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JAN 28, 2000
Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan,
Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman,
on August 28, 1987, at the Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside
his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave for abroad the same day as she
was an OFW, and for several complications. After the wedding, Yman abandoned
Beso for no apparent reason. In consequence to that, she then went to Local Civil
Registrar of Calbayog to check their marriage contract, from which she learned that
said marriage was not registered. Upon learning of the situation, she wrote to Judge
Daguman, in which he responded that Yman took all the copies and he retained
Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of
his court’s jurisdiction;
Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and
not registering the marriage in the office of the Local Civil Registry
A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom
following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing
statement to this effect but none of these instances were present in

only in the
in a sworn
the case at

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge
should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of
his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra
precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with
Article 23 of the Family Code that - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing
the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the
marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate.
DEC 11, 1992

27. 699 of RAC. filed a petition for certoriari to nullify the decision of Commission of Audit (COA) in the 7th Indorsement denying him of reimbursement anchored on the provisions of Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) in the amount of Php 40. at least. or portions thereof. the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission. The petitioner resubmitted the request asserting that the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC. the later act is to be construed as a continuation of. there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The COA Chairman again denied the request asserting the same reason and furthered that Section 699 was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. . and portions that are intended to be repealed. The request was returned due to the comments of the COA Chairman stating that the Administrative Code of 1987 already repealed the RAC being relied upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated the Revised Administrative Code including Section 699 HELD: In determining whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent which is manifested in the incorporation of a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws. he is entitled to allowances in case of injury. Under Sec.00. as a general rule. otherwise. the petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI Director Alfredo Lim forwarding the request to the Secretary of Justice. a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation. Sec. the request was again returned to Director Lim with an advice of elevating the matter in the Supreme Court if he so desires. rules and regulations. All laws. the petitioner was hospitalized because of cholecystitis and incurred the abovementioned amount. inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. According to the COA Chairman. the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. sickness.831. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest. Hence. Earlier. including Section 699. Repealing Clause. Director Lim transmitted the request to the Justice Secretary who recommended the payment to the COA Chairman.Petitioner Antonio Mecano. decrees. and not a substitute for. orders. Hence. considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually. death incurred in the performance of duty. before there can be a repeal.

JUDGE DOMAGTOY 259 SCRA 129 JUL 19. Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct. 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a . unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law. It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27. NAVARRO V. 1996 FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa. Surigao del Norte. The failure to indicate specific laws reveal that the intent was not to repeal any existing law.The repealing clause of the Administrative Code of 1987 is repeal by implication because it failed to identify which specific laws shall be repealed.

and therefore void. Under Article 3. which held that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.” Article 8.” Under Article 7. People v. Mapa (1967) was decided and revoked the Macarandang rule. . “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos. marriage may be solemnized by. Absent this judicial declaration. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. the bride. the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was only done by one party. accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. More importantly. ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction Whether or not the marriages he solemnized were null and void HELD: Yes. refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. he remains married to his former wife. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Whether wittingly or unwittingly. Macarandang (1959) was applicable. In 1965. among others. 1994. Later People v. NOT by both parties. On the second issue. one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer. ARTICLE 8 People v Licera FACTS: In 1961. marriage. the earlier case should be held applicable. it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment. Rafael Licera was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. which is a directory provision. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge.subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated.

of this jurisdiction's legal system. 1964. the accused admitted that on September 5. A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule. the judgment a quo is reversed. Macarandang have the force and effect of law? HELD: Art. but as well at the time as of his apprehension. constitute evidence of what the laws mean. notwithstanding his non compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm ACCORDINGLY. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret agent. Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle. The Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code formed part of our jurisprudence and. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle. and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. As to the facts. . Macarandang and People vs.ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial decision in People v. People v. and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent. Jabinal FACTS: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. a determined by the trial court. although in themselves not law. He however. the accused sought for his acquittal. Costs de oficio. he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. Mapa. Lucero. These decisions. which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. hence.

or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? HELD: The judgment appealed was reversed. Macarandang and People vs. the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise. On plaintiff's motion. The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. Defendant appealed to Court of First Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. citing that People vs. an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible. the new doctrine should be applied prospectively. Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967. ARTICLE 9 Chu Juan v.Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused. of the law. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero. that he is not familiar with the rules governing . hence. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight. but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted. mapa. Bernas FACTS: Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match. and the appellant was acquitted. defendant Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of this nature.

the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6. the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. HELD: Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the issue. four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against a seven-year-old girl. obscurity. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable. which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Therefore. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt. the general principles of law. that he does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights. In this case. However. Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua. provides that Customs of the place shal l be observed and in absence thereof. the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. People v. . The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof). the penalty imposable shall be death. which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence. Lorenzo Veneracion FACTS: In August 1994. HELD: No. the judge must impose the death penalty.cockfights and duties of referees. or insufficiency of the laws. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act. No special finding is made with regard to cost.

. as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.Instant petition is GRANTED. 7659.