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Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corp. vs Sec.

of Labor
GR No. 162355, August 14, 2009
On February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), instituted a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file employees of petitioner and its affiliates. The Med Arbiter ordered the dismissal of the petition due to
inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. In the meantime, CLUP-Sta. Lucia reorganized itself and re-registered itself as CLUPSLECCAWA and filed a petition. The company filed a motion to dismiss and averred that its recognized the CLUP- Sta. Lucia and as
the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees and that the collective bargaining negotiation already
commenced. On November 2001, a CBA was ratified between the company and the CLUP-Sta. Lucia. CLUP-SLECCAWA opposed
the execution of CBA as the same is tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy. Med Arbiter dismissed CLUP-SLECCAWAs
petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. On appeal, SOLE reversed and set aside Med Arbiters decision. The
company filed a petition before the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition.
Whether the CA erred in affirming the DOLE decision.
The petition has no merit. The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of
registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections
(a) to (c ) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-Sta. Lucia and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The
proper procedure for the company is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration and not to immediately commence
voluntary recognition proceedings. The petition is denied.
Patrcia Halaguea et,al. v. PAL
G.R. No. 172013, October 2, 2009.
Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on different dates prior to November 1996. They are members of FASAP
union exclusive bargaining organization of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP
entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55
for female and 60 for males).
In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter, manifested that the provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory. On July 2004, FASAP president submitted their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations at the
soonest possible time. On the same month, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with issuance of TRO with
the RTC Makati. The RTC issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on its motion for reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a
Petition with the CA. CA granted respondents petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. Hence, this petition.
Whether the provision on compulsory retirement in CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional.
The petitioners primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which
allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil
action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code.
Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction
of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute
between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article217 of the Labor Code is limited
to dispute arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code other labor
statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.