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Filing # 27890217 E-Filed 05/29/2015 09:24:51 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


IN AND FOR OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLORIDA
U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE CITIGROUP MORTGAGE
LOAN TRUST 2007-10
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: 2013-CA-000018
v.
EDWIN L. STANFORD, JR.; WENDY
STANFORD; AND ANY AND ALL UNKNOWN
PARTIES CLAIMING BY, THROUGH, UNDER,
AND AGAINST THE HEREIN NAMED
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT(S) WHO ARE NOT
KNOWN TO BE DEAD OR ALIVE, WHETHER
SAID UNKNOWN PARTIES MAY CLAIM AN
INTEREST AS SPOUSES, HEIRS, DEVISEES,
GRANTEES, OR OTHER CLAIMANTS,
Defendants.
____________________________________________/
STANFORDS EMERGENCY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, TO STAY SALE, VACATE
THE FINAL JUDGMENT, AND MOTION TO DISMISS AS SANCTION FOR FRAUD
ON THE COURT WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Defendants, Edwin L. Stanford, Jr. and Wendy Stanford (collectively, Defendants or
Stanfords), by and through undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 1.540(b) Fla. R. Civ. P.
move for a new trial, to stay a pending judicial sale, and to vacate Plaintiff, U.S. Bank National
Associations (U.S. Bank) Final Judgment of foreclosure entered in this matter. As grounds
therefore Defendants show:
I.
1.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

On February 11, 2015, following a non-jury trial, a Final Judgment of Foreclosure

was entered in this case. The Final Judgment appears as part of the Courts record and is

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incorporated herein by reference. The Final Judgment sets a judicial sale of the property that is
the subject of the action for June 5, 2015.
2.

On March 6, 2015, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. On March 10, 2015,

Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. The Amended Notice of Appeal appears as part
of the Courts record and is incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Despite the case being on appeal, this Court has continuing jurisdiction, to hear

this post-trial emergency motion to vacate the judgment and set aside and cancel the sale on
account of U.S. Banks material fraud and misrepresentations as described herein-below.
4.

At a minimum, an emergency stay of the Final Judgment and the June 5th sale is

in order because it is alleged that U.S. Bank engaged in material fraud on the Court, lacked
standing to file this foreclosure action, failed to properly invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of
this court, and was not a real party in interest with the right to enforce the debt or foreclose the
mortgage at the commencement of this action. As such, U.S. Bank is not entitled to Final
Judgment it received - as a matter of law. In either event, a hearing is required to address the
issues raised herein.
5.

Judicial discretion to vacate the Final Judgment should be exercised to sanction

U.S. Banks fraud on the Court; to promote the ends of justice, and to avoid and prevent
substantial and irreparable hardship that will result if this Motion is not granted forthwith by the
court.
II.
6.

ARGUMENT

No evidence was presented by U. S. Bank that the original Note was ever

delivered to the trust, for which it purports to be trustee, in accordance with the pooling service
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agreement (PSA) that is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission at: http://
www.secinfo.com/dqTm6.u2Dc.c.htm#1stPage.1 As such, U.S. Bank misrepresents its standing
in this action.
7.

U.S. Bank knew at the time that it filed this action that the Citigroup Mortgage

Loan Trust 2007-10 (hereainafter, Trust) was not the holder of the promissory note or the
owner of the mortgage when this foreclosure action was filed. U.S. Bank knew that the note and
mortgage were never transferred to the trust according to the strict terms of the applicable and
controlling trust agreement that is incorporated into this motion as a public record is an
admission against U.S. Banks interest.
8.

U.S. Bank made material false statements of standing on the record and at trial to

convince the court that U.S. Bank was the real party in interest and the proper authorized party to
bring this foreclosure action.
9.

There is no competent evidence in the record of this action to support the

foreclosure judgment in U.S. Banks favor and the Court should exercise its judicial discretion to
vacate the judgment. Failure to do so would serve to promote the ends of justice by denying a
judgment coerced through fraud on the court as described in this motion for special relief.
10.

This Court may in its sound discretion stay enforcement of the Final Judgment

and to grant other relief in these proceedings in this Court on terms which will protect the rights
of the parties.

