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Churches' migrant minilstry in Jthe West - were LWrested in 1961 %or unlawd .aslsembly when they
teste'd the TaIIahassee amport restaurant.
For Ithe'e y e a s they fought (the2 conviction 'but,
beoause ojf a technical lderhciency, ,they were never
able to get (hheir oase out olf the state courts and imto
Cowt.
Finally
legal avenues
'the U. S. Supreme
were IcI'ose'd ka Men1 until they ~ c t u a l l ywent to jd,
wllepce bhey could (begin a newround of appeals
through I&e #statecourts. So when Tlallahassee, for
spite, b d e d them to leave ,th'air kmportant wmk and
1,eturn to 'begin) a sixty-day sentence, they went.
At this point ,their ,at%omey,Ho1wa:d Dixon a the
American ,Civil Liberties 8Union, kook a sadkcally oan(did approachto rthejw
pproh1,em. He asked a federal
circult court of appeds bo give Ms clients either new
hail ,ol: 'a w i t of habeas corpus, .arguinlg I ~ a "iil
t six
yeass we have never won la civil ri@h8ts case on apped
ih %lorlda comts," amid that in 'race cases "lappeals :to

.them forjusticeare
futile." He begiged 'the fedend
panel tsotbalQe jurisdilction.
And the fe'derd jurlsts I&d. Th'ey gave athe state
courtsthree dlays withm whim&to grant Isonnne relief
to'tihe ministersOthelmse, (the dkdecal courtmulld
,take over. ACLU attorneys (claim tMs is EL real precedeat with promise, getting a federal court to take a
case away from the Islate COUnbS in m5dstream on Ian
open-faced plea that the state courts simply don't dispense justice.
At t,his point,withtheministens
clearly on t h e
way to victory atlast, >Florxda',scapitalcltyturned
petty in a hilarious way. It redwed >bheirsenkmces fio
time \served (four days) and threw ,them out IS jailover their potests-thus bloolung huther efforts by
Ithe nine to clear themselves in hderal court.
Gertamly'theclergymen
aannotclaimanything
unusual about being j,adeld
umonstituMolzaNy,
but
,they may be (fie f1rs.t persons railrolade,d to freedtom.

i
The wexthemd h~e~adstmes
in bhe inexpliwbge as was our plunge into
in .the PLirprpines. For four.old Prostestant ce,meltery of P o ~ ~ t u guese M.acao tell af t h e misa,dven- teen pears we have propped ,bhe
tures of many Am8ez%cainlsin ,the French efifort $bo 'keep h ~ d o C h i n a ,
"demoGulf olf: Tonkin m d ' t h e S Q U ~ for
~ htawe underwritten$the
Chana Sea. En (the early years of ccatic" F e m e s *of ,such a s lBmo Dld,
our Republic, ,the h e r b a n s who Nlgo D i d Diem and the subsequent
miLitary dictatom We havestumareawwe
&ed in this $ma~~ay
siad'ors, Yankee gaders, milsls+on- bled iwto 'kolonid" wsponsibfl5ties
w.it!hout corresponding mtho1-ity
a r m ' and visionlasy dip1,omats"like
sinice (the(defeat of France by ,the
Eidmunld Roberts, who fimt sought
treaties for &he United S$a.tes in Viebnamese in 1954.
Southeast A'sla, Journeying to, CoThe dilemma we facetd i
n midahan China, Siam 'and Musoalt in 1954 was very diBerent in some
1832. Toclay, ,the headline7 .toll the respects holm the dilemuna Presidelath m ~of
m yAmeniclans pursuing dent M,cK.idey faced ,h1898 when
the pohtical interrests of .the United he was jl$floEmeld +at aJi of the
Phlippine Islands 'were OLXS for the
States in Southeaslt Asia.
Flrom s m d beginnings our inter- taking-and bol,dhg. In 1954, there
est i n S,mtheIastAsia 'swelle,dt'o in- was nothing ready Eor, t;he taking
chde a odonial empire highlighted in Inldo-China-udess we were preby our half century in the,Phiilip- pawd t o battle the well-anned, wellpines. The United Sltates bluadeTed 1e.d and tough Vietnamese aad alinto empire ;in 1898 b y d e f e a ~ g m'ost ccertainly the Yjoloissuis Olf Comthe weak Bplanish impedalists in mun3st China. We neverthelelss de,the ;Ba!b!ile of Manila Bay. Now we Icided to try t!o A'dd S'outh Vietnam
lare fightingagain i q the Gulf of against a Co8mmu;nisttake-over.
In doing so w'e ,pnderwti.mated
Tonkin k d in ,the &elaming jungles
of d d Indo-f2hinla.Far,mmy h e r - C~oimmunistpower lmld Ithe re,sp.anse
of great numbers 08 the Vietnamese
icans (today o w deepinvolvement
in-Souohearst Asia'ss civil wars is as 60 Ho mi M . d s leadership,plus
the extent of Communistoutside
aid, emspeciallyfroin the Chillese.
J o h n Gange i s director of the Insti- When Gejcretary Dulles' went to 'the
w t e #ofbztenrational Studies and OveTGeneva Conference 08 A p d , 1954,
seas , Admamstration,Universitg
of
Oregon; h e serued foT some years as oalled to ,&~ScussIbma ,and dispose
of khe pieces of Ithe baolcen F r e n a
an officer i z the State Deparqnent.

