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Case #01
RAUL SABERON, JOAN F. SABERON and JACQUELINE
SABERON, Petitioners,
vs.
OSCAR VENTANILLA, JR., and CARMEN GLORIA D.
VENTANILLA, Respondents.
Facts:
On March 3, 1970, Manila Remnant Co., Inc. (MRCI) and A.U.
Valencia & Co. Inc. (AUVC) executed two (2) contracts to sell in
favor of Oscar C. Ventanilla, Jr. and Carmen Gloria D. Ventanilla
(Ventanillas). MRCI resold the same property to Carlos Crisostomo
(Crisostomo).
Aggrieved, the Ventanillas commenced an action for specific
performance, annulment of deeds and damages against MRCI,
AUVC, and Crisostomo with the Court of First Instance. The CFI
Quezon City rendered a decision in favor of the Ventanillas. The CA
sustained the CFI Quezon Citys decision in toto. The Ventanillas
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ was issued
and served upon MRCI.
However, MRCI alleged that the subject properties could not longer
be delivered to the Ventanillas because they had already been sold
to Samuel Marquez (Marquez)
The case was elevated to this Court where MRCI argued that the
sale of the properties to Marquez was valid because at the time of
the sale, the issue of the validity of the sale to the Ventanillas had
not yet been resolved. Further, there was no specific injunction
against it re-selling the property. As a buyer in good faith, Marquez
had a right to rely on the recitals in the certificate of title. The
subject matter of the controversy having been passed to an
innocent purchaser for value, the execution of the absolute deed of
sale in favor of the Ventanillas could not be ordered by the trial

court. Yet the court ruled in favor of the Vetanillas. As it turned


out, the execution of the judgment in favor of the Ventanillas was
yet far from fruition. Samuel Cleofe, Register of Deeds for Quezon
City (ROD Cleofe) revealed to them, that on March 11, 1992, MRCI
registered a deed of absolute sale to Marquez who eventually sold
the same property to the Saberons, which conveyance was
registered in July 1992. ROD Cleofe opined that a judicial order for
the cancellation of the titles in the name of the Saberons was
essential before he complied with the writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 26411. Apparently, the notice of levy, through inadvertence,
was not carried over to the title issued to Marquez, the same being
a junior encumbrance which was entered after the contract to sell
to Marquez had already been annotated.
Once again, the Ventanillas were constrained to go to court to seek
the annulment of the deed of sale executed between MRCI and
Marquez as well as the deed of sale between Marquez and the
Saberons, as the fruits of void conveyances. RTC ruled in favor of
the Ventanillas
Meanwhile, the Saberons filed a case in the CA relying on one
central argumentthat they were purchasers in good faith, having
relied on the correctness of the certificates of title covering the lots
in question; and therefore, holders of a valid and indefeasible title.
CA ruled in favor of the Ventanillas. The Saberons filed the present
petition.
Unknown to the Saberons, the former owner of the properties had
entered into contracts to sell with the Ventanillas, way back in
1970. It was only upon receipt of the summons in the case filed by
the Ventanillas with the RTC that they learned of the present
controversy.
With the RTC and the CA rulings against their title over the
properties, the Saberons now come to the Court with their
vehement insistence that they were purchasers in good faith and

for value. Before purchasing the lots, they exercised due diligence
and found no encumbrance or annotations on the titles. At the
same time, the Ventanillas also failed to rebut the presumption of
their good faith as there was no showing that they confederated
with MRCI and its officers to deprive the Ventanillas of their right
over the subject properties.
According to the Saberons, the CA likewise erred in ruling that there
was no constructive notice of the levy made upon the subject lands.
Issue:
Whether or not there was constructive notice of levy as an
encumbrance prior to the sale to the Saberons.
Ruling:
the Court is beckoned to rule on two conflicting rights over the
subject properties: the right of the Ventanillas to acquire the title to
the registered land from the moment of inscription of the notice of
levy on the day book (or entry book), on one hand; and the right of
the Saberons to rely on what appears on the certificate of title for
purposes of voluntary dealings with the same parcel of land, on the
other.
The Saberons could not be said to have authored the entanglement
they found themselves in. No fault can be attributed to them for
relying on the face of the title presented by Marquez. In ultimately
ruling for the Ventanillas, the courts a quo focused on the
superiority of their notice of levy and the constructive notice
against the whole world which it had produced and which
effectively bound third persons including the Saberons.
This complex situation could have been avoided if it were not for
the failure of ROD Cleofe to carry over the notice of levy to

Marquezs title, serving as a senior encumbrance that might have


dissuaded the Saberons from purchasing the properties.
It is undeniable, therefore, that no title was transferred to Marquez
upon the annotation of the contract to sell on MRCIs title. As
correctly found by the trial court, the contract to sell cannot be
substituted by the Deed of Absolute Sale as a "mere conclusion" of
the previous contract since the owners of the properties under the
two instruments are different. Considering that the deed of sale in
favor of Marquez was of later registration, the notice of levy should
have been carried over to the title as a senior encumbrance.
The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated
on the original title on file in the Registry of Deeds, which resulted
in its non-annotation on the title TCT No. PT-94912, should not
prejudice petitioner. As long as the requisites required by law in
order to effect attachment are complied with and the appropriate
fees duly paid, attachment is duly perfected. The attachment
already binds the land. This is because what remains to be done lies
not within the petitioners power to perform but is a duty incumbent
solely on the Register of Deeds.
In the case at bench, the notice of levy covering the subject
property was annotated in the entry book of the ROD QC prior to
the issuance of a TCT in the name of the Saberons. Clearly, the
Ventanillas levy was placed on record prior to the sale. This shows
the superiority and preference in rights of the Ventanillas over the
property as against the Saberons.
Case #02
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE,
EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUT-MISA, TERESITA C.
BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G. ALMAZAR, Petitioners,
Vs.
PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.

Facts:
In holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her status as
a regular and not a probationary employee, the Court finds that the
NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Records show that the NLRC based its decision on the premise that
Alcarazs receipt of her job description and Abbotts Code of
Conduct and Performance Modules was not equivalent to being
actually informed of the performance standards upon which she
should have been evaluated on. It, however, overlooked the legal
implication of the other attendant circumstances as detailed herein
which should have warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz was
indeed a probationary and not a regular employee more
particularly the fact that she was well-aware of her duties and
responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the same
would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her
termination.
CA found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
and denied the certiorari petition before it, the reversal of its ruling
was thus in order.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC decisions are not subject to appellate review
NLRC decisions are, by their nature, final and executory and, hence,
not subject to appellate review, the Court is not precluded from
considering other questions of law aside from the CAs finding on
the NLRCs grave abuse of discretion. While the focal point of
analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with ancillary

issues such as, in this case, the question of how a probationary


employee is deemed to have been informed of the standards of his
regularization if only to determine if the concepts and principles of
labor law were correctly applied or misapplied by the NLRC in its
decision.
In other words, the Courts analysis of the NLRCs interpretation of
the environmental principles and concepts of labor law is not
completely prohibited in as it is complementary to a Rule 45
review of labor cases.
Case #03
ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., Petitioner,
Vs.
SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T.
LAZARO, Respondent.
Facts:
Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC,
seeking to recover from Spouses Tito S. Lazaro and Carmen T.
Lazaro the sum of P2,160,000.00, which represented the amounts
stated in several dishonored checks issued by the latter to the
former, as well as interests, attorneys fees, and costs.
The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and
upon the posting of the required P2,160,000.00 bond, issued the
corresponding writ. In this accord, 3 parcels of land situated in
Bulacan, covered by TCTs, registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro,
were levied upon.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, Sps. Lazaro averred, among
others, that Lim, Jr. had no cause of action against them since: (a)
Colim Merchandise and not Lim, Jr., was the payee of the fifteen

(15) Metrobank checks; and (b) the PNB and Real Bank checks were
not drawn by them, but by Virgilio Arcinas and Elizabeth Ramos,
respectively. While they admit their indebtedness to Colim, Sps.
Lazaro alleged that the same had already been substantially
reduced on account of previous payments which were apparently
misapplied. In this regard, they sought for an accounting and
reconciliation of records to determine the actual amount due. They
likewise argued that no fraud should be imputed against them as
the aforesaid checks issued to Colim were merely intended as a
form of collateral. Hinged on the same grounds, Sps. Lazaro equally
opposed the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Nonetheless,
the
parties
entered
into
a
Compromise
Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount
of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of
payments covering the period from September 2006 until October
2013. RTC approved the compromise agreement.
Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift
the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on the subject TCTs,
which the RTC granted. It ruled that a writ of preliminary
attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by
a litigant to protect and preserve certain rights and interests
pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been
considered closed and terminated by the rendition of the Amended
Decision on the basis of the compromise agreement, the writ of
preliminary
attachment
should
be
lifted
and
quashed.
Consequently, it ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel
the writs annotation on the subject TCTs.
Lim, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA rendered the assailed decision, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the RTCs part. It observed that a writ of preliminary
attachment may only be issued at the commencement of the action

or at any time before entry of judgment. Thus, since the principal


cause of action had already been declared closed and terminated
by the RTC, the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
attachment would have no leg to stand on, necessitating its
discharge.
Aggrieved, Lim, Jr. moved for reconsideration which was likewise
denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly
lifted.
Ruling:
NO, By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for
its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the
relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal
action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As
such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to
by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests
during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment
in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to
acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure
of the property in those instances where personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the
length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to
subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in
the same manner provided by law.

In Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA, the Court


pronounced that a writ of attachment is not extinguished by the
execution of a compromise agreement between the parties.

charging Dechavez with Dishonesty under Section


46(b)(l), Chapter 6, Tile I of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
The Ombudsman dismissed Dechavez from the
s e r v i c e w i t h a l l a c c e s s o r y p e n a l t i e s a f t e r fi n d i n g
h i m g u i l t y. T h e m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t
D e c h a v e z fi l e d w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y d e n i e d .

Case No. 4
G. R. No. 176702
November 13, 2013
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Pe ti ti oner,
vs.
M A RC E L I N O A . D E C H AV E Z , Re s p o n d e n t .
FA C T S :
Dechavez was the president of the Negros State
College of Agriculture (NSCA) from 2001 until his
retirement on April 9, 2006. On May 5, 2002, a
Sunday, Dechavez and his wife, used the college
service to go to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
D e c h a v e z d r o v e t h e v e h i c l e h i m s e l f. O n t h e i r w a y
b a c k t o t h e N S C A , t h e y fi g u r e d i n a v e h i c u l a r
accident in Himamaylan City, resulting in minor
injuries to the occupants and damage to the
vehicle.
To s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m f o r i n s u r a n c e , D e c h a v e z
e x e c u t e d a n a ffi d a v i t b e f o r e t h e G o v e r n m e n t
Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS
subsequently granted Dechavez's claims.
O n N o v e m b e r 1 1 2 0 0 2 , t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) f a c u l t y a n d s t a ff
members of the NSCA (complainants) asked the
Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit
investigation of NSCAs expenditures in the May 5,
2002 vehicular accident. The COA dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
The complainants then sought recourse with the
O m b u d s m a n , V i s a y a s , t h r o u g h a v e r i fi e d c o m p l a i n t

The Ombudsman argues that the guilt of Dechavez


has been proven by substantial evidence -the
quantum of evidence required in administrative
p r o c e e d i n g s . I t l i k e w i s e i n v o k e s i t s fi n d i n g s a n d
posits that because they are supported by
substantial evidence, they deserve great weight and
must be accorded full respect and credit.
Dechavez counters that the present petition raises
factual issues that are improper for a petition for
re v i e w o n c e r t i o r a r i u n d e r Ru l e 4 5 . H e a d d s t h a t t h e
present case has been mooted by his retirement
from the service on April 9, 2006, and should
properly be dismissed.
The CA examined the same pieces of evidence that
the Ombudsman considered and reversed the
O m b u d s m a n s fi n d i n g s
ISSUE:
1. Whether
conclusive
2. Whether
during the
render the

o r n o t C A s f a c t u a l fi n d i n g s a r e
to the Supreme Court.
or not retirement from the service
pendency of an administrative case
case moot and academic.

HELD:
T h e C o u r t fi n d s t h e p e t i t i o n m e r i t o r i o u s .
1. The rule that the Court will not disturb the CAs
fi n d i n g s o f f a c t i s n o t a n a b s o l u t e r u l e t h a t a d m i t s
of no exceptions. A notable exception is the

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p r e s e n c e o f c o n fl i c t o f fi n d i n g s o f f a c t b e t w e e n o r
among the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact.
The case before us squarely falls under this
exception as the tribunals below made two critical
c o n fl i c t i n g f a c t u a l fi n d i n g s . W e a r e t h u s c o m p e l l e d
to undertake our own factual examination of the
evidence presented.

Case #05
National Artists for Literature Virgilio et al. Petitioners,
Vs.
The Executive Secretary, et al. Respondents.