The included link is active and may be used to access the PSA referenced. The entire agreement
encompasses volumes of pages and applicable portions are included in this Motion but the entire
PSA is incorporated herein by reference.
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11.

The prima facie showing of the facts set out below clearly show that U.S. Bank

committed material fraud on this Court requires that the court conduct a formal evidentiary
hearing on the motion to dismiss. Dynasty Express Corporation v. Weiss, 675 So.2d 235, 239
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
12.

Under the facts and circumstances presented herein, the effect of a failure to grant a

stay of the sale pending an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in this motion concerning
U.S. Banks fraud on the court, will be to deny Defendants relief and preclude Defendants from
any access to preserve and defend their rights of ownership of their home. An emergency stay is
justified in this action in favor of and on behalf of Defendants on account of, among other things,
the extraordinary impact that the outcome of this case will have on their ownership of their
home.
13.

This motion is presented as an emergency given the extremely time-sensitive

nature of relief sought in this case.


14.

Defendants are threatened with irreparable injury if a stay of the June 5, 2015

foreclosure sale is not granted. The law and equity, based on the facts of this case as presented
herein, favor granting a stay because it is the only means of protecting defendants rights while
ensuring that the parties receive proper and orderly access to the judicial system.
15.

U.S. Bank appears in this case in the capacity of a trustee, but failed to introduce

any evidence that it has any enforceable interest in the note or the mortgage and failed to
introduce the trust agreement that defines the capacity and interest, if any, that the trust can claim
in the subject note or mortgage.

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16.

The lack of a trust agreement deprived this Court of any competent evidence to

find that U.S. Bank was a holder of the promissory note or that U.S. Bank owned the mortgage
on behalf of the trust.
17.

U.S. Banks misconduct in the prosecution of this foreclosure precludes it from

being permitted to employ the judiciary to achieve its unlawful objective. U.S. Bank made
culpable and material misrepresentations that it held the promissory note and owned the
mortgage. These false statements permeate the entire foreclosure proceeding, subvert the
integrity of the action, are unconscionable, calculated to interfere with the judicial systems
ability to engage in impartial adjudication and deserving of the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice.
18.

U.S. Bank appears in this action in solely in the capacity of that as a trustee of a

trust. It is basic trust law that a trusts founding document controls and defines the powers of the
trustee on behalf of the trust. Jones v. First National Bank in Fort Lauderdale, 226 So.2d 834
(Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
19.

U.S. Bank failed to introduce any evidence that the Trust held the subject note or

owned the mortgage at the commencement of the action. As such, U.S. Bank failed to introduce
any evidence of its right to foreclose the Stanford mortgage on behalf of the trust. Absent such
essential evidence, U.S. Bank failed to establish standing or real party in interest status to
prosecute this foreclosure action. Gee v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee, Case No. 5D10-1687 (Fla.
5th DCA 2011); BAC Funding Consortium, Inc. v. Jean-Jacques, 28 So. 3rd 936 (Fla. 2nd DCA
2010); and Your Construction Center, Inc. v. Gross, 316 So.2d 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), see

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also, In re Doble, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1449 (April 14, 2011) and In re Hayes, 393 B.R, 259
(Bankr. Mass. 2008).
20.

Florida law requires that U.S. Bank hold the note and own the mortgage at the

commencement of this action in order to foreclose. There is no evidence in the record of these
material facts and, as a result, there is a complete failure of proof in this case. Pennington v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 151 So.3d 52, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 6, 2014) citing, Focht v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 So.3d 308, 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2013); Carapezza v. Pate, 143 So.2d 346
(Fla. 3rd DCA 1962); Laing v. Gainey Builders, Inc., 184 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) [holder
of note and mortgage is real party in interest in foreclosure action]; Verizzo v. Bank of New York,
28 So. 3d 976 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010) [requiring showing that foreclosing entity hold the note and
mortgage and that it owned same before commencement of the foreclosure], accord, Bouskila v.
M & I Bank, Case No. 1D10-2127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) [the party seeking to foreclose must
present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage to establish standing to proceed
with a foreclosure].
21.

