You are on page 1of 19

This article was downloaded by: [The University Of Melbourne Libraries]

On: 05 September 2013, At: 18:03


Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Education Policy


Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tedp20

The impossibility of capitalist markets


in higher education
Simon Marginson

Centre for the Study of Higher Education, University of


Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Published online: 30 Nov 2012.

To cite this article: Simon Marginson (2013) The impossibility of capitalist markets in higher
education, Journal of Education Policy, 28:3, 353-370, DOI: 10.1080/02680939.2012.747109
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2012.747109

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE


Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Journal of Education Policy, 2013


Vol. 28, No. 3, 353370, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2012.747109

The impossibility of capitalist markets in higher education


Simon Marginson*

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Centre for the Study of Higher Education, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
(Received 21 March 2012; nal version received 1 November 2012)
For more than two decades, governments around the world, led by the
English-speaking polities, have moved higher education systems closer to the
forms of textbook economic markets. Reforms include corporatisation, competitive funding, student charges, output formats and performance reporting. But, no
country has established a bona de economic market in the rst-degree education of domestic students. No research university is driven by shareholders,
prot, market share, allocative efciency or the commodity form. There is
commercial tuition only in parts of vocational training and international education. While intensied competition, entrepreneurship and consumer talk are pervasive in higher education, capitalism is not very important. At the most, there
are regulated quasi-markets, as in post-Browne UK. This differs from the experience of privatisation and commercialisation of transport, communications,
broadcasting and health insurance in many nations. The article argues that bona
de market reform in higher education is constrained by intrinsic limits specic
to the sector (public goods, status competition), and political factors associated
with those limits. This suggests that market reform is utopian, and the abstract
ideal is sustained for exogenous policy reasons (e.g. scal reduction, state
control, ordering of contents). But, if capitalist markets are clearly unachievable,
a more authentic modernisation agenda is needed.
Keywords: higher education; competition; markets; market reform; academic
capitalism; public good

The Neo-liberal Market Model (NLMM)


Policy-making is typically informed by a leading family of ideas that frame,
articulate and populate government. Policy-making is iterative and reproductive on
the basis of the dominant ideas which become institutionalised over time. These
ideas remain ascendant until displaced by another family of ideas, mostly during or
following a crisis (Hay 2001). Keynesian demand management lost policy traction
in the economic stagation of the mid 1970s. Since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic
discourse has framed reform agendas in government and education.
The rst neo-liberal blueprint in education was a 1955 essay by Friedman on
the role of government in education, republished in Capitalism and Freedom
(1962). Friedman argued that market competition would maximise efciency,
responsiveness and innovation. His consumer vouchers popularised the idea of a
government-fostered quasi-market as a half-way house on the path to the ultimate
objective of a capitalist market. There was little policy take-up until the election of
*Email: s.marginson@unimelb.edu.au
2013 Taylor & Francis

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

354

S. Marginson

a reforming Conservative government in the UK in May 1979. The rst market


reform in higher education, full fees for overseas students, was introduced soon
after Margaret Thatcher took ofce (Shattock 2012, 160). Over the next decade,
business modelling and ideas about competitive markets took hold. By 1997, a special issue of Higher Education Policy noted that policy instruments based upon
concepts of competitive markets had assumed a central role in many countries
(Dill 1997, 167). Fifteen years later, market thinking has had an extended trial in
higher education. We can now summarise its potentials. The UK reforms have been
much discussed (e.g. Williams 1997; Naidoo 2008; Brown 2011; Thompson and
Bekhradnia 2011). This article provides a more generic analysis.
Gulson (2007, 179) reects on the organising qualities of neo-liberal discourse:
Neoliberalism is a meta-narrative a conceptual marker, an indicator of processes
and practices and a description of outcomes. Neo-liberal discourse models the
world in terms of functioning capitalist markets. Its policy objective is to reform
institutions, systems, subjects and behaviours to render them instrumental for capital
accumulation (Harvey 2005). Erstwhile public functions have been reconceived
using nancial rationales and business templates, pushing some functions into the
market economy while refashioning government as the market-state (Ainley 2004)
and the global competition state (Cerny 2007). Neo-liberal discourse also
functions as a social imaginary in the sense of Taylor (2002), constituting what is
seen as possible and inevitable (Rizvi and Lingard 2010). It has become difcult to
conceive places and spaces that are not neo-liberal (Clarke 2007, 239).
Across the world, much of public aviation, communications and broadcasting,
and some health services, have been privatised and commercialised. On the other
hand, the police, law courts and national defence are mostly still in public hands,
though some prisons are provided on a for-prot basis. Neo-liberal discourse does
not constitute a universal body of practice. It might be better to treat neo-liberalism
as a project seeking to make the world in its image rather than an achieved condition
(Clarke 2007, 240). Nor is economic market reform the only policy agenda in higher
education. Most governments support the expansion of social participation and are at
least nominally concerned about socio-economic and gender equity; and there is
growing emphasis on the community-building engagement of institutions (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2008). Policies on international links and the global attributes of graduates also extend beyond a capitalist
imaginary. Nevertheless, market reform is the main policy game. The question about
higher education is, how far has it been remade? and how far can it be remade?
Neo-liberal discourse has been taken into policy and regulation at two levels.
The rst level is often called the New Public Management (NPM). The second level
embodies full economic commercialisation. It can be called the Neo-liberal Market
Model (NLMM).
The NPM is a hybrid set of organisational practices. It is not a simple function
of neo-liberalism and has multiple roots. It combines neo-liberal business models
and market templates, with on one hand bureaucratic control systems that emphasise
audit and accountability, and on the other hand ideas of transparency and individuation that owe as much to the 1960s New Left as the 1970s New Right. Nevertheless, the NPM is consistent with the neo-liberal social imaginary except where it
strengthens state control as an end in itself. In higher education, the competitive
mechanisms favoured by the NPM lock onto the long-standing contestation between
universities for good students, research scholars and ultimately for prestige. Status