2 . Re c e n t l y , w e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t i n a c a s e t h a t a
p u b l i c o ffi c i a l ' s c e s s a t i o n f r o m s e r v i c e d o e s n o t
r e n d e r m o o t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a s e t h a t w a s fi l e d
p r i o r t o t h e o ffi c i a l ' s r e s i g n a t i o n . I n t h e 2 0 1 1 c a s e
o f O ffi c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n v . A n d u t a n J r . w e
reiterated the doctrine and laid down the line of
cases supporting this principle when we ruled:

On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued


Proclamation No. 1001 and, upon recommendation of the Board of
Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the
category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded
to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters.
In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first
National Artist.

To r e c a l l , w e h a v e h e l d i n t h e p a s t t h a t a p u b l i c
o ffi c i a l ' s r e s i g n a t i o n d o e s n o t r e n d e r m o o t a n
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a s e t h a t w a s fi l e d p r i o r t o t h e
o ffi c i a l ' s r e s i g n a t i o n . I n P a g a n o v . N a z a r r o , J r . , w e
held that:
C e s s a t i o n f r o m o ffi c e o f r e s p o n d e n t b y r e s i g n a t i o n
or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o m p l a i n t fi l e d a g a i n s t h i m w h i l e h e
was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic. The
jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the
fi l i n g o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o m p l a i n t w a s n o t l o s t
b y t h e m e r e f a c t t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t p u b l i c o ffi c i a l
h a d c e a s e d i n o ffi c e d u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f h i s
c a s e . Re s p o n d e n t ' s re s i g n a t i o n d o e s n o t p re c l u d e
t h e fi n d i n g o f a n y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l i a b i l i t y t o w h i c h
he shall still be answerable.

Facts:

On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the


Law Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was
signed into law. It established the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national
culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No.
7356 is to "extend recognition of artistic achievement through
awards, grants and services to artists and cultural groups which
contribute significantly to the Filipinos cultural legacy."
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled
Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order
of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes, was
issued. Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognizes the vital role of
the NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who have made
distinct contributions to arts and letters and states that the National
Artist recognition is conferred "upon the recommendation of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines and the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts." Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further

created a Committee on Honors to "assist the President in


evaluating nominations for recipients of Honors," including the
Order of National Artists, and presidential awards. The Committee
on Honors has been allowed to "authorize relevant department or
government agencies to maintain Honors and/or Awards
Committees to process nominations for Honors and/or Presidential
Awards."
All nominations from the various awards committees must be
submitted to the Committee on Honors via the Chancellery of
Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Committee on Honors
shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a
screening committee to ensure that nominations received from the
various awards committees meet two tests: that there has not been
an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the
nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination meet these
criteria, a recommendation to the President for conferment shall be
made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the
Committee on Honors in the highest consideration. On April 3,
2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees 18
were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist
19 of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly
composed of an entirely new set of Council of Experts met and
shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist, a
final list of four names was agreed upon. The final list, according to
rank, follows:
Name

Art Field/Category Number of Votes

Manuel Conde (+) Film and Broadcast Arts (Film)

26

Ramon Santos

Music

19

Lazaro Francisco (+)

Literature

15

Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz

Visual Arts

15

On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the


NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and the ration when making
the final decision on the conferment of awards.
The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields
of arts and culture, including living National Artists. An intensive
selection process was observed following established practice.
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring
Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009.
Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829
were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguila rAlcuaz and
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced
to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July
29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select
those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set
the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted
this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for
restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be
conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa

and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in


grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to
confer the Order of the National Artists and how should it be
exercised? Was there a grave abuse of discretion when some of the
recomendees were not confirmed?
Ruling:
The former Presidents constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and
the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the
Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and
uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest
disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and
the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The conferment of
the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore
made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
Case #06
MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER
CABOVERDE, Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE
CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and JOSEPHINE E.
CABOVERDE, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde
(Roseller) are children of respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde
(Dominalda) and siblings of other respondents in this case, namely:
Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-Labrador (Fe), and Josephine

E. Caboverde (Josephine). Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand,


Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners and in possession of
certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at
Bantayan, Sindangan and Poblacion, Sindangan in Zamboanga del
Norte, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and
Dominalda Caboverde.
During the pendency of the case Maximo died. On May 30, 2007,
Eve and Fe filed an Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by
his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda. The Amended
Complaint reproduced the allegations in the original complaint but
added eight (8) more real properties of the Caboverde estate in the
original list. As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a
Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of
the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in particular, the
adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their
respective products and improvements. The parties submitted the
PSA to the court on or about March 10, 2008 for approval.
Before the RTC could act on the PSA, Dominalda, who, despite being
impleaded in the case as defendant, filed a Motion to Intervene
separately in the case. Mainly, she claimed that the verified Answer
which she filed with her co-defendants contained several material
averments which were not representative of the true events and
facts of the case. This document, she added, was never explained
to her or even read to her when it was presented to her for her
signature. Dominalda filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Answer, attaching her Amended Answer where she contradicted the
contents of the aforesaid verified Answer by declaring that there
never was a sale of the three (3) contested parcels of land in favor
of Ferdinand, Mila, Laluna, Jeanny and Roseller and that she and her
husband never received any consideration from them. She made it
clear that they intended to divide all their properties equally among
all their children without favor

On May 13, 2008, the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3)
contested properties, Lots 2, 3, and 4, for further proceedings in the
main case. Fearing that the contested properties would be
squandered, Dominalda filed with the RTC on July 15, 2008 a
Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2,
3 and 4 under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had
a legal interest in the controverted properties and their produce,
she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely
appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin.
She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the
income of these properties for her daily sustenance and medical
expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver is appointed by
the court, the income or produce from these properties is in grave
danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely by
Mila and some of her selected kin.
On February 8, 2010, the trial court issued a Resolution granting
Dominaldas application for receivership over Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
CA sustains the ruling of the trial court on the ground that the
applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the
day when the conflict will be finally settled.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
sustaining the appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that
the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those
enumerated by the rules; and
Ruling:
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or
not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be
greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed;
and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of

others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court


as those of the person requesting for receivership.
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts
and circumstances of this case, find that the grant of Dominaldas
Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on for reasons
discussed below.
First Dominaldas alleged need for income to defray her medical
expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment
of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely
on this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary
exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are
not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or
reasons for granting receivership. The RTCs insistence that the
approval of the receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59,
which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To
be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential
that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the
properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost,
wasted or injured. Second, there is no clear showing that the
disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially
impaired and that placing them under receivership is most
convenient and feasible means to preserve administer or dispose of
them. Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is
not necessary to save Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or
irremediable damage, finally, it is settled jurisprudence that the
appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a clear
showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and
irremediable loss or damage.
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to
deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation,
just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to
transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to
another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having

10

possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case


of evident usurpation. Furthermore, this Court has declared that the
appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the
parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on
the determination of their respective claims to the title of such
property unless such property is in danger of being materially
injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it
or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse
title.

Spouses Agner failed to pay four successive installments from May


15, 2002 to August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel, sent to
petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the
entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay
Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately
upon receiving the letter. Getting no response, respondent filed on
October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the
Manila Regional Trial Court. A writ of replevin was issued. But still,
the subject vehicle was not seized.

By placing the disputed properties and their income under


receivership, it is as if the applicant has obtained indirectly what
she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other parties
of the possession of the property until the controversy between
them in the main case is finally settled.26 This Court cannot
countenance this arrangement.

Trial on the merits succeeded. August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC Br.
33 ruled in favor of BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. and ordered
Spouses Agner to jointly and severally pay the amount of
Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from
August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit. Petitioners
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the CA affirmed
the lower courts decision and, subsequently, denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Case #07
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER, petitioners,
Vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondent.
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, the spouses-petitioners executed a
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc.
The contract provides, among others, that: for receiving the amount
of Php834,768.00, petitioners shall pay Php17,391.00 every 15th
day of each succeeding month until fully paid; the loan is secured
by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an interest of 6%
per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment on or
before the stated due date. On the same day, Citimotors, Inc.
assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc., which, on May
31, 2002, likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc.

Issues:
- Whether or not the respondent have cause of action, because the
Deed of Assignment executed in its favor did not specifically
mention ABN AMROs account receivable from petitioners?
- Whether or not respondents remedy of resorting to both actions
of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to the
provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code?
Ruling:
On the first Issue: It would be sufficient to state that the matter
surrounding the Deed of Assignment had already been considered
by the trial court and the CA. Likewise, it is an issue of fact that is

11

not a proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45. An issue
is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities
of the situation. Time and again, it was stressed that the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew
evidence which lower courts have passed upon.
On the second issue: Yes, the Respondents remedy is violative of
Article 1484 of the Civil Code. The remedies provided for in Art.
1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the
exercise of the others. But at the case at hand, there was no seizure
that transpired notwithstanding the issuance of the writ of replevin.
Therefore, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the
use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent
pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure.
Case #08
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.

needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is


demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts
already extended to the tow children, being a commendable act of
defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast
financial resources at his disposal.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and well-being in accordance with familys social and
financial standing. CA rendered its Decision, finding merit in
respondents contention that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner
without evidence to prove his actual income.
Issue:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may
be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner
and her children
Ruling:

Facts:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. In her prayer for
support pendent lite for herself and her two children, petitioner
sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by


marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and tot the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.

After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order


granting support pendented lite, for the amount of P250,000.00
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This
amount excludes the P135,000.00 for medical attendance expenses

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for


petitioner and her two children was determined after due hearing
and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although
the amount fixed by the RTC was reduced on appeal, it is clear that

12

the monthly support pendent lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA


was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children. As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond
doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of
his family.
Case #09
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON.
DARLENE MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner,
Vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
Facts:
The Mayor of General Santos City issued EO 40 creating
management teams pursuant to its organization development
program. The ordinance, as amended, provides that qualified
employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50)
years and sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not
less than forty (40) years may avail of the incentives under the
program.7 In other words, the ordinance "provides for separation
benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement
age.As provided, payment would be made in two tranches: 50%
paid in January 2010 and the remainder in July 2010.11 Petitioner
city alleged that out of its 1,361 regular employees, 50 employees
applied, from which 39 employees qualified to avail of the
incentives provided by the ordinance.12 The first tranche of
benefits was released in January 2010.
Respondent Commissions regional director agreed that the grant
lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to
respondent Commissions Office of General Counsel, Legal Services

Sector, for a more authoritative opinion.The opinion explained that


Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary
retirement benefit plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, prohibits government
agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or pension
plans from the time the Government Service Insurance System
charter took effect while those plans already existing when the
charter was enacted were declared abolished.
The City of General Santos filed this present special civil action
alleging that COA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
the ordinance invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring the ordinance invalid.
Ruling:
According to respondent Commission on Audit, petitioner city failed
to demonstrate arbitrariness on its part as it merely observed the
proscription under Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 when it found the ordinance a nullity.
The Court agreed with respondent Commission on Audit but only
insofar as Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned. We declare
Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid. This court has
consistently held that findings of administrative agencies are
generally respected, unless found to have been tainted with
unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion:
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionallycreated not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are

13

accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the COA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court
entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation
of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be
grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Case #10
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY, Petitioner,
Vs.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Sanggunian entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with Jadewell for the installation of its proposed DG4S parking
technology and enacted City Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000
(Ordinance No. 0032000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of
1983, outlining the rules and policy on the privatization of the
administration of onstreet parking in the city streets of Baguio.
Jadewell was awarded the project through a public bidding.
On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between Jadewell
and the City of Baguio through its then City Mayor, Mauricio G.
Domogan for the installation, management and operation of the

DG4S P&D parking meters. On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian


confirmed the MOA through its Resolution No. 2052000.
On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental MOA to
include the Ganza/Burnham parking space, owned by the Philippine
Tourism Authority and managed by the City of Baguio, in the
project.
In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and take over the
parking facilities at the Ganza/Burnham Park area. Around this time,
questions arose regarding the compliance by Jadewell with the
provisions of the MOA, notably on matters such as obtaining the
recommendation from the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the installation of the parking meters and the
legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its parking
attendants prior to the installation of the parking meters at
Burnham Park.
On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution 37,
expressing its intent to rescind the MOA with Jadewell.
Issue:
Whether or not Jadewells petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65, is essentially one for Injunction under
Rule 58
Ruling:
The Court sustained the ruling of the CA treating Jadewells original
action for certiorari as one for injunction based on the allegations in
the latters pleadings.
The CA sustained the position of the Sanggunian that certiorari
could not prosper because when the latter enacted Resolution 37,
the Sanggunian was exercising its legislative function and not its

