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Consequences of Political Instability, Governance

and Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and
Growth: The Case of Pakistan
Qamr3summary
According to this article Political regimes in Pakistan have
strongly influenced the economic outcomes. Whereas the
autocratic regimes have tended to exhibit good economic
performance with low and stable inflation, robust growth,
and fiscal discipline helped by relatively high revenue
generation and checks on public expenditure, the
democratic regimes have been marked by
macroeconomic instability and sluggish economic growth.
The economy grew more than 5 percent per annum on
average during autocratic regimes, which is 1.5
percentage points higher than the average growth rate
observed during democratic regimes. Similarly, in all
autocratic regimes, average economic growth remained
above 5 percent with the exception of the second regime
in which average economic growth was 2.74 percent.
However, in the case of all democratic regimes average
annual growth remainedin the range from 2 percent to 5
percent. Therefore, more than 5 percent average annual
growth across all autocratic regimes signifies the
relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals during
these regimes.

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