You are on page 1of 77








Chinas influence in North American trade is expanding
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated

itself into North America in a process

to the World Trade Organization. Before 2001, both
Mexico and the U.S. were increasing and deepening trade relations and regional specializations within the
parameters of NAFTA. Since 2001, however, this process has reversed as a result of Chinas
beginning in 2001 with Chinas adherence

massive trade volume with both the U.S. and Mexico. The analysis presented herein shows that Chinas
rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had
significant effects on each countrys respective trade dynamics . For instance, today China
is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States,
falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume . As we have seen from our examination of
the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is
shifting significantly : for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen
sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia , and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from
2000-2011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective
export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in
products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing
accessories and garments, among many others. NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first

phase (1994-2000), the region was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors
such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of
the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade,
investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some

of the gaps between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing , however, this was only
true for a small portion of Mexicos highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial
structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA , the
integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward
linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-), NAFTA has shown a deterioration of this
process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade , among other
variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end
of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the
survey in part two of this paper).

The link is increased economic engagement. Lack of US influence is

key to Chinas expansion in Latin America
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China



and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]
The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexicos

regional and
global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade
diversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may
open more room for Mexico to adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the
United States . Chinas rising role as a regional and global power and the new
economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial
commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which Chinas
going out strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is
likely that t here will be an adjustment in the triangles dynamic , which may result in a
closer relationship between these two countries .

Chinese international influence is an existential impact it controls

every scenario for extinction
Zhang 12

[Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. The

Rise of Chinas Political Softpower 9/4/12 ]
As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be
attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many
difficulties, including widespread poverty , international conflict , the clash of
civilizations and environmental protection . Thus far, the Western model has not
been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings
hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas . Poverty and development
The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in
developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in

developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving
to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of

development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which
enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive
experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In
the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a
more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global
security . In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more
practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation
while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism . The clash of civilizations
Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying . "In a world,

which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet
promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash
of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which

means to respect other nations, and learn from each other . This philosophy is, in fact,
wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts
have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural
conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western
counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most


obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the
emission of greenhouse gases . Although Europeans and Americans have a strong
awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant
lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some
effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China
model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing
with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger . China's experiences in eliminating
poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our
insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a
new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is t he rise of China's political

soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist
developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues . As the China model
improves, it will continue to surprise the world.






Competition Now
Chinese engagement is outpacing the US
Goodman 5-29

[Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Biden

Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties 5/29/13]
The competition

between the worlds two biggest economies for influence in Latin

America is on display this week as U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrives in Rio de Janeiro today near the end of a threenation tour of the region with Chinese President Xi Jinping close behind. The dueling visits -- Biden departs Brazil May 31,
the same day Xi arrives in Trinidad & Tobago to begin his first tour of the region since Chinas political transition ended in March --

underscore how Latin Americas natural resources and rising middle class are
making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the worlds top two
economies . Competing with Chinas checkbook isnt easy for the U.S. Seeking South American
soy, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion
in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By
contrast, the U.S. policy of pursuing free-trade accords has been controversial , said Kevin
Gallagher, a Boston University economist. If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play
with, said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book The Dragon in the Room, about Chinas inroads in the region. The onus is

on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy
because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to .

Increased China-Mexico economic engagement now

Goodman 5-29

[Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Biden

Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties 5/29/13]
Still, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who visited Beijing in April,

is looking to expand trade and

investment with China , if only to diversify away from the U.S ., buyer of 80 percent of the countrys



Chinese Influence High

Chinese influence is outpacing the US
Menedez 5-10

[Fernando. The East is rising, in Latin America 5/10/13
Trade with China has also increased dramatically over the last decade . For example,
China now accounts for 19 percent of Brazils total trade as compared with 2.8 percent in 2001. Similarly, China
accounts for nearly 20 percent of Chiles total trade in contrast to 5.6 percent a decade ago. China has also concluded
free-trade agreements with both Chile and Peru opening up those markets to
Chinese manufactured goods. By 2014, China will overtake the European Union as
Latin Americas second largest trading partner after the United States. While it still has
some way to go in potentially overtaking the United States as the leading trade partner, it is,
nevertheless, probable . Most recently, Brazil and China signed an agreement to pay for $30
billion in trade per year using local currencies and thus dropping the dollar. There
is also general speculation concerning a new renminbi-based currency , which, if it does not
replace the dollar or the euro, may well become a significant alternative foreign currency backed by commodities and natural
resources. Some even speak of a renminbi trading bloc. All of these moves demonstrate the power of

Chinas purse, which the US is increasingly unable to match . The speed and extent
of Chinas growth in Latin America also raises concerns about its geopolitical and
military policy objectives in the Americas. Many Chinese firms, especially in telecommunications, have
longstanding ties to the Peoples Liberation Army, and that should raise red flags.

Chinas pursuing increased influence in Latin America

Goodman 5-29

[Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Biden

Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties 5/29/13]
For Xi, his week-long

tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico precedes a visit to California for his first face-totrip to Latin America and the Caribbean, coming
so early in Xis presidency, reflects the rising confidence of the Chinese leadership
face talks with Obama since taking office. The

as it pursues its strategic interests with little concern for U.S. reaction, said Evan Ellis, a
professor at the National Defense University in Washington. China in recent years has ousted the U.S. to
become the top trade partner for Brazil and Chile . In the past Chinese presidents
were very deferential to the U.S., always making reference to Washingtons backyard, said Ellis, the author of
dozens of papers and a book about Chinas penetration of Latin America. You dont hear any of that from Xis
team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either.

Chinese influence in Latin American trades high now

Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China



and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
Economic ties between China and Mexico have greatly improved , given that
Mexico is one of the largest Latin American countries. From 2000 to 2009, China went
from being the 19th largest importer of Mexican goods to the 7th, while going from
7th place to 2nd in terms of exports to Mexico (ECLAC 2011). By 2011, total trade
between China and Mexico has increased significantly, and bilateral trade volume
has reached 42.1 billion USD a 19% increase compared to the previous year (MOFCOM 2011). Most importantly,
China has become the third largest export destination of Mexican goods . Chinese imports
from Mexico increased from 0.09% in 1993 to 1.35% in 2010. In dollar amounts, Chinese imports from Mexico
increased from 44.8 million USD in 1993 to 3.7 billion in 2010 (Hernndez Hernndez
2012:65). During the one-year period from 2010 to 2011, Chinese imports from Mexico increased 54.8%,
while Mexican imports from China grew 16% (see Table 1).

Its high and growing

Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
Although the

presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by

comparison to that of the United States , it is growing and exerting an increasing
weight in select countries. Particularly in states such as Ecuador and Venezuela, Chinese corporations are
becoming increasingly critical for the functioning of the extractive industries that
generate significant portions of the state's revenue. In Ecuador, Chinese petroleum and
service companies directly operate seven oil blocks, are a partner in others
through consortiums, and account for almost 40 percent of nonstate oil
production, while China Railway Road and Tongling are ramping up for a $3 billion project in the recently opened
Ecuadorian mining sector. In Venezuela, Chinese companies are one of the key actors maintaining oil
production in the mature oilfields of Maracaibo and Anzotegui , a vital current revenue
stream for the Chvez regime. In the Orinoco belt in the south of Venezuela, Chinese investment, technology, and manpower,
including Chinese-made drilling rigs, are a key to the development of that nation's future oil potential, while a May 2010 agreement
makes Chinese companies key players in the extraction of Venezuelan iron, gold, bauxite, and coal.7 Although Chinese

companies have yet to attain the level of "key employers " or have a major role in many Latin
American communities, they play a growing role in strategically important sectors in many
Latin American countries . For example, in telecommunications, the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE are
increasingly important product, service, and infrastructure providers,8 and in logistics, companies such as China Shipping,
China Overseas Shipping, and Hutchison Whampoa play increasingly vital roles in Latin
America's foreign trade.



US Engagement Low
US engagement is decreasing
Priest 5-1

[Dana. Latin American Reporter for the Washington Post. U.S. role
to decrease as Mexicos drug-war strategy shifts The Washington
Post, 5/1/13 ln]
For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have forged an unparalleled alliance
against Mexicos drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning. But much of

that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy . President Obama heads off Thursday on a threeday visit to Mexico to cement relations with the newly elected president, Enrique Pea Nieto, with vows of neighborly kinship and
future cooperation. Obamas visit comes as the fight over border security and
immigration overhaul has begun to consume Congress. The December inauguration of Pea
Nieto brought the nationalistic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) back to power after 13 years, and with it a whiff
of resentment over the deep U.S. involvement in Mexicos fight against narcotraffickers. The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels,
and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexicos streets safe and calm, Mexican authorities said.

Chinas outpacing US engagement

Padgett 5-13

[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME. The Obama

Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect TIME,
On the other hand, Latin

America can also be excused if its a little irked if its asking the U.S., Why
feels more
urgency to look south at the moment largely because of Chinas increasing
incursion into the hemisphere: annual ChinaLatin America trade exceeds $200 billion
did you wait so long to make this outreach, if you really are making a genuine outreach? Washington

today compared with less than $10 billion in 2000. U.S.Latin America trade may be robust. But this month Sabatinis publication,
Americas Quarterly, lays out striking evidence of U.S. decline: in 1995 , for example, the

U.S. sent Brazil, Latin Americas largest economy and now the worlds sixth largest, more than a fifth of that
countrys imports; by 2011 it was 15%, the same share sent from China . Ditto with regard
to Brazils exports: in 1995 the U.S. bought 21%, but just 10% in 2011, while for China it was 17%. China, as a result, surpassed the
U.S. as Brazils top trading partner in 2009. Whats more, business with the Americas as a share of total U.S. trade has actually
dropped over the past decade. The investment tally is even more striking: in 1995, the U.S.

accounted for 37% of Brazils foreign direct investment vs. 10% in 2011 less than
Chinas . Granted, its good for Latin America to be less dependent on the U.S. But its hardly unreasonable to
conclude that Washington wouldnt be facing this China syndrome in its own
hemisphere if it had simply taken high-level engagement on Latin America more
seriously a decade or more ago. Or even four years ago, when Obama took office pledging a more benign U.S. foreign policy
toward the region and then used that, say critics, as an excuse for benign neglect.



AT//Relations High
Relations may be high, but US economic engagement vis--vis China is
sufficiently low to generate uniqueness for the DA - Shaiken says
trade volume and new sectors of engagement mean future trends
ensure Chinese leadership
Hold any of their link uniqueness claims to a high threshold US
actions never reflect diplomatic rhetoric
Padgett 5-27

[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME Why China Is Behind

Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America WLRN South Florida 5/27/13 ]
There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a

former White House national security advisor

for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he
thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas . No its not, he
says. President Obamas

trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do

a lot more to open up and show Americas interest in re-engaging

with the rest of South

America. Pastor has a point: for

decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the

U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in
Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere matters more (to the U.S.) today
because it has more potential than any time in American history .

Recent attempts at engagement have failed

Zissis 12

[Carin. Mexico Analyst for the Council of the Americas. Mexicos

Pea Nieto Visits Washington to Refocus Relations 11/27/12]
the American public may not have read the good news . A November 20
Vianovo and GSD&M survey found that half of Americans have an unfavorable
view of Mexico, with drugs being the word most frequently associated with it. As many as 59
percent of those surveyed viewed Mexico as a source of problems compared to just 14 percent
considering it a good partner. This perception persists, even as signs indicate a turning tide in
terms of the drug-related violence that marked the six-year term of outgoing President Felipe Caldern. An AnimalPolitico
But it appears

analysis (translated into English by InSight Crime) reports that 20 of Mexicos 32 states saw fewer homicides between January and
October in 2012 compared to the same period last year. Areas associated with high rates of violence saw notable drops, with
homicides decreasing by 32 percent in Chihuahua, 25 percent in Nuevo Leon, and 23 percent in Sinaloa. Last month, Ciudad Juarez
logged fewer homicides than Chicago. [A]re we still in a security crisis? asks the articles author, Mexican security expert Alejandro
Hope. I would say no: crime and violence continue (and will continue for a while) at unacceptable levels, but it can no

longer be so easily argued that the situation is escalating out of control.

More evidence even recent attempts at improved relations will fail

too many barriers
Farnsworth 5-8



[Eric. Leader of the Washington Office of the Council of the Americas.

He was the Clinton Administrations Senior Adviser to the White
House Special Envoy for the Americas. Obamas Mexico Trip Yielded
Progress, Missed Opportunities 5/8/13]
At the same time, a

number of obstacles to growth must be addressed if the bilateral

relationship is to reach its full potential. Many of these are domestic issues that each
nation should resolve for its own self-interest but that would nonetheless meaningfully improve the
bilateral economic relationship. Among these are, from Mexicos side, reforms in fiscal, energy and
competition policy, as well as the continuing implementation of labor and
education reforms. Working with Mexicos other two main political parties, Pena Nietos Institutional Revolution Party
(PRI) has successfully begun the reform process. But the Mexican presidents honeymoon period is
coming to an end, and the most difficult issues remain unresolved. From the U.S.
perspective, comprehensive immigration reform would boost the economy by regularizing, and
therefore capitalizing on, immigrant workers already in the United States contributing to economic production. The United
States would also do well to quickly pass the transboundary hydrocarbons
agreement with Mexico, which would open up opportunities for cooperation with
Mexican state energy company Pemex in the Gulf of Mexico.

More evidence instances of increased cooperation are meaningless

Farnsworth 5-8

[Eric. Leader of the Washington Office of the Council of the Americas.

He was the Clinton Administrations Senior Adviser to the White
House Special Envoy for the Americas. Obamas Mexico Trip Yielded
Progress, Missed Opportunities 5/8/13]
The presidents visit to Mexico was timely and symbolically important. It was designed
to shift the narrative about U.S.-Mexico relations, and several concrete initiatives were announced. But
the trip seemingly did little to promote or capture a larger ambition for the
relationship . Both sides will need to think bigger to take the relationship to the next level.

The turn to economics is not substantive the security focus will

return and theres no coherent economic agenda
Fossett 5/28/13

(Katelyn, In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to

Economy, Interpress Service News,
Developments Achilles heel Still, for a country like Mexico that is still struggling with issues of citizen security and rampant crime,
many suggest that economic growth would have to start from the bottom , with more robust social
programmes and safety nets, before the international community becomes too optimistic about economic and trade booms.

Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center,
calls Latin America far behind in developing policies that might leverage
inclusive growth. There is not a sense of shared responsibility when your social policy is
remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted, she told reporters on Friday. The region, she said, needs a widespread
recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government [and] institutions. In a


telephone interview with IPS, she noted that the U.S. relationship with Central
America is likely to remain more focused on security concerns. There is a growing consensus
in the development community that sustainable growth cant and will not happen unless levels of violence are brought under
control, she told IPS. The World Bank recently called citizen insecurity the Achilles heel of development in Latin America.

Members of the U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a
blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico. The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going
to solve itself, Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA), an advocacy group, said in a statement. As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that

the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and
defend human rights in Mexico. In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter
from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry that stressed that [t]he human rights crisis will not improve until
there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexicos security forces, and more government agents held
responsible for the human rights violations they commit. Even as the focus of U.S.-Mexico relations

turns to economics, there is no broad agreement on how exactly a shift toward

trade relations will strengthen the economic competitiveness of both countries. Part of the
challenge is that we have this term, but we have a laundry list of issues that could fit into
that term, the Mexico Institutes Chris Wilson said. What we still dont have is a coherent agenda
or a way in which the leadership from the top level can engage the public or
business community or civil society and create something more [meaningful], he told IPS.

