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Dear Batch 2019,

What is an issue?

Welcome to the Ateneo Law School!

It is the matter in dispute in the case. It is usually in

question form and begins with the phrase whether or not.

Before you begin reading, remember that you should not

rely solely on this Primer (or any reviewer for that matter)
as you prepare for your Introduction to Law lectures. The
purpose of this Primer is to help you review and recall what
you have already read, to prepare you at the last minute for
recitations, and to help you study for the Introduction to
Law exam. We suggest that you use this in conjunction with
the carefully chosen materials provided by your professors.
You may read this after or while reading the assigned
materials to optimize your learning experience. It may also
be helpful if you annotate your copy with your personal
notes and insights from your readings. That way, you wont
have to reread all the originals again.
We hope you appreciate our humble efforts. May this Primer
help you attain EXCELLENCE!

Give an example of an issue.

The prosecution argues that the accused is liable for murder
while the defense contends that the accused is only liable
for homicide. The issue is whether or not the accused is
liable for murder or homicide.
What are the 2 types of issues?
(1) Substantive and (2) Procedural
What are substantive issues?
Issues which pertain to the rights of the parties.
Give an example of a substantive issue.

Study well and good luck!

Whether or not the accused is liable for murder or homicide.
- The Gentlemen of the Fraternal Order of Utopia
What are procedural issues?
How to Read a Case
What are the 3 main parts of a case?
The (1) facts, (2) issues, and (3) held/ratio
What are facts?
Facts are events or circumstances that transpired. They are
usually narrated at the beginning of the case.

Issues which pertain to the method or manner of carrying

out a legal dispute.
Give an example of a procedural issue.
Whether or not the case is ripe for adjudication.
How many issues are usually given in a case?
There is usually more than one issue.

Do we have to read all of the issues?

No. Read only the issue relevant to the subject matter.
A police officer, upon mere suspicion that Juans
house is a drug den, entered Juans house without a
warrant and in the course of the search, inflicted
physical injuries upon Juan and destroyed his
personal belongings. The issues presented in the case
are whether or not the police officer (1) conducted a
valid search, (2) is liable for physical injuries, (3) is
liable for damages for destroying Juans property.
Which issue should be studied?
If the subject is Constitutional Law, study the first issue
since it deals with the Bill of Rights. If the subject is
Criminal Law, study the second issue. And if the subject is
Civil Law, study the third issue.
Definition of Law Terms
Opinions. A judicial opinion is a courts reasoned
explanation of its decision. It is merely an explanation of
reasons for judgment
En Banc Opinions. A case decided by an entire court. It is
the most persuasive opinion in our judicial system, right
below a Supreme Court opinion.

Plurality Opinions. A plurality opinion resolves an appeal

in which a majority agrees with the result but not with the
reasoning.
Decree. A decree decides a motion or matter that sounds
in equity
Orders. An order is an oral or written court directive on a
question of law, as opposed to equity, punishable by
contempt if disobeyed.
Rulings. A ruling is a court order made during litigation,
and necessarily before judgment.
Judgments. A judgments is the final resolution of an
action or proceeding.
Decisions. A decision resolves a motion, application,
write, or appeal.
Reversed, Affirmed, Reversed or Affirmed in Part,
Remanded. Rulings and judgments, not rules or reasoning,
are affirmed or reversed. Rules and reasoning are followed
or not followed.
Affirmed. The decision of a lower court is met with
approval by a higher court. If a case has more than one
decision, one can be affirmed and another reversed.
Reversed. The decision of a lower court is reversed.

Concurring Opinion. Agrees with the result, but for

different reasons.
Dissenting Opinion. Objects to the result of the majority
opinion.

Remanded. A case remanded is returned to a lower court

with directions to redo or reconsider some aspect of the
case.

Majority Opinion. A majority opinion is one in which

more than half the court agrees with the result and the
reasoning.

Disapproved. A lower courts opinion is disapproved, not

overturned or overruled, by a later case, not reversed or
modified directly.

Upheld / Overturned. A case or issue is upheld or

overturned by another, later case
Sustain / Overrule. Courts sustain (allow) or overrule
(disallow) objections
Granted / Denied. Motions are granted or denied
Modified. Decisions can be modified, meaning the
modifications can cover one or more aspect of a
determination, but does not reverse the judgment of the
court.
Questions of Fact. Inquiries regarding facts. (i.e. murder
weapon used, date of violation, license plate of car) Must be
answered by reference to facts.
Questions of Law. Must be answered by applying relevant
legal principles, or by an interpretation of the law.
Question of Fact vs. Question of Law:
Question of Fact: Did Mrs. Ronhilda ask Mr. Tan to
stop singing?
Question of Law: Is Mrs. Ronhildas action of
asking Mr. Tan to stop singing a violation of the
latters right of freedom of expression?

IMPORANT: Be sure to read and understand this section

BEFORE proceeding to the cases. This concept appears
several times throughout the different cases.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review is an aspect of Judicial power which allows
the court to decide whether or not a law, statute or
provision is contrary to the Constitution, and gives them the
power to strike down the law if they find it to be so
contrary.
The Supreme Court is not given the absolute discretion to
rule on constitutionality of laws. As a mode of check and
balances the Constitution itself has provided safeguards so
that the Supreme Court may only exercise the power of
judicial review in special circumstances. Before the Supreme
Court can decide on the constitutionality of a statute these
four requisites must be present:
1. Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power
Jurisprudence dictates that for a case to be ripe for
adjudication, the governmental act being challenged must
have had an adverse and real effect on the person
challenging it.
2. Locus Standi
A party has standing if he alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy Unless a person is injuriously
affected or is about to be affected in any of his

constitutional rights by the operation of the statute or

ordinance, he has no standing.
3. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
It must be raised in the pleadings as it may not ordinarily
be raised at the trial, may not be raised in the trial court, it
will not be considered on appeal.
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the lismota
of the case
This means that the issue of constitutionality must first be
settled for the case to be resolved.

DAY 1

The priest tells Josef K not to be hasty with his

conclusion. He offers these different interpretations to the
parable:

As We Start
I.

