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Game Theory

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PS 30

Definition of a strategic form game

A strategic form game is composed of 3 things:

A set of n players, N = {1, . . . , n}.

For each player i, a set of strategies Ai .

For each player i, a utility function ui (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ).

Example

Say we have 2 people, person 1 and person 2.

Each person can either give a present or not give a present. Hence A1 = {give, notgive}

and A2 = {give, notgive}.

Assume that giving a present costs 1 but getting a present gives you a reward of

4. So person 1s utility function is u1 (give, give) = 3, u1 (give, notgive) = 1,

u1 (notgive, give) = 4, and u1 (notgive, notgive) = 0.

We can represent this game with the table below. Here person 1 chooses the row and

person 2 chooses the column. In each entry of the table are two numbers: the first

number is person 1s payoff and the second number is person 2s payoff.

2 gives 2 doesnt give

1 gives

3, 3

-1, 4

1 doesnt give 4, -1

0, 0

Prisoners Dilemma

This game is called the Prisoners Dilemma. Each person would rather not give because

regardless of what the other person does, not giving is better than giving. Hence neither

person gives a present. However, both would be better off if they both gave presents.

Any game can be specified by a table like this one.

How to make a prediction in a strategic form game

There are basically two ways to make a prediction in a strategic form game:

Eliminating dominated strategies (and iteratively eliminating them).

Finding Nash equilibria (pure and mixed).

Dominated strategies

We say that one strategy ai strongly dominates another a0i if person is utility from

playing ai is greater than her utility from playing a0i regardless of what everyone else

does.

For example, in the Prisoners Dilemma, for person 1, not giving strongly dominates

giving. If person 2 gives, then not giving has a higher utility for person 1 than giving

(4 is greater than 3). If person 2 doesnt give, then not giving has a higher utility for

person 1 than giving (0 is greater than 1). So regardless of what person 2 does, person

1 would be better off not giving than giving.

The idea is that if a strategy is strongly dominated, then that person will never play it

and hence it can be effectively eliminated from the game.

We say that one strategy ai weakly dominates another a0i if person is utility from

playing ai is always at least as great as her utility from playing a0i and is sometimes

strictly better.

For example, in the game below, 1a strongly dominates 1b but 2a only weakly dominates

2b.

2a 2b

1a 7, 3 4, 0

1b 6, 1 0, 1

Iterative elimination of dominated strategies

Once one strategy is eliminated because it is weakly or strongly dominated, it is sometimes possible to eliminate more of them. Consider the example below, in which 2b

strongly dominates 2a.

2a 2b

1a 7, 3 0, 5

1b 6, 4 2, 9

Since 2b strongly dominates 2a, we can say that person 2 will never play 2a and hence

we can effectively eliminate 2a from the game. We then get the following game.

2b

1a 0, 5

1b 2, 9

In this reduced game, 1b strongly dominates 1a and hence we can predict that person

1 will play 1b.

Another way to think about this is the following. Person 2 doesnt play 2a because she

is rational. Since person 1 knows that person 2 is rational, person 1 knows that person

2 will play 2b and hence person 1 plays 1b.

Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)

The main problem with the method of iteratively eliminating dominated strategies is

that many games do not have dominated strategies, as for example the chicken game

below.

2a 2b

1a 3, 3 1, 4

1b 4, 1 0, 0

In this situation, the most commonly accepted way to make a prediction is to find Nash

equilibria.

Definition: A combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no individual person

can gain by deviating, assuming that everyone else stays the same.

For example, in the chicken game, (1a, 2a) is not a Nash equilibrium because person

1 would rather deviate and play 1b and get 4 instead of 3.

In the chicken game, (1a, 2b) is a Nash equilibrium. If person 1 deviates, he would

get 0 instead of 1, and if person 2 deviates, she would get 3 instead of 4.

In the chicken game, the Nash equilibria are (1a, 2b) and (1b, 2a).

Take another example:

2a 2b 2c

1a 5, 3 1, 0 7, 2

1b 4, 1 0, 0 3, 1

1c 5, 6 2, 6 4, 4

Check if (1a, 2a) is a Nash equilibrium: if person 1 deviates, he would get either 4 or 5,

which is not better than the 5 he is getting; if person 2 deviates, she would get 0 or 2,

which is not better than the 3 she is getting. Hence (1a, 2a) is a Nash equilibrium.

By checking each of the 9 possible strategy combinations, we can find that the Nash

equilibria in this game are (1a, 2a), (1c, 2a) and (1c, 2b).

Another way to think about a Nash equilibrium is this: In a Nash equilibrium, each

person is playing a best response given what everyone else is doing. For example, in the

game above, we can write person 1s best response using stars (). If person 2 plays

2a, then person 1s best response is to play either 1a or 1c. If person 2 plays 2b, then

person 1s best response is to play 1c, and so forth.

2a

5 , 3+

1a

1b 4, 1+

1c 5 , 6+

2b

1, 0

0, 0

2 , 6+

2c

7 , 2

3, 1+

4, 4

Similarly, we can write person 2s best response using plus signs (+). If person 1 plays

1a, then person 2s best response is to play either 2a. If person 1 plays 1b, then person

2s best response is to play 2a or 2c, and so forth.

It is easy to see that the Nash equilibria are those strategy combinations which have

both stars and daggers.

Sometimes a game does not have any Nash equilibria, as in the matching pennies

game. Here from any strategy combination, someone wants to deviate.

2a

2b

1a 1, 1 1, 1

1b 1, 1 1, 1

The traditional thing to do in this case is to consider mixed strategies, in other words

probabilistic actions. The idea here is that in the matching pennies game for example,

instead of person 1 playing 1a all the time or 1b all the time, she will play 1a with some

probability and 1b with some probability.

Say that person 1 plays 1a with probability p and 1b with probability 1 p. Say that

person 2 plays 2a with probability q and 2b with probability 1 q. We write this below.

[q]

[1 q]

2a

2b

[p]

1a 1, 1 1, 1

[1 p] 1b 1, 1 1, 1

To find the mixed Nash equilibria, we write down each persons best response curve,

just as in the Cournot example. Say that person 2 plays 2a with probability q and plays

2b with probability 1 q. What is person 1s best response? Given what person 2 does,

if person 1 plays 1a, he gets expected utility (q)(1) + (1 q)(1) = 2q 1. Given what

person 2 does, if person 1 plays 1b, he gets expected utility (q)(1) + (1 q)(1) = 1 2q.

Thus if q is close to 1, then person 1s best response is to play 1a. If q is close to 0, then

person 1s best response is to play 1b. Depending on what q is, at some point person

1 switches from playing 1a to playing 1b. To find this switchover probability, we

set 2q 1 = 1 2q and get 4q = 2 or q = 1/2. When q = 1/2, person 1 gets the same

utility from playing 1a and from playing 1b. So we can graph person 1s best response

curve below.

What is person 2s best response? Say that person 1 plays 1a with probability p and

plays 1b with probability 1 p. Given what person 1 does, if person 2 plays 2a, she gets

expected utility (p)(1) + (1 p)(1) = 1 2p. Given what person 1 does, if person 2

plays 2b, she gets expected utility (p)(1) + (1 p)(1) = 2p 1.

Thus if p is close to 1, then person 2s best response is to play 2b. If p is close to 0, then

person 2s best response is to play 2a. Depending on what p is, at some point person

2 switches from playing 2b to playing 2a. To find this switchover probability, we

set 1 2p = 2p 1 and get 2 = 4p or p = 1/2. When p = 1/2, person 2 gets the same

utility from playing 2a and from playing 2b. So we can graph person 2s best response

curve below.

The mixed Nash equilibrium is where the two best response curves intersect. In this

case, they intersect at p = 1/2 and q = 1/2. Hence in the mixed Nash equilibrium

of this game, person 1 plays 1a with probability 1/2 and 1b with probability 1/2, and

person 2 plays 2a with probability 1/2 and 2b with probability 1/2.

Extensive form games

In an extensive form game, people do not move simultaneously (as in strategic form

games) but can move in response to each other. For example, say that a kidnapper can

either choose to kidnap or not, and if the kidnapper kidnaps, then the family can choose

either to pay the ransom or not. We write this as a game tree below.

At the end of the tree we write the payoffs for each player. If the kidnapper does

nothing, then both get payoffs of 0. If the kidnapper kidnaps and then the family does

not pay, then the kidnapper gets a payoff of 5 and the family gets a payoff of 10. If

the kidnapper kidnaps and the family does pay, then the kidnapper gets a payoff of 5

and the family gets a payoff of 5.

If we write this as a strategic form game, we get the following.

if kidnap, pay ransom if kidnap, do not pay

kidnap

5,-5

-5, -10

nothing

0,0

0,0

The Nash equilibria of this game are (kidnap, if kidnap, pay ransom) and (nothing, if

kidnap, do not pay).

However, one might say that the Nash equilibrium (nothing, if kidnap, do not pay) is

not reasonable because it involves the family making a noncredible threat. In other

words, if the game was simply the subgame below in which only the family moves,

then the family would maximize utility by paying the ransom.

In extensive form games, we say that a Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if play

in the game corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. In a subgame perfect

Nash equilibrium, no player makes a noncredible threat.

Backward induction

One way to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria is to use backward induction: start

at the end of the game and work your way backwards. For example, take the donut

competition game which is in the homework. There are two donut shops, Crazy Crullers

and Grease N Sugar. There are five towns which are linked together in a line like this:

ABCDE. Six people live in each town. The two donut shops decide where to

locate: Crazy Crullers goes first and then Grease N Sugar. People in a given town will

go to the donut shop which is closest to them; if a town is equally distant from the two

shops, then half will go to one and half will go to the other.

It is not too hard to figure out that the game looks like this.

To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction, look at each of

the five subgames at the end and figure out what Grease N Sugar will do: its optimal

choice is shown in bold. Given Grease N Sugars actions, then Crazy Crullerss best

choice is to go to town C. So in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Crazy Crullers

goes to town C and then Grease N Sugar goes to town C.

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