms o f space. including various memories o f his childhood). forthcoming). rather than hovering outside o f the aeroplane. from ‘real time’ to slow motion motion or any combination o f these. the point to make here is that these shots could bp at any speed. venicaloy (s. out into space. suggests a mastery o f space that is beyond tfie abilities o f the analogue camera alone. USA. showing Estella sat looking out o f a window. it cm also pass through solid objects.e l 2006) although LUa P„ta. N ot only does the camera move instead of cutting. the impossible shot in EnUr the Void. Here. The camera cranes up above Finn before there is a cut to a cloudy night sky.. David H. even in reverse motion. Linda (Paz de la Huerta). As such. 129) ^ d many others..J. in this scene he does not. it is their temporal and. I should say that Enter the Void is a film that travels around Tokyo. We can even zoom out from ground level on Earth. in which we pass through the solid substance o f an aeroplane’s fiiselage. such shots are characterized by startling shifts in scale . 2009) and many other films feature prominent examples o f ramping. into and out o f rooms and even into and out o f characters without so much as a seeming cut during its entire 140-minute duration (with the exception o f some moments o f blackness inserted to simulate blinks when we see things through Oscar’s eyes. in a car that their father. Purse understands ramping in The M atrix emphasizing the act of mediation’ (Purse 2005: 154) in that the variations o f speed draw our attention to the fact that these are constructed images. as does Lisa Purse. alongside which the camera hovers for a few seconds. spadOiaadon o f Cinema ong not just the vertical axis. USA.1. n l (K e n n ih Crockett 2009. an aeroplane comes to pass by. before stopping and allowing it to travel on. and it’s broken’). and I shall return to this theme in the final chapter.. USA. and further and fiirther out until we see a multiplicity of galaxies. the aeroplane rushes on. 1999). Slowly from the night sky emerges an aeroplane. provide good examples o f this spatial nuity^ Others include moments when we/the camera drop from the skies. in which the camera passes through walls and urnan bod i« as if through empty space. As per Fight Club. while she is making love to Alex (Cyril Roy). as per the opening credits o f Watchmen (Zack Snydet. only to witness Alex’s ejaculation. p u sh „ 0. Michael Bay. Enter the features myriad moments in which the camera passes into and out o f the bodies o f various characters. a distraught Finn (Ethan Hawke) looks up at the sky having been told by Ms Dinsmoor (Anne Bancroft) that he will never be united with his love Estella (Gwyneth Paltrow) (Finn: This is my heart. 222 23). After a few seconds. an gument to which we shall return. other car scenes from Spielberg films (with which Buckland compares this one) the director employs cuts (shots of one character. USA. when the ‘camera similarly rises slowly up from Tokyo street level and into the sky. However. breastfeeding a child whom she refers to by his name. in Enter the Void. the (virtual) camera’s mobility includes not just a mastery of empty space. Fleming and I have written about how Enter the Void is a film about being in and with the world (Brown and Fleming.44 Supercinema o f camera movement. 2006). W here. [but] across various axes’ (Purse 20097 tithese arguments. where we see the mother 0anice Sicotte-Bdiveau) o f the main protagonist. uw uK JU U K . In Great Expectations (/Vlfonso Cuaron. the camera can hover in the sky and then travel alongside the aeroplane. 2001). but also a space in which solid objects are traversed as easily as is thin air. including a particularly memorable and literal climax during which we pass into. USA 2009) where the camera moves steadily through still or still-seeming spaces that feature key moments o f mid. Rachel (Dakota Fanning).the uterus o f Oscar’s sister. or drop.from the endless zoom in o f the Worlds that takes us from a relattvely long shot into a drop o f water until we see the bacteria that end the alien invasion to the shot in Fight Club that sees us drift past an outsize Starbuck’s coffee cup and various other bits o f detritus before emerging from the inside o f a waste paper bin and into the narrators office. in Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 45 which we see a 150-second take featuring Robbie (Justin Chatwin) trying to calm his terrified sister. perhaps more completely than many o f the films mentioned . our own lost among th e m -^ h a p p e n s in (Robert Zemeckis. We might conversely argue.. The sam p les from Fight Club. Ray (Tom Cruise). however. goes ftirther than the similar shot in Great Expectations by suggesting not only an easily traversed space. Even though this shot involves a cut (from the crane shot to the shot in the sky) and a relatively obvious wipe (when the aeroplane passes on). N ight U rto O O ^ H ^ f m ( U S A / G e r m a f y / UK. W h i. more significantly. 1998). • dwaceerl™ ) by thei. then perhaps a shot of a chasing dinosaur. however. leaving us with an aerial shot of New York. 2008) J. We might similarly compare two moments from films in which the camera abandons the ground level o f Earth to travel up into the sky and towards a passing aeroplane.).to late twentieth-century history and the beginning of the The M a 2 . This mastery is taken to another level. Oscar (Nathaniel Brown). there is mastery o f movement and space here. Sleep Dealer (Alex Rivera USA/ M ™ . where this section of the film is set.hke a bomb from the bay doors o f a Japanese bomber Z {Pearl Harbor. but this time. we pass through its body and into the passenger hold. T„k fil„ . Warren Buckland (2006: 22 0 21) elaborates a further example o f unbroken continuity in War o f the Worlds. up into the sky.. their spatial continuity that is important. a" ' T Boyle.

whether they are in open air. walls. in fact suggest that digital cinema moves beyond human perspecove . planets: all of these things fragment space and we cannot pass through them in the way that the gaseous and virtud camera can. or up into the sky. which shifrs from the micro (brmn cells. p„cep. the shots that .e. perspectival (in that they mimic human perception). molecular level. digital cinema is an inhuman or a posthuman form. If for Deleuz^ Vertov achieved this with a movie camera. this brings us closer to Ueleuzes gaseous perception. I have also argued that digital u s ‘inhuman’ or ‘posthuman’ perspectives. where as in r/ U 7 do«r ll “ 1 hv cii ^ • ^ Man without a movie camera I2 L ‘ i ~ 3 “" T f i l ™ a t e „ to film fc. when the camera passes gaseously t r o u ^ those objects as easily as it does through ‘empty’ space. digital cinema achieves this without a (physical) movie camera (see Brown 2009a). ^ ^ I ^would 1 a suggest ~ T the cosmic zoom.r contrasts fhshioned by Eisenstein’s r t t i i r V e T '^ ’^ different from . in digital cmema literally nothing matters." L tt? “ d ‘hyper-rapid montage’ ‘WpiraUing points o f light radiat[ihg] outwards from a viewer’ (I ^ owell 2 0 02005: ^ 5 95). Perhaps we must t|e reduced to tautology and say: the continuum is the continuum.I b lllm T o n m lS o n tm u iy o f digiuJ cmema therefore paradoxically achieve.. trees. As such.miv ^le viewer that the micro with the macro. veryfoing (all space and all that fills it) simply. while V E Perkins says t at [i]n a fictional world where anything at all can happen [i. nothing at all can mean or matter’ (Perkins 1972: 59-70).b„ae c o „ „ e c d o „ on . if I cpuld not tell myself apart from other matter. then. ^ id e“ d Z p cutting o f digital cinema achieve a similar ‘gaseous’ effect. the changing scales o f digital cinema.o paaa thtough tp a ^ l„ d i p d cinoma back to G i f a Deleuzci f f l m .o b J cinon. The digital film tautologically tells us at space is simply space.p h Z p h ^ ^ In Ihe Movement-Image (henceforth referred to as CinemL / i n i ^ ^ u . a conception that leads us towards meaninglessness.d clucma and t DalTvltS i aLg Dd5°U 86. in a digital world]. in that nothing has a physical reality. broadly speaking. where Vertov and 1960s American experimental cinema respectivelv ( D e w S r 8 7 r 3 ‘° ''’|''. evei^hm g « a part of the continuum of reality. George Legrady says that the virtual space in interactive media installations is ‘free from the constraints o f material reality’ (Legrady 2002: 221).e a ^ . as I have argued elsewhere. too. I„ „ g „ potioda and . 83). . and which conflates inside and outside. tables. the ultra-rapid camera movements. From a human perspective.„ .960a Americau capmtd. We see in a ‘molecular’ fashion. ‘I’ would not exist). Digital Cinema's Conquest of Space 47 swooping over vast landscapes. v ”'" ' t ' P“ » M lti« for digkd tochnology „ o j.and not just across shots (something cinema has long since been able to achieve).. but in single shots that combine these perspectives as if they were a part of a single continuum. o™ would have dUapp^ved o T mages loss o f mdexicality. ^ ^^ ihevta5aT:^t. In effect. shows that the objects in these spices form a single continuum.- become a b . such that we are unable to differentiate between them -Ihat is to say. which posits a world in which we can pass through solid objects ^ easily as we do through empty spaces.wall or inside a human brain. Even Russian A rk is still limited comparison to Enter the Void. However. which must fragment and divide (not least in order to understand and to survive. „ „ d » l o „ „ flaahing acroaa d.lon. •/Analogue film by its very nature fragments space. both apatial lealiara through Its continuity and a form o f gaseous perception. .recovn izahlf I. Digital cinema dlows us to transcend our limited human perception. Houses. However.the disjunctive ^ ^— H o w le r. since we see not ju st how objects are connected but the connections themselves. Although Edward Branigan (2006: 88) and Stephen Prince (2010: 26) argue that image conventions in diHtal cinema remain. everything is not a ‘part’ o the continuum o f reality. the continuum. O r rather.46 Supercinema j ' i ' . inside a.. for the continuum cannot be fragmented into parts. e euze argues that gaseous perception allows us to see that objects are connected aa well ua ahowmg . bacteria in drops o f water) to the macro (galaxies). m which all points in space seem to be connected V4»f cmg ^ueleuze eL . are a part of the continuum o f reality. In other words. aU points in space. the ocean. 1 5 ■ m ^h o f . Descartes’s spatial error I hope to have shown how digital cinema’s claims to realism are not necessarily comproimsed by a lack o f indexicality. space IS firaginented.

involve spaces that are discrete.coordinates). can partake in the logic o f spatial continuity that I have proposed above. since the digital is by its very nature discrete. and which also seems to be reflected in digital cinema (even if not in every film). vertical (y)'and depth (z) axes. In this way. has been replaced in physics by a less ‘solid’ understanding o f space that is perhaps more in keeping wifo (the spirit of) Deleuze’s philosophy. To do this I shall refer to how space is understood by contemporary physics. but it is still her face and it is the relationships between points on her face that change rather than her face now taking up new points in space (Creene 2000: 233). . Hansen (2002) has endeavoured to show. As Jan Simons has explained. returns its color. but as smooth (Creene 2000: 263). as does Siegfried Kracauer (1997: 223) regarding Elia Kazan’s On the Waterfront (USA. purposes and ethics o f the people who use them’ (Simons 2002: 234). the notion o f fixed spatial coordinates. is to show us spaces that are continuous. King 2000:175—92. suggesting that digital cinema is realistic. at least not from the human perspective. or what I term human perspective.Cartesian .48 Supercinema As well as allowing us to rethink perspective. spheres and other curved surfaces or objects functioning as phenomena within an otherwise Euclidean space made up of Cartesian point coordinates. o f space . a representation that has a surprising affinity with a certain well-known avant-garde vision of cinema! For a computer. the more contrived and false it will be. and by extension for digital cinema. I'would like to take a different approach. <Georg Bernhard Riemann is credited as the physicist who ‘broke the chains of flat-space Euclidean thought and paved the way for a democratic mathematical treatment of geometry on all varieties o f curved surfiices’ (Creene 2000: 231). ontologically speaking. curvature means that the relations between points in space can change. An Einsteinian view o f ‘smooth’ space. consisting of discrete units. as I have explained. Furthermore. specim effects. while I am not saying that the continuous spaces o f digital cinema are literal manifestations of Einsteinian space.ontologically speaking . codes and technologies. rather than in conflict with. -but he also reminds us that ‘truth-telling and truthfulness are not functions o f machines. That is. as Mark B. there is an easy binarism to be drawn between analogue and digital whereby 'digitahanaldgue = discretexaHtinuous = arbitrary:motivated’ (Simons 2002: 234). the computer constructs ‘virtual spaces that are defined along the familiar Cartesian coordinate system’ (Manovich 2001: 44). is' fragmented. provided we rethink how space is organized in reality. Holly Willis has arguM that solid. and as we can see in the enlarged frame o f the IMAX screen and the ‘immersive’ powers of 3D cinema (see Darley 2000:162—66. inherited from Rene Descartes. Albert Einstein used the work of Riemann. O n this molecular. rather than remain fixed. In other words. Beyond its lack of well as the malleable. and thus unreliable as far as their veracity is concerned’. Digital Cinema’s Conquest of Space 49 Simons acknowledges that digital spaces are ‘arbitrary and manipulated (or “construed”). Cartesian space dissolves in works by digital artist Jennifer Steinkamp (Willis 2005: 88). it is paradoxical that it is deployed aesthetically to portray continuous spaces (and times). digital cinema (and special effects more generally) can take us beyond whatTorben Grodal (1997: 280) terms the ‘prototypical’. but a space (and time) that itself is curved. but for present purposes I wish to reaflRrm that while digital cinema may . vertical.N. Sean Cubitt (2004: 139) makes a similar case when he argues that realism in digital cinema is dependent on. We have a cinema arranged simply through abstract colours (not least through the intensified continuity of digital cinema analysed above). Perhaps it is for this reason that Lev Manovich encourages us to consider digital images from the perspective o f the computer: Since a computer breaks down every frame into pixels. but o f the intentions. then. rather than something stmctured by ‘shots. or. it is not. Brian Creene tries to explain this hy describing a trampoline surface picturing the Mona Lisa: her face can be distorted (the trampoline surface is stretched). ever changing'and connected nature of that space —that digital cinema depicts. and time location of each pixel. narrative. In other words. and into the realm of the inhuman or posthuman. would not seem at first blush to conform vtith the discrete space of the computer (space as made up of separate and fixed . which functions by means of discrete binary units (Is and Os). ‘mid-sized’. to come up with his general theory of relativity. among others.’ and so on. W hat this means is that Riemann posited a theory of curved spaces: that is. since it reminds us of the move from solid to gaseous perception outlined by Deleuze. Riemann helped to shift our understanding of the universe away from being a space made up of straight lines and grid coordinates and in which we can easily locate fixed points. This is actually how a computer represents a film. It might seem paradoxical that a computer. Willis’s use of the word ‘solid’ in relation to Cartesian space is interesting. given the horizontal. the ‘smoothness’ o f Einsteinian space does seem to be reflected in the continuity. a complete film can be defined as a function that. what digital cinema does. Indeed. However. etc. In the final chapter I shall bring ‘users’ (or what film studies typically refers to as viewers or spectators) into the argument. According to Riemann. However. I wish to propose that this dissolution of Cartesian space extends far beyond Steinkamp’s work and into mainstream cinema. or at least what it can do. as per a grid. ‘mid-level’. (Manovich 2001: 302) N ot only is digital cinema foil o f inhuman characters performing impossible feats. the simulated spaces of digital cinema ar6 spaces that are made up o f fixed points that exist along the horizontal (x). not just circles. then. rather than through shots. Indeed. or smoothness.’ ‘actors. Space for the computer. pulling the points that make up her face apart when under pressure. actors. a film is an abstract arrangement of colours changing in time.’ ‘narrative. To counter such claims for digital cinema’s lack of realism we could argue. but a space that is curved. but it is also full of impossible camera movements and perspectives that seem to take us beyond the frame as we typically have understood it. many might posit for all o f these reasons that digital cinema is not a realistic cinema. continuous. digital technology also seems to encourage us to reconceptualize the frame. 1954). that the more realistic a film looks. in which space is posited not as discrete. Recuber 2007).

as per Riemann’s ‘democratic’ understanding of space (Greene 2000: 231). O ur very humanity is based on the fragmentation of material space. an eighty-minute film that contains 1.. we need to distinguish between each other. on our own perspective.ame argument that I am pursuing here. for in showing how space is a continuum. [that] stand for. The Riemannian spaces of Einstein’s theory o f general relativity provide grounds to argue for the realism of the spatial continuity that we see in digital cinema. on Mars. 2. space is continuous and its fabric includes all that fills it (‘filled’ and ‘empty’ space have equal status). This suggests that interiority. not least through their shared ‘democratization’ o f space. thereby lending to digital cinema a (paradoxical) posthumanist realism. and between high and they in humans. the malleability ofspace in digital cinema. so too does digital cinema through its continuous spaces that are depicted-without the use of a (visible) cut. Digital cinema can not only pass from interiors to exteriors with consummate ease. THis is also made clear in digital cinema’s shifts in scale within the same shot: the few centimetres inside the narrator’s brain that the camera travels at great length during the opening sequence o f Fight Club demonstrate a ‘curved’ space . within the course o f our daily lives. or what Steven Shaviro terms ‘equaUty among its [digital cinema’s] elements’ (Shaviro 2010: 77). we begin to see not those objects that fill space. we would quickly get run over or fell to our doom. none quite makes the. Although Welles is the most ftmous exponent of such techniques. and replace. but the continuum o f space itself This ‘posthuman’ perspective on space also takes its lead from the physicist’s understanding o f reality. walls or thin air .. allows one both to image and to imagine an all-encompassing spectacle. miles under the Earth’s crust. gaseous level. be they manmade or natural.. If I could not . or in a wholly different galaxy. we humans cannot pass (or see) through solid objects. while Manovich seems to pursue a similar line of thought in calling digital technology the ‘Universal Recording Machine (Manovich 2000a). Naturally.. a democratization of space that allows us not to privilege . Cartesian coordinates. what it mediates is the human experience of such art encompassing. Furthermore.certain points over others.346 shots (see Bergan 1997: 112). or as if its density did not affect the (virtual) camera’s movement. but it can also pass through the wall that separates them as if it were thin air. and we need to do this in order to survive: if we could not tell how far away an oncoming vehicle or how high a cliff was. within a wall. rakp. Such a representation carries the further ontological implication that the world digitally viewed is one in which all points are equivalent .these centimetres seem like great distances. However.5 0 Supercinema after Deleuze. Marcel L’Herbier is considered an important precursor to Welles. Furthermore. access to these points in space is made easy in digital cinema: it can be achieved in single. particularly for his use of complex sets (see Sadoul 1953: 41). what I’ll call totality (Clover 2004:40). if Riemann emphasized the relations between points in space. Notes 1. whereby in digital cinema all points in space .: on an unexpected level o f realism when viewed from the perspective of contemporary physics. he was not the first. even if we humans cannot normally see them.are rendered equal. and on individual identity: I distinguish myself ftom all that surrounds me. exteriority and the apparent division between the two all form a single continuum. 3. The ‘stretched’ spaces of Fight Club and the contracted spaces of Contact are like the Mona Lisa’s stretched trampoline face: the relationship between the points changes. be they coordinates in thin air. blurring the distinction between the two.. which typically constructs space according to fixed. Furthermore. as humans. Digital cinema tells us that all points in space. Nonetheless. such that the notion of fixed points in space (a Euclidean/Cartesian geometry) is undermined. Joshua Clover suggests that Digitech. 2 The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema Digital cinema has a continuous’ logic that pushes beyond the human understanding of space (neither humans nor material cameras can pass through walls). There would typically be about 600 shots in a ninety-minute Hollywood movie. We can compare this to Battleship Potemkin. including other human beings. It is paradoxical that in digital cinema these spaces are constructed through the use o f the discrete functionings o f the computer. We live in a literally fragmented space: it is broken up by countless phenomena. Paul Young comes close to making this connection when he discusses ‘the myth of total media (Young 1999: 29). and fluid shots. coexist simultaneously. We distinguish between near and ftr. continuous. which can be compared to the galaxies through which the camera so rapidly travels in films such as Contact. Scott Bukatman also comes close in describing ‘terminal vision (Bukatman 1993: 191 and 218). all other space’ (Sobchack 1998:255). Vivian Sobchack writes that special effects spaces present themselves as ‘total spaces.

I shall argue how an antihumanist approach to cinema has precursors in avant-garde/modernist cinema. Even when films feature nonhuman characters. vampires. has traditionally reflected this reality. then. in response to the dominant and negative role that they perceived psychoanalysis to be playing in contemporary (French) thought. Contrary to the notion of continuous space put forward in the last chapter. when we watch both analogue and digital films. not all films are about humans. In order to accomplish this. Grodal says that we see things at a ‘mid-level’ between the macroscopic and the microscopic (Grodal 1997: 280). for the most part we do view films as representations. after B da Baldzs. aliens. Since they are the creation The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 5 3 ofia human filmmaker’s imagination. How. is in this sense coextensive with perspective and identity. However. Furthermore. characters in films do not melt into their surroundings and become lost in a soup of colour . that we can understand. have apparently litde or no effect on us. Tike us. falling in love. or between a films characters and its setting . and behaviour. USA. our traditional notions o f reality are turned on their head.the space that they inhabit (space that is established through the film’s mise-en-sc'ene)\ Secondly: what are the relationships between the different characters themselves? That is. the animals are given human voices. it comes as no surprise that cinema. even if digital cinema would suggest an equivalence of all points in space. are we to reconcile the continued humanity o f cinema in the face of its supposed inhumanity? Cinema: a human art form? Ostensibly. then we must reconcile digital cinema’s inhumanity with Balazs s contention that all art (including cinema) is human. USA. werewolves. fragments space in a way that is similar to how we fragment and categorize reality ourselves: we distinguish empty space from that which fills it . Since Deleuze and Guattari wrote their first two collaborative works. or. provided one shares a certain understanding of what it means to be human. Particular among these is the notion o f ‘desire’. as we distinguish protagonists from their surroundings. and the actions o f quanta. or by being. although characters and characterization have conventionally been understood in terms of psychology and psychological types. we shall establish that. There are innumerable documentaries about animals. 154) attest. we might conclude. together with ‘mid-level’ (Grodal) or ‘solid’ (Deleuze) perception. This we can achieve by comparing (human) characters as depicted and understood in analogue cinema with those depicted in digital cinema. Anti-Oedipus (1983) and A Thousand Plateaus (L987). as do the apes in Rise ofthe Planet o f the Apes (Rupert Wyatt. therefore.5 2 Supercinema differentiate myself from all that surrounds me. these monsters have also often been anthropomorphized. in the case of dinosaurs. For example. it is a human manifestation and presents human beings (Balazs 1991: 262). plants and places —although many o f these have a human voiceover which explains to us what "we are seeing. but that this approach crystallizes when cinema is constructed using digital technology. as humans we prioritize certain aspects of our reality in order to survive. Becoming human? For Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Bearing in mind Williams’ words. Furthermore. film typically distinguishes between near and far. be they fighting it out. like the movements of the solar system. emotions. First: what is the relation between figure and ground. one that is antihumanist and nonanthropocentric. Similarly. between material states (it cannot pass through solid objects). we might compare analogue to digital cinema in the light of two questions. Since fragmentation. 2011). being a product of human endeavour. Wridng before digital cinema had shifted from the margins to the mainstream. There are also fiction films that star animals —althoilgh such movies tend to involve anthropomorphized creatures. 1999) becomes ‘intelligent’ in its hunt for human meat.even if the camera itself ‘neutrally records what was before it at time o f filming. talkin'g. We must also address the issue of what it means to be human. However. the shark in Deep Blue Sea (Renny Harlin. several terms that they used to >elaborate their theory o f becoming are psychoanalytic in origin. in Jurassic Park. If with digital cinema we can at times neither distinguish between nor separate space from that which fills it. Christopher Williams said that ‘[sjome avant-gardists believe their work to be real even if the film does not show a single human being or recognizable object . humans are definedmot by a fixed essence. whose appearance we can only reconstruct from skeletons —as Bolter and Grusin (2000. as Siegfried Kracauer (1997: 97) has pointed out.except perhaps in the datamoshes that Meetali Kutty and I have explored elsewhere in relation to theories o f chaos and complexity (Brown and Kutty 2012). If I am proposing that digital cinema is an ‘inhuman’ their eyes it is more real precisely because it does not show those things (Williams 1980: 80). dinosaurs —fictional creations that have litde or no basis in observed reality. there have also been coundess films about unearthly monsters — men in the moon. I shall argue that an antihumanist approach to characterization is in its own way realistic. and between human beings. as mentioned. An analogue film. including ones occupied by human characters. how do we tell one character apart from another? By addressing these questions. or faults. There is apparently no loss of identity here. projected on to them are human qualities. or thinking. and contrary to appearances. then. T would not exist. that is to say. Most psychoanalytic theories . we are presented with a continuous conception o f space that bucks against our typically anthropocentric understanding of the universe. but by virtue o f the fact that they are always becoming. Since soon after cinema’s inception. that ‘every human art deals with human beings. digital cinema lends itself to a different understanding of characters and characterization. that is. we distinguish between different human characters onscreen. the velociraptors are particularly intelligent: they can open doors and lure their human prey into traps.

A mouth. refers to the conjunctions between multiplicities: it is ‘an increase in rhe dimensions o f a multiplicity that necessarily changes its nature as it expands its connections’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8). because humans are constantly in flux. then desire works through a process of constant change. 2003) are all liberating experiences thanks to their encounters with the various ‘others’ upon whom they spy. an encounter with an external force that catalyses a . and it has no object. formulated a conception of desire based upon presence. animal. for example becoming woman. meanwhile. my contention is that to become x (as in. a moleculci a particle —and that comes back to thought and revives it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:42).. be it woman. Deleuze and Guattarian becoming often seems. since it demands fixed/easily identifiable identities). a process o f metamorphosis. but instead is free to connect and to become with all manner o f other subjects at all manner o f different times. 2006). not least because we are always encountering the world. W hat is truly positive is not becoming x. the ontogenetic baseline o f existence. Since for Deleuze and Guattari psychoanalysis can render the individual static. is made up of a multiplicity o f ‘machines’. for example. connection and production. is a positive thing. see also Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 232-309). As is implied here.54 Supercinema had. becoming is a process that depends upon becoming something else . However. Norway/Sweden. that is. identity. UK/Denmark. molecule. or easily codified. such that the individual breaks out o f their stasis/sclerosis. then. For them. or at the very least a fixed subject. as we shall see in the final chapter. beings who work for the state (the state itself constituting a ‘repressive’ system. I am becoming woman. I was Joan o f Arc and I am Heliogabalus and the Great Mongol. by which they mean that everything is an instance of the multiple. individual. is by turns an eating machine. Germany. depending on what it (desiringly) connects with.among many Deleuze and Guattari-influenced scholars correcdy identifies various becomings here. a breathing machin6 and a vomiting machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 2). or. which is a term used mostly in A Thousand Plateaus. visible or invisible. and which.. As Martine Beugnet explains. we are always becoming. particle. thereby troubling the subject/object dichotomy. given their initially fixed identity (if they can be said to have an ‘identity’ at all?). the ontological.becoming. I am a C hinam an. for Deleuze and Guattari there are only connections and only change. in terms of how the concept is deployed in film studies. desire connects with.any . Given their initially ‘static’ status (if they can be said to have a ‘status’ at all?). whereby the flux of becoming is not constrained within an Oedipal or any other straitjacket. or flux. as such. The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 55 While Deleuze and Guattari propose that we are always becoming as a result of our interactions with others and with the world. or art) is only positive to a certain degree. or a goal. Instead. And on the level o f the. desire lacks a subject. is shaped by and shapes that which surrounds it. For to become something that is as fixed in its being as the former static identity from which one moves involves as much of what Deleuze and Guattari would term a reterritorializarion within the bounds of fixed identity and meaning as it . broadly speaking. a human. For this reason. while becomings are ‘positive’. Deleuze and Guattari. For Deleuze and Guattari.does a deterritorialization away from an initial and constrictive fixed identity. 2006). into nomadic entities who subvert the repressive state regime. but o f schizoanalysis. I wish to take this argument further and suggest that becoming is not a process that we necessarily achieve as a result of certain encounters. desire is constantly in the process of becoming. I will contend. Becoming is. To recognize that one is always becoming as a result o f one’s encounters with o^er? and with the world might. Assemblage’. significantly. Ih is is why they develop the concept of schizophrenia as being fundamental to human experience. But first I should like to provide grounds for why I believe that becoming is our . Serazer Pekerman (2012) has astutely'observed how the encounters of spies with those whom they spy upon in European ‘surveillance’ films of the 2000s engenders a becoming that sees them tu rn from being ‘static’. one desires what one does not have. becoming animal.and this is what psychoanalysis does through its Oedipalization of the individual such that the in iv id u al’s identity is triangulated within the ‘daddy-mommy-me’ system of Freudian thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 23). lead to a more ethical form o f behaviour. which each desire in such a way that they can ‘become’ at any given moment. with no fixed essence or identity. becoming art. an assemblage arises between what Deleuze andGuattari term ‘multiplicities’. which in turn lends itself to an unstable identity. a Templar. Being in flux. responds to. That is. becoming is applied to thought: ‘one does not think without becoming something else. and of Folke (Tomas Norstrom) in Salmer fra Kjokkenet/Kitchen Stories (Bent Hamer. becoming is ‘a state o f in-between-ness. This is manifested in the ways in which many becomings are defined by becoming something. at root every name in history is I (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 85-86). For example. 'What is Philosophy?. better. an unhealthy sclerosis that prevents becoming. as a process. prior to Deleuze and Guattari. desires back. or fixed. to become anything that in itself has a quantifiable. such becoming translates into a constandy changing subjectivity. desire lacks nothing. for example. y or z. I shall shortly bring this discussion of becoming to bear on digital cinema. Becoming is a productive process that arises out of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘assemblages’ between the desiring subject and that which it desires. More precisely.. Deleuze and Guattari develop a system not o f psychoanalysis. If for Deleuze and Guattari there is no fixed subjectivity except through repression. something that does not think —an animal. that affects all forms o f existence’ (Beugnet 2007: 41. viewed desire as being premised upon lack. the becomings o f Jackie (BCate Dickie) in Red Road (Andrea Arnold. to fix a subject is to repress it . however. In other woMs. Such approaches are not wrong per se. While Pekerman . I was my father and I was my son. to be a telos. but becoming in and of itself. of Wiesler (Ulrich Miihe) in Das Leben derAnderenl The Lives o f Others (Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck. a redskin. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari can speak o f how I am becoming God.animal. By the time Deleuze and Guattari write their final joint work.

In order to explain our entangled nature in/with the world. A steady.or what scientists might refer to as a vacuum does not exist ^ such. o f a dynamic universe the foture o f which we cannot predict. Instead. which has negative charge. is fixed. since ‘a vacuum is not actually empty’ (Close 2010: 3). both a wave and a particle. the case o f an electron.. d . or the ‘negative’ o f matter (for example ^ d ^though this might seem paradoxical and strange . Now. The point to be made here.5 emphasis added). as a rantainer in which the material universe exists. system would be repeatable and predictable. or spin/ entanglement diat I hope to show challenges the typical binarism o f (separated) subject and object through which we typically understand our position in the world/universe. According to physicist Paul Dirac and his ‘exclusion principle’ t ereus in re ity no vacuum. a vacuum is filled with antimatter. ^ ^72) . dieves that chaos ^an be modelled mathematically (i. a universe founded on regular Newtonian mechanics.. „ g d. ’ N ot only do we inhabit a universe that is constandy becoming. d It seems that empty space’ . space itself. links the physics o f the universe to the previous discussion o f Deleuze and Guattari. instead we are what physicists might call ‘entangled’ with it . too. everything is dynamic. That is. it is static and not becoming. who wrote these words. o esh this out in a bit more detail..that is each nanirl. within’ what space there is. [e]a^ elementary particle is composed of a single string . „ . This is not because o f flaws in the measuring system. ’ Physical becomings The material universe is dynamic The Farrh ^u- /I j • i I J J X Zb). are in/with this world. An electron is. let us stick with physics .on the erandCesti Qral^ w. but because the system cannot have such a measurement (Heisenberg 2000: 3-26). ’ The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 57 may weU be dynamic.p o . the chaotic system that we in fact inhabit defeats our efforts to predict the [or a] system’s fiiture. which means that . I mentioned above that Mtimatter also spins in the same way (though at a different ‘resonance’) to matter. can lead after a while to entirely different oumomes . determines It IS worth addressing a possible contention that readers might have Accenting v e ™ o f v . However. we mfgh. but It cannot manifest itself simultaneously as both because the more it is visible to a . be rendered predictable) ^ e in b e r g 1993: 27-28). is two-fold: firstly. it would not be an electron’ (Greene this contention would appear not to hold water. there is no empty sp a^. famously.17lT r For Greene. This evocation o f chaos theory. owever.e. let us remember that it is the filled and J n a m ic nature o f our universe that leads physicists towards chaos theory. but we are also nsep^able from that do their antimatter counterparts. but what it is moving in is not. Werner Heisenberg was the first to discover that one cannot simultaneously m e^ure the position and the momentum o f a particle. whether or not we ^ ascribe an ontological status to antimatter is a question for debate (antimatter does not e x ^ m the manner of ‘normal’ matter. we are not separable from our universe such that we can independently observe it. A chaotic system is one in which n e^ly identical initial conditions. as opposed to a dynamic.. since chaos itself is considered by some to be ‘a science of process rather than state. • ’ IS an /« rrw /c property Ifanelerrm n were not spinning.even though Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg.5 6 Supercinema e m a constant flux because we. the theoiy popularly understood through the butterfly effect.DilfLncesbe^tr^^^^^^^^^ because their respective strings undergo different resonant vibrational patternT m a t appear to be Afferent elementaiy particles are actually d i f f e r e n t i a . • smglestrmg-andall strings are absolutelyidentiL. o f becoming rather than being’ (Gleick 1998.i„ g ™ „ e .although I promise that we shall return to cinema shortly. Md. and which speaks o f the smallest things playing a role in effecting the largest changes. its ‘negative’/antimatter equivalent is a positively charged particle with positive energy known as a positron).i. secondly. but its presence is undeniable to physicists).sa p sf what m a tw ia lT m t o f movement.b „ . not least through our very interactions with it Indeed.

Going beyond Heisenberg. The impossibility o f measuring a fixed position. spooky because for photons to behave in the same way despite being physically distant from each other would suggest that information travels faster than the speed o f light. however. The brain. our perception is dependent upon input from the external world. in a linked and proportional fashion. or the (admittedly boggling) connection oTparticles . and if she is part of that system. it is at the expense o f the position. depending on what we see (and do). that is to say. then. As Niels Bohr wrote in a 1937. The ‘entanglement’ o f particles is not. Francisco J. whose work is often cited in relation to cognitive approaches to film.paper.then the ‘entangled’ andAcomplementary’ world o f quantum physics. but is incapable of accurate measurement of both position and momentum because her measuring devices are flawed. then. Cognitive becomings (Descartes's cognitive error) Baruch Spinoza (19S(6:45) famously argued that all that affects the body also affects the brain. However. suggests the complementarity. and vice versa. Influential cognitivist James J. are. ‘[o]ur coloured world is brought forth by complex processes of structural coupling. depending on our interactions with the world and with each other. Damasio has in his treatment o f Spinoza and elsewhere argued that the body and the brain are indelibly interlinked. as was mentioned in -the previous chapter.i. 1991: 164). further suggests the dynamic and ever changing/ becoming -nature o f the universe. for ocample. however. such that we can no longer strictly tell subject from object at all. One’s behaviour changes as one learns to cope with new conditions and situations.even when separated by (great) distances. Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch have also argued that our understanding of the world is shaped by what we come into contact with. then the system cannot have the accurate measurement that the observer seeks. Varela. which for Einsteinian physics is an impossibility (Zeilinger 2003: 3 4 ^ 3 ). a case of information being passed from one photon to another at a speed faster than the speed o f light. the observer is irreversibly part of that system. having once physically interacted. the less it is visible as a wave (which is dynamic. together with the cognitive approach that ensues. is embodied. regardless of the distance separating them. for example. ‘enworlding’ is not simply a question of humans being placed in the world. Hence. an argument that I shall explore in more detail in the final chapter. W hen these processes are altered some forms o f behaviour are no longer possible. the less its momentum is determined. because its momentum would be fully ««measured. that is. and the body is always ‘enworlded’. a process that they call ‘coupling’. that is. ‘entangled’.. regardless of how accurate her devices are. and Deleuze (1988. Varela. such as photons and ions. the observer does not observe the universe in a detached manner. 1992) has in his work taken up Spinoza’s mind-body parallelism as a model for his own thought. W ith regard to colour perception. can behave in such away that they are always in the same state (or what physicists would call being ‘polarized’ in the same fashion). the branch of physics connected with these arguments and ideas. pairs of photons. it is widely understood that elementary particles such as electrons do not behave in a deterministic manner (an understanding that again leads physics towards chaos theory. together with the necessity for a particle to have momentum. Entanglement. This befuddled Einstein such that he called this ‘spooky action at a distance’. which is a physical impossibility in that particles are defined by their momentum (in a fashion akin to. but they are also connected. One cannot fully measure the position o f a particle. or which has momentum).'would argue that we can only perceive ‘ecologically. In other words. Damasio 1994: 230). not least because of the affecting presence o f the observer trying to measure their behaviour. with Antonio Damasio (2003) in particular articulating his debt to Spinoza’s acceptance of the embodied nature o f thought. precisely because of the ‘spooky’ nature o f particles’ ‘action at a distance’. but they also help to define it.e. Spinoza has also emerged as an important precursor to neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists. since we cannot pin down/measure both their position and their momentum (the closer we get to measuring the one. If quantum The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 5 9 mechanics. In other words. different neural pathways are created. And. rather. or at the very least can be. In other words. If the momentum o f the particle is measured. suggests that particles give the appearance of being either a particle or a wave to those who observe them . we can .>the further we get from measuring the other). that differentiates a muon from a tau-neutrino). will hopefully serve as evidence for the realism o f a cinematic world that eschews the need for a subject-object binarism since it is a world o f constant becoming in which there is no impartial subject observing objects. if observation determines (at least the appearance of) behaviour . But to get an initial sense of what this means. they disagree with his belief that perception is ‘direct’ (Varela et al. so too does one’s sense of the world’ (Varela et al. and by extension the mind. but not strictly the same as. complementarity can appear to ‘involve a mysticism incompatible with the true spirit of science’ (Bohr 1937: 289). which in turn lead to different thoughts. Thompson and Rosch agree with Gibson’s ‘ecological’ approach. If what affects the body also affects the brain. as defined above through a lack o f predictability). namely the world. Gibson (1986). particles do not just move. Niels Bohr argued that these dual properties of a particle (wave/momentum and particle/position) are ‘complementary’. as one’s actions change. it has been known since Einstein that particles. then what affects the body is what is ‘out there’ beyond the body. And this inability to measure both the position and the momentum at once is because the observer affects the results o f their observation. but in which both subject and object are entangled in a process of mutual becoming. the way in which it is its spin.58 Supercinema hum an observer as a particle (with a fixed location). 1991: 202-205). the more the electrons position is determined. or momentum/ movement. and that these two are always working in conjunction with the environment that surrounds them (see.

contra Gibson. as opposed to in space ‘itself’. including other humans. Humans are diflerent from all solid objects that surround them. Edelman and Tononi Taldng this argument fiirther. as is the fact that classical Hollywood westerns are set on the frontier and classical film noirs are set in the neon glow . Neuroscientist (and musician) Daniel Levitin says that if 1 put electrodes m your auditory cortex and play a pure tone in your ears at 440Hz.and if we connea with the world . we might say that enough neurons are tiring at that song’s resonance that we cannot but be conscious of the song). or mediated by the senses. would seem.such that we become conscious o f it . as opposed to our ability boldly and detachedly to reflect upon it. our brains and our minds . too.then we also connect with cinema.and the shadows —o f the growing metropolis.we are constandy becoming. but also. by extension. to be false. Indeed for V^ela.for pitch.6o Supercinema continue with colour perception. as we are in a constantly changing environment. Although I have argued above that we live in a dynamic universe in/with which we are fundamentally entangled. set in the Philippines is key in terms o f how we understand them. might enough neurons fire together (as a ‘cluster’) that the source/cause o f that firing enters into conscious perception/thought (think o f how songs easily get ‘stuck’ in our heads. That is. As such. and reliance upon. to the extent that we take it for granted. the films are not simply about humans who would act in the way that they do regardless o f where the action was taking place. 1991: 51). to cinema and its depictibn of the relationship between figure and ground and between diffetent figures. then Descartes’s proposed cogito ergo sum {I A ink therefore I am).so. there are neurons in your auditory cortex that will fire at precisely that frequency! causing the electrode to emit electrical activity at 440Hz . Such a statement is obvious.we are enworlded as opposed to solipsists. to combine Edelman and Tononi with Levitin. that is. when applied to sensory perception as a whole. since the advent o f digital cinema. as promised. does a human being who is equally studies of . Such readings already suggest the complex relationship between figure arid ground within a film’s*diegesis. even sexual intercourse). The opening shot of Fight Club. If our brains are fundamentally embodied.and the conditions also sustain both rose and observer (in short. the body. iideltnan and Giulio Tononi point out that colour and other ‘qualia’ in our perceptual field are not properties o f the object itself. characters in films are typically contrasted with their setting. so. but it emerges in the interaction between rose and observer . as is argued by Damasio (1994). what goes into the ear comes out of the brain! (Levitin 2008: 29) I should make dear that I am using Levitin’s work metaphorically here (not least because the same ‘resonance’ between phenomenon and brain does not happen. that conscious perception/thought (Edelman and Tononi 2001: 120-34). in ‘which even conscious thought emetges only through our interactions with that world. or certainly not z detaA ed self that is somehow separate from the world and from our bodies and which enables Cognition (Varela et al. ^ e r e is no thought that is ‘pure’ and which defines the self outside of its re ationship with. there is no detached self. However. food. Believing ourselves to have an integrated self. The fact that Kidlat Tahimik’s films are. Therefore. notions o f subjectivity and identity aie challenged. Edelman and Tononi propose that conscious thought Itself arises from the way in which neuronal firings ‘cluster’. but they are about humans whose actions are defined by those places . and the ensuing separation o f mind from body from world A at Desc^tes views as the very definition o f humanity (I am human because can t h i ^ m a detached manner). neither to be distinguished from nor prioritized over the rest o f the space surrounding him. a rose is not red. Such an understanding o f colour perception. will provide the basis for fiirther consideration in the final chapter. but that the narrator is simply a part of space. in which the virtual camera pass’es into and out of the narrator’s body without causing any harm. we can no longer make such assumptions. They can neither walk through a brick wall nor mesh with it. If cinema is in the world . Thompson and Rosch. such ' that figures stand in opposition to each othet and to their ground. Perhaps a usefiU way o f thinking about this might be to think of music. we believe ourselves separate from our fellow humans and separate from the objects that surround us. say. which are indeed always coming into contact with the world . This in turn means that the identity/subjectivity of the narrator is open to question. let us remrn. but also for the worlds that films depict. for materially they are different. In the same way that a brick wall loses its ability to define space when the digital ‘camera can pass through it. But just as a musical tone makes our brain resonate at the same requency as the tone . And the same is true not only for how we typically view films. Deprived of individuality. with colour). most humans believe that their sense o f self is real (and inasmuch as we believe in it. In the meantime. the narrator in Fight Club lacks definition and meaning. which in turn is ‘enworlded’. colour is not ‘out there. Each pldce plays a strong part’in terms o f how we understand the film as a whole. it is real). concerning which neuroscientists Gerald M. su^ests not an individual defined in contrast to the space that surrounds him. that aRects not only our bodies. but it is red to the human observer). for example. would seem to suggest that perception is. The ‘geopolitical’ readings o f films considered in the last chapter involve locating films in specific places. pills. but we also oom zUOl: 159-62). however. indirect. when enough neurons fire in response to a particular enworlded phenomenon.and thus even our conscious thoughts . even though humans historically have allowed objects from the outer world to penetrate them for the sake o f survival (and sometimes pleasure. The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 6i Space and place in film The above picture o f dynamic/becoming humans enworlded/entangled in a dynamic/ becoming world. too. I am thinking o f injections.



the role o f the city, architecture, and landscapes in film make clear (for example,
Neumann 1996; Clarke 1997; Fowler and Helfield 2006; Bergfelder et al. 2007;
Marcus and Neumann 2008; Fortin 2011). In other words, the figures, or
protagonists, o f these films stand in contrast to, and often are trying to overcome
(aspects of), their envifonment, but their behaviour is also intimately related to that
environment. As there are no real vacuums in nature for Paul Dirac, so, too, are
there no ‘vacuums’ in cinema.
David Martin-Jones (2006; 2011) has in particular paid close attention to the
way in which place plays a prominent role in films, and he has carried out
groundbreaking work in marrying this approach to the more ‘abstract’ or theoretical
work.of Gilles Deleuze. In his analysis o f Ging chat goo sUPolice Story (Jackie Chan,
Hong Kong, 1985), for example, Martin-Jones outlines the way in which Hong
Kong’s,transition from colonial city to transnational business hub has involved the
destruction o f local identities in favour o f a more ‘transnational’ and hybrid identity.
He sees this in particular in an action sequence in which policeman Chan Ka Kui
(Jackie Chan) entraps drug dealer C hu Tao (Yuen Chor) and his henchmen in, and
then chases them through, a shantytown. Bereft o f any clear escape route, Chu Tao
and his men drive their cars through the corrugated iron buildings that comprise
the shantytown, thereby destroying both the domestic and work spaces of the
inhabitants. Martin-Jones reads this as the erasure o f the local in the face of the
transnational circulation o f capital, here associated with the drug trade (MartinJones 2011: 133-61). He also associates this erasure o f local identity in the face of
globalized capitalism with the creation o f what Marc Auge terms, as discussed, non
places - and it is significant for Martin-Jones that the final arrest of Chu Tao takes
place in a shopping mall, which is a space that Martin-Jones links to the non-places
that Auge (1995) associates with global capital. Martiq-Jones also suggests, after
Deleuze, that these places - the shantytown and the shopping mall —are also (but
not just) any-spaces-whatever.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, non-places are riot necessarily the same as
any-spaces-whatever, not least because a non-place is, paradoxically, too identifiable
a space to be any-s’pa.ce-whatever. To confirm this, Martin-Jones and Auge go so far
as to name them: airports, shopping malls, etc. If they were to be any-spaceswhatever, then perhaps we would not recognize them as a certain type o f place at all;
that is, we would not be able to fit them into the specifically geopolitical paradigm
that Augd suggests in linking the non-place to a historical moment (globalized
capitalism). Instead, an any-space-whatever might be an unrecognizable, or
unnameable, space, one whose ‘anyness’ and whose ‘whateverness’ is rendered not as
a result o f the wider context o f the film’s diegesis (the spread oF globalized capitalism
- combined with the subsequent and imminent reincorpor^tion o f Hong Kong
back into mainland China at the time of Police Storys making - threatens Hong
Kong identity), but as a result o f what the space becomes. That is, we become less
interested in the representational qualities of the image (I can identify this as a chase
through a shantytown), and more in the ‘emptied out’ or ‘voided’ nature o f the

The Nona nthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema


space (Deleuze 2005: 5 and 247). This in turn, arguably, leads us to be more
preoccupied by the qualities o f the image as an image. In other words, we forget all
sense of represented place and meaning and become instead caught up in the image
itself, such that the space depicted becomes any-space-whatever.
•Despite this different reading o f the any-space-whatever, Martin-Jones’s analysis
remains useful for its conjunction of Deleuzian film theory and the ‘geopolitical’
approach. For Martin-Jones, we should never forget the grounding context o f any
filn^ an approach that I laud. Indeed, it is an approach that can inform our
understanding o f many digital films. Take, for example. Panic Attack!, the previously
mentioned short film from Uruguay, which features giant robots/aliens attacking
and destroying Montevideo. As we see a series o f key Montevidean buijdings and
monuments (the Torre Antel, the Palacio Salvo, the Legislative Palace, the
Intendencia) destroyed in the film, we get the sense that Panic Attack! expresses
anxiety concerning the eradication of the local in the face o f globalization, which
has digital technology at its core. In short, as digital powers invade Uruguay, all that
is iconically or recognizably Uruguayan is erased, rendering the city, and the country
as a whole, an any-space-whatever in Martin-Jones’s understanding o f the term.
However, while such readings are valid, as both Martih-Jones’s reading of
Police Story and my (brief) reading o f Panic Attack! \io ^tf\A \y exemplify, I wish to
adopt here a different approach towards the relationship between figure and
ground in order to unleash a different potential in cinema: that is, simply, the
inability for us to distinguish figure from ground. This potential is, as we shall see,
brought to prominence by digital technology, but has im portant precursors in
modernist cinema.

