Outline of Report Book Review: Samuel K.


Internalization Of The Bangsamoro Struggle

CHAPTER 1: INERTIA OF HISTORY I. Struggle for Political Power a. Pre-Sultanate period i. Marked by the struggle of rajahships and datuships for the maintenance of their independence b. Sultanate period i. Concrete political system ii. Datuships and rajaships as foundational level iii. Blending of Islam and indigenous political culture c. Against colonialism (Spain and US) i. Means: violence and diplomacy ii. Succeeded in maintaining their political dominance by controlling the seas d. Introduction of steam gunboats i. Led to the decline of Muslim political power ii. Erosion of the Sultanate foundations in Sulu and Maguindanao e. Strengthened Spanish strongholds i. Treaties: a. Simuay Treaty in 1636 b. Sulu Treaty of 1645 c. Sulu and Captain General Jose Malcampo Treaty in 1876 ii. Further restricted the political range of Muslim activities iii. New Muslim response: Sabilallah a. An institution of conflict that individualized the concept of Jihad b. Created most serious problem to Spanish security in Muslim areas c. Indication of Muslims’ unwillingness to give up political power even at the cost of self-annihilation and the destruction of their homeland f. Treaty of Paris in 1898 i. Posed a more formidable challenge to the Muslim political struggle g. American campaigns in Muslimland i. Destroyed the Muslim military capacity ii. Emasculated the datuship’s and Sultanate’s political power h. Bates Treaty i. Recognized American supremacy and presence in Sulu i. John Pershing i. Pressured the local datus into respecting American sovereignty by personally presenting themselves to Camp Vicors j. Muslim leadership had become divided i. Anticolonial struggle a. Sajiduciman of Bayan

k. l.

m. n.

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r. s.

t. u.


b. Datus of Bayabao ii. Compromising in a liberal democracy Moro Province of 1903 i. Accommodation and the integration of the Muslim leaders willing to participate in the American colonial system Bud Bagsak in 1913 i. Sultanate’s ultimate loss of any political power a. Carpenter-Kiram Agreement i. Only retained for the Sultan his spiritual power over his subjects Separation of church from state principle i. Deny the Muslim’s access to political power Muslim Leadership i. To explore the possibilities in the American liberal, democratic system a. Rules more often than not clashed with the Islamic system of governance Integration of the Christian Filipino leadership i. Not only lost power to the Americans but also to the Christian Filipinos Frank W. Carpenter i. First civil governor ii. Definitely lost all political advantage Participation in the democratic processes i. Rode to political power under American rule ii. Ex: election iii. Problems: a. Lacked adequate knowledge of Western civilization b. Especially the ability to read, write and communicate in Spanish and/or English Frank C. Laubach i. Brought literacy to the Muslim South Few members of Muslim royalty that were able to study in Americanestablished schools in Manila i. Princess Tarhata Kiram ii. Hadji Gulamu Rasul of Sulu Petition to the US President in 1930 i. Not to include the Muslim South in an independent Philippines but to organize it as a territory of the US Two Sultanates were established i. Sultan Ombra Amilbangsa a. No historical linkages to the royal datuship b. Best way to reconcile the sultanate’s need to survive c. Local political system for purposes of integration but not for governmental administration Issue of proprietary rights over the Bornean territory of the Sultanate i. “Deed of cession” a. Sovereinty would revert back to the Sultanate in case of the Philippine government’s failure to pursue the Sultanate’s claims over Sabah


Struggle for economic progress a. Lucrative economic system i. Muslim South linked to the rest of the Philippines in both a beneficial domestic trade and a kind of foreign trade i. Brought Southeast Asians and their goods into Sulu from as far as Manila b. Fall of Muslim Kingdom to Spanish forces i. Under Miguel Lopez de Legazpi ii. Led to the elimination of one of the most strategic and progressive Muslim entrepots of trade c. Governor Francisco de Sande i. Expedition to Brunei due to the seizure o economic initiatives and control over the Brunei-Manila trade ii. Constituted an alliance of economic interests seeking to profit from the breakup of Muslim monopoly iii. Failed and neutralized the Muslim Mindanao a. Destroying the vital role of Sulu and Maguindanao in the trade pattern d. Muslims’ violent reaction to Spanish intrusion i. Prevent disruption of a lucrative internal and external trade e. Muslim economic losses i. Destruction of farms and villages in Jolo Island ii. Destruction of trading vessels and the looting of valuable merchandise and items f. Encomiendas i. Motivated Spanish expeditions ii. Captain Figueroa a. Led expedition to Pulangi in Mindanao b. Conditions: i. Be appointed as Governor of Mindanao for life ii. Lands acquired by conquest and pacification be distributed as encomiendas iii. Wiped out series of ancestral lands g. Role of the Jesuits and the Recollects i. Strengthening Spanish rule ii. Alienation of territories from ancestral lands of hill tribes and Muslim groups th h. 19 century i. rise of towns in Davao, Cotabato, Misamis, Zamboanga, Surigao and Sulu ii. breaking up the economic patterns of internal trade iii. marked the final loss of economic advantage they have enjoyed for so many centuries i. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss i. Governor of the Moro Province a. Reorient the natives toward the American free enterprise economic system b. Draw American agricultural and business interests to the development of American plantations and business in Southern Philippines