Before the Law

Franz Kafkas Before the Law, discusses the story

of a man who wants to seek access and the knowledge to
the Law through a doorway protected by a doorkeeper. The
man is not given access to the Law now, so he waits by the
door for years, even bribing the doorkeeper with everything
he has. The doorkeeper accepts the bribes, but tells the
man that he accepts them so that you do not think you
have failed to do anything. The man does not attempt to
murder or hurt the doorkeeper to gain the Law, but waits at
the door until he is about to die. Before the man dies, the
gatekeeper tells him that the entrance was made just for
the man and since the man is now dying the entrance to the
Law will also be closed.
II. Dialogue Between a Priest and K.2
Josef Ks Interpretation
Josef K says that the doorkeeper deluded the man
because he only gave the message of salvation to the man
only when it could no longer help him.
The Priests Interpretation
1

Before the Law is a parable from Kafkas novel entitled The Trial. In the
novel, the protagonist Josef K meets a priest in a cathedral who reveals
that he is a court employee. The latter tells K the parable, prefacing it by
saying it is introductory to the Law." The priest and K then discuss
interpretations of the story before K leaves the cathedral.
2
In Kafkas The Trial, Josef K and the priest discuss and interpret the
parable Before the Law.

(1) The doorkeeper was only fulfilling his duty. The story
contains two important statements made by the
doorkeeper about admission to the Law. The first
statement is: that he cannot admit the man at the
moment, and the other is: that this door was
intended only for the man. At that moment his
apparent duty is only to refuse admittance. There is
no contradiction. Also, he does not once leave his
post during these many years, and he does not shut
the door until the very last minute; he is conscious
of the importance of his office and is faithful to his
duty.
(2) In fact, the doorkeeper seems to be a friendly
creature by nature; he is by no means always on his
official dignity. He does not, for instance, send the
man away, but gives him a stool and lets him sit
down beside the door. The patience with which he
endures the man's appeals during so many years,
the brief conversations, the acceptance of the gifts,
the politeness with which he allows the man to curse
loudly in his presence. These could be deduced as
certain motions of sympathy from the doorkeeper.
(3) Yet, the doorkeeper is a little simple-minded and
consequently a little conceited. It may be argued
that he does not know the Law from inside. His ideas
of the interior are assumed to be childish, and it is
supposed that he himself is afraid of the other
guardians whom he holds up as bogies before the
man. He fears them more than the man does, since
the man is determined to enter after hearing about
the dreadful guardians of the interior, while the

doorkeeper has no desire to enter, at least not so far

as we are told.
(4) It is really the doorkeeper who is deluded. The
doorkeeper is actually dependent on the man and
does not know it. He is inferior to the man because
as long as the man is there, the doorkeeper is stuck
at the gate defending it. When he sits down on the
stool by the side of the door and stays there for the
rest of his life, he does it of his own free will; in the
story there is no mention of any compulsion. But the
doorkeeper is bound to his post by his very office.

Kafka sums up the piece by saying:

(5) It is not right to pass judgment on the doorkeeper.

Whatever he may seem to us, he is yet a servant of
the Law; that is, he belongs to the Law and as such
is set beyond human judgment.

Actually one can express the problem only in a sort

of paradox: Any party that would repudiate not only all
belief in the law, but the nobility as well, would have the
whole people behind it; yet no such party can come into
existence, for nobody would dare to repudiate the nobility.
We live on this razor's edge. A writer once summed the
matter up in this way: The sole visible and indubitable law
that is imposed upon us is the nobility, and must we
ourselves deprive ourselves of that one law?

III. The Problem of Our Laws; Couriers3

Couriers

The Problem of Our Laws

In this piece, Kafka tells us that our laws are held
and enforced by a noble class. But this class does not tell us
explicitly what those laws are, nor is it clear to us why these
noble people are the few to be in possession of the laws.
However, we see that it is to our own benefit to tolerate this
situation.
There is a small party, however, who rejects the
trends, and thinks that there is a problem with people
blindly following the laws because the followers do not by
themselves learn how to adjust to changes or create their
own adaptations, but can only adopt from others. This party
3

thinks that the noble will eventually cease to exist and

become irrelevant due to the eventual revelation of their
hidden laws. However, Kafka tells us that these people
who criticize the nobles will eventually hate themselves for
not having earned the right to possess the laws.

The Problem of Our Laws is a short parable by Franz Kafka and was
published posthumously in BeimBau der ChinesischenMauer. Couriers
is also a short piece written by Kafka.

They were offered the choice between becoming kings or

the couriers of kings. The way children would, they all
wanted to be couriers. Therefore there are only couriers
who hurry about the world, shouting to each other since
there are no kings messages that have become
meaningless. They would like to put an end to this
miserable life of theirs but they dare not because of their
oaths of service.
Couriers perhaps reminds us that the world needs leaders
as well as followers; systems which are too structured to
enable a person to change his role will doom the world to
chaos. An extreme form of democracy may be dangerous.
The loss of the king is equivalent to the loss of a unified and
common way of thinking, leading to every person having to
invent and uphold their individual messages and meanings.

The Concept of Law

I.

Defining the Law

In general, what is the meaning of the law?
The Law is an ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the
community, and promulgated.

II.

Kinds of Laws
What are the four (4) kinds of law?
Eternal Law; Divine Law; Natural Law; and
Human Law
What is Eternal Law?
It is the Divine Reasons conception of things.
What is Natural Law?
It is the rule of reason, promulgated by God in
mans nature, whereby man can discern how he
should act.
What is the precept of Natural Law?
It is that good is to be done and pursued, and
evil is to be avoided.
What are the five (5) basic inclinations of
man?
1. To seek the good, including his highest good,
which is eternal happiness with God.