emwe

Aug@ 24,b1?64

we w5ll n o doubt figiht this gross


times.
Eventually,
i,t
$act of our
will h,ave ,to be accepted and i t
must h8enceformth
be incluldedlin the
ingre,dien,ts thatshapeour
Asian
policy.
In 1954, we cbose not t o join in
the sF&nadDeclaration of the Geneva
Conference on Indo-China orf July
21, 1954. (The United States made
sa anilateral statement, h . o m e r , accepting the ~amiis8tilc~e
nagreemmts.)
All the other nations (U. X., France,
UISISR,Peoples Republic of China,
Laos, Camboldia and the Pgorples
Re@ublic of Vietnam[North Vietnam]) at this conferenlce, except
the Sta,te of Vietnam (Soulth Vietnam), . :a,ocepted the agreemenas
drawnthere, South Vieham,with
ourbacking, refiulsed tocarryout
the provisZonls of ahe 1954 Geneva
agreement Eor eleecltims in worth
,& 8opm one
and SouthVietnam
government and insteald set
its
of this
course againsttheintent
(agreement. South Vietnam rehssd
to permit ,the electilclns, haganits
miilitary Ibuild-up, and prapared for
the inevitable war of Vietnamese
agahst Vie~tmamese,ayi~h hothsides
drawing on onbsidleaid to #maintain
the fight,Fzoh here on it is ,the old
familiar story d who firslt vi,dated
the aocords or the intent ,ofIthe acwe first
cords, etc,etc. The fact that
refuseid to accept them putts bath
the U,.S.alnd South Vie,tnm in a
db,biou,srole-in the objeotive light
af ihCstory-a role our government
bas been dili,gentto gloss over. We
refused to permit Tree elections
in Viehmn because *we were sure
we wmld lose j$hem,
When we f>orundthe 1954 Geneva
agreements unatroceptdble to m , ai!though aclceprable $0 tbe
other
we had two
signatory
nations,
broad alternatives open ,bo p s . One
alternative was to reject ,tihe final
colllclasions of,,
the oonference, a s regarding .&ereby rhe majority de-
cisim, and continue our awn bilalterd pollicy wit41 South Vietnam.
This we chose to d ~ ,

Thesecmd alternative w a s
to seek a higher, 8omm than the
Genev,a Conference n,ations. Resort
,to the United Nations zhnoagh ,various possible arppmaches would
who wenre conhave involved
cerne,d with peace a n d ftreedlom,
which we d e g e d were threatened
in Inld,o-CMna. The UN aupervised
an election and ,a plebiscite ou1 the
resftoration of the monarchy in warc a l l