Some collaboration might be inevitable, but the increase in economic

engagement facilitated by the plan is distinct
Stratfor 13

[Stratfor Global Intelligence. Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and

Obama's Visit 5/2/13 ]
Domestic political factors will determine the success of the pending overhauls . But
the labor reform could improve bilateral commerce and investment with the
United States, as would a successful liberalization of the country's energy sector in
the coming years. Mexico is already the United States' third-largest trading partner , and
economic coordination between the two countries has become a routine matter at the ministerial level, but there is still a
need to ease bureaucratic trade and investment barriers .



AT//TPP Thumper
TPP will divide Latin America doesnt secure trade or US influence
Wagner and Parker 5-16

[Dan. CEO of Country Risk Solutions, an International Risk Advisory

Firm. And Nick is a Research Analyst with the Congressional
Research Service. Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership the Solution to
Latin America's Fractured Trade Regime? The Huffington Post,
5/16/13 ln]
Latin America is poised to assume a starring role in the governance of
international trade, with a Brazilian having been selected to lead the World Trade Organization and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership ( TPP ) set to enter its 17th round of talks in Peru later this month. Many hope an agreement on the TPP will provide a
much-needed boost to a still prostrate global economy, but what is being widely hailed as profound progress
in the evolution of trade integration globally is having the opposite effect in Latin
America. Rather than deepening trade ties within the region, the TPP is serving to expose
and exacerbate underlying political and economic fractures , raising question
about how deep Latin American trade cooperation can be, and whether the
Americas are fated to continue to be divided along trade policy lines. Praised as a cutting edge agreement
to address 21st century cross-border commercial issues, the TPP will unite a dozen nations with the goal
of establishing a core free trade area for the Asia-Pacific region. The bloc will
account for more than 30% of global GDP and 20% of the world's exports -- which would

grow considerably with the inclusion of Japan and South Korea - which are both actively exploring entry in the Partnership. Many
potential signatories, including the U.S., have expressed a desire for conclusion of the Partnership this year. As is the case with any
multilateral negotiation, getting to the finish line has not been easy. The derailment of negotiations over the

Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha Development Round
had a significant impact on the perceived realism of regional trade agreements,
while negatively effecting Latin America's ability to uniformly and robustly engage
with its largest trading partners. The radically different trade policy paths that
have emerged - pitting the notion of collaboration against economic nationalism -have given rise to a region divided over how, and whether, it should approach
trade liberalization going forward.






Link: Economic Engagement

Increasing economic engagement and support for police and security
forces creates strategic harmony between Obama and Nietos
priorities which strengthens US-Mexican relations
de Castro 12

(Rafael Fernndez chair of the international studies department at

the Autonomous Technological University of Mexico, Viewpoints:
What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican Relations?
American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12,
Brand new President Enrique Pea Nieto has three priorities in Mexicos bilateral
relations with the United States. The first priority is to take advantage of the opportunity that was
created by the weight of the Hispanic vote in favor of Barack Obamas reelection to achieve immigration reform.
It is Pea Nietos task to help Obama create the foundation for immigration
reform, not with demands but through actions. He must therefore align Mexicos
objectives with those of the United States: they must consistently seek legal, safe
and orderly migration. Furthermore, he must do some serious housekeeping, preventing abuses against Central

American migrants from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. And, he must develop a stable southern border, one that counts
with a state presence and adequate infrastructure. The spirit of the transformation of the southern border must preserve the positive
aspects of border integration processes while achieving efficiency in formal operations that will allow it to triumph over illegality.
The second priority is to take advantage of more favorable economic winds in both Mexico and the United States. Pea Nieto

must prioritize an agenda of economic integration and greater regional

competitiveness. The Mexican and Canadian entry into the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations
signify an opportunity to harmonize stances between the three members of NAFTA
to amplify markets in Asia. Mexico will be hosting the 2013 North American Leaders Summit, and Pea Nieto
should thus be able to push a new regional strategic agenda that includes safer and
efficient borders and the standardization of production. The third priority is to
maintain the aid flows that help combat organized crime and drug trafficking in the
face of a U.S. fiscal crisis that can threaten these resources. Here Pea Nieto must emphasize three elements:
agree with Washingtons priority that it help strengthen Mexicos law enforcement
institutions (police, judges, and prisons); develop a regional vision that includes Central America; and insist on an open
debate that finally puts the decriminalization of drugs on the table.

An economic approach to relations draws Mexico closer to the US

Valencia 5/20/13

(Robert contributing writer for Global Voices Online, New Yorkbased political analyst, U.S. and Latin America Economic
Cooperation Without Militarization?
In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica and vowed to strengthen economic ties with these two countries and
the rest of Latin America. He pledged to expand renewable energy development and education initiatives in recognition of the joined
fates of the United States and Latin America. This approach to Latin America is refreshing, but its impact on the ongoing War on
Drugs remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, the United States bears much of the responsibility for the failed campaign, but the

Obama administration has seen that some Latin American countries are taking
their own lead in tackling the drug trade and are increasingly relying less on
Washington. The Obama administration, for its part, has realized that shifting the


legendary treatment of Latin America as the U.S. backyard to an economic
approach would draw Latin America closer to Washingto n, especially given the fact that Latin
American leaders like Mexicos Enrique Pea Nieto and Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff want to be
considered trade partners and not U.S. subordinates.



Link: North American Competitiveness

Increasing economic engagement in movement of supplies across the
border is crucial to North American competitiveness
Shapiro 12

(Charles Shapiro, president of the Institute of Americas, a public

policy think tank at the University of California San Diego,
Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican
Relations? American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12,
At the 2009 Summit of the Americas, President Barack Obama stressed that he wanted a relationship of equals. It is time for Obama
and President Enrique Pea Nieto to transform U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations into a true partnership. The headlines

always go to energy, drugs, and immigration. And yes, Mexican leaders must figure out how to produce

more oil and natural gas. Yes, the United States must reduce our appetite for drugs and control the illicit export of weapons and drug
money. U.S. politicians will reform our immigration policy when they understand that we need Mexican workers and that antiLatino sentiments will cost them elections. What is vital, if less sexy, is to realize that Canada, Mexico,

and the United States are one economic entity. The focus must be on North
American competitiveness. While respecting national sovereignty, we need to recognize that
supply chains straddle borders. The manufactured exports of each contain components from all three. NAFTA
was the cutting edge laptop of 1992. Its time for the North American equivalent of the iPhone 5. We must accelerate
the movement of sub-components and finished products (and tourists) across our
borders. We need to make it easier for technicians to work temporarily in each
others countries. We need to harmonize our regulations and standards. Together the
three nations need to develop markets with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the European Union, APEC, and the Pacific Alliance.
Thats how to generate growth in all three North American nations.

Efforts to create a 21st century border are the most important

components of broader North American competitiveness
Leycegui 12

(Beatriz Leycegui Senior Fellow at the International Centre for

Trade and Sustainable Development in Geneva, Viewpoints: What
Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican Relations? American
Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12,
One of their top priorities should be to address with a greater sense of urgency the
bilateral and North American competitiveness agenda . The Mexican and U.S. economies are highly
integrated and interdependent. If their economies do well, the impact on job creation is immediate. The U.S. is Mexicos most
important export market; Mexico is the U.S.s second most important export market. Of every dollar the U.S. imports of Mexican
goods, 40 percent have American content, in comparison to Chinas (4 percent), Brazils (3 percent), or Indias (2 percent). Due to
the reduction in the differential in labor costs between Mexico and China (in 2003, it stood at 237 percent; in 2010, at 13.8 percent)
and increases in energy and transport costs, investment and production are returning to North America. The most

important elements of the North American competitiveness agenda should

include: expediting the work to create a twenty-first-century border (infrastructure, risk
management, pre-clearance, customs cooperation); strengthen regulatory cooperation (mutual
recognition of regulations); liberalization of strategic services (e.g. telecommunications, air,
land and sea transportation), and the improvement in the enforcement of intellectual
property laws. The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations can be an opportunity to advance some of these issues. Mexico
and the United States cannot fight geography. Why would Mexico forego the benefit of being next to the most important economy of


the world? Why would the United States ignore the possibility of further integrating with a country that has proven to be a partner in
production more than a competitor?



Link: Border Infrastructure

Creating a modern border infrastructure is crucial to developing the
Mexico-US commercial relationship
New Policy Institute 2/9/12

(Research Team of Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst,

NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik,
Director, NACTS, Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with
Mexico, North American Center for Transborder Studies)
Sharing a 2,000-mile long border needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. While land ports of entry between
the two nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has
taking a dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of federal agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. Advances in
border infrastructure simply did not happen during the last decade, which is astounding given the greatly expanded post-NAFTA
binational commercial relationship. Our borders infrastructure and capacity today reflects the

needs of a bygone era. This became evident as never before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California
port of entry the busiest land port of entry in the worldhad to shut down its 24
north-bound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof , injuring several people and damaging

vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico. According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments,

inadequate infrastructure capacity just at the border crossings between San Diego
County and the state of Baja California creates traffic congestion and delays that
cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2 billion in
forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border
delays could cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. The border has

been a filter to what shouldnt get in, when it can be a facilitator to what should get in. Rachel Poynter, U.S. State Department
These delays are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to
reduce their inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive. While importing from China to the U.S. may require a company to
hold more than 100 days of inventory, if efficiently managed, our proximity to Mexico can provide American firms with a constant
and predictable flow of goods that may reduce inventory costs and provide firms the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to
sudden market changes. With this fundamental fact in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border
Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial

relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance the

economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trad e. The idea is that development
of modern and secure 16 border infrastructure will give an added boost to our
regions competitiveness in the world and at the same time increase our access to a wider, more affordable
and ever improving quality set of goods.

Binational infrastructure building is crucial for economic integration

New Policy Institute 2/9/12

(Research Team of Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst,

NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik,
Director, NACTS, Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with
Mexico, North American Center for Transborder Studies)
Today more than 75,000 trucks (carrying close to 80 % of our two-way trade) cross our border on a daily basis. That this much
traffic is able to cross our congested borders is due in part to important advances in border infrastructure in the last couple of years
as new ports of entry have been opened. One important policy development is master planning processes for regional border
infrastructure, which have been initiated in conjunction with local border communities and state governments. It is hoped

that these regional processes will eventually make the overall binational
infrastructure-building process more transparent, more robust and ultimately a
better fit for two such powerful economies and next door neighbors. Much Opportunity,
but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun Total trade between the United States and Mexico has
expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and
investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical


for both economies. The question now is whether our current border management system will be able to sustain that
growth, and if so, for how much longer. A strong trade/joint production relationship with Mexico
can help create high-quality jobs within our borders. For reasons of geography and history,
Mexicos fate is intertwined with that of the United States. And despite the current global economic
environment, and transnational organized crime affecting Mexico and the United
States, the two countries need to implement a 21st Century border that not only reinvigorates crossborder trade and economic integration but which will also lead to increased
safety and quality of life for the residents of both countries. Both countries need to remain committed to promoting the global
competitiveness of our region and to ensuring that the benefits of expanding trade flows

keep reaching businesses, workers and consumers on both sides of our shared
border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can explain the critical nature
of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for
citizens to understand. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet
tomorrows demands, acting as a facilitator and conductor of the lawful flows of
goods, services and people between our nations, so that we may capitalize on the
full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars worth of trade crosses the
U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis and sustains six million jobs in the U.S.,
imagine what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border.

Enhanced border infrastructure is critical to the North American

New Policy Institute 2/9/12

(Research Team of Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst,

NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik,
Director, NACTS, Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with
Mexico, North American Center for Transborder Studies)
Sharing a 2,000-mile long border with Mexico needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. Though improving,
our borders current infrastructure and capacity today reflect the needs of a bygone era. While land ports of entry between the two
nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking
an overwhelmingly dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. With this
in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the
importance of fostering the commercial relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance economic
competitiveness by expediting lawful trade. The basic idea is that developing a modern and secure

border infrastructure will give an added boost to our regions safety and
competitiveness in the world. Much Opportunity, but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun The poor
infrastructure, the inadequate staffing levels and the heavy focus on security that
prevails at the U.S. Mexico border have cost both economies billions of dollars in
gross output annually. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet todays demands, acting as a facilitator and
conductor of lawful flows of goods, services and people across our nations so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our
partnership. If a billion dollars worth of trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a

daily basis now while sustaining six million jobs, imagine what could be
accomplished with a truly 21st century border. 4 An Introduction to our Unknown Neighbor, Mexico
It is imperative for the United States to engage in a national conversation regarding the value of economic integration and
interdependence, cross-border trade with Mexico, and the cost of inefficiencies at our long and dynamic shared border. As the U.S.
economy struggles to create high-quality jobs and the export sector assumes more importance, our nation needs to discover every
dollar of value in the relationship with our nations number two export market: Mexico. There is no other

relationship for the United States that is as dismissed and yet ironically as crucial
for our countrys well-being as the one with Mexico , a country with a population of over 113 million

people. Mexico is much more than a country with which we just happen to share a 2,000 mile long land border. Although it is often
unknown to us, it is important to realize that Mexico is one of our most significant commercial

partners in the world. To illustrate Mexicos overall development and the trends in its development, we can look a few
examples from its physical infrastructure, its human capital, what it produces and its trade relationships. To begin with, in
2010 Mexico invested an unprecedented five percent of its GDP in infrastructure.
With 76 seaports along its 11,000 kilometers of seashore on the Pacific and


Atlantic Oceans, 85 airports, 26,700 kilometers of railroad and 366,000
kilometers of road, Mexico is one of the most interconnected countries in the
entire hemisphere (see Figure 1 below).



Link: Access Roads

Access road improvements cement US influence
Negroponte 12

(Diana Negroponte, a nonresident senior fellow with the Latin

America Initiative under Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution,
Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican
Relations? American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12,
Deepening the trade relationship and facilitating the shipment of component parts
between Mexico and the United States requires the creation of access roads some eight
miles ahead of the principal border crossings . With electronic submission of
customs/immigration documentation and with electronic seals on transnational containers, trucks filled with
bilaterally manufactured products can more rapidly pass across the borde r. Currently,
the trucks are delayed principally for lack of access roads leading up to the border, especially on the Mexican side. In order
to construct these roads, private-public partnerships are needed . The NADBANK, established
20 years ago to support environmental projects, is the best placed to mobilize these partnerships. The bank's bylaws permit this.
However, the environmental impact needs to be interpreted broadly. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could recognize
that new roads relieve the congestion and high levels of air pollutants at the border crossing itself. Use of access roads may spread
pollution further inland, but the levels of pollutants will be significantly lower than those currently suffered each side of the Rio
Grande. NADBANKs initiative and the White House leadership to facilitate EPA

approval could lead to the development of access roads and decongestion at the
actual border. Mexican presidential encouragement to NADBANK's directors to seek PPPs and U.S. presidential urging to
the EPA for a broad interpretation of its mandate could result in a decade's work of new infrastructure projects. This will
facilitate the anticipated tripling of cross-border trade as both countries negotiate
a Trans-Pacific Partnership and Mexico negotiates a Pacific Trade Alliance with its
South American partners. Presidential decisions to advance on instructing NADBANK to move forward with PPPs
for these infrastructure projects are relatively easy. Their consequences will enhance the trade and prosperity of both nations.