14

judicial or quasijudicial function. The writ of certiorari under Rule


65 requires: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; (b) that such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.138
The CA nevertheless proceeded to treat the Petition as an original
action for injunction, ruling in this wise:
xxxx
Although in the trial court, Jadewell filed said petition for Certiorari ,
Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65, it is essentially one for
Injunction under Rule 58. Said petitions form and substance
satisfied all the requirements of a civil action for Injunction, which is
the proper remedy under the attendant circumstances.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of
the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Considering the clear and patent denial of due process committed
by the Sanggunian in precipitately rescinding the MOA and in the
interest of substantial justice, WE deem it more prudent to treat the
petition filed below as an action for Injunction under Rule 58, which
is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the
present appeal shall be considered as an appeal from the
permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, which is properly
appealable to this Court, as held in Casilan vs. Ybanez.
xxxx

We agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought permanent


injunction aside from the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction,
thus:
An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this jurisdiction.
It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, perpetually or
for a particular time, from committing or continuing to commit a
specific act, or compelling the defendant to continue performing a
particular act. It has an independent existence. The action for
injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part of an incident of
an independent action or proceeding.143 xxxx...
Case #11
MANILA BANKING CORPORATION , Petitioner,
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
Facts:
Luzon Brokerage Corporation filed a complaint against subject bank
and two (2) others, alleging that it entered into a "Field Warehouse
Storage Agreement" with PACOCO to operate warehouses. LUZON
received from PACOCO for deposit in said warehouses 150 long tons
of copra resecada , and LUZON issued warehouse receipt.
Subsequently,
MANILABANK made a formal request to the
Provincial Sheriff of Surigao del Norte to extrajudicially sell the
copra above described at public auction, without satisfaction of
LUZON's warehouseman's lien, the surrender of the warehouse
receipt, or presentation of a "written order" from the entities
mentioned in said receipt.
LUZON filed a complaint praying that, among others, a writ of
preliminary
injunction
be
issued ex
parte restraining
the
defendants, from selling the 150 long tons of copra in the two
warehouses of PACOCO leased to plaintiff. The RTC denied, ordering

15

dismissal of the complaint. On appeal, the CA set aside said order of


dismissal and remanded the case "to the lower court for further
proceedings and trial on the merits."
Issue:
Whether injunction is correct in the case at bar.
Ruling:
NO. The SC ruled:
As well established is the rule that an action for permanent
injunction should be dismissed when it appears in the trial or
otherwise that the acts,to restrain which the action was begun,
have been accomplished or fully executed. 21 It is this rule that
infuses merit into the petition at bar, impelling issuance of the writ
thereby prayed for. The acts sought to be restrained by LUZON's
complaint have already been accomplished. What the complaint
sought essentially was to perpetually stop the Provincial Sheriff of
Surigao del Norte and his co-defendants, and "their agents,
representatives or deputies from selling the 150 long tons of copra
in the two warehouses of PACOCO leased to plaintiff (LUZON) . . .
and from molesting said plaintiff in its possession thereof." This, on
the theory that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale was being
attempted without prior satisfaction of LUZON's warehouseman's
lien, the surrender of the warehouse receipt, or presentation of a
"written order" from the entities mentioned in said receipt.
But the undisputed fact is that LUZON had long since ceased to
have possession of the copra resecada and the mortgage sale
thereof has already been consummated. It is obviously no longer
possible to grant it the relief it was seeking against
MANILABANK, i.e., the permanent restraint of the mortgage sale of
the copra, and of any interference with its possession thereof.

Nor may the complaint be deemed as alternatively praying for


payment of warehouse fees for not only does it fail to set out a
prayer for the payment of said fees, but more importantly, there is
nothing in the body of the complaint particularly setting forth a
claim therefor. The general prayer "for such other reliefs as may be
just and proper" is meaningless in this context.
In any event, MANILABANK may not be deemed a debtor of LUZON
as far as warehouse fees for the storage of copra deposited by
PACOCO are concerned. While LUZON had a right of action against
PACOCO to recover fees for the storage of the copra deposited with
it by the latter, it had no such right against MANILABANK. The only
right that LUZON had vis a vis MANILABANK (or any other claimant
of the deposited copra, aside from PACOCO) consisted of the socalled warehouseman's lien, i.e., the right to retain possession of
the copra and refuse to release it to the claimant except only upon
surrender of the warehouse receipt and payment of the storage
charges. But that lien, being possessory in nature, was lost when
LUZON gave up possession of the copra; 22 and when that
happened, LUZON ceased to have any right whatever against
MANILABANK with respect to the copra. Certainly, as regards the
deposit of the copra by PA C O C O with LUZON, the latter had and
has no right of action against MANILABANK for recovery of the
storage charges therefor. Its lien having been lost, LUZON could
look only to its debtor, PACOCO, for payment of said storage
charges.
Case #12
MARTIN LAHM III AND JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
Vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.

16

Facts:

Ruling:

On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a


complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC against the members of the Board of Trustees of the
International School, Manila which was raffled to the sala of the
respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the
complainants
in
the
instant
case.

Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining


order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued
the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the
status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should
be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed,
the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.

Subsequently, Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a TRO


and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The latters
counsel ask for extension of time to oppose and make a comment
to the motion for the Issuance of TRO/Pre. Inj. Thereafter,
respondent issued an order which directed the parties to maintain
the status quo ante. The complainant sought for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, Toze was reinstated and assumed his former position as
Superintendent. The Illegal Dismissal case was not resolved instead
respondent issued an order requiring the parties to appear in his
office to thresh out Tozes claim of moral and exemplary damages.
Hence, the complainants filed a complainant for the disbarment of
the respondent for alleged gross misconduct and violation of
lawyers oath. Respondent Mayor argues that the complaint should
be dismissed for being premature and a subterfurge in order to
compel him to inhibit in resolving the said illegal dismissal case.
Based on finding, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
respondent to be suspended for a period of six months which was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution. Respondent sought to reconsider but it was denied,
hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the labor arbiters has the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders.

The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at
present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by
the NLRC (Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC).
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of
evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be
delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall
conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be
accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter
submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.
However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently
insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the
Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward
Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He
should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of
the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

17

Wherefore, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a


period of six months, with a Warning that commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result in the disposition of a
more severe penalty.
Case #13
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P.
PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M.
MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON,
NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A.
LOYOLA, Petitioners,
vs.
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM
CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE
RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, Respondents.
G. R. No. 152397
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM
CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE
RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P.
PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M.
MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON,
NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A.
LOYOLA, Respondents.
Facts:

In their Memorandum, Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road is


included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in
the name of La Paz. The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to
provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the
south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex
I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal,
and lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality
of Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to
public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La
Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from
the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC,
a consortium formed to develop several real properties in Bian,
Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of
stock, La Paz contributed some of its real properties to the
Municipality of Bian, including the properties constituting La Paz
Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI
was proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear
right over La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al.
failed to prove the existence of a right of way or a right to pass over
La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an
injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens
registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal
easement constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a
private property registered under the name of La Paz and the
beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to FEEC when La Paz
joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insists that the complaint did not
sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action.
They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an
allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading.

18

They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a


class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters
and motorists they are representing have a well-defined community
of interest over La Paz Road. They claim that the excavation of La
Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or
cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has
a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected
differently than the others.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action;
(2) Whether or not the complaint has been properly filed as a class
suit; and
(3) Whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Ruling:
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened
or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its
issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right
that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue, the
right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right
which must be shown to be clear and positive. This means that the
persons applying for the writ must show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie
proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their
right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no
clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by the CA:

Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private


respondents failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and
unmistakable right over the La Paz Road which was sought to be
protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor their purported
right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that they have
been using the same as public road right-of-way for more than ten
years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that
would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ. Failure to
establish the existence of a clear right which should be judicially
protected through the writ of injunction is a sufficient ground for
denying the injunction.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that
the parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.
Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ
is not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of
a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard. The hearing on the application
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and
distinct from the trial on the merits of the main case. The evidence
submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or
complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the
decision of the case on the merits. There are vital facts that have
yet to be presented during the trial which may not be obtained or
presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive
writ. Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for one is
different from that for the other.
Case # 14
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC, Petitioner,
Vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE,
Respondent.
Facts:

19

2. Whether or not CA erred in denying the TRO and injunctive relief.


When the public market of Padre Garcia, Batangas was gutted by
fire, its mayor invited Australian Professional Realty, Inc (APRI) to
rebuild the public market. They executed a MOA. Under the MOA,
APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex in the 5,000square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to
operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years.
When the new (Victor Reyes) mayor was elected to office, he
initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of
Agreement with Damages. The court issued summons to APRI,
requiring them to file their Answer to the Complaint. However, the
summons was returned unserved as petitioners were no longer
holding office in the given address.
Thereafter, a Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Service by
Publication was filed by Municipality of Padre Garcia. When APRI
still failed to appear to court, RTC issued an Order declaring APRI in
default and allow Municipality of Padre Garcia to present evidence
ex parte.
A decision was rendered by the RTC. The court declared the MOA
null and void. RTC grants the petition of Municipality for a Motion for
Execution of Judgment. After learning of the adverse judgment, APRI
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which was denied by the
RTC. APRI filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which was
denied. Thereafter APRI filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to
restrain the RTC from further proceeding and issuing any further
Order, Resolution, Writ of Execution, and any other court processes
in the case before it. However, CA denied the said motion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petition for review under rule 45 is proper.

Ruling:
1. No. Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised, we note
that petitioners resorted to an improper remedy before this Court.
They filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to question the denial of their Motion for the issuance
of an injunctive relief.
Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may
be taken from an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one
that does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something
to be decided upon. An order granting or denying an application for
preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not
appealable. Instead, the proper remedy is to file a Petition for
Certiorari and/or Prohibition under Rule 65.
While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an
improper remedy, it may in certain instances proceed to review the
substance of the petition. Thus, this Court will treat this Petition as
if it were filed under Rule 65.
2. No. A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive
reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights and interests. An application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of
a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an
urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A
TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued
immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a TRO
may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits

20

or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would


be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction
could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show
that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious and irreparable damage.
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending
case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of
the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards
that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its
conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion
by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except
when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Case #15
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs
CASTALLOY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, ALLIED
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, ALINSU STEEL FOUNDRY
CORPORATION, GLORIA C. NGO AND TOMAS NGO,
Respondents.
Facts:

Castalloy
borrowed
money
from
PNB
amounting
to
Php45,000,000.00. To secure the loan respondents Allied Industrial,
Alinsu Foundry mortgaged parcels of land in favor of PNB. To further
secure the loan Gloria Ngo and Tomas Ngo, Jr. executed a joint and
solidary agreement in favor of PNB.
Furthermore PNB alleged that Castalloy secured two more loans
evidenced by promissory notes, which Castalloy denies. Castalloy
argues that these two loans were not deposited in its account and
that Gloria Ngos signature was allegedly forged. When Castalloy
failed to pay the loans, PNB filed an extrajudicial forclosure of real
estate mortgage against Allied and Alinsu.
Meantime, a complaint for determination of correct obligation and
injunction
with
application
for
writ
of
preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order was filed with the RTC by
Castalloy, Allied, Alinsu, Gloria and Tomas against PNB and Sheriff
Julbert E. Opada, arguing that the money they owed in dollars,
should not be converted to pesos at current rate, because it was
already computed with the conversion rate at the time.
RTC decided for the respondent, reasoning that it will cause
irreparable injury if foreclosure will be carried. Case was elevated to
CA. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, the petition with
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC when it granted the respondents application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:

21

Petition GRANTED.

mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be


speedily resolved. To this end, the court
concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court,
through the Office of the Court Administrator,
quarterly reports on the progress of the cases
involving ten million pesos and above.