In order to determine the power of U.S. Bank as trustee, the court has to

independently interpret the terms of theTrust Agreement In re Celotex, 487 F.3d 1320
(11th Cir 2007), citing, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112, (1989). The
extent of a trustee's duties and powers is determined by the trust instrument and the rules of law
which are applicable, and not by the trustees own interpretation of the instrument or belief as to
the rules of law. Restatement (Second) of Trusts 201 cmt. b (1959).
22.

Florida law is in accord with this general statement of law: "From the trust, the

trustee derives the rule of his conduct, the extent and limit of his authority, the measure of his
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obligation." Jones v. First Nat'l Bank in Fort Lauderdale, 226 So.2d 834, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA
1969).
23.

The trustee can only exercise the powers as (a) are conferred upon him in

specific words by the terms of the trust, or (b) are necessary or appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the trust and are not forbidden by the terms of the trust." Restatement (Second) of
Trusts 164,186 (1959). The extent and limit of U.S. Banks trustee powers are determined by
the terms of the trust agreement and the trustee is under a duty to act in accordance with the
terms of the trust. Restatement (Second) of Trusts 37; In Re Celotex, supra, citing the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts 185 (1959).
24.

U.S. Banks failure to introduce any evidence to link the trust to the Stanford note

or mortgage left one of the essential pieces of this foreclosure action missing. HSBC, N.A. v.
Murray, 40 157 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
25.

The PSA is an admission against U.S. Banks interest, and for purposes of this

motion, the Court can take judicial notice of the PSA. The PSA does not authorize the trust to
acquire the 2010 assignment of mortgage that was introduced into evidence because the transfer
of the assignment was not allowed after the October 31, 2007 closing date of the trust. http://
www.secinfo.com/dqTm6.u2Dc.c.htm#1stPage.
26.

Ergo, U.S. Bank was not the real party in interest and was not and cannot be

shown to be the proper or authorized party to bring this foreclosure action. In re: Shelter
Development Group, Inc., 50 B.R. 588 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1985) and see, Nedeau v. Gallagher, 851
So.2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) and Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So.2d 1178,
1182-83 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985).
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27.

Capacity to sue is an absence of a legal disability which would deprive a party

of the right to come into court. 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 31 (1971). Standing requires sufficient
interest in the outcome of litigation to warrant the courts consideration of its position. Keen v.
Joseph C. Mackey and Co., 420 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
28.

The PSA is the controlling agreement with respect to the trust. The PSA does not

give U.S. Bank any legal right or authority to take any actions with respect to the promissory
note or mortgage because these contracts are not trust assets.
29.

Section 2.01 of the PSA, titled Conveyance of Mortgage Loans, limits the assets

that the trustee can accept for placement into the trust and provides, in pertinent part:
The Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, does hereby
transfer, assign, set over and otherwise convey to the Trusteeall the right, title
and interest of the Depositorin and to the Mortgage Loans identified on the
Mortgage Loan Schedule...
In connection with such transfer and assignment, the Depositor does hereby
deliver to, and deposit with, the Trusteethe following documents or instruments
(a Mortgage File) with respect to (I) each Mortgage Loan so transferred and
assigned:

(i) The Mortgage Note, endorsedin blank or to the Trustee showing a


complete chain of endorsements from the named payee to the Trustee;

(ii) The original recorded Mortgagewith evidence of recording;

(iii) a blanket assignmentof the Mortgage to the Trustee, including


any intervening assignments and showing a complete chain of title from the
original mortgageeto the person assigning the Mortgage Loan to the Trustee (or
to MERS, noting the presence of the MIN, if the Mortgage Loan is registered on
the MERS System);

In the event that any such original document is required pursuant to the terms of
this Section to be a part of a Mortgage File, such document shall be delivered
promptly to the Trustee

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30.

Section 2.02 of the PSA is titled Acceptance of the Trust Fund by the Trustee and

requires the trustee to acknowledge receipt of the documents referred to in Section 2.01 by the
closing date of October 31, 2007. As shown through the documents before the Court this did
not occur. The PSA defines the trust assets to be mortgage loans included in the Trust Fund as
of the Closing Date. The PSA specifies that the trust fund is comprised only of the mortgage
loans subject to the PSA.
31.