j. Muslims merely supplied the raw materials k. Sultans and datus loss their status and importance in the colonial society Struggle for social destinction a. Decline of social importance i. Loss of political and economic power b. Colonial system i. Deprived the Muslim and other cultural communities of the capacity to achieve the level of equality in social status c. People regarded the Christian Filipinos as socially higher than the Muslims and pagans d. Muslim middle class i. Educated and professionals e. Employment of royalties i. Royal class to ordinary government employees ii. Landholder to cultivator f. Quezon’s agrarian policy i. Settlement of Christians in Mindanao and Sulu as a way of finally integrating Muslim Mindanao into the ‘national mainstream’ g. Modern western influences i. Not only in societies but also in value systems Struggle for cultural identity a. Philippine independence in 1946 i. Muslim fears that whatever political, economic, social and cultural possessions they had preserved under the American liberal democratic system might finally be lost to the Christian Filipinos who had become virtual heirs to the American colonial government b. Government could not be fully trusted i. Kamlon Uprising in Sulu a. Suspected the government to be supporting their local enemies c. Moro National Front (MNLF) i. Nur Misuari ii. March 18 – memorial day a. To commemorate the massacre of Tausug-sama trainees on Corrgidor Island d. March 18 – Bangsamoro day e. Muslim perception i. Filipinism is limited and relevant only to the aspirations of the Christian majority in the country

CHAPTER 2: THE MORO IN HISTORY CHAPTER 3: OPTIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 periods: 1946- 1968: 22years domination of integrationist view of problem 1968- 1987: 19years characterized by secessionist option

1987- up to present: emergence of separatist alternative First Period: The Integrationist Approach After the Pacific War and the following declaration of Philippine Independence in July 4 1946, the government was confident that whatever Filipino-Muslim issues remaining can be resolved by the fast integration of Muslims in the Filipino Republic. However not a few Muslim leaders thought of the same thing based on their participation with national development as Filipino citizens.

Political Families in Muslim South: Lanao- Alonto, Lucman, Dimaporo, Tamano, Pangandaman, Morohomsar Cotabato, Maguindanao- Sinsuat, Mangelen, Pendatun, Piang, Matalam, Mastura Sulu- Kiram, Abubakar, Taluwi, Rasul, Sangkuli, Anni, Tan, Loong -The quality of integration can be seen by the success of involvement of both catholic and non-catholic in the electoral process Maranaos elected Tomas Cabili in congress Tausug and Sama elected Leon Fernandez as governor of Sulu Siasi elected Felix Bello and Vicente Santos as mayors Chinese families such as the Tans, Lims, Kongs, Teos and Hos were elected in predominantly Muslim areas. -This pattern continued until 1968 when new element in Muslim attitude resulted to Jabidah Massacre. -Although Muslim political families maintained the integrationist pattern, the “new element” pushed for a secessionist option that aimed for withdrawal from a political body which is in context, the “break-up” of Muslim South from the Philippine territory subjected to Philippine sovereginity. Second Period: The Secessionist Option Bangsamoro Liberation Organization -lead by Datu Rashid Lucman - leader of the secessionist movement -umbrella organization for Muslim groups seeking independence from the state although with little unity to speak of. -divided by ethnic and other local factors -composed of three largest Muslim groups in the archipelago: Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Tausugs(including Sama) -sent 90 or so Muslim youths who trained in Malaysia for military combat and training from the three major groups Three from each group were chosen to emerge as rallying personalities on what we now know a Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MNLF: Dimasangkay Pundato- Maranao Hashim Salamat- Maguindanao • • • •

Nur Misuari- Tausug-Sama In the late sixties, the Muslim struggle was ideologically anchored on a semiconservative view that the Muslims were Filipinos and thus constituted to a part of the Philippine state. Their long neglect pushed them to seek independence from the Philippines. -attributed to the leaderships of traditional leaders that wielded influence such as *Rashid Lucman and Domacao Alonto of Lanao *Udtog Matalam of Cotabato *Maas Bawang of Sulu However, the ties between traditional leadership and the central government in Manila downplayed the radical elements that had permeated the Moro consciousness -because of compromises with government as they were responsible for paving the way for the return to the “fold of the law” of a good number of rebels. 1976 Tripoli Agreement between MNLF under Nur Misuari and the government represented by Carmelo Barbero with representatives of OIC as witnesses -conducted more peace talks following the 1974 outbreak of MNLF hostilities in Jolo. -rift in leadership of MNLF The traditional leaders found the difficulty of winning over the Moro Struggle Third Period: The Separatist Alternative Nur Misuari declared the ideology of MNLF based on his own idea and not recognizing the view of the whole group. There was no other doctrine of ideology other than his. The other MNLF leaders thought of this as Misuari’s ideology. -resulted to acceptance of Misuari’s dominance Idea: concoction of Islamic, Socialist, and Marxis-Leninist sources -factor for recruiting youths in joining the group -established the fact that the “Moro Nation” was established long before the Spanish colonization and NEVER PART OF FILIPINO STATE OR NATION and in fact developing separately from Filipino or Christian community. -MNLF is reestablishes the assertion of the separateness of the Moro nation THEREFORE, SECESSIONISM COULD NOT BE CORRECT BECAUSE IT IMPLIES BEING PART OF THE FILIPINO NATION -the idea of separation appealed more to the Moro nation since it claims the fact that they were never part of a nation that was previously conquered The Moro people asked for more concrete components of the MNLF ideology. Misuari declared a speech in Maimbung following their official paper, Mahadlika. Mahadlika concepts: 1. gaosbaugbug 2. kaadilan

These concepts were attractive to the Tausug-Sama elements but unclear to nonTausug-Sama elements. This factor reinforced the perception that the ideology is made to suit the interest of the said ethnic group. Although the gaosbaugbug and kaadilan did not really conflict with the non-Tausug-Sama concepts, the ideology’s ethnic character was clearly shown. It greatly affected the stability of MNLF leadership and struggle. Crack in the movement’s solidarity: Lucman wrote a confidential note - asking for the Tripartite Committee of the OIC to resolve the issues of the Moros. - implying that Misuari’s ideology had crossed the Marxist-radical line that is not in the best interest of the Muslims in the Philippines -breakaway of Salamat and Pundato from MNLF sserved to isolate the Maranao and Maguindanao from the movement *reduced the MNLF to Nur Misuari to a Tausug-Sama based separatist struggle Pundato and Salamat created a new group named Moro Islamic Liberation Front -Misuari denied the idea that MILF was formed to repudiate the MNLF ideology -conformed that the break was because of personal interests -blamed external influences such as the Philippine government that is exploiting the internal issues of MNLF leadership Misuari recognized the seriousness of the MILF. He deliverd a message in Tausug reminding them of the three motivating concepts powered by the Moro struggle: 1. hula- Tausug for homeland; suggest the idea of territoriality 2. agama- -religious tradition; suggest the idea of identity 3. bangsa- race; suggest beyond identity of proud origin based on biological and historical beginnings - by the time of Aquino administration, the demands of the group redused to Tausg –Sama Pundato: -accepted the dictatorship of the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) -being the head of the MNLF Reformist, he followed the traditional approach by going for integration Salamat: -Maguindanao was the object of government proposals -also accepted the integrationist solution Because of this decisions made by the other two leaders, the OIC concluded their full support for Nur Misuari’s MNLF by 1989. -made the Muslims opt for the separatist movement Government Responses to the Moro Issue

The government opts for integration based on old colonial ideas Difference: Colonizers- wanted to promulgate Christianization Government- guided by constitutional guarantee of religious freedom However, the Filipino-Muslims continued to suffer neglect from the government *limited opportunities in government service *mostly in secondary levels of bureaucracy Despite political policies and programs which later on became political slogans and propaganda, the Muslim alienation intensified together with the increase of national population. -the minorities were down the list of priorities -political bias *Christian majority enjoyed abundance of natural resources *monopoly of power in nation even in Muslim areas The government correctly believed that by compromising with the Muslim leaders which were basically the elite, the Muslim threat to the national security can be neutralized. -the government gave resources to the elite, and not considering the needy Muslim masses -subsequent share of Muslim leadership in the economic resources through trade, commerce, agriculture, and other revenue generating schemes 1957 Commission on National Integration, 1968 Mindanao State University -only gave the Muslim leaders the feeling of importance -venue to project their political and intellectual profiles in Philippine society -participated only by intellectuals and academics This factor strengthened the option for secessionism or separatist struggle by the masses. They agitated because of their worsening situation. -the traditional leaders soon opened for the radical option Decleration of Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) by Governor Udtog Matalam in Pagaluan Cotabato in may 1968. -President Marcos arranged a meeting to neutralize the radical threat of the Muslims Result: it was unstoppable because the Muslims have became so united at this point although Matalam gave the government the opportunity to prove its dedication to Muslim progress -outbreak of war in Sulu in 1974 (bloodiest and costliest conflict) between the government and the newly formed MNLF seeking independence Jolo up to Tawi-Tawi- setting of the war • hundreds of government troopers and mujaheedeens were killed • poverty since lots of properties were lost and robbed Clashes in Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Basilan were reported Tripoli Agreement in December 1976 - Nur Misuari and Carmelo Barbero of the government - Witnessed by the OIC representatives


Agreed to pursue a peaceful solution towards Muslim autonomy without any prejudice The MNLF did coldly accepted the national plebiscite and autonomous structures for the Muslim South Accused the government of insincerity and duplicity

Post-Tripoli Agreement - intensified propaganda against each other - calculated armed attacks After Marcos was ousted, the Muslims saw hope in Aquino but did not do anything to mandate the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement other than one visit in Jolo. Private and public talks followed to amend the rift between the gov and the Muslims. Missions to the Middle East - dialogue with Misuari and OIC in ME Jeddah Accord in 1987 composed of Sens - Aqulino Pimentel and Agapito Aquino gave ideas to search for solutions - Uncertainties in Aquino admin gave the Muslim the idea of insincerity and infact, increased efforts to divide the Muslim people Late 1989 - the OIC gave an impending admission of the MNLF as a full member of the organization - showed the serious implications of the Moro issue - might give MNLF the leverage in fighting the OIC Through the Department of Foreign Affairs, the government attacked the MNLF in the person of Secretary Raul Manglapus - expressed that the government is ready for peace talks if the group is composed of its complete leaders Misuari, Pundato and Salamat - made the OIC doubt the unified front of the MNLF - Pundato already accepted the directorship of Office of Muslim Affairs - Salamat’s MILF was offered juicy political positions and economic opportunities, including access to financial resources The government encroached MNLF’s grounds - based on the results of the February 1991 plebiscite - inauguration of the regional gov’t by Gov. Zacaria Candao • showed OIC it’s sincerity in honoring the Tripoli Accord Final blow that brought to an end OIC’s support for the MNLF: - Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait which polarized the Muslim and Arab world - MNLF was not taking any side (neutral) which disappointed the OIC; they expected to seek unification against Iraq’s aggression MNLF profile was undermined - inability to stage credible attacks even to areas under MNLF influence unlike they did back in 1974 is Sulu


government succeeded in neutralizing the MNLF by using politicians and traditional leaders that were underrated by Misurai

1976 Tripoli Agreement asked an explanation for the lack of MNLF armed response for suspected MNLF terrorists. The leadership was forced to disown groups who kidnapped civilians and engaged gov’t troops. - Psy-war to dissimulate MNLF’s lack of control over it’s field commanders RECAPITULATION When we look back at the efforts of both groups, it’s clearly seen that integration were almost all attributed to the gov’t, with the Muslim leadership taking a “don’t know don’t care” attitude. If we look at the progress’ period, the pre-1978 resolution was one sidedly initiated by the gov’t from Roxas to Marcos. no meaningful Muslim input into their integration process which was left to the leadership in Manila due to lack of clear vision of what integration meant or lon history of government’s lack of implementation

CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONALIZATION FROM WITHIN ** Events that lead for urgent need for foreign support • Deployment of more military troops in the Southern Phil. • Pressured to diplomatic options MUSLIM VIEW OF FOREIGN SUPPORT **Reasons why Muslims handed foreign support to MNLF separatist aims • As Muslims, they should help their Muslim brothers everywhere • MNLF was fighting for the cause of Islam • Governmental effort to convert Muslims to Christianity • To improve the standard of living in Muslims areas VIOCE FROM THE FIELD ** MNLF’s rank-and-file and broad supporters • Came from the provinces of Region 9 (Western Mindanao) • Represent the reactions of the Sama, Tausug and Yakan ethnic groups THE BANGSAMORO MEETINGS AND CONGRESS **Methods used by MNLF to draw int’l attention • Organized congress • Mass gatherings ** Misuari was the central figure ** Conference of 1986 proved that:

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The MNLF was a force to reckon with It is working for the freedom of the Bangsamoro people

** 17th OIC Annual Resolution of March 1988 • Acknowledged the MNLF’s show of force • Declared unequivocal support for the MNLF as representative of the Bangsamoro ** Bangsamoro National Congress • Crafted strongly-worded resolutions • These resolutions were passed and included in the OIC’s annual meeting on March 13-16

Mansur sakili Sylvia jahil Saidali abdula Ibnu Hassan Panglima Abdullah sansawi Hadji hatab yusop Datu amiril maindan Ibnu unaid Sawadjaan atiulla Eliasin jainal Hasinon tingkaban Cesar utam Sali ilaji Apalal julkanain Samad abdurahim Matlib usman

Reasons for joining MNLF The threat of to islam, the treatment of muslims as second-class citizens, and neglect of muslim areas by the govt. To provide much needed medical service to her people. Rampant graft and corruption among govt. officials. The calling of Muslim youths to get involved in the struggle against govt. injustice. He believed that as a progressive landowner his interest could be protected from any future political changes He was thoroughly convinced by the MNLF propaganda. Sympathizer Only as recruits who do not fuly understand the MNLF stand. Belived in the struggle of bangsamoro people. Influenced by his relatives. Discrimination from islam to chrisytianity. Believed that martial law was not good for muslims. Disenchantment with marcos administration. He was against the government specialy when two of his brothrs died within marcos’s presidency. To fight for muslim independence. Marcos’s oppression of muslims and govt’s

Mudjabirin arasain Malinsa hasim Kurasiya husin Mudjabirin sarani

Hadji albasi bin mutalib Hadji bawang estino Morofred sarangkula Hadji alln salabiddin Prof. amirul abajul Amil jawari Muksan taguilid Habib harun aldam Habib nabo hasim Yusop alam Hadji malik alsad Gerry salapuddin

oppression of islam. To fight fro the bangsamoro freedom, for the cause of islam, chack govt. military abuses against muslim women and religion. He feared of loosing his religion. Belief that the govt. was carrying out the plans to convert Muslims to Christianity. Defense of bangsamoro homeland seeking for independence, defense of muslims who was harrased by the military, defense of islam which wsa threatened by marcos. To fight for freedom amg digity of the muslims and to be part of muslim struggle for independence. Rampant abuses commited by the military against many innocent muslims. Govt’s “perennial neglect”. It was duty of all muslims to help attain the freedom in mindanao. NMLF has historical basis for fighting against the autonomous govt. Defense of islam. Anti-muslim attitude. Defense of islam. Discontented with the govt. Disenchantmant with the govt. Believes in freedom and independence of bangsamoro people. Discrimination.

RESOLUTION NO. 1------- Appealing to the OIC to grant membership to the MNLF RESOLUTION NO. 2------- Calling for the resumption of peace talks between the MNLF and the Philippine gov’t RESOLUTION NO. 3------- Rejecting the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao RESOLUTION NO. 4------- Urging the Philippine gov’t to implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement RESOLUTION NO. 5------- Reiterating the congress’s recognition of Nur Misuari’s leadership RESOLUTION NO. 6------- Calling for the solidarity of Muslims, Christians and the highlanders who support the independence of the Bangsamoro homeland

RESOLUTION NO. 7------- Calling for the demilitarization of Mindanao and other islands RESOLUTION NO. 8------- Desisting the continued exploitation of the Bangsamoro homeland by multinationals and their local counterparts RESOLUTION NO. 9------- Urging the just indemnification of all the victims of human rights violations RESOLUTION NO. 10------ Recognizing the sovereignty of the Palestinian state and the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle RESOLUTION NO. 11------ Condemning Salman Rushdie and his novel, Satanic Verses RESOLUTION NO. 12------ Calling for the establishment of the Bangsamoro media **18th meeting of the OIC’s Foreign Ministers (March 13-16, 1991) • Draft Resolution No. 18-P  Reaffirmed the “unflinching adherence” of the OIC to Tripoli Agreement  OIC’s support for the full implementation of its purposes OIC urged its member states to extend material, financial and humanitarian assistance to MNLF

CHAPTER 5: INTERNALIZATION FROM WITHOUT  Muslim Independence Movement in 1968 - to internationalize the Moro struggle were directed toward foreign diplomacy. - strengthening of the domestic front. - purely Muslim independence movement in a broader and comprehensive struggle in southern Philippines. - members consisted of Muslims, Christians, and Lumads who shared common vision of free, independent and prosperous Mindanao.  The Moro struggle had become the struggle of a regional population not bound by a common religion, but by a common aspiration, a goal anchored on the conviction that the progress of the region lies in independence.  The Lucman Initiatives • Haraun Al-Rasid Lucman - prominent Maranao leader from Lanao Del Sur - he first to take steps toward the internationalization of the Moro struggle. - Established contacts with Malaysian leaders especially Tun Mustapah of Sabah for the training of Moro youth and leaders in a movement towards Moro liberation. -Established ties with Arab countries.

• The MNLF was organized with a central committee headed by Nur Misuari. • The visits in the Middle East in 1971: Libyan connection • Muslim obligation to assist oppressed Muslim, Lucman utilized the likelihood of Zionist influenced behind the Philippine government’s treatment of the Moro people as an argument to get the unequivocal and passionate support of Libyan president Muammar Ghadafi for the MNLF. • In June 1972, Libya’s formal support for the MNLF was declared by President Ghadafi who pledge substantial military and other assistance to the Moro cause. • As a result, the Bangsa Moro Army was organized and equipped with modern military weapons and hardware. • The Libyan aid was substantial, that the Libyan gave the MNLF “all kinds of support”. - Misuari meant included Libya’s strategic and vital role in the MNLF’s diplomatic efforts, especially in the OIC where all the heads of the state of 46 Muslim countries were members. • The attention to the Moro issue was no small thing. It was historic and elating because the most powerful Muslim body in the world had given formal recognition to the Moro issue and deemed worthy of support by the OIC. • The MNLF in the face of the Marcos government which was exhausting all means thwart the Moro struggle. The resolution called upon the Marcos government to guarantee the rights and security of the Moro people. • The OIC become the formidable force behind the Moro struggle, as shown by the subsequent development.  The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) • Moro struggle becoming an OIC concern, the gradual growth of Misuari’s importance here and abroad was inevitable. • In 1973, 4th conference in Bengazi, Libya. - The OIC resolution No.4, expressed concern over the genocidal campaigns of the Philippine government against the Moro population. - The formation of an OIC delegation to visit the Philippines and to report its findings. • In 1974, 5th conference in Kuala Lumpur - Resolution No.18, reiterated the previous OIC commitment and support, while also noting the Philippine government’s effort to address the problem and to improve on prospects for peace. - Urged the Philippine government to negotiate a political solution with the MNLF. - Created Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency - - a plus factor in the MNLF struggle, since the agency would deal the critical needs of the Moro people not effectively served by the Philippine government.


In 1975, 6th conference in Jeddah Resolution No.10, the MNLF demands were presented and approved for the adaptation.


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The demands were: o Self- government for Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan. o An internal security forced composed of MNLF and other minority groups. o Dismantling of all the government armed forces in the Moro homeland. o A system of Shariah courts. o Control of elementary and secondary education by the local government. o Control of all Muslim institutions by the Moro government. o Moro control of all economic affairs of the region. o Full and free participation of the Moro people in the central government. In 1976, 7th conference in Istanbul Putting real pressure on the Philippine government to grant meaningful autonomy to the Moro people. The conclusion of the historic the basis for the ultimate solution to the Moro problem without sacrificing Philippine sovereignty. From 1977 to 1980 Carry out the ambiguously general provision of the Tripoli agreement resulted in fundamental differences in interpretation. Charges and countercharges between the parties to the agreement led to a frosty conclusion when formal talks between the MNLF and the government ceased together. The Marcos government went ahead with what it considered as the faithful carrying out of the Tripoli accord, including the establishment of two Muslim autonomous regions in Mindanao – Region9 (Western Mindanao) and Region10 (Central Mindanao). The MNLF position was strengthened internationally when it acquired from the OIC an observer’s status in 1977. This allowed the MNLF chairman access to the OIC leadership. In 1981, 12th conference in Baghdad Misuari lambasted the Philippine government for its genocidal campaigns in Pata island and called upon the OIC to take drastic and urgent measures. Giving the MNLF full membership status, the OIC went on reiterating support for the MNLF as the sole official representative of the Moro people and rejecting measures taken by the Philippine government as not in keeping with the Tripoli Agreement. In 1985 The Philippines had turned increasingly against the Marcos government and the MNLF expressed support for the opposition forces seeking Marco’s overthrow. The prospect of getting a better deal for the fulfillment of the Tripoli Accord, having obtained from chief oppositionist, former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. the promised to carry out the agreement in the event that Marcos would be unseated.