2. To preserve himself in existence.

3. To preserve the species that is, to unite
sexually.
4. To live in community with other men.
5. To use his intellect and will that is, to know
the truth and to make his own decisions.
What is Human Law?
It is the particular determination of certain
matters, devised by human reason, which
observes the essential conditions of law (as
encompassed in St. Thomas definition of law)
What is Divine Law?
It is the Divine Revelation (which includes the Old
Testament and the New Testament)
What are the four (4) reasons why Divine
Law is necessary for the directing of human
conduct?
1. Man is ordained to an end of eternal
happiness which is inproportionate to mans
natural faculty.
2. In order that man may know without any
doubt what he ought to do and what he ought
to avoid.
3. Human law could not sufficiently curb and
direct interior acts.
4. In order that no evil might remain
unforbidden and unpunished.

According to St. Thomas, what are the three

(3) motives why Revelation (or Divine Law)
is necessary?
1. In order that man may arrive more quickly at
the knowledge of Divine truth.
2. In order that the knowledge of God may be
more general.
3. For the sake of certitude for human reason
is very deficient in things concerning God.
What are the two (2) functions of Natural
Law with respect to human law?

What is Moral Law?

It is the set of rules which establishes what is
right and what is wrong as dictated by the human
conscience and as inspired by the eternal law.
III.

Kinds of Human (Public) Law

What is Constitutional Law?
It is the fundamental law of the land which
defines the powers of the government.
What is Administrative Law?

The constructive function and protective function.

What is the Constructive Function of Natural
Law?
In its constructive function, natural law provides
a guide for the formulation of laws to promote
the common good. It offers a reasonable guide
to principles and general objectives. It includes
the limitation that the human law should no
attempt to prohibit every vice or enforce every
virtue.

It is that law which fixes the organization and

determines the competence of the administrative
authorities and which regulates the methods by
which the functions of the government are
performed.
What is International Law?
It is the body of rules which regulates the
community of nations.
What is Private Law?

What is the Protective Function of Natural

Law?
In its protective function, natural law provides a
shield against laws that violate natural law. Its
primary effect is to protect the rights of the
people. In this function, the natural law provides
a basis for drawing the line and criticizing an act
of the state as unjust and void.

It is the body of rules which creates duties, rights

and obligations, and the means and methods of
setting courts in motion for the enforcement of a
right or of a redress of wrong.
What is Substantive Private Law?
It is those rules which declare legal relations of
litigants when the courts have been properly

moved to action upon facts duly presented to

them.

What are the two degrees of fit between

some proposed principle and the rules?

What is Procedural or Adjective Private

Law?

Fit as a matter of logical consistency and Fit as a

matter of helping one justify or provide a rational
for the rules.

It refers to the means and methods of setting the

courts in motion, making the facts known to
them and effectuating their judgments.
IV.

Moral Lawas a species of Natural Law

V.

Law and Morality

What does fit as

consistency mean?

matter

of

logical

Any viable candidate for an underlying principle

must be logically consistent with most of the
rules. Total consistency is not required, only a
high degree.

DWORKINS INTERPRETATIVE THEORY

Fitting the Fourth Amendment: Privacy
In Dworkins Interpretive Theory, what role
will morality play if legal interpretation play
is properly carried out?
Morality will exercise some significant influence
over the way rules are to be understood.
According to Dworkin, what does the law
consist of?
The law consists of the 1) explicitly adopted rules
plus 2) the best moral principles that can be
understood to lie behind those rules. These
principles serve as a legitimate basis of legal
decisions, as well as help guide the interpretation
of legal rules in hard cases in which the right
legal answer is unclear.

Can the government search your house

without a warrant or probable cause?
The fourth amendment states, the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, so, no, the government
cannot search it without a warrant or probable
cause.
II. Olmstead and beyond.
Should laws be interpreted while keeping in
mind modern technology even though these
said technologies did not exist during the
time of those who wrote and ratified the
laws?
Yes, modern technology should be considered
while interpreting laws.

What happened in the Olmstead case?

The Supreme Court decided that because
wiretapping was not an act of physical intrusion
and confiscation, the fourth amendment rule did
not apply to it.
What was Dworkins approach to a case like
Olmstead?
He would look at the moral principle that fits the
Fourth Amendment rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Using
Dworkins
framework,
wiretapping be covered by the
amendment?

would
fourth

Yes, because according to Dworkin, privacy has

two aspects: 1) physical space and 2)
informational aspect. The Olmstead case ignores
the informational aspect.
III. The Role of Morality
What happens when in using Dworkins
method, there happens to be several
competing privacy principles that fit the
fourth amendment rule?
Then one must decide which of them can be a
legitimate basis for legal decision making.
What is the right way of understanding the
law in order for us to find the right legal
answers to cases in which the explicit rules
do not provide a single clear answer?

Dworkins solution is to look to morality. The law

consists of the rules explicitly adopted by the
political community plus the best principles that
fit those rules.
How does one reconcile the fact that each
person may have a different opinion on
what is morally best?
People will, of course, disagree over what is
morally best, but each person decides for him
orherself what is morally best. According to
Dworkin, a judge who will make a good- faith
effort to determine what is morally best is fully
authorized to make her legal decisions.
The Challenge of Skepticism
What is External Skepticism?
These
are
the
questions
about
moral
obligationswhich have no right answer because
there is nothing objective in the world that can
make a statement about our moral obligations
true or false.
How
does
skepticism?

Dworkin

counter

external

Dworkin claims that external skepticism rests on

the false premise that moral judgment must
correspond to perceivable facts in order for us to
reasonably assert that some such judgments are
right and others are wrong. However, he fails to
come to grip with the fact that there are many
different, conflicting ways of conducting moral
arguments.

What is Internal Skepticism?

This theory views our legal system as
fundamentally unjust and oppressive. It states
that the system promotes the interests of the
wealthy and privileged at the expense of the rest
of society. It holds that there is no consistent set
of moral principles that underlies our laws.

Is Dworkin right in saying that judges can

decide
based
on
their
own
moral
judgments?
No, because judges should refer to
accepted judgments in society as well.
VI.

Natural Law vs. Positive Law

Assessing Dworkin

Legal Positivism: Overview

What is a problem of Dworkins interpretive

version of natural law?

What is Legal Positivism?