Link: Security Cooperation

Increasing security cooperation secures US influence
Seelke 13

[Claire. Specialist in Mexico Affairs at the Congressional Research

Service. Mexico and the 112th Congress 1/29/13]
U.S. policy toward Mexico has been framed by security cooperation under
the Mrida Initiative. Congress has provided more than $1.9 billion in Mrida aid since FY2008 to support Mexicos efforts
against drug trafficking and organized crime. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and
equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now prioritizes strengthening the rule
In recent years,

of law. Along the border, U.S. policymakers have sought to balance security and
commercial concerns. The U.S. and Mexican governments resolved a longstanding trade dispute in 2011 involving NAFTA trucking provisions and have sought to improve competitiveness
through regulatory cooperation. Bilateral trade surpassed $460 billion in 2011.The February 2012 signing of a TransBoundary Hydrocarbons Agreement for managing oil resources in the Gulf of Mexico could create
new opportunities for energy cooperation.

Reforming cross-border regulations is the overarching factor in the

U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship
Jones 12

(James Jones chairman and CEO of MannattJones Global Strategies

and former U.S. ambassador to Mexico (1993-1997), Viewpoints:
What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican Relations?
American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12,
The overarching goal of our bilateral relationship should be to thoroughly
integrate the economies of North America. Democracy and security are
strengthened when commerce flows and grows. This creates wealth, opens new jobs, and establishes
better personal relationships in both countries. To achieve this, we can work together to reduce the
regulatory barriers to efficient trade by harmonizing cross-border regulations and
modernizing border infrastructure. The U.S. must pass comprehensive immigration reform that recognizes

reality in our labor needs and legal protections for immigrants who are here helping build our economy. The U. S. must implement a
debt reduction program combining serious spending cuts and revenue increases to give certainty and new impetus to growing our
economy. Mexico must implement judicial and law enforcement reforms that will give

confidence to businesses and citizens that a rule of law prevails there . Energy reforms are
needed to attract private capital to fully realize Mexico's abundant opportunities. Mexico needs tax reform that increases revenue,
reduces the informal economy, and provides the framework to close the deep wealth divide among its citizens. To accomplish this
and to further reduce the 40 million living in poverty, Mexico needs to make massive investments in infrastructure and quality
education. Mexico's growing middle class is impressive but to expand that even more will create market and economic power that
will be the envy of the hemisphere. North America sits near the pinnacle of its greatest economic strength in history. Together we
can take it to the top.



Link: Immigration / Trade

Engaging Mexico on trade and immigration reform is crucial to move
the US-Mexican relationship from one of necessity to a strategic
Garza 12

(Antonio Garza former U.S. ambassador to Mexico (2002-2009),

Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican
Relations? American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12,
The United States and Mexico have enjoyed a very healthy and respectful relationship.
On issues of shared interestprimarily trade and securityweve cooperated , though
mostly out of necessity. Yet neither country has ever truly leveraged the bilateral
relationship strategically. What will it take to bring about this kind of fundamental shift? A first step is to get rid of

outdated perceptionson both sides. You simply cant expect to have a strategic relationship that functions in real time if
perceptions lag present realities. Theres been new research and insightful commentary recently highlighting the gap between
Americans perceptions of Mexico and the countrys current reality. President Enrique Pea Nieto faces the daunting task of moving
Main Street U.S. perceptions of Mexico closer to where the views of economists, investors, and discerning travelers are on the
country. He will help this along by conveying his administrations absolute commitment to carrying through promised economic
reforms, implementing anti-corruption and transparency initiatives, and reinforcing cooperation on security. For President

Obama, its important to signal that his new team is completely schooled in the
reality of todays Mexico and that they are prepared to take advantage of the moment to recast the relationship to the
benefit of both countries. Delivering on immigration reform and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership trade agreement are rare opportunities for a U.S. administration to
fundamentally alter Mexicans perceptions of their northern partner . As Mexicos
place in the world rises and the U.S. continues to recalibrate its foreign alliances,
theres a unique opportunity to move the bilateral relationship to a more strategic
levelbut it will take some work.



Trade Key
Commercial relationship is crucial to both Mexico and US economies
New Policy Institute 2/9/12

(Research Team of Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst,

NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik,
Director, NACTS, Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with
Mexico, North American Center for Transborder Studies)
The United States urgently needs a sustained national conversation regarding how
to realize greater value in our crossborder trade with Mexico, and the benefits of
increasing efficiencies at our shared border. As the export sector assumes more importance and the U.S.

economy struggles to create high-quality jobs, our nation needs to discover every dollar of value in our relationship with our nations
number two export market: Mexico. Trade with Mexico: An Abundance of Value That Is Hidden In Plain Sight Trade is

an important tool in policymakers economic development toolbox . Ever since the

enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and given the complementarity of the U.S. and Mexican
economies, bilateral trade has grown exponentially, reaching a record high of nearly $400 billion in 2010. Mexico is now the thirdranked commercial partner of the U.S. and the second largest market for U.S. exports. Mexico spent $163 billion on

U.S. goods in 2010, and trade with Mexico sustains six million jobs in the U.S. This
is economic value that for many in the U.S. remains hidden in plain sight. To
provide a better idea of what this commercial partnership means to our country, U .S. sales to Mexico are larger
than all U.S. exports to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) combined, as well
as all combined sales to Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands .
Twenty-two states count Mexico as their No. 1 or No. 2 export market, and it is a top-five

market for 14 other states. American consumers and businesses import large quantities of jointly produced products and services
from Mexico such as automobiles, produce, and petroleum, just to name a few. Still, for every dollar Mexico makes

from exporting to the U.S., it will in turn spend 50 cents on U.S. products or
services, which are a considerable benefit to our economy and demonstrates the
truly unique quality of this trade or joint production relationship.

The economic component of the alliance is comparatively most

Seelke 13

[Claire. Specialist in Mexico Affairs at the Congressional Research

Service. Mexico and the 112th Congress 1/29/13]

The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship as
neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although
security issues have recently dominated the U.S. relationship with Mexico , analysts
predict that bilateral relations may shift toward economic matters now that President Enrique
Pea Nieto has taken office. Pea Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) defeated leftist Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador and Josefina Vzquez Mota of the conservative National
Action Party (PAN) in Mexicos July 1, 2012 presidential election. As a result, the PRI, which controlled Mexico from
1929 to 2000, retook the presidency on December 1, 2012. Some analysts have raised concerns regarding the PRIs
return to power, but President Pea Nieto has pledged to govern democratically and to forge
cross-party alliances.

Economic cooperation is the new orientation of the alliance

Stratfor 13



[Stratfor Global Intelligence. Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and

Obama's Visit 5/2/13 ]

When U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Mexico on May 2, he will arrive amid a period of
sweeping transformation in the country. Embroiled in myriad political battles and seeking to implement an
extensive slate of national reforms, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's administration has been
focused almost solely on internal affairs. Meanwhile, after years of delay, the U.S. Congress has been
debating gun control and immigration reform -- two issues of serious interest to the Mexican government. U.S.-Mexican
relations are strategically important to both countries, and Mexico's period of
transition has created opportunities for each to reshape the partnership . And although
U.S. media attention has focused primarily on bilateral security issues ahead of Obama's visit -- namely cooperation in Mexico's drug
war -- the Pena Nieto

administration is working with Washington to re-orient the

cross-border conversation to one centered primarily on mutual economic

possibility .

The economic aspect of the bilateral relationship is becoming

increasingly important new working group and both leaders are
distancing themselves from security and immigration issues
Thomson 5/3/13

(Adam, US and Mexico Agree Closer Economic Ties, Financial

The governments of Mexico and the US on Thursday agreed to form a group to deepen
economic integration as part of efforts to broaden the bilateral relationship and
boost North American competitiveness. At a press conference with US President Barack Obama, Enrique

Pea Nieto of Mexico said the group would comprise Mexican ministers and their US counterparts, and include input from Joe
Biden, the US vice-president. It would meet for the first time in the autumn. The Mexican president said the idea was to act as an
enabler ... in terms of how government can support efforts by the private sector to have a strong economic integration. The

announcement goes some way to meeting Mr Pea Nietos objectives of widening

relations with Mexicos northern neighbour, which in recent years have been dominated by
security and immigration issues. Mr Pea Nieto, who took office in December, has said that he intends to

reorient his countrys role in the fight against drugs, prioritising efforts that lead to a reduction in violence over the pursuit of drugcartel kingpins. Some experts have interpreted that as a deliberate desire to create

some distance from the US on the security issue, with the potential to downgrade what has undoubtedly

been a period of co-operation for both countries against organised crime. But on Thursday Mr Obama, who is on a three-day visit
to Mexico and Central America, said he supported Mr Pea Nietos intentions of reducing the murder rate, which has almost tripled
in the past six years largely as a consequence of the military-led fight against the cartels. Saying that he and Mr Pea Nieto had
discussed the security issue in depth, Mr Obama added that it is up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures ...
we support the Mexican governments focus on reducing violence. Mr Obama also commended his Mexican counterpart on an
ambitious economic reform agenda including the central goal to raise Mexicos annual growth rates to as high as 6 per cent within
the next six years. The US leader called Mexicos reform programme a necessary change. On the high-level

working group, Mr Obama said it was necessary to upgrade and revamp the two
countries trade relationship. Since the signing of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta),
bilateral trade has flourished and is now worth about $1.4bn a day. Mr Obama said that it was important to
do more. We cant lose sight of the larger relationship, he said, calling it a
historic opportunity to foster more trade and more jobs on both sides of the

The focus for the bilateral agenda is shifting to economics

Grayson 5/21/13

(George W. - Professor of Government at the College of William &

Mary, Strategic Posture Review: Mexico,


Instead, both

sides are eager to reframe the bilateral agenda and shift the emphasis to
trade and energy. During Obamas recent visit to Mexico City, both presidents pledged to
concentrate more on commerce and business, which have been eclipsed by the drug war. In an April
2013 meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Mexican Foreign Secretary Jose Antonio
Meade sounded a similar note, also stressing the need to transcend drug issues
and concentrate more on trade and investment. Meade pointed out that Mexico is the most
important export market for 22 of the 50 [U.S.] states, and added that the U.S. exports
more to Mexico than it does to China and Japan combined.






Ext. Internal Link

Improved US-Mexico relations crowd out China
Fischer 12

[Howard. Analyst for Capitol Media. Fox says US-Mexico ties deter
China's influence 9/14/12]
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the
recognizing the benefits of migrant labor -

United States has to bolster ties with Mexico - including

or get used to the idea of China setting the

international agenda on its own terms . "The threat is this so-called power shift from
the West to the East ," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of
Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead ," Fox explained,
saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of
the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under
what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their
leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and
other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have
our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that

That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico , he
said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that
Mexicans in the United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both
countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this
country and under what circumstances. "It has to be based on humanism, on compassion, on love, on friendship, on
neighborhood and on partnership that we have together," Fox said. "Otherwise, we will keep losing the jobs to
the East." Fox, who served as president from 2000 to 2006, insisted he is not in favor of "open borders." "But I am in favor

of the use of our talent, our wisdom, our intelligence," Fox said. And that requires finally filling the vacuum of what kind of laws on
immigration are necessary. In his speech, Fox did not address Arizona's approval of SB 1070 two years ago in an effort to give state
and local police more power to detain and arrest suspected illegal immigrants. But in response to a question afterward, he said
Arizona and other states have waded into the fray with their own laws out of frustration with the lack of action in Washington. "At
the very end, migration is a national issue," Fox said. With immigration reform stalled in Congress, "state governments and state
legislatures have been forced to get involved." Fox said that what's needed now is for lawmakers in Washington to come up with at
least a framework for reform. "We need to know what the playground is and what the rules of the game are," he said, calling on
leaders to "put aside xenophobia, put aside all of our complaints that we might have, and sit down and discuss the differences." Fox
said it also needs to be recognized that

this is not just a one-way relationship, saying Mexico buys

$250 billion of U.S. products every year, meaning "millions of jobs" to this
country's economy.

Chinas market potential, influence in Latin America, and perception

of emergence are key to influence
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
The concept of soft

power was introduced in 1990 by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, who defined it as "a dynamic
created by a nation whereby other nations seek to imitate that nation, become
closer to that nation, and align its interests accordingly ."1 Although the term is used to refer to a


range of concepts, this

article analyzes Chinese soft power in terms of the willingness of

governments and other actors in the international system to orient themselves and
behave in ways that benefit the PRC because they believe doing so to be in their own interests. Such a
definition, by necessity, is incomplete. There are many reasons why other actors may decide that actions beneficial to the PRC are
also in their own interests: they may feel an affinity for the Chinese culture and people and the objectives of its government, they
may expect to receive economic or political benefits from such actions, or they may even calculate that the costs or risks of "going
against" the PRC are simply too great. Soft power is a compelling concept, yet it operates through vaguely defined mechanisms. In
the words of Nye, "in a global information age...success depends not only on whose army wins, but on whose story wins."2 The
implications of soft power in the contemporary environment are difficult to evaluate because they involve a complex web of
interconnected effects and feedback in which the ultimate results of an action go far beyond the initial stimulus and the ultimate
importance of an influence goes far beyond what is initially apparent. This article examines Chinese soft power in

the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region,
while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's economic footprint in Latin America, and

has expanded enormously . Understanding

the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. In
general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States , leading
its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise,

analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S.
influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English
language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also
important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and
not necessarily on objective reality. Although

China's current trade with and investment

position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States ,3
its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those
activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the
future . Because perception drives soft power , the nature of the PRC impact on each
country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and
prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its
crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as
an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese

soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the
PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous
business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with
globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to
Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and
infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to
the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for
Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft
power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the
political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and
the general population.

Economic engagement pushes out China

Dowd 12

[Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. Countering

China's Reach in Latin America 2012. ]
Second, the U.S.

must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must
reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily . That
means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a
hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in
limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.

Reengagement means reviving

U.S. diplomacy . The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department


position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere
ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement

means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that
China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how
important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the
midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of
respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties . A good model to
follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is
reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region . Perhaps its time to
do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries
from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes
sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance
of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region .

The plan crowds out Chinese influence market influence is key

Johnson 5

[Stephen. Senior Latin American Policy Analyst at Heritage.

Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America 10/24/5 ]
In the 1960s, the

Soviet Union defied America's Monroe Doctrine by supporting Fidel

Castro's military buildup in Cuba. Later, it supported insurgencies in Central America. This triggered a competition among
existing right-wing dictatorships, Marxist authoritarianism, and the U.S. democratic model. In the end, democracy and
open markets won. Promoted by the United States, these principles have generally made Latin
American states more viable politically, economically, and commercially . Today,
another communist state-the People's Republic of China (PRC)-is seeking trade, diplomatic, and
military ties in Latin America and the Caribbean. The region is rich in natural
resources and developing markets for manufactured goods and even arms . China
does not currently pose a direct military threat in Latin America and has steadily embraced market concepts,
but it represents serious competition that could dilute U.S. influence . Washington
could ignore this intrusion or attempt to contain it . Ignoring it leaves a vacuum for
China to fill, while trying to contain it runs against America's own free market ideals. Instead, the United States
can best look after its hemispheric interests and moderate China's presence by :
Consolidating trade relations with Latin America and removing protectionist U.S. trade barriers,
Emphasizing comprehensive relationships



as opposed to narrow-interest diplomacy such as


on assistance to U.S. neighbors, and


harder for democratic and economic reforms, prioritizing support for these pur poses, and reenergizing public diplomacy.

More evidence US-China interests in Latin America are competitive

and trade off
Johnson 5

[Stephen. Senior Latin American Policy Analyst at Heritage.

Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America 10/24/5 ]
The United States and China have competing interests in Latin America .
Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo cratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the region as a
source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform for


power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In contrast, China
represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances .
Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries,
powerful presidents, and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms
and industrialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty. America's strength is
competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction. As a good
neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests , the United States should : Accelerate free trade
agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol icies toward
the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricultural and steel subsidies that dissuade potential
partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and
eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and Latin American
enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth . Adopt more
comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as
counternarcotics, leaves vacuums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that
other powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public
safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11] Cut red tape on

assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Performance requirements are blunt instruments
that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcotics cooperation and Article 98 letters
that withhold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress
considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it should tailor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate
U.S. interests. Press harder for reforms and use public diplomacy . Once Latin America had elected
leaders and fledgling markets in the 1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is
responsible for solving its own problems, external pressure can encourage progress. U.S. public diplomacy, which is
mostly reactive toward Latin America, should

be strengthened and more supportive of U.S.

development goals. The United States has become the greatest power in the world based on its tradition of free choice.
Choice goes hand-in-hand with competition , because these keep markets vibrant and
governments accountable. In a globalized world, democracies have relations with whom
they wish and nation-competitors such as China cannot be blocked from visiting
the Western Hemisphere. However, the United States can best look after its regional
interests by cultivating closer political and security ties with neighbors, advancing
free trade, and encouraging respect for the rule of law and lib eral economic
principles among all players- including China.

The internal link is empirically true American inaction drives

Chinese market expansion
Johnson 5

[Stephen. Senior Latin American Policy Analyst at Heritage.

Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America 10/24/5 ]
In the Western Hemisphere, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of halfhearted market reforms and Washington's unwillingness to pursue neighborhood
relations with much enthusiasm. National Defense University professor Cynthia A. Watson notes, "[T]he
1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to
rampant corruption and unfulfilled expectations in Latin America while
Washington became the world's superpower rather than a part ner for the



China Good: Energy Security 1st Line

Chinese influence in Latin Americas key to their energy security
Xiaoxia 5-6

[Wang. Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. In America's

Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America The Economic
Observer, 5/6/13 ]
Among the numerous needs of China, the

demand for oil has always been the most powerful

driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's
new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer . More than
half of China's oil demand depends on imports , which increases the instability of
its energy security. Diversification is inevitable . In this context, Latin America and its
huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China .
China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of
consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry
supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears
in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin
American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and

American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars
believe that China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is

interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations . This realistic path is exactly
opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain
Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United
States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an
increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a
financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "fundsfor-assets" transactions with Latin American countries . So what does China want exactly in
entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence?
Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's

involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the

United States, but brings benefits . It is precisely because China has reached
"loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings
much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have
these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded
the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent
reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S .

Energy insecurity sparks Asian war

Clement 12

[Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25,]

The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining
feature of the strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct
conflict, there are several areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing
points in the future. Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India


is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each nation are largely based on geopolitical considerations. First, it is
important to recognize that energy cooperation between China and India over the past decade has been increasing. In January 2006,
for example, both nations signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas which encouraged collaboration
between their enterprises, including joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. Escalations in global energy
prices and political uncertainties in the Middle East, however, have resulted in both countries looking for long-term arrangements.

As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet
their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price
fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy
policies, based on notions of traditional security . Ultimately, what we see is the arrival of military and
political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages . Energy security is of utmost
strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their
economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is
estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the worlds GDP and, as such, will require vast
amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the competition for energy resources such as oil

and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is
maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia
effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national
interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security.
Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading
its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and
powerful blue-water navy. Indias drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its
naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in 2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with plans to further increase naval
spending 40 percent by 2014. Chinas thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India
relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its

maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine
that control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of
military power remains a stark reality. Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly

translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military
implications. The geopolitical rivalry in Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial
energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become
a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance for both China and India due to its
location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is presented as a
source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India
for access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had
frequent discussions about building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from
Myanmars available resources. In 2005, for example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract
with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas. For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to
the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait of Malacca. The potential for the

Malacca Strait to be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to China, since as much as 85

percent of Chinas oil is shipped through the region. For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic
importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan
and has been expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a
feeling of Chinese encirclement. Indias interest in Myanmar directly relates to the growing presence and
influence of China in the region. Chinas string of pearls strategy refers to attempts to negotiate basing rights along the sea route
linking the Middle East with China, including creating strong diplomatic ties with important states in the region. Not only does this
contain Indias naval projection of power, it also directly threatens Indias energy access and the regional balance of power. While
military confrontation between China and India remains unlikely, it is important to recognize that China and Indias energy policies
revolve around traditional ideas of security, which highlight military and political balancing. Their energy policies are largely based
on geopolitical and security considerations, and not just with regards to the global oil market. As such, it is critical for

there to be ongoing diplomatic engagement between China and India to avoid

unnecessary or accidental escalation.
China-India war causes extinction

Kahn 9

[Jer. Why India fears China Newsweek, 10/19/9 lexis]

On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the
northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China.
India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has


played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon."

Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have
dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China claims some 90,000
square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of
India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to
Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought

to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become
increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward
settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans
beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down.
The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic
minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan
Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,'
as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty"
on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was once an

obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a
flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors . And that
makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than
just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of
Asia ought to take notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a
nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy,
as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

South China Sea conflict also goes nuclear

Wesley 12

[Michael Wesley, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings

Institution and an Adjunct Professor at Griffith University and The
University of Sydney, former Executive Director of the Lowy Institute
for International Policy, former Professor of International Relations
and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University, and
Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New
South Wales, July 2012, Whats at stake in the South China Sea?
The South China Sea is enclosed by the west coast of mainland Southeast Asia, Borneo and the Philippine archipelago.
Rich in hydrocarbons and fish stocks, it is traversed by over one-third of global
shipping. Its waters and seabed are subject to six opposing territorial claims by China,
Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines but these confrontations are generally not
regarded as seriously as the Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula standoffs. But the South China Sea is more
unpredictable, and certainly warrants much closer and more sustained attention by strategists and
policy-makers. It is in the South China Sea that the components of Asias changing power
dynamics are most concentrated and on display: Chinas growing strategic heft and
paranoid sense of entitlement; its Southeast Asian neighbours hopes and misgivings about Chinas
regional dominance; and the United States compulsion to meet Chinas strategic challenge . The
South China Sea is a tangle of competing and mutually complicating claims over
territory, resources and navigation rights. Geopolitically, it is like the Bermuda triangle, reversing expected
alignments and suspending normal rules of the game. It pits Asias two most significant Communist countries, China and Vietnam,
against each other, unites usually bitter enemies China and Taiwan, and is drawing the United States back to a partnership with
Vietnam a generation after the fall of Saigon. The South China Sea is the flashpoint in the Pacific

where conflict is most likely to break out through miscalculation . It is a crowded

maritime environment contested by some inexperienced maritime forces with
underdeveloped naval doctrine, among whom there are no established and


accepted rules for managing maritime incidents. And the combination of the claimant
states power asymmetries, overlapping prerogatives, and growing nationalism mean
that incidents, once they occur, are likely to escalate. There are four reasons why finding solutions to the South
China Sea disputes should be given the highest priority by strategic policy-makers. 1. For China its about security and respect
The South China Sea symbolises Beijings larger maritime dilemma. The countrys major
population and productive centres cluster along Chinas coastline, and are therefore vulnerable to major attack from the sea. Naval
strategists see China as hemmed in along its sea coast by a chain of states or territories hostile to Beijing: Japan, Korea, the Ryuku
Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The overriding goal of Chinese naval strategy is to establish

dominance over the waters within this first island chain . At the southern end of the first island
chain, the South China Sea is crucial to Chinas commercial shipping , energy flows, and the
access of its Hainan island-based submarines to the Pacific. But the South China Seas southern and
western access points the Sunda, Lombok, Luzon and Malacca Straits are controlled by allies or
partners of the United States. The best way to offset this vulnerability is to control
the South China Sea itself and thereby loosen the American position in Southeast
Asia. Influential elites in China view the South China Sea as blue territory that is, as much a part of Chinas sovereign territory
as Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan. To this line of thinking, any surrender of its claims in the South China Sea would signal a weakening of
its rights to Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan and is therefore unthinkable. Chinas 1992 Territorial Law classified the South China Sea as
Chinas internal waters, meaning foreign naval vessels and aircraft must first gain Beijings permission before transiting, submarines
must surface, and that China retains the right to evict other countries shipping at any time. Beijings willingness to enforce this law
has been growing apace with its naval power in the western Pacific. In recent weeks, Beijing has placed the Spratly and Paracel
Islands and the Macclesfield Bank under prefectural-level administration, established a 45-member legislature to administer the
1100 people who live on the islands, and approved the deployment of a Peoples Liberation Army garrison to the islands. 2.
Southeast Asia avoiding the bad old days If unaddressed, the dynamics in the South China Sea

could return Southeast Asia to the bad old days of inter-state divisions , domestic
instability and competitive great-power interventions . On no other issue have the
disagreements and rivalries between ASEAN member states been so sustained and
obvious. The Philippines and Vietnam demand that the organisation supports them in standing up to Beijing. On the other side are
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, with no direct stake in the conflict and which refuse to endorse the Philippines and Vietnams
confrontational stance. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are concerned about the dispute, but believe that avoiding confrontation
with China will improve the prospects for productive negotiations. The stand-off over the South China Sea

exposes the hollowness of Asian institutions reliance on the principle of unanimity which
means that any members objection can keep an issue, no matter how pressing, off the agenda. Beijings refusal to discuss the South
China Sea in any regional meeting, and its implicit threat to withdraw from any organisation that doesnt respect this wish, shows
Southeast Asias confidence that it could socialise China by welcoming it into regional institutions was misplaced. Asian institutions
allow Beijing to make apparent concessions, such as its 2002 agreement with ASEAN to a Declaration of Conduct on the South
China Sea, without actually surrendering any part of its position. As China and the United States increase the stakes in the South
China Sea, ASEANs cardinal principle of neutrality is threatened . The Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are tightening their strategic relationships with the United States, just as Cambodia, Laos and
Thailand deepen their links to China. And there are signs that the disputes have become entangled in domestic politics in the
Philippines and Vietnam, making their stances even more uncompromising. In Manila, following allegations that Beijing used
corrupt payments to soften the former Arroyo administrations stance on the South China Sea, the current Aquino administration
and its Parliamentary opposition are vying for the most uncompromising policies on the issue. To counter rumours circulating
around Hanoi that Beijing has bought the Vietnams senior leadership, the Vietnamese government has passed a law claiming
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 3. For the United States its about Credibility within limits It is in the South
China Sea that Southeast Asias anxieties about China overlap with American anxieties about Beijings naval buildup. Over the past
two years, the United States has taken an active interest and position in what had formerly been a dispute between China and the
other claimants. This means there are now in effect two layers to this dispute: a basic stand-off between the territorial claimants; and
an overarching strategic contest between Beijing and Washington. For the United States, whats at stake in

the South China Sea is the viability of its entire presence in the western Pacific.
The US Navys access to the South China Sea is contested by Beijing . China claims it will
respect the freedom of passage of ships and aircraft through the area, on the condition that they are en route to another destination,
and do not conduct military exercises or collect intelligence or militarily useful data. Washington is adamant that

the South China Seas sea lanes are international waters, and are therefore subject to
freedom of navigation, which in international law allows the conduct of military exercises and the collection of
intelligence and militarily useful data. If Washington surrenders its ability to navigate the South
China Sea on its own terms, it will lose a major foothold in the western Pacific . The
South China Sea in effect pits a Chinese expansive claim (sovereignty based on historical usage) against an American expansive
claim, that freedom of navigation allows the collection of intelligence and military data. The American claim is contested in other
waters by Malaysia, Indonesia and India, though supported by other regional countries. China accuses the US of hyping the
freedom of navigation question, arguing that it hides an intention to use the issue to build a coalition against China. For the


Southeast Asian states contesting Chinas South China Sea claims, the United States presence and interest in the issue is a
prerequisite for their position. Washington is acutely aware that it needs to be seen as a reliable ally

and partner in the Pacific. It realises that its arms-length response to the Asian Financial Crisis eroded its position in
Asia and set China on its path towards building soft power in the region. For Southeast Asians worried that Washingtons attention
or will to stay in the region may erode, there is virtue in keeping the South China Sea on the agenda. But Washington cant

give its allies and partners a blank cheque which allows them to confront , and even
provoke, China from the comfort of the assumption that the United States will back them up. And some in Southeast
Asia are watching Washingtons moves very closely, sensitive that any concession
could signal its acceptance of Chinas claims in the South China Sea. 4. Solutions are Part of
the Problem Either multilateral mediation or international law is most often used to
resolve disputes of this sort but in the South China Sea they act to exacerbate the
situation. Beijing refuses to discuss the dispute in any multilateral context , fearing that
it will facilitate the formation of a front against China. The Southeast Asian claimants, however, are
adamant that they must deal with China as a coalition , with Manila particularly insistent that
ASEAN must negotiate a common position before negotiating with China. The result is a stand-off: the Philippines
insists that ASEAN must find a common position before negotiating with China, while China will only negotiate if ASEAN abandons
the search for a common position. International law also intensifies the dispute. The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea does

not recognise Chinas historical claims , and therefore cannot serve

international law relies on unbroken
longevity of claims as the basis for adjudication, none of the parties to the South
China Sea dispute can allow others claims to pass uncontested, in case this is
taken as evidence of its relinquishing of its claim. The result is a steady drum beat
of hydrocarbon prospecting, fishing, the occupation of islets, and maritime clashes. Policy Implications
There is a great deal at stake in the South China Sea. The dynamics of this issue will impact on
as the basis for an adjudication of the dispute. Worse, because

Chinas evolving international personality, the response of its neighbours to its rising power, and the longevity of the United States
position in the western Pacific. With the growth of trade and investment around Asias IndoPacific coast, the South China Sea will
become ever more crowded with shipping and commerce.



Ext. China Energy Security

More ev

Dowd 12

[Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. Countering

China's Reach in Latin America 2012. ]
Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a
flurry of investing and spending in Latin America . In Costa Rica, China is funding a
$1.24-billion upgrade of the countrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million
soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements;
and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive
dry canal to link the countrys Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus,
there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics
operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to
ship Colombian coal outbound to China . In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin

drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig
to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba . New

offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer . With
some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington
Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime

beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked
technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil . Plus, as the Times
details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10
billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for

a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil fields.



China Good: China Hegemony 1st Line

Influence in LA is key to counter US leadership
Dowd 12

[Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. Countering

China's Reach in Latin America 2012. ]
The JFQ study adds that China

has an important and growing presence in the regions

military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, send officers
to professional military education courses in the PRC . In Ecuador, Venezuela and
Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated hardware such as radars and K-8 and MA-60
aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage
their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market
share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers
will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and
training infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of
the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges . To be sure, much
of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at
work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and
sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas
neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas



Ext. China Hegemony

Chinese softpowers a vital counterweight to US leadership
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
China's historical status as a "leader of the developing world" positions it as the
natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo

Chvez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example, Morales
proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of Mao," while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon
Simn Bolvar would have been "great friends." While these leaders may primarily be seeking

Chinese investments and commodity purchases , the position of the PRC as a

geopolitical "alternative" to the United States shapes the way that they court the
Chinese . In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself
directly with the anti-U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important
relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless , the relationship cannot avoid some flavor
of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states
during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K8 combat aircraft , for
example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech

More ev
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial,
and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions
and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's
sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor
such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global
institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004

and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from
being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese

markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements,
whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated
trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the
PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in
the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and
investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable . Nonetheless, as
mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could
damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.