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

355

competition in higher education is not capitalist (the difference is signicant, as


discussed below) but is comfortable with a neo-liberal view of the world.
NPM reform has become normal practice across public institutions, non-government organisations and the non-prot sector. Applying it to higher education is seen in
government as a matter of common sense. In higher education, the NPM is associated
with reforms that render institutions as quasi-business rms (corporatisation), including CEO-style executive leadership; goal-driven production, output measurement and
performance management; cost unbundling, shadow pricing and simulated bottom
lines in non revenue areas; customer focus and continuous self-evaluation. In government-administered NPM systems, higher education institutions and their units are
steered from a distance using a mix of competitive incentives, contracts, planning, output measures and audit (de Boer, Enders, and Jongbloed 2009; Mok 2009). National
higher education systems vary in the extent and intensity of NPM reform but it is
ubiquitous. For example, since 2000 in East and Southeast Asia, leading universities
have been corporatised in China, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Japan, Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia, and to some extent in Vietnam (Mok 2009; Marginson 2011).
With the NLMM, the policy agenda moves from reforms that render higher
education more market-like to reforms that make higher education into a bona de
capitalist market higher education produced as commodities subject to buyer
seller relations, in markets with free entry, by competing institutions/rms nanced
by shareholder equity, and committed to prot making and expansion of market
share, with no government interference. The full NLMM does not exist in higher
education anywhere. Nor does any government have a holistic programmatic commitment to it. But, the idea of the full capitalist market, which drives deregulation
and privatisation in sectors such as utilities or aviation, is instantly recognisable also
in higher education circles, especially in the Westminster countries.
Here, the NPM and the NLMM have a symbiotic relationship within the
neo-liberal imaginary. The idea of the NLMM, the full market model, provides
ideological backbone for NPM reforms. Up to a point, governments can retain their
neo-liberal credentials by adopting NPM reforms that fall short of the NLMM,
though they are always under pressure to go further. At the same time, the NPM
provides favourable real-world conditions for advancing more hard-edged marketisation reforms that push towards the NLMM. The process of continuous reform is
driven by a particular kind of critical reexivity, one that rests on an ambiguity
between is (higher education is an already existing market) and ought (higher
education should be made into a market). The NLMM functions as both goal to be
achieved and a (alleged) description of actually existing higher education. For
example, American higher education has little in common with a textbook economic market: federal research funding shapes the sector; tuition is heavily subsidised; and elite competition is closed to newcomers. But, it is customarily described
as a market, normalising that concept. The same designation is often applied to
higher education in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. At the same time, the difference between NLMM ideal and less than full market reality is functional for the
cause of market reform. Where higher education has failed to achieve the NLMM,
this suggests the need for reforms to close the gap. In this manner, the NLMM template continually drags policy and practice towards itself.
After two decades of this, higher education is more business-like and competitive,
more productive in volume terms and almost certainly more nancially efcient,
though there is no evidence that teaching is better or the rate of fundamental discovery

356

S. Marginson

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

has quickened (Murphy 2012). Yet paradoxically the full capitalist economic market
remains fairly distant. In some respects, universities are incompatible with the neo-liberal imaginary, and the state looms as large as ever. The next section of this article
will list the constituent elements of a capitalist market in higher education, and the
section that follows will summarise the extent to which these elements are realised in
actual existing higher education systems. The article then asks why reform has failed
to install the NLMM, though business language and competitive strategy permeate
higher education. Is the NLMM an impossible goal or is it merely the victim of weak
implementation? Can a capitalist university market ever be achieved?
Constituents of capitalist markets
Economic markets are social constructions in which both individual and institutional
actors compete on an unequal basis under conditions of shifting rules, including the
policies, laws, regulations and economic transfers of governments. As Podolny
(1993, 830) remarks: That there exists a distinction between an actor and an actors
position in the social structure and that rewards are largely a function of position is
one of the fundamental insights of the sociological perspective. Social actors bring
unequal capacities and resources to market competition, and experience differential
outcomes partly shaped by their own efforts. A capitalist market is a specic form
of market. Its essential components are as follows.
First, there is an identiable eld of production within boundaries in which
competition takes place. The market may be dened geographically as national,
regional, city-based or global; or specied by sector of education, institutions,
products or clients. Stable protocols govern entry/exit of producers and facilitate
new producers. The market must be contestable.
Second, there is open competition between autonomous producers for revenues
and market share. Government does not create competition, its goals or its parties.
The role of government is to provide legal conditions for economic competition,
transactions and capital accumulation. Ideally, the market is comprised by private
for-prot producers free of direct intervention.
Third, production is focused on scarce and individualized commodities that are
manifest in output formats and possessed by single buyers. Such goods constitute
private goods in the economic sense in that they are rivalrous and/or excludable
(Samuelson 1954).
Fourth, markets are ultimately regulated not by social needs, buyer wants or policy goals but by abstract values. Production and distribution are determined by
price-based exchange between buyers and sellers. Producers want to generate prots
revenues surplus to costs. They want to maximise the price they obtain and minimise the material value embodied in each product.
Fifth, markets need human behaviour consistent with competition, commodity
production and prot. They need entrepreneurs who imagine opportunities and take
risks; institutions (rms) that expand market share, constantly reduce unit costs, and
are exible in the products they sell and markets they enter; and consumers who
engage in price-based shopping.
To what extent has the NLMM been achieved in higher education?
In most public sector activities that have been privatised or commercialised in the
last three decades, the NLMM is incomplete. Commercial competition is often

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

357

limited by regulated monopoly, constraints on entry or continued government policy