Repulsive reality
Renoir’s La Rkgle du jeu features deep focus shots into and out of .which many
characters walk: for example, the shot at bedtime of the castle’s corridor, which
features practically all of the main characters as they shuffle into and out o f rooms.
Here, ,we distinguish the characters from each other and from the space that they
occupy. But, in Renoir’s own words, deep focus‘also seems to fuse his characters to
the location (quoted in Sadoul 1953: 86),.rather than juxtaposing them with it.’
Roman Polanski’s Repulsion (UK, 1965) also involves a breakdown of, or a
blurring o f the distinction between, figure and ground, one that makes o f Repulsion
an exceptional but important analogue film that foreshadows the becomingcommonplace o f this breakdown or blurring in digital cinema. Repulsion tells the
story o f a Belgian manicurist, Carol Ledoux (Catherine Deneuve), who lives in a
London apartment with her sister, Helen (Yvonne Furneaux). W hen Helen goes
away on holiday with her boyfriend, Carol’s neuroses get the better o f her and she
withdraws into the apartment, from which she refuses to leave. So bad do Carol’s
neuroses and withdrawal become that she murders both an admirer, Colin 0ohn



Fraser), and her landlord (Patrick ^JPymark) when they come into the apartment to
find her.
From this brief synopsis, one might think that the film differentiates inside
(apartment) from outside (rest o f world), as well as Carol from both o f these and the
other characters in the film. To a certain extent this is true: we of course recognize
interior scenes and differentiate them from exterior scenes when watching the film.
However, the film also breaks down these barriers such that, as Andrew Kievan
would put it, the discovery o f location is inseparable from the investigation of
psychology (Kievan 2005:71). In this film, Carol s internal, psychological condition
becomes synonymous with/inextricable from her exterior physical surroundings.
W hat happens m-Repulsion is that the apartment becomes Carol (and vice versa),
such that we cannot separate or distinguish between the two.
The film opens, as it closes, in darkness... [before] the camera draws back...
[and] reveals'itself as the pupil of her [Carols] eye’ (Butler 1970: 60). In other words,
from the start o f Repulsion, we are not sure whether we are ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ Carol’s
mind, an ambiguous quality that only intensifies as cracks strangely manifest
themselves in the walls of the apartment and as eery figures start to appear within the
film’s mise-en-scme (Truffot 2004; Wright Wexman 1987: 55). Since Carol responds
to these figures as if they were real, it becomes difficult to tell which images are
symbolic and which are literal. Carol is in practically every scene o f Repulsion, and
even when she is not in a scene, she is the topic o f conversation. However, Carol is
not the only character in the film, and so can we really argue that Carol is
indistinguishable from everything that surrounds her? Colin, for example, is in love
with Carol. He cannot enter her world, though, and this is reflected in the way in
which he is represented. He calls to Carol from behind a windowpane and from
within a phone box; he is always separated from her, as Didier Truffot (2004) has
pointed out.' Does this mean that there is differentiation, and that Colin is, at the
last, different from Carol? O n a certain level, we must accept that there is
differentiation. However, Colin also serves to emphasize Carol’s (and our) inability
to differentiate between inner and outer. W hen Colin attempts to penetrate Carol’s
world/Carols space, Carol kills him. O r rather, he is subsumed into the continuum
in which Carol and the space she occupies are inseparable, and in which differentiation
is impossible. Colin cannot exist as Colin in this continuum, since to do so would be
to recognize different individual identities. In this sense, there is a logical consistency
that Colin must die. Cohn’s differentiation from Carol is real, bht he can only join
Carol in the continuum by giving himself up. This he does, by dying.
Since we cannot separate Carol’s inner being from external reality, we can
understand that Repulsion involves a spatialization o f Carol. That is; we see figured
in the space of the film Carol’s inner being. But it is not that the space o f the film
becomes Carol, such that ‘she’ defines everything; the space o f the film also
becomes Carol such that ‘Carol’ also loses her subjectivity and, by extension, her
identity. We see this when Carol’s landlord asks Carol if she is Miss>Ledoux. Carol
hesitates before answering, suggesting, as Ivan Butler (1970: 69) points out, that

The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema


Carol is no longer sure of her own identity. Identity depends upon differentiation
and. separation: I am this person and not that person or thing. In Repulsion,
meanwhile, the continuum of reality subsumes Carol as much as Carol subjects the
spatial continuum that surrounds her to her inner being. In other words. Repulsion
features a ‘mutual becoming’ o f space and Carol, such that both lose their identity
to ‘become’ something different.
Making an analogue film, Polanski o f course uses analogue techniques in
Repulsion-, the film features matching eye lines, instances of continuity editing, and
haiidheld cameras and Steadicam shots that move freely around the characters and
through the apartment. Polanski maintains this ‘realist’ aesthetic throughout the
film, meaning that Carol’s inner world and the outer world, inasmuch as we can
separate them, share an equal ontological status. (Polanski has said that filmmakers
should adopt a ‘realist’ aesthetic, especially if making fantastic films; see Delahaye
and Narboni 1969; Gelmis 1971: 146.) However, Polanski did not have the
technology to pass through walls and thus depict reality as an unfragmented
continuum in which figure and ground more literally become inseparable.

Talking about Fight Club
The breakdown between inner and outer is a source of horrifying madness in
Repulsion; this blurring of the boundaries between inner and outer intensifies,
however, when we pass literally into and out o f human bodies; as per the opening
shot of Fight Club. O ther films in which we pass through the human body include
Amelie, in which we see Amdie’s (Audrey Tautou) heart beating within her as she
sets eyes on Nino (Matthieu Kassovitz), and Romeo M ust D ie (Andrzej Bartkowiak,
USA, 2000), in which we see ‘x-ray shots of Han Sing’s 0 et Li) victims at the
moment of impact when he hits or kicks them - a spine breaking, a skull shattering.
As mentioned, this technique is taken to its extremes when we see Enter the Void, in
which the camera in seemingly continuous movements passes into and out o f the
heads and other body parts o f the characters onscreen.
Stacey Abbott has identified how CGI shots that penetrate human skin have
become relatively commonplace in mainstream cinema, citing Three Kings (David
O. Russell, USA, 1999), Charlie’s Angels: Full Throttle (McG, USA, 2003),
Underworld (Len Wiseman, UK/Germany/Hungary/USA, 2003), Blade: Trinity
(David S. Goyer, USA, 2004) and Hollow M an (Paul Verhoeven, USA/Germany,
2000) as prominent examples (Abbott 2006: 97). Abbott identifies how such shots
rupture and extend the human body, but does not go so far as to say that these shots
suggest a loss of identity as the body becomes simply another part o f the continuum
o f space. In certain respects, humans are rendered hollow or invisible via these shots,
and this loss of meaning is insane-making for the characters involved, as suggested
by Hollow M an, in which Sebastian Caine (Kevin Bacon) is mrned invisible, only to
lose his mind and begin stalking the scientists that ‘created’ him.



b l o S ' '7

c Of what Abbott terms the ‘CSF shot arguably extends beyond the

Hole i
^ E tt hall m itt hjdna/A
b- b II
Moodysson, Sweden/Denmark, 2004). This latter film
hich tells the story o f a pornographer, his actors, and his son, features various ‘key
hole shots o f hearts beating and internal bodily fimctions. A Hole in M y H eartyvL
also shot on DV. Although not aU o f these films feature shots that specifically pass
sZ esT
innards does
m iT lirT '
breakdown across a variety o f cinematic registers, and we therefore
might attribute them as pertdning to a logic o f the digital age. Furthermore, when
the single-take Uruguayan film. La Casa M uda, shifts without a cut from an
o jective to a subjective point of view, as happens when the camera takes the
^ ^ e /s e e s through the eyes ofa wounded Nestor (Abed Tripaldi) - with his assailant,
Laura (Florencia, Co ucci) at this moment addressing the camera directly, as if it
a global phenomenon (^though, unlike Enter the Void, the camera in La Casa M uda
does not pass through the back of Nestor’s head).
The ability o f the digital camera to pass through bodies suggests that human
hL 7 7 /
continuum. An analogue film
^ Repulswn arguably makes a similar claim, suggesting, beyond the d ig iS , that
such a nonanthropocentric conception o f humans in space is part o f a wider
antihumanist trend. Digital technology, however, more consistency (and perhaps
intensely) reflects the insignificance o f man through its ‘inhumanity’. To fiirCher the
lum ng b e ^ e e n inside and outside, let us turn once again to Fight Club.
e films u n ^ e d narrator discovers that his hero, Tyler Durden, is actually an
exteriorization o f himself-- that his hero is himself In the same way that the body
o f the narrator forms simply a part o f the continuum o f reality (the ‘camera’ passes
mto, out of and through him), so too is his psychological existence simply a part of
a cM tmuum; we cannot difierentiate between him and Tyler.
However, while we know that Tyler is the external embodiment of the narrator’s

/T 7 C
“ ^iffbrent to the
narrator/Tyler? This is an argument that David H. Fleming and Hiave put forward in
T e rM ^ f S t
R 't
here. M ^ la (Helena Bonham Carter) has started to turn up at the self-help guidance
groups that the narrator attends in order to channel his emotions c o n s t r u i y . In
p^ticular, she turns up to his testicular cancer group, which one would assume to be
tor men only. Is her presence in such a group not indicative that Marla is, like Tyler
^ so the narrator. As the narrator ‘himself’ says: ‘A nd suddenly I realized that all of this
M ^ Ia T C ’
*°«^etbing to do-with a girl named
feed ^
presence: to him, she is an addict who
feeds on other peoples suffering (as does the narrator himself, o f course). W hen she is
addressed on the issue Marla walks away from him and across aToad to a pawn shop
where she sells some clothes that she has just stolen from a laundrene (Narrator- ‘L e i
not make a big thing of this’. Marla, walking across the road: ‘How’s this for not

The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema


m ^ n g a big thing?’). Marla crosses the road, effortiessly missing all of die speeding
vehicles that cross her path. Ih e narrator steps forward to do the same but the traffic
IS too much for him: car horns sound and braking wheels screech. Is the fret that
Marla ghosts across the road without a problem, whilst the narrator cannot move
without the threat of being run over, also indicative o f the fret that Marla does not
^ s t , since she and the narrator are in fact the same person? If this is so, who is more
real* - Marla or the narrator? A valid answer is that the character depicted in the film
is as much Marla as the narrator, and as much Tyler as every other person that we see
In the same way that the digital image itself is always becoming other, in that it is, after
Manovich, colours changing in time, so too is Fight Club’s narrator always becoming
something else. The narrator is, in accordance with Deleuze and Guattari,
schirophrenic. The narrator is Tyler, is Marla, and (who knows?) is Angel Face (Jared
H to), IS Robert Paulson (Meat Loaf Aday), etc., in the same way that Deleuze and
Guattari s nomadic’ subject is a Mongol, a Chinaman and a Redskin.

Entering The M atrix
In a frshion similar to the ‘schizophrenic’ identity o f the narrator o f Fight Club, we
might dso argue that The M atrix trilogy sets out a similar trajectory for Neo (Keanu
Reeves). In these films, Thomas Anderson - the ‘real’ name o f Neo - discovers that
the material reality m which he lives is merely an illusion, a computer simulation
created by robots some hundreds of years after the end o f the twentieth century. The
titular Matrix is designed to make humans believe that they are not slaves to the
machines and atrophied bodies cooped up in vats, but instead are leading normal
Infes m a time similar to the contemporary Western world. Having been freed from
the Matrix, Neo learns that within its system he need not obey the laws o f physical
reality. W ithin the Matrix, Neo learns to dodge bullets and to fly.
As the trilogy progresses, Neo’s powers increase until eventually he is-told that he
controls everything within the Matrix. N ot only does he control the Matrix, but
Neo also begins to exert influence over ‘reality’. He destroys machines in the ‘real’
^ r l d with a thought, and can ‘see’ machines in spite o f being physically blinded.
Ihe films culminate in Neo fighting against Agent Smith (Hugo Weaving), a
programme within the Matrix that has transcended its code in the same way that
Neo has transcended the rules o f the Matrix. Smith declares that it learnt not to
obey Its programming when it first made contact with Neo - which takes place at
the end o f the first film, when Neo literally dives into Smith and scatters it
everywhere. Smith says that it actually is Neo, and this appears to be true when, in
their final conflict. Smith defeats Neo, only to discover that it has also killed itself
These films involve what should-by now be familiar: the blurring o f boundaries
between inside and outside. W ithin the Matrix, Neo is able to reach inside Trinity
(C a rrie -^ n Moss) and to massage her heart so that it starts pumping again {Matrix:
Reloaded}. Neo has powers both within and without the Matrix, making it difficult



to differentiate between the two. If there is a human, perceived reality (life within
the Matrix) and a ‘true’ reality (we are just atrophied bodies/active brains in vats),
the difference between the two is broken down by Neo’s powers in both realms. Not
only does Neo have powers in both, but his alter ego. Agent Smith, takes on a
physical form in the real’ world as well - occupying the body o f Bane (Ian Bliss).
Add to this that Neo/Smith is a confusion o f both man and machine and we begin
to see a bteakdown in the differentiation between humans and plain matter. W hat
The M atrix trilogy suggests is that all matter is (or has the potential to be) equally
alive and intelligent.

Becoming complex
^ l e idea that all matter is, or has the potential to be, alive relates to Brian Greene’s
‘vibrational’ conception o f the universe put forward earlier. If for Greene the
constitution o f all matter - and all antimatter - is a question o f the spin or vibration
of quanta, which, in resonating together in large numbers, cohere into an emergent
form,^ then from the viewpoint of contemporary physics the difference between
‘plain’ matter and intelligent beings begins to break down. That is, intelligent
lifeforms might well seem different from apparendy inert matter and/or ‘empty’
space on the human, or mid-level, scale, but in fact the two are on a continuum
such that the beginning and end of each is hard accurately to identify.
Deleuze and Guattari propose the ‘machinic phylum’, which they characterize as
matter-movement’ or ‘matter-flow’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 411-12). For
DeleuK and Guattari, this machinic phylum is, ‘at the limit’, the only ‘phylogenetic
lineage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 406). That is, the machinic phylum is the
true line in the evolution o f life: the movement or flow of matter itself is what has
led to complex beings (and intelligent machines), rather than life being something
separate from matter. Manuel De Landa has extended Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of the ‘machinic phylum’ to suggest that it is at the root o f all self-organizing
processes (De Landa 1991: 132). De Landa suggests that there is such a thing as
nonorganic life (see De Landa 1992; 1997). To recognize nonorganic life is to
recognize the complex organization inherent in all matter that we see. As Laura U.
Marks summarizes, De Landa argues that supposedly inert matter, from crystals to
the rocks and sand in a river bed, exhibits self-organizing behaviour and even
acquires experience, which entitle it to be considered nonorganic life’ (Marks 1999).
Aligning this approach with Greene’s vibrating quanta, then, matter may be a fact
for humans, but it is the fa c t o f matter that is the basis o fiife — in that the very
existence o f matter itself is evidence o f organization, which is in.turn the sine qua
non ofiife as we know it, which in turn is life itself. If we are allowed to take string
theory as our lead, the emergence of matter via vibrations is the originary constitution
of the complex lifeforms that have followed; matter’s coming into being, via its spin/
vibration/movement, is in this sense the germ ofiife.

’ The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema


Earlier I mentioned chaos theory, which now merits a fuller explanation,
particularly in relation to complexity theory. Chaos theory draws on the second law
of thermodynamics, which suggests that entropy is inevitable within a closed system
and that this process is irreversible (see Gleick 1998: 9-31). That is, all closed
systems will inevitably have increased levels o f disorganization or chaos. To visualize
this, we might follow the common example o f two liquids held in a container in two
separate compartments. W hen the liquids are perfectly separated, the system is
thought to be highly ordered. W hen the liquids are allowed to mix, however,
eventually they intersperse such that there is an even spread between them. A
‘perfect’ intermixing o f the two liquids is considered to be the most disorganized
state possible. This process is considered to be irreversible because there is little
likelihood that the liquids will spontaneously separate out again and go back to the
ordered state from which they began (see Gleick 1998: 257).
In addition to chaos theory, which, as mentioned, is a process o f becoming,
humans also know that complex organisms and even complex ensembles/
assemblages of complex organisms (or societies) ‘emerge’ (see Prigogine and Stengers
1984: xxix), or, to continue with the term most commonly used in this book,
become. For Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela (1980), this process of
self-organization is referred to as autopoiesis, while biologist Jack Cohen and
mathematician Ian Stewart propose that chaos ‘collapses’ and that complexity
emerges (Cohen and Stewart 1994: 251-52). Furthermore, physicists Sean Carroll
(2010) and Roger Penrose (2010) have both suggested— though I will not go into
detail here - that the universe runs in cycles o f big bangs, whereby moments of great
prganization (the universe at the moment of the big bang) are followed by prolonged
periods o f entropy (or increasing levels of disorganization), and, crucially, that tiiis
view is compatible with the second law o f thermodynamics (typical understandings
o f that law would make such a view impossible). To take Penrose’s work, we might
say briefly that ‘gravitational clumping’, such as the formation, o f a staf, is a
manifestation of low entropy/high levels of order, but that this process o f ‘clumping’
(which we can think of as analogous to the ‘clustering’ neurons o f .the human brain)
is part and parcel o f the very entropic processes that it otherwise seems to contradict.
The contradiction lies in the fact that if entropy involves the (irreversible) dissipation
o f energy over time in a closed system, such that ultimately there is, or will be, no
organized matter, then how is it that organization happens to take place at all - be
that organization the formation o f a star in our actual universe, or the very low
entropy state that .was the start o f our universe itself (a state/moment commonly
referred to as the Big Bang)? This organization happens in part as a result of patience
and time —it is unlikely that ink will spontaneously separate from water, but it is
not impossible if the right conditions are created; and over an infinite amount of
time, inevitably those conditions will be created, and the ink will separate
‘spontaneously from the water (seeGarroll 2010: 206).
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the work o f virtual particles,
including antimatter, which are themselves produced through the processes of



increasing entropy or disorganization, help to bring about organization, or instances
o f low entropy. W hat happens is that the energy o f ‘normal’ elementary particles
such as neutrons ^ d protons, which themselves exhibit relatively low levels of
“ ‘^“ ^"“ /^elf-o'-ganization (that is, they exhibit low
evels o f entropy m that they exist at all), dissipates in accordance with the second
law of therm odynam ic. In other words, while the water-ink example suggests that
p a ro le s become evenly distributed, and while this may well be the case. S c energy
wi m the particles themselves also dissipates, or drifts away from/out of t £
particles, such A at the particles decohere. Now, the first law of thermodynamics
demands that the overall amount of energy must remain the same, and so if energy
dissipate to such a degree that not just stars fade, but also particles themselves begS
to decohere, then where does this energy go? This energy ‘goes into’/ ‘becomes part
the virtual particles, such as the antimatter positrons that are the ‘negative’
versions o f electrons. 7^ discussed via Paul Dirac, these antimatter particles m S e up
so-called empty space or vacuums, and it is not, then, that vacuums are bereft of
energy, but, rather, that vacuums are very energetic places, which have an enormous
amount o f what Penrose terms vacuum energy’. This vacuum energy is significant
enough to produce, m Penrose’s theory, the conditions through which a big bang (a
phenomenon o f the lowest known entropy) takes place. In other words, contrary to
the opinion o f many who bdieve the big bang to be an anomalous singularity m d
o believe that entropy will continue W
such that we and everything in
the universe dies a very cold death, Penrose suggests ‘cycles o f time’ (Penrose 2010,3 9 -2 .9 ). M c p h o r i d I ,, we
of l e i ,
Mobius strip (the analogy is mine), along which matter decoheres into antimatter
which Itself then re-/decoheres (back) into matter, in vast cycles that, after Cohen
^ d Stewart, see chaos collapse. In other words, entropy itself would seem to M
into entropy, such that order emerges from it.
sh o d d t

over-simplified the physics (about which, it
should be noted, physicists themselves disagree) it is important here simply to
recognize the proposed principle-of‘nonorganic life’, and that the emergence of
complexity/the complex becoming o f matter itself is where life might be said to start
o f our universe, miHions o f years after a big bang and at
which point specific organisms begin to form). To lend support to this argument, I
hope to have emphasized through the various references above that this process of
der emerging from chaos is recognized, or at the very least implied, across a
number o f disciplines - including philosophy, psychology, chemistry, biology,
physics mid m athem atic. As per the argument that becoming is our ontogeneJc
b c e h n e , ^ e n w might consider matter itself as a form o f organization, L d as
T? I
typically separate ourselves from ‘nonorganic
life but a mm like The M atrix, the very being o f which is enabled by digital
technology, shows us that all matter is, or has the potential to be, alive.
By ^tension, it becomes harder to differentiate between:figure and ground. The
destabilizing o f anthropocentric cinema that is brought about by the depiction of

The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema

space and all that we typically understand to fill it as a continuum is reinforced,
then, in our understanding that the ‘ground’ of films plays a key role in addition to

Timespaces of digital cinema
In some respects, the ‘ground’ has always featured heavily in films, and has always
played a role in the stories that are told. This is what David Martin-Jones (2006;
2011) implicitly tells us in his analyses o f various examples o f world, and national
cinemas. Furthermore, it stands to reason that we should consider settings and
plaqes as active participants in films since, as I. am arguing, the spatial continuity
between lifeforms and space, suggested by the (virtual) camera movements in Fight
Club and Enter the Void, is realistic based upon the understandingiof physical-reality
oudined above: the ‘ground’ o f our existence - all of the matter that surrounds us
is ‘alive’ in the sense that it has become organized into matter at all, and we are
fundamentally entangled/becoming with it. In order to extend the argument that
the spaces of digital cinema are ‘alive’ (more visibly than those o f analogue cinema),
I should like to draw on the work o f Aylish Wood.
- Wood argues that ‘digital effects... give extended-movement to spatial elements’
(Wood 2002: 3 7 3 ), and that this brings a new temporal dimension to digital effects,
such that there are not simply static spaces in digital effects cinema, but ‘timespaces’.
Foe Wood, films such as Twister Qan de Bont, U SA , 1996) and A F erfect Storm
(Wolfgang Petersen, U SA, 2 0 0 0 ) involve dynamic spaces, here figured as (extreme)
weather systems, which are not simply spurs for the narrative to take place - as
Happens with the twister iri, say. The W izardofO z (Victor Flem ing, U SA , 1939) but which are ‘mobile agents’ within the-films (Wood 2002: 3 8 2 ).
Although Wood contends that the spectacular explosions of the corporate tower
blocks at the end oiF ight Club are not timespaces, in that these are ‘mere’ spectacles,
rather than elements that have ‘agency’ within the film (Wood 2002: 374-75), I
would argue that the ‘schizophrenic’ nature of Fight Club, as oudined earlier,
somewhat subverts W ood’s claim. Nonetheless, Wood’s work is exemplary in
bringing to the fore the notion that space is dynamic and plays a constitutive role in
all films, but most visibly so in films whose dynamic ‘timespaces’ are made possible
by digital technology. We could extend W ood’s argument to include other
meteorology-based films, such as The Day A fter Tomorrow (Roland Emmerich, USA,
2004) and 2012 (Roland Emmerich, USA, 2009), in which humanity faces
extinction respectively as a result of imbalances in the Earth’s climate and the
alignment of the planets. In these films, as in Twister and A Perfect Storm, the
meteorological phenomena unleashed by the disruption o f the G ulf Stream and the
alignment o f the planets also have agential roles.
We might extend this argument further and say that a film like Dark City (Alex
Proyas, Australia/USA, 1998), in which the eponymous city itself constantly

230). While many or all films see characters ‘change’ in a variety o f ways .. Katherine Hayles and Nicholas Gessler (2004) suggest. 84). USA. dynamic world in which we live. nicknames). The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 73 In addition to the ‘liquid instability’ o f the film. aware that Neo and his band o f hackers have infiltrated the Matrix. the Agents. or characters from objects from ‘empty’ space. However. then the hum an condition cannot stagnate. Now we move toward an appreciation o f the indeterminate’ (Cubitt 2004. it is imperative to examine how its complete environment functions. suffering) --the shifting identities o f characters in digital cinema are nowadays visualized in a literal way. 1994). 139. for Cubitt. If the world and all that it contains is in a constant process of becoming. Sean Cubitt argues that the film is an example of the liquid instability’ that he sees as characteristic o f digital cinema (Cubitt 2004: 230). digital technology has also breathed new life into onscreen characters. USA. Briefly. which suggests the possibility of being singular and plural. Mark J. the city’s ‘unstable ontology’ lends it a more participatory dimension. then. 1987). 1988) (Wolf 2000: 91—93). contemporary (digital) morphing offers a ‘new species o f identity’ (Klein 2000: 36). photorealistic. including digitally enabled movies. even if as scholars o f digital cinema we often spend most o f our critical energy considering particular elements within that d ig iti environment. the morph lacks a certain realism. singular and plural. Cubitt’s ‘baroque’ is not simply a matter of viewers being ‘confused’ by the (almost incomprehensible) narrative of The M atrix. regularly change architectural layouts (signalled via Neo’s experience o f vu) in a bid to trap them.. images will be treated more like abstract types than cantankerous characters or precious objects. Morphing madness A contention might linger: we still see figures as separate from ground in most movies. However. especially through the digital morph. the agential logic o f ‘timespaces’ is intensified in digital cinema. for Scott Bukatman and Vivian Sobchack. This notion of plurality being inseparable from singularity is translated visually into morphing be(com)ings in digital cinema.some more visible (disfigurement. tracing its development from studies of human physiognomy by Leonardo da Vinci and Albrecht Diirer through to predigital films such as The W olfM an (George Waggner. W olf sees the m orph as becoming more prominent and. and in a fashion that reaffirms the logic o f becoming outlined above. ageing) than others (learning.72 Supercinema morphs and changes shape.. Rather. 138—41). USA. Sobchack 2000b. being singular plural is the possibility o f there being sameness and difference simultaneously. 1941). Since digital cinema involves dynamic spaces in which we cannot separate figures from groupd. spiritual enlightenment. digital filmmaking. Klein (2000) also traces the history o f the morph in animation. which is ‘the One of Genesis’ rendered in a plurd form (Cubitt 1998: 84). thereby playing a participatory role. For Klein. may be photorealistic. Rather than simply being a backdrop for the action. then it is apt that digital cinema features ‘agential’ spaces (or what Wood [2006] has elsewhere described as re-animated’ spaces). even if some choice examples suggest a philosophy o f digital cinema whereby we recognize that figurd and ground are not separate. as is suggested by Cubitt’s notion o f ‘identities to be guessed at’. elohim. whether we see that reversal take place or not (Sobchack 2000b: 132. Norman M.. but the assimilation of identity (see Bukatman 2000: 244. 1933) through to Street o f Crocodiles (Stephen and Timothy Quay. As such. particularly in terms o f the creation o f complete 3D digital environments through which the virtual camera can travel as it desires.. as I shall explain below. The normative cinemas found beauty in clarity. the self is. USA. H e adds: ‘The baroque tends toward the cloudy and disorienting. its tendency to temain unclosed resulting in a preference for questions to be left unanswered. The human condition does not sragnate’ (Binkley 1990: 19).. there is also an indeterminacy o f character brought about by the morph.E W olf (2000) offers a ‘brief history of morphing’. starting with characters changing from one type of animal to another in Willow (Ron Howard.such that space itself is recognized as possessing interconnected and ‘nonorganic life’ applies not just to these digital environments. Sobchack in particular wrangles with the fact that digital morphs are ‘palindromic’. UK. suggests the active/agential role that the diegetic space plays in the film. To reiterate. Sean Cubitt also sees The M atrix as part of cinema’s neobaroque trend. 1991) and the morphing o f Stanley Ipkiss (Jim Carrey) into various cartoonish grimaces in The M ask (Chuck Russell. Thinking ‘holistically . This echoes an earlier argument devfeloped by Cubitt that digital technology brings about a ‘big bang’ of the self (Cubitt 1998. avatars. are designed ‘whole’. identities to be guessed at. the morphing o f Michael Jackson into a multiplicity o f people from various ethnic backgrounds and ages in the video for Black or White (John Landis. USA. while this is true. notably. but it also involves not a celebration of difference. where we see ‘single’ characters take on multiple guises. in the future. as encapsulated by the Hebrew word. In other words. and the g e n u a l role that the space of the film plays would seem to confirm this. This in turn brings us fhll circle to The M atrix as an example o f a film in which the diegetic space is dynamic. thanks to digital technology. however. it is usefiil to recall Timothy Binkley’s argument that ‘[ijnstead of isolating our attention on the digital image”. and change for humans is slow and difficult. These latter arguments seem to contradict Cubitt’s use of the term elohim in relation to digital identities. from Betty Boop’s Snow W hite (Dave Fleischer. and . we will need to change the way we think and live. in that they are reversible. in that for Sobchack irreversible change is an inevitable part of human existence (we do not become children again. As justification for the specifically digital bent of such spaces. a theme that I shall revisit in relation to work by Jean-Luc Nancy. The Curious Case o f Benjamin Button notwithstanding). Slavoj Ziiek argues that digital technology ‘explodes’ identity (Zizek 1999: 103104). as N. 141). Now that they are a presence. but also to the ‘real’. in that one has multiple (schizophrenic) identities in the digital age (logins.

The morph has become more integrated into cinema since the publication of Sobchack’s edited collection. when it kills Neo at the film’s climax. Might schizoanalysis. these morphs bring to m ind the fact that we. USA.. but as a process. In both instances. the eponymous friendly ghost in Casper (Brad Silberling. For example. overly literal gesture toward change without pain. Philosophically speaking. Bukatman finds the digital morph ‘an inadequate. it is in fact converting an inhabitant o f the Matrix (a human who in ‘reality’ is in a vat) into it (thereby ‘killing’ them-as-other). too. who says that the morph sees ‘one single moment in tim e. As Bukatman puts it in personalized terms. ultimately Smith discovers the lethal effect of rendering everyone/everything the same. Contra (elements of) Sobchack and Bukatman. it happens so fast that it is very easy to miss. USA. To elucidate the paradox: ^Smith turns everyone into a copy of itself.often digital . that the very unrealistic (if photorealistic) morphs of digital cinema might yet am ount to a new form o f realism. contrary to digital morphs. I say that Sobchack ‘wrangles’ with the morph. Here photorealism paradoxically points to the notion that we should understand the morph not as a combination of individual reified identities (an amalgam?). To mitigate this incoherence. However. as already suggested. USA. because she also posits. Stanley Ipkiss in The Mask. on allowing others to be. and on being open to change. while the digital morph is easy and quick .144). since. Similarly. In the second and third M atrix films. it would seem. As such. at least the photorealism o f the morph latterly makes it comprehensible: we can tell that a morph is happening onscreen. Meta-Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture o f Quick-Change (2000). even if the distinct identities suggested by the morph (the ‘elements combined’ therein) are incoherent. but in a way that also subverts its nature as spectacle.. without consequence. USA. without meaning’ (Bukatman 2000: 245). 1995). In terms o f the temporality of the morph. translated into the linear structure o f the cinematic organization of images resulting in the effect that the viewer moves around the same moment in time. As a result of this blurring between subject and object. not also explain the dystopian view of self-replication elucidated in M ultiplicity (Harold Ramis. for example. it paradoxically kills itself. the process devised by Deleuze and Guattari as an alternative to the Oedipalization of psychoanalysis.. The T-1000 in Terminator 2: Judgement Day. and. perhaps the morph has become ‘normalized’. alters physical reality. so that time becomes a spatial feature’ (Spielmann 1999: 145). Dr Norman Spencer (Harrison Ford) is making love to his wife. Agent Smith does not become other so much as have everyone else become it. the radically ageing Supreme. Life. or becoming. fat professor Sherman Klump morphing into the dynamic Buddy Love (both played by Eddie Murphy) in The N utty Professor (Tom Shadyac. too. who insists upon homogeneity rather than difference. even if the m orph is ‘incoherent’.and that which morphs normally returns to some premorphing state (Sobchack 2000b: 133— 34. which then affects memory and thus the self In today’s cyber-world of digitally produced and stored multiple realities. and it is this very homogeneity that causes its demise. in The Fellowship o f the Ring Bilbo Baggins (Ian Holm) morphs briefly into a creature of demonic-looking greed when he sees the titular ring hanging around the neck o f his nephew Frodo (Elijah Wood). in which we can have sex changes and gender reassignments with relative ease (Sobchack 2000b: 153). by extension. This shot is not spectacular in the fashion described by Beebe and Ndalianis. Yvonne Spielmann. depends upon becoming other.. is arguably illusory.. In other words. is the villain of the film. Smith. are constantly becoming. This argument finds support from Spielmann. since each time Smith replicates itself. subjectivity in digital cinema. the morph perhaps does normalize/naturalize the process of change. 1996). ‘I’m stuck with myself’ (Bukatman 2000: 245). Roger Warren Beebe sees it. 1996)? Here . the ‘new species of identity’ involved in the digital morph is seemingly confusing for some viewers. not to homogenization. Chancellor Palpatine (Ian McDiarmid) in Star Wars Episode III: Revenge o f the Sith.74 Supercinema something to be worked at. to add my own example. even though Sobchack herself feels that the morph may The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 75 already have become a clich^/normalized at this point in time (Sobchack 2000b: 153). talks of the ‘incoherence’ o f the elements combined in the morph (Spielmann 1999: 134). Both Sobchack and Bukatman rely at their core (as perhaps does Cubitt) on the notion of a self which. in which we undergo cosmetic surgery and.modifications of the actor’s appearance and performance that perhaps we do not even notice when watching digital cinema) only serve to suggest what even the ‘spectacular’ morphs of other films suggest. who seethe mOrph as an example o f assimilation. used expressively as opposed simply to spectacularly. however. the mere fact o f physical existence no longer guarantees the persistence of a fixed self’ (Bukatman 2000: 229). that is ongoing for all humans and for the world with which we are entangled. when she suddenly 'and very briefly morphs into Madison Elizabeth Frank (Amber Valletta). Bruce Banner (Eric Bana) morphing into the green monster in H u lk these and countless other examples suggest the radical instability of the body. says that in ‘[cjontemporary science fiction. in fact. if the morph is in theory endemic to a process o f becoming. The morphs in Black or White and The Mask do not so much make all ‘objects’ (or other people) ‘subjective’ (or the same). as challenge the very distinction between subject and object. Indeed. 2000). m orphing. However.. Claire (Michelle Pfeiffer). as an interruption o f the narrative (Beebe 2000: 167). These ‘subtle’ morphs (together with . a woman with whom Spencer had an affair some time in the past. the morph is accommodated into the narrative flow of the film. it seems in execution to be a privileged moment in time. Bukatman. In other words. not least in an age in which the human body is sculpted. Angela Ndalianis argues that the morph becomes more realistic as the digital technology used to render it becomes more advanced (Ndalianis 2000: 256).136. after Mikhail Bakhtin. meanwhile. particularly as employed in Terminator 2: Judgement Day. And yet. in W hat Lies Beneath (Robert Zemeckis. we can compare the morph’s (admittedly easy and quick) notion of becoming other with the ‘fascistic’ tendency to become the same. such that its processual elements are better realized.