China Good: Taiwan 1st Line

Chinese influence in Latin America quells tensions over Taiwan
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan

represents an important issue of

political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world
that diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans
to countries that do not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public
diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult
for those countries that do not recognize it , while simultaneously nurturing expectations
regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring .
When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May
2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium,
the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public
works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as
well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such
Chinese generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still
recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be
made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture .13 Although the
PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic
incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic recognition , since Costa Rica's switch, the
allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic
posture by Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran president Maricio
Fuenesalthough all did so prior to assuming office.

War in Taiwan draws in the US and causes extinction

Hunkovic 9

[Lee. Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. The

Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation
between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America, 2009]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate
into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary
actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia,
Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all
other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the
United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully
annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and
begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into
India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of
military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a
full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or


militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will
determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.



Ext. Taiwan / Asian Stability

More evidence Chinese influence is key to effective Asian
regionalism locks in stability
Zheng 9

[Denise. Program Coordinator for CSIS Public Policy. Chinas Use of

Softpower in the Developing World 2009 ]
China realizes the primacy of establishing good relations with its periphery for
regional economic and security stability. It aims to acquire soft power by resolving
border disputes, which in some cases have involved Chinese territorial concessions. China actively
participates in or has assumed leadership roles in the creation of regional
organizations for economic and security cooperation, including the East Asian
Summit, the Asian Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
and ASEAN. It has contracted numerous large-scale infrastructure projects to build roads, bridges, pipelines, and powergenerating facilities, particularly in Southeast Asia and Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union. Especially
in Southeast Asia, China wields power in the region through its skillful diplomacy,
the region s admiration of China as a model for development, and by emphasizing
shared Asian values. Southeast Asia is arguably the region where China's soft
power is strongest. The assistance that China offered in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when the United
States was missing in action, has played a significant role in the transformation of the region's attitude toward China. The
depth of China's trade, investment, and aid relationships with countries on its
periphery grants China significant influence in Asia.

Chinese soft power is key to Asian stability

Wiggin 10

[Stu. Staffer for China Radio Intl. American Dream now a Chinese
Reality 8/10/10 Xinhua]
As part of the commentary which focuses upon the general relationship between the developed and developing world, more often
than not a clear delineation is drawn between the way of life pursued by the people in the Eastern hemisphere and that of the
developed Western world, while Africa is generally left out altogether. Although it is necessary to acknowledge differences during
any analysis of East and West, the reality is that the most powerful country in the 'new'

Eastern/Asian bloc, i.e. China, has inherited many of the characteristics that made
America into the power it is today. The number of similarities between the two societies is astounding. China
is not only on the verge of becoming an equal partner within the world balance of power over the next 50 years; it is also set to
take America's place as a beacon for prosperity and opportunity . The United States of
America, as we know it today, came to being as a result of the culmination of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the Second World War.
These two events allowed America to emerge as the worlds strongest power and accelerated the decline of former colonial powers
Britain, France and Germany. At this time, Asia was not even part of the equation. Today, however, it is possible to see a very similar
situation. This time it is China that remains well afloat within a sea of global recession and

Middle Eastern skirmishes. The fact that China holds huge dollar-denominated assets as part of their foreign
exchange reserves reaffirms Americas remaining importance within the global financial system, but it is generally
accepted by all that China will eventually balance America in terms of both hard
and soft power. The soft power that China cultivates often exists within the
developing world and is often seen as a rallying bloc contrasted against the selfseeking interests of developed nations. Building soft power was a priority for America post 1949 as it is for
China going into the 21st Century. China is going through the same stages of formation, albeit at an accelerated pace, that the United
States went through from the 1920s onwards. Disregarding the question of history (i.e. that China boasts a 5000 year history which
nobody below the age of 50 is willing to study in-depth, and America only possesses around 200 years of modern history, most of
which they would rather forget to a large extent), the similarities are quite clear to see. Not unlike America, China has become home
to many people from outside of its borders. Many people have set up a home here in hope of pursuing what is fast becoming the


Chinese dream: making their fortune. In Guangzhou, a 10-square-kilometer area centered around Hongqiao, affectionately referred
to by locals as Chocolate City, serves as home to a mix of Chinese and foreign dwellers, the majority of which are of African descent.
According to Guangzhou Daily, the total number of Africans in this city alone is thought to be almost 100,000, and is only set to rise
further. This influx is, at this moment in time, a novel feature of certain cities for many Chinese people, but so too was the influx of
immigrants to America in the 1920s. What is more, it is not only immigrants expecting to find fortune in China. As Lester R. Brown,
President of Earth Policy Institute in Washington has stated, "for China's 1.3 billion people, the American dream is fast becoming the
Chinese dreamMillions of Chinese are living like Americans: eating more meat, driving cars, traveling abroad, and otherwise
spending their fast-rising incomes much as Americans do." In this sense, China bears a greater resemblance to the America of the
1920s and 30s than modern America does today. Aside from demographic or financial similarities between China and the United
States, one must also acknowledge the general similarity between the psyche of the American and Chinese peoples. Both peoples are
generally insular, largely unconcerned with foreign affairs, and their grasp of geography outside of their respective continents is
rather poor. Forays into foreign countries are usually the result of humanitarian efforts or as part of their search for natural
resources, glaring examples being Chinas involvement in Africa and Americas obvious involvement in Iraq. There is no working
class sentiment in China or America, and both countries are fiercely patriotic. Patriotism seems to have filled the void of any class
sentimentality and it is for this reason that the hope of one People's Daily writer of restructuring Chinese growth in the context of
globalization, as stated in the recent article "Why can't China climb up the value chain?," will always be constrained so long as
unions are non-existent and labor remains cheap. Though the creation of a "Chinese Dream" may seem like an achievement for the
country, there is also the idea that the American Dream could become a Chinese nightmare (USA Today, June 2005), with the
possibility that consumption could outstrip global output. And even though the above paragraphs detail the likenesses that exist
between the two countries, vast differences remain, mostly in political terms. It is no secret that the two countries have endured a
tumultuous relationship, which has most recently been seen when the United States came to China with its tail between its legs
regarding a global economic bailout. China, meanwhile, is the arbiter of East Asian stability and is

often a thorn in America's side in their pursuit of Western-led initiatives . Hilary

Clinton said that global issues could not be solved by the United States or China
alone, but without participation of the two countries, no problems would likely be
solved. As it turns out, when they do work together nothing gets done, hence the
stalemate with the South Korean Yellow Sea missile, a result of a strategic alliance
between China and North Korea.



China Good: Internal War 1st Line

Alternative to robust Chinese influence is internal conflict
Mead 9

[Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S.

Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only Makes You
Stronger, The New Republic, 2/4/9,]
The greatest danger

both to

U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is

not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end

China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge
China into a major economic downturn . The Chinese financial system will

as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions

or even tens of millions of

Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net .

The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a
generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include
dangerous unrest --and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for
China's woes. ( Think of Weimar Germany , when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West
for Germany's economic travails.) Worse,

instability could lead to a vicious cycle , as nervous investors

moved their money out of the country, further

slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-

greater bitterness . Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to
manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows
what will happen if the growth stops.

That goes nuclear

Yee & Storey 2

[Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the

Hong Kong Baptist University and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence
Studies at Deakin University, The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths
and Reality. 2002, Pg 5]
The fourth factor contributing to the

perception of a China threat is the fear of political and

economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and
waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally , any or all of these
scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability . Today the Chinese
leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a
shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These

problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern

effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of
Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an
unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a
severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours . A fragmented China could
also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands
of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.2 From this perspective, a
disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.



Ext. Growth Solves CCP Stability

Alternative to Chinese growths internal war
Kane and Serewicz 1

[Thomas. Security Studies from Hull. And Lawrence Foreign Policy

Analyst China's Hunger: The Consequences of a Rising Demand for
Food and Energy Parameters, Fall 2001 Ebsco]
Despite China's problems with its food supply, the

Chinese do not appear to be in danger of

widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if
the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people
clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but
economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a

bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while
the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the
prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of
central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated
by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed
on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate
more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese
society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and
social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to
include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are
unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or
severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings.

Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede , perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey
Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such
developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of

communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its
existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after
the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it
as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would
not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send

refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider

intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's
struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario,
China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent

Economic contractions de-stabilize the CCP growth is key to their

Abebe et al 10

[Dan Prof Law @ U of C Law. International Agreements, Internal

Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The Two Chinas Problem The
Virginia Journal of Intl Law, Vol 50. Winter 2010 ln]
First, since

the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as the basis for the party's authority, the
CCP has adopted economic growth as the central justification for its one-party rule. The CCP
has pegged its political future to a type of "performance legitimacy" n12 - it governs
because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of living than any alternative form of central
authority. In Eastern China, the CCP's approach has been a nearly unqualified success. Special coastal economic zones, favorable
banking policies, and massive decentralization of government have combined to spur blistering economic growth. Western

China, however, has been left starkly behind: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Western China is less than
half of what it is in Eastern China. The result has been rising income inequality, social instability, and dramatic
divisions between East and West, rural and city, and peasants and urban residents, along with the creation of a roaming underclass


of Western Chinese seeking work in the coastal cities. n13 Worse still, these social schisms

coincide with ethnic

and religious fault lines: Western China is home to many ethnic minority groups
that harbor substantial animosity toward CCP rule. Poorer conditions in the West
have created the political environment for the emergence of separatist
movements. Brisk economic growth in Western China has thus become a political
imperative for the CCP, and the CCP has [*330] prioritized it accordingly. China is likely to balk at any international
agreement that might imperil this growth. Second, as a result of its growth-driven delegation of
power, the CCP suffers from a surprising (for such a centralized government)
erosion of state capacity: the provinces often ignore the central government's
directives, frequently without meaningful consequences. n14 The political structure of the CCP
and the institutional structure of China's government are sometimes overlapping or redundant and, in many places, lack effective
vertical or horizontal accountability. The environmental regulatory agencies are often subordinate to the very agencies they are
intended to regulate. Province-level CCP officials are often evaluated (both locally and in Beijing) by their ability to produce high
levels of economic growth, not their commitment to environmental protection. Although the CCP has recently tried to recentralize
power and rationalize the governance structure, n15 the center's capacity to enforce environmental regulations on the provinces is
much weaker than in a typical industrialized state. The existing structural relationship between the provinces and Beijing often
results in a chronic inability on the part of the CCP to provide public goods like environmental protection, an inability it will not be
able to reverse without incurring substantial costs. Finally, there is reason to believe that the vast majority of economic and scientific
projections have substantially underestimated China's future carbon emissions by failing to account for heterogeneity among
provinces. Eastern China is already highly industrialized and reasonably wealthy; there is every reason to expect that it will begin to
move towards cleaner technologies and shift economic production away from industry and towards services (which are generally less
energy and carbon-intensive). n16 Western China, by contrast, is poorer and more agrarian, and the typical development pattern for
such an area involves a shift towards greater industrialization and higher per capita energy consumption (and carbon production).
Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which Western China is moving. n17 Every quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions - save
for two important exceptions - uses only national-level data, a methodological weakness that can wash out distinctions between East
and West. Of the [*331] two studies that employ sub-national data, one projects higher emissions than any of the national-level
studies; the other projects much higher emissions than any other study. n18 We read this as suggesting that Chinese carbon
emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be significantly greater than the standard models have anticipated, with
correspondingly higher costs to China from any agreement to curb carbon emissions. In light of the importance of economic growth
to the CCP, the internal structure of Chinese governance, and the need to develop Western China, the prospects for China choosing
to join such an agreement in the immediate future seem slim. This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the general
importance of economic growth to the CCP, the distribution of growth within China, and the social and economic difficulties
generated by the CCP's hyper-growth policies. Part II analyzes the CCP's internal environmental enforcement capacity and argues
that China would encounter substantial domestic challenges in implementing a climate accord, even if it chooses to sign one. Part III
critiques the assumptions underlying quantitative forecasts of Chinese carbon emissions and suggests that future emissions may
exceed conventional projections by substantial margins. Part IV canvasses extant potential frameworks for an international climate
change agreement and argues that they are likely to be unsuitable to one or more of the relevant parties. Our conclusion is a
pessimistic one: it will be difficult to convince China to join a meaningful international climate agreement in the near future under
the best of circumstances. The Two Chinas, coupled with China's internal political dynamics, present circumstances that are hardly
ideal. I. The Chinese Growth Imperative Modern China has reinvented itself on a foundation of

kudzu-like economic growth. Where Marxism once served as the unifying national ideology, the CCP has
substituted wealth generation and prosperity as the touchstones of the regime and
suggested that the Chinese people judge the legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases
in their own standards of living. Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has also been highly
uneven. Eastern, coastal provinces have become wealthy, while central and western provinces have lagged far behind. In effect, there
is no longer simply "China." There is now Eastern China, which is urban, industrialized, and relatively prosperous, and Western
China, [*332] which is rural, agrarian, and relatively poor. This divergence in economic outcomes - a divergence that in places
coincides with pre-existing ethnic and religious fault lines - poses a serious threat to social stability within China. n19 In response,
the CCP has begun an aptly named "Western Development Program" in an attempt to prioritize economic growth, encourage
national integration, and curb nationalist unrest in Western provinces. Accordingly, the governing regime will be reluctant to join a
climate agreement that might contribute to greater instability by stunting crucial economic development in Western China. A.
Foundations of CCP Rule: Economic Growth Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic CCP, dominated by Chairman
Mao's conception of Marxism and designed to bring "socialist glory" to China while preserving party rule. After the Cultural
Revolution and Mao's death in 1976, however, the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological
foundation that served as the legitimating discursive force for CCP authority. n20 Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward
communism and questions about its efficacy as the governing regime, n21 the CCP turned to two new sources of authority and
legitimacy to galvanize support among the populace and strengthen its hold on power. The first of these was a new Chinese
nationalism. The second was an emphasis on continued economic growth - a type of "performance legitimacy" n22 - as a benchmark
and measure of the regime's success. From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic protests in Tiananmen
Square in 1989, Deng and the CCP moved slowly toward a reform of China's centralized economic policies and internal governance
structure. Deng and some of the reformers began to argue that the Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technological
dynamism, and economic efficiency, not more ideology and excessive bureaucracy. To be economically successful, they argued,
China needed the CCP's one-party rule to ensure stability and regain international prestige. In the words of one scholar, "in the most
fundamental sense ... China's economic reform strategy has been guided by a strategic [*333] vision at the top of the political
system. This vision links China's security, global influence, and domestic stability to the state of its economy." n23 Sustained


economic growth is paramount for the continuation of the CCP, the maintenance of China's
territorial integrity, and the pursuit of China's national interests in international politics. n24 The CCP's reform strategy has been
marked by incremental opening of the domestic economy, beginning with agriculture in the late 1970s and continuing through
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. n25 During the 1980s, the CCP delegated a significant amount of
authority from the central government to the provinces and cities, freeing local actors - province and city-level officials - to develop
policies that encouraged economic growth independent of the center. n26 After a temporary delay in reforms after Tiananmen
Square, the 1990s saw the CCP commit to the creation of a market system, the privatization of some state-owned enterprises, and
the development of the private sector. At the turn of the century, the CCP began to embrace private entrepreneurs and "retreat from
economic administration to economic regulation as the core economic function of government." n27 From a national perspective,
the CCP's economic reforms are an unqualified success. Fueled by these reforms, the Chinese economy has produced tremendous
economic growth and a rapidly improving standard of living for many of China's citizens (in addition to severe consequences for the
environment). Between 1978 and 2000, "overall per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant yuan roughly quadrupled."
n28 Today, China has the world's second largest economy by purchasing power parity, surpassing Japan, India, and Germany. n29 It
has the world's largest foreign capital reserves. n30 It enjoys a trade surplus of [*334] $ 163.3 billion with the United States. n31 It is
a leading destination for foreign direct investment, n32 and has become more integrated into the world economy through its
membership in the WTO. By almost every economic measure, the CCP's economic policies and drive for modernization have
produced tremendous aggregate gains for China and its citizens. The CCP's policies have also created a consumer society in the
formerly Marxist China. From telephones to televisions, newspapers to the internet, and automobiles to overseas travel, the CCP has
brought to the Chinese people access to information, goods, and technology that were unimaginable during the Maoist era. n33