interventions. But, the gap between the NLMM and practice is greater in higher
education than in most sectors. Given space limitations, this section takes a birdseye view of the extent of marketization, grounded in the comparative international
data (OECD 2011; UNESCO 2012). A fuller analysis would explore regionalcultural and national differences in the role of, for example, private higher education,
household nancing and entrepreneurial behaviour within institutions (e.g. the
national cases in Teixeira et al. 2004; Santiago et al. 2006; Brown 2011; For East
Asia see Marginson 2011). However, the overall nding would remain unchanged
no country has introduced a bona de capitalist market in higher education or has
come close to doing so.
Boundaries of the market
In mature higher education systems, sector boundaries and institutional gradations
are normalised in both custom and law. The USA and China use systems for
classifying institutions according to mission and resources. U-Map is doing this in
Europe. Market entry is usually regulated by formal accreditation protocols, which
are often subject to political processes in which existing players can exercise
inuence, for example in the USA.
These mechanisms more often inhibit or retard market contestability than
facilitate the entry of new institutions. It is especially difcult to become a new
research-intensive university. In most nations, lists of ofcially designated universities change only very slowly. Mergers normally require government consent. It can
be easier to start a commercial training college, but, in most nations, foreign
commercial providers face extra barriers (OECD 2008).
Competition and government intervention
As noted, competition plays a central role in higher education competition for
status and resources in research and scholarship; competition between institutions to
attract students; competition between students to gain the most sought-after places
in institutions; competition in international student markets and for corporatenanced consultancy work; and the often compelling contest between institutional
brands for ranking and prestige. Nevertheless, most of this competition is not
orthodox economic competition. For example, competition for public research funding is a bidding game rather than an economic market. Much competition is not
driven by economic bottom lines, though success in that competition might bring
economic rewards, such as the competition for esteem between Ivy League universities in the USA. And much competition in higher education is dened, fostered and
regulated by government.
It is common for universities to perform consultancy and applied research for
industry, and provide short-course training on a fee-charging basis. In some
systems, institutions charge international student fees at prot-making levels. Some
institutions hire out facilities in the community or run ancillary businesses. These
activities can provide signicant supplementary revenues, but except for international education in some countries (see below), are non-core in relation to rst
degrees and graduate education for domestic students (Breneman, Pusser, and
Turner 2006). Even in the USA, where the biomedical industry fosters a strong
commercial ethos (Bok 2003), business funds less than 10% of research (OECD

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

358

S. Marginson

2008). Comparative OECD data conrm that non-tuition private income has a
modest role. Private income from sources other than households exceeds 15% in
only six countries and in most countries much of non-household private income is
used to pay for student tuition (OECD 2011, 244).
In the mainstream education of local citizen students in universities, competition
for market share and economic revenues is constrained or non-existent. In some
countries, such as Malaysia, students are assigned to institutions by government. In
most countries, institutions compete for the best students but not in buyer/seller
economic markets. Regardless of the vast variation in tuition charging arrangements, from no fees to high fees, tuition levels in public institutions and in some
private institutions are normally set or limited by government rather than price-set
by institutions operating in the manner of business rms. The number of places in
elite institutions is restricted: they do not expand to meet demand in the manner of
the makers of prestige manufactured goods, or they would cease to be elite. Elite
institutions focus on research building rather than building student volume as it is
research that drives their prestige, brand power and ultimately their resource accumulation. Their students are primarily selected on merit not buying power, though
in some countries students of merit are excluded by high tuition costs. In the minority of countries where relatively high tuition is the norm and/or the private sector
plays a role in high-demand provision, tuition is nevertheless largely non-commercial and often heavily subsidised by governments or philanthropy. The forms taken
by higher education diverge from those of the NLMM.
In the last two decades, the proportion of enrolments in private sectors has
increased. In the OECD countries in 2009, 29% of degree level students and 38% of
sub-degree students were in private institutions. The degree student share exceeded
30% in Korea and Japan (each 75.4%), Chile (47.8%), Mexico (34.1%) and Poland
(33.4%). In the USA, it was 28.5% (OECD 2011, 307). However, many private institutions are non-prot and many are government-dependent (OECD 2011). Where
there are large commercial sectors Japan, Korea, The Philippines, Brazil and India
fully prot-driven institutions are concentrated at the low value end of the tertiary
education hierarchy. There are very few exceptions to these generalisations. Nominally, commercial elite research universities, such as Keio and Waseda in Japan, Postech, Yonsei and Korea University in Korea, their equivalents in Latin America and
the IITs in India, behave in the same non capitalist manner as non-prot elite private
institutions. They are exclusive and subsidise the tuition of many students. Further,
except in the USA, Korea and Chile, and the Philippines where research output is
low, all leading research universities are in the public sector (ignoring the nominal
designation of UK universities as private). In Japan, 75% of all students are in the
private sector, but nine national universities are ranked higher than Keio University
in research outputs (OECD 2011, 307; Academic Ranking of World Universities
[ARWU] 2012). Private institutions cannot sustain high cost science that does not
pay for itself. In short, the non-prot model enjoys a worldwide hegemony in university education; and outside four countries, the public sector non-prot universities
are hegemonic in the research mission.
Private goods and the commodity form
Whether commercial revenues are the intention or not, all higher education produces private goods in the economic sense. Samuelson (1954) denes private goods

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

359

as rivalrous and/or excludable. Goods are excludable when the benets can be conned to individual buyers. Goods are rivalrous when consumption by one person
blocks the possibility of consumption by another. Some individual benets from
higher education are excludable such as the extra income accruing to graduates, better health outcomes and the psychic satisfactions of knowledge (McMahon 2009).
A complicating factor is that student places are also associated with public goods
(below). But, in theory, all private goods expressed in product formats attached to
student places especially in high value elite institutions could be produced as
market commodities. It is all the more striking that commodity production is largely
absent from rst-degree education. However, commodity production is not just a
technical process, it is a social relation. In the absence of commercial pricing and
the prot motive, it cannot happen.
Higher education systems use product formats to dene outcomes, including
student places, graduate numbers and satisfaction ratings; and research papers,
citation impact and collaboration. Re-engineered as performance measures with shadow prices, these formats are tools for a regime of simulated product optimisation
(quality) and quasi-efciency. In most locations, this is as close as higher education
comes to individualisable commodities.
Prices, prots and allocative efciency
Where tuition charges are xed by government, they do not vary by supply/
demand/cost/prot but by institutional type, eld and level of study, and type of
student. As noted, most rst degrees are subsidised by government and/or philanthropy. The number of government-subsidised places is normally xed (Australia,
with its demand-driven system whereby government funds all qualied students
who enter, is a current exception). While from time to time regulated institutions
have incentives to grow in order to increase revenues, this is a function of the
policy settings, not the dynamics of capital accumulation.
Comparative OECD data reveal a worldwide though not universal trend to
higher tuition. However, there is a marked variation between countries in student
payments and in subsidies for tuition loans and student support (OECD 2011, 256
269). In 20082009, only four European Union countries charged more than USD
$1200 per full-time student per year. In the ve Nordic countries, Ireland, the Czech
Republic and Mexico, public students paid no fees. Among OECD nations, tuition
exceeded USD $3000 per year only in the ve English-speaking nations USA, UK,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and Korea and Japan. This variation underlines the fact that such arrangements are determined by political and educational
cultures, not market forces. Given global convergence and policy borrowing in
higher education (Rizvi and Lingard 2010), market forces, if determining, would
tend to atten inter-country differences as in other industries. As noted, in Japan
and Korea, full fee commercial education is concentrated below the research universities; and the UK and Australia run government controlled quasi markets in which
price does not determine supply and demand. In the UK, price and volume are
xed. Top-end competition for high scoring students and bottom-end competition
for students at 6500 are artefacts of government. In Australia, price is xed though
volume is not. There is competition for market share but only in the lower reaches
of higher education, because the xed funding rate is below the average cost. In
Australia, government-subsidised local students pay on average 40% of costs,