His theory posits an important and necessary

connection between law and morality, but avoids
the problems afflicting the approaches of Aquinas
and Fuller.

widely

This theory rejects the natural law idea that

genuine law is necessarily just law and also
rejects the links between positive law and
morality posited by Fuller and Dworkin.
Austins Theory of Law (Legal Positivism)

What is the difference between Dworkins

theory and Aquinas theory?
Unlike Aquinas theory, Dworkins theory does not
hold that unjust rules are invalid laws.
What is the difference between Dworkins
theory and fullers theory?
Unlike Fullers theory, it does not hold that the
principles of legality are by themselves sufficient
to create a prima facie moral obligation to obey
the rules of any system of positive law.

According to Austin, what are Rules?

Rules are a species of command. Laws are rules
laid down by superiors to guide the actions of
those under them.
What is Positive Morality?
Positive morality is a set of moral values and
rules informally accepted by a given society. (no
punishment/enforced by general opinion)
What is Positive Law?
It consists of general commands laid down and
enforced by the sovereign.

How does Austin view the sovereign?

In his view, the sovereign is defined solely in
terms of power, not in terms of justice or any
other moral concept. The power that makes some
person or group of persons sovereign has no
moral qualifications whatsoever attached to it.

According to Hermann Jahrreis (lawyer for

Nuremberg defendants); what is the legal
obligation of the individual?
It is to obey the dictates of the sovereign,
notwithstanding international or natural law.
II. Assessing Austin

What are some of the key differences in

Positive Law vs. Positive Morality?

What is Austins approach to the law?

1.) It is What is the law? vs. What ought to be

the law. and 2.) There is no necessary
connection between legal and moral obligation.

Austins approach presents

a clear
systematic alternative to the natural
approach.

So does Austin mean that there is no

connection between positive law and
morality?

What are
approach?

No, in fact, Austin believes that positive morality

is an important source of positive law: the
general commands of the sovereign often reflect
the rules of positive morality.
Are moral obligations imposed by Gods
commands the same as legal obligations
imposed by the commands of a political
sovereign?
No, the two must never be confused.
What
is
Austins
international law?

stand

regarding

Austin rejects the idea that international law is a

properly understood law because there is an
absence of a global sovereign to issue and
enforce commands.

some

problems

with

and
law

Austins

1.) He avoids the question, Is a rule enforced as

a law by the courts a valid law if it is contrary to
natural law or morality? and 2.) Austins
argument that traditional natural law theory
invites anarchy is questionable.
What are some of the criticisms of Austins
version of positivism?
Some say that Austins account of law in terms of
the general commands of the sovereign is
fundamentally mistaken.

VII.

Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary

Rules

comply to some general command of the

sovereign is defective?

Hart: Law as Primary and Secondary Rules

Hart argues that this analysis makes it impossible

to correctly distinguish a government from a
gunman. The gunmans threat Your money or
your life forces an individual to obey with the
use of undesirable consequences should he fail to
comply. Hart points out that being obliged to do
something is not the same as being obligated to
do it.

I. Types of Legal Rules

Why does Hart say that Austins command
theory of law fails to account for important
aspects of a legal system?
Certain types of legal rules cannot be adequately
understood as commands. Thus, some legal rules
do not prohibit or require but rather empower
individuals to do things that would otherwise be
impossible for them to do. (not all laws are
prohibitions or mandatory rules).

How are
gunmen?

governments

different

from

What are power-conferring rules?

Governments can create obligations by enacting

laws. Gunmen, through threats and orders,
cannot create any obligation moral, legal, or
any other kind.

Legal rules that empower individuals, e.g.

contract law empowering individuals to enter
legally binding agreements.

If all societies have rules that impose

obligations, why is it that not all societies
have rules that impose legal obligations?

What is a command?

Not all societies have legal systems. In order to

have a legal system, a society must have certain
special kinds of rules over and a bove the rules
that impose obligations.

A command seeks to alter the world by getting

someone to do something. A power-conferring
rule seeks to alter it by empowering persons to
do things that they would otherwise be unable to
do.

III. Primary and Secondary Rules

What are Primary Rules?

I.
Legal
Gunman

Obligation:

Government

and

Why does Hart say that Austins analysis

that an individual risks having some
sanction inflicted on him should he fail to

These are rules which impose obligations.

What are Secondary Rules?

Rule of Recognition (A rule that singles out the
rules that actually do impose obligations in that
society-Basically a rule for recognizing which
rules are valid); Rules that specify how the
legally valid rules can be changed; and Rules that
empower specific individuals to enforce and apply
societys legally valid rules.
What is a legal system according to Hart?
A legal system is a system that brings together
both primary and secondary rules.

of primary rules of obligation rules of prime

necessity in a society.
What components of municipal law are not
present in international law?
International law lacks secondary rules of change
and adjudication which provide for legislature and
courts. Rule of recognition is also not present.
Such
provides
for
general
criteria
for
identification of rules, giving its binding force.
What are the two principal sources of doubt
concerning
the
legal
character
of
international law?

IV. Assessing Hart

How is Hart different from Austin?
Hart can argue that his government of laws is
unlike a gunman in that its exercise of power is
regulated and controlled by secondary rules,
while Austin says that the source of positive law
is a sovereign power standing above and all rules
of positive laws.

In international law, law is considered as a

matter of orders backed by threats. This
contrasts the character of rules between
international
and
municipal
law.
Also,
international law believes that states are
fundamentally incapable of being subjects of
legal obligation. This contrasts the character of
subjects
II. Obligations and Sanctions

VIII. International Law

What makes a system of law binding?
Harts International Law
(1) Validity (2) Imposes an obligation or duty
I. Sources of Doubt
What characterizes the rules for states in
international law?

What is the difference between an external

predictive
statement
and
an
internal
normative statement?

The rules for states in international law resemble

a simple form of social structure, consisting only

An external
suffering for

predictive statement connotes

disobedience while an internal

normative statement connotes a pure obligation

to act.
What is the concept of sanctions
municipal and international law?

in
What
is
the
Voluntarist
Autolimitation theory?