The admission of Castalloy of failure to pay the loans when they fell
due does not merit a preliminary injunction. Foreclosure is the
correct remedy for the petitioner. A preliminary injunction will
render the original petition null and void. A court ruling Re:
Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgages provides these guidelines:
(1) No temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction against the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage shall be issued on the allegation
that the loan secured by the mortgage has
been paid or is not delinquent unless the
application is verified and supported by
evidence of payment.
(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction against the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage shall be issued on the allegation
that the interest on the loan is
unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the
mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum
interest on the principal obligation as stated
in the application for foreclosure sale, which
shall be updated monthly while the case is
pending.
(3) Where a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against a foreclosure of

(4) All requirements and restrictions


prescribed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction, such as the posting of a bond,
which shall be equal to the amount of the
outstanding debt, and the time limitation for
its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status
quo order.
The irreparable injury that the lower courts consider will be
settled when the main issue is resolved. The difference in
the loan amount should there be a surplus can be
remedied by another cause of action.
Case #16
The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute Inc., and The Board
of Trustees of Mindanao Institute Inc., represented by Engr.
Victorioso D. Udarbe. Petitioner
Vs.
The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, acting
through Agusan District Conference United Church of Christ
in the Philippines, represented by Rev. Rodolfo Baslot,
Respondent
Facts:

22

The incorporators of Mindanao Institute Inc filed a Petition for


Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction1[5] against the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), before the RTC, praying that
Mindanao Institute, Inc. (MI) be declared the sole owner of the
assets and properties of MI and to prevent the impending takeover
by UCCP of MIs properties. They averred that UCCP was unlawfully
claiming ownership of MIs properties. the RTC issued a TRO against
UCCP reasoning out that MI would suffer grave and irreparable
damages if the ownership and possession of its assets and
properties would be transferred to UCCP.
Meanwhile, UCCP received copies of MIs Amended Articles of
Incorporation (2003 Amended AOI) which was adopted by the MI
Incorporatorsand approved by SEC. UCCP, lodged a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the 2003 Amended Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws of Mindanao Institute with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and/or
Damages, UCCP and MI asserted that the Amendment of MIs
Articles of Incorporation effected by signatories in a reckless and
hasty fashion was accomplished without the required majority vote
in violation of Corp Laws.
UCCP moved to dismiss the complaint for declaration of nullity of
the 2003 Amended AOI. They contended that the SEC, in approving
the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, was
exercising its quasi-judicial function and, therefore, a co-equal body
of the RTC. Thus, the RTC could not grant any of the reliefs prayed
for by UCCP. RTC granted the MI incorporators prayer for
preliminary injunction against UCCP. UCCP moved for a
reconsideration but the same was denied, then sought relief with
the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA granted the
petition. The MI incorporators, represented by Engr. Udarbe, moved
for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA. Hence
this petition.
1

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued against UCCP.
Ruling:
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may
resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action. The objective of a writ
of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be fully heard. Status quo is the last actual,
peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
It bears stressing that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right
to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the
pendency of the principal action. When the complainants right or
title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right
and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.
In the present case, the records fail to reveal any clear and
unmistakable right on the part of petitioners. They posit that they
are suing in behalf of MIs interests by preventing UCCP from
unlawfully wresting control of MIs properties. Their claimed
derivative interest, however, has been disputed by UCCP in both its
Answer with Counterclaim in Special Civil Action. Evidently, the
conflicting claims of the parties regarding the issue of ownership
over MIs property create the impression that the petitioners
derivative right, used as basis for the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, is far from clear. Petitioners claimed right is still
indefinite, at least until it is properly threshed out in a trial,
negating the presence of a right in esse that requires the protection
of an injunctive writ. Verily, petitioners cannot lay claim to a clear

23

and positive right based on the 2003 Amended AOI, the provisions
of which are strongly disputed and alleged to be invalidly obtained.
Case #17
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Vs.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R.
GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, Respondents.
Facts:
In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an
invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract known as IPB No.
80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood poles
and 20,000 of cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders; the
contract was awarded to him being the lowest bidder. However,
NEAs board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the
material requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A
losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a complaint alleging
the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-qualification bid
were falsified. Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the
opinion of Govt Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility of
Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB
80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of
injunction which was granted by RTC Manila. PNOC Energy Devt
Corp issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW project.
Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was an attempt to
subject portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to
enjoin respondents to the proposed bidding. Respondents averred
that this is in violation of a rule that government infrastructure are
not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in
favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975
which prohibits issuance of TRO except SC to govt projects.
Ruling:
Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance
of TRO, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory
injunctions against govt.
Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO),
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its
subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a)
acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location
of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a
contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing,
prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract
or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful
activity necessary for such contract or project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed
by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall
file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall
accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

24

Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the


Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative
Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or
writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases
involving Government Infrastructure Projects.
Case #18
SPOUSES DAISY and SOCRATES M. AREVALO, Petitioners,
Vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY, Respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner Spouses Arevalo filed a Rule 65 Petition with


the CA to assail the Orders of the trial court involving the nonissuance of the injunctive writ.
Meanwhile, proceedings for the First Complaint ensued at the trial
court. Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Bank, the
trial court granted the motion and dismissed the First Complaint for
lack of cause of action.Petitioner Spouses Arevalo then proceeded
again to the CA to appeal the dismissal of the main case. The
record does not reveal the status of the case.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their
motion

Facts:
The conflict between the parties arose from a Loan
Agreement6 petitioners
executed
with
respondent
Planters
Development Bank (Bank). Petitioners obtained from respondent
Bank a P 2,100,000 loan secured by a mortgage on their property
situated in Muntinlupa. Due to their failure to pay the loaned
amount, the Bank undertook to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage. Petitioners thereafter filed the First Complaint wherein
they asked for the nullification of interests, penalties and other
charges, as well as for specific performance with an application for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the then impending auction sale of their
Muntinlupa property. During the hearing of petitioners application
for preliminary injunction, the trial court ruled that, as a
precondition for the issuance of the writ and pursuant to the
Procedure on Foreclosure, petitioners were directed to pay 12% per
annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the
application for foreclosure sale. Otherwise, the writ shall not
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was
denied. Consequently, they did not pay the required interest; thus,
no writ of preliminary injunction was issued in their favor.

Aggrieved, they filed the instant Rule 45 Petition to assail the


Decision of the CA affirming the non-issuance of the injunctive writ.
Issue:
1. Whether the requirement to pay 12% interest per annum before
the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an impending
foreclosure sale is applicable to the instant case; and
2. Whether petitioner Spouses Arevalo are guilty of forum-shopping
and should consequently be punished for contempt.
Ruling:
We deny the instant Petition for the following reasons: (1) the
Petition is moot, because the trial court has already dismissed the
Complaint dated 07 April 2009 (the First Complaint), upon which
petitioners application for the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction was based; and (2) petitioners are guilty of forumshopping.

25

A
writ
of preliminary injunction is auxiliary to, an adjunct of, and subject to
the outcome of the main case, thus, a writ of preliminary injunction
is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal
therefrom notwithstanding. A writ of preliminary injunction is a
provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an adjunct of, and subject to
the outcome of the main case. Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction
is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail
themselves
of
multiple
judicial
remedies
in
different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially foun
ded on the sametransactions andthe
same
essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially
similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of
obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in
another.
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail
themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different fora,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances;
and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of
increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in
one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is
that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court
processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice,
wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Every
litigant is required to notify the court of the filing or pendency
of any
other action or such other proceeding involving the same or similar
action or claim within five (5) days of learning of that fact.

Every litigant is required to notify the court of the filing or pendency


of any other action or such other proceeding involving the same or
similar action or claim within five (5) days of learning of that fact.
Petitioners claim that it was merely due to inadvertence that they
failed to disclose the said filing within five (5) days, contrary to their
undertaking.
Case #19
HON. MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, 4th
Judicial Region, Calamba City, Petitioner,
Vs.
JOSEF ALBERTS COMILANG, Respondent.
Facts:
State Prosecutor Comilang was designated to assist the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. he
appeared before Judge Belen manifesting his inability to appear on
Thursdays because of his inquest duties in the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Laguna. Thus, he moved that all cases
scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be
deferred because he was set to appear for preliminary investigation
in the Provincial Prosecutors Office on the same day.
Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his Order in
("Estacio Case") requiring him to (1) explain why he did not inform
the court of his previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and
(2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the cancellation of all the scheduled
hearings.
State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the (CA) a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing Judge Belens

26

Order and Decision in the Estacio Case. The CA issued a temporary


restraining order (TRO) enjoining Judge Belen from executing and
enforcing his assailed Order and Decision for a period of 60 days,
which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued
an Order. He also manifested that he was waiving his appearance
on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against
him.
Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge
Belen with manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith,
inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law in
issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and contempt citations,
in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Belens dismissal from service cannot serve to
bar a review of his conviction for indirect contempt.
Ruling:
It must be stressed that Judge Belens dismissal from service as
adjudged in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216 cannot serve to bar a review of
his conviction for indirect contempt.
A single act may offend against two or more distinct and related
provisions of law and thus give rise to criminal as well as
administrative liability.6 A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216 was the administrative
aspect while the instant case is the criminal facet of Judge Belens
act of issuing the Orders dated September 6, 2007 and September
26, 2007. Both proceedings are distinct and independent from the
other such that the disposition in one case does not inevitably
govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa.

Nonetheless, the Court stands by its pronouncement in A.M. No. RTJ10-2216 that the subject act of Judge Belen was contemptuous, for
the reason that in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain
his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to
compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the
contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect
contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge
Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of
preliminary injunction aimed to preserve.
Case #20
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. HARRY CIRIACO and ESTHER CIRIACO, Respondents.
Facts:
Spouses Harry and Esther Ciriaco (respondents) obtained a
P1,500,000.00 loan from the petitioner, secured by a real estate
mortgage over their 526-square meter land in La Trinidad, Benguet,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-21710. When the
respondents defaulted in the payment of their loan, the petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and sold it at
public auction where the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder.
The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale in the petitioners favor on
March 11, 1998. The Register of Deeds annotated the Certificate of
Sale on TCT No. T-21710 on March 24, 1998. A day before the
expiration of the redemption period, the respondents filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 8, for Injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title
in the petitioners favor, assailing the redemption price of the
foreclosed property. RTC dismissed the complaint for being moot
due to the consolidation of title in the petitioners favor on March
31, 1999, "without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action.
Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 63, for Cancellation of Consolidation of Ownership over a

27

Real Property, Specific Performance, and Damages.They again


questioned the redemption price of the foreclosed property.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint as well as
Motion for Hearing on the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), with a notice
of hearing on the omnibus motion scheduled on March 22,
2000. The respondents sought to amend the complaint to allege
further that fraud attended the consolidation of title in the
petitioners favor and to include a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or TRO to enjoin the petitioner from
disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.
RTC admitted the amended complaint and directed the petitioner to
file an answer. RTC also granted the respondents application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, since the
respondents were entitled to prove their claim of fraud, and their
claim that the interests and penalty charges imposed by the bank
had no factual basis. CA affirm the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondents application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
Ruling:
Yes CA erred in its findings. A preliminary injunction is an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It is the "strong arm of equity,"an
extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme
caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties.
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and


the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, a clear
showing must be made that there exists a right to be protected and
that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of
an established right. The holding of a hearing, where both parties
can introduce evidence and present their side, is also required
before the courts may issue a TRO or an injunctive writ.
RTC
abbreviated the proceedings and precipitately granted the
respondents application for injunctive relief. The RTC did not
conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling" of the parties
respective evidence to give it an idea of the justification for its
issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. It failed to
make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction since it did not conduct any hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or
TRO. The RTC conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000
hearings on the respondents omnibus motion only whether to
admit the amended complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the
respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.1

28

RTCs order shows that the RTC granted the respondents


application for a writ of preliminary injunction based only on the
respondents unsubstantiated allegations. Respondents right to
injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated. The respondents have not presented evidence,
testimonial or documentary, other than the bare allegations
contained in their pleadings, to support their claim of fraud that
brings about the irreparable injury sought to be avoided by their
application for injunctive relief. Thus, the RTCs grant of the writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of the respondents, despite the lack
of any evidence of a clear and unmistakable right on their part,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

To support the application for TRO, petitioner presented the


testimony of a certain Farley Cuizon, one of the people who
conducted a test-buy on October 30, 1998 at Parkson Duty Free.
Cuizon testified that he had purchased one box containing twelve
(12) bottles with red caps of Castrol GTX motor oil, and that these
red caps signified that the Castrol motor oil did not come from
petitioner, since the bottles of Castrol motor oil petitioner sold had
white caps. Moreover, Cuizon further testified that the bottles of
Castrol motor oil bought from Parkson Duty Free had on them
printed labels stating that these "may not be resold outside North
America. However, on cross-examination, he testified that no patent
violation existed since the red caps on the Castrol GTX products
were not significant.

Case #21

The RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO for a


period of twenty (20) days enjoining respondent "from selling and
distributing Castrol products until further orders. However, RTC
denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, there being no sufficient justification for the relief.

BP PHILIPPINES, INC.. Petitioner


Vs.
CLARK TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that sometime in 1994 it had entered into an
agreements with Castrol Limited, U.K., a corporation organized
under the laws of England, and the owner and manufacturer of
Castrol products. Essentially, under the terms of the agreements,
Castrol Limited, U.K. granted petitioner the title "exclusive
wholesaler importer and exclusive distributor" of Castrol products in
the territory of the Philippines.
Petitioner claimed that respondent, by selling and distributing
Castrol Products not sourced from petitioner in the Philippines,
violated petitioners exclusive rights under the agreements. Despite
a cease and desist letter, respondent continued to distribute and
sell Castrol products in its duty-free shop.