64

torn Greece isn 1996. The coinlditions occqants of the hdo-Chineee penwexe hardly worse in dl Vietnam insula wanteld rno piart of ,a future
in 1954, or even 1956, when a gen- reigime that might be dominated by
eral election was to bme hel,d in July C~ommunis1t-orien8tedleaden. For
of that year. To Uhose who way Ithat religions, econonGc and political
ths kind of
la UN-supervised election %nViet- reasonsmanyfeared
nam would no5 have been laclcept- society they would have if Hto Chi
able to N o r t h Vfelham ,and Com- Minh and Jothem09his strolng Cornmunist China, sone answer is ,that munist Ib@liefbecame the new rulms
we never tried This munse of action of t;kis w,ar-weary part of Asia. The
fmeign businessmen, rubber plantandbence we cant eay whatthe
em and mine opemators also, of
responlse might have been. Instead,
we pres,sed for a ,Southeast Asriam course,feared the sonsequences of
mililkmy selclurity paot, whiuh Secre- a Communist relgime.
Moreover, ItheUnited Sjtates had
tary DuUes Ih,ad mged in 1954.
The
EisenhmeT
adldsltration beoome iso conspicmously identified
had jusit a w d w e d the bitter pill withthe Fnench in theirstruggle
of negotiating wi& Clomlmunist against Ho lChi Mi&, (albeit iln the
armis- name Iof lde8,ense lagahstintemaC,fiina and Noxth Eorea
tice in rhe Korean War. The Re- tional commun!ism, that n o fuTther
publican eamppailgnlocrratory of 1952 action by us mow would mean Ithat
we, has well as the Frentch, had gone
woulld bave soulnldeld holhwand
[down
,to (ddeat in another eector
mocking indeed 5E the DtuUesim
trcumpets (of liberation&om com- of bhe contahmnent peniphery of
munism had aounrde,d amobher re- milibant ~mti-commu~nilsm.
So mmh $or three
quite
subtreat ,on thk roUbacVfront. Same
prominent Republicans had wanted atantial fa\cts: a strong C,ornmunist
our fighting f m a s to join the Indo- h i v e $or 6outhelast Asia: internal
Chinese fray in emly 1954, beside Jnldo-Ohinese,arnti+Cornmunitst@France, but,the general in the Com- ion; ,and +he poslture, m face, of
mander in Chiefs &air had over- the U. S. if no further &$orts were
rule,d athat, as he had rejected my made .to save hdo-China.
renewal af fighting in Korea above
Onthe lside of &e m y ~ sthat
the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, Re- entere.d into our policy cdloul,ati~ons,
publican leaders h
e
w f b m I innu- directly OT indirectly,
there
was
memble charges of their m n what finst the one, still &!tenextpresse.d,
a pmerfiul weapontheDemomats
that it was poslsible to draw a line
would have in our domestic pollitics beyond which ,$herewo;uld not be
i.f &#e Repuibilican ~drminisbation tolerated any expansion Olf Camnow lost IndoChina. Ixonically munist cmt!rol. Thins a p p o a h g
enough, as yviah mainland Chima mybh evokes images of a resolute
allegedly loet by Ithe Democrats, U. 6 . cavalry stand ,at the pass, or
the United States never had h d o - ils ne passerant a t Verdun in
China and coukdnt have held it i > f , Wlmld Wax I, or la moresophistiwehad
tried. Therefme, amther catedbutstillquite
naive canwarin
Asimawasnot
.a fe,a,sible ~ b a i n m e n t - o f ~ c o ~ m u ~ sooncept.
m
political course fcrr a U. S. sdminis- Thinking d communism (as
tratlon, even ,one iled by a five-sbax ideology ,ought t o *makepeople chary
general. ,
of expcmnding on d r a w i n g a line
Yet we Idid Ideddeto bry to ho18d .ta sttop .&e spread OS ideas. Interhistory
pfiolvidea n o exat least pant of Inldo-IChina,namely, estingly,
the new State ~f Vietnam below ample of a p p e I h g ideas havling
eHective1y in their
new- heenimpeded
the17thpardel.
Amd so
est ph,ase lof Western adventure in sprread laud adoptlon belcaulse Os
Indo-China began
that deci- lines drawn on political maps.
The second mytih that we emsion. We have been ,trying for ten
braced
was
that military action
years to prove i t a sound one.
would be r a m wcepttarble substitute
In Iretrospct the foundations $or basic polibical and social action.
for lour 1954 decision appear lto be Again the kssfons of the bitter and
part fact and paxt myth-a fairly $mstratin,g Amerrican experience in
com~mlonan% i
n foreign as well Niclaxsgu,a, Haiti lmd Ganto Domas domestic (policydeciskons. The minigo in tihe years between Wmld
h a t s were &sat#( 1) Southeast Asia Wars I and I1 were passed over
was a wcognized*target oif Com- or reje!cteld, if ever remembered.
munist subversion and possible Milirary fmce - if su%cient in
take-over; (2) many of the native amount and rutM,ess anough in diThe NATION
1