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

360

S. Marginson

though this varies from 83.6% in law and business to 18.8% in science (LomaxSmith 2011, 6 and 55). Government payments to institutions its subsidies plus the
monies in lieu of student contributions are absorbed as lump sums into institutional budgets. There is no mechanism to ensure this funding is used for teaching
costs; some goes to research. There is no market mechanism that triggers consumer
decisions and aligns price, quality, demand and supply. In both Australia and the
UK, students are protected from the negative effects of investment in low earning
degrees by the income-contingent system of the repayment of tuition loans.
In the USA, federal student loans function as vouchers that facilitate student
mobility and frame a national competition between institutions. Nevertheless, and
despite recent tuition hikes, tuition subsidies mean that few public or private
students pay the full sticker price for rst-degree education. From 1996 to 2006,
sticker prices rose 51% after adjusting for ination, compared to just 29% for net
tuition fees (Vedder 2007, 5). The average student pays less than half the cost of
tuition (Winston 2003). There is no market for washing machines or nancial
securities where the average consumer pays half the real cost.
Quasi-markets, coupled with scarcity of government funding, secure efciencies
(Dill 1997, 168). But, such efciency is driven by administered competition, not
market forces. Because the critical signalling role of prot is absent from higher
education (Vedder 2007, 9) there is no direct link between specic costs, specic
revenues and efciency. Allocative efciency is impossible. Cost reductions may fall
on cost effective not on ineffective activities, especially if the cost ineffective activity
generates institutional prestige (Porter 2008, 41). The fact that few institutions are
nanced by private equity is a major constraint on capitalist development. On the
legal basis, there are profound difculties in making public universities accumulate
capital and produce surplus value. They cannot function like private rms that collect capital and prot to their owners (Hayrinen-Alestalo and Peltola 2006, 276).
Entrepreneurs and consumers
In the 1990s, in the Westminster countries, the emphases on business models,
competition and broad-based fund raising generated a layer of quasi-entrepreneurs
and a culture of institutional enterprise (Clark 1998). The USA had this already (Brint
2002). In lieu of competition for prot and market share, university leaders compete
for prestige, in research, in emerging areas of activity and for non-core commercial
revenues. They respond to a more complex set of goals and constituencies than orthodox business leaders (Marginson and Considine 2000). Outside the English-speaking
world, some leaders are CEO-like but entrepreneurialism is less universal.
Evidence for consumer behaviour is less clear. User charges position student as
paid customers but the absence of buyerseller relations and comparative data on
teaching, and the dominance of status goals (below), inhibits the evolution of a fullscale consumer culture.
Islands of commercial production
The exceptions to the argument are the bona de capitalist institutions and sub-sectors. For-prot activity is common to many countries and has economic weight.
Nevertheless, the core of higher education remains the non-prot rst-degree
education of local university students. This sets the nature of the product and
denes the economics of higher education.

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

361

There are three modes of for-prot institution. The rst is commercial universities
and colleges in Korea, Japan and elsewhere. The second mode is commercialvocational training in many countries. The equity-nanced University of Phoenix is the
largest private university in the United States. It works a niche market in face-to-face
and online programmes in business studies and professional training for working clients who previously dropped out of education before completing college. It has built
a new market at the margin and mostly does not compete with non-prot providers
(Breneman, Pusser, and Turner 2006). The Phoenix business model has now collided
with the limits of its niche. Completion rates are much lower than in non-prot institutions, with just 33% of degree level students graduating within eight years (University of Phoenix 2012). Many of Phoenixs consumer-investors are doomed to fail or
default on their tuition, like low-income homebuyers in the mortgage market.
The third mode is for-prot international education in the UK, Australia, New
Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, and in selected programs in Western Europe,
China and elsewhere (Bashir 2007; Verbik and Lasanowski 2007). In 14 out of 25
OECD systems, international students pay higher fees than locals for the same
programmes (OECD 2011, 256). About 40% of all students who cross borders enter
commercial programmes, mostly provided in non-prot institutions. Some features
of the NLMM are present while others are not. On one hand, regulation in Australia
and New Zealand denes international students as consumers, unlike local students
(Lewis 2005; Abbott 2006); and rst degree international students in business studies in Australia pay tuition at up to three times the regulated domestic student funding rate (Beaton-Wells and Thompson 2011). On the other hand, prots are not
taken as shareholder dividends. Some revenue is ploughed back into the business
but the rest is used to cross-subsidise non-prot teaching and research. Price affects
demand and supply but production is not consumer driven. Where numbers of international students are large, they affect the developmental priorities, such as the
buildings and services provided. In 2010, international students comprised 22.3% of
onshore higher education enrolments in Australia (Department of Education,
Employment and Workplace Relations [DEEWR] 2011). However, for-prot international students studied alongside non-prot local students in common non-prot
programs, with little variation in pedagogy. Local non-prot education shaped the
product consumed by the prot-generating international students.
Why has the NLMM failed?
Why is the NLMM unrealized in higher education? The model is inhibited in higher
education because of two sets of factors. The rst set of factors is intrinsic: the
nature of knowledge and the nature of status competition. The second is political.
Intrinsic limitations
Knowledge as a public good
In economic terms, knowledge, and the knowledge contents of learning, are
public goods subject to market failure. Public goods are non-rivalrous and/or
non-excludable (Samuelson 1954). It is not protable to produce goods obtainable
free of charge that confer no private benets. Stiglitz (1999) notes that knowledge
is close to a pure public good and a global public good. The mathematical theorem
is useful throughout the world no one can be excluded from using it and use