Respondent, in its answer, stated that petitioner had no cause of


action. Respondent alleged that it was a stranger to the
agreements, it being neither a party nor a signatory thereto. Based
on the theory that only parties to a contract were bound by it,
respondent claimed that it could not be held liable for violations of
the terms of the agreements. While respondent admitted that it
distributed and sold Castrol products. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. Petitioner failed to show any act by respondent that
constitutes an injurious invasion of its rights stemming from a
contract it signed with another party coupled by the limited scope
of the transaction of respondent and its customers.
Hence, petitioner cannot be entitled to an injunction in the instant
case. It has not shown that it has a right which must be protected
by this court, and it failed to show also that defendant is guilty of

29

acts which violate its rights." the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner reiterates that it is entitled to have its proprietary rights
under the agreements protected by an injunction. It argues that the
fact that respondent was operating inside the CSEZ was
inconsequential since the agreements specifically covered the
whole Philippines, including duty-free zones pursuant to the
agreements.
Respondent, for its part, argues that the case should be dismissed
for lack of merit. It contends that it is not a party to the agreements
and as such, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, it cannot be
bound to the contract. It also argues that the Yu case is inapplicable
here since, unlike in that case, unfair competition as defined under
Article 28 of the Civil Code is not present in the case now before us.

should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary


injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo
until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the
action without the court issuing a final injunction.
In the present case, neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals found
any nefarious scheme by respondent to induce either party to
circumvent, renege on or violate its undertaking under the
marketing and distribution agreements. We note that no allegation
was made on the authenticity of the Castrol GTX products sold by
respondent. Thus, there is nothing in this case that shows a ploy of
the character described in the Yu case, so this is clearly
distinguishable from that case.
As we have already stated, the writ of injunction would issue:

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunction against thirdpersons on the basis of its marketing and distribution agreements.
Ruling:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Yu case is inapplicable
to the present case. The present case deals with the main action for
injunction..
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except
only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.
As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a
judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and

Upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of


a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said
right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is
not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual
existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
Respondent not being able to prove and establish the existence of a
clear and actual right that ought to be protected, injunction cannot
issue as a matter of course. Consequently, the Court does not find
any ground for the award of damages.
Case #22
BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT, Petitioner,

30

Vs.
THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Bacolod City, Br. 46 and the City of Bacolod, Respondents.
Facts:
On March 26, 1999, respondent City filed a case for Injunction With
a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against petitioner in the sala of public
respondent judge. The petition stated that on January 15, 1999,
BACIWA published in the Visayan Daily Star, a local paper of general
circulation, a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for
the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The rates were supposed to take
effect seven (7) days after its posting in the local papers or on
January 22, 1999. The increase was aborted after petitioner
unilaterally suspended the January 22, 1999 scheduled
implementation. On March 15, 1999, however, petitioner
announced that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1, 1999.
Respondent City opposed. It alleged that the proposed water rates
would violate due process as they were to be imposed without the
public hearing required under Letter of Instructions No. 700 and
Presidential Decree No. 1479. Hence, it prayed that before the
hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction be issued.
Respondent court favor the decision to herein respondent. The
Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that public
respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she issued the final injunction in
disregard of petitioners basic right to due process.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari, ratiocinating thus:

In the case at bar, the order of public respondent


dated 24 February 2000, though termed by BACIWA as
a temporary restraining order, is in fact a preliminary
injunction. The period of the restraint was not limited.
By its wordings, it can be safely inferred that the
increased water rates must not be effected until final
disposition of the main case. This note of semipermanence simply cannot issue from a mere
temporary restraining order. It must be further noted
that the temporary restraining order has been
elevated to the same level as the preliminary
injunction
in
the
procedure,
grounds
and
requirements of its obtention by Section 4, Rule 58.
Thus, to set [a] distinction, the present practice is to
categorically refer to it as a temporary restraining
order. In which case, the omission by the public
respondent in referring to the 24 February 2000 order
as a temporary restraining order could not have been
a mere oversight but deliberate.
Issue:
Whether or Not a writ issued is in the nature of a temporary
restraining order and not a preliminary injunction and therefore the
validity is for 20 days only.
Ruling:
SC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in
the main action.

31

The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or


ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except
only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.
As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a
judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and
should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status
quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve
the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of
issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary
restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no
action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary
restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by
the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being
necessary.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was
issued, the temporary restraining order granted automatically
expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that
respondent court merely ordered "the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist
and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate
increase which will start on March 1, 2000" without stating the

period for the restraint does not convert the temporary restraining
order to a preliminary injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited
period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if
issued by a regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix
a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary
restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be
characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day
period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed
incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is
because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was
prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a
preliminary injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of
this omission by respondent trial court.
Case #23
PALM TREE ESTATES, INC., et al., Petitioner
Vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
Facts:
PTEI entered into a seven-year term loan agreement with PNB.A
Real Estate Mortgage was executed by PTEI in favor of PNB. PNB
demanded payment of PTEIs outstanding obligations.PNB denied
PTEIs request for another restructuring of its past due
indebtedness considering its failure to fulfill the basic terms and
conditions agreed upon.As PTEI defaulted in its payment of past due
loan with PNB, the bank filed a Petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgaged properties.
PTEI and BAGCCI filed a Complaint for breach of contracts, nullity of
promissory notes, annulment of mortgages, fixing of principal,
accounting, nullity of interests and penalties, annulment of petition

32

for extrajudicial foreclosure, injunction, damages, with prayer for


temporary restraining order, and writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the mortgage. RTC issued an order
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by PNB was denied.
Thus, PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the issuance of preliminary injunction. The CA granted
PNBs petition as PTEI and BAGCCI failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right which would have necessitated the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, while PNB had the right to
extrajudicial foreclosure under the loan agreement when its debtors
defaulted in their obligation. PTEIs Reconsideration was denied
Issue:
Was the issuance of the writ of injunction by the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling:
Yes. For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely,
the existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
In this case, the hands of PTEI were not unsullied when it sought
preliminary injunction. It was already in breach of its contractual
obligations when it defaulted in the payment of its indebtedness to
PNB. PTEI and BAGCCI failed to establish an indubitable right which
was violated by PNB and which ought to be protected by an
injunctive writ. They also failed to show that the absence of an
injunctive writ would cause them irreparable injury.
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for
it must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so because

among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do
equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which
must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial
rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites
necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case
before it. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to
be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its
issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been
rendered in grave abuse of discretion
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that PTEI and BAGCCI
failed to show a clear and unmistakable right which would have
necessitated the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The
Order of the trial court failed to state a finding of facts that would
justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. It merely
stated the conclusion that "real controversies exist" based on the
observation that "the positions of the parties are completely
opposed to each other.
This clearly shows that the trial court relied only on the bare
allegations of PTEI and BAGCCI that the mortgaged properties were
being made to answer for obligations that are not covered by the
mortgage and that properties which are not mortgaged are included
in PNBs petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. Beyond bare
allegations, however, no specific evidence was cited. Thus, the trial
courts order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction had no factual basis.
Case #24
GEORGE S. H. SY, doing business under the name and style of OPM
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

33

Facts:

Vs.
AUTOBUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., Respondent.

Petitioner, Sy does business under the name OPM, a supplier of


airconditioning units for buses. He entered a verbal agreement with
the respondent Autobus, to sell airconditioning units as well as to
finance respondents acquisition of 22 bus units from CMC. As
security, respondent would execute Chattel Mortgages over the
buses in favor of CMC. Once petitioner has fully paid the
amortizations to CMC, respondent would execute new Chattel
Mortgages over the buses, this time, in favor of petitioner. In the
meantime, respondent would deliver to petitioner titles to five
properties in Caloocan City registered under the name of Gregorio
Araneta III, the chairman of respondent, as security for petitioners
advances to CMC.
The petitioner defaulted, causing the respondent to pay the
obligation directly to CMC. In this light, the respondent filed a
complaint for specific perfomance, and there after filed a motion for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction for the
return of the five titles issued by Araneta as security.
The RTC granted the motion of the issuance of such writ. Upon
appeal, the CA also granted the same. The petitioner now files this
petition for Certiorari on the grounds that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues:
Whether the RTC is right in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Ruling:

Yes. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
writ. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction will not be set aside
unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. The court said,
we find that the RTC had sufficient bases to issue the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the
issuance of such writ were established. We agree with the RTC that
respondent has a right to recover the five titles because petitioner
failed to comply with his obligation to respondent. It bears stressing
that respondent was compelled to directly pay CMC to avoid the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgages, which respondent executed in
favor of CMC. Considering that respondent has paid most, if not all,
of its obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold on
to the titles.
Case #25
JESUS LIM ARRANZA; LORENZO CINCO; QUINTIN TAN; JOSE
ESCOBAR; ELBERT FRIEND; CLASSIC HOMES VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC.; BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.; and UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATIONS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
B.F. HOMES, INC. AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent
Facts:

Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation


engaged in developing subdivisions and selling residential lots. One
of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes
Paraaque Subdivision, which now sprawls across not only a portion
of the City of Paraaque but also those of the adjoining cities of Las
Pias and Muntinlupa.

34

When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which
had substantial investments in respondent BFHI, respondent filed
with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it
was in a state of suspension of payments. On 18 March 1985, the
SEC placed respondent under a management committee. Upon that
committees dissolution on 2 February 1988, the SEC appointed
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as a Receiver, and approved a Revised
Rehabilitation Plan.
On 7 November 1994, Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his
duties as a Receiver, and a new Board of Receivers consisting of
eleven members of respondents Board of Directors was appointed
for the implementation of Phases II and III of respondents
rehabilitation.[2] The new Board, through its Chairman, Albert C.
Aguirre, revoked the authority given by Orendain to use the open
spaces at Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community assessment
funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps; recognized BF
Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the
representative of all homeowners in the subdivision; took over the
management of the Clubhouse; and deployed its own security
guards in the subdivision.
Consequently, on 5 July 1995, herein petitioners filed with the
HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000
homeowners in the subdivision" against respondent BFHI, BF
Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C. Aguirre Management
Corporation "to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF
Homes Paraaque.[3] They alleged that:
The forty (40) wells, mostly located at different elevations in Phases
3 and 4 of the subdivision and with only twenty~seven (27)
productive, are the sources of the inter~connected water system in

the 765~hectare subdivision; There is only one drainage and sewer


system; There is one network of roads;
There are eight (8) entry and exit points to the subdivision and from
three (3) municipalities (now cities), a situation obtaining in this
subdivision only and nowhere else.
Petitioners raised "issues" on the following basic needs of the
homeowners: rights~of~way; water; open spaces; road and
perimeter wall repairs; security; and the interlocking corporations
that allegedly made it convenient for respondent "to
compartmentalize its obligations as general developer, even if all of
these are hooked into the water, roads, drainage and sewer
systems of the subdivision.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that has
jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners
against a subdivision developer that is under receivership for
specific performance regarding basic homeowners needs such as
water, security and open spaces.
Ruling:
HLURB should take jurisdiction over petitioners complaint because
it pertains to matters within the HLURBs competence and
expertise. The HLURB should view the issue of whether the Board of
Receivers correctly revoked the agreements entered into between
the previous receiver and the petitioners from the perspective of
the homeowners interests, which P.D. No. 957 aims to protect.
Whatever monetary awards the HLURB may impose upon

35

respondent are incidental matters that should be addressed to the


sound discretion of the Board of Receivers charged with maintaining
the viability of respondent as a corporation. Any controversy that
may arise in that regard should then be addressed to the SEC.
It is worth noting that the parties agreed at the 1 July 1998 hearing
that should the HLURB establish and grant petitioners claims, the
same should be referred to the SEC. Thus, the proceedings at the
HLURB should not be suspended notwithstanding that respondent is
still under receivership. The TRO that this Court has issued should
accordingly continue until such time as the HLURB shall have
resolved the controversy. The present members of the Board of
Receivers should be reminded of their duties and responsibilities as
an impartial Board that should serve the interests of both the
homeowners and respondents creditors. Their interests, financial or
otherwise, as members of respondents Board of Directors should
be circumscribed by judicious and unbiased performance of their
duties and responsibilities as members of the Board of Receivers.
Otherwise, respondents full rehabilitation may face a bleak future.
Both parties should never give full rein to acts that could prove
detrimental to the interests of the homeowners and eventually
jeopardize respondents rehabilitation.
Case #26
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,
Vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
Facts:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity

the petitioner denied. Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992
in a bank where they both worked. They became sweethearts in the
last week of January 1993.
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate
sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in
the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle.
The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more
frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the
respondent found out that she was pregnant.
When told, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the
respondent but eventually backed out. The respondent gave birth to
their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show
up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him
a letter on demanding recognition of and support for their child.
When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent
filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had
sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994
and she could not have been pregnant for 3 months when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 1994.
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents
motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive
from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.
The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the
petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the
RTC order for monthly child support. The petitioner argues that the
CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs ruling, and
that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.

36

Issue:
CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation
of the respondents testimony, and that the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove paternity.
Ruling:
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA,
sustaining the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, not
finding any reversible error in the CAs ruling.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that
she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner,
at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony
that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual
encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much
later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the
respondents clear and categorical assertions.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.