, a n

a m

been told
relotion
c m slurpprelss relbelljons, dismptive intermd Sonees and ooun- Amelicanpeoplebave
but rarely has it poduced bhe re- temfonces mwing against $he pre- over#and ,over that Ithere were f m l s condit5ons whwh lead men sumed massive eeimic wave set in and still lare - no other alternatives
to jloin the ranks of rerbeUiun. We mrotilon by any little uhmge of po- bat to stand on $he 17bh parallel
vmtured t o combine lsome econnomic liticd status. It is a aeglatwe, fear- (,orwell sou& of it) land fi&t ,the
i n d te8&nilud aid Mthmilibary .sup- f u l ,and mechanistic view of politics devils (d4efgedlyall f r o m lahe s o r t h )
for those very re.a- in the ancient blattlegrounds of Inpost, but the rationale Eor rnlli6a-y andman,but
s
advocates. do-China. What we havedoneis
unejasures has prevlaibd increasing- soins it h ~ d ~countless
intervene in a thlird ckll war in
ly as our efforts ~ 1 hldmo-China
1
have
Asia; China and Koma being Ithe
So, we took some fIacts
persisted. m e areatiom of SEATO
kn 1954 epitomizes this futile faith added some mythsandcame
up other two very costly interventions.
Until relcently, too, we hlave lackmany times rein mili,tasy power bo solve t h e prob- wlih ,a decisilon
lems (of disorder in politically in- affirmed - to deny all S.outhelast eld critical voices which, while not
choate (states de.spelTate$yin need of A,sia to communism, with rnilictary acting as ithe devih advocate,
aid, and wecrelated SEATO to do would at lelast ask if ,we we sure
social reifolm.
The third myth &at we gollowed the job lfor uls. Ten years later this that ,what we are attempting is the
was-bhe ldomino tiheory of the in- quelasy founldatimaf factamd myth only poss?ble alternative larcoeptable
vexy
deeply and to our people. Like McKinley and
evitable 1,oss of dl of Asia and a finds us rnireld
vital threat to our own continental sbking in more and more. After lohe PhiJippines, the vastmajority
secupity if any additional part of expending many billions 08 dcoll*ar8s of the American people itn 1954 had
Asia cameunderC~o~mmunist O O ~ - and sachficing hun&eds of Bivels o d y ,thevaguest noltiian of where
t7ol. This iheo1-y was the delight olf in combat or related services, after Lam, Ombodia and Vietnam were
land, h e y careld less. Do (they
S e n William l h m l , a n d , who tmm- mistings Tmd turnings of CIA nnpeted it in .the Senate and across dercoveroperations, with resukimg even now believe these areas so
the Band as !it had Ithe kfallibdity changes 6: deladers in ,some of Ithe vital ,to theis weifire that very exOlf Newtons l,aw af pavity. Even states, there iss still n o eqd in sight. tensive ,and hng+tenn invollvement
that we can aonsidea?
What could we bave done that is
President Kennedy sapenteld the arlgumentsof fihe domino theory m d we fdiddt do? E it had been polsfew voilces were ra5sed &to
quesrion its &ble !for the Republicans t o bave
Jn due h e , pkb.ably later
,done,otihelwise - .orFor the Delmn.o- than would h,ave bean an optimum
logic of inevitable,irresistibleand
policy ticme for us, we will beforced to
csats #to havealteredthat
sequentialmassivedefeatoncethe
first (zad,ditional) kitble domino fell after they took over in 1961 - one $ace Ithe untihin~karbh$ poslsibility
against the hastions of our friends. woldd like to ahink $hat they would of &he neutmlization of all of the
The domho theory overboks the surely have Idme BO.The losses ob 1ndo-Ch;lnese peninsula. Secretary
reaction
by Amerioan laves, &he ou,Qouring of of State Rusik and Selcretary olf Depossibility o f strong
othernationsat
difrfermt po~ints many billilonls af Daxpayem d d a r s feme IMcNwmra
repeatedly
say
when h e y are c70mfxonteldby new and Dhe stnains on ourfriendship
that n o thought is beinggiven to
circumsbances cle,arly threatening yvjmth many ocher nratilons which .this alterhadive to our present mastheir security. The Itheory assumens bave not seen theissues QS we bave sive militaly aid-cunz&eeurs.forthat , d l power?ful forces la-e on only seen dhern, would not normally be K.hlanh .as our apprrolarch to .tihe probo n e side, dways moving outward, calleid lassets to a y political party lem. The MuNamara lslhutQe .to SAand it nelgkcts the poss2bility of seeking voter swp$ogt. Amd so ,$he gon o d e s tlmeadbme calls for
Igrelater resolve lmdwarnings Qan unfoaseeable end to the efcont,
and uixconandthen Dhe k&ar
vincingreports o f gnatifyimg progres,s and encouraging developments 011the Wcestbound mln back
#to Wmhington. In ,the meantime,
the Viedmong strike villages and
citi,es at will i
n SOutJjVi,eltnamand
,simultaneousiy odetail q m - e f o x e s
t o , pnsh their ckrpa&n in Laos.
Re~cl7uits~and rmilitiary equipment
are pickeld up in lhbundsance from
(the south Vietnqese civilian and
mditaxy fonces.
Why are we hvolved in Southeast Asima? Where do we go for
the next ten ye1arslTthe$e are hhe
queshiions thtat Ibecg and receive n o
dear mswers,:other
than Clarry
on! Whmat wasrvldid in 1954 is stiU
valid 5n 1964 d t h o u l g h the Asian
world bas @Ihan.ged [giready since
Ithen. At some p o h t - a d soon
perhaps
we must face up to:
65
August 24, 1964
m