The chain of title to the note and to the mortgage introduced into evidence does

not square with the specifications and limitations of the PSA. The 2010 assignment of mortgage
from MERS does not meet the specifications of the PSA and is years past the 2007 cut-off date
for such an assignment. And the record reveals that MERS never had any interest in the note,
rendering the language in the 2010 assignment that professes to transfer the note mere surpulsage
and of no legal effect.
32.

The trust, by its own terms, is a New York business trust controlled by New

Yorks common law on trusts. Ultra vires acts of the trustee in contravention of the trust are void
under New York law and U.S. Banks lack of standing denies it the privilege of invoking the
subject matter jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, U.S. Bank has no powers except those conferred
upon it in specific words by the terms of the trust. U.S. Bank is forbidden by the terms of the
trust from claiming that it is the holder of the note or the owner of the mortgage. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts 164,186 (1959). U.S. Banks powers are limited by the terms of the trust
and U.S. Bank is under a duty to act in accordance with the exercise of such power. In Re
Celotex, supra.

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33.

Before subject matter jurisdiction can arise, a proceeding must be "commenced

under the proper rules of law." Roberts v. Seaboard Surety Co., 158 Fla. 686, 698, 29 So. 2d 743,
749 (1947). The determination of standing to sue concerns a court's exercise of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the cause pled by a particular party. Generally, one with a legally protectable
right or interest at stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy is a proper party to obtain judicial
resolution of that controversy. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a). Rogers & Ford Constr. Corp. v. Carlandia
Corp., 626 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1993); Progressive Express Insurance Company v. McGrath
Community Chiropractic, 913 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2005).
34.

Only those who have standing to be heard in a judicial proceeding may participate

in it. Trawick, Fla. Prac. & Proc. 4-15; Byrom v. Gallagher, 578 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA
1991). Before this potential jurisdiction of the subject-matter--this power to hear and
determine--can be exercised, it must be lawfully invoked and called into action; the parties and
the subject-matter of the particular case must be brought before the court in such a way that it
acquires the jurisdiction and the power to act. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Canal Auth., 423 So.
2d 421, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
35.

It is because judicial subject matter jurisdiction is a sovereign power that its lack

cannot be remedied by the acquiescence or consent of the parties. Id. Standing to sue cannot be
conferred by consent. Florida Comm. on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology v. State of
Florida, 716 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
36.

Without a legitimate and worthy plaintiff there can be no justiciable controversy

over which this court has jurisdiction. Your Construction Center, Inc. v. Gross, 316 So. 2d 596
(Fl. 4th DCA 1975); Downing v. First National Bank of Lake City, 81 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1955);
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Shelter Development Group v. MMA of Georgia, Inc., 50 B.R. 588 (USBC, S.D. Florida 1985);
Tamiami Abstract and Title Company v. Berman, 324 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975); Laing v.
Gai45.ney Builders, Inc., 184 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). Only those who have standing
to be heard in a judicial proceeding may participate in it and standing to sue cannot be conferred
by consent. Id., supra and Florida Comm. on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology v. State of
Florida, 716 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quashed on other grounds) 609 So.2d 24 (Fla.
1992).
37.

As shown, this action was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest

and U.S. Bank does not otherwise qualify as a person authorized by any law, rule or contract to
prosecute this foreclosure action. Corcoran v. Brody, 347 So. 2d 689 (Fl. 4th DCA 1977).
38.

Standing, as a jurisdictional question, may be raised at any level of the judicial

process, by the Court on its own motion and by motion to dismiss for fraud on the court as
presented herein. The only proper party with standing to sue on a note and to foreclose a
mortgage is the holder of both or their representative. Khan v. Bank of America, N.A., 58 So.3d
927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); BAC Funding Consortium v. Jean-Jacques, 28 So.3d 936 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2010); Your Construction Center, Inc. v. Gross, 316 So. 2d 596 (Fl. 4th DCA 1975).
39.

Section 21 of Floridas State Constitution reserves access to courts to injured

persons and keeps the courthouse door locked to U.S. Bank in this action because U.S. Bank is
not an injured person. U.S. Bank is without standing to properly legally invoke the subject
matter jurisdiction of this court. United States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) U.S. Banks lack
of standing is a fatal "jurisdictional defect". State v. Property, 740 So.2d 1025 (Ala. 1999); Estate
v. Commercial, 607 S.E.2d 14 (2005).
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40.