Case No. 27
G.R. No. 184478
March 21, 2012
JAIME S. PEREZ, both in his personal and
o ffi c i a l c a p a c i t y a s C h i e f , M a r i k i n a
D e m o l i t i o n O ffi c e , P e t i t i o n e r ,
vs.
SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and
Y O L A N D A B . PA N T E , R e s p o n d e n t s .
FA C T S :
Respond ent-spouses Fortun ito M ad rona an d
Yo l a n d a B . P a n t e a r e r e g i s t e r e d o w n e r s o f a
r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n M a r i k i n a C i t y. I n
1989, respondents built their house thereon and
enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate.
In 1999, respondents received the letter dated
May 25, 1999 from petitioner giving respondents
seven days from receipt thereof to remove the
structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk.
A n d m o re t h a n a y e a r l a t e r o r o n Fe b r u a r y 2 8 ,
2001, petitioner sent another letter with the
same contents but this time giving respondents
ten days.
T h i s p r o m p t e d r e s p o n d e n t s t o fi l e a c o m p l a i n t
f o r i n j u n c t i o n b e f o r e t h e M a r i k i n a C i t y RTC o n
M arch 12 , 20 01 .Respond ents like wise soug ht the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)

37

and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin


petitioner and all persons acting under him from
doing any act of demolition on their property
and that after trial, the injunction be made
permanent.
O n M a r c h 1 6 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e RTC i s s u e d a T R O a g a i n s t
p e t i t i o n e r. O n m o t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s , p e t i t i o n e r
was declared in default on July 13, 2001. On July
2 5 , 2 0 0 1 , p e t i t i o n e r fi l e d a M o t i o n t o L i f t O r d e r
of Defaul t (wi th Ex -Parte Moti on to Admit Answe r
and Notice Entry of Appearance). On December
1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e RTC i s s u e d a n O r d e r d e n y i n g t h e
motion to lift the ord er of def au lt. Pe ti tione r
moved to reconsider the order but the same was
d e n i e d b y t h e R T C i n i t s M a r c h 6 , 2 0 0 2 O r d e r.
P e t i t i o n e r t h e r e a f t e r fi l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r
certiorari before the CA assailing the default
o r d e r. T h u s , o n A p r i l 1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e RT C i s s u e d a n
order suspending the proceedings of the
injunction case "until such time when the
Petition for Certiorari shall have been disposed
o f w i t h fi n a l i t y. "
On August 20, 2002, the CA rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
meri t. Pe titioner move d to re consid er th e
appellate courts decision, but the motion was
d e n i e d b y Re s o l u t i o n d a t e d J a n u a r y 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 .

O n S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e RTC i s s u e d a n O r d e r
dismissing the injunction complaint without
prejudice. However, upon motion of respondents,
the dismissal order was set aside and the
complaint was reinstated by Order dated
D e c e m b e r 3 , 2 0 0 3 . T h e RTC a g r e e d w i t h t h e
observation of respondents that it was the court
which suspended the proceedings in the
i n j u n c t i o n c a s e p e n d i n g fi n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e
petition for certiorari before the CA, and when
t h e RTC i s s u e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o r d e r , t h e r e w a s
yet no entry of judgment from the CA and so it
cannot be said that the petition was already
" d i s p o s e d o f w i t h fi n a l i t y. " R e s p o n d e n t s w e r e
then allowed to present their evidence ex parte
before the branch clerk of court.
O n J u l y 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e RTC re n d e r e d a D e c i s i o n i n
favor of respondents.
P e t i t i o n e r a p p e a l e d t h e RTC d e c i s i o n t o t h e C A .
On March 31, 2008, the appellate court rendered
t h e a s s a i l e d d e c i s i o n a ffi r m i n g t h e R T C d e c i s i o n .
I SS UE / S :
1. Whether or not the trial court err in
reinstating the complaint of respondents.
2. Whether or not the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of injunction are present.
HELD:

38

1. A perusal of the respondents motion for


reconsideration of the order of dismissal reveals
that there was no admission of negligence by
respondents, either express or implied. As
c o r r e c t l y f o u n d b y b o t h t h e RTC a n d t h e C A , i t
did not appear that respondent lost interest in
prosecuting their case nor was their counsel
negligent in handling it. Accordingly, there was
no basis for the dismissal order and
reinstatement of respondents complaint was
j u s t i fi e d .
2. For injun ction to issu e, two re qui si tes mu st
c o n c u r : fi r s t , t h e r e m u s t b e a r i g h t t o b e
protected and second, the acts against which
the injunction is to be directed are violative of
said right. Here, the two requisites are clearly
present: there is a right to be protected, that is,
respondents right over their concrete fence
which cannot be removed without due process;
and the act, the summary demolition of the
concrete fence, against which the injunction is
directed, would violate said right.
If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to
have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is
not to demolish the same summarily after
respondents failed to heed his request to remove
it. Instead, he should go to court and prove
respondents supposed violations in the
construction of the concrete fence. Indeed,

unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not


be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.

Case #28
ALIBSAR ADOMA, complainant,
Vs.
ROMEO GATCHECO, Sheriff III, and EUGENIO TAGUBA,
Process Server, of Branches 1 and 2, respectively, of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Santiago City,
respondents.
Facts:
The instant administrative complaint filed against respondents for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) and conduct unbecoming a court employee, arose from the
execution of a writ of replevin in Adoma v. Spouses Edmundo
Andres and Luzviminda Andresfor recovery of possession of motor
vehicle with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin before
Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago
City.
Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that on August 16, 2003 a writ
of replevin for the recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his favor.
On the same day, respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco implemented
the writ. He was accompanied by respondent Eugenio Taguba, a
process server of Branch 2 of MTCC, Santiago City, who volunteered
to assist respondent sheriff. After the two respondents seized the
vehicle, they demanded payment of P8,000.00, allegedly promised

39

by complainant but the latter was able to give only P1,000.00 and
another P1,000.00 the following day.
The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered to
complainant after 5 days from the implementation thereof. With
the vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day, complainant threatened
to file an administrative case against respondent sheriff. Finally, on
August 29, 2003, the latter was forced to release the vehicle to
complainant.
Respondents, however, continued to demand
P6,000.00, hence complainant filed the instant administrative case.
Respondents, on the other hand, denied soliciting and receiving any
amount from the complainant.
Respondent sheriff admitted,
however, that complainant promised to give him P10,000.00 if the
vehicle will be sold.
On September 10, 2003, the Court referred the instant
administrative complaint to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In her investigation report, Judge Madrid found the testimony of
complainant which was corroborated by two witnesses, to be more
credible. She refused to believe the claim of respondent sheriff that
he did not release the vehicle to complainant after 5 days from the
implementation of the writ on August 16, 2003, because he was
awaiting instructions from Judge Plata. However, she found that
respondent sheriff did not actually demand money for the
implementation of the writ because it was complainant who
promised to give money in exchange for the implementation of the
writ of replevin. Nevertheless, she concluded that respondent
sheriff is guilty of misconduct considering that he accepted partial
payment and insisted on its full payment.

As to respondent Taguba, Judge Madrid recommended that he be


reprimanded for trying to abet the misconduct of respondent
sheriff.
Upon receipt of the report of Judge Madrid, the Court referred the
case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum ,the OCA affirmed the investigating Judges
report. It recommended that respondent sheriff be fined in the
amount of P5,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a court employee and
that respondent Taguba be reprimanded for trying to abet the
misconduct of a fellow employee of another court.
Issue:
What are the procedures in executing writs and other processes?
Ruling:
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure
for the execution of writs and other processes are: first, the sheriff
must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him;
second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated
expenses; third, the approved estimated expenses shall be
deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and exoficio sheriff; fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount
to the executing sheriff; and fifth, the executing sheriff shall
liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return
on the writ. Any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the
lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction
which renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross
dishonesty.
In the instant case, respondent sheriff totally disregarded the
aforecited procedure. He failed to make and submit estimate of the
sheriffs expenses. The amounts received and demanded by him

40

are therefore unauthorized fees. His acts of accepting and soliciting


said monetary considerations make him liable not only for conduct
unbecoming a court employee but also for grave misconduct and
dishonesty.
As correctly found by the OCA, respondent sheriff deliberately failed
to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days
from the implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give
the whole amount he promised. Since the adverse party did not
object to the complainants bond nor posted a redelivery bond to
recover possession of the vehicle taken under the writ of replevin,
respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van to
complainant. However, it took respondent sheriff 13 days before he
released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation of Section 6,
Rule 60 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides

SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5)


days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse
party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety
or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court
affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond,
or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his
bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith
file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the
applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the
applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
Case #29
THOMAS YANG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R. VALDEZ, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch XXII,
General Santos City, SPS. RICARDO MORANTE and
MILAGROS MORANTE, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an
action in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City against
petitioner Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover
possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. In their complaint, the
Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and possession
of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them during the period
from 1982 to 1984. The trucks were, however, registered in the
name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the
Morante spouses' business of buying and selling corn. The Morante
spouses further alleged that they were deprived of possession of
the vehicles in the morning of 3 January 1985, when petitioner Yang
had the vehicles taken from where they were parked in front of the
Coca-Cola Plant in General Santos City, to the warehouse of Manuel
Yaphockun and there they were thereafter held. Despite repeated
demands, the complaint alleged, petitioner Yang refused to release
the trucks to respondent spouses.
To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent
spouses applied for a writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of
P560,000.00 executed by respondent Milagros Morante.
The
respondent judge issued an order of seizure directing the Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotabato to take immediate possession and
custody of the vehicles involved. The Sheriff carried out the order.
Defendant Manuel Yaphockun filed a motion seeking repossession
of the cargo trucks, and posted a replevin counter-bond of
P560,000.00 executed by himself and one Narciso Mirabueno. The
respondent judge promptly required the respondent spouses to
comment on the counter-bond proffered.
The respondent judge disapproved the counter-bond filed by
Manuel Yaphockun, since the latter had been dropped as party-

41

defendant and accordingly no longer had any personality to litigate


in the replevin suit. The trial court also ordered the immediate
release and delivery of the cargo trucks to respondent spouses.
Petitioner Yang moved for an extension of fifteen (15) days within
which to file an answer to the complaint for replevin. Four days
later, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the amount of
P560,000.00 which counter-bond was, however, rejected by the
respondent judge for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner Yang now argues before us that, firstly, respondent judge
had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the replevin bond of respondent
spouses. It is contended by petitioner that replevin bond was
merely an undertaking of the bondsmen Milagros Morante and Atty.
Calonzo to pay the sum of P560,000.00, that no tangible security,
such as "cash, property or surety," was placed thereby at the
disposal and custody of the court. It is argued, secondly, that the
replevin bond was defective considering that it had been filed by
only one of the two (2) private respondents and that the bondsmen
thereon had failed by its terms to undertake to return the cargo
trucks to petitioner should he (the petitioner) be adjudged lawful
owner thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not it was proper that the judge denied the application
for counter-bond in his answer to the replevin suit.
Ruling:
The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which must approve the bond. In the case at
bar, the replevin bond given by the respondent Morante spouses
was properly secured by the sureties themselves who declared their
solvency and capacity to answer for the undertaking assumed.

Petitioner also contends that since the respondent spouses are not
the registered owners of the cargo trucks involved, the writ of
replevin should not have been issued. We do not think so. The
provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory
action and the applicant who seeks immediate possession of the
property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the
property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin,
he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession
thereof."
Petitioner would finally challenge the order of respondent judge
dated 28 February 1985 rejecting his counter-replevin bond for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner received summons on the
amended complaint on 25 January 1985 and on the same day, filed
his counterbond. It is his contention that his redelivery bond was
not filed out of time, since he was served with summons only on 25
January 1985.
A defendant in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of
the property replevied by filing a redelivery bond within the periods
specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60
Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of
the property to the plaintiff" require the return of the property; in
Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer." Both these periods are mandatory in
character. Thus, a lower court which approves a counter-bond filed
beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction. In
the instant case, the cargo trucks were taken into custody by the
Sheriff on 7 January 1985. Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond
was filed on 25 January 1985. The matter was treated at length in
the trial court's order of 28 February 1985: court agree with the
conclusion of respondent judge that petitioner's right to file a
counterbond had already prescribed.
Case #30

42

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,


Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon R. Villar, a married businessman in Angeles City. The
relationship between the two developed into an intimate one and
resulted to a son - Christopher J., and two other daughters. The
relationship became known when Daisie took Christopher J. to
Villar's house and introduced him to the legal wife. After this, the
children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they
were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J.,
then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie
agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. He
said Christopher J. was enrolled at school and will be staying with
him for a while. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
Christopher J before the Regional Trial Court which rendered a
decision granting rightful custody of Christopher J. to his natural
mother Daisie T. David and ordering Ramon to give a temporary
support of P3,000.00 a month to all his 3 children with Daisie.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, declaring habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy. According to the CA, questions of
custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case
only when the parents are married to each other but are separated.
Hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and
Villar therefore, cannot properly provide for their support.
Issue:
The propriety of Habeas Corpus as a remedy for the custody of a
child?