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

362

S. Marginson

by one does not impair the opportunities of another. Knowledge is naturally excludable only at the moment of creation. Once circulated, its market value is zero.
Those outcomes of research that take the form of new knowledge or know-how can
be distinguished from particular manifestations of that knowledge in the form of
intellectual property, such as patents and copyright. Once circulated, the former outcomes of research are non-excludable as well as non-rivalrous, like classic public
goods. It would be impossible to turn discovery research in universities into a capitalist market without radically reducing that research. All over the world, discovery
research is subsidised by governments or philanthropy. However, journal pay-walls
and other devices can be used to articially prolong the excludability of texts or
artefacts that embody particular knowledge or know-how. Those who seek free
access to university research in the form of journal papers are struggling to assert
the natural form of knowledge. Arguably, as stated by the OECD (2008), the potential for creativity in research and its applications and especially for collaborative
creativity is maximised when knowledge ows as freely and quickly as possible.
Because knowledge is intrinsically public in form, the contents of student learning in higher education are also public goods. Teaching in higher education cannot
be wholly marketised without thinning the knowledge component, which is subject
to market failure. Graduates are not rewarded in labour markets for knowledge but
for private goods: vocationally specic skills and the brand on the degree certicate.
MIT acknowledged the public good nature of knowledge when it launched Open
Courseware. This did not impair the rivalrous and excludable private goods that
MIT provides to its fee-paying students: access to elite networks and an Ivy League
brand (Hansmann 1999). Likewise, Mass Online Open Courseware (MOOC)
programmes produced at Stanford and Harvard/MIT (Ed-X) are distributed free of
charge via the Internet. They draw large populations of users attracted to both programme contents and the status value of the university brands, and do so without
undermining the exchange value of the on-campus Ivy League degrees. The social
role and economic value of private goods in education is maximised in elite universities. In non-selective education, the public good component is more dominant. Yet
even in elite institutions, saleable skills and brand status rest on the knowledge-conferring role of education. The private goods depend on public goods nested in the
institutional settings where value is created. The knowledge-oriented component,
often described as general education, must be subsidised by non-market sources
such as government, philanthropy or non-prot institutional provision, or the private
value of student places will be weakened.
General education and research provide downstream public goods many
collective in character that are conditions of economic and social activity. Higher
education augments common language, literacy and communications: these are foundational to stable government, economic production, consumption and cross-border
relations. It provides a structure of equitable social opportunity. It augments technological adaptation, entrepreneurial creativity and innovation. Graduates create productivity spillovers to non-graduates in the workplace. All these benets are difcult
to measure, being mediated by factors like work organisation, the deployment of
graduate labour, business capacity to use research, the macro-economy, global
developments, social stratication and cultural identity. This underlines the difculty
of creating a market that includes all goods in higher education. How can the effects
of higher education be distinguished from those of the workplace, government and
communications? Where does the product begin and end? Who should pay? How

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

363

can institutions compete in, say, enhancing the adaptability of the population to
technological innovation? Economic norms of scarcity, excludability, rivalry and
allocative efciency do not apply here.
Is the intrinsic nature of knowledge always a barrier? Might a market in knowledge, and the associated public goods in teaching, become possible under the right
circumstances (political, economic, social and cultural)? Knowledge in the intrinsic
form, created by discovery and original know-how, could function as a continuing
commodity only if excludability was rmly maintained. Such a regime would
undermine the norms of creative collaboration and innovation, reducing the
knowledge produced. The failure of a universal commodity market in knowledge is
further emphasised by the always-partial reach of copyright controls, more so in a
digital age. As long as it is technically possible to reproduce copyrights, they will
be so reproduced. For example, most social exchanges in music and lm/television
materials occur on the basis of free transfers. Nevertheless, these limitations are
more conjunctural than absolute. The more fundamental problem is that it is impossible to maintain full excludability while using created knowledge in a relational
setting, whether in a teaching/learning site or in knowledge-intensive production of
goods and services. The possibility of reverse engineering always exists; and
knowledge in the form of intellectual property is vulnerable to the making of alternate texts or artefacts embodying the same discovery in one or another guise.
Status competition
Universities are cultural as well as economic institutions, remarks Brint. They
consequently compete with each other on symbolic (or status) as well as economic
grounds (Brint 2002, 3). This points to the second intrinsic limitation of the
NLMM.
Status is a relative or positional concept: the perceived quality of that
producers products in relation to the perceived quality of that producers competitors products (Podolny 1993, 830). Positional competition (Hirsch 1976) is shaped
by the structure of positions. A producers position in the market affects the
relative opportunities open to that producer in comparison to those available to its
competitors (Bourdieu 1993; Podolny 1993, 830). Hence, the most important factors are the identity of the actors and their status rank order, not the standard of
their outputs (Aspers 2009). The status or brand power of a university is primarily
determined by research performance (Dill 1997; Horta 2009) and by selectivity in
student entry, which is partly sourced in the reputational effects of research. The
determining role of research in status again points to the way public knowledge
goods are foundational to the value of private goods in higher education and to the
capacity of institutions to compete.
Status competition has four special features. First, status markets are constituted
by both producer competition and competition between students for places in top
institutions: Two rank orders are generated, and not only one, as is the case if the
consumers are an anonymous mass (Aspers 2009, 117). High quality students bring
status to elite institutions and have their own status conrmed and augmented in
return: The actors, and what is traded in the market, are co-constituted (116).
Second, as noted, elite institutions do not expand to realise all possible demand.
This would devalue the brand. Third, rank-ordered positional goods like higher education are not just scarce like all economic resources but scarce in absolute terms.