while Anna Powell has also classified the morph as a trope o f horror cinema (Powell 2005: 92). We might define many of the above morphing characters as signifying ‘horror’ elements in films that otherwise belong to. in X-Men: The Last Stand (Brett Ramer. for example. and during which she even mentions the character of Mystique (Pisters 2003: 141). Mystique’s ability to become other is characterized as ‘true’. USA. But regardless of genre. even if they are shot in a (photo)realistic manner. like Mystique. including how the changing/becoming body is gendered. that the m orph in general. I would argue. 1999) sees the eponymous actor disappear inside his own head. Mystique is (seemingly) irreversibly morphed here from m utant to human. Even though in the first three films and in X-Men: First Class (Matthew Vaughn. These ideas are philosophically reinforced by the thought of Deleuze and Guattari.the becoming of the morph is characterized as a predominantly male trait. Regardless of the ‘reversibility’ of her morphs. what ‘she’ gains in identity. of process. Although not real. shows the fluidity o f gender and racial boundaries. they have evolved out o f human beings. can these or other monsters in digital cinema be gendeted according to human norms? This question is only in part serious. each of which is capable only of uttering a single word: Malkovich. Being John Malkovich (Spike Jonze. USA. and Mystique in particular. Patricia Pisters. The ‘homogenization of her identity is figured here as a loss. even if. but « sexes. However. homogenization is figured as a destructive trait. 1988) also become dangerous and go mad because of their very similarity (Cronenberg edited two versions o f Irons into single shots through the use of digital editing effects. However.'it also heightens the sense that today’s cinematic reahsm is one that draws heavily upon antihumanist (or posthumanist) thought. Carol Clover has identified that horror is a genre for which ‘gender is less a wall than a permeable membrane’ (Clover 1992:> 46).-gender and identity. if reversible. presents an engaging account o f fluid identities that do not respect the usual boundaries of race. Similarly. 2000-2003) is. Schizoanalysis is the variable analysis of the n sexes in a subject’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 296). to the best of our knowledge. but our ability to gender it at all. Linda Mizejewski states that ‘[t]he threat is the threat of becoming. 1990). France. or a ‘supercinema’. see Ohanian and Phillips 2000: 99-101). USA. between self and other. In addition to the morph. who themselves argue that humanity (and every human) is composed of ‘not one or even two sexes. Mystique ostensibly challenges not only the supposed masculinity of the morph. my argument would be that the morjlh not only collapses the boundary between subject and object.or posthuman characters allows us easily to grasp the ways in which digital cinema is also potentially an antihumanist cinema. Mystique is apparently gendered as ‘feminine’ (not least because o f her shapely form and the fact that she is played by a female actor. the character Mystique (Rebecca Romijn). Sobchack argues that the reversibility o f the morph is unrealistic. of the possibility that the body-is not separate and stable.7 6 Supercinema we see Doug Kinney (Michael Keaton) replicate himself so often that his life begins to fall apart. can we really attribute. changes are permanent (although one wonders by this token whether Sobchack would preclude humans from changing their mind). We cannot say with any evidence that these creatures are ‘realistic’. Murray Pomerance (2001: 9-10). only to find himself inhabiting a world filled with replicas o f himself. Mystique is rendered human and as a result is gendered approach that echoes Pisters’ consideration of Mystique. these creatures do exemplify the ways in which digital cinema reinforces the idea of permanent change and fluid identity. 2006). This is not only figured through the persistent role that digital creatures play as a threat to or replacement of normative human life. even though her morphs as Mystique are reversible. 2011). schizophrenic change. a fixed gender to Mystique as Mystique? Although Sobchack (2000: 151) argues that the morph is a ‘male’ trait. her shifting identity as Mystique is understood as being closer to her ‘true’ self. is on the other hand seen as limiting. she also loses in potential. who constantly shifts her shape in the first two of the X-M en films (Bryan Singer. digital cinema features myriad ambiguous characters that cannot be sexed or identified according to traditional classifications —whether or not these morph in a manner that literally realizes perpetual. such that these normalizing conditions o f subjectivity are brought into relief The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 77 Writing o f the threat o f ‘feminization’ that Arnold Schwarzenegger’s male body undergoes in Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven. Becoming is here understood as'a threat to masculinity. after Pisters. Gender trouble In (seemingly) definitively becoming Raven Darkholme. these creatures point to what Deleuze and Guattari might term a nonhuman reality. a m orph that is characterized as a gaining of an identity (‘her’ ‘real’ name is Raven Darkholme). Homogenization. or play with the boundaries between. These creatures do not exist in our everyday reality and so there might seem little practical point in addressing the ways in which these creatures function. while the becoming o f the morph seems more liberating. asks whether Yoda in the Star Wars films or the diva in Le cinquRme element/The Fifth Element (Luc Besson. for example. Here. discovered alien life (and therefore cannot comment with authority about the forms . a variety of genres. or a stable identity. but could at any moment turn into on merge with something else’ (Mizejewski 1999: 159). Although we have not. deprived o f her m utant powers owing to a serum produced to inhibit mutants. but that it also collapses the structure of identity. USA. which stands in contrast to Sobchacks argument that. 1997) can be sexed . in real life. However. that predominandy being Jennifer Lawrence in the latter film). However. The Mantle twins (Jeremy Irons) in David Cronenbergs Dead Ringers (Canada/USA. The fact that digital cinema is a cinema in which fixed identity is replaced by the constantly shifting and fluid identities of non. Let us linger on the digital morph a while longer in order to bring out what this notion of reversibility might mean. USA.

that populate it. or better with. changing. Karen Barad. they are often muttered or unclear. argues that we are entangled in. That for. That. after Judith Butler (1990). Truffot’s error is furthermore usefiil. Deleuze and Guattari. enough to raise a ‘call to arms’ so that we see ‘the degree to which culture is a partner in producing body systems commonly referred to as biology’ (Fausto-Sterling 2005: 1516). Viewed in this ‘molecular’ fashion. for Fausto-Sterling. however paradoxically given the nonindexical nature o f the digital image. and more). and I wish to argue here that this is a productive relationship. gender is not only a ‘permeable membrane’. becoming). as characterized most prominendy in the morph and the myriad unsexed. or w-sexed.naming Michael as Carol’s suitor and victim. proposes something similar when she. but that culture also plays a part in how our bodies should be defined. digital technology enables us to challenge the separation o f figure from ground. but so. humans are inextricably with the world. aside from Carol’s. that it would have). to a supercinema in which sex and gender cannot be assigned.and that all characters might in fact simply be extensions of Carol. digital technology not only enables a supercinema to come more clearly into existence (a supercinema that is and will continue itself to be dynamic. Fausto-Sterling takes as an example the way in which bone development does not just diflFer across the sexes. humans are not defined simply by sexual difference. when they are. since Laura Mulvey’s seminal ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (Mulvey 1975). molecular biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling (2005) argues that sexual difierence is not simply a question o f biology. Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation o f n sexes is not just a metaphor. for w e'do live by them). such that we recognize the enworlded nature o f characters in films . but by many other factors as well. including digital cinema’s analogue conspecifics. is sex itself. it seems that digital technology can enable cinema to go ‘beyond’ this. such that we and the world are in an open-ended becoming (Barad 2003: 821). If. The Nonanthropocentric Character of Digital Cinema 7 9 Note 1. whose confusion is in feet understandable.and o f ourselves in our world. among others. Indeed. then gender. gender is performative (which is not to say that gender definitions are not real. working through a heady combination of. creatures. Helen. the world. Gender theory o f the 1990s onwards might help to affirm this perspective. ensexed. a conception of identity as fluid is realistic from the antihumanist point o f view. but it also allows us ‘supercinematically’ to consider all perhaps" best regarded as a malleable trope as opposed to a reified object (or a representation). While film studies has. since it indirectly indicates that identity is not important in the film . From this perspective. Butler. I have made the necessary corrections when quoting Truffot. when in fact Michael is away on holiday with Carol’s sister. such that scholars assign to (elements of) filmc a fixed (and notably linguistic) meaning. As such. and Niels Bohr. ’^ a t digital technology makes clear.78 Supercinema that it would take or the identities. like me. such an antihumanist conception o f identity applies to humans themselves. Truffot in fact confuses Michael and Colin throughout his article . and with each other. . Furthermore. been concerned overwhelmingly with the representational aspects o f cinema. the names of characters are seldom mentioned in the film and. sexualities. as it produces multiplicities of genders and sexes (and races. too. but that it differs depending on environment and culture. This diminution o f the importance o f sex is. is the reality in/with which we have always been.

tempo or Chronos.3 From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema I have thus far proposed that digital technology enables cinema to depict a posthuman space in which ‘empty’ space and all that fills it share an equal ontological status. so. we must pick apart various issues. Each temporality. or what I shall term a Chronos. I have also proposed that this troubles the distinction between figure and ground. speeds. the competing (or harmonious) elements within a film’s mise-en-schne have their own temporalities. is the experience of time . and that the flux of the world therefore plays a part in the constant becomings o f characters in film. such that these are the source of tension that drives the narrative. is entangled with the other tempos in the universe. after Deleuze and'Guattari and Manuel De Landa. As the term ‘timespace’ implies.such as twisters and storms . becomings that are given literal form in the shape of the digital morph. such that its separation from the ground is harder to make. are we to make o f time in digital cinema? In order to answer this question. or tempos at which we and all matter exist.begin to play an agential role in films. that all matter has a ‘life’. we must distinguish between temporalities within a film and the temporalities o f a film. however. Aylish Wood’s (2002) ‘timespaces’ see ‘bac%round’ elements . the most salient of which is the distinction that I shall make between time and temporalities. A temporality. and as W ood elaborates. Temporalities are the different rhythms. and it is from this entanglement that what I shall (somewhat esoterically) call consciousness emerges. W hat. Digital cinema instead suggests an ‘enworldment’ of the figure.and in the same way that I have argued. therefore. W ith regard to temporalities and cinema. a tempo. . too shall I argue that all matter has a temporality.

to be equated with those moments in film that puncture narrative flow through moments o f exhibition. 1907) cinema was an ‘attraction’. As such. continuous shot). but he does not prioritize it in the same way that Mulvey does. he prefers to define this temporality as one of ‘temporal irruption’ (Gunning 2004b: 46). emphasized (and sought to deconstruct) the dominance of narrative in mainstream cinema. emerges thanks to relationships developed across scenes via recurring characters and spaces. However. That the temporalities. For in addition to the historiographical work thar the essay performs (refining. W ithout wishing to overgeneralize. As such. with Laura Mulvey’s aforementioned ‘Visual Pleasure. both within and o f a film. it is perhaps not surprising that various scholars have sought to demonstrate the links between contemporary cinema and its earlier periods. there are also the temporalities o f a film. even if the ‘timespaces’ o f digital cinema make this most clear. that digital cinema often involves moments o f slow motion. perhaps even redefining. but digital cinema can. which in turn suggests that classical Hollywood cinema was made with a male viewer in mind.’ essay at its core (Mulvey 1975). the ‘cinema o f attraction(s)’ essay is often cited in relation to spectacular cinema typically action or sci-fi blockbusters that feature impressive set pieces. The temporality o f a film is inherendy linked to the temporalities o f the elements within a film. For example. Gunning does mention the word spectacle in his ‘Cinema o f Attraction(s)’ essay. Mulvey sees as foremost among these interruptions moments in tvhich female characters are put on display for a male diegetic character to look at. Gunning does not deny that narrative is inherent in early cinema. as befits its supercinematic status. including various precinematic technologies. Mulvey characterizes such interruptions o f the narrative as spectacle.. that is. In her deconstruction of narrative cinema. but he does argue that early cinema does not have a cause and effect-driven logic. designed to entertain briefly with regard to content. fast motion. To summarize Gunning’s argument. Instead. and combmanons o f both slow and fast motion with ‘normal’ speed via ramping (varying the speed o f the movement within a single. broadly speaking.and all matter . it was also written in the aftermath o f Screen theory’s 1970s heyday. By not explicitly calling these moments spectacles. mainly as a result of moments featuring digital special effects. as we shall see. Screen From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 83 theory. Mulvey discusses moments in which narrative is interrupted in classical Hollywood cinema. the flow o time seems to change within the film’s diegesis. Spectacular attractions/attractive spectacles One o f the most often cited essays in film studies is Tom Gunning’s ‘Cinema of A ttraction. the term spectacle is linked to Gunning’s ‘cinema of attractions’ because it has come. In fact. although the term also features in a subsequent essay by Gunning about the temporality of the cinema o f attractions. each new scene ‘irrupts’ into the preceding one with no clear explanation. Indeed. or do not exist on the same ! ‘itself’. performs in narrative cinema. is different from our everyday experience o f it. as we shall see. a history of cinema that emphasized the medium’s nonnarrative origins was timely and important. Indeed. In other words. long pitted as a binary opposite to narrative. that space and time are unified as spacetime. In the first chapter I mentioned. a narrative. before establishing how these are linked to the temporalities TOthin a film. 1990). we shall address rhe concept o f narrative flow and the supposedly interruptive role that spectacle. but these are downplayed in favour o f the ‘temporal irruptions’ that he describes. after Paul Ricoeur (1990). temporalities are not necessarily the same.may possess different temporalities’ or experiences of rime. cinema has not always been about narratives that tell stories. but also to exhibit the new technology used to create the film. it is no surprise that Gunning’s essay has been ‘reloaded’ in an edited collection that in part deals with digitally enabled spectacles (see Strauven 2006). via Lisa Purse and others. I shall define time through contemporary physics as the whole . if through nothing else). since only a voyeuristic (heterosexual) male viewer would gain visual pleasure from such moments. Ramping is an example o f what I shall call the changing temporalities o f a film. Gunning perhaps avoids the political sense that the term had accrued through the work o f Mulvey (and others). such. in its earliest incarnation (from cinema’s invention to. given the prevalence o f spectacular moments in digital cinema. For Gunning. later rebranded as rhe ‘cinema of attractions’ (Gunning 1986. though. whereby. the temporality of the cinema of attractions is one in which scenes follow each other in such a way that the connection between them is not entirely clear. or an ongoing storyline. there are narrative elements in early cinema (figured through movement over the duration o f a shot. but what is time such that we can experience It at dl? Time. In order to do this. roughly speaking.82 Supercinema Cinema always shows us different temporalities.. We . such that the film slows or speeds up depending on the techniques adopted. One might read Gunning’s ‘cinema o f attractions’ as not being merely a transparent history o f cinema. then. vary ‘over time’ (the film ' ' '" T fast motion. or display . Timothy Druckery (2003) analyses how the spectacular roots o f future’ cinema can be found as far back as the early optical-based forms of . this was an exhibitionist mode o f cinema. now at ‘normal’ speed) points to the time Itself that I wish to explore (the concept o f time that allows us to distinguish between different temporalities at all). bring us closer to an encounter with time itself Before we reach that point. Instead. In conmast to the different temporalities within a film. As such. in which the medium was on display as much as the filmed subjects themselves. our understanding o f early silent cinema). However.whether or not those moments are linked specifically to the exhibition of the female form. we should first look at the different temporalmes o f film. given the fact that spectacle is considered an inherent part of digital cinema.

while television was a separate medium from cinema in the 1950s. Human life. This is o f coutse an over-simplification o f human experience. among others. therefbre. As Paul Ricoeur (1990) makes clear. Technicolor. inherently ‘realistic’. narrative is based upon a unidirectional temporal flow in which certain events lead to others. not least because many o f these media are owned by the same multinational conglomerates. while in digital cinema. and instead might be deemed to ‘interrupt’ it. particularly in relation to time? By providing a basic definition o f narrative. Similarly. explains how spectacle has been core to cinema from the pioneering films o f Georges Melies in France and Dadasaheb Phalke in India. the spectacles created by CinemaScope. such as the camera obscura. driven by cause and effect. Early cinema was. or our ability to retain information from one moment to the next. According to Ricoeut’s theory o f narrative. and other innovations acted as a promise for something bigger and brighter than television could offer. through to the Hollywood blockbuster that came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s. such that a linear narrative is. and it is also human. story. as is often thought to be the case. a typical nartative (what Bordwell might tetm its fahuld) still has a chronology. meanwhile. these spectacles might be parts o f the female body. For. these causal and sequential telationships ate embedded in the structure of our own life experience. upon which we linger for a few seconds. humans experience time as a linear succession o f moments that stretches from birth to death. this does not necessarily eradicate the. This moment might be characterized as spectacular because it does not drive the plot per se (dinosaurs break loose from their confines and begin to hunt humans). the jaws of the scientists drop. Thanks to memory. Seeing digital special effects in the theatre allows audiences to see the ‘full’ splendour o f the technology. we can give clearer examples o f spectacle. This shot is not necessary for the narrative. for example by Sean Cubitt (1999. now the two seem to work in conjunction. According to Mulvey. from these ‘causes’ we can infer what probabilistically might happen in the future. these might be moments featuring huge explosions or ‘jaw-dropping’ figures or scenery. and of how spectacle is a temporal irruption’ supposedly contrary to narrative. which may or may not have any motivational fotce in the narrative. The rise of spectacle in cinema is often seen to derive from developments in technology. Andre Bazin (2003) saw the rise o f cinematic spectacle in the 1950s as a logical response to the threat posed to cinema by television . the technology does become a selling point for digital cinema — even if. In other words. magic lanterns and Phantasmagoria. peep shows.8 4 Supercinema entertainment. spectacle is commonly thought of as an interruption o f this temporal flow: the narrative ‘stops’ and instead we are invited to linger on specific details. W hen we relate/mediate our experience o f reality. Sean Cubitt (1999a). In other words. Thomas Elsaesser and Warren Buckland (2002: 215-17). As such. Arguably the same holds for digital cinema: home viewing technologies such as VHS and DVD. the . for example. inter alia. Narrative is typically (though not always) linear. in which scientists Grant (Sam Neill) and Satder (Laura Dern) first see a dinosaur. Nonetheless. as Timothy Corrigan (1991: 11~48) ^ d Julian Stringer (2003: 12). In short. before we see a shot in which their helicopter is dwarfed by the afore-mentioned mountains. Even when a film is not told in a chronological order. McClean (2007). according to Shilo T. building up expectations for something imptessive). magic mirrors.away from movie theatres. It also allows us to deduce from the remembered past ‘causes’ that lead to the ‘effects’ o f the present moment. Theoretically speaking. and instead it interrupts the narrative. which we can infer/deduce from the evidence that we see. narrative emerges from a sequence o f events that have common elements — including From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 85 characters and settings. life and narratives both have a consistency o f content. in that they induce states in which viewers (and characters within the film) are ‘overwhelmed’ by what they see. before we see a shot of them and the dinosanr that they are watching (a btachiosaur). centred around characters. as well as the internet. posited as a technology/medium rather than necessarily as a tool for telling stories. such moments have also been ahgned with ‘the subhme’. In this scene. Furthermore. 2004: 264) and by Scott Bukatman (2003: 81-110). and as discussed by Gunning. which were prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. and this ‘consistency’ is part and parcel o f a human ability to use remembered features of the past to recognize features o f the present. we create narratives that are organized around causal and sequential relationships. meaning that cinema has responded by becoming spectacular. then what exacdy is narrative. with inference having been identified by both David Bordwell (1985) and Edward Branigan (1992) as a key to our understanding of cinematic narration/narratives. This reading is not so convincing when we consider that VHS and DVD are often premised around the very same products (or what Janet Wasko [1999: 210] refers to as software) that are designed to get audiences into film theatres in the first place. lends itself to narrative. analyse a key moment in Jurassic Park. Dan N orth (2008: 38—45) sees spectacular special effects as similarly having their roots in the long history o f magic shows. The logic is that with audiences drawn away from theatres by television. A similat process takes place in Avatar when Jake Sully (Sam Worthington) and othets first see the fabled floating Hallelujah Mountains on Pandora: their jaws drop (and the music argument also posited. as Gunning argues. have noted. which also displays causal and sequential strucmres o f this kind. movies are sold on hype as well as on starding imagery. threaten to keep audiences. by Claudia Springer (1999) and Murray Pomerance (2005). but in cettain respects it holds true. As mentioned. Narrative versus spectacle If Gunning’s ‘temporality o f attractions’ involves ‘temporal irruptions’ such that no narrative is built up (theteby preventing us from guessing what happens next). from a human perspective. such that they become incapable o f action. cinema responded through technological innovation in order to attract audiences back to the theatre.

narrative might be deemed more ‘intelligent’ than spectacle. it can also reinforce our everyday assumptions about the world. In this context. namely how time itself is figured in digital cinema. as exemplified by its association with action and explosions. since I more or less agree with them. that spectacle. a civUian. I should like to argue. and many scholars conclude that spectacle does not ‘ehminate’ narrative firom films. this does not mean that humans do not have memories that potentially allow them to become ‘deeper’ and ‘more complex’ over time. we should state that it is no less human to stop and observe things. Jack is forced-into another hostage situation: Payne has boobytrapped a bus. while seemingly superior directors such as Sam Raimi. which is then played back to Payne. hut perhaps also cinematic) spectator to ‘sensual or psychological’ impact (Gunning 1986: 66. Geoff King. These films still tell reasonably coherent stories. he shoots the driver. with narrative arguably taking second place in the pecking order. I would like also to offer a-shift in emphasis. USA. together with Michael Bay. In his contribution to The Cinema o f Attractions Reloaded. panicking. Thomas Elsaesser also argues that it is ‘impossible’ to separate attraction (or spectacle) from narrative (Elsaesser 2006: 216). Tom Gunning saw narrative as an inherent part o f the cinema of attractions. All the passengers escape the bus before Payne realizes that he is . underpins narrative. From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 87 Against spectacle? There are various reasons as to why spectacle is thought to be the inferior of narrative. now it seems than digital effects films are instead structured around such moments o f spectacle. see also Eisenstein 1974. reinforcing capitalist ideology in a manner that deprives citizens of their critical faculties and of hope for alternatives. even if they may sometimes be looser and less well integrated than some classical models’ (King 2000: 2). while narrative encourages intellectual engagement through ‘deep’ characters and complex situations. even in the most spectacular and effects-oriented o f today’s blockbuster attractions. it is not that I wish to reverse Tomasovic’s seeming formula and propose that spectacle is good and narrative ‘bad’. reading through the (extensive) literature on narrative and spectacle. Understanding that Payne must he observing them via the bus’s CCTV camera. Indeed. For while narrative can help us to see the complexity of situations and characters. who believes them to be driving normaUy. Jack announces that he is a cop. or what can be termed monstration. Now. As mentioned. which wiU explode if it goes below 50 miles per hour. works out how to save everyone from the bomb. Following Eisenstein/Gunning. 78). However. Having overcome the challenge o f a boobytrapped elevator. while Tomasovic creates a distinction between ‘mere’ spectacle and something like ‘integrated’ spectacle through his distinction between the likes o f de Bont and the likes o f Raimi. Debord’s ‘society of the spectacle’ has more in common with narrative cinema as it is commonly understood. Furthermore. It is not my intention here to engage at length with these arguments. In fact. is certainly not always ‘bad’ . A passenger with a criminal past believes Jack to be after him. 1995) also have a fiarrative function. we should first consider various ideas from different discourses in order to make clear the ultimate goal o f this chapter. Spectacle. The need for Speed speed sees SWAT t^ent JackTraven (Keanu Reeves) on the trail of demented ex-cop Howard Payne (Dennis Hopper). an argument echoed in a brief essay by Richard Rushton (2007) and in Tom Brown’s (2008) consideration o f narrative and spectacle in Gone with the W ind (Victor Fleming. not least because cinematic spectacle is thought to appeal to audiences on a purely visceral or base level. or makes ‘more narrative’ filmmakers like Raimi ‘superior’ to ‘pure spectacle’ filmmakers like de Bont. however. whose notion of a ‘montage of attractions’ was designed a^ressively to subject the (explicitly theatrical. USA. Peter Jackson and James Cameron elaborate a complex relationship between narrative and spectacle (Tomasovic 2006:-311). Now. However. which we shall look at shordy —they serve as deadlines for the action (see King 2002: 206-208). To reach'that point. 1939). Dick Tomasovic says that Jan de Bont. the narrative/spectacle dichotomy is not so easily distinguished. for example. must drive the bus while Jack. even if humans themselves stop to look at things that they do not ‘need’ to observe. who has subdued the criminal passenger. Jack manages to set up a loop of CCTV footage of the bus. it becomes apparent that there is no absolute distinction between the two. However. if equated with ‘attractions’ (as it has been). while narrative might once have been the driving force behind films. reminds us that ‘[n]arrative is far from being eclipsed. Gunning discusses this in relation to Eisenstein. Guy Debord (2002).as I hope to explain by looking at a film by one of Tomasovic’s ‘pure spectacle’ filmmakers. for example. even if this ‘sublime’ experience seems rarer than ‘everyday ’experience. Having got on the bus. Jan de Bont s Speed. though. King reiterates this point in a consideration o f the contemporary blockbuster. not least because in this film —as well as in Speed Qan de Bont. since narrative is typically thought to be predicated upon action performed by characters. in which images dominate our lives. This aggressive impact would shake the spectator out o f their unthinking absorption in the narrative. However. and from which spectacular cinema is often distinguished. Tomasovic implies that the persistence of narrative in spectacular cinema somehow ‘rescues’ spectacle. meaning that Annie (Sandra Bullock). has fiunously written that the (Western) world has become a ‘society of the spectacle’. for while I argued in the last chapter that humans are always becoming. is a director o f ‘permanent spectacle’. I would not disagree with Debord. in films such moments are considered to be spectacular. 1994). claiming that the spectacular action sequences in D ie Hard: W ith a Vengeance (John McTiernan. if Ricoeur considers narrative to be ‘hum an.8 6 Supercinema incapacity for action being an important idea for spectacle. USA. I would propose that Debord’s ‘society o f the spectacle’ is not the same as cinematic spectacle.

Speed may have the ‘temporal irruptions’ o f Gunning’s cinema of attractions’. the meaning is contained in the image. This critique o f Strike and The Navigator is applicable to the lion statues in Potemkin: their meaning is as automatic as the ‘immersion against which Eisenstein sets up his ‘montage of attractions’. As such. the deadlines in Speed ensure that the film does have narrative elements. while in The Navigator Buster is freed from a lifejacket filled with water and which is drowning him. perhaps. For example. Eisenstein might want to lead his viewers to thought. Unlike the hostage situations in Speed. for Deleuze this does not push audiences far enough. rather than the image opening out on to the ‘infinite’. it doesn’t matter when we discover the death of Jacks partner. Writing of Eisenstein’s Stachka/Strike (USSR. Eisenstein’s ‘montage o f attractions’. would imply not the rising up. as per Speed. But the lions do have a ‘full thematic effect’. and so he kidnaps Annie and escapes on the subway. at least from the perspective of its temporality. 1924). The former link between the foreman and the factory. meanwhile. a chase and a chase’ (Gross 1995: 9). as manifested in Battleship Potemkin. Payne does predict the polices attempt to track him down and to trap him. Speed. who perishes in Payne’s boobytrapped home. if there were no convict on»the bus. in that the images do not literally show their ‘meaning’ (revolution dawning). meaning that Annie would not have to drive the bus). Given the apparent mindlessness’ of Speed. seems to contain the same logic o f cause and effect typical o f narrative cinema. if not to elevate Speed as a ‘philosophical’ . As such. As per Kings analysis of Die Hard: With a Vengeance. Jack gives chase. and she is killed. and they have no literal connection to the film’s characters or plot. More important than how each moment fits into the narrative arc is simply the fact that these moments/scenes take place. which are then matched with Hctory towers. Richard Dyer wrote that Speed is a "rollercoaster’ movie featuring no politics. for Deleuze. Cinema should instead seek to break down such automatic thoughts and associations —and one o f the ways in which cinema can do this is by presenting films thatffo not have an overall cause and effect logic. As such. W ith no overarching logic. If this scene took place after the bus performs a fifty-foot jump over an unfinished stretch of freeway. the film is what Larry Gross described soon after as "a chase. Upon its release. namely to reflect the rising revolutionary spirit o f the people of Odessa. Gilles Deleuze. but there does not seem to be an overarching logic to Speed . In order to explore how this is so. have too obvious a meaning. to thrill audiences and that the effects must get ‘bigger’ as the film goes on. sees metaphor as being akin to cliche. Furthermore. we must turn to Deleuze. However. We can illustrate what Eisenstein means in this awkward(ly translated) phrase by looking at the montage o f the three lions in Battleship Potemkin. O n the bus. in that the film is not From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 89 a documentary about statues o f lions. the sequences within the film are driven by the narrative logic of cause and effect (for example. but it does not have the ‘full thematic effect’ that Eisenstein desires in his ‘montage o f attractions’. Furthermore. which is when it does take place. for example. However. on the other hand.except. this argument will seem perverse. the lions cannot be placed in a different order and have the same effect. the 'attraction-image' The shots of the lion statues in Potemkin serve a metaphorical function. their temporality is one of ‘irruption’ as opposed to being integrated into an ongoing narrative. often. while the latter suggests a moment of rebirth (Deleuze 1986: 208-10). a chase. It results in Paynes death and Jack and Annie’s survival. let us push further. however. ‘causal motivation appears at times to be suspended’ (Buckland 1998: 172). we could swap the order o f the set pieces within the three hostage situation sequences. even though Deleuze describes the latter as the most beautiful metaphor in cinema. 1925) and Donald Crisp and Buster Keaton’s The Navigator (USA. A lion falling asleep. Deleuze says that the metaphorical images in these film^. As such. too teleological. but the thought to which Eisenstein wants to lead viewers is. we could progress from the bus to the train to the lift as easily as from the lift to the bus to the train. a woman tries to jump to safety after Jack has managed to negotiate the liberty of the injured driver.' Similarly. That is. the location o f the film. However. In accordance with Eisenstein’s ‘montage o f attractions’. a level o f thought that is for Deleuze profoundly philosophical (Deleuze 1986: 274). then. a big explosion. the driver would not be shot. since Speed is seemingly defined by temporal irruptions . Harry (Jeff Daniels). In Strike we see an upside down image of a foreman’s legs. SpeedwoulA seem to qualify as a film o f ‘attractions’. but the suppression o f the Odessa crowds. for each involves an exciting situation and.^ As Warren Buckland says of New Hollywood cinema in general. this ‘full thematic effect’ emerges from the ‘free montage o f arbitrarily selected independent (also outside o f the given composition and the plot links o f the characters) effects^ (attractions)’ (Eisenstein 1974: 79). and a final hostage situation takes place on the underground train.88 Supercinema watching a prerecorded loop. the lions are ‘arbitrarily selected’ in that the statues are not all from Odessa. most certainly provides the sensual assault that Eisenstein calls for. but without the overall logical progression. That is. no character depth. the plot in Potemkin requires one event to take place (mutiny on the battleship) in order to cause another (uprising in Odessa) in order to cause another (the attempted suppression of the uprising/the massacre on the steps) in order to cause another (mutiny on more and more navy vessels). Towards the time-image. for example. as does the fact that many sequences are in the intensified continuity style typical o f postclassical Hollywood/ narrative cinema. the order of the sequences in Speed could be changed and the film would still make as much sense. As much as attractions’ are designed to challenge narrative. its temporal irruptions are perhaps in their way as radical as Eisenstein wanted his montage o f attractions to be. and ‘next to no plot’ (Dyer 1994: 7). if Eisenstein through the ‘montage of attractions’ wanted audiences to be shaken out o f the stupor that immersion in narrative entails. For Eisenstein. it would have the same effect as if it took place beforehand.

while the timeimage occurs in films that reject narrative. 1976): ‘Like Django. Rodowick has termed this the ‘spatialization of time’. in cinemas from around the world. after Henri Bergson. But it is Martin-Jones who is most relevant here for his identification of alternative modes. or narrative cinema. and it is for this reason that moments o f spectacle (which interrupt the narrative flow) offer an alternative temporality to that of cause and effect-driven narrative. Django has something like an SSSSS structure (MartinJones 2008: 84-85). while maintaining the same framing. Italy. Deleuze recognizes that there are other types o f ‘action-image’ . It is sometimes explained as a geographical difference. does offer a different temporality. which in turn leads to a changed person (A') . and in From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 9 1 which ‘heroes’ become ‘seers’ who are overwhelmed by purely sonic and optical situations that they cannot modify. Rather. D . USA. or types. terms duration. in which the narrative logic of cause and effect is on the whole discarded. Furthermore. has a somewhat noncausal logic in its series o f set pieces (and which ludicrously does not even stop at the end o f the film: even though sleep-deprived and surely exhausted from all of their effort in surviving the war zone that Los Angeles has become following alien invasion. and who as a result change that situation (S') . The difference between the movement-image and the time-image is often explained as an historic one: the movement-image ends and the time-image begins at the end of the Second World War. a theoretical synthesis o f Deleuze and Gunning. and which Martin-Jones charts from the early silent films of Georges Melies through to. The movement-image is characterized by Deleuze as an ‘action cinema. However. Nevertheless. time-image cinema for Deleuze involves action being displaced by passivity. That is. or what Deleuze calls the ‘action-image’. or action. In fact. but to go immediately back into combat). there is a ‘non-continuous montage’ that we realize has happened because of the changes in the image. but instead the time o f the events is measured only by movement/action (Rodowick 1997. which means that the attraction-image is not for Martin-Jones the same as the time-image. In Deleuze’s work. which.hence Deleuze’s acronym SAS' (see Deleuze 1986: 141—59). In subsequent work Martin-Jones (2011: 21-66) builds upon his analysis o f Django to develop his concept o f the attraction-image. spectacular cinema et la Speed and Battle: Los Angeles does not seem to contain much ‘empty’ time. David Martin-Jones and Patricia Pisters have in particular been sensitive to forms of cinema that blur the boundary between the movement-image and the time-image. who carry out actions (A). the spaghetti western. W ith the time-image we see a direct image o f time. an aspect of Deleuze’s cinematic thinking to which we shall return.such as the ‘small form action-image’. ‘action. which Martin-Jones works into an analysis o f the film’s Italian origins and its ‘opposition to Hollywood (and the classical western’s optimistic belief that good will out). In effect. This is not in the sense that all films are action films like Battle: Los Angeles (Jonathan Liebesman.go Supercinema film. As such. created by montage) in what appears to be an otherwise continuous space constructed by continuity of framing’ (Martin-Jones 2011: 39). In narrative terms.although I do not have space further to develop this line o f thinking here). or even to eat. we are surprised in Escamotage d un e dame au thecitre Robert Houdin (Georges Melfes. 1896) when a dummy suddenly ‘comes alive’ as a woman and when the woman then ‘disappears’ from under a blanket only to reappear inside a mounted basket. This ‘SSSSS’ structure sees the characters become equal to their situation. Instead of an SAS' structure. Castellari. in which an action takes place (A). the soldiers led by Michael Nantz [Aaron Eckhart] decide not to rest. spectacular cinema is identified by agents who are seemingly superhuman in their deeds (if not literally superhuman as characters). and as such time-image films can seem to have much ‘empty’ time (and space) within them. it is the elimination of ‘empty’ time (and space). Melies has obviously constructed these moments using cuts/montage. a film like Speed. In feet.but what is important to elaborate here is the relationship to time that action-image filmmaking. N or does it contain much in the way of seers who do nothing. or o f what Deleuze. in which characters are dominated by the situation and become pure ‘seers’. the movement-image is often characterized by classical narrative (see Heme de Lacotte 2001: 29: Elsaesser and Buckland 2002: 271). The ‘attraction-image’ is translated into the irruption of fantasy in the spaghetti western. but which instead they must simply observe (see Deleuze 2005: 2). refers to a cinema predicated on humans who find a situation (S). in particular Keoma (Enzo G. Martin-Jones writes of Django (Sergio Corbucci. like Speed. Pisters (2003) sees tim e-im ^es in mainstream cinema like Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow. 2011). in particular the European modernist/ auteur films o f the 1950s onwards. or moments in which little action seems to take place. In time-images. a new situation always develops in the spaghetti . time is measured only by action (characters doing things). France. for the sake of everything driving the narrative forward through a sequence o f motivated/caused events. Italy/Spain. in particular his work on spaghetti westerns. 52). For action-image filmmaking entails the suppression o f time ‘as it is’ for the sake of movement. 1995). the ‘attraction-image’ occurs when ‘non-continuous montage is foregrounded by the sudden jolt o f surprise on the part of the spectator when something entirely unexpected happens (the trick. Fight Club and The M atrix through their mixing of virtual and actual images.N . USA. the time-image comes into existence alongside the movementimage at the end o f the Second World War (in part because the twin horrors o f the Holocaust and the atomic bomb offer a crisis point in man’s belief in his own sense of morality . leading to a situation (S). For Martin-Jones. establishes. events unfold in ‘real’ times (and spaces). Deleuze famously has distinguished the ‘movement-image’ from the ‘timeimage’.'of image. Keoma is another attraction-image constituted of a string of spectacles that revises the US action-image western both ideologically and formally (Martin-Jones 2011: 52). between America (movement-image) and Europe (time-image). but at the very least to complicate the notion o f what a ‘philosophical’ film might be. whereby events do not necessarily unfold in ‘real’ times. Obviously. 1966) that it is an episodic series of spectacles that do not combine to form a coherent narrative. precisely.

This may sound contradictory: Jack Traven and Michael Nantz perform myriad actions in Speed and Battle: Los Angeles respectively. a hand. such an analysis is not the purpose o f this discussion o f spectacular cinema. however. Instead we must look at how spectacle relates more specifically to the digital. As such. The remake o f King Kong (Peter Jackson. a head). while these films might be action-packed. Larry Gross says that contemporary blockbusters allude to our contemporary feeling o f powerlessness. the M ^ies ‘attraction-image’ foregrounds the cut. with whom they are seamlessly integrated. rather than emanating from them’ (Elsaesser and Buckland 2002: 271). such that wilderness and civilization become indistinguishable (Martin-Jones 2011: 55—57). but the discussion of spectacular cinema has so far not been centred around the digital. then something different can (and often does) happen in digital cinema. while humour” feels like a legitimate expression o f an outlet for anxiety rather than a knee-jerk reminder that none o f this should be taken that seriously (Gross 1995:10). the digital spectacles that we see often do not correspond to the noncontinuous times that Martin-Jones attributes to the ‘attraction-image’. This noncontinuous temporality is figured in the SSSSS structure: as the woman disappears via an unseen cut in Melies.the revelation o f the monster either in parts (a foot. always to be ready for work/action. Denham urges Baxter to stand in shot with the dinosaurs as he fihns them. in that it speaks to the now-global sense o f resistance to the dehumanizing processes of constant labour and neverending information flow.. However. The attraction-image therefore takes us beyond the movement-image and towards the time-image. then no one will believe that they are real. In Elsaesser and Buckland’s Deleuze-inspired terms. Meanwhile. 2005) makes clear this logic: in one scene. finds itself compensated in the contemporary American cinema by a kind of psychotic hyperactivity. who argues that Deleuze might easily have overlooked contemporary Hollywood cinema as a(n unlikely?) source o f time-im^es (Cubitt 2004: 360). Digital spectacles speed does feature digital imagery. 1933). FurAermore. The montage involved in showing the creature can be described as the temporal depiction of a body/space one image after another o f diflFerent fragments that we use to create the whole. seems to be a film with an SSSSS structure. Flowever. Digital cinema often eschews the cut at moments when analogue cinema would have had to cut. Shoedsack and Merian C. particularly in light of Martin-Jones s work discussed above. and by extension filmmaking technology itself. Regarding Speed. similarly suggests that (the best) HoUywood films feature characters who do both intellection and action. This logic of rejecting the cut to show the shared continuous space o f humans and dinosaurs extends into the shared and continuous times o f humans and other . in which the white man comes to tame wild and evil nature. The heroes do not win so much as endure. even if we can never truly overcome the Sisyphean tasks beset us. or through long shots and miniatures (the monster climbing the Empire State building). the new King Kong is conscious o f showing its protagonists interacting with photorealistic monsters in a manner that suggests an equal/shared ontology. prompting Denham to tell him that if he does not stand in shot with the creatures. the contemporary Hollywood blockbuster does not really involve characters that willingly perform actions in pursuit of particular goals. whose temporality we have now established as being different to that o f narrative cinema. and in a space that also contains humans. Martin-Jones’s argument for the breakdown o f the inside/outside binarism in the spaghetti western recalls the way in which digital cinema can (and at times does) pass through solid as well as ‘empty’ space. but must instead watch/become a seer ]. rehes upon. the attraction-image’ does break down the division between inside and outside fbr Martin-Jones. we can perhaps now bring the digital back into the discussion for a number o f reasons. Cooper. even though the film offers the illusion o f continuous action. and it is for this reason that Martin-Jones argues that Keoma speaks o f the subordinated peoples o f global capitahsm: they are always having new crises thrust upon them. Sean Cubitt. If for Martin-Jones.92 Supercinema western that requires more action. Firsdy. or survive. In other words. the two united in many instances as heroic problem solving’ (Cubitt 2004: 251). Rather. in which the moveigent and action come a t the characters. they do not necessarily feamre action’ m the Deleuzian sense of characters doing things that allow them to master their environment. contemporary spectacles involve characters who do not exacdy master their situation. Baxter refuses. W ith digital technology. This runs counter to the founding myth of the classical western. such that one never fully masters one’s situation or the space in which one finds oneself. always From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 93 to be on call. but instead to something slightly diflFerent. Secondly. and the noncontinuous temporalities o f the attraction-image. ‘the rupture of the sensory-motor links [a key aspect of the time-image as the hero can no longer ‘do’ anything. King Kong (Ernest B. This might be hnked to ‘late’ or ‘post’ capitahst malaise. New Zealand/USA/Germany. too. for example. and more importandy. Furthermore. not least because in the spaghetti western the civilizing’ nature o f American expansionism is brought into question. we will be able to shift the argument from the temporality of films (spectacle has a different tempo to narrative). in a photorealistic manner. it. it is charaaerized by the kind of re-active heroes that Martin-Jones sees in the spaghetti western. film director Carl Denham 0ack Black) stumbles across a herd of feeding brontosaurs with leading actor Bruce Baxter (Kyle Chandler). even if they must prove themselves equal to it time and again. In other words. thereby negating the distinction between them. so a new situation arises in Speed. USA. they contain the temporal irruptions’ o f the cinema o f attraction(s). However. which require us never to be offline. as are Battle: Los Angeles and many other action films o f the last twenty or more years. to temporalities within films. there is a reversal: Jurassic Park and other films show the whole o f the beast at once. In discussing this difference..

which is a film based upon temporal irruptions. Nightcrawler is a spatial irruption —materializing within the frame but without a cut . W hat is more. in the second o f the X-M en films. Belle Qosette Day) dons a glove that enables her to teleport from the beast’s (Jean Marais) castle to her family home. o f the human figures (who each have their own [changing] temporality). where in analogue cinema spectacle is established via inserted shots (cuts) that allow us to Unger on details that perhaps do not drive the plot. gravity causes Belle to fall between the supports and to be engulfed by the sheet. 1946). The temporal irruptions o f the ‘cinema o f attraction(s)’ have been displaced by the spatial irruptions of Nightcrawler.even if. and o f this shift from the temporalities of a film to the temporalities within a film. Bachelard’s Bergson understands time as continuous. or temporality. of cinematic time and cinematic space (such that we have timespaces). W ithout wishing to malign Cocteau and his technical ingenuity. Instead there is a multiplicity o f temporalities. which threatens the ability to move. not all matter has the same temporality. the varying temporalities o f matter have already been suggested by Aylish Wood’s concept of timespaces: the movement o f the ground is defined by its own. who materializes and dematerializesfrom nowhere within the same frame. one from an analogue and one from a digital film. as the ‘spectacular’ objects exist in frame at the same time as the ‘normal’ narrative-based and predominandy From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 95 human characters. in a universe of becoming. before reappearing elsewhere. X2. W ith regard to cinema. on the other hand. Nightcrawler (Alan Gumming) infiltrates the White House in an attem pt to send a prom utant political message to the President. The shot is achieved by playing backwards an aerial shot of Belle lying horizontally on a sheet held taut over two supports. suggesting that the tempo(ralities) o f films cannot so easily be divorced from each other if we can slip from one ‘speed’ or rhythm o f filmmaking to another without a change of shot. the teleportation in X 2 is spectacular because o f the realism that is founded on temporal continuity. For. especially since it lingers in the air like ink in water). That is. the shot looks as though a vertical Belle is emerging from the wall. to whom we shall return later. If Martin-Jones proposes that the ‘attraction-image’ is not quite a time-image. The results o f this interdependence of narrative and spectacle. as per the ‘cinema of attraction(s)’. here we see competing temporalities in the film. making the effect more realistic. disappears and reappears within the same shot. I would argue that cinema only ever shows us timespaces. a rock has its own (varying) temporality as does a human (and as do parts of the human). especially if using fast or slow motion). the changing rhythms of the film take place in single. As per my earlier argument that digital timespaces open our eyes to the fact that. where formerly the interruption of the narrative led to a change in the tempo(raUty) o f the film (such that the film speeds up or slows down. W hen played backwards.the insertion o f unexpected material via cuts. after Manuel De Landa. then the coexistence of digital beings in frame with flesh and blood characters is perhaps a time-image o f sorts. from which emerges Belle. o r the temporality. Furthermore. By contrast. France. (E)merging temporalities I have argued that all m aaer is ‘alive’ . while matter itself coheres to become identifiable entities thanks to the combined temporality/vibrations o f its material (quantum) parts. Martin-Jones proposes that the Melies ‘attraction-image’ is founded on ‘noncontinuous montage’ (which might be simplified to just ‘montage’). The film cuts to what appears to be a wall. in digital cinema the spectacles are inserted* into the same continuous space and time as the emplotted action. I have argued that this is based on the fact that all matter involves the spinning of quanta/elementary particles that cohere to form identifiable entities. That is. This ‘spatialization of spectacle shows that in digital cinema-spectacle and narrative are not only mutually inclusive. Nightcrawler teleports back and forth in order to fool and defeat the assembled security guards. At the time of filming. we might say that each ‘spinning’ or ‘vibration o f quanta has its own rhythm. standing vertically E^ainst the wall that the sheet was supposed to represent. Bachelard’s Bergson is different from Deleuze’s Bergson. but Nightcrawler appears. W ith regard to Nightcrawler’s teleportations. N ot only is it practically impossible to detect how the shot was done (contrary to the Cocteau effect). How can we reconcile the contradiction of a time that is continuous with one that is noncontinuous? In order to do this. temporality. but emerging firom the wall. and the continuous temporalities that I am claiming to be typical o f digital cinema. there is no cut. This contradiction arises through the comparison o f Speed. but that they may even be codependent. unbroken shots. even if the ones Wood identifies in digital cinema are the most obvious. For while digital technology might suggest that narrative and spectacle are on a continuum such that we cannot clearly tell where one begins and the other ends. Once detected. all matter has a temporality which is different to that o f antimatter. I shall turn to Gaston Bachelard’s critique of Henri Bergson’s conception of time as duration. when the girl disappears in the Houdini theatre we know that there must have been a cut. In the terms of this chapter. there is a seeming contradiction in my argument.more than he is a temporal irruption . but not quite . tempo. there is no stasis. since it takes place within a spatial and temporal continuity. This shift is also reflected in the ramping that is commonplace in contemporary cinema. we must look at ‘time itself’. one either side o f the actress. require further scrutiny. However. in a nonorganic fashion. We see her disappear from her bed in the beast’s castle. We see Nightcrawler disappear in a puff of what could be smoke (it in fact looks like the ink with which the original X-M en character was drawn.94 Superdnema creatures — something that we can make clear by comparing two teleportation scenes. We follow the logic o f the sequence and realize that Belle was n o t lying on the floor. To clarify this. In La belle et la bHelBeauty and the Beast (Jean Cocteau. This ‘magic’ shot is accompanied by a third shot of Belle.

‘Timespaces’ are more clearly suggested not by split screen effects. These do also produce a new. or of possessing an emergent temporality that is the film’s own. however. we might argue that both films show us dinosaurs according to the anthropocentric principles of the action-image. [such] that space acts on time and time reacts on space’ (Bachelard 2000: 20). such that we can tell where one temporality begins and the other ends. Bachelard argues that temporality is not continuous. homogenous (or monotonous) temporality. In the former film. Since both Jurassic Park and King Kong might predominandy be defined as action-image films. as is made most clear when they act according to their own desires and not those of the filmmakers. such that when the filmmakers ran the programme for the Battle o f Flelms Deep in The Two Towers. a tool that was also applied to Pandora in Avatar (see Duncan 2010). In . the images also show us dinosaur-time and human-time. Firstly. their environment. a field or a building moves at such a slow rate that it seems static.96 Supercinema in the sense of continuity that I have thus far proposed. emergent temporality that pertains to each film itself. dinosaur-time: the fi lm ‘slows’ (and the shot w idens/len^ens) to accommodate the dinosaurs. diegetically both films show us the coexistence onscreen of creatures that have been extinct for some 65 million years walking alongside humans. Each digital character develops its own ‘personality. Showing us both now and 65 million years ago simultaneously might alone constitute some form of time-image. there is one ongoing and unchanging temporality to the universe.also features multiple split screen shots featuring the ‘action that would typically be considered most relevant to the film’s plot. Nevertheless. W ith regard to Bachelard’s critique of Bergson. Bachelard understands Bergsons concept of continuous duration as relating to a single. That is. some of the ‘A[rtificial]-Life soldiers decided not to fight but to run away (Ndalianis 2006: 45). The latter. we see screens like web browsers pop up on to the cinema screen in order to provide us with information about the history of the films diegesis (humans under attack from bugs from outer space) and in order to give us background knowledge (for example. Bachelard critiques this definition of duration by saying that things within the universe move at different rhythms. then we might also argue that human-time is here interrupted by. dystopian California setting. rather than there being a single ‘regularly flowing duration.the temporality of the figure and the temporality of the ground. Angela Ndalianis (2004b. The shots from Peter Jacksons King Kong remake. as the human (Bachelard 2000: 20). the ploughed field does not move at the same rhythm. then. here armies of ores and Uruk-FIai. I simply want to say that these films simultaneously offer us multiple temporalities. A similar case might be made for the digital quasi-split screen effects seen in Starship Troopers (Paul Verhoeven. 298—99).^ e n t Simulation System in Virtual Environment. but the different temporalities visualized in the split screen sequences from Starship Troopers and Southland Tales do not form a spatial continuum as per the images of dinosaurs walking alongside humans in Jurassic Park and King Kong. are driving a late twentieth-century Jeep. the notion of rhythm brings with it the need to consider that stasis always accompanies change in cycles. as already discussed. about the bugs thdmselves). for various battle scenes in The Lord o f the Rings films. thus show us different temporalities on at least two levels. but by a spatial continuity . or does not have the same temporality. Flowever. Furthermore. That is. even though they are separated from each other on the cinema screen. as well as the first shots of the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park. We might argue that a split screen (and digital) film like TimeCode also suggests the coexistence of different temporalities thanks to the fact that four (interconnected) stories are offered to us simultaneously. or what Bachelard describes as ‘a continuously. such that we can take in their fill! size. . and more. King Kong.or the Multiple . in Jurassic Park. but entire ‘virtual or artificial ecologies that can evolve and develop on their own (Thompson 2006. The Two Towers and Avatar because the screen is split. Simply. as per Wood’s digital timespaces. The spatial continuum of these latter (digitally composited) films does not mean that split screen films are incapable either of suggesting different temporalities. who. In order to make this point clearer. ‘Massive’ endows digital From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 97 characters. brings this most clearly to the fore. then. such that ‘different things and different times slowly adjust to each other. In other words. since all four parts of the film are played out simultaneously! and are within the viewer’s field of vision at the same time. then. film is always a depiction of different temporalities . In a sense this is true. we are shown dinosaurs according to the demands of human-time. and the tempo of their existence. Kirsten Moana Thompson reports how Regelous has further developed the Massive software in order to create not just digital beings. in terms o f temporalities. And yet if temporality is measured by rhythms^ then there is a succession of stillness/ stasis and movement (Bachelard 2000: 23—48). Steve Regelous at WETA developed ‘Massive’ . with artificial intelligence.but digital technology. there may be different temporalities. background details about the films alternative. the fa a that these temporalities are depicted on a spatial continuum suggests more clearly the interconnected nature of different temporalities. Rather than continuity being simply unbrokenness. digital elements. figured in both f i lm s as attractions. Here. even if. since the moments o f the dinosaurs’ introduction are. from characters* in The Two Towers to whole ecologies (or timespaces) in Avatar. As such.and a mutual influence . regularly flowing duration (Bachelard 2000: 20).between differing temporalities. we might mention how digital creations do not necessarily behave in the ways intended by their creators. Shaviro (2010) says o i Southland Tales that it is ‘post-cinematic’ in its use of multiple screens. In cinematic terms. and in accordance with John Mullarkeys (2009) work on cinema. or moments of spectacle/temporal irruptions. USA. In other words. 1996) and Southland Tales. but they differ from the ‘embedded’ digital images o f Jurassic Park. Bachelard contends that Bergsons philosophy of fullness (Bachelard 2000:23) does not have room for ‘nothingness’. from the mid-level or human perspective. or sits alongside. meanwhile. have their own (complex) temporalities. 2006) has written at length about how. we might argue that all moving images that contain figures and ground show us different temporalities or rhythms . or moments of stillness.

see Wood 2007b: 66—70). Arnold Royalton (Roger Allam) explains to racing driver Speed (Emile Hirsch) that. but also among the image and the various other windows on the laptop (for example. such as the much-vaunted buUet-time from The M atrix films. then this is perhaps true: different temporalities (or time-images) are always already in movement-images. That the ‘camera’ moves with great fluidity and rapidity across a space that contains action that has greatly been slowed down means that ‘the viewer moves around the same moment in time. Speed does not stand a chance o f winning the Crucible (the major motor racing event of the calendar). USA. which for spectators seem easy to follow but the complexity of which is hard to explain. W hen we consider that all images show us different temporaUties. the presence o f other spectators means that not only are there always competing elements. Indeed. we see the simultaneous presentation onscreen not just of different temporalities. which is set in 2054.P. 2008). Various scholars have offered detailed discussions o f bullet-time (for example. but must also include reality. USA. and all of which do not actually contrast with each other (as per a typical split screen effect). offer multiple. then. even the cinema as a theatrical experience involves ‘competing elements’ when we take into account the room. some virmal. At the same time. and the snorers in the audience as each possessing different temporalities).h\A\e. the (virtual) camera moves through the three-dimensional space of a From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 99 bar.98 Supercinema Speed Racer (Andy and Lana Wachowski. other spectators.t progresses towards Neo at a rate considerably slower than the everyday perception of a fired bullet. and so I only wish briefly to touch upon the topic. in which various moments of a drunken night out between loser cops Allen (Will FerreU) and Terry (Mark Wahlberg) are shown in still images: Allen and Terry playing pool. a viewer has what Aylish Wood describes as ‘distributed attention (Wood 2007b: 135). or what I am defining here as temporalities. but o f multiple virmal-digital and actualanalogue realities and temporalities. in which we see the simultaneous coexistence of two (or more) different temporalities within the frame. As a result. nor of the virtual-digital interacting with the actual-analogue. This suggests that we ate aware of the ‘edge of the frame’ in ‘normal’ theatrical experiences. while the frame gives us the impression that we are rotating around them. Rehak 2007). Purse 2005. In moving through spaces that have otherwise been stilled. email alerts) and elements of teality (the room in which we are seated) that surround us. the snoggers. This is manifested not just through the different temporalities that we see simultaneously onscreen. the camera expresses its own temporality above and beyond the temporality of the onscreen events. such shots. For example. W hat is more. Meanwhile. and towards an anti-. even in IMLAX 3D cinema experiences. but that we cannot stop at (the limits of) the screen. 2010). R a n d le himself suggests that the logic of each is ‘neat-totally indiscernible’ (Rancide 2006: 122). And in a sequence from popular comedy The Other Guys (Adam McKay. some actual. instead the screen is ‘layered’). in which the camera makes visible its own'temporality (drawing our attention to the cameta. USA. there is no split screen. we are simultaneously presented with multiple tempotalities. and the noise from neighbouring screens and the rumble of passing trains. Enabled by digital technology. In The M atrix a. . In other words. Speed similarly appears multiply onscreen. If M inority Report (Steven Spielberg. then contemporary film viewing is for many people a similar (though in comparison a technologically ‘primitive’) experience: watching a film on a laptop. but into the multiple and. Indeed. Such moments also suggest what Jamie Skye Bianco might term ‘fluctuating speeds and worlds beyond the capacities o f the organism and beyond humanist or realist scales of time and space’ (Bianco 2004: 397). the moaners. sometimes from the front. within (or on) the cinema screen. Terry firing his gun into the air. This ‘beyond humanist-tealist scales o f time and space’ takes us beyond the anthropocentrism of movement-image cinema. or posthumanist cinema. unless he joins his megacorporation. distributed not only among the various ‘competing elements’ o f the image itself (and Wood looks specifically at M inority Report in this respect. North 2005. when evil corporation boss E. different temporalities are spatialized such that they form a single spatial continuum. animated newspaper adverts. the perception o f multiple simultaneous temporalities seems clearer still when we consider the shift from cinema to home-viewing in patticular in the wake o f DVD technology. but also in moments. we see Royaltohs face track sideways across the screen. I shall return to this notion of spatializing time shordy. 2002) depicts the multiple temporalities exhibited by the computer screens. sometimes from the right. our conception of cinematic time has exploded not just from one temporality (a temporality of action) to two (the temporality of the virtual-digital and the temporality of the actual-analogue). so that time becomes a spatial feature’ (Spielmann 1999: 145). we might mention that MuUarkey cites Jacques Ranciere in suggesting that the difference between Deleuze’s movement-image and time-image is not as strict as many Deleuzians take it to be (MuUarkey 2009: 102). which itself is composed of multiple temporalities (playfully we might think of the popcorn munchers. in other words. but which instead seem to form a single spatial continuity. but briefly. And yet. and holograms that are embedded into the diegetic world o f the film. into the infinite — and all within a spatially continuous field (as opposed to the split screens of Southland Tales). the opening moments of Watchmen also see the camera move steadily through stiUed/nearly stilled and iconic moments of twentieth-century history (and the counterfactual world in which the film takes place). parallel perspectives inhabiting the screen as if they formed one single point of view (i. with his head at times appearing onscreen from two angles at the same time.e. while the (virtual) camera circles around him at a rate faster than even the bullet itself As has already been mentioned. sometimes filmed firom the left. As much is tacitly acknowledged in the contemporary push towards one or a combination of IMAX and 3D cinemas in which ‘there is no awareness o f the edge o f the motion picture frame’ (Zone 2007: 3) as the image ‘comes out into’ the screening space. the background gives us information about race preparation and car construction. rendering the image an ‘attraction’?). potentially.

as he argues. made visible in slow motion. which have a different duration. For many viewers. in addition to movement (although Bergson does not explicitly assert that it is made up of ‘nothingness’). Furthermore. That is. or empty moments/times. they must do so over time — and it is this-time over which temporalities change that I term time itself . This is not necessarily a uniquely ‘hum an phenomenon. rhythm may have within it stasis and movement. in which characters strike still or almost-still poses of ‘mastery’ before or after they have carried out incredible feats of speed.indeed. in cinema as in life. but time. at whatever speed. Vivian Sobchack mentions how the transition is/was ‘particularly asronishing and metaphysically disturbing’ (Sobchack 2006: 340). there is no empty time. M inh-ha suggests when she says that ‘[t]ime is plastic. It would seem. while Bergson says it does not) is in fact akin to Bergson’s own view o f the cinematograph. recalls Bachelards critique of Bergson. and passing trains suggested above). I would argue that the temporalities of a film (moments of stillness/spectacle. the movementfrom one terminus to the other . action. temporality. Temporality is the experience of time . occupies the uncanny space-between these end From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 101 points. emergenr 'temporality’ when put into conjunction with (the temporality of) the spectator (discarding for now the complexities of the other. in Bachelards terms. since ostensibly all life forms (including nonorganic ones) have a chronological temporality. we might adapt Sobchacks words to say that the different temporalities of a film (spectacle. However. in which the future comes into the prfesent before flowing into the past (or. contra Bergson. Writing of Gunning’s ‘cinema of attraction (s) . but also temporally. In other words. unified temporality. the movement o f movement itself. Bachelard says of reality that its ‘being’ (or movement) is accompanied by ‘nothingness. Time ‘itself: Chronos and Aeon In talking about the ‘shock’ produced during the earliest cinema screenings when a still photograph projected on to a screen suddenly began ro move as the projectionist cranked the projector. in Bachelard s terms. 2011). a rhythm or temporality may itself change in tempo. different dimensions of the same temporality. or sense of time passing. but one that has — and at length through the use of CGI —is The Tree o f Life (Terrence Malick. but rather a different mode of time itself.. ‘Nothingness. again. for me the reason for including such sequences in a film that otherwise might (loosely) be characterized as a 1950s-set family melodrama is to suggest precisely how we are connected not just spatially with all that surrounds us. like Sobchacks analysis o f the transition from stillness to motion in the early cinematographic screenings. but time still passes. to moments o f action/moments in which we ‘do’ things. in which we pass from the past and into the future via the present). moments of movement/action) themselves combine to form a single temporality. We shall consider this spectatorial ‘temporality’ in the next chapter. sfill passes. at worst pretentious. as has been suggested.Supercinema 100 To return to the temporalities in and of films themselves. If temporalities change in tempo. interconnected and interdependent. (Sobchack 2006: 340—41) In the context of the present discussion. in the same way that there is no empty space. Few films have endeavoured to show this. and from the present moment forward to the ‘end o f time’. but only temporalities. agility and strength. I have said that the different temporalities within a film produce an emergent temporality that is that of the film itself. availability here equating to one’s level of attention. which. then so too is all of time. from the present’ moment right back to the origins of the universe. that we have reached two different conceptions o f time. in that Bachelard also perceives duration. ‘competing’ temporalities of odier audience members. the ‘relevance’ in that film of ‘big bang sequences and of dinosaurs walking the Earth may at best seem opaque. " ^ i l e Bachelard seems soundly to reason that reality is made up of moments of still reflection. ongoing movement. is not. In other words. However. the room. but of rhythms that include stillness and movement. then.its passing as a unidirectional rhythmic flow. time may change rhythm or tempo. evidence of a ‘dialectic’ between full and empty time. or narrative and spectacle. Sobchack argues that what ‘attracts’ is not simply ‘still to moving’ or ‘moving to still’ but. Similarly. or teipporality itself. and reveals them both to be merely different ‘dimensions of the same process’. which Bergson defines in Creative Evolution as not reflecting duration precisely because it is made up of ‘still’ images instead of being continuous (see Bergson 2009: 234-36). The temporality of the film is always producing a new. while Bergson (and various scholars already mentioned) suggests of analogue cinema that it also is made up of stillness. but here we must consider what the ‘emergent’ temporality of the film itself is. and which we might equate to moments of action (movement) being ‘interrupted’ by moments of spectacle. The coinbination of stillness and movement. or moments of stillness. That is. or stillness. rather. as Trinh T. both are. or emptiness. Time seems to shrink or ro expand according to the degree of ones availability (Trinh 2005: 76). in that many moments of action (Purse investigates The M atrix films and X-Men: The Last Stand) are accompanied by moments of stillness. In other words. slow motion. analogue cinema may be made up of stiU 'images. Lisa Purse (2009) considers ‘posture’ an important part of CGI-dominated action cinema. there is not a single. fast motion) are ‘merely different dimensions o f the same temporality. rhythm or . USA. which is time itself Bachelard’s ‘dialectical’ view of Bergson’s otherwise ‘unified or full conception of duration (Bachelard says that duration has lacunae. as being composed not o f a single. If all of space is. Hf-ppnding on how one wishes to orient oneself in relation to time.. in contrast to Bachelard. These moments o f ‘posture’ by characters within films reflect the combinations of stillness and movement that make up the films themselves.

Like a database. it immediately gives us a movement-image’ (Deleuze 1986: 2). the latter ones have anything but a linear chronology. Russian A rk and Enter the VoidxsAne. In this way. various scholars. and the interlinked nature.102 Supercinema tempo that happens to be. and which we have seen in films like Speed and Battle: Los Angeles. ‘stretches out in a straight line. or time itself From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 103 Digital time-images If Lev Manovich identifies digital cinema’s move away from editing towards compositing. In this sense o f always passing/wanting to die.its emptiness not being simply instances o f stillness between movements (as is the case for Bachelard). in that digital cinema is made up o f interchangeable moments in time that are ‘navigable’ in the same way that space is (we can travel through time. we drift between different epochs o f Russian history. but between Chronos and Aeon. here constituted as change or movement. including Manovich. Deleuze in Cinema 1 takes Bergson’s notion o f duration and wresdes from him the aforementioned argument that the cinematograph does not show us time as continuous. revealing a space over time via cuts). by simultaneously showing us multiple temporalities. Aeon. which suggests that the digitization o f “films on to DVD fundamentally changes our relationship to those films . in the case o f nonorganic life. then another. is not something that follows from seeing still images one after the other. Furthermore. from the present day to the reign o f Nicholas the Second. chronological story. then we might argue that film has shifted from being a temporal depiction of space (one ahalogue frame. or the abnormal set’ (Deleuze 2004a: 89). and tied to the body (or. Chronos. but directly with Cronos. cinema does not give us an image to which movement is added. regardless o f whether cinema is actually composed o f still images. even though it looks like the movement-image. ‘[t]he present instant is never fully present because it becomes past even as we try to grasp it’ (PoweU 2007:140). which is characterized as being the totality o f time. or the lived experierice o f time (Chronos). USA/UK/Germany. another form o f ‘illness’). Always already passed and eternally yet to come. to the reign of Catherine the Great. Deleuze distinguishes Chronos from Cronos..'posseSs ‘SSSSS’ structures that involve a democratization o f time in that the order o f the scenes is not important/they are interchangeable. to being a spktial depiction o f time (different digital/digitized elements forming a harmonious whole within the frame. Klinger 2006: 132—51. then. meanwhile. Aeon. or Aeon. Chronos for Deleuze ‘is the present which alone exists’. non-organic Life which grips the world (Deleuze 2005: 79). To get a better sense o f what ‘sickness itself’ means. while the time-image presents us not with Chronos. which has freed itself of its present corporeal content’ (Deleuze 2004a: 189). meanwhile. The seeming reversed relationship between time and space in digital cinema in part recalls the Superman/Batman analogy from which this book takes its name: analogue cinema aspired to offer viewers time-images. without the' need to cut). For no present can be fixed in a Universe which is taken to be the system o f all systems. limitless in either direction.. as per the ‘SSSSS’ strhcture identified by David Martin-Jones (2008. 2008) might best be understood as a film created for the express purpose o f being viewed nonchronologically at home. the powerful. or an indirect image of time. o f all moments in time. or depictions o f Aeon. Chronos is the lived experience o f time: the present is the only moment in time to which we have access . in the sense of being sickness itself (Deleuze 2005: 23). which in an infinite subdivision o f the abstract moment endlessly decomposes itself in both directions at once.and the films themselves (see Mulvey 2006: 17-32. In other words. time. then. Arguably. in the'cross-navigational opportunities offered by DVD (we can skip backwards and forwards through a DVD as we please). Kinder 2002. though in a different way. Manovich and Kratky 2005). This is reflected in the interchangeability o f moments in digital cinema. Chronos is ‘sickness itself’: it is mortal. even though they are (ostensibly) single-take films. For Supercinema. in always passing.and as such. digital cinema ‘democratized its constituent elements such that they can be reordered. and instead the film passes back and forth through time. suggesting that the latter is non-chronological tim e. Battle: Los Angeles and even M amma Aftd. For-while the former films still tell a linear. us a step further in their treatment o f time. a film like M amma M ia! (Phyllida Lloyd. As Anna Powell puts it. or the simultaneous coexistence. or the database space can be crossed. In Deleuze s terms. is ‘chronic’. Chronos ‘devours’ us (Deleuze 2004a: 150). a character . have likened digital cinema to a database (Manovich 1999. This ‘time travel’ eschews normal chronology. or Chronos. Aeon.^ Notably. Aeon is what I am terming ‘time itself’. in any direction we please). while digital cinema. we might turn to The Logic o f Sense where Deleuze draws a distinction not between Chronos and Cronos. In Cinema 2. without even conventional flashback indicators (for example. to ‘simple’ matter) in that it is the physical experience of time (which is measured by decay. while Aeon is the ‘past-future. like space. this is also reflected. and we shall distinguish Chronos from ‘time itself’. As we follow the Marquis de Custine through the Hermitage in Russian Ark. in order to argue that cinema does show us time as precisely continuous. meaning that Chronos. instead cinema presents movement or change itself In terms o f Chronos and Aeon. Brown 2007. ‘in spite o f’ its technological limitations. does depict (something like) Aeon. Aeon is the eternal truth o f time: pure empty form o f time. instead. wants to die (Deleuze 2004a: 188). This is in keeping with Sean Cubitt’s (2004: 33) suggestion that the smallest unit o f cinema has changed from being a temporal uriit (a frame) to being a spatial unit (a pixel). is time outwith (or heyonHsuper) hum an experience . This experience o f time we shall call Chronos. and is in certain respects akin to entropy as defined earlier. Sperb 2009). as audiences skip to their favourite scene/song in whichever order they-wish. W hile Speed. this means that movement-image cinema presents us with an image o f Chronos. 2011). in any direction.

all moments in time coexist simultaneously). and not because space becomes ‘temporalized’. Because there is no cut. Chaos aesthetics If I have defined reality as ontogenetic. for example. many time-images. are for Deleuze characterized by static frames and stillness in that ‘nothing’ takes place onscreen: time-image cinema is inhabited by seers who are in ‘pure optic and sonic’ situations and who are incapable of acting (Deleuze 2005: 2). linear notion of cause and effect.. by being linear. Time has become spatialized’ (Baguer 2004: 249). this concept o f ‘spatialization would seem more in keeping with the way in which the term is used by scholars other than Rodowick. Massumi explains that ‘[c] narrative’ (Bpkatman 1998: 267). Time is treated here as a spatial phenomenon. classical notions of cause and effect. such that now the passage of time/duration itself dominates over movement/action. or Aeon. O f quasi-causes. the spatial and temporal continuity o f Russian A rk and Enter the Void makes explicitly clear the simultaneous coexistence of From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 1 0 5 'moments’. For.and yet the time-image seems to take us ‘beyond’ becoming and towards a static universe (as per Russian Ark and Enter the Void. the spatial continuity o f Enter the Void and Russian A rk is matched by a temporal continuity. I hope to resolve this paradox. However. he simply says that it can transform it.that the butterfly causes the weather in New York. ‘spatialization here seerjis to conform more to my understanding of the term.. an action followed by an ec^ual reaction. as we shall see. I earlier explained chaos theory in terms o f systems the directionality o f which is irreversible as a result of entropy. through a consideration of time via strands of contemporary physics. The system is nonlinear. Although the film does involve ‘cuts’. The point of this example is to suggest that the universe is not governed by a direct.e. fragment the process of viewing into a series o f [interchangeable] moments’ (Bordwell 1985: 317). while Aeon. while the time-image involves the ‘temporalization of space’ (Rodowick 1997: 52). Instead. it suggests that all o f time. nor can the imagined from the real. In other words. reversible. ‘is sensitive- .or time being suppressed for the sake of movement (action and plot drive narrative cinema). This is not to say that the Beijing butterfly does not have a part to play in New York’s weather patterns. hence its being ‘empty’. or still. meanwhile. and birds. does not change. Quast-causality. which are beating their wings. Note that Gleick does not suggest . Brian Massumi writes that they are ‘the condition of newness "or anomaly’ (Massumi 2002: 225).‘while Ignacio Domingo Baguer posits that time in 1980s American science fiction cinema ‘has acquired the three-dimensional quality of space. In other words. It is not that the butterfly causes the tornado. This recalls Bachelard’s suggestion that ‘[p]ure consciousness will be revealed as the capacity for waiting and for watchfulness. In other words. the past and the present cannot be separated from each other. or that which depicts Aeon/ Cronos directly. like space. however. which therefore means that Godard’s films share ground with the ‘SSSSS’ structure of digital (and other) cinemas defined above. Enter the Void also passes back and forth through time: we see Oscar’s childhood memories and the Tokyo lives of his sister and friends after his death —all in a seeming realtime movie. or time itself. David Bordwell. chronologically through time. we should perhaps start with chaos theory’s most famous example: ‘a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking [sic. can be crossed in any direction. Indeed. and repeatable: there is a stimulus followed by a response. in that time. then. spatialized within the cinematic frame). Rodowick uses the term because for him the movement-image involves time being ‘hidden’ within space (spatialized) . I persist with the term ‘spatialization o f time’ because it makes more sense to me to say that if time-images allow us to see time directly.] can transform storm systems next m onth in New York’ (Gleick 1998: 8). Garrett Stewart (2007) implies a similar idea when he says that fime is ‘framed’ in contemporary cinema (i. and humans.104 Supercinema looking up in reminiscence. this move from depicting Chronos towards depicting Aeon. linear cause. a slow dissolve and harp music). linear cause pertains to the generally predictable context within which newness irrupts’ (Massumi 2002: 225). or what Deleuze calls ‘sheets’ (Deleuze 2005: 54) o f time. however. Similarly. Rodowick uses the term ‘spatialization o f time’ to signify the opposite o f what I am describing. or photosynthesizing. there are countless other butterflies.N . and flies. while the ‘temporalization of space’ involves time being brought forth from space. A paradox seemingly arises. In other words. ‘the chief effect [in Godard] is to. I have already mentioned that D . breathing. is therefore (akin to) a time-image. That is. It is for this reason that they present us with a direct image of time/a time-image. it is that the weather in New York is the result of so many simultaneous and intertwined phenomena that we cannot find a true. and plants. in addition to the Beijing butterfly. as the freedom and the will to do nothing’ (Bachelard 2000: 18). Furthermore. speaks of the ‘spatialization o f narration’ in the films of Jean-Luc Godard. My definition of the ‘spatialization o f time’ is more akin to Rodowick’s ‘temporalization of space’. But this temporal continuity in both films is not simply the creation of a realtime film that progresses forwards. Tliis ‘spatialization o f time’. specifically the past in the present. exists simultaneously. such that there is a constant flux o f air in the world. these are masked/ marked as Oscar’s blinks. in that we and everything with(in) it are constantly in a state of becoming. Rodowick uses the term ‘spatialization of time’ to describe the movement-image. in that digital special effects also ‘provide a release from causal structures . W ith regard to time in cinema. since we can pass seamlessly from one time plane to the next without so much as a some people might interpret it . because becoming is key to digital cinema . or the virtual from the actual. For Bordwell. then a paradox seemingly arises: Chronos is defined by constant change. which lies at the heart of the second law of thermodynamics. are predictable. and animals. but it is only a quasi-cause as opposed to a cause. then it is because time becomes manifest in space (it is ‘spatialized’ such that we can see it). however.

Forrest Gump. a margin o f And most important. the Cold War. This is ostensibly contrary to the second law o f thermodynamics (but in fact 14. such that time becomes spatialized. Quasi-causality finds its way into digital cinema. seem directly to reference the quasi-causal tenets of chaos theory: an unseen narrator tells us . it perhaps seems churlish to argue that a. It injects a measure of objective uncontrol. indeed. the shot of the neurons firing in Fight Club. as my discussion o f work by Sean Carroll.and in seemingly continuous shots. but most viewers simply do not see films in this way.every element in every frame is relevant to our understanding o f the film . Before I turn to the role o f the spectator. and other (digitally enabled) narratives: there is no element that we can discount from contributing to the events that we see in a qualitatively. chaos theory would seem to suggest that there is truth in Amelie.28pm and 32 seconds.for it may be that all elements o f the image count towards the film. Complexity and monstration Complexity theory is an outgrowth o f chaos theory. The universe is in a certain sense ‘fractalized’. caring not at all for the details o f a system’s constituent atoms’ (Gleick 1988: 304). something affirmed by eye-tracking studies o f film viewers-who for the most part limit their attention to only certain parts o f the frame (see. to view films ‘holistically’ (or at least as holistically as possible). In a sense. the micro is inseparable from the macro. and the cosmic zooms o f Contact. in that we discount none o f the possible contributing/ quasi-causal elements of a film. for change. The fkmous ‘butterfly effect’ from chaos theory implies that we cannot attribute causality in the traditional sense o f the word. In other words. Complexity flourishes as a result o f change. nor are there empty moments. Everything potentially has a quasi-causal role to play. complexity-flourishes’ (Gleick 1988: 308). In complexity theory. and reality itself: no detail is trivial to the point o f irrelevance. as we have seen. Event Horizon and other films. Similarly. ‘chaotic self-organizations not only happen. a liveliness’ (Massumi 2002: 225). To reiterate. complexity theory argues that self-organization emerges from even very simple processes or laws. Roger Penrose and others hopefully clarified in the last chapter). no two snowflakes are the same (Gleick 1988: 30914).the atomic (and subatomic) levels are inherently tied to emergence at the macro level. though.unless we see them as part of a chaotic reality in which the smallest events (a fly beating its wings . in effect. It expresses a global ability to sense and be affected. For this reason. except to suggest that the smallest thing . The invasion o f Earth by aliens is surely more meaningfiil than minor details in the film’s mise-en-scene —at least for most viewers. a feather . 1960s American inherently bound together with the large events that Forrest witnesses or takes part in (Vietnam. or time. In our world. across the micro and macro scales. As Gleick puts it: ‘[sjimple systems give rise to complex behaviour. a Calliphorides blue fly lands on the rue St Vincent in Montmartre: at the same time. If I am arguing that we muststrive. even the most microscopic factors contribute towards the end results.io6 Supercinema like Battle: Los Angeles ‘fractalizes’ events in this way. and we have already discussed it indirectly since it involves autopoesis/the creation o f order out of chaos. the air at the beginning and at the end o f Forrest Gump is not relevant to the film. As per the discovery of fractals m nature by Benoit Mandelbrot (1967). As Massumi puts it. as we are told) are bound together with the largest events (a conception).) From Temporalities to Time in Digitai Cinema 107 make clear the fact that everything that we see contributes to the whole. quasi-causes see the linear temporality of rause and effect distributed in space (multiple/infinite quasi-causes). I must perhaps admit that the ‘chaotic’ mode o f seeing films that I am describing —whereby . The fly.670 beats per 'ihinute. and more) during the Im. Complex systems give rise to simple behaviour. the glasses and the address book have nothing to do with the film in traditional narrative terms. and which we follow through. at 6. It is at this precise moment that Amelie is conceived. including both ‘empty space and ‘empty’ moments in films (since in fact there is no empty space. since there is no element that we can discount from contributing to what happens in the real world. all suggest the interconnected nature of space and time. such that events are inseparable from the whole flux or change of the entire universe. wine gl^ses dance unseen on a table cloth in the wind at a restaurant in the Place du T hatre. the laws of complexity hold universally. The shot of the bacteria in the drop o f water in War o f the Worlds. all ‘points’ in space and all ‘moments’ in time contribute to what happens. In this way. I should pursue further my investigation into how physics can help us to resolve the seeming paradox of a ‘static’ whole/Aeon and becoming/Chronos. or creative [as opposed to reactive/active-passive].. Smith 2006). not least through its ability to rep res^t objects at both the micro and macro scales . such that the totality of the universe is interconnected across the entire space and time o f its being. the feather that Mauovich (2000b: 179) identifies as being composited into. in which ‘Everything tends toward disorder. W hat they cannot be is faithfully reproduced (Massumi 2002:225). since initial conditions can never be repeated. meanwhile. .. they can be repeatedly induced. The opening moments oiAmMie.. meaning that. furthermore.and the visual track shows us . In this way. because there is no ‘single cause’ for events as per classical physics. and from which chaos theory also draws inspiration (see Gleick 1988: 96-103). a gentleman erases his best friend’s name from his address book. it always retains the same stucture. But while Amelie and Forrest Gump (together with many other ‘butterfly effect’ and“timespace’ film. perhaps this is how we should begin to consider all films. having returned that day from his fimeral. forexample. on 3 September 1973. as is famously known. space and time both become self-similar at all scal«: at no matter what scale we view a fractal. or what Gleick terms ‘randomness with direction’ (Gleick 1988: 314). it is the energy contained in ‘empty’ space/vacuums that arguably makes life possible in the first place) arguably a (desired and impossible?) mode o f seeing films as much-as it is true of the images o f (digital) cinema itself.

However. This delay opens up space for us to analyse how not just digital cinema. USA/Japan. which would destroy novelty.io8 Supercinema If no two snowflakes are the same. living systems. and Jean-Luc Nancy (2003). including film images. and time-nonreversible qualities. within any complex system. It is timereversible because closed. then there would be repetitions. quasi-causal. we are in what Thomas Elsaesser has termed a ‘post-narrative age’ (Elsaesser 2006: 215). The work o f Gaudreault and Charles Musser also seems to corroborate this: Musser. which in turn helps m ount a challenge against the logic of cause and effect. Instead o f an eta of classical narrative.and uniqueness is the measure of novelty (if it has been produced before. modular narratives (Cameron 2006. And this is what digital cinema seems to suggest.i. Japan. Nancy finds that all images. I would like to propose that the breakdown of classical narrative both stems from and leads to a rise in cinematic monstration. explains Pierson. This shift of emphasis away from narrative also creates space to conceive of cinematic time as a succession of interchangeable moments. 2009). who argues that images are monstrances. Time is nonreversible because ‘there are no truly isolated [sub] systems. but all cinema. ‘The computer-generated Godzilla represented a conservative attempt to pass off an aesthetic that had already lost its auratic power over contemporary audiences’. for example. Simons 2008). We shall consider below (and indeed we shall refine) what this ‘whole’ might be. I have also argued that it precedes narration in a psychophysiological fashion (Brown 2011b).is time-reversible. repeatable and time-reversible laws. then. self-organizing. It is only the entire universe that is time-reversible’ (Cohen and Stewart 1994: 260). In other words. (cinematic) images are philosophical in the Deleuze and . complexity can be understood here both as involving a nonreversible/nonrepeatable temporabty and as the emergence of the new. precisely because the spectator desires to see the whole of the monster at once and interacting with humans (Pierson 2002: 148-56). From this perspective. Monstration is a term derived from various sources: Andre Gaudreault (1990. 1954). images are ‘presence’ or ‘pre-sense’ (Nancy 2003: 46). or what Nancy describes as ‘before’ meaning. Branigan 2002). ‘using partial models to suggest that an entire monster existed somewhere just offscreen . unrepeatable. puzzle films (Panek 2006. but in open. or the interconnection o f all spaces and times. As such all images demand thought. Through Pierson. fractal films (Everett 2005). are initially incomprehensible (or ‘pre-sense’). This emergence of the new is a process that repeats itself across all scales. but instead places an emphasis on spaces and times as much as on stories. post-classical narration (Thanouli 2006). or the individual (each snowflake is new and therefore individual). This is suggested by Michele Pierson when she explains that the CGI-laden remake of Godzilla (Roland Emmerich. Staiger 2006. like a snowflake. Stephen Bush. a moment in which showing (the world.e. quotes early silent cinema lecturer W. a trend in which digital technology also plays a crucial part) leads to the untenability of classical narrative. mindftick films (Eig 2003). anything that is not the whole universe). complex cinema (Ramirez Berg 2006). both organic and nonorganic. however. if for Jean-Luc Nancy images are ‘monstrances’ that (at least initially) defy sense. or of multiple chronologies.e. complex narratives (Harper 2005. causal. time is nonreversible. Demanding thought. novelty emerges from all interactions between entities (which equate here to what Cohen and Stewart refer to as subsystems —i. Firstly. In addition to these theoretical frameworks. via montage. Buckland 2009b). manifests itself) precedes telling (we ‘make sense o f’ what we are seeing). which involves forking path and multiple draft narratives (Bordwell 2002b. and this is by no means a reflection on their intelligence’ (quoted in Musser 1990: 263). not least through its rejection o f classical narrative techniques. which suggests that time is nonreversible. not just those of silent cinema. there is only the production o f the new. 1998) failed artistically and commercially because it was too concerned w ith reproducing the aesthetics of the earlier. including ostensibly narrative cinema. Thirdly. Gilles Deleuze. then it would appear that images lie outside of meaning. Secondly. 2008). twist films (Wilson 2006). W hat emerges from these interactions between entities is novel. the monster is revealed in fragments. who asked: ‘[w]hy do many people remain in the moving picture theatre and look at the same pictures two or even three times? Simply because they do not understand it the first time. the whole . in that there is seemingly a ‘delay’ on the cerebral level between perception and cogniuon. Deleuze’s use of the term ‘montrage’ implies a move away from the cut (montage) and a move towards continuity in terms of the depiction o f times and spaces (Brown 2009b). nonlinear. In those earlier films. if for Gaudreault monstration precedes narration in a historical sense. There are several reasons for using this term as opposed to any o f the ‘postnartative’ frameworks mentioned above. cinema showed.the entire universe . Each of these in its own way reflects the manner in which an understanding o f chaos and complexity (together with cultural concerns. while within the universe there is only (nonreversible/nonrepeatable) novelty as a result o f the interactions of entities/subsystems. But since one cannot repeat events exactly/since time is nonrevetsible. we can argue that digital cinema is a ‘monstrous’ cinema that shows as much as it tells . the universe is simply a machine for generating the new thanks to its nonclassical.and so nothing ‘new’ can take place. is not necessarily/uniquely narrative. whose work on early silent cinema has persuasively argued that prior to becoming a narrative form used to tell stories. That is. eachdnstant is unique . such as globalization. then it is not new).and that the im ^ e disappoints the viewer when it does not. or showings of other-ness that affect us in ways that elude comprehension. and mind-game films (Elsaesser 2009). From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 109 or monstrated. since classical narrative is based upon linear. If time were reversible. complex or organized systems are emergent as a result o f time in the sense that. Everything and every time ‘already exists within the whole . who charts in postwar cinema a progression away from montage and towards ‘montrage’ (Deleuze 2005: 40). analogue Gojira/Godzilla films from the 1950s (starting with Ishir6 Honda’s Gojira. but the monstrative elements o f digital cinema help to make this particularly clear.

