You are on page 1of 2


FACTS: Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2)
daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her
daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while
Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
In 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be
declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share
in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria
Cailles, and (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, partitioned between him
and defendant. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject
properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed.

Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. RTC
granted the same . IAC reversed.
ISSUE: W petitioners, as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona, by
right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona
RULING: Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code. Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an
illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.


It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as
the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken

RULING: (1) The two parcels of land was bought in 1908 and 1917, respectively, by Maria
Cailles. After declaring them in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from
1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija,
Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for
unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this,
plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson
of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.

FACTS: On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta. About four years after his death,
Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was
entered by the widow Perfecta and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on
the GROUND that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three
parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties.

(2) The name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a
certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and
Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence
showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he

Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, Claro insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the
conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as
follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that
besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another
1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while
Perfecta claimed 1/2. RTC ruled: for widow and for son.

(3) Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering
that he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca
DIAZ v. IAC, 150 SCRA 645
FACTS: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe and
Petronila Pamuti; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is
the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was
the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6)
that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa.
RTC declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. Petitioners Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, and Felixberta
Pacursafiled their "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin from further taking
part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de

RULIN G: Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary
Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession.
Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to
3/4 of his father's estate.
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow
or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.______
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown.
More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she
was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing
her estate among her heirs.
Meelodia was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo,
an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,

Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children
of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three
degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by
brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with
article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or
will the former be excluded by the latter?
RULING: We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as
the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966).
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.)
from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of
the Civil Code. Art 952 and 954:
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present
Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is
true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their proximity
to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal
degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p.
439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
Thus, under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.__________________
FACTS: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of

Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. Among the many legacies
and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the
testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of
her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts
to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also
instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother
of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will
alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law. Vicente B.
Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. the probate court rendered its decision
on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
ISSUE: Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?
RULING: Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has
no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against
any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously
had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long
before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire
any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such
right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is
true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the
law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose
Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ."