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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U S S R.

ARCHIVES DIVISION

GERMAN
FOREIGN OFFICE
DOCUMENTS
GERM AN

P O L IC Y

IN T U R K E Y
( 1941 - 1943 )

FOKl. IGN

LANGUAGES
Ma s c o t

PUBLISHING
194S

HOUSE

M INISTRY OF FO R EIG N AFFAIRS OF TH E II.S.S.R.


ARCH IVES DIVISION

GERMAN
FOREIGN OFFICE
DOCUMENTS
G E R M A N P O L IC Y
IN T U R K E Y
( 1941- 1943)

F O R E IG N

LANGUAGES
M o s c o to

PU BLISHING
19 4 8

HOUSE

A collection of German Foreign Office docu


ments, note in the possession of the Archives
Division of the M inistry of Foreign A ffairs
of the U .S .S .R ., relating to German policy in
Turkey in the years 1941- 1943 . The translations
have been made from the original German.

R rinied in the U nion of Soviet S o cia list R ep u blics

L IS T O F D O C U M E N T S
t

D ocum en t!
j^ro

N a m e 01 D o cu m en t

D a te

i.

Pag

T elegram from G erm a n A m b assador


in T u rk e y P a p en to R e ich sm in iste r
o f F o reig n A ffa irs R ib b e n tro p

1 4 .V .1 0 4 1

2.

T elegram fro m R ib b en tro p to P a p e n

16 . V . 1941

3.

T elegram from R ib b e n tro p to P a p e n

1 7 .V .1 9 4 1

10

4.

T ele gram from R ib b en tro p to P a p e n

1 9 .V .1 9 4 1

13

5.

T elegram from P a p en to R ib b en tro p

20. V . 1941

16

6.

T elegram fro m R ib b en tro p to P a p e n

2 6 .Y .1 9 4 1

iS

7.

T elegram from R ib b e n tro p to P a p en

9 .V I .1 9 4 1

25

8.

T elegram from R ib b en tro p to P a y e n

1 3 .Y i.1 9 4 1

30

9.

T ele gram from P a p e n


F o reig n O ffice

to

G erm an
1 7 .Y I .1 9 4 1

33

10.

L e tte r from P a p e n to G erm an . F oreig n


O ffice
5.YIII.1941

34

11.

M in u te o f a C o n v ersa tio n B etw een


U n d e r S ecre ta ry o f S ta te a t th e
G erm an F o reig n O ffic e W e izsa c k e r
and T u rk ish A m b assador in B e r lin
G ered e

12.

P o litic a l R e p o rt o f P a p e n t o

13.

L e tte r

14.

M in u te o f a C o n v ersa tio n B etw een

m an F oreig n O ffice
from

H e n tig

to

39

1 0 .X I .1 9 4 1

40

1 7 . X .1941

43

2 4 .x l.1 9 4 1

45

G en eral

B rk ile t
H e n tig and H aru n

5 .Y I I .1 9 4 1
G e r

D ocum en t

JSfe

'

N a m e o f D o cu m en t

47

5 . I . 1 9 4 2

49

2 3 .1 . 1942

61

16. I I . 1942

65

7 .I I I . 1942

69

9 .I I I . 1942

70

1 7 .I I I . 1942

71

I 3 . V . I 942

74

I. V I . 1942

76

12 .V I . 1942

78

5. V I I I . 1942

79

2 6 .V III.I9 4 2

S2

P o litic a l R e p o rt o f P a p en to G erm an
F oreig n Office
27 . V I I I . 1942

87

T elegram from P ap en
F o reig n Office

94

L e tte r fro m

16.

P o litic a l

E r k ie t

to

H e n tig

R e p o rt o f P ap en to G e r

m an F o r e ig n O ffice
M em oran d u m fo r G en e ral W a riim o n t w ith C o v e rin g L e tte r b y
U n d er S ec re ta ry o f S ta te at the
G e im a n F o reig n O ffice W oeim an n
18.

P o litic a l R e p o rt o f P a p e n to G erm an
F o reig n Office

19 .

T ele gram

from

P a p en

to German-

F oreig n Office
20.

T elegram

from

Papen

to G erm an

F o reig n Office
2 1.

P age

2 7 .X I .1 9 4 1

*5-

17.

D a te

M em oran d u m o f C h ie f o f C om m er
c ia l

P o lic y

D ep artm en t o f the

G e rm a n F oreig n Office W ie h l to
R ib ben tro p
22.

L e tte r fro m P a p e n to G e im a n F o r
e ig n

O ffice

23.

M in u te o f a C o n v ersa tio n Betw een

34.

N o te fro m P a p e n to G en e ral Secre

H e n tig and H aru n

ta ry o f the T u rk ish F oreign Office


M en em en cio glu
25.

M em oran du m from D ittm a n n to T ip p e lsk ircii

26.

T elegram

from

P a p en

to G erm an

F oreig n Office
27.
28.

to G erm an
2 8 .V III.I9 4 2
4

D ocum ent!

M
29.

Dat

N a m e o f D o cu m en t

I Pa

L e tte r o f G erm an In tellig en ce S e rv ic e


to F oreig n Office F o rw ard in g a R e
p o r t o f th e

Sw iss M in is te r

in

T u rk e y on H is C o n v ersa tio n w ith


M en em en cio glu
30.

T elegram

from

K r o ll

B ucharest K illin g e r

2 1 .I X . 1942

107

2 5 .X . 1942

109

2. X I I . 1942

11

5 .X I I . 1942

117

9 .X I I . 1942

118

9 .V .19 4 3

120

to G erm an

L e tte r from P a p en to G erm an F o r


eign O ffice

34.

T elegram fro m R ib b en tro p to P a p en

35.

L e tte r from Seiler to G erm an F o re ig n


O ffice (E xcerp t)

36.

102

T elegram from G erm an M in is te r in


F oreig n Office

33.

1 2 .I X . 1942
to G erm an

F oreign Office
32.

95

T elegram from R ib b en tro p to C h ie f


o f H is Personal S ta ff H ew el-W eh rw o lf

31.

10 .I X . 1942

L e tte r from M an n stein to D irk sen

No. 1
PAPEN TO MBBENTROP

TFXEGRAM

Secret
A n k a r a , M a y 1 4 , 1941
R e c e iv e d : M a y
N o . 552

14 , 19 4 1 , 20 h . 22 m .

T r a n s m itt e d

th e

to

s p e c ia l

tr a in ,

Very
urgent

M a y 14 , N o . 1523

T h e Reichsminister of Foreign Aairs


Th e one hours audience w ith the President was marked
by the utmost cordiality. He requested me to tell the
Fhrer that he was deeply impressed w ith the contents of
the letter and that he fu lly reciprocates the confidence and
friendship its lines convey.
F ligh t Captain N ein is bringing a detailed report of
the results o f the conversation.
T h e President is prepared to. conclude a treaty w'hich
w ill ensure the re-establishment of the old friendly rela
tions. He said that if Germany is prepared not to enter
into any engagements directed against Turkey w ith any
power, T u rkey is prepared to pledge herself never to under
take anything against German interests, or to enter into

conflict with Germany. In reference to the contradiction


with the obligations under the A nglo-Turkish treaty, he
said: Where there is the w ill, a formulation can be
found. Talks with Foreign M inister Saraolu are to begin
at once.
Through transport o f war material to Iraq m ay accord
ingly be regarded as assured.

Papen

No. 2
RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM
F u s c h l, M a y 1 6 , 19 4 1 , 18 h . 40 m .
R e c e iv e d : M a y 16 , 19 4 1 , 19 h . 00 m .
V ia F o r e ig n O ffice , B e r lin
A n kara

Secret

No. 38S

For the Ambassador personally


Before we carry out the idea o f a treaty w ith Turkey
which would unloose the country from its present tie w ith
Britain and more or less lead it into our camp, the ques
tion must be examined whether we would not thereby be
running the risk o f an internal political putsch in Turkey,
similar to the one we recently wimessed in Yugoslavia
when that country joined the T rip artite Pact. Are we not
opening ourselves to sudden surprises, such as the remov
al o f the President and the leading M inisters b y a coup
d tat, or the like? I request you to give your opinion at
length on this subject telegraphically, stating your views
on the general internal political situation in T u rkey and
the stab ility o f the present -state leadership, also in case
of the foreign policy reorientation we are striving for.

Ribbentrop
T r a n s m itte d to A n k a r a ,
M a y 1 6 , 20 h . 10 m ., N o . 471

No. 3
RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret
F u s c h lj M a y 1 7 , 1 9 4 1 , 1 h . 55 m .
R e c e iv e d : M a y 1 7 , 19 4 1 , 2 h . 50 m .
N o . 393
Very

urgent

A n k ara

For the Ambassador personally


in your reports o f M ay 13 and 14 on the situation which
you found there on your return, I find confirmation o f the
fact that the moment has now come to reach an under
standing w ith Turkey. And I believe that we should utilize
the situation described in your communication and endeav
our to go even somewhat farther wdth Turkey than we
hitherto contemplated. I therefore request you, in supple
mentation o f the instructions already given you orally here,
so to conduct your preparatory talks that we m ay achieve
the following objectives:
Simultaneously w ith the official treaty with Turkey,
a secret treaty shall be concluded which would permit us
unrestricted transit o f arms and war material through T u r
key. It shall therein be laid down in suitable form that
Turkey shall raise no objection i f the war material during
10

transit is accompanied b y the necessary escort personnel.


P ractically, this would amount to sanctioning the transit
o f a certain number o f troops in disguised form. I f we find
that T u rkey is prepared to consent to transit o f mate
rial and arms accompanied b y escort, she m ay be promised
in return a correction o f the frontier near Adrianople,
to an extent still to be determined, and eventually one
or other island in the Aegean. I t is understood that it is
not small consignments o f m aterial which are in ques
tion, such as those which follow from our commitments
to deliver arms to Iran, etc., but substantial consign
ments the volume o f which must be left to our discretion.
There must be no unclarity on this point. It should also
be remarked that according to the customary practice
o f international law transit solely o f m aterial is quite com
patible w ith the neutrality o f a state, so that the .stipu
lation o f this point in a treaty should present no difficulty.
As to the stipulation regarding escort personnel, it should
be easy to find a formulation for such a stipulation, pro
vided the Turks are prepared to agree to an understanding
to this effect and to carry out this understanding in a man
ner conformable w ith our wishes.
Such a line o f procedure would also enable the Turks
to preserve face vis--vis England. Should there be any
scruples, they m ay be removed b y the following argument:
T h e treaty was concluded b y T u rkey w ith England and
France, and rested on the m utual obligation to assist one
another in the event o f a threat. France is beaten, and
England is generally no longer in a position to support
Turkey in any way. Moreover; one o f the partners to the
treaty, France, is already swinging over to our side. Thereby
the former Turko-Anglo-French treaty, both legally and prac
tically, has lost all foundation. I request you to make
this clear to the Turks in your talks.
11

T h at the Turks want to preserve face is understand


able . W e may therefore without more ado lend the official
treaty a corresponding form. On the other hand, the world
w ill understand that today, when England is not in a
condition to render her any support, Turkey, from motives o f
self-preservation, is compelled to guarantee herself against
an alleged German and actual Russian threat. T u rkey m ay
secure this guarantee against Russia by a friendly arrange
ment with us. I f the sole price for this friendly arrange
ment is the sanctioning o f transit o f war m aterial accompa
nied by escort for the support o f Arab peoples, e .g ., Iraq,
against British attack or breach o f contract, T u rkey w illhave weighty arguments w ith which to counter anyone who
asserts that she has lost face.
I request you, in accordance w ith the instructions given
you here orally, and taking the aforementioned directives
as a basis, to enter at once into negotiations w ith the T u r
kish Government for the conclusion o f a treaty. You are
requested to conduct these negotiations for the present only
orally, and to refrain for the time being from subm itting
a draft treaty or any other written formulation. I shall
give you further instruction on this point when I receive
your report on the results o f your oral negotiations.
W e are interested in having the matter arranged as
speedily as possible. I therefore request you to begin nego
tiations at once and to report. I w ill then i f necessary im
m ediately send you drafts for the treaty.

Ribbentrop
T r a n s m itte d to A n k a r a ,
M a y 1 7 , 4 h . 35 m .. N o . 476

No. 4
RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret
F u s c h l, M a y 19 , 1941
R e c e iv e d : M a y 1 9 , 1 9 4 1 , 2 h . 30 m .
N o . 405
Very
T r a n s m itt e d
M ay

urgent

to A n k a r a ,

19 , 1 9 4 1 , N o . 485

For the Ambassador personally


Re: telegram N o. 569 o f 17th

In view o f the considerations you mention, I agree to


your refraining from the attempt to reach agreement with
T u rkey on the lines indicated in m y telegram No. 476
o f M a y 17. If, as I gather from your telegram, the situation
there does not perm it the attainment o f the desired objective
just now, we must seek to achieve it in several phases, the first
o f which should be an arrangement on the lines discussed with
you here orally. I request you to start negotiations with
the Turkish Government in this direction without delay,
observing however the following points:
1.
It is important that the treaty wTe are seeking shal
now be concluded as speedily as possible. As soon as your
report on the results o f the prelim inary negotiations is re
ceived, a draft o f the treaty w ill be sent you from here
13

for submission to the Turkish Government. Please wire


your suggestions on the subject.
2. T h e decisive thing in the contemplated pact is to
secure the possibility o f transporting war material through
T u rkey, which is to be stipulated in a supplementary se
cret agreement. I f we are to help Iraq we must do so quick
ly. M aterial is already being assembled at Constantsa. On
ly in this point are the Turks not the takers but the g iv
ers, and herein lies the compensation T u rkey makes in
return for our far-reaching promises and guarantee o f her secu
rity and her interests in the Straits. I t is therefore essen
tia l that there should be complete clarity between the part
ners regarding this compensation.
I t w ill not satisfy us i f it is only agreed that T u rkey
w ill permit the transit o f war m aterial addressed to a neu
tral state, and then believe that she is only obligated to
forward a few cars now and then to Iran or Afghanistan.
It m ay rather be, depending on further developments in
the Near E ast, that we m ay find it desirable to direct big
consignments o f war m aterial to Syria or Iraq through
T urkey. Such a possibility must be provided for in the
agreement in any event.
3. Should it be necessary in discussing this question
to promise to address the consignments to neutral states,
I request you to bear in mind that this w ill be done only
for purposes o f camouflage. I t m ust be understood that
no further significance is to be attached to this.
4. As tangible compensation, you m ay promise T u r
key a stretch o f territory near Adrianopie. W e have in mind,
as you know, not all the territory near Adrianopie that
Turkey ceded in 1915 to Bulgaria, which K in g Boris would
not want to surrender entirely, but chiefly the eastern half,
and T u rkey would in any case get the railw ay line from
P ythicn to Adrianopie.

5.
As to the offer o f one or other island in the Aegean
I would leave it for you to decide whether- it is necessary
to raise this question during the discussion o f the treaty.
I f it is, please wire us before giving any promise.
I request you to keep me informed o f the progress of
your negotiations as prom ptly as possible by telegraph.

R ib ben trop

No. 5
PAPEN T O R 1BBENTROP

TELEGRAM

Secret
A n k a r a , M a y 20, 1941
R e c e iv e d : M a y 20, 1 9 4 1 , 20 h . 55 m .*
N o , 582
T r a n s m itte d to F u s c h l,
M a y 20, 20 h . 15 m .,* N o . 1593

Reichsminister o f Foreign Affairs


Re: telegram N o. 485 o f 19th
On receipt o f your new instructions I requested Sara
olu to begin our talks forthwith. He told me that only
on Saturday had he had the opportunity to orientate the
British Ambassador as to the intentions o f the Turkish
Government in accordance w ith m y telegram o f M ay 16,
No. 563. I would have to be patient for two or three
days until this matter was settled. For the rest, I am pre
paring everything so that the matter m ay-b e concluded
speedily, and after m y next talk w ith Saraolu w ill sub
m it you m y suggestions for the draft treaty.
* S o in the origin al.

16

I do not intend to offer the Turks one or other island just


now, which would scarcely be acceptable to them so long
as operations are in progress. Rather I would only tell them,
in accordance w ith our oral talks, that these questions can
be arranged in the interests o f T u rkey at the time o f the
peace settlement.

Papen

2 1303

No. 6
RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret
F u s c h l, M a y 26 , 19 4 1 , 1 h . 41 m .
R e c e iv e d : M a y 2 6 , 1 9 4 1 , 2 h . 45 m .
R e ic h sm in iste r o f F o r e ig n A ffa ir s 2 1 3 / R 41
F u s c h l, M a y 2 5 , 194 1
T r a n s m itte d to A n k a r a , M a y 26, N o . 527

For the Ambassador personally


Re: telegram o f M a y 23, 1941, No. 598
I perused w ith interest your report o f the first conver
sation w ith Saraolu regarding the contemplated treaty.
W ith reference to point 2 o f your telegram, I would
observe that the promise to satisfy T u rk e y s wishes (Interessenwahrung trkischer Wiinsche) in southern and
eastern neighbouring zones requires very cautious han
dling. I request you to confine yourself in this point to expres
sions that are not very concrete. W hat was said in this
respect in the rough draft o f the treaty prepared here, w ith
which you are fam iliar, was: Germany w ill p o litically
and diplom atically support the aspirations of T u rkey to guar
antee her possessions and to secure a revision o f the T rea ty
o f Lausanne comformable to her vita l needs. W e must
18

P h o to s ta tic c o p y o f first p a g e o f D o c u m e n t N o . 6

avoid any specific geographical definition of the direction


such aspirations o f T u rkey m ay take; in particular, our
present relations w ith France and our collaboration w ith
that country in S yria do not permit us to encourage Turkey
in any aspirations in this direction. Also in respect to hold
ing out the prospect o f one or other island in the Aegean,
as w ell as in respect to the status o f the Straits, extreme
caution in the selection o f the formulations is recommended
pending further concretization o f the draft treaty.
I await an early further report on the progress o f the
negotiations.

Ribbentrop

P h o to s ta tic c o p y o f la s t p age o f D o c u m e n t N o . 6

No. 7
RIBBENTRQP TO' PAFEN

TELEGRAM

Secret
r u s c h . , Ju n e 9 , 1 9 4 1 . 15 h . 30 m .
R e c e iv e d : Ju n e 9 , 19 4 1 , 16 h . 13 ra.
N o . 526
Very

urgen t

T r a n s m itt e d to A n k a r a ,
Ju n e 9 , 1 9 4 1 , N o . 631

For the Ambassador personally


Re: telegrams N o. 679 o f June 6 ana No. 686 of
June 7, 1941

I.
Herr Numan has advanced the objection to our fo
m ulation o f the treaty that, according to it, Germany m ight
regard a request from T u rkey to England for help in the
event o f attack b y a third p arty, or any other tie between
T u rkey and England, as an action indirectly aimed at Ger
m any, and that the Turkish Government wants to preclude
the possibility o f such an interpretation o f the Turko-German treaty. He therein gave expression to the underlying
Turkish standpoint in the negotiations with us. T u rkey
w ould indeed like to conclude a treaty w ith Germany in
order to guarantee herself against German attack, but would
25

at the same time like to remain allied to England and ap


parently to preserve the possibility o f co-operating with
her p olitically and m ilitarily in case o f necessity, at least
indirectly. T h e Turkish Government must clearly under
stand that i f T u rkey co-operates even indirectly w ith Eng
land, w ith which Germany is waging a life and death strug
gle, she w ill autom atically place herself in opposition to
Germ any. She would thereby again abandon the neutrali
ty, the re-establishment o f which is to be the minimum
consequence o f the treaty w ith Germany. W e o f course un
derstand that T u rkey desires to formulate the treaty w ith
Germ any in a w ay that would not im ply an open breach
o f her treaty w ith England, and we have form ulated
our proposals accordingly. But i f T u rkey demands our
direct recognition o f her treaty w ith England, and i f she
wants exp licitly to reserve for herself the possibility o f
co-operating w ith England, that we naturally cannot
accept.
II. T h e possibility to w hich Herr Numan refers o f an
attack on T u rkey by a third power is purely theoretical. In
general, only Russia and Ita ly can be in question here. But,
as things are, especially in view o f the German attitude
toward T urkey, the fear o f an attack on T u rkey b y either
o f these powers has no political reality.
III. I t is therefore to be presumed that in objecting
to our treaty draft, Herr Numan had in mind possible ac
tions against Syria. I t is probable that precisely in view
o f such an eventuality did he consider our proposed ex
p licit reference to indirect actions inconvenient. However,
the reply o f the Turkish Foreign M inister to the inquiry
you made in accordance w ith m y telegram No. 625 o f June
8 sounds satisfactory, so that we m ay proceed from the
assumption that the Turkish Government w ill continue
to be very reserved on the Syrian question. In this connec
26

tion, I would also observe in reference to the concluding par


agraph o f your telegram N o. 686 o f June 7 that consider
ation for France makes it sim ply impossible to give T u r
key any w ritten or even verbal promises w ith regard to
Syria.
IV .
I request you to give due consideration to the abov
and to adopt the following position relative to the formu
lation o f the details of the treaty:
1)
Preamble. T h e present formulation o f the preamb
proposed b y the Turks does not seem happy to us. T h e
expression peace-loving character is even stylistically
(sprachlich) impossible and should be replaced b y the ex-'
pression friendly character. T h e words in the spirit o f
their exchange o f letters were indeed contained also in
the text we had proposed, but later gave rise to doubt,
inasmuch as the exchange o f letters between the two heads
o f State is not complete, since, as we know, the Turkish
President has not yet replied to the Fhrers last letter.
Moreover, it is hardly feasible expressly to refer in a treaty
which is to be made public to an exchange o f letters which
is not made public simultaneously. T h eir publication has
so far not been contemplated, and furthermore does not
seem to us to be opportune. L astly, the concluding part
o f the formulation o f the preamble proposed b y the Turks,
which speaks o f the present commitments o f the two coun
tries, must also be omitted, because it would signify an ex
p licit recognition o f the A nglo-Turkish treaty. I must also
observe for your personal information that, b y accepting
such a passage in the preamble, we should be blocking the
w ay to the further development o f Turko-German relations.
T u rkey would always be able to counter any subsequent
wishes o f Germ any w ith the convenient excuse that we had
in the preamble to the treaty expressly renounced the
presentation o f such wishes.
27

Under the circumstances, it seems to us best to formu


late the preamble very briefly as follows:
T h e German Reichskanzler and the President o f the
Turkish Republic, animated b y the desire to create a firm
foundation for the friendly development o f their mutuaL
relations, have agreed to conclude a treaty and have,
etc. . .
2) In article 1 we must, just because o f the arguments
adduced b y Herr Numan, insist on the retention o f the
words direct or indirect. Our arguments for this follow
from point 1 above, and it is particularly necessary to point
out that Turkish neutrality, which w ill have just been re
established b y the treaty, would be prejudiced b y any co
operation w ith England indirectly aimed against us.
3) T h e addition which the Turkish side desires to make
to article 2 would weaken the significance o f this article
extremely, and would again restrict it, as was originally
proposed b y the Turks, to questions o f interpretation o f
the treaty. T h is wish seems to us all the less understandable
as the text o f article 2 proposed b y us mentions only the
minimum o f what is usually included as something self
understood in similar agreements between two countries.
I f the Turks want to om it this, or weaken it in the afore
said manner, they are certainly very far indeed from
the concept which guides us in the conclusion o f this
treat)''.

V.
I f T u rkey should still not agree to the formulatio
o f the treaty we propose, or should again make proposals
which weaken it, we would have to consider whether such
a treaty would meet the desired ends at all. T h e position
expressed in the Turkish attitude is so reserved that the
treaty as formulated b y the Turks, when commented on
in the Turkish press, m ay in the end be reduced to something
quite meaningless. Y et, in view o f the actual political situa
28

tion, T u rkey has a far greater political interest than we


in the conclusion o f the treaty. T h e Turkish Government
would therefore do well to make up its mind as soon as
possible whether it wants to accept our offer o f a treaty
or not.
I request a prompt telegraphic report on the progress
o f your negotiations w ith the Turkish Government.

Ribbentrop

No. 8
RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret
F u s c M , Ju n e 1 3 , 19 4 1 , 14 h . 20 m .
R e c e iv e d : June 1 3 , 1 9 4 1 , 1 4 h . 30 m .
N o . 548
T r a n s m itte d to A n k a r a ,
Ju n e 1 3 , 1 9 4 1 , N o . 650

Re: telegram 715 o f June 12


Y ou inform us in your telegram that our desire to have
no reference made in the treaty to T u rk e y s former commit
ments has created the impression there that we want b y
this treaty directly to force T u rkey out o f the B ritish camp
into the German. T h is impression is false. As you have al
ready been informed, w e' intend nothing else than to bring
T u rkey back to neutrality, which the Turkish Government
itself at the beginning o f the negotiations wanted express
ly to proclaim o f its - own accord, but has since desisted
from doing. Before we can in general consider the new sit
uation which has arisen from the present Turkish attitude,
1 should be interested to know whether perhaps another
formula could be found for the reservation regarding T u r
ke y s present commitments. One m ight, for instance, con
sider the following formulation: Anim ated b y the desire
30

to place the relations between the two countries on a foun


dation o f m utual confidence and sincere friendship, the two
countries, w ith reservation respecting their present commit
ments, have agreed to conclude a treaty. . . . Such a for
m ula would essentially im ply the same as the Turkish
formula. I t would not however smack o f the unpleasant
suggestion that T u rkey must guard herself against Ger
m an ys making demands upon her which are not compatible
w ith existing Turkish treaty obligations.
I request you to ask the Turkish Foreign M inister about
this, and at the same time to tell him that you have not
yet received from us any reaction to your report on your
last ta lk w ith Saracoglu except this brief inquiry. Y ou have,
in other words, no intimation yet from Berlin whether, in
view o f the present attitude o f T u rkey, which is so different
from her attitude at the beginning o f the negotiations, the
conclusion o f a treaty is possible at all. Since I am leaving
tomorrow for Ita ly and w ill only return next week, I re
quest you to send me the T urkish Governm ents reply to this
question today, because I should like to settle the m atter
finally before m y departure.

Ribbentrop

No. 9
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret
A n k a r a , June 1 7 , 1941
R e c e iv e d :

June 1 7 , 19 4 1 , 13 h . 22 m .

N o , 741
V er y

u rgent

Reichsminister o f Foreign Affairs


Re : N o. 671 o f June 16
In accordance with your instructions, I have just to
gether w ith Saraolu compared the treaty texts and found
that they fu lly conform. O nly in article 3 should the fol
lowing sentence be added:
T h e present treaty is subject to ratification and the
instruments o f ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin
as early as possible.
2. Complete agreement as to an exchange o f notes re
garding economic relations.
3. In the statement to the press your wish w ill be taken
into account. T h e text therefore conforms w ith your tele
gram.
4. Saraolu is prepared to sign on the evening o f Wednes
day, June 18. He w ill let me know the exact hour tomorrow
32

morning after reporting to the President. The publication


w ill, in accordance w ith your wish, be made in the morning
press on June 19. Hence the German and Turkish radios
w ill report nothing in the night broadcasts o f June 18/19,
so that the news w ill first appear in the press of both coun
tries on June 19. Saraolu w ill o f course take care that the
Turkish press and radio also greet the treaty o f friend
ship w ith proper warmth.
5. For m y authorization a telegram to me w ill be enough.
6. Please send authority to sign the railw ay agreement
if possible simultaneously.

Papen

3 1803

No. 10
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

S e c r e
G e rm a n

E m b a ssy

N o . A 3018/41
T h era p ia ,* A u g u s t 5 , 19 4 1
F o r e ig n O ffice,
B e r l in

Re: T h e Pan-Turan Movement


A well-informed confidential agent communicates the
following:
In view o f the German successes in Russia, Turkish
government circles are giving increasing consideration to
the fate o f their co-racials on the other side o f the TurkishRussian border, especially the Azerbaijan Turks.
There seems to be a disposition in these circles to re
vert back to the events o f 1918 and to want to annex this
area, especially the valuable Baku oil region. T o this end,
something in the nature o f a committee o f experts has been
formed, composed partly o f persons who rendered sim ilar
services at the time o f A bdul Hamid, the duty o f which
is to collect all relevant m aterial and to win adherence,
* A sum m er resort n ea r
h a d a v illa .

Ista n b u l w here

34

the

G erm an

E m b a ssy

both at home, among the migrs from across the border,


and abroad, especially in the A2erbaijan part o f Iran, for
a union o f the new T u rkey w ith the Turk-inhabited regions
bordering on it in the east, as far as the Caspian.
T h e leader o f this group is the D eputy from Istanbul,
Shukru Y en i baha (who him self claims to be o f T a ta r ori
gin, although his fam ily has been settled in T u rkey for
several generations).
Others are:
N u ri Pasha (brother o f Enver Pasha; he once occupied
a leading post in the so-called Islam Or lu,* and is reputed
on that account to have particular sym pathy for his broth
e rs Pan-Turanian plans).
Professor Zekhi V elid i (Bashkir), who was formerly pro
fessor at the Istanbul U niversity, but had to leave it owing
to a quarrel w ith A taturk, and temporarily resided in
Vienna, H alle and Bonn.
Ahmed Cafer (also known as Ahm et S ait Cafer), a C ri
mean T u rk. H e is believed to be very unreliable, also acts
as a spy for the Government, and is supposed to be still
close to General Sikorskis Prometheus organization in
London. Under the name o f Ahmed Caferoglu, he is w ell
known as a Turkologist.
T h e Turkish Ambassador at K abu l, Memduh Sefket,
who was in Ankara for talks recently, m ay also be taken
as belonging to this group. In his official capacity he can
scarcely take a different line from the Government; although
he must not be identified w ith the above-mentioned per
sons, he is considered to be a sincere friend o f the Eastern
Turks.
. '
T h e present plan o f Turkish government circles in Ankara
in respect to these Eastern Turks w ith the exception of
* A r m y o f Isla m a P a n -T u r k ic o rga n izatio n in T u rk ey.

3*

35

Azerbaijan in other words, the Volga Turks, the Tatars,


the Turkomans, e tc, is to weld them together into their
own, outwardly independent, East Turkish state, in which,
however, the Western Turks would p la y a dominant po
litical and cultural role as advisers.
But these plans b y no means conform to the wishes o f
the Eastern Turks themselves. In their opinion, the Turks
inhabiting T u rkey have been definitely lost to the true
T u rkic folk, and moreover, not from any recent date, but
since many years. T h ey are regarded in Baku as nothing
but Turkish-speaking Levantines, w ith whom it is desired
to have as little to do as possible. T h is development dates
back many hundreds o f years. For the past few centuries
of Osman history, the higher officials o f the court and the
Empire consisted only to a very small extent o f Turks.
T h ey were consecutively o f Hungarian origin, Albanians,
and, lastly, under A bdul Hamid, Circassians and Arabs,
but never Turks. (This historical concept and political
attitude was often expressed in political conversations w ith
interested circles in T ab riz. There, particularly, these
views are now on the order o f the day, since the inhabitants
o f Tabriz are likewise Azerbaijan Turks, and consider them
selves to be blood relations o f those in Baku. I t is partic
ularly noteworthy that one o f the leading figures o f this
movement in T a b riz is the Iranian Governor-General him
self.)
T h e leader o f this movement is considered, as hereto
fore, to be Mehmet Emin Rasul-Zade (founder o f the Mussavat, or E qu ality, Party). H e joined the Polish Prome
theus movement, which was nothing more than a sub-depart
ment o f the Polish General Staff. R . lived on the General
Staff funds transferred to Switzerland (the so-called P ilsudski Fund) even after the fa ll o f Poland in 1939, visited
Sikorski in London on a political mission in 1940, and then
36

lived w ith other Polish refugees in Bucharest. He is a poli


tician o f parts, i f one ignores the financial side. (Since other
Turkish members o f the Prometheus organization have re
cently expressed themselves in T u rkey in an unfriendly
spirit toward Germ any, an attitude o f reserve toward R .,
too, is recommended.)
R . is represented in T u rkey b y his adjutant, Mirsa
Bala (who has now been called up by the Turks to the army
and is serving as a private soldier in the vicin ity o f Istan
bul. N othing more is to be said o f him except that he is
a faith fu l disciple of his greater teacher).
It is worth working w ith both these people, in the opin
ion o f the confidential agent. (In the opinion of another
E ast-Turkic confidential agent, it would be better to have
nothing to do w ith this whole old guard, who because of
their past and their financial connections cannot be trusted
to p lay any reliable role in a new Azerbaijan state.)
T h is new Azerbaijan state does not want to be burdened
w ith the other Eastern Turks and is rather of the opinion
that they, the V olga T u rks, the T atars, the Turkomans,
etc., because o f the w ay they are distributed that is, in
no w ay forming a compact comm unity and above all be
cause o f their economic backwardness, can have no claim
yet to state independence, but must still go through a long
period o f evolution. T h e Azerbaijan revolutionary move
ment does not regard it as its duty to train them for state
hood. Nevertheless, the confidential agent recommends that
this task should not be left to the Russians, but to see to
it that German organization and experience be the decisive
factor in their further development.
Germ any should attach great importance to the forma
tion o f as strong a state as possible in the southeast, in or
der b y this roundabout w ay to be in a position to keep the
Russians constantly in check. T h e Ukraine is not quite
37

adequate to this task. T h e Ukrainians are Slavs and, like


the Bulgarians and Serbs, m ight at any moment recall
their common past w ith Russia. In the case o f the Turks
this is entirely precluded!
W hen I mentioned that the Iran Government was also
extremely interested in the Azerbaijan Turks, m y confi
dential agent replied this was quite understandable. There
were as many Turks living in Iran today as Persians. T h e
Shah him self came from a Turkish fam ily. He could there
fore easily, b y a mere stroke o f the pen, build up his IranArab state into a state o f mixed nationalities, if the advantage
o f such a transformation were made clear to him and he saw
that he could in this w ay m aintain his political independ
ence. T h is also explained the role which the GovernorGeneral o f T ab riz is playing in the movement.

Papen

P. S. Addition to p. i:
One o f the Governm ents agents on the East-Turkish
question in Ankara is General H seyin Hsn Emir E t
kilet, who is o f T a ta r origin.

No. 11
W EIZSAC&ER T O RIB B EN TR O P

S e c r e t

B e r lin , A u g u s t 5 ,

1941

N o . 494
Copy

T h e Turkish Ambassador today presented his new Em


bassy Counsellor to me. H e soon directed the conversa
tion to the border peoples o f Turkish blood in Soviet Russia.
He drew attention to the possibility o f conducting antiSoviet propaganda through these Turkish tribes. H e then
said quite bluntly that the Caucasian peoples could later
be united into a buffer state, and hinted that an independ
ent Turan state m ight also be formed east o f the Caspian.
Gerede mentioned this in conversational tone. His re
marks were however by no means casual, as they complete
ly coincide w ith what A li Fuad had said to Herr von
Papen (see A nkara report o f the 14th u lt., No. 2335). Ge
rede laid his finger on the crux o f the m atter when he re
marked that Baku was a com pletely Turkish-speaking city.
F o r th e a tte n tio n o f th e R eich sm iriiste r
o f F o r e ig n A ffa ir s .

Weissdcker
Copy b y c o u rie r to the G erm a n E m b a ss y in T h e r a p ia

39

No. 12
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE *

G e rm a n

E m b a ssy

N o . 645/41

Secret
A n k a r a , N o v em b er i 0 , j 4 1

F o r e ig n O ffice,
B e r lin
P O L IT IC A L R E P O R T !

Re: General A li Fuad Erdens visit


As I have already wired, the two Turkish Generals re
turned greatly satisfied w ith their trip to the Eastern Front
and their visit to the Fhrers headquarters.
General A li Fuad yesterday paid me a two-hours
visit in order to give me a detailed account o f his impres
sions.
T h e courteous reception given him b y all m ilitary au
thorities, he said, was beyond all praise, and everywhere
he was strongly reminded o f the comradeship-in-arms of
the world war. T h is idea was also very cordially expressed
b y Colonel-General Fromm at a banquet given in his (A li
F u a d s) honour.
* T h e first p a ge o f the docum en t bears th e
to th e F h r e r , and th e le tte r

in

stam p,

green p e n cil,

H itle r s han d . The o rig in a l is in itia lle d b y W eizsck er.

40

S u b m itte d
e v id e n tly

in

Th e General seemed to be particularly grateful for the


instructive talks given him at the unit headquarters he
visited b y officers of the General S taff on the big opera
tions in the B attle o f K ie v , the forcing o f the Dnieper, etc.
H e added the wish to receive, if possible, a map o f these
operations, indicating the Russian dislocation (without, o f
course, detailed data as to the German forces), so that he
m ight use these exemplary historical operations for instruc
tional purposes in the Turkish M ilita ry Academy.
T h e German commanders made a splendid impression
on him. He had words o f the highest praise for the training
o f the General Staff, even o f its junior members. T h e
unparalleled successes o f the German armies against al
most invariable superiority o f numbers and m atriel
could have been achieved only thanks to the excellent
training o f this corps o f commanders. He was inspired
w ith particular admiration b y the functioning o f the rear
services.
I t was naturally a great experience for the gentlemen
to be personally received b y the Fhrer and to have from
him a detailed account o f the operational position. General
A li Fuad concluded from what the Fhrer had said that
he intended to reach the Caspian and the Caucasus as speed
ily as possible. He inferred this particularly from the fact
that the F irst Arm y was being used, w ith heavy forces and
in spite o f not inconsiderable losses, to conduct the extreme
ly difficult operation against the Crimea, in order to push
on from there to the N orth Caucasus. For otherwise, he
believed, it would probably have been easier sim ply to cut
off the Crimea, and to continue w ith the F irst A rm y the
advance on Rostov.
N o t w ithout interest were his observations on his visit
to a Russian war prisoners camp, where many TurkoRussian prisoners appealed to him to use his influence
41

to secure for them better treatment and rations than the


Russians.
I would like in this connection to revert once more to
m y proposal that when the Crimean operation is concluded
an administration should be established there in which
the Turkic-Crim ean Tatars would have a considerable share.
This would make a very strong political impression in Turkey.
T h e day after his return, General A li Fuad made a
report to the President, at which the Foreign M inister and
M arshal Cakm ak were present. T h e talk lasted six hours,
and this should show how great was the political importance
o f the visit.
A li F u a d s general conclusions fu lly coincide w ith the
opinion expressed to him b y the Fhrer, nam ely, that,
w ith the exception o f the three points o f resistance, the Rus
sian campaign m ay essentially be regarded as over, and that
the reduction o f these points only depended on the weather.
He believes, however, that we shall have to leave consid
erable forces in Russia. As regards the occupation o f Euro
pean Russia and its reverberation on the British blockade,
h e is o f the opinion that the blockade has been rendered
ineffective thereby.
T h e General requested me to convey his heartfelt thanks
to the Fhrer, the Reichsminister o f Foreign Affairs, as
w ell as to Field-M arsh als von Brauchitsch and K eitel.

Papen

No. 13
H E N TiG T O E R K IL E T

M in is te r v o n H e n tig

B erlin , November i j ,

i 94z

Dear and H igh ly Esteemed General,


I thank you for your lines o f November 10, which reached
me safely. As for me, the m atter which we had jointly
worked on was, even before the arrival o f your letter, ur
gently dealt w ith in the spirit suggested b y me and in which
you concur. I am m yself awaiting information as to the
last detailed decisions. .
I was strongly dissuaded b y various parties, including
semi-official Turkish, from going to T u rkey just now to re
sume or continue the talks we had arranged. I m yself am
not altogether in a position to form a judgment, since, in
the fu ll knowledge and conviction that m y intentions
would exclusively promote the cause o f Turko-German co
operation, I would have gone without the slightest hesita
tion. B ut i f this m ight give even the slightest cause for
unbiased parties to reckon me among the fifth colum n,
I would natu rally prefer to refrain. M eanwhile, the gentle
men you mentioned have long ago received entry visas
into Germ any. However, from the date o f the exchange o f
telegrams, which on account o f m y long illness were only
43

laid before me today, I gather that they were too late to


achieve their purpose, nam ely, o f meeting you here.
I have followed the friendly interviews you have given
w ith the greatest interest. W e are now awaiting the press,
which always arrives rather late, in order to read the ar
ticles promised to us and the world.
W ith best greetings to you and also to His Excellency
A li Fuad Pasha,
I am,
Alw ays yours

faithfully,

von Hentig

H is E x c e lle n c y , G e n e ra l H sn E m ir E r k ile t,
Ista n b u l

No. 14
HENTIG TO ERDMANNSDORFF AND
W OERMANN*

P o l. D e p t. V I I

1234

seer.

I was visited by D r. Harun who is w ell known in Berlin,


having been for seventeen years lecturer at the Technical
College here, and who is now again living in Istanbul. E vi
dently commissioned b y the Embassy here and b y other
leading Turkish circles, he came in order to leam our atti
tude toward Turanism . D r. Harun conveyed to me messages
from Ambassador Gerede and the Turkish C h ief o f Staff,
E evzi Cakm ak. Both declare that they are greatly interested
in this question, without being able to act officially in its
behalf. T h e C h ief o f S taff is reported to have said that the
Turanian question m ight be a basis on which to build re
lations between T u rkey and-Germ any. He furthermore gave
the assurance that T u rkey would never take the field against
Germ any. O nly in case o f invasion would she have to defend
* T h e d o c u n e n t bears W o erm a n n s in itia l.

45

herself. He was also following our treatment o f the T u rkic


peoples w ith the greatest sym pathy. He was ready to place
people at our disposal to propagandize the war prisoners.
F o r th e a tte n tio n , th ro u gh L e g a tio n C o u n se llo r M e lc h e r s ,
o f M in is te r von E rd m a n n sd o rff and U n d er S e c re ta ry o f
S ta te W oerm an n

Hentig
B e r lin , N o v e m b e r 24, 1941

No. 15
ERKILET T O HENTIG *

G e n e r a l H . E . E r k ile t
Ista n b u l, November 2 7 , 1 9 4 1

Dear and H ighly Esteemed M inister,


I thank you very much for your friendly lines o f N o
vember 17 sent me through Herr V e li Menger, and for your
h igh ly valued efforts in behalf o f our common cause.
I am very sorry to hear that your visit to Istanbul, which
we so much desire, has been postponed. B u t the reasons
given in your letter are to me neither clear nor well-founded.
Y ou are no fifth column to us, but only a friend, and w hat
is more, a highly valued friend. Moreover, I cannot under
stand who these semi-official Turkish parties m ay be who
strongly dissuaded you from coming to T u rkey just now.
I am convinced they are wrong and are wrongly dissuading
you. I am also convinced that the only proper person to
give correct advice on this m atter is His Excellency Ambas
sador von Papen. I informed him , through General Rohde,
o f your intended visit to Turkey. He is in Ankara and w ill
not be in Instanbul before December 5. W hen he comes I
shall naturally speak w ith him and w rite you again.
*

T he le tte r is w ritten in G erm an in E r k ile ts h an d .

47

I was sorry tc hear you were ill. I hope you are now quite
w ell again.
Tw o o f the gentlemen who recently received visas,
M iistecib F agil and Edige K em al,* w ill come to see you.
T h ey have been commissioned to help the Germans in the
Crim ea and at the same time to be helpful to the Crimea
Turks. I have written to Prof. Idris about it and requested
him to translate to you everything I have written him.
M stecib is a lawyer and writer and was lately public pros
ecutor. Edige is also a well-educated young man. T h ey
are both from the Crimea and are very reliable. I request
that the two o f them be sent to the Crim ea and be used
there in behalf o f common Turko-German interests. T h ey
dont know German but they speak Russian and w ill
soon learn German.
W ith best greetings,
I am always,
Yours faith fu lly,

H. E, Erkilet

* In the o rigin al: K r im a i.

No. 16
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE *

G e rm a n
N o. A

E m b a ss y
6/42 seer.

Secret
A n k a ra , Ja n u a ry 5 ,

1942

F o r e ig n O ffice ,
B e r lin
P O L IT IC A L

REPORT!

Re: T u rk e y s A ttitude at the Beginning o f the New Y ear


Three copies
T h e extension o f the war theatre owing to the outbreak
o f the American-Japanese conflict and the declaration o f
war on the U nited .States b y the A xis Powers at first
caused a deep feeling o f disappointment here.
As I have repeatedly reported, the Turkish Government
cherished the hope o f a compromise between the British
Empire and the A x is Powers, which it thought could
be found so long as Am erica did not definitely join the
other side. I t is now thought that all doors to this have been
closed.
* T h e first p a g e o f th e docum en t bears the stam p, S u b m itte d to
the F h re r, and the le tte r F in green p e n cil, e v id e n tly in H it
l e r s h a n d . T h e origin al is in itia lle d b y W eizscker and W oerm an n.
4 -1 3 0 3

49

T h e immediate consequence of this development was


renewed emphasis on T u rk e y s unalterable w ill to keep out
o f the war and not to be enlisted b y any side for interests
which do not affect Turkey.
T h a t is the formal position today. However, on closer
examination o f the potentialities which lay their imprint
on the world conflict, the Turkish attitude begins to re
veal nuances.
It is clear that as far as T u rk e y s foreign interests
are concerned the entente between the Anglo-American
bloc and Soviet Russia determines the contours of Turkish
foreign political thought.
Tu rkey knows too w ell from her long history that her
national existence is intim ately linked w ith the outcome
of the Germ an-Russian wrar. T h e fact that Britain has ap
parently decided to reorder Europe w ith the help o f Boishewik Russia was a severe shock. It positively cannot
be imagined that a civilized power like the British Em
pire, which should more than any continental power be
concerned to m aintain principles o f thousands o f years
standing, can mean this seriously. T h e declaration is re
garded as a propagandist measure, in order to support
Soviet R ussias fight w ith every means.
In the Turkish opinion,, o f the partners o f the AngloAmerican bloc, Am erica is invincible. Consequently, the
Axis Powers could secure a decision in their favour only
b y smashing the British world empire. T h a t the total smash
ing o f the Empire is not in the interest o f Turkey, I have
often pointed out. For Turkish interests require a balance
o f power in the Mediterranean, and not unlim ited Italian
domination, which m ight be the consequence of a total
victory for the A xis.
T h e other eventuality is a total victory for the AngloAmerican bloc w ith the help o f Soviet Russia. T h is, in
SO

the Turkish opinion, would mean the complete dissolu


tion o f Europe, since neither Britain nor the U .S .A . would
be in a position to check the Russians territorially, or to
prevent the bolshevization o f a starving, war-exhausted
and impoverished Europe.
Consequently, Turkish foreign policy is still concerned
to find the possibility o f a compromise, in the event o f
which she would undoubtedly be prepared at the proper
moment to throw her m ilitary weight into the scales.
Such being the case, it would be interesting to examine
the Turkish view on the world situation and its develop
ment more closely.
Th e talks in Washington and Moscow have made it
fairly clear that the Anglo-American bloc w ill seek to de
cide the world conflict not in the Pacific but in Europe. It
is even believed here that the U .S .A . and Britain have
already to a large extent w ritten off their positions in the
Pacific the British Empire, it goes without saying, on the
assumption that in the event o f the loss o f the Pacific posi
tions India could be retained in any case, and that the Em
pire would find rich compensation in A frica for its position
in the Far East. As to the U .S .A ., it is known that it has
always regarded its far-advanced positions as difficultly
dfendable in case o f a conflict. I f it were possible at the
end o f the conflict to secure profitable economic agreements
w ith Japan and China, then it would be sufficient for A m er
ica s security needs to retain her position in H aw aii, at
the same time, however, taking over the legacy o f the B rit
ish Empire in all the W est Indian bases and establishing
out-and-out imperialism in Central and South America.
If, therefore, the Anglo-Am erican bloc seeks the deci
sion in Europe, it can only find it on the Russian battle
fields. Therein, however, lies a direct threat to the future
o f T u rkey, and, therefore, developments in this theatre
4*

52

of operations w ill necessarily determine T u rk e y s future


line o f foreign policy.
T w o eventualities m ay induce Turkish policy to re
nounce the principle o f neutrality w ith regard to one side
or the other:
1. I f the A xis Powers should succeed in securing a deci
sion in Russia in the spring, and, in particular, penetrate
into the Caucasus and thence threaten the British oil supply
in the Persian G u lf, then, in the opinion o f Turkish states
men, it would be clear that the Anglo-American bloc can
not win the war in Europe. This prospect would then per
haps create the possibility o f a compromise, which Turkey
would be prepared to support w ith her m ilitary weight..
2. A n y attempt to induce T u rkey prematurely to take
up an active position, whether b y demanding her participa
tion in the war or demanding the right o f transit for troops
through her territory, would inevitably push T u rkey over
to the other side.
T h e longer the decision of this war is delayed, the
stronger is T u rk e y s wish to keep aloof from the conflict,
so as under no circumstances to find herself on the losing
side.
T h is feeling also strongly dominates Turkish public
opinion; the Government could therefore justify entry into
the war only on the ground o f a violation o f its sovereign
rights.
In the highly revealing talk I had the other day w ith
the President, the assurance was repeatedly intimated
that T u rkey was strongly interested in the destruction
o f the Russian colossus, and that no propaganda or pressure
from the Anglo-American side could induce T u rkey to
do the slightest thing against our interests. On the contrary,
said the President, T u rk e y s neutral position was already
today much more advantageous to the Axis than to Brit-

c h e ?

P h o to s ta tic c o p y o f first p a g e o f D o c u m e n t N o , 16

ain. I f Turkey had been actively on the side o f the British


ally, the British navy would today be in the B lack Sea
supporting the Russian southern flank and a convenient
way for the defence of the Caucasus would have been found.
W hen I said to the President that in the gigantic fight
for the protection of Europe from Bolshevism no European
state could stand aloof, and that he ought to consider to
what extent Turkish policy permitted the rendering o f
more active help, he replied that these questions were being
examined w ith the greatest earnestness. I pointed out that
if we began the offensive against the Caucasus in the spring,
a strong concentration o f Turkish forces on the Russian
frontier would be of great value to us.
From a conversation which M inister A li Fuad had late
ly w ith M inister Jenke, it is to be inferred that the T u rk
ish General S taff has examined this question and decided in
the coming spring to handle it in the w ay we desire. T h e arctic
winter in the Turkish eastern provinces, and the almost
complete lack o f means o f communication and possibility
of m aintaining supply render any alteration o f dislocation
quite impossible until the snow has melted.
W hen, at the end o f the conversation, the President
averred that he had, in stating his views, far overstepped
the bounds demanded b y im partial neutrality, he was ob
viously expressing the wish that such indirect support o f
the A xis b y T u rkey should under no circumstances become
known to the enemy prematurely.
M y recent conversations w ith Messrs. Saracoglu and
Numan again made it clear that they expect anything from
Russia. Even if the Turkish Government were to receive
no official confirmation o f the territorial demands discussed
between Eden and Stalin, they w ill s till assume that such
demands conform w ith the Bolsheviks actual intentions.
I t would be highly desirable if in this sphere we shared
55

all information confidentially w ith the Turkish Govern


ment. T h e trust o f the Turkish Government in our as
surances not to do anything which m ight put T u rk ey into
a m orally embarrassing position vis--vis her British ally
must remain unshaken. T h e march o f events must leave
the Turks free to choose for themselves the moment at
which they become convinced that the maintenance o f their
alliance w ith Britain is incompatible w ith the safeguarding
o f their national future.
It is the opinion here that there is now little scope for
propaganda treatment o f the world conflict, since all
peoples and nations have taken up their stand. On the
other hand, great emphasis is here laid on the idea that the
Axis Powers must proceed to give practical shape to the
European new order which has hitherto been proclaimed
only by propaganda. In all circles one hears the hope ex
pressed that it w ill be possible now already to give shape
to the new1 Europe, which, on the one hand, would strengthen
the m aterial m ilitary weight o f the A xis Powers, and, on
the other, would enable the strong internal opposition in
the United States effectively to combat Roosevelt and his
aims. T h e Foreign M inister said to me only yesterday:
Churchill has now in the W ashington declaration guaran
teed full sovereignty to the European states (with the prob
able exception o f the B altic countries). T h e A xis Powers
have proclaimed the same aim. T h e Fhrer should now
proceed to create a fait accompli. T h is would be o f partic
ular importance in the French question, since A frica w ill
be a battlefield which w ill decisively influence the entire
European situation.
In this conversation, the Foreign M inister also touched
on R oosevelts message to Congress, in which the fable was
again dished up that the Fhrer wants to extend his plans
for world supremacy to South America. M . Saraolu be
56

lieves that this constantly recurring assertion is to be attrib


uted to the influence o f the numerous books written b y mi
grs, which continually speak o f intim ate talks o f which
these plans were allegedly the subject. German propaganda
must therefore endeavour to create a counterweight by
practical political measures in Europe.
T o sum up, it m ay be said that the confidence o f the
Turkish Government in a victory for German arms remains
unshaken. B ut it is feared that i f the conflict continues
too long there m ay be a too excessive dissipation and
exhaustion o f strength, which m ay place the ultim ate re
sult in jeopardy.
N o likelihood is seen in the immediate future o f the
opposing side being able to bring about a decisive turn
in the conflict. Under these circumstances, the decision
regarding Turkish foreign policy remains a function of
the further development o f the -war situation.

Papen

h o to s t a tic c o p y o f la st page o f D o c u m e n t N o . 16

No. 17
MEMORANDUM . FO R GENERAL W ARLIMONT
WITH COVERING L E T T E R B Y W OERM ANN*

Secret
B e r lin , Ja nu ary 23, 1942

T he enclosed memorandum, in m y opinion, on the


whole gives a quite correct picture o f the Turkish attitude.
It is, in particular, true that T u rkey cannot remain indiffr
ant to anything we do in the Arab and Turan questions.
It h a s . therefore been provided that T u rkey shall be in
formed, for instance, before we make any statement on the
subject o f Free Arabia. And later, too, in the constitution
of the Arab Raum, it w ill be absolutely essential to co
operate w ith Turkey.
Nevertheless, for various reasons, the present moment
is not deemed opportune for negotiations or transactions
with T u rkey on this question.
1 . F o r ih e a tte n tio n o f the S ecre ta ry o f S ta te .
2. F o r P o l. D e p t. V I I , th ro u gh C h ie f o f P o l.

D e p t., w ith

re q u e st to d raft an in stru ctio n to A n k a r a ro u g h ly in the above


s p ir it, to be ten t w ith a c c p y o f th e enclosure.

Woermann
* The docum en t bears W e izs c k e rs in itia l.

61

D ecem b er 2 , I9 4 r

M EM ORANDUM
F O R G E N E R A L W A R L IM O N T
1. T h e Turkish Government wants to keep the country
out o f the war, but, on the other hand, is increasingly un
able to resist the temptation to derive advantages for Turkey
from the new ordering o f things. T h e propaganda developed,
with its toleration, b y General Erkilet to awaken interest
in the peoples o f T u rk ic race indicates where it is being
driven, or allowing itself to be driven.
Tu rkey has interpreted her treaty obligations toward
Britain very elastically, but w ill scarcely venture to go
so far as a rupture o f the treaty. T h e offer o f peace media
tion hinted in a speech o f the President is obviously de
signed either to secure advantages as a reward for the peace
efforts, or to facilitate a swing over to the A xis Powers
which would bring advantages in return for m inim al par
ticipation in battle operations.
2. Britain has nothing to offer territorially or in any
other respect. Syria has been included in the category of
liberated democratic states, and promises have likewise
been made to the other Arab states. T h e policy which crops
up every now and again in favour o f an independent Cau
casus is not taken seriously, since it would represent a mani
fest breach vis--vis the Russian ally. T h e propaganda in
behalf o f an independent K urd state hits Turkey on a very
sensitive spot and gives rise to grave m isgivings.
3. Germany has her grip on the Greek islands, which
control the Dardanelles and are important to T u rkey as a
Mediterranean power. T u rkey believes Germany w ill con
quer the Caucasus and determine the fate of the Caucasian
peoples, who are m ostly Mohammedan and partly T u rkic.
T h is has its reverberations also on the T u rkic peoples east
62

o f the Caspian, in whose fate Turkey is interested. Further


more, Germany is pursuing a policy in the Arab area toward
which T u rkey cannot remain indifferent.
4. Turkish policy vis--vis Germany has grown increasing
ly friendlier in the course o f the Russian campaign. Events
such as the L ib yan campaign and the difficulties encoun
tered b y the offensive on the Russian Southern Front are
temporarily strengthening the inclination to preserve neu
trality, although to all appearances this does not im ply
that T u rkey w ill cease to swing toward Germany, or w ill
slide back into the British sphere of influence, since the
British army in the N orth African and Arab-Iranian areas
w ill in any event be seriously exhausted b y the Libyan
campaign. Reinforcements from Australia or New Zealand
are not to be expected. Whether replenishments can be
brought from the British metropolis cannot be judged
from Turkey. Turkey therefore considers that the danger
of a British attack which cropped up from time to time in
the past months is apparently out o f the question in the
next few months. One thing which worries T u rkey is the
position of Ita ly , which is regarded as internaily weak.
5. T u rkey has not yet succeeded in getting into con
tact with anti-British groups in the Arab countries. She
w ill learn w ith great interest, and not without nervousness,
o f the negotiations on the Arab question which are to be
held shortly in Berlin. As a neighbouring G reat Power,
she believes herself entitled to be at least informed o f such
negotiations, even if she cannot justify a claim to partic
ipate in them. This offers an opportunity to discuss with
her the future shaping o f things, and this should be done
before the beginning o f the phase of the Russian campaign
which affects the Caucasus. T h e idea of sharing in the war
against Russia by m aintaining a benevolent attitude and
granting certain advantages would be popular in the arm}?
63

and among many sections o f the population, and this ques


tion could be discussed unreservedly after T u rkey has been
informed o f the Arab negotiations.
6. T h e T u rkey o f A taturk was b uilt on the purely na
tional principle, and Mohammedan or T u rkic interests out
side T u rkey proper, which had been discussed at the time
of the Young Turks, have ceased to evoke interest. T h at
T u rkey expects territorial increment has so far not been
intimated. There are certain signs which seem to indicate
that a revolutionary movement among the Azerbaijanians
in North Iran m ight be utilized as a basis for territorial
claims, or at least for the creation o f a sphere o f influence.
However, the idea advocated is the formation o f independ
ent, or at least outwardly independent, T u rkic state enti
ties in the Crimea, the N orth Caucasus and Russian Azer
baijan the two latter as part o f a Caucasian State and
similar entities east of the Caspian.
7. T h e above-mentioned points provide a basis for
negotiations w ith Turkey. T h e Turkish Government cer
tainly does not expect to receive any advantages without
making considerable compensation in return. I t is very
questionable whether, bearing in mind the price involved,
T u rk e y s participation in the war is desirable at all. T h e
object o f the negotiations should be to ascertain how far
T u rkey is prepared to stretch the concept benevolent neu
trality and thereby make it easier for the Germans to carry
the war into the Arab area and the Suez Canal.

No. 18
PAPEN TIO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE*

Secret
Copy
G e r m a n E m b a ss y
N o . 71/42 seer.
F o r e ig n O ffice,
B e r lin

Ankara

., February 16 , 1942

P O L IT IC A L

REPORT!

Re: A Turkish Proposal


I have already attempted in m y report G . Rs. N o. 47/42
and in m y telegram No. 206 o f February 10 to indicate the
underlying factors which determine present Turkish policy.
T h e central consideration is the desire to keep out o f the
war, in order not to weaken T u rk e y s growing m ilitary
potential b y a new loss o f blood and to be armed and pre
pared for any possible issue o f the war. Whereas u ntil last
summer the possibility o f a total victory for the A xis and
the domination o f the Eastern - M editerranean by Ita ly
was the chief preoccupation,- against which T u rkey hoped
* T h e docum en t is in itia lle d b y W oerm an n and bears the fo llo w in g
n ote in his h an d : I h a v e tra n sm itte d (n e x t w o rd in deciph erab le) to
M in is te r ia l D ir e c to r W ie h l.
5 1303

65

to find a counterbalance on the British side, the war w ith


the Soviet Union has com pletely changed the picture.
As I have already reported, the present situation is
dominated by the anxiety that a Soviet Russia reawakened
to life w ith the help o f the Anglo-American forces w ill in
the event o f an unfavourable issue o f the war, in accord
ance w ith Cripps prediction, lay down the law for the new
order in . Europe. A cting on these considerations, N um an
proposed to his M inister and the Premier that he be empow
ered to discuss w ith me how Turko-German relationsm ight be developed and strengthened on a basis o f confi
dence, without at the present moment complicating T u r
k e y s relations w ith the Soviet Union or prejudicing her
relations with the Allies.
T h e talks suggested to me have now taken place. N u
man described T u rk e y s attitude, in the w ay I have briefly
sketched in the foregoing lines. He added that it would
be of advantage to the A xis to have Turkey as strong as
possible m ilitarily, so that she m ight be able in any cir
cumstances to resist possible Anglo-American pressure. It
was true that T u rkey had been promised substantial deliv
eries under the lend-lease law. How far they could be real
ized depended on the transport situation, which, as v/e knew,,
was extremely bad. Furthermore, even more important
for T u rkey were supplies o f grain and food, which T u rk ey
could under no circumstances renounce. But it accorded
w ith Turkish policy to lean toward Germany and thus create
a counterbalance to the Anglo-American influence which,
was being broadened in this way.
His proposal was that the credit agreement concluded,
w ith M inister Funk which was not ratified and accordingly
was shelved be revived and the sums provided in it.
used to supply T u rkey w ith war material. This measure
should not be viewed from the angle o f propaganda, b u t
66

rather as an expression o f T u rk e y s real political considera


tions.
During the discussion o f this proposal, Numan partic
u larly stressed that it was a m atter o f confidence in Turkish
policy, since at the present moment T u rkey was not in a
position to offer any concrete compensation, such as I had
proposed. Consideration of the m ilitary situation should
suffice to make clear to the A xis the value o f a m ilitarily
strong T u rkey, which wanted to be prepared at any moment
to successfully resist Anglo-Am erican pressure. It m ight be
argued on the German side that it was not necessary for
this purpose to supply T u rkey w ith war m aterial, because
i f Germany were in occupation o f the Caucasus in the sum
mer o f 1942, the German armies would constitute a sufficient
guarantee and, as allies o f T urkey, could at any moment go
into action against the Anglo-Am erican forces. However,
even in the event of R ussias utter defeat and G erm anys
victorious advance in the Caucasus, it would, in his opinion,
be o f great advantage to German policy to know that the
then very sensitive German flank would not be exposed to
any surprise attack from Turkish soil.
I naturally explained to Herr Numan that the largescale delivery o f German war m aterial to T u rkey which
he expected must have some political equivalent. It went
w ithout saying that we should first have to examine the
technical feasibility o f such a plan. I f it should appear to
be practicable, my Government would undoubtedly in
sist on certain compensation, which, without anticipating
the decisions of m y M inister, I believed should essentially
consist in a concretization of-the Turkish attitude toward
the Europe and Soviet R ussia problem.
Numan replied that both M . Saraolu and he had not
left the slightest doubt in the minds o f their British friends
regarding T u rk e y s wish to see the Soviets beaten. N ever
5*

67

under any circumstances could T u rkey desire to see a victo


rious Soviet Russia exercising a decisive influence on the
new arrangement o f Europe. Nevertheless, concretization
o f this Turkish view would constitute a political act which
T u rkey for the moment could not afford. As to the dislo
cation o f m ilitary forces, I m ight rest assured that Turkey
w ould fu lly take the new situation into account. T h is, too,
would be tantamount to supporting us in the Caucasian
campaign.
In the course o f the discussion we finally agreed that
I should report the proposal to the Reichsminister o f For
eign Affairs, w ith the reservation that a common basis is
found. H e, Numan, cherished no illusions b u t that the
publication o f such a project would deal a sad blow to
A nglo-Turkish relations, but he was prepared to say to the
British: W e have made this agreement w ith Germany
because we want to be m ilitarily armed for any eventuali
ty even for the event o f an Anglo-Am erican a tta ck .
Reporting N um ans proposal, I should like to recommend
that the technical possibility o f supplying the m aterial
be first examined. In spite o f the obvious difficulty o f securing
an equivalent political return at the present moment, I
regard the proposal as a good opportunity to achieve more
intim ate relations w ith the Turks, and especially the
T urkish General Staff.
I should be grateful for a lead as to the opinion at your
end.

Papen

No. 19
PPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret
A n k a r a , M a r c h " , 1942
R e c e iv e d : M a r c h 7 , 19 4 2 , 13 h . 50 m .
N o . 355
P o l. D e p t. V I I

307 seer.

In supplement to telegram N o. 351 o f the 6th


1. A Russian was arrested yesterday in K ayseri.
2. T h e time lim it for the voluntary surrender o f P av
lov b y the Consulate-General has been extended till tomor
row morning, after which forcible arrest w ill be effected.
3. L ast night the C h ief o f the Press Department tele
phoned for details o f the police measures against the Russian.
Please inform the appropriate departments that such in
quiries are purposeless, since, in order not to prejudice thor
ough elucidation, the Embassy can give no information b y
telephone.

Papen

No. 20
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret
A n k a r a , M a r c h 9 , 1942
R e c e iv e d : M a r c h 9 , 194 2 , 11 h . 35 m .
N o . 363
P o l. D e p t . V I I 308 seer.

In supplement to telegram No. 355 of the 6th


Numan told me that the Russian had been voluntarily
surrendered after the Consulate-General had been surround
ed b y a battalion o f infantry and no other alternative re
mained. He o f course denies everything, but he is just now
being put to the third degree. Journalistic reports notwith
standing, the Russian Ambassador has not left for Moscow.

Papen

No. 21
WIEHL TO RIBBENTROP*

Secret
'C h ie f o f
C o m m e r c ia l P o lic y
D e p a rtm e n t
62 seer.
B e r lin , M arch l 7 , 1942

M EM ORANDUM
O n D e liv e r y o f 20 K r u p p

7 .5

c m . F ie ld A n ti- A ir c r a ft G u n s

and 100,000 R o u n d s o f A m m u n itio n

Field-M arshal K eitel has informed Ambassador R itter


that the Fhrer would like to discuss w ith the Reichsminister o f Foreign Affairs whether the 20 field anti-aircraft
guns should be delivered to T u rkey as an advance against
eventual deliveries o f chromium. T h e substance o f the
m atter is as follows:
A pre-war contract w ith the firm o f Krupp provided
for the delivery o f 108 pieces o f 7.5 cm. field anti-aircraft
guns and 6,400 rounds o f ammunition, o f which 20 pieces
were s till undelivered on the outbreak o f the war and were
detained. T h e finished guns have since been ly in g ' at the
K rupp works. Their u tilization in the Wehrmacht would
* T he docum en t bears W o e rm a n n s in itia l.

be difficult, because they do not correspond w ith German


patterns. T h e delivery o f these 20 pieces was again promised
in the Clodius agreement w ith T u rkey o f October 9, 1941,
together w ith 100,000 rounds o f ammunition, which would
have to be manufactured. T h e firm o f Krupp have to con
clude a new contract for the delivery. T h e government
agreement does not couple the delivery o f these Germ an
weapons w ith any Turkish counter-deliveries o f chromium:
or any other m aterial. A t first the H igh Command o f the
Wehrmacht expressed the desire that the private negotia
tions o f the Krupp firm be so steered as to fix the date for
the delivery o f the guns and the ammunition s till to be
manufactured for after January 15, 1943, since, according
to the government agreement, after this date we could
receive chromium ore by w ay o f counter-delivery. T h e
Ankara Embassy, however, recommended that the guns
be delivered earlier, because we are obligated to do so b y
the agreement and, since the guns are ready, no excuse can
be offered for delaying their delivery. When the Foreign
Office asked the H igh Command whether the guns m igh r
be delivered earlier, Field-M arshal K eitel reported the
matter to the Fhrer, because meanwhile a fact w ith
which the Foreign Office was not acquainted the delivery
of the guns had been interdicted b y order of the Fhrer.
When Field-M arshal K e ite l made his report, the Fhrer
said that he had indeed contemplated another use for the
guns, but he did not object to again giving consideration
to the question o f their delivery, perhaps in the form o f a
certain advance against subsequent Turkish deliveries o f
chromium. T h e 20 guns are valued at about Rm. 2,000,000,
the 100,000 rounds of ammunition at Rm. 12,000,000. I f
the contract is signed in A p ril, the delivery o f the ammuni
tion still to be manufactured could begin in, December 1942.
Speedy conclusion o f the contract, followed by delivery o f
72

the guns, would have the advantage that we would receive


a 30 per cent advance paym ent, roughly Rm. 4,000,000, on
the signing o f the contract for - the ammunition, and the
value o f the guns, roughly Rm. 2,000,000, on their delivery,,
or Rm. 6,000,000 in all. For this sum we could forthwith
buy in T u rkey urgently needed strategical raw materials,
such as copper and cotton. W ith the further payments o f
about Rm. 8,000,000, which would fa ll due on the delivery
o f the ammunition starting w ith the beginning o f next
year, we could, besides the aforesaid strategical raw mate
rials, buy chromium on account o f the contingent o f 45,000
tons provided for the period o f J anuary 15 to M arch 31, 1943.
Econom ically, in view o f the important counter-deliv
eries, such a contract would be very advantageous, all the
more that the guns are ready for delivery and can hardly
be used by us. Early conclusion o f the contract is also desir
able from the political standpoint, since delay m ight raise
doubts in the T u rk s minds as to our willingness to carry
out the agreement of October 9, 1941.
T h e W ar Economy and Armaments Office o f the High
Command, in a memorandum to Field-M arshal K eitel, has
also recommended the delivery o f the guns. Field-M arshal
K eitel has requested,. after the Reichsminister o f Foreign
Affairs has reported to the Fhrer, to be informed o f the
decision.
I recommend that the firm o f Krupp be allowed to con
clude a contract w ith the Turks on the above lines.
F o r the a tte n tio n , th ro u gh A m b a ssa d o r R i t t e r
of

th e

and th e S e c re ta ry o f S ta te ,
R e ic h sm in iste r o f F o re ig n A ffa irs

Wiehl

No. 22
PAPEN T 0 ! GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

G e rm a n E m b a ssy
N o. A

2632/42
Copy
A n k a ra , M a y

1 3 , 1942

F o r e ig n O ffice,
B e r lin

Re\ Turkish Interest in the Caucasus


I was today visited by General Mursel Baku Pasha,
who told me that he had had a long talk w ith M arshal
Cakm ak. T h e latter had assured him that the civilian per
sons in whom we were interested in connection w ith this
m atter would receive travel permits for Germany without
delay. As to the officers, he would have for the time being
to refrain. T h e Turkish army had a large number o f former
Caucasian, especially Azerbaijan, officers who were inti
m ately acquainted w ith the country. I f the operations
make further progress, he would, at our wish, grant them
furlough.
H e also told me that he had learned in the General
S taff that the Russians had b uilt new aircraft plants, name
ly , a group in C hita, a group near Tom sk and Omsk, and a
third group near Tashkent. T h e oil wells at U fa had been
74

completed, and it was hoped that their output would exceed


that o f Baku.
T h e Pasha then handed me a memorandum from Kerim
Oder, who is Rasul-Zade E m ins deputy and a leader of the
Azerbaijan N ational Party. A translation of the memoran
dum is appended.*

Papen

* T h is m em orandum has
F o reig n O ffice arch ives
m en t.

in

n ot

been

fou n d

the possession

of

am ong the

G erm an

th e

G o v ern

S o v ie t

No. 23
CONVERSATION BETW EEN HENTIG
AND HARUN

Secret

M IN U T E
Notified by one of the members o f the Indian Comm it
tee whom I met b y chance, D r. Harun visited me today and
confidentially informed me o f his latest observations in
Turkey. D r. Harun claims to be a confidential agent o f
M arshal Cakm ak. He had not less than five times discussed
w ith him the question o f T u rk e y s entering the war. C akm ak
holds that T u rk e y s entry is hardly avoidable. I t m ay hap
pen at any moment, and w ill as soon as the Turkish arm y
possesses sufficient arms. T h e Turkish advance would be
in the direction of Baku, through the Iranian uplands.
There could be no question o f an attack on the Caucasian
positions proper. T h ey do not reckon on encountering any
substantial opposition from the British in Iran, but do
from the Russians. . . .*
W ith reference to the T u ran question, he assured me
that he knew from his own experience and from what he
* P a rt o f the m in u te ,

con cern in g

G e rm a n F ro n t, is o m itte d .

76

the

situ a tio n

on

th e

S o v ie t-

had learned in Turkish parliam entary circles, and also


from the M arshal, that, contrary to official declarations
and probably also to the reports o f our Ambassador in An
kara, a Greater Turkey movement not only existed, but
w as steadily gaining in strength and importance. T h e true
state o f affairs was revealed, among other things, b y the
fact that the President had ordered the deletion o f all foreign
words from the Constitution, and had done so w ith an eye
not only to T u rkey, but also most definitely to the other
T u rk ic peoples. Asked how he conceived future develop
ments, D r. Harun told me that what was envisaged was not
th e conquest o f these lands by T u rkey, but rather the crea
tion o f a federal state, sim ilar to the Bismarck Reich. I t
was to include, besides A natolia, the Caucasus and the
T u rk ic peoples east o f the Volga.
B ut the ideal o f the Turkish statesmen was and is,
precisely because o f their recognition o f the yellow peril,
to p lay the role o f mediator between Germany and Britain.
Germany and T u rk e y , he said, should build a w all
against the yellow flood. 'And England to o , I added, to
w hich he readily assented. In reply to my remark that the
T u rks had once already, under Bayezid, faced the Mongo
lians, he said that that was quite a different matter. This
denotes a complete alteration of T u rk e y s position from an
A siatic to a European Power.
H e u t ig
B e r lin ,

Ju n e

i,

1942

No. 24
PAPEN TO MENEMENCIOGLU

C o n f i d e n t i a l
A n kara, J u n e

12 ,

19 4 2

A m b a ssa d o r N u m a n M e n e m e n cio g lu ,
G e n e ra l S e c r e ta r y o f th e T u r k is h F o re ig n O ffice,
A n kara

M r. Ambassador,
I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the
following list o f war m aterial specified in A rticle 4, Price
Group V III, o f the supplementary agreement signed today:
20 Krupp field anti-aircraft guns
40 Bochumer Verein gun barrels
64 Skoda mountain guns.
Accept, etc.

Franz von Papen

78

DITTMANN TO TIPPELSK IRCH

C o m m itte e on R u ssia
L e g a tio n C o u n se llo r D ittm a n n

In reference to the questions raised in the report o f


Ambassador von Papen o f July 24 A 3835/42 I should
like to express the following opinion.
1)
From numerous talks in the M inistry for the Eastern
Occupied Areas I have got the impression that Reichsminister Rosenberg does not favour the plan for the creation o f
independent Caucasian states under German protection.
True, recognition is gaining ground even in the M inistry
for the Eastern Occupied Areas that conditions in the Cau
casus differ essentially from those in the other already con
quered regions o f the Soviet Union, and that therefore an
at least outwardly different form o f administration must
be chosen in the Caucasus from that, say, in the U kraine.
But I have been informed in strict confidence that these
past days Reichsminister Rosenberg has personally drafted
for submission to the Fhrer a comprehensive memorandum
regarding the future p o litical structure o f the Caucasian
region, the details o f which are s till unknown even to the
competent officiais in the M inistry for the Eastern Occupied
Areas, but which adheres to the principle that a German
c iv il administration should be set up in the Caucasus. How79

ever, the supreme representative o f the German civilian


authority in the Caucasus as a whole is not to bear, as h ith
erto contemplated, the title o f Reichskommissar, but o f
S ta tth a lter, and its representatives in the individual
regions (Georgia, Azerbaij an, Arm enia, North Caucasus) are
to be called General-bevollm chtigte.
2) As to the Crimean T atars, as far as I am aware it
has already been decided not to grant them self-government.
U n til about three .weeks ago it was even contemplated re
m oving the Crimean Tatars from the Crimea and making
the latter a purely German region. T h is plan has now been
dropped, chiefly because o f the technical difficulties in
volved in its execution. T h e Crim ea, with the addition o f
certain Ukrainian areas north o f Perekop, is to be admin
istered b y a Commissariat-General, under the direction of
G auleiter Frauenfeld.
3) T h e dissatisfaction o f the leading representatives
o f the Caucasian migrs in Berlin, to which Ambassador
von Papen refers in his report, has considerably increased
these past days. T h eir uneasiness is to be attributed to the
fact that the request subm itted to G auleiter M eyer by
Ambassador Count von Schulenburg that the Caucasian
migrs enlisted b y the Foreign Office be engaged in a man
ner befitting their position was rejected by Reichsminister
Rosenberg. A gainst the advice of his officials, Reichsmin
ister Rosenberg decided only that a few o f the migrs
be taken on b y the M inistry for the Eastern Occupied Areas
to fill advisory posts, which already exist in the M inistry.
T h e migrs rejected this proposal, because they do not
w ant to be employees o f the M inistry for the Eastern Occu
pied Areas, which acceptance o f the offer would practically
result in. In several talks w ith the representatives, partic
u la rly o f the Azerbaijan migrs, I was able to observe
that they are deeply depressed, and it was only w ith great
80

difficulty that they could be dissuaded from the conviction


that their mission in Germ any must already be regarded as
having completely failed. O nly w ith great effort were they
dissuaded from their intention to return to T u rkey immedi
ately because there was no longer a suitable field o f activity
for them in Germany. I t is unquestionable that the return
o f the migrs at this juncture would have the effect o f in
creasing the uneasiness in Turkish circles.
In m y opinion, the report o f Ambassador von Papen
should be made the occasion for a communication from the
Foreign Office to the M inistry for the Eastern Occupied
Areas (perhaps in the form o f a letter from the Secretary c f
State to G auleiter M eyer), which, referring to the conver
sation between Ambassador Count von Schulenburg and
G auleiter M eyer, should once more intim ate that a satis
factory solution o f the migr problem is urgently necessary
in the interest o f Turko-German relations. I would remark
confidentially that two days ago Professor von Mende, the
Caucasian expert in the M in istry for the Eastern Occupied
Areas, exp licitly requested me that such a communication
be sent b y the Foreign Office, since he hopes w ith its help
s till to be able to get Reichsminister Rosenberg to alter
his view.

Dittmann
F o r th e

a tte n tio n

T ip p e ls k ir c h ,
c o n v e rs a tio n .
B e r lin , A u g u s t 5 , 1942

6 1303

w it h

of

H e rr

referen ce

M in is te r
to

th e

von
o ra l

No. 26
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret
A n k a r a , A u g u s t 26, 1942
R e c e iv e d : A u g u s t 27, 1942, 3 h . 07 m .
N o . 7 4 , A u g u s t 26

T o d ay I had my first official talk w ith Numan after


his assumption o f office.*
Numan thanked me for the cordial reception given toArikan b y the Fiihrer and the Reichsminister o f Foreign
Affairs. O f his conversation w ith the Reichsminister he
remarked that he had taken note o f the fact that the Reichs
minister had for the second time conveyed to him that even
after the defeat of Russia there could be no question o f
a separate peace with Britain. In reference to the remark,
o f the Reichsminister o f Foreign Affairs that T u rkey s till
seemed to be uncertain as to who would win this war, he>
Numan, would like to explain to me the view o f the Turkish
General Staff, which was also, o f course, his own view.
T h e Turkish General S taff believed that the capture
o f Stalingrad would be the coping stone o f this y ears
* M en tm e n c io g lu

had

been

A ffa irs.

82

ap p oin ted .M in is te r

of

Foreign.

operations. T h e solution o f the Russian problem, in his esti


m ation, was to push forward northward from Stalingrad
in order to cut the railw ay line between K uibyshev and
Moscow. T h e central and the northern Russian army groups
would then have only one railw ay at their disposal,
which was bound to lead to the collapse o f these forces. T h a t
the Russians were for three weeks throwing their strategi
cal reserves into a hopeless diversive action against the
German forces in the central and northern sectors was a
capital strategical error.
In comparison w ith the complete liquidation o f the
Russian forces in the central and northern sectors b y art
operation against K uibyshev, the operation in the Cauca
sus was only o f secondary importance. In view o f this situa
tion, the General S taff was convinced that by the end o f this
year Germany w ill have so weakened the Russians that they
w ill no longer count as a decisive factor in this war.
T o this must be added the blocking of Anglo-Am erican
supplies from the South.
From this Numan drew the conclusion that the abovementioned question o f the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs
was unjustified. In view o f this general situation, and
because T u rkey was as interested as ever in seeing Bolshe
vik Russia defeated as thoroughly as possible, Turkey had
never had any negotiations w ith the Russian Government,
w ith the exception o f the declaration which, owing to
British pressure, she had made to the Russians that the
earlier treaty o f friendship remained in force. He wanted
most categorically to tell me th at his new ambassador in.
Moscow had received instructions not to enter into any
negotiations. He must most categorically repudiate the
suspicion expressed b y the Germans that the Russians had
withdrawn several divisions from the Turkish border as
the result o f assurances given by T urkey.
6*

83

I thanked Numan for his statements, but did not con


ceal from him that we had latterly had the feeling that T u r
key was lending an all too w illing ear to the British and
American insinuations that Russia was already so weakened
that she could never again represent a danger to T u rkey,
whereas Germany, on the other hand, i f she were to gain
possession o f the B lack Sea, would constitute a future
threat to Turkish interests which was not to be underesti
mated.
Num an denied this very vehemently. T h e Allies m ay
have suggested this to him, but he had always rejoined that
the huge S lav empire would never cease to be a menace to
T u rkey, and that, on the other hand, she could not perceive
any menace in having Germany as a neighbour. For, he
added, he could positively not imagine that the Fhrer
would seek a final and lasting solution o f the Russian prob
lem in the erection o f a frontier w all which would always
have to be defended and o f a number o f states under the
police direction o f Germany. G erm anys task o f settling the
Russian problem was immensely difficult. Turkey had every
interest in . . . [garbled] -and she was therefore ready to
assist the Reich within the bounds o f possibility. Since
his country was not pursuing im perialist aims, its only
interest was in having the cultural existence o f its political
minorities guaranteed. Furthermore, they were convinced
that the Russian problem could be solved only i f these
various peoples, w ith their specific cultural characteristics,
were placed on their own feet under German guidance.
O nly thus could their active co-operation be enlisted against
the danger o f Pan-Slavism .
In reply to m y question as to what form T u rk e y s co
operation could take, Num an said that certain bounds
were placed to such co-operation b y the -necessity o f main
taining neutrality, but that it would be forthcoming
84

wherever his country had legitim ate cultural interests to


represent. H e requested me to apply to him on all questions
in which we desired T u rk e y s advice on matters of adminis
tration or personnel.
In a written report to be sent w ith the courier o f August
29, I shall revert to detailed aspects o f this question in
connection w ith the visit o f the representatives o f the M in
istry for the Eastern Occupied Areas.
On the question o f the navy, he declared . . . [garbled]
that there was only one irrevocable decision: complete
internment, and in a place that corresponded w ith T u rk e y s
interests (in any case, no M editerranean ports). There
could be no negotiations. N o changes would be tolerated.
Asked about the results o f the Moscow conference, he
said that all that one heard from K u ibyshev diplom atic
circles was idle chatter. But he was expecting a compre
hensive report from his London Ambassador in the next few
days and would let me know. I t appeared that a decision
to open a second front in the Caucasus had been taken.
U n til now ' the Russians had categorically rejected the em
ploym ent o f foreign troops on their territory. Even in these
past few days further Polish divisions had been shipped
off to Iran. Even two .British airmen, intended as sym bolical
o f co-operation, had been sent back. I t now seemed, how
ever, that Russia was w illin g to depart from this principle
as far as the Southern Caucasus was concerned. T h e appoint
ment o f Voroshilov and W ilson indicated this. T w o Ameri
can divisions are said to be arriving at Basra.
Num an added in connection w ith this information that
any demand on the part o f the A liies to involve T u rkey in
any w ay [text not clear] in such a second front would in
evitab ly mean war. T h is attitude accorded prim arily w ith
T u rk e y s interests, but he believed that it would also be
useful to Germany.
85

W illk ie s visit to T u rkey, and its announcement in the


press without Turkey having been asked, was a usual piece
o f American insolence.
In conclusion, the M inister handed me a memorandum
regarding the state o f the Turko-German negotiations on the
armament credit. H e complained that in the hands o f the
experts the negotiations now bid fair to be endlessly pro
tracted. H e had believed, and the cordial reception given
to the delegation had stressed this, that it was to be an
agreement dictated b y political usefulness. He regretted
that, evidently as a result o f false conceptions in Berlin
regarding T u rk e y s attitude, the negotiations seemed to be
deadlocked.
I replied that I was not informed o f the progress o f
the negotiations. A telegram on this subject follows.

No. 27
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE*

G e r m a n E m b a ss y
N o . A 524/42 seer.

Secret
A n ka ra , A u g u st

27,

1942

F o r e ig n O ffice,
B e r lin
P O L IT IC A L

REPORT!

Re: T h e New T u rkish Premier on the Turkish M inorities


and the Future o f Russia
T od ay I paid m y first visit to the newly appointed
P rim e M inister, M . Saraolu.
In the course o f the conversation, which touched upon
the general situation in T urkey, I requested him, as I had
requested Human yesterday, to let me have his views on the
Russian problem.
T h e Prime M inister said that he would like to reply
both as a T u rk and as Prime M inister.
As a T u rk, he yearned for the destruction o f Russia,
w hich would be an epoch-making deed on the part o f the
Fhrer, and which had been the dream o f the Turkish
people for centuries. N o T u rk, even Y alin who wrote
for the British, could think differently from him on this
* T he docum en t bears W o e rm a n n s in itia l.

87

point. In his recent avowal o f fidelity to the Turkish racial


cause he had made an indirect reference to this.
Germ any could solve the Russian problem only if she
slaughtered off at least one-half o f all living Russians, and
i f she rescued the Russified national m inority regions from
Russian influence once and for all, set them on their own
feet, and educated them to be w illin g collaborators o f the
A xis and foes o f Slavdom . In exterminating a substantial
part o f the Russian population potential, the allies were
taking the best course. He did not know what the Fhrer
had decided regarding the future constitution o f the m inority
regions. T h e overwhelming m ajority o f the inhabitants o f
these regions belonged to the Turkish race, and Turkey
therefore had a legitimate interest in the settlement o f
this question. He recalled that I had at one time declared
to the President on the instructions o f the Fhrer that in
the new Europe T u rkey was to constitute a strong buttress
in the Southeast, and consequently the Turkish racial ele
ments in the present Russified lands must also be taken
into consideration. True, the intellectuals there so far as
they existed at all had either surrendered to Bolshevism
or had been massacred b y it. Consequently, a section o f
the younger generation o f these countries should be sent
to German universities and a section to Turkish universi
ties, then this new generation would in the future b a
guarantee o f effective co-operation between the two factors.
Germ any had invited to the Reich a number o f migrs
from these countries in order to hear their opinion or to
make use o f their services. Some o f them had come back
w ith the conviction that it was not intended to grant the
countries w ith T u rkic minorities independent existence,
but to turn them into states under German administrative
and police direction. He could not believe that this was
the Fhrers view. I f the Russians were soon completely

P h o to s ta tic c o p y o f first p a g e o f D o c u m e n t N o . 27

beaten, we would find that the lands in question, with


their non-Russian minorities, expected from us freedom and
reconstruction. W e must not disappoint this hope. Nor
would the minorities disappoint us.
So far he had spoken as a Turk.
As Prime M inister, it was his business to see that at
the present moment not the least thing occurred which
m ight furnish the Russians w ith an excuse to slaughter the
Turkish minorities. T h e Russians fear o f other races was
w ell known. I t was for this reason that they would not
allow either Poles, or Britons, or Americans to fight on
their territory. O nly recently, Azerbaijan Turks in Iran
who had expressed their sym pathy wTith T u rkey were com
p letely exterminated, together w ith their villages.* Hence
the necessity for a strictly neutral attitude. As Prime M inis
ter, he considered it necessary not to compromise T u rk e y s
position also because, in his opinion, the approaching col
lapse o f Russia would certainly prompt a desire for peace
on the part o f the British. T h is opportunity to restore
peace to Europe must not be missed.
I thanked the Prime M inister for his statements and
asked him in what practical w ay we could make sure o f
Turkish co-operation or take account o f T u rk e y s interests
in the administration and development o f the conquered
regions. Saraolu told me, as Numan had told me yes
terday, that he would be very w illing, in case o f necessity,
to discuss practical questions with me confidentially, or
to indicate a third person for the discussion of such matters.
T h e Prime M inister is setting out today for a tour
o f inspection o f the Russian frontier, because, as he told
* T h is assertion o f S ara co g iu is fa lse fro m b e g in n in g
N o th in g o f th e k in d h a p p en ed in A ze rb a ija n .

to end.

R e ga rd in g the s y m

p a th y o f th e A ze rb a ija n T urks fo r T u rk e y , see D ocu m en t N o . 10,


p p . 34-38.

91

me, he was not fam iliar w ith these regions and wanted to
form a personal impression. He w ill return to Ankara via
Samsun.
I got the impression from this conversation that the
Prime M inister is following developments in Russia, es
p ecially the Caucasus, w ith the liveliest interest, and that
he would like to maintain close contact w ith me on this
matter.
Th e above-mentioned questions were also discussed
w ith Professor von Mende, the representative o f the M inistry
for the Eastern Occupied Areas. SS Brigade-Fhrer Zimmer
mann, who has established contact w ith another migr cir
cle, was present. From our talks, I m ight draw the follow
ing conclusions regarding the practical handling o f the
matter:
T h e Turks are o f the opinion and I fu lly share it
that a lasting solution o f the Russian problem w ill only
be possible i f we enlist the active co-cperation o f the minor
ities in the various parts o f the country, and i f they are
educated in a feeling o f independence, naturally w ithin
the framework o f Germ an spiritual, economic and m ilitary
leadership. Following good examples (e. g., Japan in Bur
ma), we should endeavour to find in each o f the Caucasian
and Transcaspian countries a suitable person who could
outwardly appear as the native representative head o f the
administration. Side b y side w ith this head, there must be a
responsible German director outwardly, in the background,
as an adviser; actually, as the leading, deciding and re
sponsible person. Under this head there should .be the nec
essary number o f adm inistrative authorities, in which the
native element had a big share. T h e already existing legions
composed o f m inority nationals constitute a splendid nuc
leus around which to build up the armed forces in the
various districts. Outwardly, the organizations o f the
92

armed forces and the police should wherever possible like


wise be represented b y a native person.
In the matter o f selecting the leading native person
for each district, I could, as I reported after m y conversa
tions w ith Numan and Saraolu, always ask the opinion
o f influential Turkish circles, and in this w ay create a
common interest in the new political entities.
T h is proposal, o f course, com pletely differs from the
purely German government and administration set up in
the Ukraine and the other occupied regions o f Russia. But
I would urge in support o f m y proposal relative to the
Transcaucasian and Transcaspian lands that a question of
foreign policy o f first-rate importance is here involved.
W ith ou t T u rk e y s participation, and without the co-oper
ation o f the factors involved in the common Mohammedan
religion, we could occupy and administer these lands only
on a purely German police basis. T u rkey would then nec
essarily remain outside this new European combination.
T h e consequences o f so defective a construction would soon
m ake themselves felt.
Since, w ith the descent from the Caucasus o f the vic
torious German troops, the first elements o f a new adminis
tration in these lands w ill have to be inaugurated, it would
seem very urgent that the Fhrer decide this question
along the lines o f the grand general political conception he
.at one time prescribed.

Papen

No. 28
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret
T h e r a p ia , A u g u s t 28, 1942
R e c e iv e d : A u g u s t 28, 1942, 14 h . 37 m .
N o . 1205

am sending a detailed report o f the lengthy conver


sation I had yesterday w ith the Prime M inister. B riefly,
I m ay state that he too is led to believe b y the Moscow
talks that the Allies w ill greatly activize the prosecution
of the war in the Orient, w ith the result that T u rkey w ill
again find herself in the centre o f events. In order, w hile
fu lly m aintaining her neutral position, to make possible
a quite confidential exchange o f opinions on questions o f
m utual interest relative to the neighbouring regions, should
this be agreeable to us, he offered to name a third person
w ith whom such conversations could be conducted. I also
received the promise that T u rkey would close her eyes to
the passage o f certain persons through her territory.
In m y estimation, Saraolus proposal signifies a grat
ifying advance, and a trump card in the fight for T u rk e y s
allegiance which is again developing. (He is setting out,
accompanied b y m ilitary men, for a tour o f inspection o f
the eastern frontier.)

Papen
94

No. 29
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE T O TH E
FOREIGN O FFICE*

I n te llig e n c e D e p a rtm e n t
F o r e ig n In te llig e n c e
N o . 1372/42 seer.

C iEBd. V i l l a U/M

Secret
Septem ber 10, 19 4 2

Re: Conversation Between the Swiss M inister


and the Turkish Foreign M inister
On August 25, 1942, the Swiss Legation in Ankara sent
the enclosed report (translated from the French) to the
Federal P olitical Department in Berne.
It is particularly requested that i f it is intended to make
use o f this report its source should not be indicated or be
apparent.
B y o rd e r>
(S ig n a tu re in d e cip h e ra b le )
I E n c l.

(5 pages)

* T h e d ocu m en t bears th e in itia ls o f W eizscker and W oerm an n .

95

ENCLOSURE*

On m y return from Switzerland, and after a two-days


sta y in Istanbul, where I met the German and Italian A m
bassadors, but could not be received b y the American
Ambassador who was sick in hospital, I paid the customary
visit to M . Numan Menemencioglu, who after his appoint
m ent as D eputy was called to the post o f Foreign M inister.
M . Menemencioglu v/as o f course very pleased by the
-message I conveyed to him from you, and requested me to
assure you o f his friendship. He assured me at once that the
Saracoglu M inistry would follow the same foreign policy
as the Refik Seydam Cabinet; his appointment to the Foreign
Office was a corroboration o f this, as was also the m inisterial
declaration o f M . Saracoglu, in which he deliberately repeat
ed the formula: British alliance and German friendship.
T h is, he added in reply to a question from me, was the w ay
T u r k e y s so-called active neutrality, in distinction to
our integral neutrality, was to be understood. T h is casual
and practical neutrality did not prevent T u rkey from pur
suing a p olicy o f alliances, which included constant nego
tiations w ith the governments, whether allied or friendly.
A s regards the general situation, Menemencioglu, when
I asked his opinion o f the state o f things in Russia, said
that, according to reports received, the harvest in the
Ukraine was over 60 per cent o f normal, which, in his opinion,
was enormous, and all the more important that the scorched
earth policy had compelled a large part o f the popu
lation, which would otherwise have had to be fed, to evacu
ate. On the other hand, the fact that m any of the transports

* T ra n slatio n from th e G e rm a n ; the F re n ch t e x t w a s


co v ered in the arch ives o f the G erm a n F o re ig n O h c e in
sessio n o f th e

S o v ie t

G o v e rn m e n t.

96

n o t d is
th e p o s

recently sunk north o f Murmansk were carrying food indi


cated that the Russian army was threatened w ith a food cri
sis; it was quite obvious that infinitely precious tonnage
would not have been employed for the transport o f food
unless it had been im peratively necessary. Menemencioglu
attaches greater significance at the moment to the loss o f
the producing regions o f the Ukraine and the Donets Ba
sin than to the severing o f communication w ith Iran, which
has not yet occurred; actually, he holds, the American food
supply via Basra is only o f symbolic importance. Under
these circumstances, the M inister continued, there is every
reason to assume that in the coming winter the German
army w ill not be confronted w ith an opponent equivalent to
the one o f last winter, even taking into account R ussias
possession o f important reserves o f munitions and oil,
as w ell as the exploitation o f new mines. T h is does not neces
sarily mean that the Russian army w ill be put out o f the
running in the coming autumn. I t is s till too early to assert
anything, as the issue o f the summer campaign remains
uncertain; nevertheless, the season is w ell advanced and the
September rains are already hampering operations; on the
other hand, the fact must not be lost sight o f that the three
hundred divisions o f the Russians main army have still
taken no part in the operations in the Caucasus, where at
present only fourteen Russian divisions are engaged. Under
these conditions, the Turkish General S taff is inclined to
the view that the German H igh Command, if it does not
want to postpone its decisive blow u ntil next spring, or
even summer, w ill be compelled to attack the Russians
main forces. For this purpose, an offensive northward from
the Stalingrad-Volga area m ay be expected. I f the German
army should succeed b y this offensive in driving a wedge
between Moscow and K u ibysh ev, the Soviet army would be
in a bad w a y . As to. the current operations in the South,
71303

97

one o f their principal purposes, namely, to drive the Russians


away from the B lack Sea coast,* is on the point o f accomplish
ment, in spite o f the necessity o f capturing Novorossiisk
and Tuapse through mountain passes negotiable only b y
infantry. B ut nearer to the east the approaches w ill
become harder and harder to master, so that the capture
o f Baku w ill be a problem.
T h e prospect for the future, as Menemencioglu sees
it, is a much easier winter campaign in Russia, on the
one hand, and possible operations against E gyp t, on the
other. He assured me o f his conviction that Rommel would
at the end o f autumn resume the offensive, in conjunction
w ith a new pincer m ovement' through Cyprus and
Syria.
T h e picture so sketched has the advantage, so impor
tant for a Turkish M inister, that T u rkey would remain
outside the fighting zone. Turkish diplom acy has apparent
ly every interest that the strategical objectives o f the
A xis should develop in the direction o f Moscow, rather
than o f Iran and Iraq; it has likewise every reason to wish
that a coming attack on Syria from Cyprus m ay leave Anato
lia outside the strategical pincers, whose jaws this w inter
w ill converge on the Suez. I t is in the light o f these factors
that the M inisters predictions must presumably be taken.
A t this first conversation, which lasted forty m inutes,
I did not have time to raise the question o f the second
front. I know, however, that M . Menemencioglu, in a
recent conversation w ith the Bulgarian M inister, character

* I n th e

G erm a n

t e x t, fro m

th e w ords

R u ssian

d iv is io n to

B la c k S ea c o a st, there is a stro ke in th e m a rg in m ade in c o p y -in k


p e n cil, a gain st w h ich , e v id e n tly in th e sam e h a n d w h ich

w rote

th e

m em o on th e a cco m p a n y in g le tte r to th e docu m en t, are w ritte n

th e

words: T his p o in t o f v ie w is a lre a d y kn ow n from other so u rces.

98

ized such an undertaking as a plaisanterie macabre.


On the other hand, Menemencioglu spoke w ith greater
emphasis to the Belgian M inister than he did to me o f the
still unbroken strength o f the Russian army and only
touched ligh tly on the harvest in the Ukraine. T h is apparently
can only be interpreted as different shades o f polite circum
spection.
T h e Greek M inister, whom I visited, laid great weight
on the three hundred intact Russian divisions. In his opin
ion, the lost o il regions accounted for not more than 25
per cent o f production, while the exploitation o f the' oil
fields in the Urals is already yielding unexpected results.
T h e M inister contested the opinion that the German army
could reach Baku this autumn, and pointed out that the
oil from Baku could be shipped across the Caspian to the
railw ay station at Krasnovodsk, on a branch line o f the
trans-Siberian R ailw ay.
M y talk w ith Herr von Papen, w ith whom I lunched
at Therapia, and the Italian Ambassador was dominated
b y the Italo-Germ an naval victory in the Mediterranean,
and I found them optim istically impressed b y this news.
T h e Italian Ambassador gave repeated expression to his
conviction that next year would see victory. In face o f the
inflexible- attitude o f the Anglo-Saxons, the word apparently
now is to adopt a sim ilar tone and to repudiate the very
idea o f a compromise. Chancellor H itler recently spoke to
the new Turkish Ambassador in the same spirit. Never
theless, M . Menemencioglu accepts such assurances, from
whatever quarter they m ay cpme, w ith reserve; in a conver
sation he had lately w ith the D utch M inister he expressed
the conviction that a compromise which would include the
complete independence o f Belgium , H olland and N orw ay
was possible. T h e Belgian and D utch M inisters, who are
getting more and more worried about the situation o f their
7*

99

countries, continue to show interest in this question, al


though orders have come from London not to mention it
any more and to react negatively i f it is .raised. T h e B rit
ish, Ambassador, w ith whom I lunched on Wednesday,
questioned me at length on the situation in Switzerland
and also, naturally, about m y journey. T h is gave me the
opportunity, after I had spoken o f the good order prevailing
in our country and had praised the splendid behaviour of
our people, to refer to the concern which the navicerts were
causing the Federal Council. I was able to observe, in contra
distinction to earlier conversations, an absence o f the cus
tom ary insinuations regarding the impending collapse o f
German resistance. On the contrary, the Ambassador told
me he was inclined to believe the reports o f the Turks that
the A xis was in a position to continue the fight for one
or even two years.
M y return journey through Ita ly , Belgrade and Sofia
were without incident and gave me no reason to anticipate
the attack which was made on our courier on the same stretch.
In the Ita lia n region o f former Y ugoslavia (Postumia-LjubIjana), the line was h eavily guarded, with a post in
trenches at about every 200 metres; along the whole stretch
semi-permanent fortresses protected artificial structures
(bridges, tunnels, etc.). T h e walls o f these blockhouses
were b uilt o f a double row o f logs filled in w ith stone, and
were furnished w ith firing slits; many o f these works were
still in construction. T h e approaches were protected by
barbed-wire fences, which barred access to the artificial
structures themselves and to other probably. - threatened
zones. On both sides o f the stretch the forest, which is dense
in these parts, had been cleared, or was in process o f being
cleared, to a width o f about 100 metres. A t one part o f the
journey a detachment o f troops occupied the train, chiefly
m y car. These precautionary measures apparently ceased
100

in the German-occupied region (Ljublj ana-Zagreb), as well


as on the Croatian stretch (Zagreb-Belgrade), at least in
the western area, which one travels through b y day; they
began again in Serbia, beyond Belgrade, where fortifications
again appeared, this time older and very solid structures
(of brick and stone, w ith searchlights). T h ey are manned
chiefly by Bulgarian troops, but the sentry posts are more
rare. In Serbia and Bulgaria m y train (with the exception
o f the sleeping cars) was so overcrowded that free move
ment through the corridors was impossible; it is wiser not
to leave ones compartment at all. As to the stations, the
one at M ilan, where seething crowds keep surging forward,
or spend the whole night in complete darkness w aiting for
the rare trains, makes an unpleasant impression on the
uninitiated. Elsewhere, however, and especially in the B al
kans, where m ilitary police duty is performed b y German
and other posses, such overcrowding was not to be observed.
Everything seemed to be proceeding without friction. N ot
far from Sofia we passed a train going in the other direc
tion which seemed to me to be carrying a German motor
transport column (cars, trucks, motorcycles); the m atriel
looked badly mauled and was covered w ith dust and had.
evidently been through a severe ordeal. T h e soldiers, young
and spirited Germans, had well-kept but very threadbare
uniforms. M ajor Frick, who has just arrived and who trav
elled the same route, w ill give fuller details o f his obser
vations on the journey in a technical report.

No. 30
R1BBENTR0P T O HEW EL-W EHRW OLF*

TELEGRAM

Secret
F u s c h l, S ep tem b e r 1 2 , 1942 , 16 h . 30 m .
R e c e iv e d : S ep tem b er 1 2 , 1942 , 17 h . 25 m .
N o . 1104
T r a n s m itte d to
M in is te r H e w e l-W e h rw o lf,
S ep tem b e r 12 , 1942, N o . 179

For M inister Hewel-W ehrwolf


N ote for the Fhrer
T h e reports o f Ambassador von Papen from Ankara
respecting his talks w ith the Turkish Prime M inister and
Turkish Foreign M inister concerning the T u r k ic . peoples
in the Soviet Union have prompted me to draft the enclosed
telegraphic instruction to Ambassador von Papen, in which
he is ordered to exercise absolute reserve in this matter.
M inister Hewel informs me that the reports have suggested
to the Fhrer the idea o f calling Ambassador von Papen
to Germany in order that he m ight be told b y word o f mouth
* T h e do cu m en t bears W o e rm a n n s in itia l.

102

v/ ^

'

' f r " ,

'

P h o t o s ta tic c o p y o f fir s t p a g e o f D o c u m e n t N o . 30

to exercise the utmost reserve in these matters and not to


be led into any inopportune conversations. I believe that
the attached telegraphic instruction, which has not yet been
sent, would create the necessary guarantee that Herr von
Papen w ill not pursue this subject any farther in Ankara.
I f I were to have Ambassador von Papen come here at this
juncture, it m ay be presumed that in view o f the undesir
able publicity which his trips usually get in the interna
tional press, the perverted impression m ight easily be cre
ated abroad that we are on the point o f entering into closer
contact w ith the Turkish Government, and, in view of the
war situation, it would be generally conjectured that this
must be connected writh our operations in the Caucasus and
the future fate of these regions.
I f the Fhrer therefore agrees, I would suggest that we
coniine ourselves for the present to sending the enclosed
instruction to Herr von Papen. Should however, the Fhrer
desire that I have Herr von Papen come here nonetheless,
in order to discuss this and perhaps other questions with
him, I should be grateful for an intim ation to this effect.
F u s c h l, S e p te m b e r, 12 , 1942

End o f note for Fhrer


D raft telegram follows

Secret
G e rm a n E m b a s s y ,
A n kara

For the Ambassador personally


As is evident from your telegrams o f August 26 and 28,
and from your written report o f August 27, in your latest
conversation w ith Turkish statesmen the subject o f T u r
kish interest in the T u rkic peoples in the Caucasus and other
former Soviet-Russian regions was repeatedly raised, and
the question was also discussed how Turkey could co
operate in the solution o f the problems involved. Both Herr
Numan and Herr Saracoglu took advantage o f this oppor
tunity to stress T u rk e y s interest in this m atter and, by
means o f vague offers to advise us on these questions, con
fidentially or through a third person, to present T u rk e y s
wishes and demands, at the same tim e em phatically reiter
ating T u rk e y s known neutral position.
W e have no interest just now in entering into any con
versations w ith the Turkish Government concerning these
questions and thus prejudicing their development. N or is
there anything to induce us to give the Turks any assurances
or to present them w ith the opportunity to convey to us
their wishes and demands relative to these questions, for
obviously Turkish interest in these matters does not yet
go so far as to prompt T u rkey to change her general political
attitude toward the belligerent Powers in our favour.
I therefore request you not to enter into any further con
versations on these questions and, should the Turks again
bring up the problem o f the T u rkic peoples in the Soviet
Union, to exercise the utmost reserve.

Ribbentrop
E n d o f d r a ft

Sonnleithner

No. 31
KROLL TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM
T lie r a p ia . S ep tem b e r 2 1 . 1942
R e c e iv e d : S ep tem b e r 2 1 , 19 4 2 , 19 h . 20 m .
N o . 1322
P o l V I I 1242 seer.

In reply to telegram N o. 1334 o f September 16.


T h e report o f the Greek Ambassador, o f whom it is
generally known that he is not very scrupulous w ith the
truth, regarding the impression W illk ie s tables o f figures
supposedly made on Numan is certainly incorrect. On the
Ambassadors instructions, I was m yself personally in An
kara during W illk ie s. visit, and from m y talks w ith Numan,
w ith p olitically influential Foreign Office officials, w ith the
Director-General o f the Press, and w ith members o f par
liament, I got the uniform impression that W illk ie s prim
itive, stereotyped and extremely superficial arguments were
assessed as pure propaganda. T h e Turks agreed w ith me
that the American production figures could give a useful
picture only i f they were compared w ith the production
figures o f the A xis, w hich could not be done because o f their
secrecy. I o f course had no difficulty in scoffing at W illk ie s
prediction that next year the German U-boats w ill sink
only 350,000 tons per month. H is assertion that Rom mels
107

offensive power was smashed and that the Egyptian front


was definitely secured, did, it is true, give food for reflec
tion here, but, in view o f the m any surprises that have al
ready been experienced in this field, it was not altogether
convincing. . T h e Turks even considered the manner in
which a civilian like W illk ie spoke of so tried and tested
a m ilitary leader as Rommel extremely tactless.
N aturally, after having seriously erred regarding the
Soviet Union, Italy, France, etc., the Turkish Government
is interested to have as reliable a picture as possible of
the present and future m ilitary strength o f the United
States. I t is known that the former Turkish M inister in
Cairo has been sent to Washington to devote him self spe
cially to this subject. W illk ie s visit was also certainly
utilized to obtain from him confidential explanations on
certain, matters. T h a t he was in a position to do so, seems
to me doubtful. As already reported in previous telegrams
(see N o. 1276 o f September 10 and N o. 1285 o f September 11),
the Turks took advantage of the visit in order in the first
place to press for the speediest and largest possible deliv
eries o f war materia! and grain. T h e rumours spread b y
the Rumanians and Italians that W illk ie offered a loan of
one billion dollars and delivery o f 5,000 aircraft are still
unconfirmed. T h ey were probably launched b y the Ameri
cans a id British themselves in order to cover up W illk ie s
failure.

Kroll

No. .32
KILLINGER TO GERMAN -FOREIGN OFFICE*

TELEGRAM
S e c r 'e t
B u ch a re st, O c to b e r 25, 1942, 11 h . 00 m .
R e c e iv e d : O c to b e r 2 5 , 19 4 2 , I I
N o . 5307, O c to b e r 25

h . 15 m .

Th e Vice-Prem ier told me that he had had a talk with


T urkish Ambassador Tanriover, who lias returned after a
iongisli stay in T urkey. Tanriover declared that Russia was
s till Enemy N o. 1 for Turkey, and that the latter would
continue to observe strict neutrality.

K illinger

* T h e do cu m en t bears th e n o ta tio n in
A n k a r a b y c o u r ie r .

109

b la c k p en cil:

Copy

to

No. 33
PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE*

G e rm a n E m b a ssy
N o . 717/4 2 seer.

Secret
A n ka ra

December 2 , 19 4 2

F o re ig n O ffice,
B e rlin

Re: Conversation Between the M ilita ry Attach


and the Turkish D eputy C h ie f o f Staff
Yesterday, Major-General Rohde had a lengthy con
versation w ith the D eputy C h ief o f Staff, Colonel-General
Asim Gndz. I should like to draw particular attention,
to his report, which w ill arrive w ith this same courier.
T h e Coonel-Genera seriously criticized the opera
tional measures o f the German General Staff, and was amazed
that the communications he had made to the M ilita ry A t
tach regarding the impending threat to N orth A frica had
remained unheeded b y the German side and no countermeasures had been taken. T h e M ilita ry Attach -got the
impression that the very frank, i f critical, remarks o f the
Colonel-General were prompted by deep concern that we
* T h e first p age o f the d o cu m en t bears

W e iz s a c k e r s in itia l and

the stam p : S u b m itte d to th e R e ich sm in iste r o f F o re ig n A ff a ir s . '

110

P h o to s ta tic c o p y o f first p a g e o f D o c u m e n t N o . 33

m ight not succeed in bringing the operations on the Eastern


Front to a conclusion which would guarantee the security
o f Europe.
T h e German General S taff had acted contrary to the car
dinal rules o f classical strategy b y neglecting to build up
the necessary concentrations o f strength in the vita l sectors
o f the war theatre. In the opinion o f the Turkish General
Staff, Stalingrad, which had obviously riveted far too many
German forces for far too long a time, was not a strategical
objective. Owing to the heavy expenditure o f available re
serves at this focal point, the Caucasian Front was left w ith
out adequate concentrations o f strength and the offensive
there consequently petered out.
Position E g y p t, which was so decisive for the future
of the A xis, had not been captured and had succumbed
to British attack, because air support on the Eastern Front
had also obviously absorbed forces which should have been
used for success here.
T h e Colonel-General believed that it m ight definitely
be taken that the Eastern Front in its entirety could be
held. T h e question, however, was whether the German Gen
eral Staff would be able to concentrate a sufficient number
o f divisions on this front in order either to undertake a new
offensive in the spring w ith adequate shock strength, or to
hold what in his opinion is the most threatened sector of
the A xis, Ita ly . T h e chances o f retaining N orth A frica are
apparently estimated very low here. T h e Turkish General
Staff believes that in Tunis only about three divisions are
available in ail, against six British and American divisions
and the total fighting potential o f the French armed forces
in North Africa.
Particularly worthy o f attention seems the Colonel-Gen
erals intimation that the British w ill attempt a landing
in the spring in the N orth o f N orw ay, in order to lend a
81303

113

hand to the Russians on the Finnish front. T h e aim appar


ently is, b y an attack at the extreme ends o f the front, to
cause the greatest possible strain on G erm anys transport
facilities and a scattering o f reserves.
Interesting in this connection is a conversation I had
today w ith the very well-informed M inister o f a neutralcountry. In a recent report I have already quoted this same
source as saying that the enemy is showing extremely great
interest in the A x is fuel supply. T o d ay he told me that it
is the intention of the enemy Powers to take advantage of
the present unsatisfactory fuel situation o f the A xis to com
pel us to expend the maximum possible quantity o f fuel
precisely this winter. I f we should succeed by economies this
winter in building up a new stock which would permit
operations on a big scale in the spring, then the enemy would
have missed a very great chance. For our fuel situation next
year, thanks to the M aikop yield, would probably be much
better.

Papen

P h o t o s ta tic c o p y o f la s t p age o f D o c u m e n t N o . 33

8*

No. 34
R IB B E N TR O P T O PA PEN

TELEGRAM

Secret
S p e c ia l tr a in , D e ce m b er 5 , 19 4 2 , 2 h . 30 m .
R e c e iv e d : D e ce m b e r 5 , 19 4 2 . 3 h . 30 m .
N o . 1526
G erm an E m b a ss y ,
A n kara

For the Ambassador personally


In response to your communication o f November 2c
A 6154 I have given instructions to remit to you immediately
five m illion Reichsmarks in gold, so that you m ay be in
a position to help out our friends in T u rkey in their strait
ened circumstances. request you to use this money most
generously and to report.

R ib ben trop
T r a n s m itte d to th e G e rm a n
B e r lin , D e ce m b e r 5 , 1942

E m b a ss y , A n k a r a , N o .

117

1700

No. 35
SEILER TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Istanbul, December

9 , 1942

Turkey, which would be very unw illing to see the B rit


ish driven out o f the Mediterranean (Suez Canal), on the
other hand, wishes us success in our campaign against Rus
sia and is sincerely worried that our strength m ay not suf
fice to put the Russians out o f the running, at least for
some time to come. She is today less inclined than ever to
contribute to this, since, as the Turks see it, the final issue
still seems very much in doubt. T h e Turks, it is true, clearly
realize that a British victory would mean a Russian vic
tory, and hence an end to T u rk e y s domination o f the Straits.
This realization is, however, compensated b y the increas
ing pressure which is being exerted, notably b y the Ameri
cans, in order to take advantage o f the difficult food situa
tion T u rkey is in as a result o f three bad harvests in suc
cession. T h e object o f the Americans is undoubtedly to
use T u rkey as an air base for raids on the Rumanian oil
fields. T h is is the purpose o f the airfields being b u ilt by
the British. Further, roads are being b u ilt in South Ana
tolia which can have meaning only i f they are intended for
the transit o f troops in the direction o f Izm ir-Salonika. W heth
er the Americans intend to carry out this plan independ
ently of, parallel w ith, or after the failure o f an undertaking
118

in French N orth A frica, we, o f course, are not in a position


to judge.
Foreign M inister Numan, in the name o f and on the orders
o f the Cabinet, has informed the Ambassador that, even
if the A xis were on the eve o f collapse, T u rkey does not
intend to renounce her neutrality, but, on the contrary,
w ill defend it under all circumstances. I am inclined to be
lieve that this declaration corresponds w ith the view of
the General Staff, as w ell as w ith T u rk e y s real inter
est, w hich certainly cannot lie in a collapse o f Ger
many. I am therefore inclined to believe that N um ans decla
ration also reflects the sincere opinion o f the Foreign Office,
at least at the present juncture. However, there are some, no
tably among the m ilitary attachs and journalists, who
question whether T u rkey would still defend her neutrality
if the Americans should be in a position to build up a big
army in the Near East, and i f Germ any, whose position in
respect to transport (Black Sea) is very unfavourable, should
have nothing to counter it w ith. Further, they regard the
close collaboration between British and Turkish m ilitary
men as very suspicious. I would not go so far as they and
believe that T u rkey is already playing a perfidious game
w ith us and leading us b y the nose, but am rather inclined
to think that T u rkey is at present non-committally making
eyes to our enemies in order to obtain as much war m aterial
as possible. In any case, caution is indicated.

Seiler

No 36
MANNSTEIN T O D IR KSEN

M a y 9, 194.3

H ighly Esteemed Herr von Dirksen,


M any thanks for your detailed and interesting letter.
I should first o f all like to express m y regret that your
wife does not feel so w ell and to convey m y best wishes
to her.
Your impressions o f your visit to Niedermeyer interest
me very much. I f only these auxiliary peoples m ight really
develop into useful soldiers for us! So far they have m ostly
run away when the Russians seriously attacked. It would
naturally be a great relief i f Russians and alien peoples could
be put into action on a big scale against the Bolsheviks.
B ut the difficult thing w ill always be w hat object to offer
them, since their interests are antithetical, and in the long
run diverge from ours. It is certainly true that the attempt
to bring about a split should have been made earlier, and
above all should have been prepared b y suitable'behaviour
in the occupied areas.
I am now sitting again at m y headquarters in the sum
mer heat and w aiting for things to happen. So far it; is still
quiet. T h e developments in Tunis are very regrettable.
Above all, it w ill again have a depressing effect in Germ any,
120

and it w ill scarcely prompt the Italians to new enthusiasm


for the war.
Unfortunately, I must now close, because m y m ail has
accumulated.
W ith cordial wishes for your wife, and best greetings,
Yours very truly,

Mannstein

NAM E
A B D U L -H A M ID

IN D E X

I I : S u lta n o f T u r k e y ; b o rn 1842; su cce e d e d to

th e th ro n e in 18 7 6 , and d e p o se d in 1909; d ie d 1 9 1 8 . 34 , 36
A L I F U A D : C f . E rd e n A l i F u a d
A R I K A N , S A F F E T : T u r k is h M in is te r o f D e fe n c e , 1940 -41; A m
b a s s a d o r to B e r lin , J u ly 1942 to A u g u s t 19 4 4 . 82
A T A T R K , G H A Z I M U S T A F A K E M A L : L e a d e r o f th e T u r k is h
n a t io n a l

lib e r a tio n

m o v e m e n t;

P r e s id e n t

of

T u r k is h

R e

p u b lic ; b o rn 1S 8 1; d ie d 19 3 8 . 3 5 , 64
BAKU

M U R S E L P A S H A : B r ig a d ie r - G e n e r a l; in W o r ld W a r I
c o m m an d e d the T u r k is h a rm y in th e C a u c a s u s w h ic h o c c u p ie d
B a k u in 19 18 ; in 19 3 7 , in sp e c to r o f c a v a lr y ; fro m M a r c h 1943,,
m e m b er o f the C o m m itte e o f N a t io n a l D e fe n c e , a n d D e p u t y
fro m K o c a e li to 7 d n m o f M e j li s . 74

B A L A M I R S A : M e m b e r o f P a n - T u r k ic m o v e m e n t and c o lla b o r a to r
o f R a s u l-Z a d e . 37
B A Y E Z I D : T h e referen ce is p re s u m a b ly to S u lta n B a y e z id I ;
b o rn 13 4 7 ; su cce e d e d to th e th ro n e , 1389; d ie d 14 0 3 . 77
B O R I S I I I : T s a r ; born 1894; su cceed ed to th e th ro n e O c to b e r 1 9 1 8 :
d ie d A u g u s t 28, 19 4 3 . 14
B R A U C H I T S C H , W A L T H E R von : N a z i F ie id -M a r s h a l; C o m m a n
d e r - in -C h ie f o f th e H itle r G e rm a n A r m y , 19 3 8 -4 1. 42
A K M A K , F E V Z : M a r s h a l; T u r k is h C h ie f-o f-S ta ff; re tir e d J a
n u a r y 12 , 1944 . 4 2 , 4 5 , 7 4 , 76
CAFER AH M ED

( S A T C A F E R ; C A F E R O G L U ) : W h ite m ig r,

m e m b e r o f th e P a n - T u r k ic m o v e m e n t in T u r k e y , 35
C H U R C H IL L , W IN S T O N

S P E N C E R : 5

C L O D I U S : G erm a n d ip lo m a tis t; h e a d e d th e d e le g a tio n to n e g o tia te


a c o m m e r c ia l a g re e m e n t w it h T u r k e y in 1 9 4 1 . 72
C R P P S , S I R S T A F F O R D : M . P .; M e m b e r B r itis h L a b o u r P a r t y ;
A m b a s sa d o r to U . S . S . R . ,
C o a litio n C a b in e t . 66

1940-42; m em b er o f C h u r c h ilT s

122

D I R K S E N , H E R B E R T v o n : G e rm a n d ip lo m a tis t: A m b a ssa d o r to
L o n d o n 193S-39; fro m O c to b e r 1939 in F o r e ig n O ffice re
s e r v e . 5 , 120
D I T T M A N N , H .: L e g a tio n C o u n se llo r and officia l a t th e G erm a n
F o r e ig n O ffice ; in 1940, C o u n se llo r to th e G e rm a n L e g a tio n
in T e h e r a n . 4 , 7 9 , 81
E D I G E K E M A L : L a w y e r ; m e m b er o f th e P a n - T u r k ic m o v e m e n t;
w a s se n t fro m T u r k e y to th e C rim e a to a ssist th e G erm an s in
e s ta b lis h in g tie s w it h th e C rim e a n T a t a r s . 48
E D E N , R O B E R T A N T H O N Y : B r itis h S e c re ta ry o f S ta te fo r F o r
e ig n / f f i i r s in C h u r c h ill s C a b in e t , 1940-45. 55
E N V E R P A S H A : L e a d e r o f th e Y o u n g T u r k s ; T u r k is h W a r M in
is te r in W o r ld W a r I ; P a n - T u r k ; on e o f th e o rga n izers o f
th e B a s m a c h m o v e m e n t in C e n tr a l A s ia , w h ere h e w as k ille d
in 19 2 2 . 35
E R D E N A L I F U A D : In 19 3 7, d ir e c to r o f th e T u r k is h M ilit a r y
A c a d e m y ; M e jiis D e p u ty ;

la te r u n t il F e b r u a r y 1944 , com

m a n d e d 3rd A r m y C o rp s, th en P r e s id e n t o f th e S u p re m e M i l
i t a r y C o u r t o f C a s s a tio n . 39-42, 44, 55
ESD M AN N SD O SFF, O TTO
to B u d a p e s t,

19 3 7 -4 1;

v o n : G erm a n d ip lo m a tis t: M in is te r
fro m 1942 ,

o fficia l

in

th e F o re ig n

O ffic e . 4 5 , 46
E R K I L E T H S E Y I N H S N E M I R : R e tir e d T u r k is h

g en eral;

on e o f th e lead ers o f th e P a n - T u r k ic m o v e m e n t. 4 , 38, 4 3,


44, 4 7 , 48, 62
F A G L M S T E C I B : L a w y e r ; M e m b e r o f th e P a n - T u r k ic m o v e
m e n t; se n t fro m T u r k e y to th e C rim e a to a ss ist th e G erm an s
in e s ta b lis h in g ties w it h th e C rim e a n T a t a r s . 48
F R A U E N F E L D : A u s tr ia n N a z i; se rv e d w it h th e N a z i a d m in is tra tio n
o f th e C r im e a , 1942 -43. 80
F R O M M : C o lo n e l-G e n e r a l in H i t le r s a r m y . 40
F U N K , W A L T H E R : M a jo r G e rm a n w a r c rim in a l; S e c r e ta r y o f S ta te
in R e ic h M in is t r y o f N a tio n a l E c o n o m y ; H e a d o f th e R e ic h sb a n k as su ccessor to D r . S c h a c h t sin c e 1939; se n ten ced b y the
In te r n a tio n a l M i li t a r y T r ib u n a l to life lo n g im p riso n m en t in
19 4 6 . 66
G E R E D E , H S R E V : T u r k is h d ip lo m a tis t; A m b a s sa d o r to G e r m a n y
1939-42. 3, 39, 45
G N D Z A S I M : C o lo n e l- G e n e r a l; D e p u t y C h ie f-o f-S ta ff o f T u r k
ish A r m y . n o

123

H A M D U L L A H S U P H I T A N R I V E R : T u r k is h M in is te r to B u c h a
r e s t. 109
H A R U N : L e c tu r e r a t te c h n ic a l c o lle g e in B e r lin . 4 , 4 5 , 76 , 77
H E N T G : G e rm a n d ip lo m a tis t w it h ra n k o f M in is te r , o fficia l a t
th e F o r e ig n O ffice . 4 3-4 7, 76 , 77
H E W 'E L - W E H R W O L F : G e rm a n d ip lo m a tis t; C h ie f o f th e p e rs o n a l
s t a f f o f R ib b e n tro p , G e rm a n F o r e ig n M in is t e r . 5 , 102
H I T L E R , A D O L F : 7 , 2 7 , 40-42, 49, 56, 7 1 - 7 3 , 7 9 , 82, 8 7 , 88,.
93, 99, 10 2, 105
I D R I S : P ro fesso r; m em b er o f th e P a n - T u r k ic m o v e m e n t. 48
J E N K E , A .: C o m m e rc ia l C o u n se llo r to th e G e rm a n E m b a s s y inA n k a r a , 1940-42. 55
K E I T E L , W I L H E L M : G e n e ra l; M a jo r G e rm a n w a r c r im in a l; offi
c ia l in th e W a r M in is t r y , 1935-38; fro m 1938 t i l l th e d e fe a t
o f H it le r G e r m a n y , C h ie f o f S t a f f o f th e O b erk o m m an d o o f
the W e h rm a c h t. F ie ld -M a r s h a l fro m 19 4 1; e x e c u te d in 1946
by

se n ten ce o f th e

7U

72 , 73

K IL L IN G E R ,

I n te r n a tio n a l

M ANFRED

B aron

M ilita r y

von:

G e rm a n

T r ib u n a l. 42,
d ip lo m a tis t

M in is te r to B u c h a re s t. 5 , 109
K R O L L , H . A . : C o u n se llo r to G e rm a n E m b a ss y in A n k a r a , 19404 1 . 5 , 10 7 , 108
M A N N S T E I N : F ie ld -M a r s h a l; co m m an d ed th e G e rm a n s o u th e rn
a rm y gro u p on the S o v ie t f r o n t . 5 , 120 , 12 1
M E L C H E R S : O ffic ia l in th e P o lit ic a l D e p a r tm e n t o f th e G e rm a n
F o r e ig n O ffice . 46
M E N D E : P ro fesso r; o fficia l o f th e N a z i M in is t r y fo r the E a s te rn
O c c u p ie d A r e a s . S i , 92
M E N E M E N C I O G L U N U M A N : F ro m 19 3 7 , G e n e r a l S e c re ta ry o f
th e T u r k is h F o re ig n O ffice; fro m m id -19 4 2 to 19 4 4 , F o r e ig n
M in is t e r . 4 , 5 , 2 5 , 26, 28, 5 5 , 66, 6 7 , 68, 7 o , 7 8 , 82, 84, 8 5 ,
87, 9 i> 93 , 96 , 97 , 98, 99 , i o 5 , 10 7 , 1 1 9
M E Y E R : O ffic ia l o f th e N a z i M in is t r y fo r th e E a s te r n O c c u p ie d
A r e a s . 80, 81
N E I N : G erm a n c a p ta in . 7
N I E D E R M E Y E R : G e r m a n g e n e r a l. 120
N U M A N M E N E M E N C I O G L U : C f . M e n e m e n cio g u H u m a n
N U R I P A S H A : B ro th e r o f E n v e r P a sh a ; m e m b e r o f th e P a n - T u r
k ic m o v e m e n t. 35
ODER

K E R IM : A

le a d e r o f th e M u s s a v a t i s t s , . a W h ite m igr

o r g a n iz a tio n o f A z e r b a ija n n a t io n a lis ts . 75

124

P A P E N , F R A N Z v o n : M a jo r G e rm a n w a r c rim in a l; R e ic h C h a n
c e llo r , M a y 30, 1 9 3 2 - J a n u a ry 30, 1933; N a z i S p e c ia l A m b a s
s a d o r to A u s t r ia , 1934-38 ; A m b a s sa d o r to T u r k e y , 1939-44.
3-5, 7 -10 , 1 3 , 16 -18 , 2 5 , 30, 32-34, 38, 40, 42, 4 7 , 4 9 , 5 7 ,
65 , 68, 69, 70 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 78 , 7 9 , 8 1, 82, 86, 87, 93, 94, 99, 102,
10 5 , n o ,

114 , 117

P A V L O V : O ffic ia l o f th e S o v ie t C o n s u la te -G e n e ra l in I s ta n b u l. 69.
P I L S U D S K I , J O S E P H : P o lis h sta te s m a n ; in 1918 p ro c la im e d h im
s e lf C h i e f o f S ta t e ; in 1926 h e te m p o r a r ily re tir e d fro m p o
w e r, b u t in 1926 h e o r g a n iz e d a cou p d ? ta t and e sta b lish e d
a m i l i t a r y d ic ta to r s h ip . 36
R A S U L - Z A D E M E H M E T E M I N : L e a d e r o f th e M u s s a v a tis ts , a
W h ite m ig r o r g a n iz a tio n o f A z e r b a ija n n a tio n a lis ts ; m em
b e r o f th e P a n - T u r k i c m o v e m e n t. 36, 3 7 , 75
R I B B E N T R O P , J O A C H I M von : M a jo r G erm a n w a r c r im in a l;
A m b a s sa d o r to G r e a t B r it a in , 1936-38; R e ic h sm in iste r o f
F o r e ig n A ffa irs fro m F e b r u a r y 1938 to d o w n fa ll o f H it le r
G e r m a n y ; e x e c u te d b y se n te n ce o f th e In te r n a tio n a l M i l i
t a r y T r ib u n a l in 19 4 6 . 3 , 5 , 7 , 9 -10 , 12, 13 , 15 -1 6 ,

18,

21,

2 5 ; 2 9 ) SO) 31 ) 39 ) 7 1 ) 103 ) to S , 1 1 7
R I T T E R , K A R L : G e r m a n d ip lo m a tis t; as h e a d o f th e E c o n o m ic
D e p a r tm e n t a t th e M in is t r y o f F o r e ig n A ffa irs in 1930-35,
h e to o k p a r t in p o l it ic a l
and e co n o m ic n e g o tia tio n s
w it h
to

B e lg iu m , P o la n d ,

B r a z il

in

19 3 7-3 8 ,

F in la n d
a fte r

and

F ra n c e ;

A m b a ssa d o r

w h ic h

w o rk e d

in

F o re ig n

O ffice . 7 1 , 73
R O H D E , H .:

M a jo r -G e n e r a l;

G e rm a n m ilit a r y

a tta c h

in

T u r

k e y . 47) i t o
R O M M E L , E R W I N : F ie ld -M a r s h a l co m m a n d in g th e G e rm a n fo rces
in N o r th A f r ic a , 19 4 1-4 3 , th e n in I t a l y . 98, 10 7, i o 3
R O O S E V E L T , F R A N K L I N D E L A N O : 56
R O S E N B E R G , A L F R E D : M a jo r G e rm a n w a r c rim in a l; D ir e c t o r
o f th e F o r e ig n O ffice o f N a z i P a r t y ; E d ito r -in -C h ie f o f th e
V lk isch er Beobachter, 19 19 -3 8 ; R iin is te r fo r E a ste rn O c c u p ie d
A r e a s , 19 4 1-4 4 ; e x e c u te d b y se n ten ce o f th e I n te r n a tio n a l
M i l i t a r y T r ib u n a l in 19 4 6 . 79 , 8 1,
S A R A C O G L U S H U K R U : T u r k is h

F o r e ig n M in is te r fro m 193S to

A u g u s t 19 4 2 , th e n P rim e M in is t e r . 8, x6, 18 , 3 1-3 3 , 55 ,


5 6, 6 7 , 87, 9 1 , 93, 94, 96, i o 5

125

S C H U L E N B U R G , F R I E D R I C H W E R N E R von : G e rm a n d ip lo
m a tis t; A m b a ssa d o r to M o sco w fro m 1938 u n t il H i t l e r s
a tta c k on th e U . S . S . R .; la te r o fficia l in F o r e ig n O ffic e . 8 0 ,
81
S E F K E T M E M D U H ( E S E N D A L ) : T u r k is h A m b a s sa d o r to K a b u l .

35
S E I L E R , F . : G e rm a n C o n s u l-G e n e ra l in I s ta n b u l, 1940-43. 5 , 1 1 8 ,

119
S E Y D A M R E F I K : T u r k is h P rim e M in is te r , 1939-42; d ie d J u ly 7 .
19 4 2 . 96
S H U K R U , Y E N : C f. Y e n i S h u k ru b a b a
S I K O R S K W .: G e n e ra l; P rim e M in is te r and W a r M in is te r o f th e
e x ile P o lis h go ve rn m e n t in L o n d o n , 193 9-43 . 3 5 , 36
S O N N L E I T H N E R : M e m b e r o f R ib b e n t r o p s p e rs o n a l s t a f f . i o 5
S T A L I N , J .V .: 55
T A N R I V E R , H A M D U L L A H S U P H : C f . H a m d u lla h S u p h i T a n
r ver
T IP P E L S K R C H :

G erm an

d ip lo m a tis t;

o fficia l

at

th e

F o re ig n

O ffic e . 4 , 7 9 , 81
V E L , M E N G E R : C o n fid e n tia l a g e n t o f E r k iie t fo r c o n ta c ts w it h
G e r m a n s . 47
V E L I D I Z E K H I ( T O G A N ) : M e m b e r o f th e c o u n te r -re v o lu tio n a ry
m o v e m e n t in B a s h k ir ia , th en W h ite m igr; r e c e iv e d t it le
o f p ro fesso r in T u r k e y ; a le a d e r o f th P a n - T u r k ic

o r g a n iz a

t io n . 35
V O R O S H I L O V , K L I M E N T E F R E M O V I C H : M a r s h a l o f th e S o v ie t
U n io n ; V ic e -C h a irm a n o f th e C o u n c il o f

P e o p le s C o m m is

sa rs, 1940-46; V ic e -C h a irm a n o f th e C o u n c il o f M in is t e r s ,


sin c e 1946; d u rin g th e G r e a t P a t r io t ic

W a r , m e m b er o f the

S ta t e C o m m itte e fo r D e fe n c e . 85
W A R L I M O N T : L ie u te n a n t-G e n e r a l; c h ie f o f o p e ra tio n s a n d p la n
n in g se ctio n s o f th e O p e ra tio n a l D e p a r tm e n t o f th e G e rm a n
H ig h C o m m a n d . 4 , 6 1 , 62
W E IZ S C K E R ,

ERNST,

B aro n

von :

G erm a n

re c to r o f P o lit ic a l D e p a rtm e n t o f F o r e ig n
S e c re ta ry o f S ta te a t F o re ig n O ffice,

d ip lo m a tis t; D i
O ffice, 1936-38:

1938-43. 3, 39,

40,

49, 6 1 , 95, n o
W IE H L ,

E M IL :

C o m m issio n e r fo r C o m m e rc ia l

G e rm a n F o r e ig n O ffic e . 4 , 65, 7 1 , 73

T r e a t ie s

a t the

W E L L K IE , W E N D E L L :

R e p u b lic a n c a n d id a te fo r p re s id e n c y o f

th e U n ite d S ta te s in 1940; d ie d 19 4 4 . 86, 10 7 , 10S


W IL S O N ,

HENRY

cer, b o m

M A IT L A N D :

18 8 1; se rv e d in

F ie ld -M a rs h a l;

B r itis h

offi

19 14 -18 w a r; in 1 9 4 1 , M i l i t a r y

G o v . and G e n . officer co m m a n d in g C y r e n a ic a , G re e c e , P a le s
tin e and T ra n s jo rd a n ; a p p o in te d com m an d er 9 th A r m y in
M id d le E a s t, 1 9 4 1 ; G e n . officer c o m m an d in g I r a q , and P e r
s ia , 1942-43; B r itis h C o m m a n d e r -in -C h ie f M id d le E a s t, 19 4 3 44; S u p rem e A llie d C o m m a n d er in M e d ite rra n e a n

T h e a tr e

1 9 4 4 85
W OERM ANN,

ERN ST:

ic a l D e p a r tm e n t

G erm a n d ip lo m a tis t; D ir e c to r o f P o lit

and U n d e r S e c re ta ry o f S ta t e a t F o re ig n

O ffice, 193 8 -4 3. 4 , 4 5 , 46, 49, 6 1 , 65 , 7 1 , 87, 95 , 102


Y A L I N , H S E Y I N C A H I T : T u r k is h jo u r n a lis t, e d ito r o f T a n in :
M e jlis D e p u t y . 87
YENI

SH UKRU

bah a:

M e jlis

D e p u ty

o f th e P a n - T u r k ic m o v e m e n t. 35
Z I M M E R M A N N : SS

B r ig a d e -F h r e r . 92

fro m

I s ta n b u l; m e m b er