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

364

S. Marginson

Only one institution can occupy each rank. These are winner-take-all markets, like
celebrity markets in lm or music (Frank and Cook 1995). There is only one Elvis
Presley and only one Harvard University. Only 100 universities can be in the top
100, and so on. Unlike textbook markets where there is no intrinsic barrier to
producer pluralisation, in status competition in higher education the number of top
producers is largely xed. Fourth, elite status competition is largely closed to new
entrants. The list of leading American universities has little changed since the First
World War, inconceivable in markets for cars, household goods or banking. University status is reproduced by the social standing of students and graduates, by student
selection (high excess demand forces up entry scores, signifying high value and
strengthening student demand further) and by the superior research outputs
generated by status and resources. Non-elite institutions cannot entice elite customers by dropping price for the same service as in other sectors (Hansmann 1999, 2).
Leading institutions nd it easy to block outsiders.
Elite universities are partly beyond economics. They need resources, but
resources are the means to more fundamental ends: the education of future leaders,
research, institutional social position and historical power. They do not invest so as
to maximise returns, or shareholder value, or market share or revenue. They are
largely exempt from boom and bust cycles though their investments sometimes take
a hit. They embody some of the NLMM but contradict it at other points. There is a
dened eld of production, with tight boundaries, open competition for prestige and
elite students and production in output formats (student places). There can be
prices. Yet, the market is not contestable. Prices do not mediate supply and demand.
Producers do not maximise volume, market share or the rate of prot. Ivy League
institutions, charge their customers, on average, no more than the cost of providing
the service (Hansmann 1999, 1). They do not maximise allocative efciency: they
compete with each other in building prestige facilities. Patterns of consumer
demand do not alter their time-honoured products.
Studies of student choice nd that most students prefer a high status institution to
a lesser one with better teaching (Hansmann 1999). Prestige is gained by denying
students access the supply is perfectly inelastic (Vedder 2007, 6). This blocks the
potential for NLMM-type consumers. Though elite institutions focus on teaching
and student services, a necessary gesture to elite students, consumer pressure is second order. Consumer culture is supply-driven not demand-driven (Brint 2002, 4). It
is unrealistic to talk of higher education as a competition based on institutional quality or student satisfaction, unless quality means the market power of brands. Prestige ought to reect quality, but far more is involved (Geiger 2004, 169). Rather
than quality determining status, the relation is vice versa (Brown 2011).
The publication of comparative indicators on graduation rates, studentstaff
ratios, library facilities, and survey-based ratings by students and graduates, does
not change the dynamics of status competition. The comparison that matters is
league tables. Rank ordering settles all questions of value. By having a stable
social structure of identities with positions xed in relation to each other, which
make up a status hierarchy, the market overcomes the problem of asymmetry
(Aspers 2009, 116). League tables of research output matter more than league tables
of student satisfaction. Research is integral to brand value not to student satisfaction. Genuine price signals and consumer behaviours come into play in capitalist
market terms only in lower echelon commercial institutions where brand value is
negligible.

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

365

The two sets of intrinsic factors combine to lock out the NLMM. If mass higher
education was equity nanced and entailed commercial tuition, this would force a
sole focus on private goods, generating market failure in the general education component of learning. This would reduce the market value of vocational education,
which rests partly on general education. Elite higher education cannot sustain a
commercial regime: while some of its clients could nance public good knowledge
as a spillover from status formation (elite liberal arts secure prestige), the commercial dynamic is thwarted by enrolment goods, oligopoly, exclusivity and non-economic objectives. Applied to high status university education, the commercial logic
of an equity-nanced business entailing open-ended growth, potential mergers
and strategic mobility between different markets and business lines could not be
fullled without destroying the business itself. Status needs to be stable, reproductive and long-term.
Nothing is impervious to change in the long run. But for commercial education
to become dominant in the tertiary education sector, the status goods produced by
elite institutions would have to lose potency. Bourdieu famously argued that higher
education systems are driven between two contrasting poles: the elite sector, which
generates scarce social goods on the basis of autonomous cultural standards; and
the mass tending to commercial sector, which is driven by quantity objectives and
is partly heteronomous in relation to government and markets (Bourdieu 1993;
Marginson 2006, 2008). The culturally dened goods produced in the elite sector,
which monopolizes research funding, cast a long shadow over the universities
located between the two poles. The elite sector is not inclusive but its practices are
hegemonic. Not withstanding the trend of the decline of government funding of universities in the English-speaking world and Europe, the growing heteronomy of the
mass sector (Naidoo 2004) and the potentially transformative effects of MOOC
technologies in the economics of mass teaching, there is no sign that Bourdieus
system model has been disrupted. The strongest global research universities appear
stronger than ever. They remain repositories of public research funding, which is
integral to their claim to brand value; and their status-producing capacity is
enhanced by MOOCs and global ranking. If some leading national universities have
lost ground, it is not because educational status has itself been deconstructed. It is
because provincial status generation has been partly transferred to the global leaders. If elites in business, government and the professions are not valorised through
the leading universities, there would be substitute means. Hypothetically, it is possible for status competition to decouple from the university sector. There is no sign
of this happening yet.
Political limitations
In addition to the intrinsic limitations on the NLMMs, there are political constraints.
First, it is difcult for governments to tinker with status competition without fostering powerful opponents. Second, governments regulate mass higher education to
sustain and modify public goods, such as general education, social equity and
research. Third, governments have their own political interests; and intervention in
higher education is widely accepted and expected.
Notionally, regulation could level the playing eld for NLMM commercial
competition by attening status differences and breaking open the elite institutions.
Government could build research capacity in lower status institutions, level down

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

366

S. Marginson

the peaks and/or create new research universities. It could override merit (and hence
elite closure) in student selection by opening or expanding enrolments in elite institutions and then step back to watch the market work. But, this would undermine
not only the logic of status competition but also high status producers and consumers themselves. This is politically risky for states. Anyway, a levelled commercial
competition would not repress status for long. Competition would re-stratify the
system by magnifying small differences in research and social participation over
time. Narrow status differentials are sustained only in systems where higher
education is governed largely as a non-competitive public good and is provided at
uniformly high quality levels, as in the Nordic countries. It is possible to have low
status differentials or market competition, but not both.
Government cannot abstain on public goods, though it quibbles over funding
them. It needs productivity spillovers, scientic and cultural literacy, technological
capacity and industry innovation; and social equity policy is politically essential.
The distribution of opportunities for post-secondary instruction is a ubiquitous concern in modern societies, and hence invites a large degree of central coordination
(Geiger 2004, 162) and funding. Nations vary in how their political cultures dene
equity in higher education for example in post-Confucian societies, with their
deep family commitment to self-cultivation and social positioning through learning,
social equity is compatible with high household investment but all such systems
are headed by public research universities, including South Korea.
Governments also use higher education policy to build their own political
capital, by making the gift of educational opportunity more visible or by fostering
science to brighten their modernist image. To secure these political benets,
governments must be able to intervene in the system settings and ne-tune strategic
outputs: Markets by design are more amenable to these political agendas than
markets of spontaneous interaction (Niklasson 1996, 8). Genuine NLMM deregulation would mean setting these political options aside. It does not happen.
In other words, governments investing in the neo-liberal imaginary also have
other ends. NLMM visions in higher education slide back to an NPM control
and allocation regime, articulated through quasi-markets (Niklasson 1996; Dill
1997 and others) in which the policy and organisational cultures are marketfriendly but the system drivers remain regulated. As Naidoo (2008, 3) sees it,
market mechanisms are applied selectively, to further the states agenda for
change the state can actively mobilise market mechanisms to attain political
goals. For example, governments deploy competition to expose weak institutions
and drive mergers, while evading responsibility for potentially unpopular outcomes. User charges and devolution to institutional entrepreneurs enable scal
allocations to be cut. Output formats and targets bring with them direct control
over products and local priorities. Competition for funding secures predictable
outcomes, without the state being seen to service its favourites. Regulated quasimarkets also enable one-way accountability to governments at system centre and
managers at the institution centre (Porter 2008) more closely than to consumers.
Devolved systems that are premised on self-managing agents generate less resistance than command. Governments employ competition as divide and rule,
enhancing their residual authority.
All of this suggests that the intended outcomes are political rather than
economic. To build a genuine NLMM in higher education would be to block the
ow of these political benets.