In municipal law, physical sanctions are both

necessary and possible. It is also believed that
there are no natural deterrents in breaking the
law.
In international law, violence between states
must be public. In this regard, organized
sanctions involve risks, as there is no assurance
that the side of international order could prevail
over state powers tempted to aggression. No
simple deduction can thus be made upon the
necessity of organized sanctions in international
law for it to impose obligations, and therefore,
binding.
III. Obligations
States
What is
states?

the

and

concept

We can only know which states are sovereign,

and its extent, when we know what the rules are
and what they allow.

the

Sovereignty

of

of

sovereignty

of

There is difficulty in accepting or explaining that

a state could at once be both sovereign and also
a legal subject.
In most cases, the dependence of one unit, such
as that of a colony, on another (sovereign state)
is expressed in legal forms. In some cases, the
legal system of the dependent unit may not
reflect its dependence (e.g. puppet governments,
internally autonomous states).

Theory

or

The voluntarist/auto-limitation theory treats all

international obligations as self -imposed, like the
obligation which arises from a promise. It is
similar to social contract theories which sought to
explain how free and independent individuals, in
their natural state, were bound by law, by
treating the obligation to obey as that of a
contract.
What are the arguments against voluntarist
theories?
First, it is contended that voluntarist theories fail
to explain how it is known that states can only be
bound by self-imposed obligations.
Second, for a state to impose obligations on itself
by promise, agreement, or treaty, rules must
already exist to bind the state to undertake that
promise. Such rules bind independently of the
choice of the bound party, thus it is inconsistent
with the supposition that their sovereignty
demands freedom from such rules.
Third, factual bases are incompatible with
voluntaries theories since they still require the
consent of the state to self-impose. For example,
new states are bound by general obligations of
international law, including those that give
binding force to treaties, right when they emerge
into existence. Also, a stateundergoing changes

or acquiring territory is subject to rules it

formerly had no opportunity to observe or break,
or to give or withhold consent.

In international tribunals, no state can be

brought before it without its consent, unlike
municipal courts.

IV. International Law and Morality

According to Kelsen and other modern theorists,

international, like municipal law, possess a rule of
recognition, and the other rules constitute a
single system. On the other hand, an opposed
view states that international law consists of sets
of separate primary rules of obligation, and of
which the rule giving binding force to treaties is
such.

Can international
morality?

law

be

recognized

as

Not necessarily. There are several reasons why

international law is not classified as morality.
Some of which are as follows:
Appraisal of states conduct in terms of morality
is different from the formulation of claims,
demands, and the acknowledgment of rights and
obligations under rules of international law
Claims under international law are not couched
in terms that appeal to conscience, though like in
municipal law, may be joined with a moral appeal
Rules of international law are morally
indifferent
The very idea of change by human legislative
fiat is repugnant to the idea of morality, as we
conceive it as the ultimate standard
Moral obligation in the course of conduct in
international law is neither apparent nor
necessary.
Compare and contrast the form and content
of international and municipal law.
International law resembles in form, but not in
content, a simple regime of primary and
customary law.
Municipal law does not recognize the validity of
agreements
extorted
by
violence
while
International law does not.

Is a basic rule of recognition a necessary

condition of the existence of rules of
obligation or binding rules?
No.
Describe a system with a rule of recognition.
Does international law accept the rule of
recognition?
In such a system, a rule will be valid if it
conforms to the requirements of the rule of
recognition.
International law is in a stage of transition
towards acceptance of a rule of recognition,
which would bring it nearer in structure to a
municipal system.

V. Analogies of Form and Content

What analogies can be made
international and municipal law?

between

Analogies of function and content can be made

but not of form. Analogies of function reflect on
ways on how international law differs from
morality. Analogies of content are in the range of
principles, concepts, and methods common to
both municipal and international law.

Digest of Queen v. Dudley and Stephens

Mr. Brooks Mr. Parker were English seamen cast away in a

storm on the high seas. Their group was stranded on an
open boat without any basic necessities. After days without
supplies, members of the group thought of sacrificing Mr.
Parker to save the rest. Mr. Brooks did not like the idea.
However, Mr. Dudley suggested that they would kill Mr.
Parker if they were still stranded the next day. Hence, when
no vessel rescued them, Mr. Dudley killed Mr. Parker. The
remaining castaways ate the victim until they were rescued.
The issue in this case is whether or not Mr. Dudley and his
companions committed murder.
The Court held that Mr. Dudley and his companions would
not have survived and subsequently rescued if they had not
killed and eaten Mr. Parker. The killing was justified by
saying that Mr. Parker appeared likely to die before the
others and that there was no reasonable expectation of
rescue when he was killed. However, even if killing Mr.
Parker was necessary, there was no greater necessity to kill
Mr. Parker instead of another. Hence, the Court found Mr.
Dudley and Mr. Stephens guilty of murder, reasoning thus:
To preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it
may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice
it. War is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to

live, but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain

to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to
women and children, as in the noble case of theBirkenhead;
these duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the
preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others,
from which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in
England, will men ever shrink, as indeed, they have not
shrunk.

Survey of Past to Present

I.

Philippine Legal History

Describe the Philippine legal system.

The legal system in the country is described as a blend of
(1) customary usage, (2) Roman (civil law), and (3) AngloAmerican (common law) systems.
What is civil law?
Civil law is codified. Countries with civil law systems have
comprehensive, continuously updated legal codes that
specify all matters capable of being brought before a court,
the applicable procedure, and the appropriate punishment
for each offense.
Civil law operates in areas such as family relations,
property, succession, contract, and criminal law.
What is common law?
Common law is generally uncodified. This means that there
is no comprehensive compilation of legal rules and statutes.
While common law does rely on some scattered statutes,
which are legislative decisions, it is largely based

on precedent, meaning the judicial decisions that have

already been made in similar cases.
Statutes and principles of common law origin are evident in
such areas as constitutional law, procedure, corporation
law, negotiable instruments, taxation, insurance, labor
relations, banking, and currency.