but that this important difference does not and cannot occur within physics. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers seem to address the two sides to the Chronos/Aeon debate during a discussion o f Einstein and philosopher Rudolf Carnap. It is for this reason that Bergson introduced the distinction between physical time and duration.. subjective time. present and future. we must go on a lengthy detour away from cinema and further into physics. opens on to the infinite. chronological time. but intimately connected . digital cinema is excessive. then. in a sense following an opposite road. has bothered Einstein and Bergson alike. it ‘inceeds’ rather than exceeds the image. A philosopher like Alain Badiou. If subjettive. as shown in the examples from Eisenstein and Buster Keaton above. I remarked that all that occurs objectively can be described in science: on the one hand the temporal sequence of events is described in physics. versus Chronos. as well as suggesting how (overdetermination hy) language closes off the phenom enological potential o f images for affect and thought. That this experience cannot be grasped by science seemed to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation. This would conform to the classical. This latter assertion points to the way in which language determines meaning.(Badiou 2000: 19—30). provides a way that perhaps justifies the differences . but because the images-themselves show before they tell. Bergson started with a subjective time and then moved to time in nature. such that digital cinema is ‘incessantly excessive (see also Brown 2012a). Echoing Kristin Thompson (1977). it is excessive not because of what lies beyond the frame (that which literally exceeds the image). or objective time. in which time and space are separate. which ‘fractalize’ our understanding o f narrative such that the micro is of Squal importance to the macro. Furthermore. for him this objectivization led to a debasement of time. for example. The notion o f an ‘entire universe’ recalls Deleuze’s concept of Aeon. but also the ongoing use o f hype. The excess that I am speaking of.110 Supercinema Guattarian (1994) sense o f the word. In order to do this. that enables Steven Weinberg (1993) to ‘dream o f a final theory’ in which the whole o f the universe would be understood. which he defines as ‘the sum of all possibles’ (Deleuze 2006: 87).. Aeon and possible worlds Above I quoted Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart’s idea that the entire universe is timereversible. Nonetheless. because all constituent elements would ‘already exist within it. but they attem pt to determine what it ‘means’. and as such they exceed meaning. perhaps stretches cinema’s language-like capacities to breaking point. a cinema o f ‘post-continuity’. (Quoted in Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 214) Prigogine and Stengers then continue: It is interesting to note that Bergson. postclaSSictll physics suggests that time and space are not separate. however. then Aeon would in theory be ‘static’. for Prigogine and Stengers. including his different attitude towards past. (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 214) These quotations serve to show that the issue o f Aeon. from the physical point of view Aeon is commonly thought to exist. then it would appear that. in Deleuze’s terms. promotional materials. But if ‘the arrow o f time [or Chronos] is only a convention that we (or perhaps all living beings) introduce into a world in which there is no objective distinction between past and future’ (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 254). show as much as they tell.. on the other hand. in the sense that it exceeds meaning. might refute this From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 111 argument. However. the peculiarities of man’s experiences with respect to time. However. in that they induce novel thoughts and/or concepts in viewers. time as objectified by physics. in that. or Chronos.. a concept referring to existential time. Internal existential time has qualitative features that are lost in the process. also reached a dualistic conclusion. By language. These can in turn form the basis for our understanding o f Aeon in relation to cinema. and. However. Monstration. for Steven Shaviro (2010). It is implicitly an understanding of Aeon. that there is something essential about the Now which is just outside of the realm of science. lies not beyond but within the frame. and in which a ‘total’ understanding would allow us to see the determined nature o f the universe. since for him there is no univocity. are language-like in that montage. it is an ‘incess’ as much as an excess. as held in chaos and complexity theory. and all other language-based discussions o f films. they lie outside of the text/film under consideration. meanwhile. I mean not just the spoken language o f a narrator or o f characters within a film (in particular expository dialogue that pins down the ‘meaning’ of otherwise ambiguous images). help us to understand the diminished role o f narration and the heightened role of monstration in digital cinema. although not a language (see Currie 1995: 113—37). He Explained that the experience of the Now means something special for man. theories o f chaos and complexity. including academic texts. However. Like Einstein. A fuller discussion o f the relationship between images and the viewer will have to wait until the next chapter. They quote the latter: ' Once Einstein said that the problem of the Now [or time as perceived chronologically by humans] worried him seriously. can be described and (in principle) explained in psychology. Digital cinema. also referred to in The Fold as chaos. there are only unique and unrepeatable events. Aeon does exist. is irreversible and the constant production'of the new. Newtonian view o f the universe. such that the ‘monstrous’ capacities of cinema (not least in a cinema populated by countless almost-incomprehensible digital monsters) are maximized. the narrative techniques o f continuity editing. and which function as what Gerard Genette (1997) terms paratexts. understood as a cinema of continuity intensified to the point o f becoming. In addition to expository dialogue and paratexts. rei/iews. or ‘sum’ that unifies everything such that it has ‘wholeness’. But Einstein thought that these scientific descriptions cannot possibly satisfy our human needs. whose divergences from Deleuze merit greater exploration/explanation than I have space here to provide. something essentially different from the past and the future. One.

or the ‘actual’ path that the particle takes. space and time acmally get smaller the faster one travels (and th e faster one travels. quite simply. they vary according to the velocity of the objects with which they are interacting/co-constituted. and that these varying temporalities are linked to space. together with Hermann Minkowski. for one of the clearest explanations of spacetime that I have found.112 Supercinema between Rodowick and my uses of the word ‘spatialization’ since both meanings (Rodowick’s understanding that the spatialization of time makes time invisible. in that changes in one lead to changes in the other. that tall people live longer than short people (Davies 1988: 43). Feynman’s (1990) predilection for drawing an arrow for each possible trajectory that a particle can travel also reflects the desire to take seriously the possible. N ot only does this further suggest the aforementioned ‘complementarity’ that Niels Bohr describes as being key to the universe. Instead there is always difference. worlds/universes. made up of multiple timespaces. W hen an experiment is conducted. Richard P. in that observers and the universe observed are interdependent. thereby undermining all claims to free will. we do not live in such a universe. static such that an image of Aeon would show us ‘the future’. Max Planck. which is a picture of reality that is ‘far removed from the commonsense one’ (Davies 1988: 136). instead. each of which affects the others such that there is no dear boundary between one and the next. That is. and others. physicists predominantly do not take this approach. as per Newton’s understanding of time (and that of Bachelard’s Bergson). If the universe is it organically or nonorganically). meanwhile. even if we as observers only have access to one of them. space and time both contract or expand depending on how fast an object is moving. neither space nor time is immutable or disconnected from that which fills it. There is only one thing. In establishing that the whole itself is constantly changing. each has a quasi-causal role to play in everything else. time and space. or a spacetime that is. or parallel. We might typically imagine that an image of all of space and all of time would be coherent. W ithout wishing to render the argument too opaque. and this is because they are moving at different velocities (they have different tempos). “distance in space” measured by odometers and “duration in time” measured by clocks. but it also su^ests the unpredictability of elementary particles and perhaps the universe more generally. In this sense. such an image is not possible because. Like Feynman. time would slow down to a stop. is in part determined by the observer. neither space nor time is constant according to Einstein’s model. such that space and time become what is commonly referred to as spacetime. Now. also. in that new worlds are constantly emerging. Probability also plays a key role in the universe itself. since at no point in our evolution was vision handed down to us ‘whole’. However. This does not mean that large planets are necessarily travelling faster than small planets. Einstein understood time not as being unchanging and monotonous. a quantum experiment will have a different outcome each time. Secondly. such that everything is a quasi-agent (or is ‘alive’ . More than this. ‘each individual electron actually traverses everypossible trajectory simultaneously (Greene 2000: 110). and your mass would become infinite’ (Kaku 2005: 33). The first is that space and time are interlinked. and Chronos would seem to be the preferable understanding of the universe. where the outcome of experiments. changes in velocity on the part of the moving entity bring about changes in both space and time and vice versa. Instead. or interdependent. developed the ‘many-universes interpretation o f quantum theory’. That is. the universe arguably shows greater levels of complexity than this. then the future has not already happened. as opposed to my understanding that this makes time visible) reflect the interlinked nature of the two. each o f which is equally real. outcomes to experiments. as I shall explain presently. H ugh Everett III. which itself contracts or expands as the velocity/tempo of an entity changes. since everything that we do would always already have taken place. Note. rather. from some transcendent point of view. or. Rather. distances would contract to nothing. and it would also be the underlying ‘Oneness’ that Badiou critiques in Deleuze’s work. but as being varied/variable. which we can articulate through the discourse of possible. no two entities experience time at the same rate. In this sense. the interval in spacetime between two events’ (Carroll 2010: 75. The universe is not. the heavier one becomes). It is not simply that space and time ‘seem’ to pass by quicker for the objea travelling rapidly through them. and not just the actual. such as the path that an electron might take from one point to another. instead. I have mentioned the concept of probability in relation to perception: what we see is a probabilistic version of the world. that this suggests a universe o f constant becoming: there are only differing spaces and times. spacetime is indivisible from that which fills it. This would be the static universe o f Newtonian physics. rather than just one . but that it is not ‘One in the way that Badiou understands Deleuze to take it. let us imagine that we could picture ‘the whole’ and that a direct image of time showed us Aeon in Deleuze’s sense of the word. as Paul Davies su^ests. W hen an observer helps to determine the path of an electron from one point to another. Two things are important to bear in mind here. In other words. space. Albert Einstein. but instead are intimately connected. but that there are in fact multiple/infinite outcomes to the experiment. This is because neither space nor time is a detached backdrop for movement/velocity. it is thought not that there is only one outcome for each iteration of the experiment. such that Chronos and Aeon are not binary opposites. in that we could see a clearly laid out image of the universe from the big bang to the end o f time. However. such that if one ‘approached the speed of light. it would seem that there are only varying temporalities in the sense discussed earlier in this chapter. simply put. Everett argued that we should not disregard possible outcomes to experiments. see Carroll 2010: 74-76). This is made most clear at the quantum level. depending on the observer’s behaviour. or the whole of spacetime. Deleuze’s aforementioned definition of chaos as the sum o f all possibles is truly insightful. time and velocity are mumally interlinked. brought about in physics the unification of space and time as a result of the former’s special theory of relativity. we can argue that Aeon does exist. in Aylish Wood’s terms. As Sean Carroll explains: ‘There are not two different things. From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 113 from without.

but rather is ontogenetic. or virtual. as is . but they do not occur.114 Supercinema single. We have so far mentioned the term virtual mostly in relation to that which is computerized and without a material existence. the virtual. therefore. If there are infinite such parallel universes. Many of the other infinite universes are almost identical to mine. And these infinite universes must always be expanding. each with its own timespace continuum). the future does . and if every subatomic change ‘creates’ one or infinite such parallel universes. our own bodies are part of the world. The actual. This growing. but our brains and. and imagine in such a way that . a more useful framework for discussing the matter is through Deleuze’s concepts of the virtual and thought in relation to cinema. like our actual universe. France/Italy. the totality of superspace and supertime might exist in a fashion akin ro Deleuze’s conception o f Aeon and/or his description of chaos as ‘the sum of all possibles’. while his discussion o f the ‘powers of the felse’ seems also to relate to possible worlds and to how they might exist simultaneously with each other and with our own. unbroken tracking shots that ‘define. then. or in our world. such as antimatter. we have also touched upon a different meaning o f virtual in relation to Deleuze. If Deleuze says that ‘virtualities are actualized in prehensions/individual entities’ (Deleuze 2006: 90). supposedly ‘objective’ world o f the film from what is subjeaively remembered/imagined. I mean that all ‘moments’ in time (and all possible ‘moments’ in all possible times) exist simultaneously. we seem to have strayed far from cinema here. but those possibles are multiplying dynamically at any given ‘moment’. W ith regard to the time-image. or when we cannot tell that which pertains to the actual. a film like L’annee demiere h MarienbadlLast Year a t M arienhad (Alain Resnais. presumably. In this sense. Furthermore. in which there is an infinity of universes. then each parallel universe must. each of which is equally real within the realm of what Everen terms superspace. as each material decision. 1961) becomes for Deleuze perhaps the archetypal time-image film (Deleuze 2005: 113-20). However. ‘real’ outcome there are multiple/infinite possible outcomes. we have passed from the. a further ‘infinity’ o f parallel universes comes into being. then superspace is likewise infinite. As Davies puts it: ‘The events have past-future relations. except that in one of the universes I took coffee instead of tea. Not only our bodies. talk. and these themselves form an expanding continuum.especially via Resnais’s long. then this means that the supposedly objective criteria o f true and false are also troubled. then. Chronos and Aeon From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 115 seem to be interdependent: we cannot tell ‘the’ future. One of the infinite universes is the actual universe in which I now perceive reality. As such. or rather construct. If the real and the imaginary are indistinguishable in the film. but universes themselves are constantly coming into being from this physical perspective. In the words of [Bryce] DeWitt ‘Our universe must be viewed as constantly splitting into a stupendous number of branches’. in a fashion that recalls the way in which actual particles also emerge from (and dissipate back to) virtual particles. which is humanity’s perceived reality. emergent reality does not have a stable. in that in this realm there is stillness (all moments in time have ‘equal status’). our consciousness is being repeatedly multiplied. Not only might our own universe be expanding spatially and temporally. and they too are split ^nd split again. Every subatomic process has the power to multiply the world. is simply a fragment. The single answer that we humans perceive to be the ‘real’ one is merely a fragment of superspace. presents and futures (or parallel universes. the world is continually splitting into countless near copies of itself. in every galaxy. . In this film. or even if. It follows that. ‘present’ to the ‘past’ o f the film. continuums’ (Deleuze 2005: 115) . That is. which contains all possible outcomes. or each possible path taken by each nonorganically living quantum of matter. Deleuze himself seems to intuit a many worlds interpretation of the universe. asserts a chronology (Chronos) that expands the whole (Aeon). or fixed. in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world into myriads of copies of itself Here is schizophrenia with a vengeance!’ In addition to this ceaseless replication. Paul Davies explains. By ‘is taking place’. maybe an enormous number of times. but instead there are infinite possible pasts. for in each new universe. which remains probabilistic. according to this theory. actual world (Deleuze i005: 127). also aligns itself with memory and with the imagination. subtends that which exists in the realm o f the actual. ontology. (Davies 1988: 136-37) If indeed there are coundess parallel universes. be a timespace (all time and space pertaining to an individual universe exists on a continuum). Nonetheless. he writes of other worlds and their self-containment (Deleuze 2005: 60). on Vincente Minnelli. what he means is that all that exists in the realm o f the possible. and in another I quit my academic job and became a filmmaker. for example virtual cameras. the actual emerges out of the virtual. all that is possible is taking place. In ‘superspace’ and ‘supertime’. feeling human being inhabiting another universe much like the one we see around us. for all of past and future exist with equal status’ (Davies 1988: 189). the foregoing and extended discussion o f parallel universes/possible worlds can help us to understand contemporary cinema.. in many of which exist people who are almost identical to ourselves. or from the ‘real’ to the ‘imaginary’. there is a hum an being almost exactly the same as me.we cannot tell when. virtual bodies and virtual spaces. However. Cinematic consciousness As warned. a direct image o f time occurs when we cannot tell what is ‘real’. then it stands to reason that each human action also creates one or an infinite number of parallel universes —since human bodies and brains ceaselessly undergo transitions in the same way that quanta do. reminisce. In this respect. for Deleuze.not come into being and the past is not lost. each copy becoming a thinking. or the virtual. ‘we can no longer tell what is flashback and what is not’ (Deleuze 2005: 118) as the film travels around a hotel in which unnamed characters walk. DeWitt explains: ‘Every quantum transition taking place on every star. If for each experiment there is an infinity o f possible outcomes. such that there is only change.

‘in which the same character occurs in two quite different positions’ (Armes 1968: 111). which I have dared to define here as the organization of. we only perceive one o f these trajectories. For that ‘choice’ is only made when the particle comes into contact with an observer. This ‘new logic’ in part involves cinema becoming like thought: ‘Resnais has always said that what interested him was the brain. even if nonorganically. between different temporalities. it might be deemed to have a consciousness. but it plays a part in forming the consciousness. creates a cinema which has only one single character. even if only in a quasi-causal fashion. After Deleuze. such that change for both parties takes place. such as photons and electrons. Brains are organs possessed by few species. or consciousness as I am defining it here. while Last Year a t M arienbad predates all but the most ‘primitive’ and experimental digital cinema (although it does not predate digital thought^. and which also finds an important precursor in Deleuze. and such that these relations challenge our normal separation o f subjeas and objects. the possible and the impossible. A specifically human observer does indeed affect the behaviour of elementary particles being observed. an argument that Daniel Frampton (2006) has developed in the direction o f the ‘Filmind’. it afiects the observer as the observer affects it). and the living and the nonliving become indiscernible according to the traditional.but it is a ‘subjectivity’ that emerges only out of its relationship with an observer (with whom/which the particle has a two-way relationship. so the film employs ‘impossible’. brain and mind are all useful terms. that surround it. If. and its From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 117 ‘organization is defined by the fact of quanta coming into being (passing from the virtual to the actual) through vibrating. We have also argued that all organized matter is ‘living’. if Last Year a t M arienbad indicates avant la lettre aspects of digital cinema. matter itself. then. the true and the false now become undecidable or inextricable: the impossible proceeds from the possible. as we shall see). the subject and the object. As such. not least because all matter exists in a continuum of space and time . However. and space and all that fills it?): Qjust as the real and the imaginary become indiscernible in certain very specific conditions of the image. established between the actual and the virtual. frameworks that we normally apply to film. or simply the fact of. We might normally believe that some entities are conscious subjects and that some are nonconscious objects. whereby any film presents to us a ‘brain. This no doubt seems an extremely esoteric assertion to make. at least on a metaphorical level. exists not within a mind. we have argued that elementary particles. A new logic has to be invented. then ‘life’. its logic becomes commonplace in digital cinema. a memory it evokes. even if nonorganically. then. screens have brains and films can think. the past is not necessarily true. each of which has its own temporality. an imagined future that ensues). of cinema that digital technology helps more clearly to liberate. and which has its roots in contemporary physics (as well as in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. this does not necessarily render my argument superfluous. the universe shows self-similarity . Since we only perceive one trajectory. so.there are continuums —across all scales. the brain as world. a brain is a material object from which a m ind that thinks emerges.” It is in the most concrete way that Resnais attains a cinema. this is not quite enough. therefore. but one that has been in cinema ever since its birth. simply by virtue of its organization. As hum an thoughts slip between the past. All matter affects other matter. which I have been trying to elucidate throughout this book. parallel universes. the present and the future. does Last Year at Marienbad. just as earlier a new psychology had to be. the true aqd the false. or spinning. Thought [la PenseeY (Deleuze 2005: 117). If even an elementary particle takes on a Chronos/chronological existence (this path. or a potential. However. after Deleuze. or Chronos. while thought. (In a fractal sense. as is all matter in a continuum like that defined in the first chapter. as “memory of the world. nor a mind. unbroken tracking shots. but this distipction in feet does not hold when we adopt the point o f view elaborated here. Parallel universes exist alongside the actual universe that we inhabit. That Last Year a t M arienbad also proves an im portant precursor makes it worth reminding the reader that while the focus is on digital cinema here. For. Supercinema is about a logic. while an elementary particle may take all possible trajectories between two points. or the virtualities. or the relations . digital cinema also demands a new logic. but where Last Year a t M arienbad is exceptional as an analogue film. or better with. If Aeon and Chronos are interdependent. this ‘thinking’ emerges via the continuum that is. such that an actual world emerges from the infinite potential. Last Year a t M arienbad therefore portrays the inner workings o f a mind: in the same way that humans slip from one thought to another (concentration on a present task. .that are. and nonorganic life. the world. An observer here is not to be understood simply as a human observer. but ‘observer’ can be understood more generally as other matter. and if Chronos is equated to subjective time. suph that we cannot tell them apart. at a particular tempo. It is as an extension of this argument o f cinerpa as thought that Deleuze (2000) says that ‘the brain is the screen. that emerges in the relations between different (parts of) matter.'* The virtual exists alongside the actual. or a brain that is isolated from the world. Consciousness is in this sense the relationship between differing entities. has neither a brain nor. Consciousness does not exist a priori. as memory [memoire].) All matter is ‘living’. but is produced in the relations between what we might normally define as subjects and objects. too. or classical.a continuum that is itself on a continuum with other. such that the two are interdependent. nor a brain. whereby all films have a ‘m ind’. and not all paths simultaneously). all matter has neither a subjectivity. but it emerges from the relationship between entities in. I wish guardedly to propose that ‘consciousness’ is more apt as a term. we might say that the elementary particle ‘chooses’ one particular pathway. simultaneously take all possible trajectories between two points. Now.n 6 Supercinema the distinction between subject and object (and ground and figure. (Deleuze 2005: 263) Now. However. However. a mind. then even elementary particles have some ‘subjectivity’ .

To ‘save’ her. as Joel takes Clementine into memories in which she had not previously feamred (at one point. has had his father killed. In Eternal Sunshine o f the Spotless M ind. and by extension their interdependence. Joel (Jim Carrey) tries to save memories of his exgirlfiriend Clementine (Kate Winslet) from being destroyed following a decision to remove her from his mind via surgery. Lola. which he gives to his younger self in order correcdy to predict’ the winners of various sporting events. but we also see that these other universes and other Neos exist. choosing its own path). In this film. the programme that designed the Matrix from which Neo escapes only to return at the end to confront Agent Smith. Each screen represents a parallel universe. Manni (Moritz Bleibtreu). this logic comes to the fore in digital cinema. Lola succeeds in her mission. or an alternative future that comes into being as Neo reacts. Rather. As Tont Whalen (2000: 34) points out. 1985. while being seamlessly integrated into the frame suggests the copresence of past and future. she learns to avoid the punk and the dog that trip her up on the staircase to her apartment. Furthermore.ii8 Supercinema Digital possible worlds If Last Year a t M arienbad is an important precursor to such a ‘supercinematic’ logic. a supremely wealthy Biff has married Marty’s mother. Having learnt how to travel in time. but in which small changes in initial conditions can lead to vastly differfcnt outcomes.impossibly? . or which future. the f a a that Joel literally sees his future self suggests the interaction between these moments. walls of television screens show various different reactions that Neo makes as the Architect reveals the nature of the Matrix to him. in which seemingly minute variations in Lola’s (Franka Potente) efforts to raise money to rescue her boyfiriend fi’om criminals produce startlingly different end results —in one version of the film’s ‘levels’. present a ‘spatialized time’ that can be crossed in any given direction. we might argue that the film shows as equally real the diflPering versions of reality. In this sense. The fact that both scenes are featured simultaneously within the frame suggests a ‘democratization of time. or multiple possibles. ot chaos. Instead. such that one is on a continuum with the other. ‘happy ending o f the film is the ‘real’ version of events. In particular the second film sees Marty’s nemesis. there is no ‘true history’ . Furthermore. with Marty’s girlfriend Jennifer (Elisabeth Shue). 1989 and 1990) presents a conception o f the universe that blurs the actual and the virtual. and she also manages to learn to climb on to the back . We need only content ourselves with a few choice examples. are in fact communicating. Neo meets with the Architect (Helmut Bakaitis). from 2015 back to 1985. then. as signalled by the fact that the film does not cut from one moment to the next but instead tracks into screen after screen of Neo reacting to the Architect. at another she appears in bed with Joel as he masturbates . Biff (Thomas F. Run (Tom Tykwer. Lola seems to learn from version to version o f her race against time. Instead. leaving all of the other parallel Neos behind. Although the film finishes with Marty and Doc reestablishing the ‘correct’ timeline o f events (a ‘correction’ that Rodowick sees as being a major limitation in the film. she learns how to use a gun. or the parallel universes. and has had Doc placed in an insane asylum. they discover that all is not as it was when they last left 1985. The Back to the Future series (Robert Zemeckis. Furthermore. During this scene. the moment constitutes a (digitally enabled) time-image . W hat we might have thought o f as ‘incompossible worlds’. and the coexistence with the actual world of possible worlds. W hen Marty and Doc themselves travel.a moment now ‘shared’ even though Joel was on his own when the event upon which this memory is based took place). the supposed ‘present’ o f the film. The time-image here shows not one/‘the’ future coexisting with the past and the ptesent. we also see the emergence of new worlds. We see a similar conception o f parallel universes in the rriuch-discussed ‘butterfly effect’ of Lola rennt/Run. see Rodowick 1997: 222). travel from 2015 to 1955 with a copy o f Gray’s Sports Almanac. As per Deleuze. Reality is made up of infinite parallel universes.he is choosing which parallel universe. such that we follow one Neo. is killed. each different from the next. Stan (Mark Ruffalo). Wilson).rather than to interrupt the driver —of a pasting ambulance. such that digital cinema seems to be full o f direct images of time. but many possible futures. but the visualization of their interdependent nature. ‘O ur’ Neo discards many possible universes. Fox) and Doc Brown (Christopher Lloyd) travel in and out o f parallel universes. Clementine takes on the role o f one of Joel’s mother’s friends in a memory that he has of himself as a young child. all the while seeing a future version of himself undergoing preliminary tests with Mierzwiak’s understudy. From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 1 1 9 interconnected worlds. in that there is tio point discussing them if we cannot gain access to them and if they were totally isolated from us. Many films do this. USA. W hat we see is Neo’s precise thought pattern . Each time we see his multiple possible reactions on the multiple television screens. Marty McFly (Michael J. This conception of parallel universes is also depicted in The M atrix: Lieloaded. then. including one o f Joel talking to head doctor Mierzwiak (Tom Wilkinson) about the treatment he is about to image of Chronos (the subjective experience of time. in which repeatedly we cannot tell the virtual from the actual.creates memories. including the many time travel narratives analysed by Garrett Stewart in his Framed Time (2007). The film contains many time-images. It is not that the final. the irruption of one into the other is not so much the achievement o f the impossible. 1998). Every choice is an act o f creating something new. Complexity theory is not just the process of self organization that happens within the world. In other approach that would give us grounds to dismiss the concept of parallel uhiverses as hokum. in which things have turned out very differendy. he . while in another the boyfiriend. is his. all o f the difierent versions o f events are equally real. Joel tries to take Clementine somewhere into his memories where the brain surgeons will not find her. Germany. we track towards one screen and ‘enter’ it. The films. they seem not to be parallel universes that ire separate from each other . a ‘schizophrenic’ becoming other. however. in relation with Aeon. Marty must therefore travel back to 1955 in orddr to prevent the young Biff from receiving the Sports Almanac from the older Biff. the present (Joel’s desire to save Clementine) feeds back into Joel’s past.

she whispers to him the word ‘Montauk’. between the virtual and the actual. even if those virtual ‘charactets’ are not ‘beings’ but (agential/quasi-agenrial) environments. Untimely final thoughts on digital virtual time In this chapter. so too is the whole. a woman working on the Source Code project that enables such antiterrorist measures to be taken. Digital cinema ubiquitously features actual (profilmic) and (perceptually realistic/photorealistic) virtual (digital) charactets within the same frame. meaning that there are infinite parallel universes alongside our actual universe. Joel. I have suggested that we must include the film spectator in this argument. bids farewell to her. but are themselves interdependent. in which time is suppressed for the sake of movement. since Clementine did not really whisper ‘Montauk’ in Joel’s ear. From Temporalities to Time in Digital Cinema 121 Beyond this. such that ‘empty’ time is as significant as ‘full’ time. The fact that Clementine and Joel could meet (again) in this way is impossible. These virtual elements are real. what was temporal in cinema has become spatialized. My point. The spatial irruption of beings with their own temporalities challenges the cause and effect-driven logic of narrative cinema. in particular its blend o f analogue and digital imagery. although both believe it to be for the first time (for Clementine has had Joel removed from her memory. 2011). while all spatial and temporal elements of the acmal world (or the diegetic world of the film) might be construed as important. in that Colter in effect ‘kills’ the human whom he ‘occupies’). but I shall end this one by suggesting something simple. Stevens explains that he has just averted the terrorist attack. ever expanding in new directions. This further democratizes time. or Aeon. USA/France. As such. but within the frame (a dinosaur interacting with humans). towards the end of the film Joel and Clementine talk inside a crumbling house on a beach (the presence of waves and sand in the house suggest the breakdown of inside and outside). As Joel. we might also look at Source Code (Duncan Jones. is endemic to such an image: it is the irruption o f the digital into the analogue.rather past and present and virtual and actual feed into each other such that we cannot easily distinguish between them.120 Supercinema o f events here . such that the boundaty between the two is blurred. chaos and complexity theories suggest that all elements. Incompossible worlds communicate. but the virtual (invented!) memory o f Joel irrupts into the ‘real’ world o f the film. particularly Russian A rk and Enter the Void. There he meets Clementine for the second time. Parallel universes do not exist in isolation. as contemporary physics ■would seem to suggest. the Clementine that did this was not even a ‘real’ memory. both spatial and temporal. By way o f a final example. such that the spatial and temporal elements of cinema exist on an inseparable continuum. is simply that digital cinema. which is the location o f the beach where they first met. such that we cannot tell them apart. Last Year a t M arienhad (a potentially real scene followed by a potentially imagined scene). parallel universes. There is a sense in which the blurring of the boundaty between the real and the imagined. such that we do not have an ‘original’ universe against which all others are measured as fake. though not according to the traditional cause and effectdriven template. film narratives are ‘fractalized’. Furthermore. but which is depicted photorealistically and interacting with the other. This will follow in the next chapter. After the surgery is complete. Joel and Clementine both seem to remember what was said in a fictional (and now destroyed) moment in which she did not really figure. then. or a continuum. is perhaps always already a tim e-im ^e of sorts . walking and interacting with each other. we see this in films in which parallel universes come into being. cause and effect-driven logic. the virtual irrupts into the actual (and it is perhaps significant that this takes place through the digitized medium of the mobile phone). in/through/across which we can travel in any direction. chronological fashion. in which there is only ever creation o f the new. the film presents us with incompossible and communicating worlds when at the film’s climax Colter sends a text message to Colleen Goodwin (Vera Farmiga).in that it involves the spatial irruption within the frame of a digital element (be it an extinct creature or a fictional creation) that could not possibly be there. In other words. profilmic/ . too). then so can cinema cross between the actual and the virtual in any direction. we have looked at how spectacle interrupts narrative time. Instead. Aside from the unlikelihood o f humans travelling in time or being able to inhabit the bodies of other humans (which becomes an ethical question that the film does not explore. This blurring is not achieved uniquely in the sequential fashion that we see in. such that they are reunited. particularly those in which the parallel universes communicate with each other. while each Chronos ot chronology is always changing. N ot only is the future confused with the past and the present (all moments in time exist simultaneously) within Joel’s brain. Here. which itself may slow down or speed up (as figured literally in ramping shots). Cinematically speaking. skips work for no apparent reason (on Valentine’s Day) and travels to Montauk. in this his final memory of Clementine. Finally. We have also looked at how there are multiple temporalities within a film. but an Invented one. and incompossible worlds are shown to communicate. And yet. supposedly back in the ‘real’ world. in which Colter Stevens (Jake Gyllenhaal) repeatedly goes back in time and into the body of another human being to work out how to stop a terrorist attack from taking place on a Chicago-bound train. then. and between this and other. These combine to form the temporality o f the film. have equal importance and are interdependent. and ‘empty’ space is as important as ‘full’ space. treat time as if it were a space. so might all elements o f vittual worlds. a commonplace trope in digital cinema and one that su^ests the democratization of all moments in time: they are interchangeable and need not follow each other in a single. such that she will never even know that it might have taken place. As a result. and not just in a linear. we have seen how some films. including those o f different onscreen elements and that o f the (virtual) camera. but an originary (or ontogenetic) universe. And if cinema can cross time in any direction in the same way that we can cross space in any direaion. between the past and the future.

but It IS a useftd metaphor. Roz Kaveney echoes this when she says that audiences of sci-fi films always expect ‘bigger and louder and more’ (Kaveney 2005: 73-74).neuroscience to argue that the cinematic experience is always ‘philosophical’ in the sense that it involves the production of thought. because if what I am calling consciousness (as opposed to a mind or a brain) emerges from relations between matter. turning to cognitive psychology and . then. since had she been on board. One could argue diat it is only as a result of the woman’s death that the bus is able to make its fifty-foot jump. not the alternations in the spectator’s relationship to temporality produced by film-going’ (Friedberg 1993: 129). something I discuss later in this chapter. actual world. but interacting with each other. movement-image cinema (Deleuze 2005: xii. is very similar to the experience o f watching a movie: the collision of two different temporalities. U ere is perhaps a logic to the events in Speed: that is that they get bigger and ‘better’ as QOQ logic is inherent in the film industry. the digital and the analogue. As such. Julian Stringer in particular argues that blockbusters are consistendy ‘believed [or are hyped up] to be in some sense bigger . but the continuity between cinema’s worlds and our own. let us start with an analysis of . situations in which they are incapable o f action). but o f irrational continuity: the impossible/digital exists alongside and interacts with the possible/analogue. This would mean that the woman unknowingly sacrifices herself for the benefit/survival of the others on board (one can imagine a revisionist history of positing this woman and not Jack Traven as the true lifesaver). then. the bus might have been too heavy to clear the gap in the freeway. To extend this argument towards the spectator.e. Outwith IS a term often used in Scodand to mean ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’. As Anne Friedberg has pointed out. Ignacio Domingo Baguer explains how the spatialization of time brought about in 1980s science fiction cinema engenders films in which ‘[t] he experience o f the characters. Two temporalities. This is of course metaphorical. then what images do (their effects/ ^ e c ts) suggests not the separation o f cinema from reality. 192. hopefiilly my point about being made up of interchangeable moments remains tenable. the screen fimctions as a metaphor for the relation between film and spectator. are spatialized. Notes 1. whereby a ‘loving’ (or what I shall term sophophilic) approach to cinema can lead us to recognize our own ‘enworlded’ position. K n d er 2002). To move in this direction. time-image films might be populated by ‘seers’ placed in purely optical and sonic situations (i. we might say that images as a whole are irruptions. Two temporalities. ethical take on cinema. since it suggests a sense of ‘withness’ even when it supposedly demarks a sense of separation.. ‘Deleuze’s descriptions border on a theorization of where . cinematic worlds into our own. in that it IS on the screen where the two. I use it here in some senses deliberately. This sense o f ‘withness’ will be elaborated m greater detail in the conclusion. 238. or monstrances. However. as Rick Altman (UJJ: 152 56) points out in relation to genre.or of more noteworthy size . we shall explore what cinema does in terms of its relation with the spectator. its butterfly effect logic. This will lead in the conclusion to a final. that of the spectator’s real life and the temporal dimension o f the world on the screen (Baguer 2004: 250). This implies the irruption of the novel in cinema.122 Supercinema analogue elements in the frame. Note that it is the screen that has a brain for Deleuze.. 2. of other.not one told by cinema. IS even appealing). Baguer argues that the spatial depiction of time renders 1980s science fiction cinema a ‘meta-time travel story . but since images have real eflfects/affects on our world. then. with regard to cinema. This compositing o f the digital and the analogue is a case not o the irrational cuts’ that modernist cinema employed to challenge the unthinking comprehension o f mainstream. 3. whereby small background details play significant if overlooked parts in the events portrayed. In this chapter. but this is also true of the filmgoing experience itself.than the rest’ (Stringer 2003:4). but one enacted by the film-viewing experience’ (Baguer 2004: 250).in time . In this chapter. we shall think about cinematic spectatorship in terms of time and'thought. akin to the notion proposed in the last chapter that consciousness emerges in the relation between observer and observed. Although unusual^. are depicted not just side by side. seriously as we might take this train of thought (indeed. they are based upon excess ^ seen through the common use of the term ‘super’ to define blockbuster films ( trmger 2003: 5). 4. 4 The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage In the last chapter we explored time in relation to digital cinema. spectator and film.the spectator is. then. In Deleuzian terms. meet. but his discussion o f the “time-image” ultimately relies on a conception of diegetic film time.

whereby the pleasures o f art are afforded by a ‘natural’ ‘pleasure’ system in which exaggerated forms induce ‘rewards’ in the brain. ni meme d’y faire des trous et de le vider’ (Deleuze 1989: 33). this ‘peak shift effect’ of heightened experience transposes from seagulls and on to humans. However. my contention here is that parody can defeat cliche —as indeed can ‘making holes’ and ‘emptying’ it. one that for Deleuze takes place when our sensory-motor schemata break down. or excess. as mentioned by Deleuze himself. Tomlinson and Galeta suggest that parody can make us see through cliche. rarely if at all seeing those objects ‘for themselves’.see Deleuze 2005: 325). brighter. as I suggested earlier. Deleuze (without offering a direct reference to Bergson) suggests that clichd is akin to normal perception (Deleuze 2005: 19—21). but which are exaggerated versions of the form and colour of her beak (longer. what is important is that exaggerated forms produce heightened experiences. the baby gull is perhaps responding only in a sensory-motor manner to . we see objects as we want or expect to see them. from the Deleuzian standpoint. while at the same time trying ‘to break through the cliche.see what we expect. but at a later point in time stopping and seeing that it has changed. in a manner similar to Jean-Luc Nancy’s ‘monstrances’ described in the last chapter. or for themselves. while ‘making holes in’ and ‘emptying’ cliche. while the repetition of images (were it strictly possible) might lead towards cliche. deliberate attempts to frame objects in a novel manner might not achieve the desired effect of making us see objects anew. thinner. is exemplified for Bergson by walking past a house everyday and not noticing it changing. paradoxically hides from us the image itself O r rather. as Ramachandran and Hirstein maintain. since all images ‘sink to the state of cliche’. Exaggeration and spillover Vilyanur S. Seagulls have been proven to respond with aplomb to fake beaks that bear little resemblance to their mother. hides from us the force o f the image itself. If. or. and in which the object depicted is presented to us in an excess of horror or beauty. For. We no longer see what we expected to see (according to our economic interests. involves us seeing not just in the embodied fashion that Deleuze decries (that is. movement of the camera. whether or not exaggeration constitutes ‘art’ is not necessarily important. prevents a sensory-motor response. there is on occasion another type of image or perception. de parodier le cliche. Let us pick apart further levels o f cliche and/or the image’s capacity to inspire thought by looking at contents as if anew. this force always. However. and it is perhaps on this level that cliche is most commonly understood. which is why Deleuze invokes the idea of reading these images as opposed simply to seeing them (what Deleuze terms ‘lectosigns’ . can help us to elaborate the role of thought in cinema. particularly in the light of Deleuze’s subsequent proclamations in> Cinema 2 against Hollywood: Deleuze warns against ‘Hitlerism’ in Hollywood and the perils of ‘automatic’ The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 125 thinking that its repeated formulae entail (Deleuze 2005: 159-66). not to make holes in it and empty it’ (Deleuze 2005: 21) is their rendition o f ‘[i]l ne suffit certes pas. it is not that a lack of realism. to get out o f the cliche (Deleuze 2005: 20). but seeing in such a way that ‘new dimensions’ are found in the image. with more dots on it than the mother’s original beak). but the thing itself Deleuze himself says that it is hard to know what is or is not a cliche. What is a cliche? Referring presumably to a passage from Henri Bergson’s Time and Free Will (2005: 129—31). does not in my argument exceed the image. be it in-frame movement.cannot. Deleuze says that the repetition of images can turn them into a cliche. to fastforward from Deleuze’s treatment o f cliche to later parts o f Cinema 2 (and other works by Deleuze). a cliche is a sensory-motor image o f a thing (Deleuze 2005: 19). cliche. rather than simply being a quahty of the image itself An initial foray into cognitive science can help us to elaborate this.124 Supercinema cinematic cliche. perhaps most simply. More pertinent to the time-image is the notion that cliche.‘inceeds’ the image. However. This ‘force’ is what leads us to new thoughts. This is an embodied mode of vision. This mode of vision. these new dimensions might be characterized as thought. or seeing what we expect to see in images. to parody cliche. For this reason. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta offet up a curious translation for one of Deleuze’s sentences on cliche in Cinema 2. it is not as if the flat image on the screen suddenly sprouts a third or more dimensions. it is an image open to interpretation. philosophy being for Deleuze the creation o f new concepts (see Deleuze and Guattari 1994). even though Tomlinson and Galeta offer up a mistranslation of Deleuze. what for Deleuze is also the inherent potential for philosophy in cinema. movement is never really eradicated from cinema. pour vaincre. as Deleuze says. seeing the world as we expect to see it). nor can making holes in or emptying it. or automatic viewing. or exaggeration as it is termed here.and the key to unlocking this potential lies in the relationship between images and viewers. But this force. Ramachandran and William Hirstein have proposed a ‘neuroscience of art’ (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999: 15-51). if achieved. our ideological beliefs and/or our psychological demands). This is a pure optical and sound image. That is to say. M I have argued elsewhere with regard to colour in digital cinema (see Brotvn 2012b). ‘Enough. Rather. repetition is not necessarily the only level of cliche that Deleuze describes. for victory. Deleuze argues that parody cannot vanquish cliche. the avoidance o f cliche. since cliche. the creation of new concepts. However. the movement o f the film itself (frame succeeding frame). the potential for inspiring thought is there in all images . Furthermore. By this I mean to say that the noncliched image inspires thought in us. In the original French. however. whereby we. a ‘whole’ image that is devoid of metaphor. Deleuze explains that these new dimensions are not spatial.

and similar to the way in which the incessant repetition of a word to oneself can often cause laughter as we realize the absurd/arbitrary nature o f the word. which in itself is arbitrary and meaningless. such . Writer Hakim Bey explains in his work on the ‘temporary autonomous zone’ that a spillover is a vessel which tips over when filled to the brim. we cut several times to a shot o f a spillover vessel.. I should give an example in order to propose that parody. so too does cliche always work against itself. bllllatttt. In a dizzying mixture o f Taoism. constandy becoming. or to think. words themselves. or. snow can magically appear (making it a ‘spatial irruption of sorts). and not what is there (a painted stick with some dots on it). The sound of the spillover also accompanies a section o f the confrontation between the Bride and O-Ren. but rather to see the image itself. USA. the abstract ideas. which in turn leads to new becomings. his films can suddenly erupt into violence or even animation (as happens earlier in K ill B ill Vol. however..i. As exaggerations of reality. that is. it sees what it wants (a beak). A word.1 2 6 Supercinema the potential for food . like one of those little oriental dolls which are legless and weighted at the bottom. its modified colours. More generally. Having su^ested that novelty is inherent in cinema. uses clichds. meaning that we are aware o f it even when it is not onscreen (although the spillover does latterly disappear from the diegetic soundtrack. The spillover’s metaphorical meaning makes us recall how Deleuze wants us not to see images as metaphors. in Deleuze’s terms. Translated into Deleuzian terms. As the musical reference to Lady Snowblood makes clear in the swordfight scene in K ill Bill.. and from the abyss of aloneness’ (Bey 2003: 141). The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 127 We might apply Bey’s ‘spillover’ conception of language to K ill B ill and to cinema more generally. Living with metaphor The image of the spillover from K ill B ill Vol 1 does not have any special qualities that make it ripe for noncliched thought. so that they always pop back up when you try to knock them over. precisely because of that modification. The Bride defeats O-Ren. the image o f the spillover functions. but by virtue o f their not being (and never having been) transparent portrayals o f reality (something is always modified when an image is taken). all cinematic images offer the potential for seeing thihgs anew.. but potentially a new meaning each day. through Hakim Bey. Tarantino is more generally and famously a filmmaker who reworks. Paul Feyerabend. images and sounds from other films in order to unlock the potential for new meaning in them. then rights itself. However. to make us see them anew.^ (1 9 8 1 ) and Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied M ind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999). is an exaggeration o f reality.. and can often mistake for.. Bey ends by invoking Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu to argue that this overflow of meaning enables language to ‘save itself’ . to.. but which come about from our orientation in and with the world th a t surrounds us. or. We might see m ages ‘automatically’ (i.e. In both texts. language consistently spills over with meaning. and is replaced by a nondiegetic song originally used in Toshiya Fujita’s 1973 Japanese film. the theoretical physics of Ilya Prigogine. the potential for which lies in all images.‘both from the tyranny o f any lord. and the philosophy of Michel Serres. Tarantino’s images are like a spillover. as discussed in the last chapter. can make us see anew. the very repetition o f cliche can lead to its being emptied out. I use Ramachandran and Hirstein here to suggest that cinema. the Bride/Beatrix Kiddo conducts a swordfight with O-Ren Ishii (Lucy Liu) in a Japanese garden that is layered with very soft (and very fake) snow (fake because there has not previously been snow in the Tokyo o f the film’s diegesis). while an/any image might be a cliche. its size when projected. Metaphors We Live . The meaning is not fixed. This concept o f space-as-acontainer is taken up by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their books. 1 when we are presented with an animated section providing O-Ren Ishii’s backstory). as a metaphor for this potential. or the emptying o f cliche precisely through the repetition o f images. and to renew their capacity for thought. the book that seems to influence Deleuze’s definition of cliche. but. The vessel could refer. we might unthinkingly look at the contents of the image). However. spontaneously fills up and overflows with meaning. the reverse also holds: no image is a cliche in that no image is the same as its referent. nor just a semantic raspberry. in order to empty out the ‘standard’ or embodied/everyday meaning within them. In Time and Free W ill. During the final showdown o f K ill B ill VoL 1 (Quentin Tarantino.e. It is a consideration of metaphor from the cognitive perspective that will allow us to further critique Deleuze. by virtue o f its lenses. Bergson points out that much o f our thought regarding space is influenced by the idea that space is a container (Bergson 2005: 2). This is reflected in the ontological instability o f Tarantino’s diegetic worlds: characters killed off in one scene can come back to life in the next through his nonlinear storytelling. Georges Bataille and Friedrich Nietzsche. as per this example. or parodies. The vessel fills up and empties again and ^ a m —same vessel. and for all of its other combined formal elements. Shurayukihime/Lady Sndwblood). So the word contains more meaning than it appears to nominate or denominate. 2003). during a pause in their conflict. (Bev 2003138^2) ^ This overflow of meaning is part o f what Bey terms ‘Taoist Poetics’. but it is not mere ‘blowing breath. In the same way that the Buddhist repeats his or -her chosen mantra. which in turn provides these images with the potential for us to see again. a process by which words are constantly in play.the authors oudine the way in which the very structure of our thought is the product of our embodiment in the World: that is. sowing the seeds of its own unbecoming. . Prepositions such as ‘in’ and ‘to’ indicate the spatial models that we apply to. Tarantino deliberately repeats images. we attribute to abstract concepts spatial qualities that are not necessarily inherent in those concepts themselves.. images always show us the thing depicted anew.