l a n i l

I&

(1) our dubious legal position in


SOLI'^^ Vietnam,
our sh,oolting
and des,tsoytng of militaryforces
under the t!hin ,de:c,eit of being advlsers; ( 2 ) the soiundlnelss of ow
conti,nuing passivity toward a
strong role f o r the UN in Southecast
Asilan strife, &iJe ,at
,the
sme
ticme we ulave pressed for UN action in the inniternelcine flghtrng s f
the Congo, Cyprus and $he Middle
East; ( 3 ) a new look a t neutralization of ;bor;dertareas between East
aad West in Asia land tihe established examplmes, both satisfac~orya n d
ansati,sfacdory, !of neutralizationin
Europeand elsewhere; ( 4 ) a hmd
review of all our interests in Asia,
eventually in conferenoe with Communist Chlina; land (5) ablandoning
Ithe shibboleth olf oontrainia?lg comrnunkm aloag artificial latitudes or
wilbh

2. Th

election peri,oclsee LIS re-examine


:activedeSeasel
in
Soueheast Asias Indo4Xinese peninsula? Perhaps noit; it has become
a habict to lmgue las we have -for
so Ilomg. AppaFen:tly only a Senlator
Wayne Monse can change hia mind
as f d y as h e circumsbances require and .still retain his following.
Pmoliticsdoesnt stop atthe wateis
edge, but rather i,t governs all we
[do. Only a sltatesman above politics
clan change our coume now. Events
i n Indo-China may notwaitfor
our politicians %oclelar the Novembey election hurdle before bhey can
lead our discontented pelople to
a new amd more realistic settlsn~en~t
i n 6outheast Asi,a, and extricate us
from a rniQadventure kern of good
motives based on sfome faulty c~alculations land, expectations.
OUT ,d,ecade o

.>

nly War Weve Got . . .

Saigon, Vietnam
You hear &e phrase everywhere. A
young Special Forces captain, f;reslh
from >Okinawa,ldelclares: All I want
#i?olrnVietnam is #nitheC I B ( ~ come
a long
batinfantrymansbadge,
rifle on a bluefield wibh a silver
wrelath , b e h d i t ) . Hell, man, its
theody war weve got. And an
eamest mfajlolrin corps headquarters
says: Xouill rneet the brravest and
best soldiers in the U S . Army right
here. This is ,the o d y war weve
got, and Id mtate the whole Army
throughhere if I couid. AIS i t is,
Im ,told Ifhe volunteers axe bacle,d
up for four mmonths.
W h k h is one reasoin why we are
fighting a war and losing a revoh i o n in South Vietnam. The backbone of any =my is its N.C.0.s and
company-grade ofchcers, and i t is
n o #accident bhat most of )&he Arnerican (advisersat,taohed to ahhe Vietnamese a m y axe sergeanbs, first
lieu:tenantmsm d capitains in their
twenties. A man m e t see combat
before he is truly a soldier. Our
Woxld Wkx $1 veterans are middelaged desk soldiars now, land even
in their
(our Korean vetemnsare
Danzel F . Ford, a freeJance journalist,
has been in South Vietnam f o r the
on
a magmane
past two months
wrzters grant from t h e Phzlzp M . Stern
Fnmzly Fund. This is the lastarticle
in a series he has w r ~ t t e nfor %e Nlation f r o m the war zone.
6G