U.S. Bank admitted at trial and concedes in its answer brief that a former loan

servicer, Bank of America, possessed the original note well before lawsuit inception. U.S.
Banks argument that it was holder of the note because it had constructive possession of the
original note indorsed in blank through its loan servicer at lawsuit initiation finds no support in
the Uniform Commercial Code or any other Florida law, rule of procedure or contract.
41.

U.S. Bank misrepresents its standing in this action. U.S. Bank knew and was

fully aware that it was not the holder of the Stanford note and also knew or should have known
with the exercise of due diligence that the Bank was not the owner of the mortgage at the
commencement of this action.
42.

U.S. Bank representations to the court that it was the holder of the note and the

owner of the mortgage with the right to enforce the debt and foreclose were false and made to
convince the court that U.S. Bank was the real party in interest and the proper authorized party to
bring this foreclosure action. In re: Shelter Development Group, Inc., 50 B.R. 588
(Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1985). U.S. Bank did not hold, and pursuant to the contents of its own PSA,
could not have held the note at the time this action was filed based on the contents of its own
PSA.
43.

Despite this knowledge, U.S. Bank introduced the promissory note with

indorsements and the mortgage assignment into evidence knowing that these documents were
false. U.S. Bank was fully aware at all times herein that it was not a holder and that U.S. Bank
was not a real party in interest and did not have standing at the time of the commencement of this
action.

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44.

The integrity of the civil litigation process depends on the truthful disclosure of

facts. Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen, 736 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999), Andrews v.
Palmas De Majorca Condominium, 898 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
45.

U.S. Bank, as a party to this action, unlawfully prosecuted this foreclosure and

should not be permitted to continue to employ the judiciary to achieve its ends. Id. U.S. Banks
culpable and material misrepresentations as to its standing are blatant and permeate the entire
foreclosure proceeding and subvert the integrity of this entire action. Metropolitan Dade County
v. Martinsen, supra; Deakter v. Menendez, 830 So.2d 124 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002).
46.

This Court has the inherent power and authority to prevent the abuse of the

Courts processes and to reverse the judgment and order this action dismissed with prejudice
based on the fact that U.S. Banks claims in this action are without basis in law or fact. The court
has the power to dismiss this foreclosure action based on U.S. Banks fraud on the court and to
predicate the sanction of dismissal simply on the PSA because that document duly establishes the
Banks fraud before the court. O'Berry v. Pearson, 186 So. 430 (Fla. 1939); Arzuman v. Saud,
843 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Piunno v. R. F. Concrete Constr., Inc., 904 So. 2d 658 (Fla.
4th DCA 2005).
47.

U.S. Bank was fully aware that its claims of standing to pursue the subject

foreclosure action were untrue and an impossibility at the time that U.S. Bank made the
allegations in the trial court and also to this court. Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 193 (Fla.
1934).
48.

U.S. Banks lack of holder/owner status in this foreclosure action are essential

material facts that go to the heart of the Banks claim of standing. Pleading a matter known by
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the party to be false for the purpose of... unworthy object, has always been considered a very
culpable abuse against justice and at common law was subject to censure and summary setting
aside with costs. Id.
49.

Fraud on the court must be dealt with in this case because it is clear that U.S. Bank

deliberately set upon an unconscionable course of action calculated to interfere with the judicial
systems ability to engage in impartial adjudication. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
1951) The unyielding standard is that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or
take advantage of his own wrong, or fraud any claim upon his iniquity, or profit by his own
crime Id.
50.

U.S. Banks allegations concerning its standing as a real party in interest in this

action were false and were made in bad faith. Read together, the record and the PSA provide
prima facie clear and convincing evidence of U.S. Banks material and culpable fraud on the
court. An evidentiary hearing on the issue of U.S. Banks fraud on the court is required. Dynasty
Express Corporation v. Weiss, 675 So.2d 235, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
51.

The extraordinary and harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice is warranted in

this case due to the deliberate and material fraudulent scheme put in place by U.S. Bank to divert
the judicial process. Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Bologna v. Schlanger,
995 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). U.S. Banks actions require nothing less than the
sanction of dismissal with prejudice. The falsehoods in their totality rise to the level where the
process of trial has itself been subverted. Suarez v. Benihana Natl of Fla. Corp., 88 So. 3d 349,
353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) and Cross v. Pumpco, Inc., 910 So. 2d 324, 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

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52.