Law, Mining Law, etc. were already in force in the

Philippines.
c. Philippine
Republic
Constitution
When was the
proclaimed?

independence

of
of

the

1898/Malolos
Philippines

a. Pre-Spanish Period
What were the two codes which existed during the
pre-Spanish era?

Gen. Aguinaldo proclaimed Philippine independence on June

12, 1898.
When was the Malolos Constitution approved?

Evidence points to the existence of (1) the Maragtas Code

issued by DatuSumakwel (1200-1212 AD) and (2) the Penal
Code of Kalantiao (1433).

The Malolos Constitution was approved on Jan. 20, 1899.

Describe the Malolos Constitution.

b. Spanish Period
What happened to the Philippine legal system upon
the arrival of the Spaniards?
Spanish laws and codes were extended to the Philippines
either expressly by royal decrees or by implication through
the issuance of special laws for the islands.

This Constitution proclaimed popular sovereignty and

enumerated the fundamental civil and political rights of the
individual. At the time of its proclamation, the Republic
exercised, albeit briefly, de facto authority, although this
came to an end upon the arrival of the Americans.
d. American Period

What were some of these Spanish laws?

What is the Treaty of Paris?

Some of these laws were the FueroJuzgo, Fuero Real, Las

SietePartidas, Las Leyes de Toros,and the Nueva
Recopilacion de Las Leyes de Indias.

The Treaty of Paris paved the way for the cession of the
Philippines to the United States. It was signed on Dec. 10,
1898.

At the end of Spanish rule in the Philippines, what

were some of the codes enforced in the country?

What happened to the existing Spanish laws upon the

establishment of American sovereignty in the
country?

After the Spanish era, codes and statutes on Criminal

Procedure, Commerce, Civil Law, Marriage Law, Mortgage

The political laws of the Philippines were totally abrogated

and Spanish laws, customs and rights of property

inconsistent with the US Constitution and with American

principles and institutions were superseded. Some of the
laws in force during the American period were the Spooner
Amendment, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Jones Law, and
the Tydings-MacDuffie Law.

When
did
the
independent?

What was the effect of the enforcement of the

Tydings-MacDuffie Law?

President Marcos declared Martial Law on Sept. 11, 1972,

while the Constitutional Convention was still in session.

It granted Filipinos a right to formulate the 1935 Philippine

Constitution under the Commonwealth government. On May
14, 1935, voters went to the polls to elect the first set of
executive and legislative officials led by Pres. Manuel
Quezon and VP Sergio Osmena.
e. Japanese Occupation
Who ratified the 1943 Constitution?
The Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod ng Bagong Pilipinas
(KALIBAPI), in a special national convention, ratified it. This
led to the establishment of the short-lived Japanesesponsored republic headed by Pres. Laurel.
What happened to the Commonwealth government
during Japanese occupation?
It was in exile and functioned in Washington DC from 194244. It was re-established in 1945 by Pres. Osmena.
f.

July 1946 Independence and the Post-War

Philippine Republic

Philippines

officially

become

July 4, 1946 is the inauguration of Philippine independence.

When did President Marcos declare Martial Law?

g. Martial Law Period

What Constitution was effective during Martial Law?
The Martial Law period was governed by the 1973
Constitution which established a parliamentary form of
government. Executive and legislative powers were merged
and the Chief Executive was the Prime Minister who was
elected by majority of all members of the National
Assembly. The Prime Minister had the power to advise the
President. The President was only the symbolic head of
state.
This
parliamentary
government
was
never
implemented due to the transitory provision of the 1973
Constitution.
Military
tribunals
were
established.
Amendments were made wherein the powers of the
President and the Prime Minister were merged into the
incumbent Pres. Marcos.
What was the effect of the 1981 amendment?
The
1981
amendment
introduced
the
modified
presidential/parliamentary system. Under this, the people
shall elect the President for a term of six (6) years while the
PM shall be elected by a majority of the Batasang
Pambansas members upon nomination of the President. He
was the head of the Cabinet and had supervision over all
the ministries.

h. EDSA and
Republic

the

Revival

of

the

Philippine

III.

The Legal Significance of Customs

Are customs considered part of Philippine law?

When was Pres. Marcos ousted?
Feb. 25, 1986.
What was the Philippines provisional constitution
after Marcos was ousted?

Yes. Philippine law takes cognizance of customs that may be

considered as supplementary sources of law.
IV.
The Philippine Justice System and the Legal
Profession
Describe the Philippine justice system.

Immediately
following
the 1986
People
Power
Revolution that
ousted
Marcos,
President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 as a provisional
constitution (Freedom Constitution). It adopted certain
provisions from the 1973 Constitution while abolishing
others. It granted the President broad powers to reorganize
government and remove officials, as well as mandating the
President to appoint a commission to draft a new, more
formal Constitution.
II.

Sources of Philippine Law

What are the sources of Philippine Law?

The sources of Philippine law are:
(1) Constitution fundamental law of the land; law of
the highest order
(2) Statutes supplies the details which the
Constitution, because of its nature, must leave
unprovided for
(3) Treaties/Conventions laws which the Philippines
enters with other states
(4) Judicial Decisions only decisions of the Supreme
Court establish jurisprudence and are binding on all
other courts

The Philippines has a multi-tiered court system (Municipal

Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts/Metropolitan Trial
Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Court of Appeals; Supreme
Court).
We also have special tribunals/quasi-judicial agencies like
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan
handle graft cases. We also have Muslim Courts, Small
Claims Courts, and a Barangay Justice System.

Law as a Way to Resolve Conflicting

Interests
1.

Law and Conflicting Interests

i. Pounds Model of Conflict and the Role
of Legal Systems

According to Pound, what is the purpose of a legal

system?
Legal systems are designed to determine which of the
competing claims to material wealth and life space are to be
recognized and secured, and which are to be denied.