working in concert across many levels of neuronal organization. we should bear in m ind that we are also always constrained by our bodies. then this split cannot possibly happen. As such. then the break that Deleuze calls for in sensory-motor perception is impossible. rather than the image opening out on to the ‘infinite’. can lead to disembodied perception and. by extension. This ‘blip’ can perhaps be mitigated for political reasons. or with. Arguably this also holds for Tarantino’s spillover. we can use Lakoff and Johnson’s understanding of metaphor here to critique Deleuze. there is a ‘blip in logic here: if cinema breaks sensory-motor perception then mind and body are split. who similarly criticizes Deleuze from the perspective of contemporary neuroscience. Presently. the meaning is ‘contained’ in the image. and biological regulation all play a role in human reason. Beihg influenced by Spinoza (1996). to have pinned down the ‘meaning’ o f this image is to limit its possibilities for thought. one sees the meaning of the images ‘automatically.. Indeed. Damasio rejects Descartes’s famous cogito ergo sum formula. However. it is the simple fact o f our physical orientation in and with the world that shapes the metaphors we use to describe it. as LakoflF and Johnson imply. rather than on a single brain centre. 2003). In short. rather than thinking new concepts as a result o f their sheer force. that we use to negotiate reality. whereas noncliched images open up to thought by avoiding metaphor/association. Emotion. That they are metaphors does not necessarily make them ‘false’ or ‘wrong’ —but recognizing as much does allow us to question the validity of the further conclusions that we draw about the world as a result of the language that we use to describe it. This link is understandable. but for the time being I shall work through the metaphor problem posed above. In Deleuzian terms. cinema does not let us think for ourselves. Deleuze is an advocate o f mind-body parallelism. ‘naturalizes^ the modes of thought. telecommunications technologies might seem to allow us to see and hear places and qbjects that are not within our immediate realm of consciousness. while Deleuze here The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 129 lays claim to a mode o f thought that somehow transcends the body by ‘breaking’ our sensory-motor perception. Deleuze feels that the metaphors. the upside down image of the foreman’s legs counterpoised with the factory towers means that authority is linked with wotk. and Buster Keaton freed from a lifejacket filled with water. Being only ever in. as I shall explain later. I shall discuss the politics behind my disagreement with Deleuze on this point later. or perhaps .N. but we are always rooted in out bodies. but these moments are not quite ‘philosophical’ or open to ‘infinite thought’ because their meaning is too readily implied in the images themselves. and vice versa. whereas if mind and body are co-dependent and function in parallel. As discussed. Thought. I shall mention the work of Mark B. I shall return to our common use o f prepositions later. For Lakoff and Johnson. who shares Spinoza with Deleuze as a common precutsor. and by encouraging instead a ‘literal’ seeing o f the image (Deleuze 2005: 319). or rather nature’s complicity with human endeavour. The lowly orders of our organism are in the loop of high reason (Damasio 1994: xxiii). but instead form a continuum that cannot be separated. In Strike and The Navigator. Hansen (2004). and which is drowning him. Hansen rejects the argument that new media. For Deleuze. 2000. and if we should. but that they are fundamentally embodied. to see an image as a metaphor is akin to cliche. for Lakoff and Johnson. whereby.towers and a pierced. there is no disembodied perception. Deleuze thus sees metaphors in Strike and The Navigator.128 Supercinema as time and love. Deleuze reasons this through by suggesting that the unification o f man and nature. To be ‘in time’ or ‘in love’ suggests that both are container metaphors. Johnson and other proponents of embodied cognition to argue against him. Deleuze holds that body and brain are irrevocably interlinked (Deleuze 1988: 18). As Hansen explains. a disembodied consciousness. If embodied cognition is accepted as true. gushing lifejacket . then. and we always need our bodies to perceive whatever it is that these technological interfaces offer us.-emotions. or what in another currency we might call the ideologies. this is impossible. signifies rebirth. proposing instead that ‘human reason depends on several brain systems. as opposed to the mind-body dualism that is implied by his desire for cinema to bteak sensory-motor perception and to take us towards ‘infinite thought’. however. rethinking these metaphors might lead us to original thought. argue that ‘higher order’ capacities such as conscious thought are not separate from our bodies. To employ the critical method of Lakoff and linked with and designated as a complement to the human world —the foreman and Keaton-as-reborn. This sensory-motor or automatic thought leads directly to Deleuze’s critique of Hitlerism and Hollywood mentioned earlier. who argues that any change in body state will be accompanied by a change in brain state. but makes thoughts and associations that become automatic to us (Deleuze 2005: 159-60). or their defiance of easy meaning. He argues this because the external world . Embodied cognition In the wider context of his wotk. the term ‘extension suggesting the fundamentally connected nature of these technologies to us. and conscious thought are not separate levels o f human existence. Like me. but ultimately it is what leads to film as a means for controlling/automatizing thought. for Lakoff and Johnson. If we ‘live by metaphors. that is. feeling. Visceral responses. o f both communism (Eisenstein) and capitalism (Keaton). or action-thoughts (Deleuze 2005: 155). in Eisenstein and Keaton suggest a fundamental link between man and nature. For this reason. Nonetheless.. Deleuze is not ‘g a in s t’ such metaphors. endeavour to rethink the metaphors that we use to construct our thoughts about and interpretations of the world. I shall use Lakoff. neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio (1994. is irreversibly embodied (we ‘live by’ metaphors).' W hat is more. as a preliminary indication of what I understand to be the reasoning behind Deleuze’s ‘blip’. this can be seen in the spatial metaphors that we use to talk about technology: they are extensions of perception. after Georges Duhamel. which we shall understand here to include digital cinema.

Deleuze argues that ‘I t is not the same which returns. But. colour. this stands to reason: via saccades. contra Deleuze. not least because we do not see the world from the point of view o f Aeon. let us argue that if there is only difference. This is not to deny any of the horrors o f the Second World War. since. to elicit homogeneous effects in different spectators. it is instead dynamic and always changing. nor the ‘power’ o f the media. the intersubjective correlation (ISC) of spectators. entropy) or through autopoietic processes. thought may be ‘automatic’ in the sense that it is always embodied and arises firom ‘lower-order’ body and brain functions. for the time being. Chronos here is not necessarily ‘subjective time’. from the neurological perspective. profoundly philosophical beings. so too do our bodily states respond to (and feed back into. which. In some senses. this is the conscious aspect o f our selves that M s . There maybe. conscious linear human perception is not matched by the workings o f the brain. That is. as Edelman and Tononi argue. embodied and always becoming human. would seem to contradict this. then neuroscientists Gerald M. Each ‘microconsciousness’ is ‘responsible’ for the perception o f different aspects o f the visual scene (for example. which are involuntary eye movements that form a central part o f human processes of vision. or processes of self-organization (complexity). However. However. o f the Dissimilar (Deleuze 2004b: 374). I shall only briefly consider his thoughts on the matter. but this cannot be done by breaking (from) the sensorym otor system. or seeing things anew. including cinema. but with these core clusters will always be firing different neurons that bring about modulations in the thinking that we do. Insteads repetition or the use of cliche can help us to achieve this. Gibson (1986). but thought cannot be automated in the strict sense that we think exactly the same way twice. then this is because we are always only ever (in or with) our bodies (we cannot be disembodied and still be). At the climax o f Difference and Repetition. it is not the similar which returns-. but the fact o f ‘returning’ itself (‘the Same is the returning of that which returns’ —namely difference). be this through processes o f decay (which shares ground with. From repetition to ecology As intimated above. before turning to repetition in cognitive other words.130 Supercinema more clearly simply being. 1999. In other words. or reenter) the world. among others. nor jump forwards. it would seem. I would like to argue that if becoming is our baseline ontology/ontogeny. —in other words. then I contend that for the ecologies. Furthermore. and yet. our bodies. In Bergsonian terms. In other words. Deleuze’s desire to transcend the sensory-motor is impossible. If we take memory as the hum an capacity to ‘repeat’ moments of experience/thought. and instead only notices the house changed. Nonetheless. but which should not be entirely conflated with. o f the eye. To contend that we are consistently becoming is still not to refute Deleuze. . 1987). rather. This can only be done in a sensory-motor fashion. while our higher-order consciousness might depend upon or grow out of our lower-order bodily functions and nonconscious processes. there are only ever new thoughts. involve many ‘microconsciousnesses’ that do not work sequentially but in parallel (Zeki and Bartels 1998. followed by fixations. and to be ecological is consistently to become other. At every moment (or at every ‘return’). there is something new. o f the Different. Returning to cliche. it is no surprise that we see the phenomenal world in a linear sequence as well. some neuroscientists argue. the similar is the returning o f that which returns. especially in his work with Fdix Guattari (1983. However. But this argument requires. who. as K ill B ill helps to suggest. Given that Deleuze argues for the repetition o f difference. clarification. If novelty is the measure o f philosophy for Deleuze. and shape). and so that which stays the same is not the thing that returns. human vision is dependent upon movement. Indeed. what is the repetition o f thought or images such that cliches exist? Although repetition is an ongoing theme in Deleuze’s work. for the question is/becomes. it might seem strange for him also to argue that thought can become automated. that leads us towards infinite thought. (as far as we can tell) humans cannot travel backwards. humans view the world egocentrically. Furthermore. such that it can and/or does repeat. even when we remember something. since there are. Bartels and Zeki 2004a). Deleuze may praise cinema that can inspire thought and make us see objects anew. then we are. we exist ecologically in the sense o f the term employed by. Chronos is the product o f our relations with the world and it is not uniquely something that we ‘have’ independent o f the world. as I shall explore below. and because we are always only ever (in or with) the world (we cannot step outside o f physical reality). this seems precisely to be Deleuze’s concern with regard to mainstream cinema when he warns of/against ‘Hiderism’. and these are . Since we cannot separate ourselves from the world. as we shall explore in greater detail shortly. we cannot transcend the sensory-motor.. the Same is the returning o f that which returns. Overcoming cliche is im notice the house that is slowly decaying. according to Edelman and Tononi. is a philosopher par excellence o f becoming. This seemingly perplexing sentence suggests that there is only ever difference. the world is not static. Gregory Bateson (1972) and James J. Since these fixations take place one after the other. whereby the same parts o f the brains The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 1 3 1 o f different spectators fire during the same moments o f the same films. the brain in fact forms new neural connections every time we remember things. Chronos is linear. Put another way. in time. only ever new cerebral states and new bodily states. Cognitive scientists also imply that repetition is the repetition o f difference. core clusters o f neurons that fire repeatedly when we think about the same thing over time. motion. it^is perhaps not (only) by offering up novel perspectives via original framings that images can help us to achieve ‘infinite thought’. we are only ever ecological beings. but from the point of view o f Chronos. subjectivity is predicated exclusively u p o a ‘enworldedness’. and if it is exposure to the new. Edelman and Giulio Tononi (2001: 93-110) argue that there is no precise repetition.

which the cinematograph then seems to portray as moving backwards) not change. the time-image allows us consciously to see that which is automatic and The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 133 nonconscious. Bordwell and Branigan also interpret the cinematic experience as being based upon inferences: because in exterior shot'A I-see a man walking towards a door. timeimage cinema brings to consciousness not states. in which the ‘seer’ o f the tim e-im ^e exists (Deleuze 2005: 39). then our conscious mind is not necessarily aware of these changes. in the case of predicting where figures are headed and/or what they will do. As such. Viviani and Aymoz 2001). but they are accepted at face value in order to justify the conscious and state-driven conception o f movement in time that I have tried to describe above.and. the perception of these different temporalities is suppressed in ‘normal’ perception in otder to create a coherent visual field. Edward Branigan (1992). to all intents and purposes. but it is the result of specific neural substrates in the same way that the perception of opposed to the fixity of being. it seems that a plurality of temporalities is ‘supptessed’ to present a unified space. it allows us to see the unconscious (and ‘chaotic’) processes o f vision itself It brings the otherwise nonconsciously perceived dynamics o f the whole world-body-brain assemblage into consciousness. If conscious perception sees states. itself. exemplified by David Bordwell (1985). motion and shape is (see also Ivry 1996). the perception of time passing is not simply a ‘result’ of other brain activities. In other words. While we live -in an ecology that is constantly changing. Although in real life wagon wheels turn forwards. Anderson in particular explains that the reason why we see the spokes on a wagon wheel turning backwards during a film is that while a movie typically progresses at such a rate that our visual system does not/cannot notice the fact that we are always seeing a succession of still images. we attribute smooth. relies upon the nonconscious perception o f change. and that B is the effect of A’s cause. when the object being filmed both moves fast enough and is composed of symmetrical parts (like a spoked wheel). But the step that such studies seem unwilling to make is in recognizing the deeper nature of our ability to comprehend film. while consciously I perceive movement and ‘automatically infer where the moving figures will go.namely time. or visual field. Chronos is produced from a complex ‘chaos’ of parallel brain processes. Cinema offers us a good. Deleuze defines this indivisible flow as being an interval between states. see Moutoussis and Zeki 1997. ecological flux o f the world-body-brain assemblage. nonconsciously I am aware o f the whole flux o f becoming which lies ‘between geometrical ‘points in space’ that consciously are apprehended only ‘after the fact’ (Riemannian. however. there is one or more ‘microconsciousness’ of duration. if working at different speeds. if backward. 2008: 60—74). But Chronos is not an emergent product o f the brain alone. While consciously I see one state and then another. Unconscious (or nonconscious) processes are recognized by these studies. the cinematographic example of wagon wheels turning backwards can bring to mind how. it would seem that the human perception of a unified space is dependent on parallel processes that nonetheless work at different speeds. . as opposed to Cartesian. we do not have to spend too much time consciously working out the relationship between shot A and shot B. This conscious perception of states (fixed positions). faster than motion. or tempos (with colour being processed. precisely. Using the same terms as elsewhere in this book. Cognitive film studies Cognitive approaches to film. but that this also involves the production of a linear perception of time from processes that are simultaneous/parallel. and while the production o f conscious film cognition involves inferences and probabilistic interpretations both o f events passed and of events that might take place. or the chronoarchitecture/asynchronicity of the human brain. the brain has what Bartels and Zeki term a ‘chronoarchitecture’: distinct areas of the brain have distinct activity time courses (ATCs) (Bartels and Zeki 2004b). If time is change. offer magnificent insights into how we perceive cinema. and Joseph Anderson (1996). we are not (often) consciously aware of change itself. motion of the same spokes to what are in fact different spokes rotating in space. must detect these changes and ‘teact’ accordingly in order. example: we know that we see only events changed because wagon wheels seem to turn backwards in westerns. As mentioned in the last chapter. to produce the homeo-stasis that holds us together as human beings). the very un. Unconscious thought processes are recognized by both Bordwell and Branigan as part of how film can be understood so easily by humans. Furthermore. or time. Translated back into the dynamic. we can sometimes perceive simultaneous events as occuring at different times (Johnston and Nishida 2001). while in the subsequent interior shot B I see the same man walking through a door and into a hallway.132 Supercinema autonomous. I probabilistically . it is in this sense pure becoming . That is. In the terms of Bartels and Zeki. if metaphorical. which is an indivisible flow. space). we see states (wagon wheels in a series o f fixed positions. As a result of these microconsciousnesses . That is. from the Bergsonian position. but which all too often exceeds our conscious perception . but change. because our brain does much of this work for us on an unconscious level (see also Bordwell 1996. even if (we feel that) we perceive the whole’ visual field simultaneously. It allows us to see what we perceive incessantly (nonconsciously). and/or work out how they got from point A to point B in space. even if we see events changed. or which. or space. In Deleuzian terms.infer that B follows on from A. correctly . and while our nonconscious bodies are able to detect these changes (and from the point of view of homeostasis.or nonconscious processes that allow this do not rely upon the same model o f time. there are specific ‘brain mechanisms specialized for the encoding of stimulus duration’ (Meek 2005: 1): that is. O ur brains infer (in this case incorrectly) the smooth backward movement of spokes from the forward movement of spokes that the camera was filming. for example. In other words.

that we can arrive at the direct perception of time of which Deleuze speaks. what we expect to see.too implicitly on a still-passive spectator (only aesthetic films produce aesthetic thought). is always already in all images. the unconscious or automatic perception o f which involves the perception not of change. then. Deleuze’s reasoning is that ‘automatic’ or conscious perception. rather. Smith (Smith 2006. Cognitive studies o f film by Timothy J. Mullarkey opens up space for slippage between the aesthetic/time-image and the everyday/movement-image. when it is innovative’ (Mullarkey 2009: 103). -with the attention o f human viewers being guided towards those ‘relevant’ parts of the frame by various techniques. W hen we do have a direct. Furthermore. or infer from them. or automatic. According to these studies. by arguing that the spectator must be taken into account. [such that] we might even speculate on the possibility of a renewed form of movement-image becoming the latest cinematic'avant-garde’ (Mullarkey 2009: 103). is an inherent part of the movement-image. when filmmakers employ long. ideology. i. style. we must endeavour to bring into our conscious m ind that which all too often remains unconscious. The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 135 John Mullarkey. bring about the time-image (Deleuze 2005: 21). then. or philosophy. This nonconscious perception is instead of time itself. rather than for some practical end. we are always sensory-motor individuals. scholars in the burgeoning field of neurocinematics suggest that mainstream film viewing involves intersubject correlation (ISC). This nonconscious perception is not o f point-to-point geometric space. but we do notice after the event that it has changed). In other words. even if the rest of the frame is incessantly there for us to see. However. is not to see ‘automatically’. However. even if we must always see in a sensory-motor fashion. Siiice everyday perception is efficient and easy. by fioting how the time-image ‘has now itself become both a clichd of bad art films (Zwr/been normalized within neoclassical cinema. however. perception from what she terms ‘aesthetic perception: Because everyday perception is habimal and strives for a maximum of efficiency and ease. including lighting and framing. That is. nor is it of figures changed and/or presumed states o f change that will result from the present conscious perception. we move closer to what Deleuze terms ‘infinite thought’. or in any image. processes. uses Deleuzian terms to blur the boundary between ‘aesthetic’ devices and those that rely on ‘everyday perception. It is naturally an obscure point that I am trying to make. then. we are part of this novelty. but it is in the conscious perception of the otherwise nonconscious aspects of our sensory-motor existence that we see things anew. aesthetic perception does the opposite. the aesthetic film seeks to prolong and roughen experience . That induce us to concentrate on the processes of perception and cognition in and of themselves. Intensified stasis In Cinema 2. Furthermore. and that the movement-image ‘can -be connected to time no less than the time-image. static takes (‘fixed shots’). predictive film viewing). Where Thompson relies perhaps. but it is a view shared. That is. passively. Smith and Henderson 2008) show that film viewers concentrate on the parts o f the frame in which mid level. we look at images and see in them. it is at any moment. or in/with the world. (Thompson 1988: 36) For a scholar who positions herself resolutely against ‘passive spectatorship’ (Thompson 1988: 26-29).134 Superdnema allow me to project causality into the movement in order to arrive at its effect (which in certain respects means that effect and cause are reversed during inferential. As we shall see. including in cliches. with the rest seemingly . or conscious. meanwhile. that is. perception'of time/becoming/change/novelty. which lies outside of classical cause and effect. The key. and that the potential for ‘transgression.e. viewers can look beyond the specifically narrative ‘meaning’ of the shot (what does the movement shown add to the story?). and we know that we cannot (often?) see time/change itself. it seems contradictory that Thompson here confines ‘aesthetic perception to ‘aesthetic films’ —as if the viewer could onljt respond to a film in the way that the film wants her to. Films seek to defamiliarize conventional devices of narrative. or unthinkingly. or perceived in an automatic and unthinking fashion. the movementimage is a sensory-motor form of perception: automatically. Deleuze’s discussion of cliche in Cinema 2 suggests that somehow we must reject automatic thought in favour of the novel. and at (the duration of) the various elements in the shot. Thompson differentiates habitual. in which we infer and project cause and effect-based states. meaning that ‘the timeliness of the time-image is only its novelty’. what I am trying to describe is in some senses familiar to us: we know that there are nonconscious levels of cognition. as Mullarkey terms it. However. I have argued that novelty is not ‘out there’ but that. or what we might term the shot’s whole ‘ecology’. that we can perceive time. viewers’ eyes fixate only on parts of the frame. and its obscurity will be grounds for many readers to reject it. but does not always necessarily.remaining in ‘excess of’ our conscious perception. Deleuze explains how the ‘fixed shot’ can help to. Thompson perhaps does not here give a strong enough account of the role of the spectator in the film-viewing process. Mullarkey blurs the boundary between the time-image and the movement-image by calling the former a ‘place-holder for whatever transgresses’. or human. action takes place. but o f changed states (typically we do not see the house changing. for example. has been to show that we cannot entirely reject automatic thought since our minds are embodied and our bodies are governed by many unconscious. mainstream films lead human brains . by aoieoformalist scholar like Kristin Thompson. since we are ecological. as the preceding discussions o f chaos and complexity have hopefidly made clear. or automatic. It is not by rejecting cliche. This rejection of automauc thought might seem rooted in some unquantifiable theory. and genre. I should like to push further than both of these. My argument here. in particular time itself. Let us further this take on Deleuze through cognitive approaches to cinema.

then seemingly we do automatically. such that they form a continuum. conscious thought. 2004. shot-reverse shot. or movement-image. as Deleuze says. As I have argued elsewhere. this intensified continuity is also manifested in longer takes and in shots that involve movement through both ‘empty’ and ‘full’ spaces. the extreme speed of contemporary (mainstream) cinema is also interesting for other reasons. which. And yet. and Transformers: Dark o f the Moon (Michael Bay. Transformers: Revenge o f the Fallen (Michael Bay. of space. or unthinkingly. The otherwise nonconsciously and previously ‘excessive’ aspects of the frame come to the fore. and so on). following on from Smith and Henderson (2008). or on a continuum. cinema can ‘control’ conscious thoughts —' with mainstream cinema itself dominated by particular through the opening sequence of Fight Club . after Antonio Damasio. view films made via continuity editing —or what Deleuze would call movement-image films. opens up the possibility of not just seeing movement (although. we do still see movement in such shots. For one might similarly reach the time-image not through stillness. 2008a. USA. 'or the ‘wholeness’. And yet. can also move towards the time-image) precisely because of the visceral and emotional affects that they entail. while stillness. That is. If I have above critiqued Deleuze’s seeming ‘reversion’ to Cartesian dualism in arguing for films that inspire higher-order thought as opposed to relying upon lower-order. in that the same parts of the human brain fire in different humans as they watch the same sequences from the same films (see Bartels and Zeki 2004a. Evidendy. I argued for a cinema of intensified continuity. but through the sheer speed o f the image. as happens in the opening sequence o f Fight Club. show precisely clusters of neurons firing. it seems that by offering us images of stillness. If. we are our bodies. or still images. Kauppi et al. I have also argued. (2010) identify intensified continuity in terms of a greater number of shots in contemporary mainstream cinema. that such shots can move towards time-image cinema. which are in/with the world. but rather is formed through the relations between the body-brain and the world. USA. 2009).the more ISC is shown to occur. but it is a continuity created without editing. Although Bordwell (2002a. which command our visual attention. Admitting that this ‘Cartesian argument from Deleuze is a ‘bhp’. particularly during shots that involve vertiginous camera movements through photorealistic if digital spaces. aspects that have durations/temporahties different from those of the mid level. consciousness does not look ‘objectively at the world from a detached perspective. since they are specifically not photographs). If cliche can lead us to see (the objects in) cinematic images anew precisely through repetition. 2008b). involuntarily) attacts viewers’ attention (Brown 2011a). since these visceral and emotional affects are themselves the bedrock of higher-order. in which . Edelman and Tononi argue that our conscious thoughts are formed by the synchronous firing of clusters of neurons. change achieved via movement of the figures onscreen.e. As mentioned. 2008b. If our attention is drawn automatically to the screen by the film edited in the continuity style. While longer takes do not obviously or necessarily amount to a fast(er) cinema. and Kauppi et al. the more ‘mainstream’ a film is —i.e. the speed o f these takes is manifested in the rate of in-frame change. 2010). New York (see Hasson et al. and not just parts of the frame. Blackmore traces a line through Hollywood from Sam Peckinpah to contemporary directors such as . and changes. However. even though they involve a large amount of movement. Bordwell and Cutting in particular identify that the amount of motion onscreen and' the movement o f the camera have also ‘intensified’ . the more it employs the techniques o f continuity editing . and/or editing exogenously (i.'if we are unable to spot those edits. 2006). 2011). motion of the camera. movements. or slowness. USA. the arrest of movement that is stillness both within and o f the frame (litde seems to happen. as per the spillover example from K ill Bill. contemporary cinema can induce new modes of thought (i. pushes cinema in the direction of the photograph. These shots of continuous spaces are important. and we can never cease being so. 2007).1 3 6 Supercinema to ‘tick together’. then cinema can also move so fast sometimes that the ‘automatic’ vision decried by Deleuze can also break down.-An example o f this can be foundnn an otherwise ‘mindless’ action/ science fiction franchise. cinema can subvert these automatic or unthinking expectations/processes.e. To return to stillness and the time-image. and if the same film elicits the same cerebral response in different humans. It is in showing us the ‘wholeness’ of the world-body-brain continuum.the world. The Film-Spectator-Worid Assemblage 137 NeuroHollywood In the introduction and the first chapter on space. In effect. or intensified. Cutting et al. the body and the brain are shown as being connected. visceral and emotional responses. there is continuity in the Washington Square Park film. it appears that viewers become ‘blind’ to edits employed in the services of continuity editing (matches on action. and which for Deleuze bring us closer to seeing time. I shall here propose that accelerated. or assemblage. Tim Blackmore has written about how contemporary Hollywood films move so fest as to induce the ‘speed death o f the eye’ (Blackmore 2007). and allow us to see not just movement as measured in or perceived retrospectively as states. for they show the connected nature. Barry Salt (2004) and James E. then (Duhamel and) Deleuze are perhaps correct in saying that mainstream. might lead us to the timeimage for the reasons stated above. then. but ‘pure’ change). therefore. the results from Hasson et al. importantly.or accelerated. this is not the only path to the time-image. automatic. namefy Transformers (Michael Bay. or more specifically slowness. Interestingly. work by Alfred Hitchcock commands significandy higher ISC than a single-take film of a park bench in Washington Square Park. not as a rhythmic series imposed upon us by movement (whereby time is occulted by movement and we see only changed states). or human protagonists. but of seeing time. but for itself (we do not see changed states. For example. Hasson et al. that this Cartesian dualism does not exist. but the ‘whole’. or at least it is not the only path to a cinema that brings us to original thought. as well as in many other films. the camera does not move).

sometimes the images move so fast as to be entirely incomprehensible. jet planes. for that matter —is one of. the argument here is neither to claim the novelty o f digital effects per se. ‘no less than the art films of the Deleuzian time-image.are dependent on the spectator’s prior experience. Indeed. it does indeed result in a radical aesthetic “regime change’” (Shaviro 2010: 123). whereby we can or should ignore the history of cinema and cinematic effects such that all chronological precursors are discarded in an exuberant claim that only what we see ‘now’ counts. then any viewing of a cinematic effect will always involve a different context that contributes to a novel experience and understanding o f that effect. for whatever reason. the argument here is to state that novelty —as well as cliche —can be found in any image. and Bay as directors of what he terms ‘post-continuity’ cinema . That is. the intensified continuity of these films presents us with something new. colours changing in time (Manovich 2001: 302). even repeated viewings o f the same effect. and are littered instead with gaps and false accords’ (Shaviro 2010: 174). And if. Instead o f coherent action dominated by figures moving across the screen. . Tellingly. ‘Bay’s films’. also be called into question. Relativizing novelty W hether an image is novel or not depends at least in part on what other kinds of images a given spectator has seen. In the 1920s. overpowered reason by almost completely commandeering the audience’s optic nerve’ (Blackmore 2007: 368). heard of. o f the body. It is not possible. If they have not seen a rush of colours before seeing one o f the Transformers films. but it is the presence of seemingly ‘avant-garde’ techniques in a mainstream (and mindless) film like Tranformers that makes this clear.or o f anything at all. tethered people to the screen im ^ e longer. nor to reveal that kaleidoscopic flashing colours predate digital cinema and digital technology. feels that these films challenge reason. but instead manipulates the spectator’s affective state on a moment-to-moment basis (Shaviro 2010: 118).a cinema in which editing has ceased to make meaning. higher and continuing education. Blackmore’s argument that the very speed of the image can take us ‘beyond reason’ implicidy acknowledges the embodied nature o f reason and higher cognitive functions. We do not know exactly where to-look. Unlike the too easy (or what Blackmore might term reason-able?) metaphors offered by Eisenstein and Keaton. reject organic unity. abandoning the logic of facts and the reality of objects. 1994). once the body is pushed to its cognitive limits. By pushing the speed of visual perception to its limit. and fight each other. Grandrieux. or temporality. whereby viewers cannot distinguish between the mid. And Martine Beugnet identifies an ‘aesthetics of chaos’ in the films o f Philippe. If Blackmore. Ackbar Abbas writes that ‘[tjhings have now been speeded up to such an extent that what we find is only a composition o f light and colour in which all action has dissolved —a kind of abstract expressionism or action painting. movement is abstracted (it becomes incomprehensible) and this challenges our ‘automatic’ vision o f the films as movement-images. and Michael Bay. secondary. As David H . Rather. after Deleuze (after Nietszche). But it is precisely in bringing reason up against that which is ‘beyond’ itself. mainly as a result of Grandrieux’s refusal to film in focus (Beugnet 2007: 113—24). Brian Neveldine and Mark Taylor. when the titular robots come out o f their everyday disguises as cars. a particular effect or film’s precursors. However.138 Supercinema Tony Scott. and the like. Henri Chomette spoke o f a cinema that could ‘draw from The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 139 itself a new power which. and instead can induce new modes of thought. from the perspective of the computer. or —a hazard of tparhing film history . hyperbolic point. he is correct to do so. if not the. As per Mullarkey who challenges the movement-imt^e/time-image distinction. quoted in Rees 1999: 35). In the Tranfiormers films. whereby the image comes to the fore as a whole. but it does work’ (Shaviro 2010:120) . that thought begins. Fleming and I have argued elsewhere. Shaviro concludes. and we actually come to think. it is to say that novelty and thought. In these cases. rushes of colour predate the Transformers franchise. not just in other films but also in the same film. meanwhile. For if reason can only ‘work’ at ‘normal’ human speeds. they have only seen what they have seen and no one can have seen everything. even if encouraging students precisely to find out about the various historical contexts of a technique or o f a particular film . In other words. so too is reason left struggling to keep up.they are not impressed by. most pressing duties of primary. I see continuity intensified —but to such a degree that we see the gaps and false accords that were always there in ‘normal’ (mid-level and human) continuity editing. ‘editing no longer signifies. To argue for novelty in Transformers is not to legitimize an ahistorical reading of films. the supposed novelty of digital cinema’s ultrarapid images can. such that we might call its effects a cliche. tp discern who is doing what to whom’ (Abbas 1996: 298). or in this case that which moves too fast for us humans to follow. If Shaviro sees ‘post-continuity’ in the work o f Michael Bay. wanted to find out about. however. there is no repetition/there is only the repetition o f difference.and he critiques David Bordwell for not recognizing that ‘when intensified continuity is pushed to this absurd. Neveldine/Taylor. Steven Shaviro also identifies Tony Scott. O f Wong Kar-Wais D ung che sai duk!Ashes o f Time (Hong Kong/Taiwan. reason depends on the ‘normal’ speed.or human levePof objects and events. ^ th e r . then it will be novel to the spectator in question (should they notice it). if. therefore. And yet it is only by having reason challenged that thought can move beyond its ‘automatic’ functioning. these images force us to think. generates a succession of unfamiliar visions inconceivable outside the union o f lens and moving filmstrip’ (Chomette. and instead we are submitted to the ‘whole’ of the image. perhaps the ‘axiomatization o f avant-garde effects by the mainstream is simply an inevitable aspect of the film industry (Brown and Fleming 2011). arguing that each ‘has forced the eye to work harder. For Shaviro. the screen becomes a rush o f colour. then it is not entirely their fault. Furthermore. This rush o f colour brings to mind Lev Manovich’s aforementioned argument that digital cinema is. they have not seen.

as per chaos theory. 1 4 1 Through their mainstream use o f abstracted colour. or otherwise. the transgressive nature or otherwise of the image is established in/emerges from the relationship between spectator and image. and as our body-brains are embedded inextricably in/ with the world.^ However. in the same way that all films are ‘monstrative’. 1997). In a universe o f change. For this reason. Broadly speaking. these studies. To endeavour to remake a film. According to Marks. she writes o f the [bjlurring or overload[ing] of photographic precision. or the whole. under-exposure or over-exposure. when we become aware of our (otherwise automatic) seeing. because the viscera are an inextricable part o f higher-order processes. easily loses its function as the main point of reference. such that neither Gus van Sants Psycho (USA. it is in fact through our visceral experiences that we can achieve original thought. one cannot view the whole" o f the picture. however. superimpositions. even if that image is one that we have seen many times before. Dudley Andrew announced in 1978 that phenomenology had been overlooked as a potentially important approach to film studies (Andrew 1978). is to see that Chronos is interdependent on Aeon. elements of the cinematic experience the ‘higher’ ‘brain elements that in fact form a continuum with them. including the spectator.such a description arguably extends to all o f cinema. then. then the cinema screen is also a body that touches us. variations in sound pitch and intensities: when cinema becomes a cintema of the senses it starts to generate worlds of mutating sounds and images that often ebb and flow between the figurative and the abstract. but by their very nature are. at least as a unified entity. It is not. representation (identifiable figures performing recognizable actions) in order to maximize sensation. Barker (2009). in a similar way to how synaesthetes see colours when they hear music and perceive smells when they see colours. but seeing the otherwise automatic nature o f our seeing itself To be aware o f novelty. the Transformers films are extreme examples o f ‘thought-inducing’ cinema in the mainstream of intensified/ post-continuity. They are useful because the ‘extreme’ namre o f these images allows us to clarify the potential in all images to induce new modes o f thought (i. after Robert Sinnerbrink (2008). do not synthesize with the haptic. synaesthesia is a central concept in phenomenological "approaches to film. Beugnet would seem to concur with this atgument when she says that affective and aesthetic shock can be a spur to thought (Beugnet 2007: 38). such as those o f Marks. in particular in the light of work by Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. even if we have never seen such an image before. after Damasio’and others. in MuUarkeys terms. the experience o f film. the brain and the mind are embodied. which is core to Deleuze’s project for philosophy. acknowledging the materiality of film and its ability to ‘touch’ us ‘before’ or as the ‘representational’ qualities o f films manifest themselves. original thought is the conscious awareness of novelty. each of these scholars analyses.1 4 0 Superdnema The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage involve a novel context. if not dispense entirely with. and where the human form. we do not observe films in a detached manner. As our brains are embodied. Any image that we see can be seen automatically. 2002). There may well be a shift in emphasis in certain kinds o f film. or even to repeat a viewing o f the same film. films have a ‘skin that we experience. W hen Beugnet identifies the ‘aesthetics o f chaos’ that she sees in Grandrieux’s films. that substantial phenomenological approaches to film began to appear. for Deleuze. It is not through a rejection of visceral responses that we can achieve these new modes of thought.e. It is not just seeing according to Chronos. even when they form part o f what is more obviously a narrative. all films involve degrees of phdtographic precision. 1960) or Haneke’s ovm Funny Games (Austria. or which touches us. any image can ^so lead us to thought. even in ‘mindless’ Hollywood schlock). 1998) nor Michael Haneke’s Funny Games US (USA/France/UK/Austria/Germany/Italy. shot scale. Marks (2000. or affective. for us briefly to consider the foregoing argument in the light o f phenomenological approaches to film. since the physical nature o f the film experience means that what is typically thought o f as visual and aural translates into the tactile. As such. there is only ever becoming. or the chaos fixim which Chronos organizes itself and which incessandy exceeds our conscious vision and thought even thoughdt surrounds us in all places and at all moments. It was not until the 1990s. as the very practice of giving clarifying examples o f more . ‘the brain is the screen (Deleuze 2000). and if. or to ‘see seeing’ as it were. Grandrieux’s films might obviously reject. but instead we have a physical relationship with films. but in reality all films combine representation with sensation. but in a ‘haptic’ manner. If films like those o f Gfandrieux are obviously blurred. 2004) have since been followed by other important contributions firom Laura U. and Jennifer M.namely the twenty-first-century French ‘cinema o f sensation’ . are always diflFerent. (Beugnet 2007: 65) While Beugnet is making reference to a particular'kind o f cinema . However. extreme close-ups. That is. or automadcally. not in an optic. so too is our response to cinema ‘integrated’ in this fashion. will always involve variations in the initial conditions such that. Phenomenology and film Nonetheless. Pioneering works by Allan Casebier (1991) and Vivian Sobchack (1992. Beugnet’s work is a bridge. the outcome will be different. are overexposed and involve varation in pitch and intensity. integrated during film viewing (during the world-body-brain-film assemblage). exposure and intensities o f pitch. 2007) can really repeat Alfred Hitchcocks original Psycho (USA. be they Deleuze-inspired. filmed in extreme closeup. that there are ‘transgressive’ images (time-images) and nontransgressive images (movement-images). ‘affect’ and ‘brain’ approaches to film not only can be. Rather. not least because the conditions of viewing. If one isolates one approach from the other. If.