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In effect, the position and status of the MNLF in the OIC has remained the most important leverage of the Moro struggle for selfdetermination or, at least, a meaningful autonomy. Psychologically, the OIC has given moral and political strength that military forces could not. Tripoli Agreement as the only basis of any settlement. It has internationalized the MNLF struggle’s international character. It has given Misuari a semblance of sovereignty as MNLF chairman. The Agreement is so unique that the OIC and its member states are bound collectively and individually to uphold the MNLF cause. OIC commitment is a sacred responsibility. The MNLF is bound to the agreement and therefore cannot exceed the limits set by the accord. It cannot ask for more than a truly meaningful autonomy for the Moro homeland because the agreement honors Philippine sovereignty. Provisions has kept the OIC from granting the MNLF full membership status which the movement has been seeking since 1977. To grant the MNLF full membership would be to negate the Tripoli Agreement. By consistently denying the MNLF fell membership, the OIC has given the Philippine the guarantee of sovereignty and thus remain the only hope of the Philippine government resolve the Moro issue without waging a costly decisive war against the MNLF. The Aquino government did not give this point serious attention, insisting instead on treating the issue as an internal problem that can be adequately dealt with by the Philippine constitution. As long as the Philippine government keeps ignoring the agreement, the delays buys time for MNLF campaign for full membership in OIC. The abandonment of the Agreement works in favor of Moro secessionism or separatism, the MNLF’s original goal, which has been effectively checked by the OIC. Other Diplomatic Offensives • The MNLF established an office in Pakistan, and its presence had also been made visible through representatives in Sabah, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Darrasalam. • No doubt that Misuari was establishing or strengthening ties with other revolutionary movement in the world to give the MNLF the international dimension. • He vehemently attacked the Philippine government using Tausug expletives to denounce not only the Filipino colonialism but also the government’s irreconcilable position. • 8th OIC conference in Tripoli on May 20, 1977 where Misuari accused the Philippine government of violating the Tripoli Agreement and continuing its genocidal against the Moro people. • The more effective tools in internationalization process were Misuari’s lecture circuit and talks heads of state. • On January 27-28, 1987 Misuari addressed the plenary session of the 5th Islamic Summit of Muslim heads of states of Kuwait, wherein he

again underscored the failure of the Philippine government to carry out the Tripoli agreement. • Misuari stressed his “quest for peace in Bangsamoro Homeland” and Somalia’s support for the MNLF full membership in the OIC as “the key to peace”. • He projected the confidence of a head of state and impressed his host with his knowledge and skill, especially with the use of titles of MNLF leaders. • “Jihad in the Bangsamoro Homeland, its roots, ordeal, and future” wherein Misuari dramatized the Moro people’s long and sanguinary struggle and the price they had to pay for their liberation. • During the second plenary session of the 8th Islamic conference of foreign minister on February 18, 1989 wherein he revealed the probable secret collusion between the Aquino government and the Zionist Club International to train young Christian Sabahans in the Hacienda Luisita with the blessings of Jaime Cardinal Sin. He suspected the scheme to be part of the government’s anti-Moro design.  The Psychology of state violence and peaceful Bangsamoro Demonstrations • Since 1968, one of the effective means employed by the MNLF propaganda arm to attain the internationalization of the Moro struggle was the graphic and emotional portrayal of massacres, killings, rapes, and as such human rights violation in Muslim areas. • “The unbroken thread of Genocide in the Bangsamoro Homeland”. It attacks the failure of the Aquino government to follow up the prospects of peace presented in the “Jolo Peace Dialogue”. • It enumerates and describes several of the incidents to prove the government’s genocidal campaigns: 1.) Manili Massacre - In 1970, In North Cotabato - Men, women, children, young and old- were shot and killed, including Muslim pupil in a near by school. 2.) Malindong Massacre - September 25, 1976, 9 navel boats landed on Malindong beach - Rounded up the Muslim residents in a barbed-wire and were ordered to dig their own grave and were massacred. 3.) Motong Massacre - in 1976 in Zamboanga del Norte - 15 pregnant women, 14 children, and old people were executed. 4.) Naga Massacre - In Zamboanga del Sur - Hundreds of Muslims were surprised by Ilaga-PC troopers and killed. - Those who escaped to the sea were rescued by a Japanese or South Korean boat. 5.) Bassilan Massacre - Merciless killings in Tubutan, Sangbay, and Dasala islands by government troops.