loagitudes.The
tmthisthat
the
ideologicd appeal of Macest doc,trine and olre refomls that colmmunism s$ten bas espoused efJectively
appeal to nmny people around the
world; rmd *&e spreadod bheseideas
will not be stopped by military fiat.
Nor wiLl i t help at all to continue
the repelated plaintive 1amen.t of
Secretary Rusk that there would
be peace in IndoJChina if only the
NorohVietnamelse ,and the Chiftese
wodd leave their neighborsalone.
If !dluountxies w o d d Jeavebheir
neighbors alone, i t would b e a very
different world, hut it is not realisttc to expect rhils change in our
time,s. To expland ,thewar would
assure only lmolther Xorea or w w e ,
with d the pdssibilities of a nuclear war.
Will tlhe newyear or the post-

thizties and pastsing beyond the


stage where they might
be leading
platoom md8cmplanieisin a f,uture
war: Thusthere is a very h p n a n
desire on Ithepart of the, U.8 A m y
to exploitthechaos
in Smolutheast
AsPa to hain a new lgenezation of
co,mbat-experienced soldiens.
Niolt dl Amedcan servicemen in
South Vietnam share ;this lattimtlude.
Many, probably a majloxity, did not
want ,to come %ere, and now th,at
they =e here
they
woulld like
nothing bebter ~thmto ,go, home.
Bu.t the prorfessional sddiersare
positively *gleeful at hi ch,ance to
[advancetheirJ,profe~slsiondstatus.
Paafessionalisrn is not the
only reason we are overemphasizing
the U b a r y s role in lSoutheaslt Asia.
There is also the fact Ithat sold,iers
are lborund to v i m affairs fcom a
military standpoint, even is the results are disoouraging, as they have
of
been so far.Theappointment
General Maxwell Taylor as our ambassador t o Soath Vieltnam can
h . a d y beexpected t o reverse ithis
tendmcy.
But even more crucial is our refusal to naune.the fighting here for
what it is: a revolution. For a people born out of revolruition, we are
strangely reluctant (to recognize the
symptolmls in otherlands. We insist that 8 t h i si,s wax-guerrilla war,
limited w a r , c o u ~ t e n ~ s u n g ewar,
~cy

Daniel &. Ford

some kind
wa!r-ldespite all evildence t o the ~con,trary.I bave spent
IWO months in Soulth Vietnam. I
have been shot at,rainedon
and
chewed by insec,ts, but never h v e
I had the Zeeling that 1 was witnessing la was. Mast 8correspondentawho
go out into $he field have a sindar
experieace. Fulllscale battiles are
such a aasity hereIthatwhenone
Do Xa
does takeplace,likethe
operation in June, ,$he trophies are
fllorwn t o Saigon for ex.hibdtion, a n d
mass decorations =,e awarded in
the publilc squares.
I tried the notion [o.f revohtion
u p o n several Ameriican advisers.
The moat common ccetori was: Ib
this isnlt .a war, why are they 6hoo.tinnlg ,at me?I poimed out that men
w,me 1bei)ng shot 60s ci,vil rtghts lactiviMes in the Sltatels.Was that war?
But ,theyre nolt usingautomatic
weapms, was lthe reply, ignoring
the fact that most orf the ViehconIgs
autamaMc weapon8s have been oap,
ltured h o r n ,government fomes.
A moresophisticatedangument
goes like ,this: revoLutions are indigenous to the c o u n ~ while
,
$he
fighting in South Vietnam is direlctefd rom Hanoi. This masked
aggression themy is official Army
doctrine. Quite ap,arrt from I&e fact
that most revolutions - including
our own-werelassistedbyforeilgn
powers, it overlooks th,e evidence
which suggests fiha,t even hard-core
) o f

The NATION