How are competing claims or conflicting interests to

be evaluated by a legal system?
Pound suggests that there are three ways:
(1) Precedent results that have worked in the past are
used
(2) Jural postulates goals that all legal orders strive to
achieve
(3) Ethos, direction, goals of society
Pounds Model of Conflict and the Role of Legal
Systems

ii. The Case of the Spoiled Chiles4

What is the case of the spoiled chiles about?
In 1964, Mr. Andres, a merchant, made a complaint before
a court in Mexico about Mr. Herrero, the chauffeur of a
cream-colored truck which bruised Andres basket of chiles.

This is a case which shows the way a court in Mexico attempts to make a
balance between contending parties.

In his defense, the chauffeur argued that it was Andres

fault for he (Andres) put the chiles on the ground, knowing
there is truck traffic. Andres disagreed.
In the end, the court ruled that it would be most convenient
if the chauffeur paid for damages. After an estimation of the
amount to be paid, the court reminded Andres to be more
careful next time, and watch where he put his booth.

DAY 2
1) Do I have rights?

Republic v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
The
AFP
Anti-Graft
Board
(AFP
Board,
Petitioner)under the Presidential Commission on Good
Government5 (PCGG, Petitioner) investigated reports of
alleged unexplained wealth of Major General Josephus Q.
Ramas (Ramas, Respondent).
Police officers, acting under the authority of the
PCGG, conducted a raid on the house of Elizabeth Dimaano
(Dimaano, Respondent), a confidential agent of the Military
Security Unit and alleged of mistress of Ramas. On 3 March
1986, the raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a
search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team
seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other items not included in the search warrant.
The raiding team seized the following items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting ofPhp2,870,000 and US$50,000,
jewelry, and land titles. Of these items, the money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles were not
included in the warrant.

They were tasked to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.

The AFP Board then filed complaints against Ramas

and Dimaano for alleged violations of RA3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and RA 1379 (The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property). Respondents
Ramas and Dimaano filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint. Citing Republic vs Migrino, the respondents
argued that the PCGG did not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of
mere position held without showing that such officers were
subordinates of former President Marcos.
The Sandiganbayan granted respondents motion
and dismissed the complaint on the following grounds:
a) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance
with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which
involve the same issues.
b) No
previous
inquiry
similar
to
preliminary
investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.
c) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not
constitute a prima facie case against him.
d) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition
for review on certiorari asking the high court to set
aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dismissing
the complaint.
ISSUES:
a) W/N the PCGG had jurisdiction to investigate
the respondents.
b) W/N the Sandiganbayans dismissal of the
case prior to the completion of the
presentation of evidence was proper.
c) W/N the revolutionary government organized
after the EDSA Revolution was bound by the

Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during

the interregnum.
d) W/N the protection accorded to individuals
under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal
Declaration
on
Human
Rights
(UDHR)
remained in effect during the interregnum.
e) W/N the search and seizure conducted by
police officers on Dimaanos residence was
legal.
HELD/RATIONALE:
a) The PCGG, through the AFP Board, could only
investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories mentioned
in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters
immediate family, relative, subordinate or
close associate, taking undue advantage of
their public office or using their powers,
influence x xx; or (2) AFP personnel involved
in other cases of graft and corruption provided
the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Ramas did not fall under either category.
First, Ramas was not a subordinate of
former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments. Republic vs. Migrino held that
mere position held by a military officer does
not automatically make him a subordinate
as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close
association with former President Marcos.

Second, Petitioner did not claim that the

President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG.
In sum, the PCGG had no jurisdiction over the
Respondents.
b) The failure to complete the presentation of
evidence was due to Petitioners own fault.
The case had been pending for four years
before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.
Petitioner filed its amended complaint on 11
August 1987, and only began to present its
evidence on 17 April 1989.
Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its
evidence. However, despite this sufficient
time, petitioner still delayed the presentation
of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous
motions for postponements and extensions.
Furthermore, the rulings in Migrino and Cruz
are sufficient bases for the dismissal of the
complaint. In sum, the Sandiganbayan did not
err in dismissing the complaint.
c) The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25
February 1986. As succinctly stated in
President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated
25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was
done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution. The resulting government
was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations.
During the interregnum, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives

and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973

Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum.
d) The revolutionary government, after installing
itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with the Covenant to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is
also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)
that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property.
The revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in
the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.

In sum, the Bill of Rights under the 1973

Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum.
However,
the
protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during
the interregnum.
e) The warrant for the search and seizure was
issued by the authority of the Revolutionary
government
and
was
therefore
valid.
Consequently, the seizure of items specified in
the warrant was also valid. However, the
search and seizure of items not specified in
the warrant was unlawful. While the Bill of
Rights which protected citizens from unlawful
seizures could not be invoked, similar rights
guaranteed
under
the
Covenant
and
Declaration remained in effect. Thus, the
items illegally seized must be returned to the
person from whom the raiding team seized
them.
RECITATION-READY DIGEST:
Dimaanos house was searched by PCGG, yielding
firearms (sequestration order) and money, and titles,
jewelry (not covered). Allegedly illegal search.
Republic contends that the Bill of Rights was not
operative during interregnum (between overthrow of Marcos
and enactment of 1987 Constitution). True, the 1973 Bill
of Rights was inoperative (abrogated by the
revolution, the whole legal order nullified) during the
interregnum;
no
municipal
law
to
govern
revolutionary government. But the ICCPR and UDHR
were effective. (1987 Constitution was prospective).
The revolutionary succeeding government (Aquino)
inherited the international obligations of the last

regime.
clause.

Interpreted

as

covered

by

incorporation

Items not covered by order must be returned. But

sequestration was valid. Puno Dissent: the right against
search and seizure existed during that time, based on
natural law.

2) Could Morality be legislated?

Imbong v. Ochoa

FACTS:
Nothing has divided the nation more in the recent years
than the growing debate and opposing views on population
control and contraception. Despite opposing views, R.A. No.
10354 (RH Law) was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Prior to the passing of the RH Law, there were already
laws used to solve the problems of population and growth
control, which is the Status Quo Ante of the RH Law. After
the president has finally signed RH Bill into the RH Law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the court, asking it to strike such law down
for being unconstitutional.
The petitioners in this case are one in praying that the
entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional and maintain the
Status Quo.