left to rot in front of his mosque. 7.) Pata Massacre - in 1981 - Children and orphans were thrown to the sea for the sharks, and women were raped for weeks before they were killed and thrown to the sharks. • Photos of Moro children killed and Moro women preparing themselves for jihad carry an emotional message to the Muslim world. CHAPTER 6: MORO SECESSIONISM COMPARED CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Difficulties in the research of secessionism: - gathering of related or significant data - gaps of information because of the lack of primary sources - a lot of information only comes from one side of the conflict (govt/state) - too little info from the protagonist (rebel) - as long as there is a part of the Filipinos who are committed to the cause separate identity, our vision of ideal might be lost forever 4 historical motivations of secessionism 1. political power 2. economy 3. social importance 4. cultural distinction Approaches to Moro struggle 1. integration (join together) 2. secession (separation) 3. separatism Issues concerning today Do the Muslims consider themselves as Filipinos? o Yes: because Sulu is part of the Philippines o No: because of the neglect and treatment as second class citizens (there is doubt if they are part of the nation) o despite all, there is still hope that autonomy (freedom) might work o there remained a desire for peace, for freedom from the horrors of war Whether the involvement of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is welcomed by the Muslims o Nobody regards the OIC involvement as an “interference” o Muslim view is opposite that of the government - What is happening in the Muslim South is outside the process of the Tripoli Accord and therefore unacceptable o This is the Muslims’ core of sentiments Conclusion: Generalizations - Muslim’s perception of Filipinism is vague - Awareness is territorial and geographic in nature

6.) Merciless killing of an imam in Palawan, whose body was hanged and




Whatever thrust was given to nationalist education had been insufficient to reverse the factional tendencies in our national society o implies that we are facing a serious ideological problem in our effort to unify the nation unity based on dominant exercise of power by the central government cannot last in a pluralistic society such as ours o should serve as an eye opener to deal with national minorities as important complements to national unity and growth internationalization of Moro secessionist movement there is still a large number of Muslims and Christians who adhere to autonomy and not independence as the most ideal setup for the Muslim South peace and independence in the Muslim south is inseparable because they are the basic components of human progress

The Imperative of Peace Five aspects of human radicalism 1. state and radicalism a. interest of elite and the masses 2. state and secessionism 3. society and tribalism 4. society and criminalism 5. various elements and factions - State policies implementing mechanisms and programs to thwart the secessionist movement are anchored on religious premises which categorize secessionism as purely Islamic phenomenon Conflicts: - tension and violent clashes between factions in both the radical and secessionist movements The Imperative of Development - development refers to progressive growth of political, economic, social and cultural conditions of society brought about by the action of individual The following realities are found in Mindanao: a. colonialism was marked by freedom and interdependence of various ethnic groups b. political power had been concentrated in an alien group c. American imperialism accelerated the further alienation of the native societies from their identities and traditions except for the Muslims d. The failure of the United States to decentralize political power to the local or sectoral level proved detrimental to the liberal democratic system established in the region Priority Areas of Development approach to Mindanao problem is to give priority to the elimination of the of the psychological problems that have confused the issue of autonomy and self-determination first, eliminate the perception that Muslims and non-Christians are discriminated against in the upper echelons of power and decision making.


There should be non-Christian, most especially Muslim paraticipation in the highest level of national decision making o If this is supplemented in national government agencies, the psychological barrier will eventually be eroded before peace and development can be obtained in Mindanao, psychological gap between national leadership and regional relations has to be bridged o

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