As mentioned. a fact that presents us with the possible scenario of films becoming literally like drugs as studios seek to supply audiences with cerebral 'hits’ . and so with respect to film viewing. As Scott Brown (2010) reports. a recognition o f how we are ‘enworlded’ leads logically towards a rejection of the subject-object binarism and. neutocinematic studies suggest that there is much homogeneity across spectators o f mainstream films.what Murray Smith would term an ‘effect’ o f the text (Smith 1996: 138). and so novelty itself is neither a quality inherent in any images nor the result specifically of a spectator choosing to find novelty. . both in terms o f where their eyes look and in terms of neuronal intersubject correlation. That is. Rushton seems to suggest not so much passivity in this Brechtian and anti-Brechtian sense. The breakdown between active and passive has already been implied in the ‘relativistic’ account of cinematic novelty put forward earlier: what is new to me is not necessarily new to you. if passivity is understdod firom a Deleuzian perspective. of the dichotomy between active and passive. This he differentiates from film viewing as ‘a process o f becoming conscious of what is happening ih a film’ (Rushton 2009: 48). in the terms of Aylish Wood (2007b). Paradoxically. with Screen theorists in the 1970s critiquing the passive viewer of Hollywood cinema while championing those filmmakers. giving rise to the argument that the viewer responds passively to these stimuli. this consciousness is not consciousness o f the film. Shaviro’s words indirecdy point to a more productive direction fot understanding film spectatorship. challenges this approach. We might also mention the way in which studies of audiences often reveal the diverse ways in which spectators watch. that spectators must be made aware o f the fabricated nature o f the film. For Rushton. who might contend that our brains are actively wotking during film viewing such that we can make inferences and predictions about the film. since the world is also always part of our film-viewing experience.many o f which can be surprising and most o f which certainly suggest an ‘active’ film viewer (see. consciousness is something. The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 143 Hollywood seems to be taking seriously (at least for the time being) the findings of neutocinematic studies. consciousness is not consciousness of something.. who acts in or on an object-world. interpret and appropriate films and film imagery . but a renewed consciousness that emerges from the film-spectator encounter. Small screen viewing perhaps makes this particularly clear: as we view films on our laptops.or seeing in cinema the potential for thought. for a recent example. regardless of the film being viewed —is an ‘enworlded’ mode of viewing. and inducing them to want what you give them’ (Shaviro 2010: 121). Thinking in/with/through cinema . Richard Rushton argues that passivity should be considered a positive aspect of film viewing. these inferences seem to be cued by the film. The ability o f viewers to read films ‘against the grain (Comolli and Narboni 1991). this is a passivity that does make the spectator . as above. supposedly noncinematic objects are vying for. as does cognitive work by Bordwell and Branigan. As a mode of viewing. our attention beyond simply the screen/the film itself And yet phese competing phenomena are also part o f the film-viewing experience. understand. all films are always both affective and cerebral. part o f the process of cinema. to be active or passive presupposes a coherent subject or self. Brave ^New World (Huxley 1994). This is paradoxical because where Smith posits that both ‘naive and critical spectators are ‘effects’ o f the ‘text’ in order to argue against the passivity o f both positions (critical and naive). as well as to promote the potential for cognitive/conscious processes during film viewing.. Active or passive spectators? Debate over whether film viewers are active or passive has long since characterized film studies. a sort of multisensual ‘cinema’ that Aldous Huxley describes in his dystopian classic. Rushton believes that the motion o f tesisting passivity h la Brecht is not necessary. the assemblage o f brain-body-film must include ‘world’ in the formula world-bodybrain-film. this latter approach to film seems to bring us full circle and to suggest a passive spectator. ‘our consciousness [during film viewing] is formed by what happens in the filn i (Rushton 2009: 48). however. In an excellent essay published in Screen. the potential for a film-spectatorworld assemblage to lead to thought is. While from the cognitive perspective the viewer is always thinking. Nonetheless. might seem to be more ‘affective’ than cerebral. Again. who draws'on the work of Bertolt Brecht to suggest. And yet. including Jean-Luc Godard. or.along the lines of the ‘feelies’. such as those by Grandrieux. who sought to bring conscious awareness of the film experience to the fore. Barker 2011). but passivity in the sense that the spectator and the film ‘fuse’ so as to achieve consciousness. and subsequently thought. consequehdy. better. we cannot say that there is a canonical list of films that induce thought. the way in which Grandrieux’s ‘blurry’ films inspire nonrepresentational readings can fulfil precisely this exemplary function). the spectator is 'fused with the film . Rather novelty. Rushton’s definition o f passivity is different from the one argued for (or rather against) by Screen theorists such as Colin MacCabe (1975). in tetms o f making inferences. Rather than needing to come down on either side of the active/passive debate. there are only subjectivities formed by the cinema (Rushton 2009: 48). As Steven Shaviro puts it: ‘There is almost no boundary between giving customers what they want. But while certain films. while cognitive approaclies to film have led to the evolution of neurocinematics. the fused viewer-film ‘assemblage’ . but it is one that emerges only in the relationship between images and viewers. are ‘distributing’. Instead.or. other. is a quality that is potentially in all images. or at least not in the way that the filmmakers seemingly intended. In other words. though some seem through various (typically ‘slow’) techniques to maximize the possibility for thought.142 Supercinema specifically ‘haptic’ filmmaking itself makes clear (and here. in any and all films.

the very notion o f what an environment is cannot be separated from what organisms are and what they do’ (Varela et al. However. but that we and the world help to define each other. taste. and shelter. Consciousness emerges Work by Varela. (Damasio 1994: 225) In other words. we are not passive viewers of the natural environment. even to constitute each other. sex. but consciousness with a film. For Varela. In the terms being put forward order for us to become aware. in other senses it confirms the above argument. not consciousness of a film. This argument recalls the idea put forward earlier that observation determines the behaviour of elementary particles. Daniel C. consciousness is not an a priori. Dennett proposes something similar when he. That is. but rather in seeing the time-image qualities that are present in all images. or automatic. so that appropriate actions can be taken in response to what is sensed. 1991: 174-98). the world. In cinematic terms. There are no completely separate domains o f matter and mind and no grounds for dualism’ (Edelman and Tononi 2000: 219). brain and body. or ‘mindful’: ‘[w]hat mindfulness disrupts is mindlessness . Thompson and Rosch allows us to pursue further an understanding of our place in. which we usually take for granted. For while Rushton is perhaps correct in suggesting that the ‘fusion o f spectator and film is ‘passive’ in that the fusion ‘modifies’ the spectator. becoming ‘mindful’ (for a m ind to become) means seeing tim e-im ^es . the world."vibration. being probabilistic is key to becoming.but not just in terms o f seeing images that are ‘already time-images the ‘transgressive’ nature o f which is determined in advance (should this be possible). 1991:164). W hat is true o f the environment is also true o f films: we fuse with films as we fuse with the world. then. or spin. but instead it. or becoming (Edelman and Tononi 2000: 152). being mindlessly involved withoiit realizing that that is what one is doing’ (Varela et al. sensing it and acting upon it. is always changing. our relationship with films and with the world takes on a ‘philosophical’ quality only when this ‘consciousness with’ moves from being an unthinking. Thompson and Rosch posit that there is no mind. Edelman and Tononi argue that consciousness is a process. Film viewing also involves the production of consciousness. Consciousness is always becoming because the m ind is ‘based in and dependent on the physical processes that occur in its own workings. or with. If Varela. this might challenge the probabilistic understanding o f perception put forward earlier (perception has evolved heuristically over time). 1991: 225). posits that consciousness is a result o f the brain’s material processes. for. since one can never be separate from the world (Varela et al. is not just a matter of having the brain receive direct signals from a given stimulus. touch. Thompson and Rosch continue their discussion of mindfiilness conquering mindlessness by saying that ‘[i]t is only in this sense [of becoming mindful o f what otherwise is mindless. The body proper is not passive.‘you have to learn new ways o f thinking’ (Dennett 1991: 16). like Edelman and Tononi. is not ‘life’. or as Rushton puts it. in those o f other minds.144 Supercinema Rushtons use o f the word passive is potentially problematicj even if we wrest it from the negative connotations that it has garnered in film studies since the 1970s. Thompson and Rosch take this argument further by saying that if ‘a mind must be something that is separate from and knows the world’. but an emergent result of the relations between body. the mind is not detached from. not in such a way that we are passive to the world. Antonio Damasio sums this up well when he talks about the relationship between body-brains and environments: Perceiving the environment.. stasis would follow. Thompson and Rosch.. then this might sound contradictory. but we are always interacting with it. or mindful. the state of functional balance. the reason why most of the interactions with the environment ever take place is that the organism requires their occurrence in order to maintain homeostasis. let alone receiving direct pictures.-however. but that they actually do shrink. organization —or what I have termed the fact of matter and nonorganic life . too. this means that . which in turn are shaped by and shape our environment: ‘we must see the organism and environment as bound together in reciprocal specifications and selection. we are fundamentally enworlded. or automatic] that the observation changes what is being observed’ (Varela et al. and that in order to understand this . The organism actively modifies itself so that the interfacing can take place as well as possible. However. all particles ‘observe’ and therefore ‘determine’ the behaviour of other particles. brain and world. For them. predicated upon movement. such that observation and change become the ontogenetic baseline of reality. that this is the case . The world does not ‘seem’ to be as it is. While from the perspective o f nonorganic life. Varela. in that if probability were eliminated and The Film-Spectator-World Assemblage 145 replaced by ‘certainty’. Perhaps no less important. there is still as much activity as passivity taking place in this fusion. But if it is to succeed in avoiding danger and be efficient in finding food. so that it can propitiate the interactions necessary for survival. since even at the quantum level. process. hear. it must sense the environment (smell. is constimted through complex and delicate patterns of sensorimotor activity (Varela et al. The organism continuously acts on the environment (actions and exploration did come first). In some senses. it —and we — mutually become through our interactions. such that we can move beyond subject-object binarisms and the passive-active dichotomy. ‘our perceived world. Perceiving is as much about acting on the environment as it is about receiving signals from it. We might compare this to Einstein’s understanding that space and time do not simply ‘seem’ to shrink if we travel faster through them. But in fact their point is that we must recognize the m ind’s enworlded nature. like consciousness. in cinematic terms. then. in that it. then ‘we have no mind’. see). and in the events involved in communication. our perceptions are dependent on our bodies. while ‘consciousness with’ might be how we as humans ‘naturally operate both in/with the world and with films. 1991: 31—32). 1991: 32).that is. emerges from the relations between world. nor does it reflect objectively on. to being one of which we are aware. Varela.

as humans commonly do . In effect. we will also discover what our bodies can do. However. both automatic/clich6d and novel thought. automatic because embodied. behave towards the world. However. or what Deleuze and Guattari term philosophy. the timeimage does not exist ‘out there’. of this fusing is what leads to thought. but is instead produced in relation with films.presents a metaphor for existence whereby the world is a container from which we humans are separate. In the spirit of Spinoza. precisely because embodied thought would be automatic. Kennedy (2000). 60).‘in’ as a preposition metaphorically to describe our relationship with the wo/ld betrays a sense of human detachment from the world. the language we use to describe the world is intimately connected to our ethics. Earlier I discussed Lakoff and Johnson. but rather that we are with the world. I might say that we seek to discover what out bodies can do. an image that demands new thought always eludes the body.e. reduces the body to ‘passivity’ in that the sensory-motor links are broken owing to the sheer difference of the image. and in discovering what our bodies can do. In the spirit o f their work.N. A noncliche. To persist with using. In other words. even if we are within it.1 4 6 Supercinema mindfulness o f the film-viewing experience changes the film. ‘in’ metaphors arguably also contribute to humans isolating themselves from each other . and not dualism. metaphors. Other notable work that adopts these and similar approaches includes Lant (1995).is enworlded. the brain is embodied. and the body . and such that classical notions of a self that stands in opposition to the world must be rejected in favour of a conception o f ^cistence that challenges the very notion of a self This in turn upsets the usual subject-object binarisms that persist in human thought.cannot challenge these metaphors. then presumably we can conceive o f an ‘out’ of this world. One could argue that Deleuze’s conception of the time-image involving the breaking of automatic thought does involve mind-body parallelism. by extension. and replace ‘in’ with a different metaphor that not only reflects paore accurately the truth o f our relationship with the world. who suggest that the metaphors we use to negotiate reality are just that. whic^ humans treat poorly. 5 Concluding With Love Repeatedly in this book I have posited that we are not in. as docs Mark B. if we are ‘in’ the world. and Laine (2006). That is. perhaps even a prison. in being an image that we cannot read in an automatic fashion. Lakofi^ and Johnson suggest that a ‘primary’ metaphor like being ‘in’ the world ‘form[s] a huge part of our conceptual system and affect[s] how we think’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1999. automatically). or how we conduct ourselves. 2. together with the passive-active dichotomy that logically ensues therefrom. but becoming aware. That is. we might also discover what our brains can do (what can be thought). We may always ‘fuse’ with films. this does not mean that we . I would still contend that we can only ever perceive with our bodies. one would not think anew. and that our bodies play a fundamental role in thought. but which might also aflFect how we think and. Notes 1. in the same way that we fuse with the world. since if one coiild respond to the image in a sensory-motor fashion (i. And in discovering what our brafns can do. This is not simply an environmental/ecojogical issue. we might say that to state that we are ‘in’ the world . Hansen. such that consciousness emerges from our relations with the world. The cognitive scientist^ dis9 ussed in the last chapter would seem to affirm as much: mind is not separate from matter. which in turn feeds into our behaviour towards the world —namely that i.t is a container. or mindful.

but by divorcing ourselves from the world entirely that this can be achieved. then it is choosing to believe in the world that brings us back to thought and the world. while this sense o f withness is negative. if the ‘ordinary’ experience o f cinema is a ‘mechanical’ or ‘automatic’ one. after Bazin. as Deleuze and Schefer seem to suggest (Deleuze 2005: 164). to choose is to think thought into existence (in a fashion that perhaps recalls Daniel C. or the externalization o f man’ (Deleuze 2005: 156-57). In other words. we might tentatively propose that humans treat both the world and each other poorly. and hence. If we rethought our relationship with the world and with each other along the hnes o f ‘with’ and ‘withness’. Via Antonin Artaud. The world is ‘intolerable’ to those divorced from it. however. Let us do this by putting Nancy into dialogue with Descartes. Deleuze seems to suggest that it is not by turning. and not the proliferation of difference and becoming that we might find elsewhere. for Antonio Damasio. With Deleuze To think of the ‘with’ in some respects takes us away from Deleuze. We are with the world and with each other. for Deleuze. which nonetheless cannot but be thought’ (Deleuze 2005: 164). their divorce from it. or Hitlerism (Deleuze 2005: 159-61).. see Dennett 2003: 259-88). in contemporary terms. as noted in Aylish W ood’s timespaces). then Descartes also posited mind as . Eisenstein’s visual metaphors. cinema typically shows us man in contrast to nature. it is through the breakdown o f our automated/automatic existence. as mentioned. In other words. we are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent with the world and all that surrounds us. or action-thoughts. a sense of the agency of the environment. far from being a positive experience. the unthinkable. of the individual and the mass’ (Deleuze 2005:157). which in m rn is tied to the powerful emergence of the world itself (long takes and long shots in which humans do litde or nothing. while diversity (or multiversity) allows for difference and becoming. is different.hence a sense of the sublime. man and the world. then perhaps new thought and new actions would follow. man’s homogenization (or the making repetitive. then. then we reach a seeming impasse between the singular (unity) and the plural (diversity). is the ‘way oUt’: ‘[t]o believe. ‘carries out a suspension o f the world (Deleuze 2005: 163). It is thus all the more suitable for showing the reaction of man on nature. the automation) of space and time leads to a homogenization o f thought . action-thoughts impose thoughts on the spectator (their meaning is too clearly articulated): they do not allow spectators to have their own thoughts. but in a link between. for Deleuze. and this is what Eisenstein achieves — a sensory-motor unity. However. is organic. such that ‘[a]ction-thought simultaneously posits the unity o f nature and man. seeming microscopic in comparison to the world . can help us to reconcile these positions. to believe in this as in the impossible. Far from showing us as being with the world. a ‘ftscistic’ form o f control. as is demonstrated by the way in which we speak of ‘inner’ feelings or an ‘inner’ being —and this self is again detached from the world and from others). indeed. for Deleuze. O r rather. and therefore to think with the world). However. but instead becoming simply ‘seers’. with Deleuze now drawing upon Jean-Louis Schefer’s L’homme ordinaire du cinima (1980). but that this seems to be a logical consequence of characterizing our relationship with the world through the preposition ‘in’. places the world outside the realm o f the thinkable. If. ‘Descartes’s error’ is to have believed in ‘the separation o f the most refined operations of mind from the structure and operation o f a biological organism’ (Damasio 1994: 250). such images do not suggest a sense o f ‘withness’. Consciousness emerges only in our relations with others and the world —tpid while this happens automatically (with humans egocentrically believing that their thoughts are uniquely their own). via automatism. Eisenstein’s unity of man and nature is a homogenization of nature by man. W hen thought suddenly does erupt upon us. Deleuze suggests another way of being with the world. between man and nature. but by raising it to a supreme power’ (Deleuze 2005: 156). In other words. If the automation o f humanity (and o f thought) involves something like the colonization o f the sensory-motor system. Dennett’s argument that humans ‘bootstrap’ themselves free.. In other words. This. 'the relation between man and the world. meaning that cinema becomes. but rather. Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept o f being singular plural. from namre to m an. then Artaud suggests that a shock can only make us think that we are not yet thinking (Deleuze 2005: 161-62). If automatism has divorced humanity ftom the world. we would do well to be mindful of. as suggested in the action-thoughts o f his films. cinema. explains how cinema is particularly good at going ‘from the setting to the character. or to realize this. ‘[i]n the sublime there is a sensory-motor unity o f nature and man’ (Deleuze 2005: 157).148 Supercinema (‘in’ is tied to a sense o f ‘self’. Deleuze. however. If Eisenstein believes that it'requires a shock to create thought (hence his dialectical montage in which images clash with each other). Deleuze continues by arguing that cinema suggests the impossibility of thought. then what Concluding With Love 149 separates man from world is automatism itself. the sensory-motor unity. as per the conception of space and time suggested by digital technology and cinema.back to some preautomatic existence that humans can find the world (to be/become ever changing. That is.and it is this that divorces us from a world that fundamentally >is becoming. not in a different world. in love or life. However. is insufficient for ‘real’ thought since unity is repetitive and homogeneous. With Nancy If I have inferred from Deleuze that Eisenstein’s unity o f man and nature. by becoming pure seers. indicate. or simply to become. then it is no surprise that modern cinema’s attempts to show thought involve humans becoming incapable of acting within the world. is heterogeneous.

PENSER). In this sense. detached in their observations and thoughts. I walk. after Damasio. thinking observer that Descartes proposes as the mind ^filit from the body. nor is it saying (declaring. and if I understand by vision or walking the act of my eyes or of my limbs. (Descartes 2004: 18) If thought and the m ind are precisely embodied. There is not singularity or plurality. (This ‘rehabilitation may not be perfect. m i ^ t allow us to ‘rehabilitate Descartes in spite of’ himself Descartes first proposes ‘je pense. the binarism between self and other breaks down.Supercinema 150 separate from the world. to imagine (IMAGINARI). it says Being itself as communication and thinking: the co-agitado of Being. however. which is the work of the body.Damasio. to will (VELLE). there is repetition (singular). leading a relative existence. but also singularity. In other words. we are singular and plural .the mind. but that we cannot doubt our minds. outside of the world. (Nancy 2000: 53-54) In other words.from my place. there is no existence without coexistence and communication. the knowledge is manifestly certain.and if I can be so bold. However. or. then Descartes s definition o i cogitatio would seem to be misguided. with one’s body). Rather. co^to ergo sum. in that our ‘higher’ conscious processes 'stem from and cannot live without our socalled ‘lower’ viscera and emotions. although I have no body: but if I mean the sensqtion itself. Descartes refines ‘je pense. are here the same as to think (COGITARE. because thinking determines that-we must have a mind (Descartes 2004: 17). done je suis’ in 1637 as one of only three things about which he can have no doubt in Discourse on Method (the other two are the existence of reason and the existence of God) (Descartes 1998: 53). Relating this to cinema. Saying‘to speak with’ is like saying ‘to sleep with. ENTENDRE). ‘to speak with’ is the conversation (and sustaining) and conatus oS a being-exposed. then cogitation is . because it is then referred to the mind. humans do not lead lives in which they can objectively observe each other. therefore I am. which is different front the world. perhaps. or of opening oneself up to the other. Rather. it has to be an ontology for each‘and every one and for the world ‘as a totality’. However. such that we must face the truth of the self with others. which we might equate with the concept of nonorganic life. involves plurality. and our relations to the ‘nonhuman’. I am only with others. He argues that we might well imagine that there is no God and that we have no body. as opposed to difference being a process. Nancy defines it as follows: Both the theory and praps. as opposed to the supposedly subjective experience of being) ™ in communication. or as a co-agitatio. which we might also relate to Chronos. my singularity depends upon plurality. existence both with the world and with cinema involves the acceptance of and acceptance by others. which cannot exist without the multiverse. critique absolutely needs to rest on some principle other than that of the ontology of the Other and the Same: it needs an ontology of being-with-one-another. we might ‘rehabilitate’ Descartes.a French term also meaning ‘film’) of a film (Nancy 2008). the conclusion is not absolutely certain. Descartes goes. or what elsewhere we have termed Aeon . In defining the mind as a self that exists outside o f the body and. but even to perceive (SENTIRE. and even.always already a phenomenon done with others (and. SENTIR). because.interdependent with superspace and supertime). in the sense that we are always only ever coexisting. which alone perceives or is conscious that it sees or walks. not only to understand (INTELLIGERE. as the actual only exists in relation with the virtual). Nancy writes: ' ‘to speak with’ is not so much speaking to oneself or to one another. as per. or cogitatio: By the word thought. a level of thought in which we are not the detached. the process of becoming. Descartes might seem to advocate difference. Instead we are always at all points with each other. For Nancy. the body and the world are posited as separate things. Nancy’s approach here recalls his argument elsewhere that exposure is central to the cinematic experience. but this only exists in relation with ‘Being’. move. as we are ‘ex-peau-sed’ {peau being the French for skin) to the ‘skin’ (peUicuU . difference is reified . if as Nancy explains to us. and nothing short of the whole world. replacing it with the Latin cogito ergo sum. of critique demonstrate that. or the subjective experience o f time.the totality of the universe (which itself exists only in relation with the multiverse. since this is all there is. we must recognize our enworlded nature. however. Nancy’s suggestion that Being (the whole. or to live w ith: it is a (eu)phemism for (not) saying nothing less than what ‘wanting to say means [le ‘vouloir-dire’ veut dire] in many different ways. ‘to go out with (co-ire). I understand all that which so takes place in us that we of ourselves are immediately conscious of it: and. That is. for everyone . which exposes only the secret of its own exposition. we remember that co^tatio is derived from co-agitatio. by extension. (Nancy 2000: 92-93) If we interpret this passage. then. while Descartes might be ins'error’. by saying not co^to ergo sum.on to define thought. Indeed.and to recognize being as both singular and plural is to think ‘holistically ' (of the ‘totality’)v There is what N ^ c y would term ‘being’. from now on. done je suis’. or do with. In Principles o f Philosophy from 1644. and so on. naming). it must be an ontology for the world. For if I say I see. and this ontology must suppoh both the sphere o f‘nature’ and the sphere o f‘history’. existing Concluding With Love 151 only in relation. 'spacetime is. as the foregoing discussion of Deleuze’s treatment of thought and the world would seem to suggest: in effect. we only exist in relation. or plurality: there is the self. that is to say. although I do not open my eyes or move. as well as both the ‘human’ and the ‘nonhuman’. nor is it proffering (bringing forth meaning or bringing meaning to light). And yet. in that Descartes’s sum still needs somehow to . as is often the case in dreams. according. but co-agito ergo sum. And these in turn cannot exist without the world (which cannot exist without the universe. both are interdependent the one with the other. we can surmise that Nancy offers communication as a means o f ‘exposing oneself’. I may rhink that I see or walk. this erroneous split is also what leads us towards the impossibility of thought. or consciousness of seeing or walking. Difference as a process. There is no detached thought/mind-body dualism since we are always only ever embodied. and which finds expression in his most famous dictum. which etymologically speaking means to act. through the repetition of difference (plural).

it seems that a full Heideggerian analysis o f cinema is long overdue. or Umsicht. but re-spect (looking ‘again’). Digital cinema may retain many o f the tropes o f analogue cinema (in particular the cut).and intensify them to the extent that. on the contrary. Thompson and Rosch also invoke Heidegger when.) Cinematic ethics For Deleuze it might only be the time-image that begins to reconnect humanity with nature . if we look not at what digital cinema is. but rather as a mode of viewing. rather than viewing the totality for itself). with the totality o f times and spaces. because o f some familiarity with the world’ (Heidegger 2008: 107). then. or in an automatic sense (in which we find what we are looking for . it would be irrelevant for an understanding o f the ‘real’ world and our place with it. define Umsicht as looking around or looking around for something’ or ‘looking around for a way to get something done’: ‘In ordinary German usage. In place of the automatic viewing o f circumspection. Concluding With Love 153 In suggesting that humans have not yet begun to think. Indeed. Heidegger’s translators. Rather than provide such an analysis. ‘Being-in-the-world. then the simulacral nature of digital images would prevent us consistently from seeing anything o f worth in digital cinema. Malick himself having been a Heidegger scholar when at Northwestern (see Sinnerbrink 2006). Deleuze recalls Martin Heidegger. or realize this. Varela. an imbalance also acknowledged by Stanley Cavell in The World Viewed (Cavell 1979: xv—xvi). Indeed. To see in fijms not what we want to see. what they do. who offers a Heideggerian analysis ofTerrence Malicks Thin Red Line (USA. by extension. the ‘for something’ suggesting a teleological mode o f viewing. In other words. as if seeing it for itself . However. Relating this adaptation of Heidegger s work to the present argument. We might understand circumspection. or be mindful of. while also presenting us with times that are traversable. in whose W hat is Called T h in kin g l^s German philosopher suggests that although the state of the world is becoming more thought-provoking. like space. Film viewing is fundamentally embodied. towards the end o f The Embodied M ind.. it presents to us an irrational continuity o f space in which we can pass through solid objects as easily as we can through empty’ space. however.a planetary thinking that also recalls Nancy in asking us to think of the world ‘as a totality’. they call for ‘planetary thinking’ along Heideggerian lines (Varela et al. The irrational (inhuman) continuity and the irrational (inhuman) speed o f digital cinema paradoxically do provide grounds for original thought. enworlded. but what they are (or.1 5 2 Supercinema shift from the stasis o f being to the dynamism o f becoming. among others. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. how they enable us to become). Heidegger establishes a vast array of concepts. then. However. If we were concerned only with what cinema is. But Heidegger seems to be generalizing this notion as well as calling attention to the extent to which circumspection in the narrower sense occurs in our every-day living’ (Heidegger 2008: 98-99). namely an elaboration o f love. For Heidegger. as has been explored at some length. human. Being embodied. and that we are connected with the totality o f time and space. but perhaps this would arise naturally if the co. even if to varying degrees o f intensity. 1991: 239-41) . as viewing the world as if familiar. many of which combine to present a philosophy o f our enworlded nature. M ost thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking (Heidegger 1968: 4—6). Digital technology allows films to adopt the techniques that are associated with time-images. movement-image.brink. the sheer speed of contemporary digital cinema might seem to prevent us ftom being capable o f any thought. This does not mean that we do not view digital cinema ‘automatically. to recognize our enworlded nature is to respect the world. and to respect films when we view them. it is not that humans transcend their bodies while watching films (although we might read the common dream o f humans finding themselves on cinema screens/becoming stars as a dream o f losing one’s body and o f ‘becoming light’ . Any con'cern is already as it is. perhaps even inevitable. Among these is circumspection. amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand o f a totality of equipment. or unthinkingly.. but it is also perhaps best understood not as a certain taxonomy o f techniques. 1998). To look again at the world and to see it in this way. we should remember.dth the world. and precisely because thesq filmi take the techniques associated with mid-level. . but it does not need to (digital is Superman to analogues Batman).moving so fast that space would shrink to nothing..and yet. or what I shall term sophophily. we might suggest a viewing o f the world as if unfamiliar. In Being and Time. as Steven Shaviro recognizes.namely continuity editing . The potential for us to engage thinkingly with films is inherent.of co-agito were thought through. I wish here only to rework a concept from Heidegger in order to push this conclusion towards its final direction. a relationship that exists between film and viewer. in any given direction. “Umsicht” seems to Jiave much the same connotation as our circumspection” —a kind o f awareness in which one looks around before one decides just what one ought to do next. rendering us in all places at once). Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to the world (he was a student o f Husserl) also brings to mind the aforementioned work by Sobchack. with all films.. we are interdependent with them.‘looking around for something’. involves not the circumspect. given that we only exist in relation to films. the time-image not only finds itself within contemporary mainstream cinema. they take on a new aesthetic regime. Marks and Barker. but at what it can do. precisely because of this irrationality. but rather than forget this (if ever humans really thought that —even indexical —film images were anything other than fabrications). then we can recognize a cinema that paradoxically shows that humans are v. it is entirely embodied and. thought is not disembodied. and automatic cinema . Furthermore. It presents us with agential timespaces and morphing beings. and which has perhaps begun to be redressed by scholars such as Robert Sinnei.

as if unfamiliar. always still in prison. love here is not love o f this or o f that. enables us to see our enworlded nature.. Given the ‘split’ nature o i In Praise o f Love. W ho knows whether capitalism is terminally in .involves sleeping with. this involves . Alex (Alex Ghevasco). Nancy IS carefiil to differentiate ‘thinking is love’ (‘lapensee est amour’) to rn thinking is Love’ (‘la pensee est I’amour’) (Nancy 1991: 84). in that half of the film is on polyester. not to exclude. . meanwhile. then we can now move on to the final argument to be presented m Superanemu. And yet thinking.while thelatterinvolvesathing. love seems to be at the heart of recognizing our enworlded nature.:courage p rta in s to the heart (the Latin for heart is cor). especially through the use o f digital technology. This indeterminacy does not bring about the end o f the power of institutions. but loving everything. (Nancy 1991: 83) In other wor J . in love or life’ (Deleuze 2005.which in turn reminds us o f the Latin term for the p ysical act o f love. but this is because ‘the place o f their effectivity is increasingly indeterminate’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 197). love. become a prison ‘in’ which we are. such a love exhausts humans. Being ‘shattered’. Nancy says that ‘it will one day be necessary to attest this has never explicitly attested this’ (Nancy 1991: 83). Hardt and Negri define the contemporary world as institutionalized. 2009). 164). but in a link between man and the world. under Empire the world has. Meanwhile. In Praise o f Love. Instead. Godard seems cinematically to suggest that cinema must love the digital. Michael H ardt and Antonio Negri have also taken up the concept o f love in their trilogy o f works on ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000. It is important that institutions fimction through ‘in-ness’ (as opposed to ‘with-ness’). Notably. exhausting. In Jean-Luc Godard’s film. fraternal love and the love of art. the lover/thinker is no longer the egocentric being defined by Chronos. Nancy’s definition o f withness’ . the neighbour and the infant. is akin to Nancy’s ‘possibilities o f love’: to love without hierarchy. on the contrary. If we modify the logic o f ‘in’ towards the logic of ‘with’. Hardt and Negri argue that ‘love is an essential [if overlooked and often rejected] concept for philosophy and politics’ in the contemporary era. the difference between the two being that the first involves a process .a world of communication . while the exhausted exhausts all of the possible’ (Deleuze 1995: 3]). disembodied reason. separation from the world. Deleuze suggests that the time-image can allow us ‘[t]o believe. therefore.. Like think is to love . friendship. In a ^fferent essay. In the general breakdown. the lead character. e generosity not to choose between loves. the kiss.the generalization o f power: ‘[t]he production o f subjectivity in imperial society tends not to be limited to any specific places. or going out with. always still in school. to love everything. Given the shattering.orreifieslove. repetition. then thinking is thinking the whole. Reason and capital have broken human hearts (cor-rupted us). to see everything as love. evolving towards eedom and choosing to choose. In other words. love as werythmg. or to respect the world. 2004. passion. a character repeats St Augustine of Hippos famous saying that ‘the measure o f love is to love without measure’. Concluding With Love 155 such as the nuclear family and the prison. One is always still in the family. the love of lovers and the love of God. its voices or its characteristics. If ffm king Is love. we head towards a more ‘loving’. institutions. not m a different world. For H ardt and Negri. nature of love. and so forth. and automatic thought are all interconnected consequences o f this fundamentally alienating approach. We should be carefiil to distinguish what we mean by love here. If cinema. with Aeon (exhaustion for Deleuze is beyond tiredness and fitigue: ‘the tired has only exhausted realization. Love for them is not race love or nation love.. M d can perhaps only be felt in exhaustion. then to understand that we only exist in relation w A jh e world (and during film viewing with cinema) is in some respects to love the As mentioned. we must live with love. but is dispersed everywhere and evetywhen. That is. ‘thinking’ understanding o f the world. in my own (litde-seen) film. En Attendant Godard (UK. as Nancy argues. rather than mourn the seeming passing o f polyester-based filmmaking. die heart?). unthinking existences. and so now we must live with courage (an age of cor. particularly as a means to move beyond ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 179). However. To think love would thus demand a boundless generosity toward all these possibilities. or patriotism. If thoughthere is defined as the mindfiilness love is a l s o t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t o n e is o r r e a li z a t io n o f o u r e n w o r ld e d n e s s . coitus (co-itus).154 Supercinema Sophophily If seeing the world with which we are entangled is to see anew. Both Nancy and H ardt and Negri suggest that philosophy has on the whole rejected love. a love based on the encounter o f almrity’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 184-87). not to hierarchize. which are impossible to confuse and yet ineluctably entangled: charity and pleasure emotion and pornography. Nancy invokes the Latin for go with . explaining that where reason pertains to the head and capital.. That is. not to privilege. which ‘are examples o f the pressure to love most those most like you and hence less those who are different’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 182). t h e n t o W it h t h e w o r la . thinking h o h ^ i^ ly Such love shatters’. loving. and from which we might wish to escape. are ‘increasingly in crisis’. even though love (tJilXoc/philos) constitutes one half o f its being. it requires courage to love and to think. Similarly. the fimctioning o f the institutions is both more intensive and more extensive’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 197). implores his viewers to lead a life o f courage. love for Hardt and Negri is ‘the constitution o f the common and the composition of singularities. To inflect Nancy’s argument with the D eleu zi^ concept o f exhaustion (Deleuze 1995). Philosophy has often rejected outright the life o f the heart. 2009). are the only assertions that humans can escape automatic. striving instead towards a disembodied reason. Nancy says that aU the loves possible are the possibilities of love. while the other half is on (digital) video.

tft. As such. 1933. 1978. Anderson. r i n e m a seems to have reemerged. even i f ‘well’ intended (and felt) by its author. J. therefore. and the realization of being with the world can lead us to thought and to love. in S. it is to lead us to cinephilia: not the love o f ‘some’ films that do certain things. Cinema. 1999. often perceived as the malady that will result in the death o f cinema. C i n e m a is alive. Furthermore. 2011.pdf>. In this way. should the love of wisdom not be sophophilia? And is philosophy. ‘From Bwana D evil to Batman Forever. Film as Art. Perhaps perversely I have argued that time-images are visible in that most powerful purveyor o f mindless schlock. but with films. Allen. Harmondsworth: Penguin.}. Altman. increases cinema’s powers to show us as enworlded. Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies. Auge. or whether the planet with which we live is exhausted.1 5 6 Supercinema crisis. we respect the world and each other. Science Fiction Studies i'iiV ) (March): 89—108. an emergent consciousness that occurs when viewers fuse with films.ucla. a sophophilic machine. Contemporary Hollywood Cinema. in that cognitive science. ‘Final Frontiers: Computer-Generated Imagery and the Science Fiction Film’. J. But if the philosophical project has ‘failed’. Abbott. Technology in Contemporary Hollywood Cinema’. Howe).).edu/mediascape/Winter2011_ Avatar. in C. 2010. let us coin sophophily as the name of this new project. It is a loving. Arnheim. attest to love). ----------. D. capable now o f more than it was before. or without hierarchies —we recognize our fundamentally enworlded nature. Mediascape: UCLA’s Journal o f Cinema and M edia Studies (Winter). Andrew. London: Faber and Faber. mode o f viewing. but with the world. then perhaps it is time to replace philosophy with sophophily. Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology o f Supermodemity (trans. 1983. W hat Cinema Is! Bazins Quest and its Charge. H a v i n g survived its supposed death at the exhaustion of polyester f i l m m a k i n g . South Brunswick: Tantivy Press. then. I have argued that digital technology. Smith (eds. In terms of viewing films. ‘All Aboard The Polar Exprds-. A '“Playful” Change o f Address in the Computer-Generated Blockbuster’. Parameshwar Gaonkar (eds. . 2006. have shaken philosophy to its core (shattering. Total Film A \ (June): 25. London: Faber and Faber. 1998. The above will certainly seem to have taken us a long way from cinema and perhaps will seem sentimental guff. but the love o f all films. <www. to achieve consciousness not of. 289-312. Film and Reality: A n Historical Survey. R. which evolves from philosophy: not the love of wisdom. nor even the patrimony o f certain films and filmmakers. Neale and M. even though most other forms of love. 1996. and consciousness not of. 2006. 1996. even when it is nonindexical. 1995. 1995. then. but the wisdom o f loving. M. evolved. animation: an interdisciplinary journal 1(2): 153-72. R. W hether cinema is indexical/analogue or simulacral/digital. In other words. or cinephilic. London: Tantivy Press. Cinema does not sit in isolation of the world. 109—29. ‘Udder Trouble’. Accessed 21 November 2011. ----------. ‘Cultural Studies in a Post-Culture’. S. Film. Nonetheless. We are with the world. The time-image is not a set of techniques. not better understood as the wisdom o f loving? In loving —in loving without measure. Malden: WileyBlackwell. and therefore to help us to think. London: Verso. London: Routledge. Anonymous 2000.). digital technology enables us to create a cinema. The Cinema o f Alain Resnais. ----------. 1968. The Reality o f Illusion: An EcologicalApproach to Cognitive Eilm Theory. ----------. ‘The Neglected Tradition o f Phenomenology in Film Theory’. Film/Genre. Aldred. in which we see ourselves as simply a part of the continuum o f the world. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. together with some of the more esoteric aspects o f quantum physics. or a supercinema. have the ‘loving’ aspect o f their linguistic construction as a suffix. Cinema is dead? Long live supercinema! Bibliography Abbas. Philosophy is commonly understood as the love o f wisdom.such that philosophy must. ----------. ‘From Synthespian to Avatar: Re-framing the Digital Human in Final Fantasy and The Polar Express'. London: Routledge. exhausting it . pp. London: BFI. 1971. the Hollywood mainstream. Wide Angle 2(2): 44—49. pp. Patterns o f Realism. Cinema is with us and with the world. from cinephilia to paedophiUa. ----------. Armes. A. 1974. Princeton: Princeton University Press. is a philosophical machine. M. what cinema can do is to enable us to be mindful o f our enworlded nature. Nelson and D. M ists o f Regret: Culture and Sensibility in Classic Erench Eilm. after Nancy. R.

2004b. Beebe. Film Architecture and the Transnational Imagination: Set Design in 1930s European Cinema. R. Shaw and P. ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Towards an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter’. Benjamin. pp.). London: Vintage. Burchill). Mast. Pogson). M. W hat is Cinema? Vol. Cohen and L. H. H. Garcia-Mainar (eds.: M IT Press. R. Belton. ‘The Chronoarchitecture o f the Hunjan Brain . Jean Renoir (trans. M ilton Keynes: Lightning Source.). Future Cinema: The Cinematic Imaginary afier Film. I. French Cultural Studies 15(3): 281-99. Neuroimage 22(1)419-33. 1978. pp. Mitchell). 2004. ----------. H. W. Eisenstein: A Life in Conflict.A. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bartels.. Cambridge. Rosenbaum). G. del Rfo-Alvaro and L. //(tran s. A. 1991.A. Technology and Society 27(5): 367—72. Philosophy o f Science A{3) Quly): 289-98. W. Marston Gate: Elibron Classics. Horeck and T. Mass.S. Braudy (eds. J. 1971. Oxford: Oxford University Press.'Der Film bei Deleuze/Le Cinima Selon Deleuze.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone. Manchester: Clinamen. ‘Will CinemaScope Save the Film Industry?’. 1990. Sobchack (ed. J. pp. Bergfelder. Kendall (eds. Barad. A. 2007. Bazin.D. D. Cambridge. in C. Bianco. 1972. 2003. W W . Gray). ‘Film Theory for the Digital World: Connecting the Masters to the New Digital Cinema’. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Gray). Badiou. R. Berkeley: University of California Press. in G. Bibliography 159 ----------. Bensmai'a. 105-16. T. A. Time and Tree Will: An Esay on the Immediate Data o f Consciousness (trans. Camera Lucida: Rejlections on Photography (trans.M. Andy Serkis as Actor. L. London: W H . Barthes. ‘W hat Time is it? Netv Temporal Regimes in Contemporary Science Fiction C inem a. Bordwell. Body and Gorilla: Motion Capture and the Presence o f Performance’. 2008.). . R. 1: Film. Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Reading. pp. 2000. N.).R 2004. Weimar: Verlag der Bauhaus-Universitat Weimer/Presses de la Nouvelle Sorbonne. Berton Jr. ----------. Howard). Simon). Berkeley: University o f California Press. Dialectic o f Duration (trans. ----------. ‘L’“espace quelconque” comme “personnage conceptual’”. 2003. Blackmore. Mast. Binkley. J. J. 2000. ‘Techno-Cinema’. Orson Welles: A Critical View (trans. Sperb (eds. EL. pp.). R. ‘The Work of Art in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction. Narration in the Fiction Film. and S. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 2003. 2000. 2007. 1997. J. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 1991. 197A. ‘The Speed Death o f the Eye: The Ideology of Hollywood Film Special Effects’. Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag Winter. in T. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 2^{5) (March): 801-31. ‘Digitizing Frenchness in 2001: O n a “Historic” Moment in the French Cinema’. ‘Painting by the Numbers: The Digital Intermediate’.. Grusin. J. 13-19. Bohr.Z. S. Bergson. Creative Evolution (trans. ----------. M. London/New York: Routledge. Barker.Natural Viewing Conditions Reveal a Time-Based Anatomy of the Brain. Balcerzak and J. 2009. Enjoying Watching Rape. Cinephilia in the Age o f D igital ReproducHon Vol. Pleasure and D igital Culture. Cinema and Sensation: Erench Film and the A rt o f Transgression. pp. 2007. Ontological Anarchy. Human Brain M apping2\{2): 75-85. T . Poetic Terrorism.. Deleuze: The Clamor o f Being (trans. A. Leonardo: D igital Image—Digital'Cinema Supplemental Issue 3 ’. 2000. Halsey II and W H . ‘Digital Dilemmas’. in S. Weibel (eds. J. New York: Autonomedia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Berkeley: University of California Press. Beugnet. G. New York: Columbia University Press. 2005. M eta Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture o f Quick Change. B. T. 2000. ‘A Century o f Electronic Cinema’. Bergan. in O. Steps to an Ecology o f M ind. 1937. Baguer. 2009. ‘A fter Arnold: Narratives o f the Posthuman Cinema’. London: Little Brown. Film Quarterly (Aif)) (Spring): 58-65. and R. Balcerzak. Mass. H.). Comparative Literature Studies A\Q>)377-403. in V. Boddy. M. ‘Watching Rape. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Balazs. Leonardo: D igital Image— D ista l Cinema Supplemental Issue 3: 5-11. 159-79.M. 2011. and S. M.: M IT Press. S. Bachelard. Harris. 1967. Engell {eAs.W. McAIlester Jones). Barker. Screen 49(2): 142—56. Remediation: Understanding New Media. The New Extremism in Cinema: From France to Europe. 2009. Fahle and L. 1990. 1985. The Close U p .. 260-62. in G. London: Elm Tree Books. Zeki 2004a. W hat is Cinema? (trans. Bateson.: How Does a Study o f Audience Cha(lle)nge Film Studies Approaches?’. Functional Brain Mapping during Free Viewing of Natural Scenes’. The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience. 140-59. Im a^nation and Desire in Contemporary Anglo-American Literature and Film. Memory. ‘Causality and Complementarity’. Bulletin o f Science.D . 1997. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. Allen. pp. 245-51.). 2008. Braudy (eds. Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings. 195-213. 81-85. Bey. in J. . K. pp. 665-81. Street.). M.1 5 8 Bibliography Austin. Bolter. T. 2004. Cohen and L.