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

367

WTOGATS
The political factors together explain why the multilateral and bi-lateral negotiations, fostered by the World Trade Organisation under its General Agreement on
Trade in Services (WTOGATS), have failed to achieve the WTOs objectives.
WTOGATS set out to create a unied global market in education in which in each
nation, foreign producers are equivalent to local producers (OECD 2004). The
mechanism is for each nation to establish with each other nation liberal protocols in
four designated areas cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and movement of natural persons in each education sector. However, nations
can exempt all or part of systems (national treatment), for example to maintain
selective subsidies of local institutions. Some developing countries have been
persuaded to ease the entry of foreign companies, but in the outcome, national treatment has been the dominant norm. Enhanced free trade and commercialisation have
been the exceptions. Governments have mostly opted to maintain control over
social selection and public goods in higher education, and to protect the national
institutions that are direct instruments of policy.
Conclusions
The focus of this article has been on markets in student places. The argument applies
also to NLMM-oriented policy in research. In most national systems, reform ushered
in intensied competition for research funding, quasi-economic output measures,
incentives to conduct industry research and a partial shift from basic research to
commercialisable projects. After two decades of quasi-markets, there has been only
a modest increase in industrys share of university research costs, and the NLMM
has not taken root. The OECD now argues that the NLMM and also aspects of the
NPM in research were wrong-headed policy. It states that the main role of university
research lies in public good open science rather than the production of directly
marketable knowledge (OECD 2008, Vol. 2, 102120). It is also concerned that
short-term product formats in research may inhibit intellectual creativity (114).
This article has been a critique of market reform in higher education. It differs
from other critiques because it is concerned with the is not the ought. Instead of
focusing on normative issues such as whether business values are agreeable; or
the alleged negative effects of market reform for educational quality, academic freedom, social justice or the humanities the article explores the profound failure of
policy implementation. There is something very odd about contemporary higher
education systems. On one hand, they are simulacra of competing rms as if they
are retailers or banks. On the other hand, they are quite different. They manage
money, produce products and compete. But, they are not and cannot be capitalist.
Why is the experience of NLMM reform in higher education different to that in
other sectors? Aviation and telecommunications can turned into capitalist markets
on the basis of shareholder ownership, though natural monopoly is a difculty.
Though there might be political reasons for continuing government interference, the
intrinsic factors are different to those operating in higher education. The same barriers to full commercialisation created by the public good nature of knowledge, and
the forms of status competition, do not exist.
These inhibiting factors in higher education cannot be wished away. Rather than
being the road to continuous improvement in higher education, the NLMM is a cul de
sac. Its impossibility has been apparent for at least a decade. So, why do governments

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

368

S. Marginson

persist with it? Why is it so hard for them to forgo? The most common explanations
given for the failure of NLMM reform, sourced largely from within the neo-liberal
canon, are insufcient political will in implementation, and/or the capture of government agendas by universities and interest groups like university teachers or publicly
funded scientists (following Buchanan and Tullock 1965), and/or the control impulses
of governments unable to leave higher education alone. These arguments have merit,
especially the last, but do not go to the heart of the matter. They all claim the triumph
of political interest over policy without explaining why and they leave the NLMM
itself unexamined. It is still assumed that the market model is feasible. But given the
long dominance of the NLMM, it just does not seem plausible that everywhere governments have experienced the same collapse of integrity and paralysis of will just
when the implementation of the NLMM was within reach. The plain fact is that the
model cannot work.
Policy needs to develop a normative model more nuanced and more sector
specic than is the NLMM, attuned to the character of higher education and knowledge that would establish a dynamic of reexive continuous improvement across
the full range of activity in the sector.
Notes on contributor
Simon Marginson is a professor of Higher Education at the University of Melbourne in
Australia and joint editor-in-chief of the journal Higher Education. He works on
globalisation and international higher education; markets, competition and public goods in
higher education; and education and research in East Asia. He is rst named co-author of
The Enterprise University (2000), International Student Security (2010), Global Creation
(2010) and Ideas for Intercultural Education (2011); and joint editor of Higher Education in
the Asia-Pacic (2011) and Handbook of Globalization and Higher Education (2011).

References
Abbott, M. 2006. Competition and reform of the New Zealand tertiary education sector.
Journal of Education Policy 21, no. 3: 36787.
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). 2011, 2012. http://www.arwu.org.
Ainley, P. 2004. The new market-state and education. Journal of Education Policy 19, no.
4: 497514.
Aspers, P. 2009. Knowledge and valuation in markets. Theory and Society 38: 11131.
Bashir, S. 2007. Trends in international trade in higher education: Implications and options
for developing countries. Education Working Paper 6, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Beaton-Wells, M., and E. Thompson. 2011. The economic role of international students fees
in Australian Universities. PowerPoint presentation. Melbourne: University of
Melbourne.
Bok, D. 2003. Universities in the marketplace: The commercialization of higher education.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bourdieu, P. 1993. The eld of cultural production. New York, NY: Columbia University
Press.
Breneman, D., B. Pusser, and S. Turner. 2006. Earnings from learning: The rise of for-prot
universities. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Brint, S. 2002. Higher education in The age of money. Paper to a Ford Foundation
Meeting on markets in higher education, in Tampa, June, University of California,
Riverside.
Brown, R., ed. 2011. Higher education and the market. New York, NY: Routledge.
Buchanan, J., and G. Tullock. 1965. The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan.
Cerny, P. 2007. Paradoxes of the competition state: The dynamics of political globalisation.
Government and Opposition 32, no. 2: 25174.