All parties and the Court itself have affirmative obligations to promptly raise and

present issues of material fraud on the court in order to prevent representations from being made
to the court for an improper purpose and to make sure that fraud on the court is swiftly dealt with
and deterrent and punishing sanctions imposed. The law in Florida is very clear on this point:
there is no legal way to walk around fraud on the court. The court has the power to look beyond
the complaint to consider matters of public record in ruling on a motion to dismiss especially
when the motion is based on fraud on the court. Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 153 F. Supp.2d
1322 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
III.
65.

CONCLUSION

The undisputed facts as presented in this emergency motion, together with the

documents or record and the PSA, show by clear and convincing evidence that U.S Bank is not
the real party in interest; is not the holder of the note or the owner of the mortgage and by
representing same committed fraud on the court. As a sanction U.S. Banks actions the Final
Judgment of Foreclosure should be vacated and this action dismissed with prejudice.
66.

The court should set a hearing requiring U.S. Bank to show cause why this motion

should not be granted and the Final Judgment stayed the June 5, 2015 judicial sale cancelled and
to determine why this action should not be dismissed with prejudice.
WHEREFORE, Defendants request this Court to grant the following:
(a)

Cancellation of the June 5, 2015 judicial sale;

(b)

Set this matter for an emergency show cause hearing;

(c)

Set aside and vacate the Final Judgment of Foreclosure;

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(d)

Award Defendants their reasonable attorneys fees as authorized by

statute and contract and under F.S. 57.105; and,


(e)

For all other just and appropriate relief to which these Defendants prove

themselves entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL B. TAYLOR, P.A.
By:/s/ Samuel B. Taylor
SAMUEL B. TAYLOR
Florida Bar No.: 0736341
P.O. Box 1474
Destin, FL 32540-1474
Tel: (850) 699-2858
Email: sam@staylorpa.com
Attorney for Defendants

/s/ April Carrie Charney


APRIL CARRIE CHARNEY ATTORNEY AT
LAW
Florida Bar No.: 310425
P.O. Box 576
Venice, FL 34284-0576
email: aprilcarriecharney@gmail.com
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing STANFORDS EMERGENCY MOTION


FOR NEW TRIAL, TO STAY SALE, AND VACATE THE FINAL JUDGMENT WITH
INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW was furnished via the Florida E-Filing Portal
and by email to the following:
Amelia M. Hallenberg, Esq.
Anthony M. Lopez, Esq.
Elizabeth J. Tamborra, Esq.
Joseph Robles, Esq.
Travis J. Mehler, Esq.
Morris, Schneider, Wittstadt, LLC
5110 Eisenhower, Boulevard, Suite 302 A
Tampa, FL 33634
mswinbox@closingsource.net
ahallenberg@closingsource.net
CourtXpress@firmsolutions.us
etamborra@closingsource.net
jrobles@closingsource.net
tmehler@closingsource.net
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Parker B. Smith, Esq.


1219 Airport Road, Suite 311
Destin, FL 32541
pbsmith@gnt.net

Attorneys for Plaintiff


Steven W. Copus, Esq.
Copus & Copus, P.A.
1186 Eglin Parkway
Shalimar, FL 32579
steven@copuslaw.com
linda@copuslaw.com
cindy@copuslaw.com
Attorney for Defendants

Nancy M. Wallace, Esq.


William P. Heller, Esq.
Akerman, LLP
106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200
Tallahassee, FL 32301
nancy.wallace@akerman.com
ryan.oconner@akerman.com
elisa.miller@akerman.com
michele.rowe@akerman.com
william.heller@akerman.com
lorraine.corsaro@akerman.com
Appellees Attorney

George M. Gingo, Esq.


James E. Orth, Esq.
Gingo & Orth
400 Orange Street
Titusville, FL 32796
gingo.george@gmail.com
jamesorthlaw@gmail.com
Appellants Attorney
and filed with the Clerk of Court (via Florida E-Filing Portal) this 29th day of May 2015.

/s/ Samuel B. Taylor


______________________________
SAMUEL B. TAYLOR

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