Film Theory and Contemporary Hollywood Movies. Durham. Cameron. Abingdon/ New York: Roudedge/AFI. London/New York: R oudedgf ■ “T w i L f °" “'T l A cce^ . Kutiy. Bordwell and N. ‘Datamoshing and the Emergence'of Digital omplexity from Digital Chaos’.C. Film Futures’. Digital Imagery and Colour’. f^ m d l^ ^ * ^ T ls s ^ ‘ in Contemporary Cinema. the W ind'. pp. Buckland fed 1 F 7 7 2 . Lewis (ed. Butler. B r o „ .. 'M an W id. c u Morphing and the Performance of Self.C. . 1970. W . Sobchack (ed. 2006. ‘Camera-Eve Cr. Tht L io h K in g ^ i. Cnichester. 2011. and the Modular Narrative: 21 Grams and Irreversible. ‘A Monstrous Cinema’. I. J.C. 1998.o„.2 /„ i. Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Sdence Fiction. Zooming Out: The End o f Offscreen Space’. ‘Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes o f Cran^ Theory. W . 'O” N»»1G-Spor. Neale and M R A London: Roudedge. 2012. Durham. — (forthcoming). Durham. 2012. New Review o f Film and Television Studies — . ‘Neuroscience. A. Carroll feds ) Pm t 7h d Sadies.. Gender Trouble.). ^ ° ”*'"^Lorary Hollywood Cinema. theD lriial — . and N. Convergence: The InternationalJournal o f Research into New Media Technobgies 18(2): 165-76.. ‘A Close Encounter with Raiders of the Lost Ark: Notes on Narrative Aspects o f the New Hollywood Blockbuster’. Butler.v . in D. Order.i6o Bibliography . London: Roudedge.f c Special Effects and Supermen in the 20th Century.: Duke University Press. in S. or Unbecoming Cinema in Enter the Void.W .F. Language-Games in Film Theory.o„. Image [& ]Narrative 12(4): 43-55. 2012b. W and D H. 248-73. Film Theory: Rational Reconstructions. Abingdon: Roudedge Bulatman. 2006. Brown. ~ 2009a.Movie. Carroll (eds) 199/^ Pnci. Colour and the M oving Image. —. SubStance 5l{l): 88-104 ^^2012a. London: Continuum. Basingstoke: Palgrave Moving Image. Bucldand.^’.d. ‘Deterritorialisation and Schizoanalysis in David Finchers Fight Club’. Wiley-Blackwell.: Duke University Press. ‘Contingency. in V. a Movie C a „ .. Brovm and L. MenTowards a Posthumanist Cinema. of A m aaion. N. ‘Voiding Cinema: Subjectivity beside Itself.V » v . pp.-?. P uzzb Films: Complex Storytelling in Contemporary Cinema. oordwellj D. pp.. ‘in J.™ . 1996. London: Roudedge.e „ . in W. and M. 1990. Watkins (eds. Madison: University o f W i s c o n S ^ ^ Bibliography . Deleuze Studies 5(2): 275-99. ^ 1993.— .A b i„ g d o „ /N e „ Y o . London: Roudedge. 2011b ‘The Pre-Narrative Monstrosity of Images: How Images Demand Narrative. Meta-Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture o f Quick Change.. in S.: Duke University Press. \r . Unive„i. j C » ^ ^ p . ° ~ 2009b. The Cinema o f Roman Polanski. Fleming. 2009. w 2009a.A Cinema Journal i%{5) (Spring: 122-28 i6i . N. 2002b. ^Cinematic”’.London: Brooker. 225-49. B ro w .TL n M a d i„ „ . Directed by Steven Spielberg: Poetics o f the Contemporary Hollywood iUockbuster. Film-Philosophy. W 1998. Cambridge: Cambridge University .^ 5 S ^ e r ™ 1 ® '° ^ 'J ' °™ . The Velvet Light Trap 58: 65-78. N. Street. W. The New American Cinema. New York: Tantivy Press.). S.).y o f w L L ‘ p tf 16^7 ^ 'T S e d g i ^ ^ ^ ’ Comprehension and Film. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

----------. D iftta l Aesthetics. 682—89. (ed. Crary and S. The New M edia Book. Colman. Burchell and H . The Collapse o f Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World.C. Mast. Hurley. 1998. Oxford: OneWorld. Cambridge. 5 65 -7 A.). The Feeling o f W hat Happens: Body. Corrigan. ----------. Flaxman (ed. The Cinema Effect. London: Continuum. 1988. and J.i 62 Bibliography ----------. Deleuze. 117-39. and C.B. Cinema 2 : 1’image-temps. M.E. D. com/2010/feamre-articles/making-space/>. ----------. Narboni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. in G. 2003. ----------. Accessed 21 November 2011. London: Vintage. The M atrix. a n d j. Hurley). Cohen. Nicholson-Smith). Cinema 1: The Movement Image (trans. ----------. Harries (ed. Theory. A. Manchester: University of Manchester Press. Carroll. Mass.E. Dennett. with C. ‘Phalke. The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy o f Cinema. Tomlinson). G. 1994. Mass. H . 2003. ----------. 2009. <http://www.: M IT Press. Damasio. Senses o f Cinema 57.sensesofcinema. DeLong. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. Galeta). Philosophy and Cognitive Science. pp. E 2010. A.. Baroque'{txzsxs. London: Continuum. G. London: BFI. in G. G. Cinephilia in the Age o f D iftta l Reproduction: Film. ‘Entreuen avec Roman Polanski’. 2006. 1987. 2002. Casebier. Clover. ----------. London: Continuum. 2010. Meliw and Special Effects T oda/. W hat is Philosophy? {yx2j\s.). Warholstars: Andy Warhol Films. ComoUi. ‘The "Camera as Camera”: How CGI Changes the World As We Know It’. D. New York: Urzone. Davies. 1988. Reason. Accessed 21 November 2011. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. New York: Zone Books. in J. Lane). A.. London: Wallflower. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nothelfer. H . Stivale). Descartes’s Error: Emotion. London: Vintage. Currie. Vol. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology o f Film. M. 1989. Tomlinson and B. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (trans. New York: Zone. M. London: Roudedge. London: Continuum. C. 2004b. Bibliography 163 ----------. Guattari. J. Tomlinson and B. 1. War in the Age o f Intelligent Machines. Balcerzak and J. ----------. UhJmann). Film. Film and Phenomenology: Towards a Realist Theory o f Cinematic Representation. Seem and H. in D. T.// www. A rt and Superstars. 2010. Patton). ----------.. Massumi). Delahaye.). ‘The Exhausted’ (trans. London: BFI. 129-67. Habberjam). 1992. Zone 6: Incorporations. G. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Lookingfo r Spinoza: Joy.. 1983. S. Crockett. 2004. M. and Philosophy: The Key Thinkers. 1997.d. London: Penguin. T. Visual D igital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media Genres. London: Vintage. Brandy (eds. ----------. J-L. 1991. ----------.). New York: Zone. 1994. 1995. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (trans. Wide Angle 21(1): 115-30. London: Roudedge.). 1998. A. 17—29. M. ‘Nonorganic Life’. Habberjam). Antimatter. pp. Cubitt. Conley). ----------. Emotion and the M aking o f Consciousness. 1991. London: Penguin. 1986. Guirgis). and the Human Brain. One Thousand Years o f Nonlinear History. R. Cutting. 2000. Image and M ind: Film. A Thousand Plateaus (trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen and L. ----------. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (trans. 1994. Difference and Repetition (trans. 1969. and I.T.warholstars. <http.. 1979. The Cinematic City. 1 9 9 2 . Narboni. Pleasure and D iftta l Culture. E (ed. London: Penguin. n. Cambridge. and F. pp. Cahiersdu Cinema 208 (January): 23-3ftand 62-63. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. ----------. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cinema 2: The Time Image (trans. ----------. 1991. ----------. London: Penguin. H. San Francisco: City Lights Books. M.). J. ‘The Brain is the Screen (trans. Cavell.: Harvard University Press. London: BFI. 1992. Sperb (eds. ‘A ttention and the Evolution o f Hollywood Film’. A Cinema W ithout Walls: Movies and Culture after Vietnam. M. Joughin). 2000. Clarke. ----------. De Landa. 2002. Other Worlds: Space. Men. New York: Zone. Debord. Women and Chainsaws: Gender in the M odem Horror Film. 2005. London: Continuum. New York: Zone Books. S. 1991. Superspace and the Quantum Universe. ..E. London: Athlone Press. in S.R. S. G. Darley. Deleuze. Bergonism (trans. Interpreting the M oving Image. Psychological Science 432-39. T. 2004a. ----------. The Logic o f Sense (trans.].). 2010. D. The Told: Leibniz and the. Sorrow and the Eeeling Brain. 1997. 1991. 2010. Stewart. Kwinter (eds. 2000. R. pp. 1999a. Freedom Evolves. G.html>. pp. Tomlinson and R. London: Verso. Consciousness Explained. Comenas. ‘Digital Filming and Special Effects’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004. SubStance 24(3): 3—28. Clover. Lester. ‘Cinema/Ideology/Criticism’. Society o f the Spectacle (trans. J. Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Reading. 1995. From Eternity to Here: The Questfo r the Ultimate Theory o f Time. ----------. P. Close. B. ‘Making Space’. ----------.

Grodal.Film Form. Greene. pp.: Kessinger Publications.E. Strauven (ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. London: Harcourt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ‘Montage o f Attractions: For Enough Stupidity in Every Wiseman (trans. A. Cinefex 120: 68-146. London: Arnold. 1990. inT . Druckery. Grace. L. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. in W. T. Place. B. Cambridge. ----------.M. Buckland (ed. ‘The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity’. Consciousness: How M atter Becomes Im apnation. Enticknap. Differences 18(1): 128-52. Discourse on M ethod 2.. G. Lewin). A. London/New York: Routledge. Fleming. ‘The Seduction o f Reality’. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 1998. Geuens.). Bibliography 165 ----------. Sight and Sound. 205-23. ----------. pp. Filmosophy.-P. London: Wallflower. 2006. ----------. Elsaesser. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 30(2): 1491-528. Future Cinema: The Cinematic Imaginary after Film. Dyer. 1998. T. J. Buckland.: M IT Press. Emotion. London: Penguin. London: Penguin.i64 Bibliography Descartes. Studies in European Cinema 2{?>): 159-71. Mass. and W. J. ‘Battleship Potemkin’. Frame. or Future Cinema(s) Past’. pp. 9-26. T. Mont. and G. 2000. Senses o f Cinema 4. Elsaesser. Galloway. Feynman. in W. R. 1997. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Barker (eds. 2010. and Identity in Films about the Land. Film Form: Essays in Film Theory (ed. 1969. Gelmis. ----------.ejumpcut. 1974. D. inT. 1 9 9 5 . pp. ‘Cinema Futures: Convergence. 2009. Frampton. Content and Criticism in the “Post-Analogue” Era’. and Film. Cambridge. Cinema Futures: Cain. 31-41. 1998.J. A. 2003. ‘Bare Bones o f Sex: Part I’. 2006. 2002.P. October: 7-10. 2002. 1998. Helfield (eds. Hagener. London/ New York: Wallflower. The Transparency o f Spectacle: Meditations on the M oving Image. 2002. Sight and Sound.M. 274-81.). <http://tvww.H . Sutcliffe). ‘Fugitive Realities. Hoffmann (eds. Culture. New York: State University of New York Press. M oving Image Technology: From Zoetrope to Digital. L. and G. EE.. Accessed 1 December 2011.>.W.).). ‘Showing and Telling: Image and World in Early Cinema’ (trans. Quarterly Review o f Film and Video 29(5): 415-24.. D . Everett. Early Cinema: Space. Eisenstein. Fowler. Doane. Elsaesser and K. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. QED: The Strange Theory o f Light and M atter. Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture. London: Seeker & Warburg. Fausto-Sterling. and K. D. Veitch). 2003. 2011. —-— —-. D. and M. Barnard).R. J. 2005. Cinema Futures: Cain. Tononi. J. A. 2001. Difference’. 1993. Gleick. 1986. ‘A Skeuomorphic C inema. T . ‘A Beautiful Mind(fuck): Hollywood Structures of Identity’. 2004. London: Penguin. Hoffmann. R. W. “Situational Realities”. From Plato to Lumikre: Narration and Monstration in Literature and Cinema (trans. Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling in Contemporary Cinema. ----------. J. T. 2005. in J. 2010. 60-65. 2009. J. 1994. Principles o f Philosophy (trans. G. . London: Vintage. Situated Realities. In preparation. Elsaesser and A.r\A The Meditations (trans. 2009. Eig. W. Dixon. Hidden Dimensions. ‘The Mind-Game Film’. Abel or Cable? — The Screen Arts in the DigffalAge. Elsaesser. Film Quarterly 55(4) (. Whitefish. and W./«»*/> CutAG. T . Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Leyda). ‘Big and Loud’. sensesofcinema. Oxford: Q arendon Press. Embodied Vision: Evolution. London: BFI. Berkeley: University o f California Press. 1997. The Emergence o f Cinematic Time: Modernity. 1998. The Film Director as Superstar. H. August: 6-10. ‘Fractal Films and the Architecture o f Complexity’. Genette.: Harvard University Press. Architecture and Science Fiction Film: Philip K D ick and the Spectacle o f Home. 1971. Shaw and P. Edelman. ‘A ction!’. Gross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Narrative. The EcologicalApproach to Vistial Perception. ‘Electronic Enlightenment or the Digital Dark Age? Anticipating Film in an Age without Film’.A. The Cinema o f Attractions Reloaded. Chaos: M aking a New Science. Gibson. C. and trans.). M oving Pictures: A New Theory o f Film Genres. 2000.Su m m er)16-27. Weibel (eds. and the Questfo r the U ltim ate Theory. 2006. Representing the Rural: Space. Friedberg. Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern. Film Theory: A n Introduction through the Senses.mindfilms/text. ‘The Digital World Picture’. Studying Contemporary American Film: A Guide to Movie Analysis. 2006. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. S. Mass. London: Vintage. Gaudreault. Paratexts: Thresholds o f Interpretation (trans. J. J. Feeling and Cognition. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. M. Divergence. J. ‘Discipline Through Diegesis: The Rube Film between “A ttraaions” and “Narrative Integration”’. 1990.. Howe). Abel or Cable? — The Screen Arts in the D igital Age. Aldershot: Ashgate. T. 2009. The Dratna Review 18(1): 77-85. ----------. pp. Accessed 21 November 2011. R. 2005. <http://www. Gerould). htm l>.2003/eig.). The Elegant Universe: Superstrings. J.T. Contingency The Archive. Elsaesser. Fortin. Brown.

N. Nordicom Review 5(1/2): 39—49. ‘W hat’s the Point of an Index? or. Furman. Mass. London: Penguin. BCaku. Kramer (eds. Macmillan. Cambridge. U. ----------. Reading Science Fiction Film. K. Miller and R. Early Film.. J. The Macmillan International Film Encyclopaedia. 1997. Dudai and L. Faking Photographs’. pp. ‘Electronic and Computer Games: The ITistory of an Interactive Medium’. Gessler. 2005. Cambridge. The End o f Celluloid: Film Futures in the D igital Age.J. 2004. Sams and J. 1995. O. Grieveson and P. Frame. D. Paris: L’Harmattan. 1994. ‘Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film’. New Philosophyfo r New Media. M. Hardt. 2001. London: Penguin.K. Projections: The Journalfor Movies and M ind 2(1): 1—26. Heme de Lacotte.02/fflucas.'Nichols (ed. P. J-P..nih. 2000. New York: Harper Perennial. Cinetech: Film. Frontiers in Neuroinformatics 4(5). Screen 29(2): 52-73. M. pp. 41-50.i66 Bibliography Gunning. M. A. Berkeley: University of California Press.). and P. in T. Kelly. ______ .. F. W. Movies & Methods: An Anthology Volume 1. ----------. Now You Don’t”: The Temporality of the Cinema of Attractions’.B. ‘Inter-Subject Correlation o f Brain Hemodynamics During Watching a Movie: Localisation in Space and Frequency’. 89—101. Stam (eds. 2001. Differences 18(1): 29—52.>. Empire. 2000.. <http://www. U. G. 2004. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6(6): 851-57. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row. Narrative. Keane. Neuron 57(3): 452—62.. 1981. Questions o f Cinema. Ivty. 2007. Heeger. Barker (eds. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in M odem Science. I. 314-24. Deleuze: philosophic et cinema: Lepassage de I’imagemouvement a 1‘image-temps. ‘The Cinema o f Attractions: Early Film. Hasson. B.ncbi. U. W hat is Called Thinking? (ynaxs. Haddon. R. From Aliemto The Matrix. S. and A. Malach. New Punk Cinema. Understanding Indian Movies: Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. M . Rombes (ed. M ultitude: War and Democracy in the Age o f Empire. 2004. Cambridge. Accessed 5 December 2011.. Science 303(5664): 1634-40. Early Cinema: Space. 2 0 0 5 .). Kaveney. Mies: RotoVision. London: IB Tauris. in N. 1989. “‘Now You See It. Wide Angle 63—70. I. Negri. Gray). 1 9 9 4 . 1990. . Landesman. 2008b.B .wired. <http:// www. 1968. ‘Intersubject Synchronisation o f Cortical Activity During Natural Vision’. A Companion to Film Theory. 2004.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1976.: Harvard University Press. Fuhrmann and R. Hansen.. Macquarrie and E. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Parisi. ‘Time Perception: Brain Time or Event Time’. ‘The Long Take’.: Harvard University Press. ----------. 2000. Elsaesser and A. ------. Accessed 21 November 2011 .). Hasson.—. Levy. Nishida. Davachi.Q . ----------. Katz. Hayles. 2005. Y. 2009. Convergence. Kauppi. 2008a. London: Flamingo. 2008. ‘DVD and the New Cinema of Complexity’. pp. Hanson. Hogan. and S. ‘A n Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous Spectator’. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.html>. O. and New Media. ----------. ‘The Cinema of Attraction.. Brave New World. ----------. Johnston. London: Penguin. Huxley. 1988.C. Robinson). and N. Mass. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. in B. pp. ‘Enhanced Intersubject Correlations during Movie Viewing Correlate with Successful Episodic Encoding’. \jm daa:. Parallel Worlds: The Science o f Alternative Universes atnd Our Future in the Cosmos. 2004a. and M ulhollandD rive. Its Spectators and the Avant-Garde’. Harbord. 1986. Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde’. nlm. 2004. 1 9 9 6 . ‘Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality’. Jenkins. Being and Time (trans. ‘The Representation ofTempbral Information in Perception and M otor Control’. L. Current Biology 11(11): 427-30.: M IT Press. London: Roudedge. pp. 2006.P. 2007. London: Palgrave Macmillan. I. Vallines. Wired 5{2) (February). 2008. A.N . New York: New York University Press. ‘Beyond Star Wars’. M . Cognition. Nir.M. Harper. and Scientific Imagination. Tohka. ‘The Work of Theory in the Age o f Digital Transformation’. in L. J. Hasson. S. G. 2007. 56-62. H . London: Blackwell. Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics o f Sensation. E. Heisenberg. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. 234—61. ----------. 2004b. B.j. Commonwealth. Jameson. The Silent Cinema Reader. B. ‘The Slipstream o f Mixed Reality: Unstable Ontologies and Semiotic Markers in The Thirteenth Floor. R. 2004. The Evolution o f Film: Rethinking Film Studies. Y. inT . Clark. Bibliography 167 Heidegger. T. M. Heath. Knappmeyer. S. PM LA 119(3): 482-99. London: BFI. 2010. Mass.). Rubin and D. A rt & Text 34: 31-45. Dark City. Henderson. Convergence Culture: Where O ld and New M edia Collide.

Mirineapolis: University of Minnesota Press. The Oxford Guide to Film Studies.i68 Bibliography BCinder. Spectacular Narratives: Hollywood in the Age o f the Blockbuster. King. London: IB Tauris.). 2008.. Sinherbrink. 1980. London: Routledge. Neumann (eds). pp. animation: an interdisciplinary journal l{\): 25-44. 2008. New Review o f Film and Television Studies 4(2): 93-106. 2005. in G. Kievan. ‘A nimation and Animorphs: A Brief Disappearing Act’. Bibliography 169 . 1999. Mast. 1 9 9 1 . and the Home. 21-39.)-. Accessed 2 1 November 2011. 1999.). 2002. New York: Basic Books. L. Recent Work on Cinema as Philosophy’. in M. ‘The A rt o f Technology: Contours of Space in the Science Fiction Film . 595-604. Mass. 2000b. The D igital Dialectic: New Essays on New Media. Screen 16(4): 46-61. T. New Screen Media: CinemalArt/Narrative. ’ ----------. 2001. M. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006. Sight and Sound. ----------. in J. Beyond the M ultiplex: Cinema. London: BFI. Macnab. in I. Laine. M. McKay). New Review o f Film and Television Studies 4{2): 75—92.). ‘Zeuxis vs RealityEngine: Digital Realism and Virtual Worlds’.: Duke University Ptess. ----------. 2008. Cohen and L. Cambridge. Glory and Failure: The Difference Engines o f Johann Muller. Theses on Cinema as Philosophy. 2006. Spectacle and the Spaghetti Western’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http:// www. 2008. MacCormack (eds. M illennium Film Journal 54 (Fall). ----------. Film Quarterly 55(4): 2-15.C.>. 2010. ----------. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. Journal o f Aesthetics and A rt Griticism 64{\): 11-18. The Language o f New Media. Cinema and National Identity: Narrative Time in National Contexts. 1998. Kissel. 2006.G. L. October!A\ 45-73. Sobchack (ed. August: 20-22. Klein. I. A. J. ‘Theoty and Film: Principles o f Realism and Pleasure’. 2092. ----------. G. Journal o f Visual Culture 7(3)' 349-61. Accessed 21 Novembet 2011. 67-76. 2002. 2002. pp. Charles Babbage and Georg and Edvard Scheutz (ttans. L. Sofi Cinema: Navigating the Database. Mullarkey and R. London: Wallflower. G. Braudy (eds. The Skin o f Film: Lntercultural Cinema. ----------.). pp. Brown. Mass. D. Cambridge. Lant. 75-88. M. Church Gibson (eds. Cambridge. pp.). 79-92. 2006. MacCabe. 2000a. ‘Parting Glances’. ‘Cinema as Second Skin: Under the Membrane o f Horror Film’. 2000. Konigsberg.). C.: M IT Press. Cinema Journal 45Q. Mandelbrot.html>. Marks. and D. Levitin. Manovich. Science 156(3775): 636-38. A. Lewis.U. Marcus. Rieser and A. 1975. P. Cambridge. Berkeley: University o f California Press. ‘From D V Realism to a Universal Recording Machine’. in G.). Embodiment and the Senses. J.. <http://m^-onIine. ‘Haptical Cinema’. Film Performance: From Achievement to Appreciation. pp. Klinger. Manovich. 1990. Hill and P. Deleuze and World Cinemas. Princeton: Princeton University Press. G. with W. Visualizing the City. Lindgren. Film Theory and Criticism: . B. S. Martin-Jones. D. . Gaut. Space and Beyond: The Frontier Theme in Science Fiction. D. C. L. Meta-Morphing: Visual Tranformation and the Culture o f Quick Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.. New York: Creation Books. New Technologies. Kracauer. in P. N. and M.Introductory Reading. 2002. ‘Image Future’. L. The Terrain of the Long Take’. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1434: 394-405. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.M . 2004. Film-Philosophy 14(1). Legrady. Lunenfeld (ed. G. and A. This is Your Brain on Music: Understanding a Human Obsession.: M IT Press. Mass. in V. 2005. 2006. Convergence: The International Journal o f Research into New M edia Technologies 5(2): 80-99. Livingston. New Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction. ‘Schizoanalysis. Mass. Martin-Jones. 2011. 1995.manovich. Lakoff. Philosophy Compass 3(4)' 590-603. 1999. ‘Palace in Wonderland’. Deleuze. Database as Symbolic Form’. Avatars and Narrative Fields Forever: Bunuel’s Legacy for New Digital Media and Interactive Database Narrative’. ‘Film and Changing Technologies’.: M IT Press pp 172-92. . . 98-101. ‘How Electrons Remember’. B. Malanga. Metaphors We Live By. G. ‘The Politics o f Sepatation (On Deux ou trois choses que je sais d ’elleanA Toutva bieri}’. Buchanan and P. B. Kratky. Johnson. . Intersecting the Virtual and the Real: Space in Interactive Media Installations’. . BCipnis.: M IT Press. Theory o f Film: The Redemption o f Physical Reality. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied M ind and Tts Challenge to Western Philosophy. Westfahl (ed. London: IB Tauris. . Croydon: Adantic Books. pp. ‘Following the Footsteps’. 2000. 1998. 1997. . 1967. ‘W hat Is Digital Cinema?’. ‘How Long is the Coast o f Britain? Statistical Self-Similarity and Fractal Dimensions’. 2000. Deleuze and the Schizoandlysis o f Cinema. Westport: Greenwood Press. Touch: Seruuous Theory and Multi-Sensory Media. N. 221-26. London: Continuum.. Zapp (eds. ‘H ot Spots. 2008. London: Continuum. A. ArchivingWarhol: Writings and Photographs. 2002. W hat is Film-Philosophy? Round Table’.

Screen Consciousness: Cinema. and S. Refractions o f Reality: Philosophy and the M oving Image. Martin-Jones and W. Martin-Jones. S. ‘A ction Bodies in Futurist Space: Bodybuilder Stardom as Special Effect. D. 1-17. A u fo n d des images. 2004b. The M atrix Trilogy: Cyberpunk’Reloaded.. Boston: Reidel. pp. L. pp. M ind and World. 160-70. and the Laws o f Physics. Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future o f Narrative in Cyberspace. ‘Digitalization and the Instrumentalist Approach to the Photographic Image’. Martin-Jones and W. ‘The Poet and the Detective: Defining the Psychological Puzzle Film’.: M IT Press. London: Reaktion Press.' Panek. Connor. 1990. D igital Filmmaking: The C hangngArt and Craft o f M aking M otion Pictures. Proceedings o f the Royal Society 264(1380): 393-99. McClean. The Communist Manifesto (trans. pp. Varela. New York: Dover Publications. ‘The Uncanny Valley (trans. 1975. Pepperell and M. Miinsterberg. S. London: BFI. pp. Film Architecture: Set Designsfrom Metropolis to Bladerunner. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. and T.php/f-p/article/view/260/217>. Barker (eds. 1998. 2000. in V. Parablesfo r the Virtual. Morphing Magic. D. in T. The Emperors New M ind: Concerning Computers.-L. M. M inds.A. 121-36. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. The Inoperative Community (trans. 2010.. 152—72. D. Phillips (ed.E. Brown (eds. 2009. Elsaesser and A. 2008. 1970.J. pp. Moutoussis. 2 0 0 5 . J. Penrose. ----------. 2004a. 1997. Mclver Lopes. pp. Nancy. T. Richardson and A.). 2005. B. London: BFI. Frame. Ndalianis.170 Bibliography <http://www. and E Engels. Minnis. ‘Virtual Actors. L. Massumi. London: Verso. Cinematic Thinking: Philosophical Approaches to the New Cinema. R. Ohanian. Global Hollywood 2. D igital Storytelling: The Narrative Power o f Visual Effects in Film. ‘Neuropsychology of Timing and Time Perception.J. Pekerman. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Deleuze and Film. andW . London: Wallflower. North. A. Garbus. Brown. 1985. London: Penguin. in D. Energy Jiff)-. S. K. J. 2008. Meek. ‘Special Effects.).: M IT Press.: M IT Press. D. Cycles o f Time: An Extraordinary New View o f the Universe. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’. in D. 2012. and the 1990s Cinema of Attractions’. Convergence: The InternationalJournal o f Research into New Media Technologies 6(2): 41-61. K. Punt (eds. N. Marx. R. Being Singular Plural (trans.: M IT Press. J. London: Wallflower. Sawhney). Neumann. 251-71. Bibliography 1 7 1 Murray. ----------. ‘Impact Aesthetics: Back to -the Future in Digital Cinema? Millennial Fantasies’.). 1991. Mass. Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the M oving Image. 1970. Maturana.F. in S. ‘The Aesthetics o f Photographic Transparency’. Minneola. ----------. 2006. P. Mullarkey. 1998. Kuhn (ed. Wang. 2012.T. Cambridge. W H . Screen 16(3) (Autumn): 6-18. Brain and Cognition 58(1): 1-8. Mass. ‘Tlie Wonder o f Digital Worlds’.. ----------. P. T .H . Performing Illusions: Cinema. 2006. Iris 25: 49-59. K. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. 2003. 41-64. C. R. Sobchack (ed. J. O ’Byrne). 2005. Movement. ----------. in A. London: Vintage. Affect. Musser. 2002. Mass. 1989. Special Effects and the Coming o f the Virtual Actor. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization o f the Living. Gillis (ed. Alien Zone IT: The Spaces o f Science-Fiction Cinema. S. Cambridge.. L. 2007. ----------. Early Cinema: Space. ‘Introduction: Deleuze’s World Tour of Cinem a. 48-61. ‘Tomorrow’s World I h a t We Shall Build Today. Critical Inquiry 52{3): 443-81. 2000. Vie Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era. Durham. Mitchell. * Mulvey.). Govil. in J. Enright). New York: Prestel. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Moore).. M ind 112(447):433-48.C. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. and M. London: Vintage. MacDorman andTakashi Minato). ‘The Schizoanalysis o f European Surveillance Films’. W. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 1999. Narrative. Zeki. ----------. Sensation. ‘Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics’. Miller. 1980. Holland and S. D. ----------. 256-72. in R. pp. N. McMurrie. H. 1992. Paris: Galilee. Morgan.). Mass. Brown (eds. Neo-baroque Aesthetics and Contemporary Entertainment.). ‘A Direct Demonstration of Perceptual Asynchrony in Vision. Film Criticism 31(1-2): 62-88. Cambridge. 1996. Cambridge. McQuire. 2006. 2000. Accessed 5 April 2012. Mizejewski.: Duke University Press. E. 2003.). 2006. . Phillips. Meta-Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture o f Quick Change. ----------. pp.).film-philosophy. 33-35. Maxell. The Film: A Psychological Study — The Silent Photoplay in 1916. Mori. S. ‘H ie Nickelodeon Era Begins: Establishing the Framework for Hollywood’s Mode of Representation’. Southern Review 37(1): 21-33. H. and EJ. 2000. Boston: Focal Press. Spectacle and Special Effects: Kung Fu Meets All that CGI Bullshit’. ‘Claire Denis: Icon o f Ferocity’ (trans. Deleuze and Film.

2005. in S. ^ o f Filmic Artifects: Cinema and Cinematography in the Digital E ra. 1984. Stengers. Rosen. Volk). Balcerzak and J. Accessed 21 November 2011. . in M. ‘Speed is the M other o f Cinema. The Virtual Life o f Film. Vol 1 . 2007. Sperb (eds.). Elsaesser and K. Architectures o f Illusion. 2007. 2003. Space and Culture 10(3). A History o f Experimental Film and Video: From Canonical Avant-Garde to Contemporary British Practice. Oxford: Berg. Pierson. 2010. Denny). Renoir. 1-20 ^ °T re sf Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 2007. Projections: TheJournalfo r Movies and M ind ACT) (Winter). Time and Narrative Volume 1 (trans. N. 209-24. erez. Mass. R. Neale and M. Battista). Prince S. ‘A bsorption and Theatricality in the Cinema: Some Thoughts on Narrative and Spectacle’. ’ Rombes. R. London: Falcon Press. Theories and Practices o f Digitextuality. 2010. 2007.). Harper Perennial R am achandr^ VS. ‘The Science o f Art: A Neurological eory of Aesthetic Experience’. Oxford: Berg. 1999.. P. King (ed. Contemporary Hollywood Cinemat London. Special Effects: Still in Search o f Wonder. Order O ut O f Chaos: M an’s New Dialogue with Nature.X 2001. V E 1972. M c L a u g h lin and D . Screen 50(1): 45-53.T Galdwell (eds. 2006. P. Renoir on Renoir: Interviews.C. ‘Flashing Digital Animations: Pixar’s Digital Aesthetic’. Cambridge. in S.rottentomatoes.. Rees.). pp. Perldns. 214—34. J. Boys and Girls: Gender in Film a t the tn d of the Twentieth Century. Hoffmann (eds. and S. 2002. N. 1996. 1997. . 2005. Essays. P. Salt B. French Film. 135-64. and Remarks (trans. Screen 48(1). pp. 2007. Film Criticism 31(1-2): 5-61. J. ‘A Taxonomy o f Alternative Plots in Recent Films: Classifying the “Tarantino Eflect’”. M oving Viewers: American Film and the Spectators Fxperience. London: BEL Rehak. Sunderland. Cinema in the D igital Age. 1930. Durham. Smith (eds..M . and G. Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the Architecture o f the M ind. pp. 1999.>. Jean Renoir: M y Life and M y Films (ttans. D. Bibliography 173 Ramirez Berg. Amdsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Gilles Deleuzes Time Machine.). E 2003. Bettinson. The M atrix o f Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory.. 2009. New York: SUNY Press. New Review o f Film and Television Studies 2(1): 61—85. pp. ‘Deleuzian Spectatorship’. ‘The Migration o f Forms: Bullet Time as Microgenre’. 2003. Mass. Thomas and E Penz (eds. — . and FUm Theory’. 2006. P. Cinema Futures: Cain. ‘Gestures a'nd Postures ofMastery: CGI and Contemporary Action Cinemas ExpressiveTendencies’. Digital Images. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bristol: Intellect. Film Criticism 32(1).S. G. London: Collins. & B / — . New York: Columbia University Press. 109-12. 26-48. W hat is Film Theory? A n Introduction to Contemporary Debates.172 Bibliography Penz. ‘True I^ies: Perceptual Realism. Purves D. Philosophical Toys and Digital Visual Effects.. .) o f the 1950s: Themes and Variations. 151-60. 156-65. The Johns rlopkins University Press.//www. Recuber.). Sergi. ----------.. G. Baltimore. 2009. London: Wallflower. C. Ramachandran. E. Film Quarterly 57(5): 24-33. Ricoeur. Hirstein. in A Everett and J.1990. Pom ei^ce. The Film Till Now. Change M ummified: Cinema. otanrord: Stanford University Press. . 1998.: Sinauer. pp. New M edia. Capturing and Building Space. Ranciere.19-40 Dynamics of the Bullet'Time Effect’. B. Pleasure and D igital Culture. Sadoul. London: Roudedge. London: Heinemann. Deleuze. ‘Immersion Cinema: The Rationalization and Reenchantment o f Cinematic Space’. E.). 2001.: Duke University Press. 1980. Film as Film: Understanding and Judging Movies. Architecture and the Screen from Photography to Synthetic Imaging. Abel or Cable? The Screen Arts in the D igital Age. T. Roudedge. Berkeley: University o f California Press. Rodowick. Plantinga C. Rushton. A Gry in the Dark. 15-51.’ in G. Pisters. 2009. K .L. Sarafian. o f Consciousness Studies 6(6-7).: Harvard University Press. K. 2004. M. The Spectacle o f the Real: From Hollywood to Reality T V and Beyond Bristol /Portland: Intellect. Rotten Tomatoes. ‘Introduction: Movies and the 1950s’. V. Rotha. C. ‘The Shape o f 1999’.-L. 1998. Film Quarterly (Spring): 27-37. A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. Pomerance (ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 63-72. and W. in M. Altered States and Film. 2003.N. Cinephilia n the Age f f D igital Reproduction: Film. pp. Time and Motion’. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. London: Wallflower. Reitt. Theory. Film Fables (trans. London/New York. 1953.. I and I. The Role o f Post-classical Film Sound’. and R B Lotto. Paris: Cahiers du Glndma. Rushton. Historicity. in T. 197A. 2009. <http. 1989. Why We See W hat We Do: A n Empirical Theory of Vision. London: Jonathan Cape. Blakeslee. ‘Through the Looking Glass. (ed. Harmondsworth: Pelican. Pellauer). N. 1998 Jhe M aterial Ghost: Films and their M edium. Ladies and Gentlemen. L'homme ordinaire du cinema. 315-30. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Prigogine.

MovieBlockbttsters. 247-55. (ed. J. B. Affect. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Tryon.//www. Strauven (ed. ‘Post-classical Narration’. Oxford: Blackwell. J. 203-18. ac. Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and M oving Image Culture. Elsaesser and A. London: Roudedge. 2004. ----------. J. 1990.). ----------. pp. Sinnerbrink. Y. Thomson. Journal o f Eye Movement Research 2{6): 1-17. and H.M. Farocki. ‘The Logic and Legacy of Brechtianism’. 337—51. 2006. Speaking about Godard. London: Elm Tree Books. ‘A Heideggerian Cinema? O n Terence Malick’s The Thin Red Line'. Smith. Film-Philosophy 10(3): 26-37. Truffot. 2002. Tomasovic. <http://www. Bibliography 175 Pleasure and D igital Culture. vii-x. Carroll (eds. 130—48.). Spielmann. ‘Edit Blindness: The Relationship between Attention and Global Change Blindness in Dynamic Scenes’. 1999. Meta-Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture o f Quick Change. 1992. E. Narrative. 2009. R. pp. in A. pp. E.).). Thanouli. Smith. New York: New York University Press. ‘Scale. 2QQ'5. G. Curley). M .. The D igital Film Event. New York: Columbia University Press. Penz (eds. 1998. ‘A esthetic Features in Digital Imaging: Collage and Morph’. pp.}. 2010. Pomerance (eds. pp.). inT. pp. Film Criticism 31(1-2): 1-4. Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies. London: BFI. ----------. Abingdon/New York: Roudedge/ AFI. Silverman.. 2008.). Y.J. Wide Angle 131—48. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 2006. 2009. and Poiesis and the Attractions o f Slow Motion’. Projections: TheJournal fo r Movies and M ind 1(2) (Winter): 37-56. in S.). T. Senses o f Cinema 31. ‘ComplexNarratives: An Introduction. 231—40. and the Brain: Deleuze’s Cinematic Aesthetics’. Sperb. ----------. New Philosophies o f Film: Thinking Images. The Cinema o f Attractions Reloaded. ‘Emotion Capture: Affect in Digital Film’. ‘Some Hi^orical Footnotes to the Kuleshov Experiment’. ----------. and J. F. 2003a. 131-58. London: Roudedge. in W. The Cinematic Body. Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis. pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ‘Time. 2006. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Minh-ha. Framed Time: Toward a Posfflmic Cinema. 1999. “‘A t the StUl Point o f the Turning World”: Meta-Morphing and Meta-Stasis’. The Cinema o f Attractions Reloaded. Film-Philosophy 12(1): 85-96.pdf>. (ed. submitted to the University o f Edinburgh. Spinoza. ‘Introduction. Accessed 5 December 2011. Thompson. 2000. ‘The Eye Boundary: Repulsiori (trans. Smith. Stewart. ‘Foreword’. 1-27. K. C. Alien Zone IT: the Spaces o f Science Eiction Cinema. M. pp. Bristol: Intellect. ‘The Concept of Cinematic Excess’. Henderson.: Rutgers University Press.174 Bibliography Shaviro. K 1977. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Thomas. London/New York: Verso. New Review o f Film and Television Studies 6(2): 111-26. pp. 283-300. 2006. 1988. ----------. ‘The Hollywood Cobweb: New Laws o f Attraction (The Spectacular Mechanics o f Blockbusters)’. New Brunswick. Screening Space: The American Science Eiction Film. ATOCE_2006. London: Continuum. Cinephilia in the Age o f D igital Reproduction Vol. Spectacle and Movement: Massive Software and Digital Special Effects in The Lord o f the Rings’. N. K. 1993. London: BFI. Strauven (ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1996. Sobchack (ed. ----------. 1: Eilm. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. in D. ‘“Cutting to the Quick”: Techne. Reinventing Cinema: Movies in the Age o f M edia Convergence. pp. ‘New Media as Old Media: Cinema’. 1996. Berkeley: University o f California Press. C. in V. Tavormina). Post-Cinematic Bordwell and N. Ropley: Zero Books. London: Penguin. ----------. ‘Complex Narratives’. Accessed 28 November 2011. Thomas and F.). ----------. 2007. Princeton: Princeton University Press. The New M edia Book. in M. 140-57.). in D. 2011. Rosenbaum). Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. 2006. 2004. Vu for Something that Hasn’t Happened Yet/Time. B. 2009. 2000b. Cine-Tracts 1(2): 54-64. Thompson. Erame. T. Early Cinema: Space. Staiger. 2008. Truffaut. html>. D. Ethics (trans. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. T J. V. The Address o f the Eye: A Phenomenology o f Film Experience. 1978. New Review o f Film and Television Studies 183-96. in E. Simons. in W. Repetition Jamais Vu W ithin a Cinephilia of Anticipation. Kuhn (ed. Barker (eds.J. Trifonova. European Film Theory. trans. 1998. Film Theory: An Introduction. 2007.Harries (ed. . Physis. Bazin. Springer. A.M . 309-20. 2006.bbk. ----------. Sobchack. S. 2005. ‘Psycho-Cybernetics in Films of the 1990s’. Stringer.).). Trinh T. Tsivian. Architectures o f Illusion. Mathijs and M. From Hobbits to Hollywood: Essays on Peter Jacksons Lord o f the Rings.). ‘A n Attentional Theory o f Continuity Editing’. The Premature Revolution: Russian Literature and Society 1917-1946. 2006. Unpublished PhD thesis. D. pp. R. Sperb (eds. Balcerzak a n d j.sensesofcinema. 1972. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Stam. in Orson Welles: A Critical View (A. J. <http.

Eilm Quarterly 53(3): 33—40. Vogel.html>. Zeilinger. Wilson. 2008. and Movement are not Perceived Simultaneously.). 2007b. A. Kevin O ’Brien). 2002. ‘Cyberspace or the Unbearable Closure of Being’. R. Screen 43(4): 370-86. Proceedings o f the Royal Society 265(1405): 1583-85. 1987.spb. Wollen.//www. Wasko. Hill and P.: M IT Press. ‘Transparency and Twist in Narrative Fiction Films’. Tugend. 1993. 2006. in J. animation: an interdisciplinary journal 1(2)133-52. Wood. 2006. The S t Petersburg Times. Wright Wexman. Vision Research i \ : 2909-18. Critical Inquiry 34 (Summer): 754-76. 1984. Aymoz. 1980. London: Roudedge/ Kegan Paul/BFI. A. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. <http://www. 2003. Zeki. V. Whalen. 83-101. System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. Form. Kino-Eye: The W riting ofD ziga Vertov (trans. ‘Tales o f Upward Mobility: The New Verticality and Digital Special Effects’. 1991. Vertov. ‘The Asynchrony of Consciousness’. F. Bartels. S.times. New D igital Cinema: Reinventing the M oving Image. TheJournal o f Aesthetics and A rt Criticism 64(1): 81-95. Williams. Rosch. pp. ‘A Brief History of Morphing’.176 Bibliography ----------. Convergence: The InternationalJournal o f Research into New M edia Technologies 5(2): 24—50. Hollywood in the Information Age: Beyond the Silver Screen. No longer available. 2003. 2005. Interview with Alexander Sokurov’ (trans. Realism and the Cinema: A Reader. Willis. P. ‘Toward a Theory of Visual Consciousness’. D. Pixel Visions: Digital Intermediates and Micromanipulations of the Image’. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Varela. ‘The Negative Reinvention o f Cinema: Late Hollywood in the Early Digital Age’. The Embodied M ind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. ‘Run Lola R u n . 1998. 1998. Sobchack (ed. pp. ----------. 2006. Consciousness and Coalition 8(2): 225-59. Zone. ‘“W hat is Cinema?” An Agnostic Answer’. P. 1999. . C. 1980. H . London: C T Editions. Cambridge. A. P. Church Gibson (eds.). 10 January. 1999. Berkeley: University o f California Press. S. Scientific American Special Issue: The Edge o f Physics. London: Tavistock Publications. M etaMorphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture o f Quick Change. ‘Filming History and Making It’. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. J. . and C. Berkeley: University o f California Press. Shoulgat). Endless Night: Cinema and Psychoanalysis —Parallel Histories. Austin: University o f Texas Press. London: Columbus Books. G. 2000. Wilden. Weinberg. and A. Tuchinskaya. London: Vintage..). Eilm as a Subversive A rt. <http. pp. .. London: Roudedge. (ed. A. 26-29. 2001. K. D igital Encounters. Eilm Quarterly 59(4) (Summer): 23-34. 34— russkyi_kovcheg/mnp_ark. 2000. 96-125. The Oxford Guide to Eilm Studies. Bergstrom (ed. The Island o f Sokurov. ‘Timespaces in Spectacular Cinema: Crossing the Great Divide between Spectacle versus Narrative’. Mass. 1999. 2005. 2007. S. Bibliography 177 Young. in V. 2izek. ‘Q uantum Teleportation’.P. Whissel.. Dreams o fa Einal Theory: The Search fo r the Eundamental Laws o f Nature. Citizen Kane’. Accessed 21 November 2011.htm>. A.). 2002.sokurov.spb. Quarterly Review o f Eilm and Video 32(1): 72-94. A. Viviani. Wolf. London/ New York: Wallflower. M. Thompson. Stereoscopic Cinema and the Origins o f 3-D Film 1838-1952. E. 1999. _______ . Re-Animating Space’. Roman Polanski. and E. 2007a. T. ‘Colour.J. in J.