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

Journal of Education Policy

369

Clark, B. 1998. Creating entrepreneurial universities: Organisational pathways of transformation. Oxford: Pergamon.
Clarke, J. 2007. Citizen-consumers and public service reform: At the limits of neoliberalism?
Policy Futures in Education 5, no. 2: 23948.
de Boer, H., J. Enders, and B. Jongbloed. 2009. Market governance in higher education. In
The European higher education area: Perspective on a moving target, ed. B. Kehm,
J. Huisman, and B. Stensaker, 79104. Rotterdam: Sense.
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR). 2011. Statistics
relating to higher education. http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/higher_education/publications_resources/statistics/publications_higher_education_statistics_collections.htm.
Dill, D. 1997. Higher education markets and public policy. Higher Education Policy 10,
nos. 34: 16785
Frank, R., and P. Cook. 1995. The winner-take-all society. New York, NY: The Free Press.
Friedman, M. 1962. The role of government in education. In Capitalism and freedom, ed.
M. Friedman. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Geiger, R. 2004. Market coordination of higher education: The United States. In Markets in
higher education: Rhetoric or reality? ed. P. Teixeira, B. Jongbloed, D. Dill, and
A. Amaral, 16183. Dordrecht: Springer.
Gulson, K. 2007. Neoliberal spatial technologies: On the practices of educational policy
change. Critical Studies in Education 48, no. 2: 17995.
Hansmann, H. 1999. Higher education as an associative good. Working Paper 9913, Yale
Centre for International Finance, Yale Law School. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
Harvey, D. 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hay, C. 2001. The crisis of Keynesianism and the rise of neoliberalism in Britain. In The
rise of neoliberalism and institutional analysis, ed. J. Campbell and O. Pedersen, 193
218. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hayrinen-Alestalo, M., and U. Peltola. 2006. The problem of a market-oriented university.
Higher Education 52: 25181.
Hirsch, F. 1976. Social limits to growth. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Horta, H. 2009. Global and national prominent universities: Internationalisation, competitiveness and the role of the State. Higher Education 58: 387405.
Lewis, N. 2005. Code of Practice for the pastoral care of international students: Making a
globalising industry in New Zealand. Globalisation, Societies and Education 3, no. 1:
547.
Lomax-Smith, J. 2011. Higher education base funding review. Final report. Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia.
Marginson, S. 2006. Dynamics of national and global competition in higher education.
Higher Education 52: 139.
Marginson, S. 2008. Global eld and global imagining: Bourdieu and relations of power in
worldwide higher education. British Journal of Sociology of Education 29, no. 3:
30316.
Marginson, S. 2011. Higher education in East Asia and Singapore: Rise of the confucian
model. Higher Education 61: 587611.
Marginson, S., and M. Considine. 2000. The Enterprise University: Power, governance and
reinvention in Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McMahon, W. 2009. Higher learning, greater good: The private and social benets of
higher education. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mok, K. 2009. When neo-liberalism colonizes higher education in Asia: Bringing the public back in the contemporary university? Book chapter in draft. Hong Kong: University
of Hong Kong.
Murphy, P. 2012. The collective imagination: The creative spirit of free societies. Farnham:
Ashgate.
Naidoo, R. 2004. Fields and institutional strategy: Bourdieu on the relationship between
higher education, inequality and society. British Journal of Sociology of Education 25,
no. 4: 45771.
Naidoo, R. 2008. The competitive state and the mobilised market: Higher education policy
reform in the United Kingdom (19802007). Critique Internationale, 4765. Paris:
Presses de Sciences Po.

Downloaded by [The University Of Melbourne Libraries] at 18:03 05 September 2013

370

S. Marginson

Niklasson, L. 1996. Quasi-markets in higher education a comparative analysis. Journal of


Higher Education Policy and Management 18, no. 1: 722.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2004. Internationalisation and trade in higher education. Paris: OECD.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2008. Tertiary education
for the knowledge society. Vols. 1 and 2. Paris: OECD.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2011. Education at a
glance 2011: OECD indicators. Paris: OECD.
Podolny, J. 1993. A status-based model of market competition. American Journal of
Sociology 98, no. 4: 82972.
Porter, T. 2008. Locating the domain of calculation. Journal of Cultural Economy 1, no. 1:
950.
Rizvi, F., and B. Lingard. 2010. Globalizing education policy. London: Routledge.
Samuelson, P. 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and
Statistics 36, no. 4: 3879.
Santiago, R., T. Carvalho, A. Amaral, and V. Meek. 2006. Changing patterns in the middle
management of higher education institutions: The case of Portugal. Higher education 52:
21550.
Shattock, M. 2012. Making policy in British higher education 19452011. Maidenhead:
Open University Press.
Stiglitz, J. 1999. Knowledge as a global public good. In Global public goods: International
cooperation in the 21st century, ed. I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. Stern, 30825. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, C. 2002. Modern social imaginaries. Public Culture 14, no. 1: 91124.
Teixeira, P., B. Jongbloed, D. Dill, and A. Amaral, eds. 2004. Markets in higher education:
Rhetoric or reality? Amsterdam: Springer.
Thompson, J., and B. Bekhradnia. 2011. Higher education: Students at the heart of the system. An analysis of the higher education White Paper. London: Higher Education Policy
Institute.
UNESCO. 2012. Institute for Statistics. Tertiary Indicators. http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=167&IF_Language=eng.
University of Phoenix. 2012. University of Phoenix releases 2011 Academic annual report.
http://www.phoenix.edu/news/releases/2012/02/university-of-phoenix-releases-2011-academic-annual-report.html.
Vedder, R. 2007. Over invested and over priced: American higher education today. Washington, DC: Center for College Affordability and Productivity.
Verbik, L., and V. Lasanowski. 2007. International student mobility: Patterns and trends.
London: Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (OBHE).
Williams, G. 1997. The market route to mass higher education: The British experience.
Higher Education Policy 16, nos. 34: 27589.
Winston, G. 2003. Towards a theory of tuition: Prices, peer wages, and competition in
higher education. Discussion Paper 65, Williams Project on the Economics of Higher
Education. Williamstown: Williams College.