Ruling:
Rule 102, of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. The CA correctly observed that the
determination of the right to the custody of minor children is
relevant in cases where the parents are married and for some
reason were separated from each other. However, it does not follow
that it cannot arise in any other situation. Christopher J. is an
illegitimate child, his father, being married to another woman.
Pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
the parental authority of his natural mother, who as a consequence
of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since the
petitioner has been deprived of the rightful custody of her child, she
is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Rule 102 makes
no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a
mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is a vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child.
Under Article 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." Christopher J., being less
than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided
by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age the mother's custody over
him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Article 213 of
the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it
has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he
should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of
his custody to him (private respondent).

43

In consideration of the above premises, the decision of the CA was


reversed. Villar was ordered to deliver Christopher J. to the custody
of his mother and to give him temporary support in the amount of
P3,000.00 pending the fixing of the amount of support in an
appropriate action.
Case #31
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as successor-in-interest
of Far East Bank and Trust Company, Petitioner
Vs.
EDUARDO HONG, doing business under the name and style
SUPER LINE PRINTING PRESS and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents
Facts:
On September 16, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies (EYCO)
filed a petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A stay order was
issued on September 19, 1997 enjoining the disposition in any
manner except in the ordinary course of business and payment
outside of legitimate business expenses during the pendency of the
proceedings, and suspending all actions, claims and proceedings
against EYCO until further orders from the SEC.
On September 14, 1999, the SEC rendered its decision disapproving
the petition for suspension of payments, terminating EYCOs
proposed rehabilitation plan and ordering the dissolution and
liquidation of the petitioning corporation. The case was remanded
to the hearing panel for liquidation proceedings. On appeal by
EYCO, the CA upheld the SEC ruling. A petition for certiorari was
eventually dismissed. Sometime in November 2000 while the case
was still pending with the CA, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, a petition for
extra-judicial foreclosure of real properties mortgaged to it by Eyco

Properties, Inc. and Blue Star Mahogany, Inc. Claiming that the
foreclosure proceedings initiated by petitioner was illegal.
Respondent Eduardo Hong, an unsecured creditor of Nikon
Industrial Corporation, one of the companies of EYCO, filed an
action for injunction and damages against the petitioner in the
same court. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss arguing that by plaintiffs
own allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction over the reliefs prayed
for belongs to the SEC, and that plaintiff is actually resorting to
forum shopping since he has filed a claim with the SEC and the
designated Liquidator in the ongoing liquidation of the EYCO Group
of Companies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The CA
affirmed the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC can take cognizance of the injunction suit
despite the pendency of SEC Case No. 09-97-5764
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Perusal of the complaint reveals that
respondent does not ask the trial court to rule on its interest or
claim -- as an unsecured creditor of two companies under EYCO -against the latters properties mortgaged to petitioner.
The
complaint principally seeks to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings
initiated by petitioner over those properties on the ground that
such properties are held in trust and placed under the jurisdiction of
the appointed Liquidator in SEC Case No. 09-97-5764. Upon the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8799, SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 was no
longer pending. The SEC finally disposed of said case when it
rendered on September 14, 1999 the decision disapproving the
petition for suspension of payments, terminating the proposed
rehabilitation plan, and ordering the dissolution and liquidation of
the petitioning corporation. With the enactment of the new law,
jurisdiction over the liquidation proceedings ordered in SEC Case

44

No. 09-97-5764 was transferred to the RTC branch designated by


the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction over cases formerly
cognizable by the SEC.

annul the aforementioned orders on the ground that they were


issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the Petition.
Issue:

There is no showing in the records that SEC Case No. 09-97-5764


had been transferred to the appropriate RTC designated as Special
Commercial Court at the time of the commencement of the
injunction suit on December 18, 2000. Pursuant to its original
jurisdiction over suits for injunction and damages, the RTC of
Valenzuela City, Branch 75 properly took cognizance of the
injunction case filed by the respondent. No reversible error was
therefore committed by the CA when it ruled that the RTC of
Valenzuela City, Branch 75 had jurisdiction to hear and decide
respondents complaint for injunction and damages.
Case #32
TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner,
Vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION
DIAZ, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against his wife,
respondent Diaz and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. Respondent then
filed with the lower court a complaint against the petitioner for legal
separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children
and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for
her and their youngest son. The petitioner filed his opposition to the
respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as
defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.
Judge Luciano granted the respondent's application for support
pendente lite. The petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to

Whether or not adultery is a good defense against the respondent's


claim for support pendente lite.
Ruling:
In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife
against the husband for support, based upon a written contract, this
Court held that adultery is a good defense.
In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61
(Section 5), the probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal
separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse,
having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. It
is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of
provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation
cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact
that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be
permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite,
which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the
decisions of this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense.
Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring
spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit
for legal separation no matter how groundless.
Case #33
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner,
Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR,
Respondents.

45

Issue:
Facts:
Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy4 (CoC) for the position of
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha
J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel
Hayudinis CoC, entitled Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S. Hayudini,
docketed as SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F).5
Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for
making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed
that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga
City. Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar
Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudinis petition on January 31, 2013.6
On that same day, the COMELECs First Division dismissed7 Omars
earlier petition to cancel Hayudinis CoC in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F)
for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false
representation as to his residency. Hayudini won the mayoralty race
in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently,
took his oath of office but the Comelec issued an order canceling
Hayudini's COC He filed a MR but Comelec Enbanc denied it for lack
of merit.
Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
alleging that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
cancelled that petitioner's COC.

Whether or not Comelec Committed grave abuse of discretion when


it cancelled petitioner's COC.
Ruling:
No. He Court finds the petition to be without merit. A special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based
on thespecific grounds and available only if there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion
has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent
and gross.16
Here, Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC
rendered its assailed Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court
sustains the COMELECs liberal treatment of Omars petition. As a
general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be
liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice
of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite
period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can

46

only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that


protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission
on Elections18 and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where
the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as
defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the
COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.1wphi1
The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend
its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a
speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is
for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as
achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is
imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the
real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding
duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, which the
people truly chose as their rightful leader
Case #34
RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION, Petitioners,
Vs.
BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., Respondent.
Facts:

On May 24, 2000, RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement


(SPA) with Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the
individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) for the sale to
RCBC of 226,460,000 shares (Subject Shares) of Bankard,
constituting 67% of the latters capital stock. After completing
payment of the contract price (P1,786,769,400), the corresponding
deeds of sale over the subject shares were executed in January
2001.
The dispute between the parties arose sometime in May 2003 when
RCBC informed EPCIB and the other selling shareholders of an
overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an
overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to P478 million
and that the sellers violated their warranty under the SPA.
As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration
proceedings with the International Chamber of CommerceInternational Court of Arbitration (ICC-ICA).
In its Request for Arbitration, dated May 12, 2004, Claimant RCBC
charged Bankard with deviating from and contravening generally
accepted accounting principles and practices, due to which the
financial statements of Bankard prior to the stock purchase were far
from fair and accurate, and resulted in the overpayment of P556
million. For this violation of sellers representations and warranties
under the SPA, RCBC sought its rescission, as well as payment of
actual damages in the amount of P573,132,110, legal interest on
the purchase price until actual restitution, moral damages and
litigation and attorneys fees, with alternative prayer for award of
damages in the amount of at least P809,796,082 plus legal interest.
In their Answer, EPCIB, Go and the other selling individual
shareholders (Respondents) denied RCBCs allegations.

47

Subsequently, the Arbitration Tribunal was constituted. Mr. Neil


Kaplan was nominated by RCBC; Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (a
retired Member of this Court) was nominated by the Respondents;
and Sir Ian Barker was appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman.

On May 28, 2008, the Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second


Partial Award and EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial
Award in the Makati City RTC. On July 10, 2008, RCBC filed in the
same court a Motion to Confirm Second Partial Award.

On August 13, 2004, the ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are
required to pay US$350,000 as advance on costs pursuant to Article
30 (3) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules). RCBC paid its
share of US$107,000, the balance remaining after deducting
payments of US$2,500 and US$65,000 it made earlier.
Respondents share of the advance on costs was thus fixed at
US$175,000.

Issues:

Respondents filed an Application for Separate Advances on Costs12


dated September 17, 2004 under Article 30(2) of the ICC Rules,
praying that the ICC fix separate advances on the cost of the
parties respective claims and counterclaims, instead of directing
them to share equally on the advance cost of Claimants (RCBC)
claim.

Ruling:

Respondents, however, refused to pay the increment, insisting that


RCBC should bear the cost of prosecuting its own claim and that
compelling the Respondents to fund such prosecution is inequitable.
On September 27, 2007, the Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial
Award (First Partial Award) subsequently, on October 26, 2007,
RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC, a motion to confirm the First
Partial Award, while Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 2008, the Makati City RTC, Branch 148
issued an order in SP Proc. Case No. M-6046 confirming the First
Partial Award and denying Respondents separate motions to vacate
and to suspend and inhibit Barker and Kaplan.Respondents motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied.

1. Whether or not there is legal ground to vacate the Second Partial


Award; and
2. Whether BDO is entitled to injunctive relief in connection with the
execution proceedings in SP Proc. Case No. M-6046.

The Court held that the pertinent provisions of R.A. 9285 which
provides that in confirmation of a domestic arbitral award Section
23 of R.A. 876 shall govern, thus, a domestic arbitral award when
confirmed shall be enforced in the same manner as final and
executory decisions of the Regional Trial Court.
It likewise held that a review brought to this Court under the Special
ADR Rules is not a matter of right. Rule 19.36 of said Rules specified
the conditions for the exercise of this Courts discretionary review of
the CAs decision. Accordingly, the Court examine the merits of the
petition before us solely on the statutory ground raised for vacating
the Second Partial Award: evident partiality, pursuant to Section 24
(b) of the Arbitration Law (RA 876) and Rule 11.4 (b) of the Special
ADR Rules.
The Court agreed with the CA in finding that Chairman Barkers act
of furnishing the parties with copies of Matthew Secombs article,
considering the attendant circumstances, is indicative of partiality
such that a reasonable man would have to conclude that he was
favoring the Claimant, RCBC.

48

On Injunction Against Execution Of Arbitral Award, the Court held


that before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the
following requisites are present: (1) there must be a right inesseor
the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against
which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus
probandiis on movant to show that there exists a right to be
protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be
enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the
right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.
Rule 19. Effect of appeal.The appeal shall not stay the award,
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
Court of Appeals directs otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
just. The Court find no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion
in the CAs denial of the application for stay order or TRO upon its
finding that BDO failed to establish the existence of a clear legal
right to enjoin execution of the Final Award confirmed by the Makati
City RTC, Branch 148, pending resolution of its appeal.
Settled is the rule that injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Injunction is
not a cause of action in itself, but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined has
become fait accompli, the prayer for provisional remedy should be
denied.
Case #35
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO and
PUGSONG MAT-AN, Petitioner
Vs.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES MAURO and ELISA
ANCHALES, Respondent.
Facts:

Spouses Anchales filed with the then Court of First Instance, Branch
9, now Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
(Urdaneta RTC), a Complaint for ownership, delivery of possession,
damages with preliminary injunction and attachment against the
spouses Augusto and Rosalia Yadno, Orani Tacay, and the spouses
Laura Yadno and Pugsong Mat-an. The Urdaneta RTC rendered its
Decision, Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the land
in question. The court also, among others, ordered Augusto Yadno,
Rosalia Yadno, Orani Tacay, Laura Yadno and Pugsong Mat-an order
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the amount of 400 cavans
of palay representing the harvest for the last six (6) years up to and
including the years 1982 and 1983 until they actually vacate and
deliver the premises to the plaintiffs; and attorney's fees. A Writ of
Execution was subsequently issued.
The sheriff of the Urdaneta RTC issued a Notice of Levy on the
property registered under the name of Orani covered by TCT No.T13845 of the Register of Deeds of Baguio City.
Spouses Mat-an, filed with the RTC of Baguio City (Baguio RTC),
Branch 7, an Action for injunction and damages with prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction against respondents predecessors, the
Spouses Anchales, Spouses Yadno, and the Provincial Sheriff of the
RTC Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan claiming that the Provincial
Sheriff of Urdaneta, without any authority from the trial court,
indiscriminately levied and conducted a public auction sale of the
property registered under the name of Orani Tacay covered by TCT
No. 13845.
A motion to Dismiss was filed on the ground that the Baguio RTC
had no jurisdiction to enjoin the Urdaneta RTC, since that latter
court is a court of coordinate jurisdiction. The Baguio RTC issued its
Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The CA upheld.
Issue:

49

Whether the Baguio RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
Facts:

Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled:
We find that the Baguio RTC correctly dismissed the case for
injunction with damages filed with it, since it had no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action. Petitioners' predecessors could not in
an action for injunction with damages filed with the Baguio RTC
sought the nullification of a final and executory decision rendered
by the Urdaneta RTC and its subsequent orders issued pursuant
thereto for the satisfaction of the said judgment. This would go
against the principle of judicial stability where the judgment or
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Urdaneta RTC, may
not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (i.e.,
another RTC), for the simple reason that the power to open, modify
or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed by but is
restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or
issued.
The long standing doctrine is that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a
province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule
would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
Case #36
SPOUSES HUMBERTO P. DELOSSANTOS AND CARMENCITA M.
DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners,

From December 9, 1996 until March 20, 1998, the petitioners took
out several loans totaling P12,000,000.00 from Metrobank, Davao
City Branch, the proceeds of which they would use in constructing a
hotel on their 305-square-meter parcel of land located in Davao
City. They executed various promissory notes covering the loans,
and constituted a mortgage over their parcel of land to secure the
performance of their obligation. The interest rates were fixed for the
first year, subject to escalation or de-escalation in certain events
without advance notice to them. The loan agreements further
stipulated that the entire amount of the loans would become due
and demandable upon default in the payment of any installment,
interest or other charges.
On December 27, 1999, Metrobank sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage after the petitioners
defaulted in their installment payments. The petitioners were
notified of the foreclosure and of the forced sale being scheduled on
March 7, 2000. The notice of the sale stated that the total amount
of the obligation was P16,414,801.36 as of October 26, 1999.
On April 4, 2000, prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale (i.e., the
original date of March 7, 2000 having been meanwhile reset to April
6, 2000), the petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint (later
amended) for damages, fixing of interest rate, and application of
excess payments (with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction).
They alleged therein that Metrobank had no right to foreclose the
mortgage because they were not in default of their obligations.
In the meantime, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the foreclosure sale. After hearing on notice, the RTC issued
its order dated May 2, 2000, granting the petitioners application for
a writ of preliminary injunction. Metrobank moved for

50

reconsideration. The petitioners did not file any opposition to


Metrobanks motion for reconsideration; also, they did not attend
the scheduled hearing of the motion for reconsideration. On May
19, 2000, the RTC granted Metrobanks motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for
certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC
when it issued the orders dated May 19, 2000 and June 8, 2001.
On February 19, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirming
the assailed orders.

function of a writ of certiorari. It is clear to us, therefore, that the CA


justly and properly dismissed their petition for the writ of certiorari.
Secondly, the Court must find that the petitioners were not entitled
to enjoin or prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgage
by Metrobank. They were undeniably already in default of their
obligations the performance of which the mortgage had precisely
secured. Hence, Metrobank had the unassailable right to the
foreclosure. In contrast, their right to prevent the foreclosure did
not exist. Hence, they could not be validly granted the injunction
they sought.

Ruling:

The foreclosure of a mortgage is but a necessary consequence of


the non-payment of an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where
the parties have stipulated in their agreement, mortgage contract
and promissory note that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose
the mortgage upon the mortgagors default, the mortgagee has a
clear right to the foreclosure in case of the mortgagors default.
Thereby, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
application of the mortgagor will be improper. Mindful that an
injunction would be a limitation upon the freedom of action of
Metrobank, the RTC justifiably refused to grant the petitioners
application for the writ of preliminary injunction. We underscore
that the writ could be granted only if the RTC was fully satisfied that
the law permitted it and the emergency demanded it. That,
needless to state, was not true herein.

The appeal has no merit.

Case #37

Petitioners aver that the respondent Court gravely abused its


discretion in finding that petitioners are in default in the payment of
their obligation to the private respondent.
Issue:
- Whether the petitioners had a cause of action for the grant of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
- Whether or not the petitiobers were entitled to the writ of
preliminary injunction.

The petitioners resort to the special civil action of certiorari to


assail the May 19, 2000 order of the RTC (reconsidering and setting
aside its order dated May 2, 2000 issuing the temporary restraining
order against Metrobank to stop the foreclosure sale) was improper.
They thereby apparently misapprehended the true nature and

ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA and ATTY. CLARITO


SERVILLAS, Complainants,
Vs.
JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Surigao City, Respondent.
Facts:
The undisputed facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

51

As their final charge, complainants aver that respondent judge is


guilty of tardiness and inefficiency in trying cases before his branch.
Complainants state that respondent judge usually starts the hearing
between 9:45 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. in violation of the Supreme Court
Circular.
In his Comment with Counter-Charge dated 5 November 2010,
respondent judge preliminarily states that complainant Atty. Medina
is neither a counsel nor a party litigant in Spec. Proc. No. 7101 and
Civil Case No. 7065; thus, he has no interest to question perceived
irregularities relative to these cases. With respect to Atty. Servillas,
he is neither a counsel nor a party-in-interest in any of the cases
mentioned in the complaint.
Relative to Civil Case No. 7077, respondent judge claims that he
issued the TRO and preliminary injunction judiciously and without
bad faith or irregularity. He argues that he resolved cases based on
the merits of the case and if there was indeed error, it merely
constitutes an error of judgment. Respondent judge further states
that the alleged error was already aptly corrected by Judge
Bayanas reversal. Regarding the alleged delay in the resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge defends himself
by explaining that the Motion was not submitted for resolution.
Respondent judge argues that respondent spouses lawyer
(complainant Atty. Medina) failed to file a responsive pleading to the
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration and that the hearing of
the Motion was further reset to 12 March 2010.
As for Spec. Proc. No. 7101, respondent judge argues that it is
already subject of an earlier complaint filed by Cristita C. Vda. de
Tolibas against him. With respect to Civil Case No. 7065, respondent
judge states that the Motion to Dismiss was already resolved.
On the charge of tardiness and inefficiency, respondent judge
attached the: (1) 21 October 2010 Joint Affidavit of Prosecutor
Maureen Chua and Atty. Jose Begil, Jr.; and (2) 21 October 2010

affidavit of Court Legal Researcher Peter John Tremedal explaining


the reasons for the delay of the hearing. In Tremedals Affidavit, he
states that respondent judge instructed him to convene the
counsels first, and to ensure their attendance before respondent
judge starts the hearing. In conclusion, respondent judge asserts
that the malicious filing of the baseless complaint was conduct
unbecoming officers of the court for which complainants must be
held accountable.
In their Rejoinder and Answer to Counter-Charge dated 1 December
2010, complainants reiterate their arguments in the Complaint. In
the first case, they emphasize that respondent judge deliberately
failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. On the second,
complainants argue that the pendency of the Tolibas administrative
complaint cannot divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to
review the actions of respondent judge, more so in the light of new
allegations supported by judicial records. As for respondent Judges
alleged tardiness and inefficiency, complainants point out that the
joint affidavit of Prosecutor Chua and Atty. Bejil, Jr. merely pertained
to one particular day. As answer to respondent judges CounterCharge, complainants denied the allegation for lack of factual and
legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not undue delay in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration, the OCA likewise held it unmeritorious because the
motion was not submitted for resolution in view of the resetting of
its hearing.
Ruling:
Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, gross
ignorance of the law is a serious charge punishable by either: (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement

52

or appointment to any public office, including government-owned


and controlled corporation; or (2) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000 while undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is a less serious charge punishable by either (1) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more thanP10,000 but
not exceeding P20,000.
Accordingly, we impose a fine of P25,000 for the charge of gross
ignorance of the law, taking into account that in a previous case
respondent judge had been sanctioned.
WHEREFORE,
we
find
respondent
Judge
Victor
A.
Canoy GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW andUNDUE
DELAY in rendering a decision and accordingly fine him Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000). He isSTERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. The other charges are hereby dismissed.
Case #38
RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA, Petitioner,
Vs.
HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ACTING
THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR
THE MILITARY, MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN, EMMANUEL M.
LAUREZO AND ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
Agdeppa filed an administrative complaint against Marydel B.
Jarlos-Martin (Jarlos-Martin), Emmanuel M. Laurezo (Laurezo), and
Iluminado L. Junia, Jr. (Junia).

The said admin case arose from another administrative complaint


before the Office of the Ombudsman. Junia alleged in his complaint
that the contractor for the NHA in Tala, Caloocan City (NHA Project),
was overpaid in the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The
overpayment was allegedly facilitated through the dubious and
confusing audit reports prepared by Agdeppa and endorsed by
Castillo, to the detriment, damage, and prejudice of the
Government.
According to Agdeppa, Junias claims that he (Agdeppa) had
manipulated audit reports of overpayments to SupraCon to create
confusion and defraud the Government, were unfortunate,
irresponsible, and malicious. However the Ombudsman dismissed
the complaint. Agdeppa filed a MR but was denied for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, Agdeppa filed the instant Petition before this Court
averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in rendering
the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated September 28,
2000.
Issue:
Whether or not should Court adheres to a policy of noninterference with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
Office of the Ombudsman
Ruling:
YES. In general, the Court follows a policy of non-interference with
the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory
and prosecutorial powers, in respect of the initiative and
independence inherent in the said Office, which, beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the
integrity of the public service. The Court expounded on such policy
in M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc. v. Ombudsman, thus:

53

It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause against


those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function
that belongs to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is vested with
the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprioor upon
the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. As explained in Esquivel v.
Ombudsman:

discretion defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of


judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. For there to be a
finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the
discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law. (Citations omitted.)
Case #40

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists


reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled
is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with
the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate
and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and
the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if
they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public
prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss
a complaint by a private complainant.
The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the
latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy
Ombudsman, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause may
only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on
the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of

RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO, Petitioner,


vs.
EMILIANA M. ROJAS, and the legitimate heirs of JOSE A.
ROJAS, namely: JOSE FERDINAND M. ROJAS II, ROLANDO M.
ROJAS, JOSE M. ROJAS, JR., CARMELITA ROJAS-JOSE, VICTOR
M. ROJAS, and LOURDES M. ROJAS, all represented by JOSE
FERDINAND M. ROJAS II, Respondents.
Facts:
Emiliana M. Rojas is the widow of the late Jose Rojas, while the other
[respondents] are the children of the spouses. he Franciscos, are
the applicants for registration in Land Registration Case No. 950004 from whence the challenged decision and orders sprung.
Subject of the controversy is a portion of the 3,181.74 hectares of a
vast track of land, known as the Hacienda de Angono, in Angono,
Rizal. The entire hacienda used to be owned by one Don
Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana upon whose death left a portion
thereof, consisting of the said 3,181.74 hectares, to his two (2) sons
Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido. ubsequently, the entire
parcel of land covered by Decreto No. 6145 was subdivided into
twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of
title were issued in lieu of the reconstituted TCT No. 23377.

54

Thereafter, the heirs who executed the aforesaid document of


extra-judicial settlement, including the now spouses Jose Rojas and
Emiliana Rojas, sold the property to Pacil Management Corporation

Whether or not CA should have dismissed the petition for certiorari


and prohibition filed by respondents for being filed beyond the 60day reglementary period

On August 22, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines filed a


complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6145, the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377 and all titles derived from said
decree; and the declaration of the parcel of land covered by the
decree as belonging to the State, except so much thereof as had
been validly disposed of to third persons. The complaint, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 34242 before the CFI of Rizal, alleged
that Decreto No. 6145 issued on September 10, 1911 and the
alleged owner's copy of TCT No. 23377 issued on May 12, 1933,
both in the name of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido, and which
supposed owner's duplicate was made the basis of the
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. (23377) RT-M-0002 on
March 29, 1976 are false, spurious and fabricated, and were never
issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for registration of land,
either under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, or any other law.

Ruling:

The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared Decreto No.
6145 and TCT No. 23377 genuine and authentic. The CA affirmed
the Decision. In its motion for reconsideration, the Republic prayed
for an alternative judgment recognizing the authenticity and validity
of Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 only with respect to such
portions of the property which were either: (1) not possessed and
owned by bona fide occupants with indefeasible registered titles
thereto or (2) possessed and owned by bona fide occupants and
their families with lengths of possession that has ripened to title of
ownership. The motion was denied.

As to the alleged indefeasibility of the Franciscos title, petitioners


contention is incorrect. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after
the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the final decree of
registration. As long as a final decree has not yet been entered by
the LRA and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of
entry, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it. In this case, the subject parcels
of land were eventually registered in the names of petitioner and
his sisters on July 29, 2000 with the issuance of TCT Nos. M-102009,
M-102010, M-102011, and M-102012. Less than a year later, on
January 3, 2001, respondents already filed a petition for certiorari

Issue:

Respondents committed a lapse in procedure, but not due to a


petition that was filed out of time before the CA. Respondents erred
because they should have filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules instead of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. Such petition does not require a
person to be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.
Nevertheless, considering that the petition before the CA essentially
alleged lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process two grounds
upon which a petition for annulment of judgment may be based
(aside from extrinsic fraud)
We deem it wise to ignore the procedural infirmity and resolve the
substantial merits of the case, especially so since the action filed is
not yet barred by laches or estoppel.

55

and prohibition before the CA. Therefore, the principle that a Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked does not apply.