The CCP's economic policies have reduced the role of the state in the affairs of
daily life, leaving ordinary citizens more free to engage in social and economic
activities. In so doing, the CCP has reinforced the norm that prioritizing hypergrowth polices and ensuring economic development are the party's overriding
responsibilities. China is hardly unique in favoring continued economic growth; there are few nations on earth that are not
attempting to grow their economies and produce wealth for their citizens. In China, however, economic growth is
not merely a matter of policy. Growth, particularly in certain geographic regions, is viewed by the
CCP as a political imperative, integral to the regime's survival. As subsequent discussion will
demonstrate, this focus on economic growth significantly impacts the CCP's incentives to curb environmental degradation and
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Economic decline destabilizes the CCP internal dissent

Davies, 10

[Iwan, MA candidate -- Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced

International Studies, Does the Financial Crisis Threaten
Democracy? SAIS Review Vol 30 No 1. Spring 2010 Ebsco]
On the other hand, the crisis

could result in a fourth wave forward for democracy, particularly

in the cases of Russia, Iran, and China. These countries have so far been able to resist the global political trend towards
democracy while becoming integrated in the global economy. But as global commodity prices fall, the crisis
could foster a move towards genuine democracy in these countries, threatening the
survival of Russian delegated democracy, Iranian theocracy, and Chinese authoritarianism. These countries
have experienced phenomenal growth driven by rising commodity prices (Russia and Iran) or trade fuelled by
an artificially low exchange rate (China). A severe recession could tip the balance of political
legitimacy. Devoid of significant economic growth, these regimes may face
growing domestic calls for increased democratic accountability . In the Islamic Republic of
Iran, falling commodity prices and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads perceived economic mismanagement have already angered
citizens. In Chinas case, double-digit growth in the past decade slowed to only 6.8

percent in the final quarter of the year.3 Energy exports have fuelled the Russian boom, but if oil remains

below $80 per barrel (the minimum price of oil as calculated by the Russian government to maintain its budget), Russian citizens
may begin questioning their lack of civil liberties or an electoral system that maintains the status quo. As markets begin to stabilize,
the immediate threat to these regimes appears to be diminishing. Nevertheless, understanding the impact of the

crisis on such countries can help us understand the impact that future crises may
have on governments whose legitimacy depends on economic growth .

More ev
Abebe et al 10



[Dan Prof Law @ U of C Law. International Agreements, Internal

Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The Two Chinas Problem The
Virginia Journal of Intl Law, Vol 50. Winter 2010 ln]
First, the

increasing divergence in standards of living between Eastern and Western

China has been accompanied by the breakdown of the social safety net provided by the
Maoist-era state. n57 This has left many in Western China without proper access to health care, unemployment compensation, or
housing. n58 These problems have been compounded by the fact that the CCP expects local governments to provide education, social
welfare, and health benefits, further worsening the situation for those in the poorest provinces. n59 The result has been the rise of a
"New Left" n60 discourse about social justice and mistrust of market forces. As one scholar pungently described, " popular

discontent with rising inequality, unfair income distribution, and rampant corruption has made parts of
Chinese society volatile cesspools of potential instability." n61 At the same time, the CCP must
balance the need to ensure social stability [*341] with providing high rates of growth for elites. Regional disparities,
economic inequality, social instability, and class conflicts raise the possibility of a
new "revolutionary struggle" if the CCP is "unable to bring income redistribution to a point that is satisfactory to
the lower classes without disillusioning the entrepreneurial class and other well-to-do social strata and thereby hampering growth in
the economy." n62 Second, the East-West economic divide manifests itself as an urban-rural schism as well: n63 the vast

majority of job and wealth creation has occurred in urban areas. This has
produced a floating population, estimated at one-hundred million Chinese, that has left the rural areas to pursue
economic opportunities (mostly in the coastal cities). n64 The population exodus has placed greater stress on
the CCP to either improve economic conditions in the rural areas and the West (via the WDP) n65 to
slow the flow of migrants or fund the coastal regions' absorption of unskilled labor migrating
from the West. These forces generate a vicious cycle: the CCP's economic policies
favoring the eastern provinces encourage migration to those provinces, requiring
additional investment to maintain high levels of growth . Finally, as we noted briefly in the previous
section, Western China contains a number of ethnic separatist movements that might
challenge the CCP. The party has already struggled in dealing with pro-independence activities in Tibet, and it has
reason to fear that the fifty-six non-Han minority groups represented in (mostly
Western) China might push for self-determination. n66 For instance, Uighur separatists in the
Xinjiang province - an area rich with mineral resources n67 - are increasingly aligning themselves with Islamic fundamentalist
movements. n68 It is hard to overstate the significance of these types of prospects for

unrest in a developing state dependent on natural resources for [*342] much of its
growth: "The western region contains more than half the nation's reserves in 13 of the 45 main minerals ... [and] 80% of the
nation's potential hydropower and 58% of the nation's natural gas reserves." n69



Chinese Influence Good: Growth

Chinas influence is key to Latin American regional growth
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite

China's impressive rates of sustained growth,

only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern"
economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods . Estimates of the
size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used, although the
number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer

number of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American

businesspeople, students, and government officials. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong,
for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a wealthy
country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as
well. In the commodities sector, Latin

American exports have expanded dramatically in

recent years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In Argentina , Chinese demand
gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously
existed. During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive
Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for extractive
industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets
such as the United States and Europe fell off. Beyond commodities, certain internationally
recognized Latin American brands, such as Jos Cuervo, Caf Britt, Bimbo, Modelo, Pollo Campero, and
Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is open to
leveraging its new wealth to "sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the
world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including light manufactures and traditional

products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers
to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this

arena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are
willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on
the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning
themselves within the emerging Chinese market. The hopes of selling products to
China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance
the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made

Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin
American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to
China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2008. Governments in the region

have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of

trade promotion organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundacin Exportar

(Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other
Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place products in those

countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC
and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese culture and trade shows such as the
Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their
countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China's
combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates
gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be
invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread


awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin
American countries in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy
over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actually referring to trade or investment has only called more

attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of funds. Although the

expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize , today, thanks to China's growing familiarity
with doing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves (including a foreign currency surplus that had reached
$2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of billions of dollars in

the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3
billion commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its
rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for
petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional
investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco,
Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Au, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian
offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of its
offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the

timing of the
arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in
2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen
because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has
commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private

sector activities in ways that U.S. investors cannot .6



Chinese Influence Good: Turns Stability

Chinas regional influence is key to Latin American stability
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
Beyond business ties, the

PRC has an important and growing presence in the region's

military institutions. In addition to frequent visits by senior-level officers and defense leaders, Mexico and
almost all of the countries of South America send officers to professional military
education courses in the PRC, including a 5-month course for midgrade officers taught in Spanish in Beijing.
Chinese-made clothing and nonlethal equipment are also becoming increasingly common
within Latin American militaries. In addition, thanks to opportunities provided by the regimes of Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Bolivia, the PRC has begun to sell sophisticated hardware in the region,
such as radars and K8 and MA60 aircraft. As happened in commercial industries such as motorcycles, cars, and
consumer appliances, Chinese military goods companies such as Norinco are likely to
leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand
their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become
more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training
infrastructures that support those products. Beyond Chinese corporations and military ties, the PRC is also
taking on a progressively important role in regional institutions, such as the
Organization of American States ( OAS ), Inter-American Development Bank ( IADB ), and United Nations
peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Although the PRC has only observer status in the OAS, for example, its
delegation is a strong contributor to the activities of the body .9 With respect to the IADB,
China has leveraged its seat at the table as an opening for doing business in the
region, such as the $10.2 billion currency swap with Argentina, which it signed on the sideline of the IADB's annual meeting in
March 2009. Also, through its initial financial contribution to the IADB, the PRC became part of a special
committee overseeing loans to highly impoverished countries in the region,
affording it expanded contacts with and subtle pressures over countries that do
not currently recognize the PRC diplomatically , including Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the case of
Haiti, Chinese leverage is further bolstered by having had police forces on the
ground there since 2006, through PRC participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.10

China turns Latin stability

Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 89-90]
Although the interdependencies between Mexico, the

US, and the PRC allow us to legitimately

characterize their relationship as a triangle, these interdependencies must also be
understood in the broader Latin American and global context in which they occur .
With respect to Latin America, agreements and other interactions between the US, China,


and other actors in the region impact

the Mexico-US-PRC triangle particularly with respect to

trade . The US-Colombia free trade agreement, for example, which was ratified in May 2012, is seen
in China as a possible alternative to Mexico for Chinese and other producers seeking to enter the US
market (Portafolio 2011). Similar calculations exist within the nations of Central America
and the Dominican Republic concerning their own free trade agreements with the US, such as CAFTA-DR, as well as the US-Panama
Free Trade Agreement (ratified in October 2011) and the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in 2009. As with
US commercial agreements with the rest of the region, the

success or failure of Chinese initiatives in

the Americas, such as FTAs with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, and potentially Colombia (El Tiempo 2012), as well as loan-backed
infrastructure projects in the Andes and the Caribbean, each impact the market logic for investments
from Chinese and other firms in Mexico.



Chinese Influence Good: Turns Security

Chinas key to sustainable regional security
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]
Crime and Security Interdependencies. Growing criminal activities linking China,
Mexico, and the US are driven by many of the same factors associated with the commercial
ties between the three nations, including the strategic position of Mexico with respect
to PRC access to the US market. To date, such triangular connections have
manifested themselves in two areas: human smuggling and narcotrafficking, with
money laundering remaining a matter of potential concern. With respect to human
trafficking, Mexico is not only a transit country for persons migrating from Central
and South America to the United States, but also for those coming from the PRC
and other parts of Asia. Organized crime groups such as Red Dragon smuggle
Chinese immigrants through a variety of different routes transiting Europe and the
Americas, frequently leveraging Chinese communities en route, generally with the US
and Canada as final destinations. As of mid-2012, such routes included entry through the
Mexican Pacific ports of Puerto Vallarta in Jalisco, Manzanillo in Colima, and Coyoacn,
in Mazatln. In other cases, Chinese immigrants are smuggled into South America often through Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru - and from there, via land routes through Central
America8, crossing into Mexico at entry points such as Frontera Corozal in the state of Chiapas
and on to Tapachula, where there is a sizeable Chinese community. From that point, Chinese
migrants reportedly follow a route that begins with a journey by train to the Atlantic coast, and
then follow the coast northward through territory controlled by Los Zetas, to ultimately arrive in
the United States (Ellis 2012/a/b). Still others arrive by air directly to Mexico City, where the
activity of Chinese trafficking networks has been publicly reported by the Mexican Attorney
Generals office. In addition to human trafficking, the supply chain for illegal drugs
creates another connection between the PRC, Mexico, and the United States.
Mexican cartels, such as Sinaloa and Tijuana, obtain many of their precursor chemicals from
Asia including, but not limited to, essential ingredients for methamphetamines, such as
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (El Peridico de Mxico 2011; La Prensa 2009; Ellis 2012/a; El
Universal 2010). The Mexican cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacin, for example, is believed to
import ephedrine from China and India to produce methamphetamines, which are ultimately
sold in the United States (Noticias24 2012). Mexican authorities have made multiple seizures of
such precursor chemicals arriving from China and India in recent years at Mexican commercial
ports such as Lzaro Crdenas and Michoacn (Carvallo 2012; Noticias24 2012) Shipments of
precursor chemicals have also been intercepted coming into other Latin American
countries such as Peru, and have been linked to Mexican cartels such as those of Sinaloa
and Tijuana (Reforma 2011), suggesting the emergence of a global narcotics supply
chain with China, Mexico, and the US as key nodes for source chemicals, management
and production, and consumption, respectively. With respect to money laundering, the
proliferation of Chinese commercial banks in the region offers new options for
Mexico-based cartels to convert drug earnings generated in the United States into
legitimate income in Mexico. The use of Chinese companies and banks is attractive due to


the language barrier and a lack of close institutional relationships, making it difficult for
Mexican and US authorities to follow money trails into the PRC. Although public data on such
activities is difficult to come by, reports in the media provide anecdotal evidence of the problem.
In March 2010, for example, the Mexican Federal Police made public a case in which a
Colombian group, in their dealings with the Mexican cartel La Familia, had sent part of their
earnings to the PRC (El Comercio 2010). Although the use of PRC-based companies and banks
for money laundering is currently in its infancy, the expansion of Chinese banking
activities in Mexico, lines of credit to facilitate conversion of RNB into Mexican
pesos, and increasing commercial activities that provide potential cover for illegal
transactions suggest that this dimension of the triangular US-China-Mexico
relationship will become an increasing challenge over time to law enforcement
authorities. In addition to organized crime, the US, Mexico, and the PRC impact each
other in the security and defense arena in other important ways, with perceptions
and sensitivities on all sides playing a significant role in the dynamic. As the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese defense contractors such as the NORINCO
group look to Mexico, for example, the latters geographic proximity to the US,
coupled with the concern over alarming US policymakers by meddling in the US
backyard, has inspired caution (Ellis 2011/c). Reciprocally, the Mexican government
under Felipe Caldern, conscious of US security assistance to Mexico (including the $1.6
billion received under Plan Mrida) and working to strengthen US-Mexican security
cooperation, was arguably cautious in pursuing ties with the PRC which could have
undermined the US-Mexico security relationshipparticularly in a highly polarized
presidential election year in the United States.9 Despite such considerations, the Mexican
armed forces (SEDENA) and navy (SEMAR) each continue to work with their PLA
counterparts regarding exchanges of personnel, attendance by Mexican officers in
professional education courses at the PLA National Defense University in
Champing, and high-level officer visits, such as the September 2010 visit by Chinese
Defense Minister Liang Guanglie to both the Mexican ministry of defense (SEDENA), and
ministry of the navy (SEMAR) (PDO 2010).



Chinese Influence Good: Turns Development

Chinas key to regional development
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
China as a Development Model. The

tremendous, sustained economic growth that the PRC has

enjoyed since opening up to the world in 1978 has caused many in Latin America to look to
China's integration of capitalism and authoritarian politics as a development

even while the U.S. combination of liberal democracy, free markets, and privatization is increasingly


as ineffective for solving the region's endemic problems , such as corruption, poverty, and
Chinese model is particularly attractive because
it suggests that it is possible to achieve prosperity and growth without
relinquishing political power.
inequality. For traditional Latin American elites, the



Chinese Influence Good: Turns Regional Growth

China not the US is key to Latin American growth
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
Access to Latin American Markets. Latin

American markets are becoming increasingly valuable

for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export
base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region
has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher
value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances,
computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for
its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets
in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically wellconnected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and
investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in
those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the
resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in
the country who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese



Chinese Influence Good: Turns Trade

Chinese influence controls trade
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 67-68]
The end of the Cold War and East-West confrontation ushered in an environment conducive
to economic globalization. Globalization is the defining feature of our current age .
Countries have connected with each other more closely than ever before , and the
cross-border flow of capital, goods, and personnel has become an integral part of
modern life. When adjusting to the tide of globalization, some countries make special arrangements in their region so that
their interests can be better served. Regional cooperation is used to manage and even control
the flows of capital, goods, and personnel in any given region, yet the hindrance of
cross-border flows of production elements does not seem to be a goal of such cooperation.
Regional cooperation is not meant to resist globalization. It is simply an instrument developed by
countries to aid in adjusting to the globalization process. It would be wrong to use regional cooperation as a synonym for
exclusiveness, as there is no reason that regional cooperation should prevent the formation of new international partnerships.

Regional cooperation in this case in the form of the North American free trade zone
can substantially influence relations between the United States, Mexico, and
China. The North American free trade zone was established in the 1990s, and is composed of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. Each countrys economy complements the others, given that each is in a
different economic stage and has its own unique advantages. The U.S., Mexico, and Canada
together form a solid market, conducive to the production of manufactured goods and energy. As a major supplier of
manufactured goods, Mexico benefits a great deal from this type of cooperation .
However, North America is not isolated from the global economy . With the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995, the United States - as a global superpower and the
largest economic body in the world can no longer constrain itself to a regional market . It is almost
inevitable for North American countries to come into contact with actors from other parts of the world. Some countries
may find that their shares in regional markets are diminishing with the arrival of
outside countries prompted by the framework of the WTO, yet the presence and influence of external countries may bring
new opportunities to these regions. For example, in regards to the relationship between China and
Mexico, the two countries may compete to some degree in terms of exporting to
the United States. However, Chinese-Mexican relations go far beyond exporting to the
U.S. market . As an emerging power and a representative of a region enjoying robust economic development,
China now means more to Mexico economically than does the United States . Firstly,
the adjustment of Chinas economic structure may help to change the false
impression of Chinese-Mexican trade relations and allow Mexico to further pursue
interests in economic cooperation with China. In regards to Chinese-Mexican relations, the common
perception is that the two countries compete with each other in the U.S. market due
to the fact that their exports are very similar. However, this may not necessarily be the case , as some scholars
have pointed out that the competition between China and Mexico has been exaggerated, and
in fact the two nations complement each other in more aspects than in which they

(Xie 2005). Moreover, China

does not want to become involved in trade conflicts


with other developing countries, given

that it is trying to change the mode of its economic

development and update its export structure . With a stronger focus on bolstering its domestic market and
supplying more high-value products to the world, China hopes that it can further coordinate its own
production with Mexico and other developing countries. In addition, China is able to
provide Mexico with new markets and investors. It would be erroneous , therefore, to
simply define Chinese-Mexican economic relations in terms of competition for the
US market. Chinas increasing engagement with Mexico and Latin America has the
potential to positively impact numerous aspects of these transnational relations. Furthermore,
Chinas involvement in North and Latin America can also help Mexico to reduce
certain negative outcomes resulting from North American cooperation. Generally speaking, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a beneficial arrangement for each of its three signatories (The U.S., Mexico,
and Canada), but this does not imply seamless cooperation between them.1 In the case of
Mexico, the country benefits from exporting manufactured goods to the U.S., as well as receiving capital in the form of
U.S. investments, but suffers where bilateral agricultural interests are involved . Even more
harmful to U.S.-Mexico relations is the exercise of U.S. political influence . As Mexicos
economy becomes increasingly dependent upon the U.S. market, the United States has more political
leverage over Mexico, creating some uncomfortable situations for Mexico on the
international stage. For example, during the administration of President Vicente Fox, in order to further develop its
relations with the United States, Mexico was forced to distance itself from left-wing Latin
American governments that have traditionally been its close allies , such as Cuba and
Venezuela (Chen 2007). The gesture assuaged the United States to some extent, but ultimately
Mexicos influence in Latin America decreased and the critical problems between Mexico and the
U.S. regarding immigration and drugs were not resolved . Indeed, Mexicos overdependence on the U.S. market has been a political disadvantage in its relations
with its northern neighbor.

United States.

Mexico needs outside players to balance the influence of the

In this context, diversifying

economic cooperation with China and other

would be beneficial for Mexico . Thirdly, China can also act as a bridge that
Mexico can use to engage with other East Asian countries. East Asia is a region that
has been attracting global attentions due to its strong economic performance. The region has not
only maintained a high growth rate, but it also has a vast market with great potential,
with over one billion people in the region entering into a so-called middle class. Therefore, the U.S. is
increasing its investment in and shifting its attention to Asia - actions that would benefit Mexico
as well. However, it appears that Mexico has not found an effective way to develop cooperative
relations in East Asia. The U.S., for example, does not seem overly eager to involve Mexico
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Mexico therefore must depend on itself to step into the
western region of the Pacific, making it even more crucial for Mexico to strengthen its
relations with East Asian countries. China, as a major player in East Asia, has extensive economic and
trade relations with other countries in the region, and could help Mexico put its
foot in the door, so to speak. China and Mexico, therefore, have the potential to help each other
achieve intra-regional cooperation .

Pushing China out collapses complex interdependence thats key

Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China



and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 86-7]
Trade and Investment. The

principal commercial interdependencies between Mexico, the

PRC, and the US involve (1) competition between Mexico and China for sales to the US
market, (2) final assembly of products in Mexico for entry into the US market under the
provisions of NAFTA, and (3) the interrelationship between US-to-Mexico revenue flows
from exports and remittances and Mexican purchases of Chinese products . As
established in various studies, Mexico and the PRC are frequently in competition for the US market (Dussel Peters 2005; Gallagher
and Porzecanski 2010), implying that increasing purchase of Chinese manufactured goods by US

consumers in recent years has, to some degree, come at the expense of Mexico-based manufacturers and
Mexican jobs. The competition for the US market , as it has played itself out in the last decade has not
only involved competition between Mexican and Chinese exporters, but also
decisions by foreign-owned multinational firms about where to conduct
outsourcing operations.5 When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in December
1992, a key selling-point of the agreement for Mexican audiences, in the eyes of then Mexican President Carlos Salinas,
was the prospect of attracting foreign investment to the country , with a particular interest to
the access that Mexico would provide to the US market (Salinas de Gortari 2008). By the early 2000s, however, the presence
of the PRC in the equation, was resulting in dynamics not fully contemplated
during the debate over approval of the original agreement. With the entry of the PRC
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, multinational companies increasingly began
to locate their manufacturing operations in the PRC . Although the displacement
of foreign direct investment from the Mexican maquiladora sector to China (Garca
Herrero and Santabrbara 2005) was strongly emphasized during the early years following the PRCs accession to the
WTO, by 2007, a new dynamic had begun to emerge: Chinese companies investing in Mexico , with the
objective of securing access not only to the Mexican market, but also to tariff-free access to the US
under the terms of NAFTA. Examples proposed auto plants by Chinese automaker FAW in Hidalgo and Geely in
Leon (Dickerson 2007) a plant for the Chinese computer company Lenovo for manufacturing laptops in Monterrey, as well as a cloth
manufacturing facility in Durango for the Chinese firm Sinatex (Hernndez Camargo 2011). The economic

interdependence between Mexico, the US, and China via the US market was
further highlighted by the PRCs January 2012 proposal to negotiate a free trade
agreement with Mexico (Daz 2011), providing incentives for Chinese (as well as other)
companies to conduct final assembly operations in Mexico to export to the US market,
not only to avoid tariffs under the provisions of NAFTA, but also to more effectively serve the US market due to Mexicos relative
proximity. The

dynamics generated by such interdependence, however, have not been

limited to trade

and investment.

Commercial interactions between two of the parties in

the triangle frequently have political repercussions in the third . Mexicos

disappointing economic performance during the first decade after the ratification
of NAFTA, due in part to the new competition from the PRC, helped to fuel frustration in Mexico over
unmet expectations of the accord with the US and Canada (Mora Legaspi 2011; Garca Estrada
2012). Similarly, the location of Chinese factories in the Mexican maquiladora sector prompted
concerns in the US that through NAFTA, Mexico could become a back-door for
the entry of Chinese products (CER 2012). From the Chinese perspective, US-Mexico collaboration
on anti-dumping cases may be seen to have adversely impacted Chinas
relationship with both (Vzquez, Lpez-Portillo, and Vzquez Bravo 2008). In addition to economic interactions
between two parties producing political effects on the third, non-economic behaviors of one may impact
the trade and investment relationship between the other two . It can be argued, for example, that
the US demand for drugs and the flow of US-purchased firearms into Mexico has
contributed to narco-violence in the north of Mexico , where Chinese and other
investors have contemplated setting up operations. Although many of the interdependencies between Mexico, the US,
and the PRC revolve around the US market, there is also an important relationship between flows of
export and remittance income from the US to Mexico and Mexican purchases of


Chinese products. With respect to export income, apart from the previously mentioned issue of production by PRC
companies in Mexico, a portion of the profits from Mexican exports to the US, as well as
the wages of the Mexican workers employed in generating such exports, ultimately
go toward the purchase of Chinese consumer goods . Moreover, in the process of producing goods to
export to the United States, Mexican firms incorporate intermediate goods from the PRC, with the implication that sales of Mexican
products to the United States both directly and indirectly drive Mexican purchases of Chinese goods, including clothing, shoes, toys,
appliances, motorcycles, cars, computers, telecommunication equipment, and intermediate products. Beyond profits

and wages, another revenue flow from the US to Mexico that impacts the purchase
of Chinese goods comes in the form of remittances. In 2010, Mexicans working in the United States
sent an estimated $21 billion in remittances to their families and friends in Mexico, a more significant source of income for the
country than foreign tourism (Jimnez 2011). The impact of each of the above-mentioned revenue streams

Mexican consumption of Chinese goods is distinct . Remittance and wage income
goes directly to families, and is therefore arguably the most correlated with
Mexican purchases of Chinese consumer goods. The Mexican production process
itself, by contrast, is linked to the consumption of intermediate goods from the PRC, while
the corporate earnings of exporters is tied to Mexicos purchase of Chinese capital



AT//Chinese Softpower Inevitable

It could go either way it has a tenuous foothold in the region
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
Affinity for Chinese Culture. The

PRC has actively promoted Chinese culture and language

throughout the world, including through such landmark events as the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and 2010 World Expo
in Shanghai, visited by an estimated 5 million foreign tourists,12 as well as establishing more than 282 Confucius institutes
worldwide, including 20 in Latin America. Cultural exchanges are a featured part of China's

dealings with Latin America, consistent with the "nonthreatening" character that
Beijing wishes to emphasize in these interactions. Despite PRC "marketing efforts," by contrast to the global
impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of the PRC's weakest levers of soft
power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, China's influence in
the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American
mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally limited and
superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in those countries. Such
perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense
of mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from
the perceived differentness of that culture and commercial competition from
Chinese products.



AT//Chinese Softpower Fails

Chinese influences effective in the context of Latin America
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
China as "the Wave of the Future." Perhaps China's

greatest source of soft power is the most

intangible. China's emergence as a key global player is a phenomenon that has
assumed almost mystical proportions within Latin America . The rapid growth in
PRC trade with and investment in Latin America, and the expansion of contacts at
all levels, only reinforce the perceived significance of "China's rise," as observed from Latin
America. In addition to opportunism for commerce, Latin America's belief in the rise of China and its
globally transformational implications draws the attention of the people and
leaders of the region to the PRC and shapes their course of action . Costa Rican
president Oscar Arias, for example, established regular diplomatic relations with the PRC as a
necessary part of ensuring the relevance of his country as an international actor .
At the popular level, the rise of China is most likely behind a swelling interest in the
Chinese language in the region. The dedication of 5 or more years by students to gain a basic
capability in the Mandarin language and its character set, for example, is arguably driven by their
calculation that the ability to communicate in Chinese will be fundamental to the
pursuit of opportunities in the PRC, and with Chinese businessmen and
government officials, in the future.



AT//China Bad
Chinese interaction in Latin American markets inevitable
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
Several policy recommendations result from this analysis. First, solely

bilateral negotiations, i.e. between just the

not sufficient given the quick and profound shifts in
trade occurring in the NAFTA region. Thus, long-term NAFTA-China trade
negotiations seem to not only be plausible, but inevitable, given the comprehensive
U.S. and China or just Mexico and China, are

production and trade integration between Mexico and the U.S . Second, NAFTA
countries require additional policies and incentives to encourage competitiveness
in the region, particularly regarding the manufacturing sector. Behind the substantial trade losses since the year 2000 are
million of jobs. If the governments of the United States and Mexico are sincere in their
aim to maintain and increase high-quality jobs, manufacturing will play a critical
role. Coordination of policies in these areas within NAFTA from industrial and innovation
policies to research and development should be promoted actively not only at the national level, but at the regional
level as well.

Increased influence doesnt result in military modernization

Lampton 7

[David M., Dean of Faculty, Professor of China Studies, Director of

China Studies at Johns Hopkins, The Faces of Chinese Power,
Foreign Affairs, Winter 2007. Ln]

Fortified by both globalization and its economic policies, China has thus become
an ardent supporter of the existing international economic orderan almost total
reversal from Maos opposition in the 1950s and 1960s. In international relations, dominant states typically want
to preserve the status quo and rising states want to change it. But today, it is China that wants to preserve key features of the current
world order,whereas the United States, the lone superpower, seems bent on shaking it up by creating coalitions of the willing
assembled outside established international organizations. Chinas national strategy is designed to

continue its fast domestic economic growth, the regimes principal legitimizing
factor besides nationalism; attract maximum resources (technology, investment, and strategic materials) from the international
system; and reduce external threats that might deplete its resources. This strategy
does not emphasize rapid military growth, and with good reason: fast expansion of
the armed forces would alarm the outside world and likely produce countervailing
coalitions; high military expenditures would also drain Beijing of badly needed
human and material resources just as President Hu Jintao, emphasizing the importance of turning China into a
harmonious society, sets out to expand human, environmental, and infrastructure investment for those Chinese left behind by the
countrys rapid development. After Maos dependence on coercive power and Dengs on economic power, China now seeks

a more balanced mix that also uses idea power.

Chinas peaceful
Rosenberg 5



[David. Prof Poli Sci Middlebury. Dire Straits: Competing Security

Priorities in the South China Sea 2005]
Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response ?

The Chinese
defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This
year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing
its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile
destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any

long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances
for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air
defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and
training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in
the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming
military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The
U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military
personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals
between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of

pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative

approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004,
reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China
has taken significant steps to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework
Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation , negotiated in November
2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010.






Slayer 2AC
US influence in Latin Americas resilient and the thesis of the DA is
Duddy & Mora 5-1

[Patrick US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior

Lecturer at Duke. And Frank Director of Latin American Center at
Florida Intl University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Western Hemisphere (09-13). Latin America: Is U.S. influence
waning? 5/1/13]
As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there

has been an important change in

power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and
increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and
scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic
forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships
involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student
exchanges and social media, travel and migration . Trade and investment remain
the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly
the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region . Many observers who
worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the
presence of European companies and investors. While it is true that other countries are important
to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United
States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and
trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements. An area of
immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the
exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration . It is commonplace to note the enormous

presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe,
Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel
every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-

government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities

increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of
four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States
totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows
can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally, one should not underestimate
the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region . The power of national reputation,
popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence
in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify . Example: Despite 14 years of
strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chvez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas
every year, including many thousands of Chvez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the
hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating

interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the
importance of our ties to the region. We have many individual national partners in the
Americas. We dont need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a
whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy . A greater commitment to
work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to


them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural
heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests .



Link NUQ
Economic engagement now
Valencia 5/20/13

(Robert contributing writer for Global Voices Online, New Yorkbased political analyst, U.S. and Latin America Economic
Cooperation Without Militarization?
President Obamas meeting with Mexicos President Enrique Pea Nieto centered
on the historic economic relationship between the two countries , and furthered their
conversation on economic and commercial initiatives as well as immigration issues. Additionally, Pea Nieto highlighted Mexicos
economic growth and the necessity for bolstering student exchange. Both leaders agreed to create an

economic team led by Vice President Joe Biden and Mexican Secretary of the
Treasury Luis Videgaray. They resolved to create projects to improve infrastructure and
security along the 3,000 kilometer-long border, one of the worlds largest.

TPP makes increased economic engagement inevitable

Sarukhan 12

(Arturo Sarukhan, Mexican Ambassador to the U.S. since February

2007, Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S.
Mexican Relations? American Society/Council of the Americas,
Over the past two decades, NAFTA has dramatically altered the way Mexico and the United States engage with one another.
However, much more can and should be done to bring North American competitiveness back to a starring role on the global stage.
This is why the participation of all three North American countries in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will be so important.
The TPP will enable us to discuss measures that meet the needs and challenges of twenty-first-century free
and fair trade, such

as compatibility of regulatory systems, new environmental

provisions, strong protection for intellectual property rights, and emerging areas such as
digital technologies and e-commerce . The TPP will further deepen and strengthen
the integrated supply and production chains between our two countries . And as a
true coalition of the free-trade willing in the Americas and across the Pacific Rim, the TPP
therefore represents the next step in a North American Grand Strategy . In addition to the
TPP, we need to continue strengthening the participation and commitment of civil
society and the private sector across our common border , as they are true costakeholders in our bilateral efforts toward economic progress.



Coop Inev
Cooperations inevitable
Seelke 13

[Claire. Specialist in Mexico Affairs at the Congressional Research

Service. Mexico and the 112th Congress 1/29/13]
Over the last five years, U.S.-Mexican

security cooperation has intensified significantly as

a result of the Mrida Initiative. U.S.-Mexican cooperation has evolved to the
point where it is able to continue even amidst serious strain caused by sometimes unforeseen
events. For example, bilateral efforts against weapons trafficking continued even after
the failed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) operation dubbed Fast and Furious resulted
in firearms being trafficked into Mexico. 47 U.S. training and law enforcement support efforts
have advanced even as U.S. personnel have been injured and even killed while
working in Mexico. The U.S. government has helped Mexican govern ment
investigate the circumstances under which two U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
employees were wounded on August 24, 2012, as their vehicle came under heavy fire from Mexican Federal Police.



US-China influence isnt zero-sum
Xiaoxia 5-6

[Wang. Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. In America's

Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America The Economic
Observer, 5/6/13 ]
For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but
a multiple choice of mutual benefit s and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin
American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong
and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated

over two centuries in the region.

The relationship is trilateral and US engagement helps China

Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 32-33]

If one simply looks at Chinas trade surplus with the United States and Mexico, one
would assume that China plays a very influential role in the triangular relations
between these three nations. However, as the Chinese saying goes, there is no diplomacy for a weak country ,
implying that developing nations inherently assume a submissive role in relations with
economic superpowers. In this sense then, economic power becomes the most important
factor in the context of international diplomatic relations . Applied to the framework of the
trilateral relationship between China, the United States, and Mexico, this theory clearly assumes the
existence of one key player . There is no doubt that the United States is a superpower, not only
surpass the U.S. in 2016 to become the worlds largest economy, the fact remains that
China is still a developing country and only one of the regional powers in Asia ,
unlike the United States, which is a leading global superpower . The economic performance of
the United States remains very impressive. Even though the economy of the U.S. was significantly
affected by the international financial crisis, and is still in the process of recovering from an economic
recession, the United States finds itself even now in a unipolar moment of
unchallenged superiority. Therefore, although China is referred to as the second
largest economy in the world, such accolades would be dampened if Chinas situation
were viewed comparatively, as a whole, with the United States. It is clear that Chinas economic status
among these three countries, but also in the world. Although the International Monetary Fund predicts that China

has been increasing in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is the correct unit of measurement when examining the cost of
living. However, the traditional measure of GDP, calculated in dollars at current exchange rates, [indicates] that the U.S. economy
remains nearly six times the size of Chinas (Stallings 2008:241). Furthermore, it is widely known that

competitiveness indicates the level of a countrys productivity . According to a report by the

World Economic Forum, the U.S. is ranked much higher than both China and Mexico (China:
26th and Mexico: 58th), even though the U.S. continues its decline for the third year in a


row, falling one more place to fifth position (WEF 2011). All of the above-mentioned data indicates that
the United States continues to be a prevailing superpower in the world a
particularly relevant fact for both China and Mexico . As for these two nations, both are developing
countries, both are listed among the middle-income countries, and their economic performance and GDP per capita are much lower
than that of the U.S. However, when we compare China and Mexico to each other, we see that both countries are in the process of
modernization, although comparatively speaking, Mexicos per capita GDP is 2.3 times higher than that of China. As the most
powerful country in the triangular relationship, the United States has become the most important trade partner for both China and
Mexico, as well as a key player in other facets of their relationship: (1). For China, the United States is its

most important economic partner, a status which is supported by the fact that the
U.S. is the second largest export destination for Chinas manufacturing products ,
following only behind Asia as a whole. What is more, China is the most significant shareholder of U.S.
stock, and both countries enjoy a close, mutually beneficial relationship in terms
of their economies, their militaries, and their cultural and interpersonal exchange .
To a certain extent, China and the U.S. are mutually dependent on each other. However, it is
worth noting that the United States holds the upper hand in terms of the bilateral
relationship between the two nations. Superficially speaking, Chinas swift economic
growth has greatly strengthened its economy, hence the reason it has been regarded as world-class
economic power (Smith 2008:215). However, the commodity boom is unlikely to last forever (He
2012:31). Chinas manufacturing road to modernity has become rocky and uncertain
for a number of reason: The first is related to increasing labor costs in China , not only
compared to what they were before, but also in terms of neighboring countries such as Vietnam and India. According to AlixPartner
Consultancy, compensation costs in East Asia a region that includes China but excludes Japan rose from 32% of U.S. wages in
2002 to 43% in 2007. And since wages have been increasing at a rate of 8% to 9% a year, taxes have been increasing as well. East
Asias overall costs have doubtlessly escalated even more during the last two years (Devonshire-Ellis 2011). The effects of

wage increase in China have been exemplified by American companies like Adidas
leaving China in response to escalated labor costs. What this ultimately means for
China is a gradual loss of its comparative advantage as the lowest-cost producer in
the manufacturing sector a status that it has maintained for decades. Secondly, United States-based
multinational companies (MNCs) are crucial in determining the structure of the
global production system, labor mobilization, and international trade flow. China ,
as the final assembler of goods produced by the MNCs, has enticed such companies with low costs of labor. This has
incentivized many MNCs in the manufacturing sector to build accessory plants in China, which now account for over 60% of Chinas
exports.2 Consequently, MNCs receive a large percentage of these export profits, calling into question the true trade surplus that
China has with the U.S. and Mexico. In other words, the United States, as a primary base for MNC-

operations, will be a determining factor regarding Chinas future economic

performance if China continues to follow its manufacturing road . Last but not least,
China is currently facing numerous domestic problems, such as: (1) a rich
government with poor citizens, suggesting that the benefits of economic growth have not been enjoyed by a
significant portion of the population; (2) rampant social inequality; and (3) inefficiency of stateowned enterprises, incomplete economic reform, and a semi-market and semicommand economic system. Chinese economist Wu Jinglian has argued that Chinas future will be decided based on
whether the country advances to a law-based market economy or reverts back to a command economy and state capitalism (Wu
2012). The aforementioned factors have impeded Chinas economic development, supporting the contention that Chinas economic
clout and status should not be exaggerated (Roett and Paz 2008:9). In short , it is necessary for China to

explore a new model of development - that is, from an export-driven model to one
based on innovation - in order to sustain its economic growth .

No trade-off the plan facilitates a trilateral relationship thats key

Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China



and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
The analysis of Ping Wang highlights that

in the Mexico-US-China triangular trade relationship ,

the United States is the key player . While Chinas presence has increased, the
United States remains a critical influence on both Mexico and China. Furthermore, the
author suggests that Chinas rise and emergence in terms of trade and investments in LAC,
and specifically in regards to this triangular relationship, will slow increasingly in
the future, considering its specialization in industrial commodities and products, rising wages in China, and the high number
of multinational corporations involved in Chinese exports. For Ping Wang, the politically and historically
subordinated role of Mexico with the United States, in contrast to Chinas
increasing regional and global status, is a basis for understanding future scenarios
in which the Mexico-United States relationship is more stable in comparison to
that of China and the United States (where the US, for example, views China as a threat).

Chinese influence doesnt undercut US hegemony

Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 68-9]
Secondly, although

the U.S. pays close attention to Chinas engagement with Latin

American countries, it knows that China does not really have the capability to challenge the
position of the United States on the American continent. It is true that Chinese-Latin
American relations have developed rapidly over the past ten years, especially in regards to three aspects:
Firstly, China has established connections with the entire American continent , not only

developing economic relations with the major powers in the region, but also strengthening its cooperation with many medium-sized
countries as well as regional organizations. Some countries in the region, however, do not maintain diplomatic relations with
Mainland China, and do with Taiwan. Secondly, China has begun to pursue universal cooperation

with Latin American nations, with more and more dimensions emerging in its various relationships including
tourism, cultural exchange, security issues, climate change, etc. Thirdly, topics of interest between China and
Latin American countries have gone beyond the bilateral and regional levels , with
these nations exchanging views on the world order and global affairs. Thus , China believes that its relationship
with Latin America has strategic importance.2 Certain Chinese scholars have pointed out that the
Chinese-Latin American relationship has exhibited unprecedented growth in the new century (Zheng and Sun 2009). Chinas
increasing reinforcement of its relationship with Latin American countries, however, does
not imply any intention to enter into geopolitical competition with the United
States . Economic development is the primary goal of Chinas cooperation with Latin
American countries. Indeed, China wants to expand its exchange with Latin American
countries to include other areas such as education, culture, politics, security, etc., given Chinas belief that one-dimensional
relationships are both unhealthy and unsustainable. Chinese-Latin American economic cooperation
needs to be both complemented and supported by diplomacy in other areas. Therefore, from the
Chinese perspective, developing comprehensive relationships with Latin American
countries has little to do with strategic or military competition . In fact, Chinas
engagement with Latin American countries in the realm of security is quite limited ,
compared with their other economic and political partnerships. The Chinese military has just begun to interact with its Latin
American counterparts. There have been no regular or institutional arrangements between


the Chinese and Latin American militaries, let alone any joint actions between them. Thus, the
reality of the Chinese-Latin American military relationship is not that it has been
developing too much or too quickly. On the contrary, the question becomes how this facet of the relationship can catch
up with the rapid growth observed in other areas. What this implies is that China is not pursuing strategic
competition with the United States in Latin America. If the U.S. is to be concerned
about anything, it should be the potentially catalytic effects on Latin American
economic growth caused by Chinas presence in the region .

Multiple barriers to Chinese influence in Latin America and

challengers to American control are inevitable
Ellis 11

[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint
Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.]
The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have
limits that are important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same
as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise
from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in
learning each other's culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by
the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America
generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from
differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different
attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which
contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin
America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America
is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak
or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish , although the
number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for
learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures.

Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge

regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social Sciences,

which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong
Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE the general

knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government

functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and
sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region . Perhaps most importantly,
despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too
frequently perceived as "not one of us"a reality reflected even in Chinese
communities, which often remain only partly integrated , despite deep historical roots in many
Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent
mistrust , even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation . Latin
American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the
Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas
behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often
seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers
harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America military exchanges, it is
interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their
colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not. Finally, Chinese


influence is diluted by increasing interactions between Latin America and other
extraregional actors , such as India, Russia, Iran, and others. Although the PRC is arguably the
most significant new suitor of the region, it is not the only alternative . For Nicaragua and populist
regimes in the Andean region, Russia provides important alternatives with respect to arms
purchases and energy sector investments. An $18 billion commitment by a Russian consortium to develop
the Junin-6 oilfield in Orinoco, for example, may have helped to accelerate China's subsequent commitment to invest $16.3 billion in
Junin-4. In addition to Russia, India is increasingly engaging in commercial opportunities,

particularly in high technology, services, and commodity sector investments, while challenging the PRC monopoly
over "south-south" developing country partnerships in the region. When China cut off purchases of Argentine
soy oil, for example, it was India that picked up the slack .



Chinese Influence Bad

Chinese influence in Latin America is bad US economic engagement
is comparatively superior
Shaiken et al 13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
However, closer

ties to China also have signifi cant disadvantages for both Latin
America and the United States: Growing trade deficits. Latin American leaders
who sign trade and investment deals with the PRC have noticed that China's
exports are more affordable than their own goods, which contributes to trade deficits. Chinese goods are
made by laborers who work for one-third of the wages of Latin American
counterparts and who tolerate worse working conditions . Officials in Argentina, Brazil, and

Mexico have signaled their unease about trade with such a hot competitor. In September 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox made
it clear to visiting President Hu Jintao that dumping electronics and clothing was unacceptable. For every dollar that

Mexico makes from exports to China, the PRC makes $31 from exports to Mexico .
[9] Disinterest in economic reform . Some analysts believe that the commodities-based trade
model used by China will undermine the progress that Latin America has made
toward industrialization. While countries like Chile and Brazil have moved beyond raw materials exports, others with
powerful presidents or ruling oligarchies may be tempted to fall back on plantation economics. Income gaps between
the rich and poor may widen as a result. Moreover, such narrowly focused economies are
vulnerable to downturns in commodity prices. Some 44 percent of Latin Americans already live below
the poverty line. If these countries fail to adopt reforms, social inequality and political
instability could depress U.S. exports to the region and increase migration
problems. Scramble for resources. To obtain commodities, China offers tempting
investments in infrastructure. In contrast, the United States cannot offer direct tie-ins
to state industries and can only offer development aid , now in decreasing amounts. Chinese
competition may make Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) money a less effective incentive to democratize governments and
liberalize markets. The one-to-two year lead time from proposal to disbursement of MCA

aid gives volatile governments a chance to back away from market-oriented

performance requirements. Evasion of American-style bottleneck diplomacy.
China's flexibility counters more rigid U.S. approaches. Obtaining any kind of
assistance from the United States requires compliance on a battery of restrictions,
including observing human rights, protecting the environment, prom ising not to
send U.S. military personnel to the International Criminal Court (ICC),[10] not assisting current or former terrorists, and not using U.S.-provided equipment for any other
than its stated purpose. American commitments also depend on legislative approval and can be reversed if the mood
in the U.S. Congress shifts. Prying eyes on America. From electronic espionage facilities in Cuba to port facilities run
by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing's Hutchison-Whampoa conglomerate in Panama, China has an eye trained on
the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies are aware of this, but Washington's
penchant for focusing on one threat at a time, such as the war on terrorism, could
leave America vulnerable to Chinese industrial and military espionage .