ISSUES:
1. Procedural
(a)
W/N the Court can exercise its Power of Judicial
Review.
(b)
W/N there is an Actual Case or Controversy.
(c)
W/N the Court can Facial Challenge the RH Law.
(d)
W/Nthe Petitioners have Locus Standi.
(e)
W/N the Court can decide upon the case even if it
does not have original jurisdiction over Declaratory
Relief.
(f)
W/N the RH Law violates the One Subject/One
Title Rule.
2. Substantive
W/N the RH Law is Unconstitutional
(a)
Right to Life
(b)
Right to Health
(c)
Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech
(d)
Privacy and the Family
(e)
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
(f)
Due Process
(g)
Equal Protection of the Laws
(h)
Delegation of Authority to FDA
(i)
Autonomy of Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
(j)
Natural Law
HELD/RATIONALE:
Procedural
a) YES, While the courts may not pass upon questions
of wisdom of the RH Law because of the principle of
separation of powers, it may do so where it comes
with UNCONSTITUTIONALITY or GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

b) YES, an actual case or controversy exists, and the

same is ripe for judicial determination. Petitioners
have shown that the case is so because of medical
practitioners are in danger of criminal prosecution
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof.
c) YES, the RH Law may be facially challenged although
it is not a speech regulating measure. The Court has
expanded the scope facial challenge to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech but also
those involving religious freedom and other
fundamental rights.
d) NO, constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed
through
an
as-applied
challenge.
However, in the view of the seriousness to the
public and all, the issues raised are of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
e) YES, the court can decide upon the case even if it is
for Declaratory Relief, which the lower courts have
original jurisdiction. The Court would just consider
them as petitions for Prohibition under Rule 65, of
which it has original jurisdiction over.

Substantive
a) Right to Life
When Life Begins
The Constitution affords protection to the unborn
from conception. However, the Constitution is mute
as to any proscription prior to conception or when
life begins.
It is a well-settled principle in statutory construction
that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.
Thus, "conception" which, as described and defined
by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of
the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion.
b) The RH Law and Abortifacents

f)

NO, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one

title rule. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as are
productive health law, the Court sees it as principally
a population control measure. And, in this case, a
textual analysis of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective of population control.

The Court finds that the RH Law does not sanction

abortion. To repeat, it is the Courts position that
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation.
The Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden
duty to protect it.
The RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion of the first kind and prohibits
abortifacent of the third kind.

c) Right to Health
The Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing.
d) Freedom of Religion and the Right of Free
Speech

They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they

cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but
he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation. The guarantee of religious
freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to
free speech. This in turn includes the right to be
silent.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases

The court has no jurisdiction to determine whether

the use of contraceptives or ones participation to
reproductive health measures dogma or belief.

An exception must be made in life-threatening cases

that require the performance of emergency
procedures.

Purely ecclesiastical matters or matters of faith are

outside the province of the civil courts.

If it is necessary to save the life of a mother,

procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments
of the medical practitioner.

However, while the Court cannot rule on

ecclesiastical matters, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes religious
freedom.
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with
the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.
The Duty to Refer and Institutional Health
Providers
The Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the
mandates of the RH Law.

Family Planning Seminars

The requirement of participating in family planning
seminars as a condition for marriage license issuance
does not violate religious freedom.
All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend
a
seminar
on
parenthood,
family
planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial.
e) Right to Family and Privacy
Section 23 (a) (2) (i) violates the constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. The
said section provides that with regard to operations
such as tubal litigation and vasectomy, spousal

consent is required. In case of disagreement, the

decision of the one undergoing the procedures
shall prevail. RH law allows one of the spouse to be
excluded from in the decision making process
regarding the future of the family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution defends the
"right of the spouses to found a family." One person
cannot found a family. The right is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them" is equally
recognized.
Sec 7 of the RH bill provides the exclusion of parents
with regard to the family planning of minor children
(who are parents themselves or suffered a
miscarriage) violates the right of parents over their
children. Only a compelling state interest can justify
a state substitution of their parental authority.
EXCEPTIONS to the rulings on Section 23 (a)
(2) (i) and Sec.7

Access to information about family planning

services is constitutional supported by Article
II Sec 12 of the Constitution.
Life Threatening Cases
Academic Freedom

The SC deems the attack on Section 14, particularly,

teaching of Reproductive Health Education under
threat of fine and/or imprisonment as premature.
The other parts of Sec. 14 which includes values
formation, gender sensitivity, and anti-discrimination
are deemed to be in line with the governments role

as parens patriae(government should help parents to

fulfill their duty).
g) Due Process
RH law does not suffer from vagueness with regard
to the words private health service provider and
incorrect information. A statute can only be vague
when (1) it violates fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion and arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. It is also a rule in statutory construction that
a word must be interpreted in its plain and ordinary
meaning in relation to its context.
h) Equal Protection
There is no merit in the contention the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike.
However, does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. However, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number.

As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or

stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive
health. (passes the germane to the purpose of the
law test).

It cannot be said that the RH Law amounts toan

undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes
to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH
Law.

The exclusion of private schools from mandatory RH

program does not violate equal protection. There is a
substantial
distinction
rests
between
public
educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions
i)

The same ratio applies to ARMM. Despite the

autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and
the supporting jurisprudence reject the notion of
imperium etimperio (state within a state) in the
relationship between the national and the regional
governments.

Involuntary Servitude
The required pro bono services do not amount to
involuntary servitude. The practice of medicine is a
privilege, not a right. The court sees the scheme as a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

l)

Natural Law
The Court does not duly recognize it as a legalbasis
for upholding or invalidating a law.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
j)

Delegation of Authority to the FDA

Sereno, C.J. (Concurring and Dissenting)
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. It
is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention.(Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice)

k) Autonomy of Local Governments and the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)

There is no right more important than the right to life, and

this right is enshrined in the Constitution. The RH Law not
only supports the rights of women, but also the right of the
family to raise a child in a decent environment.
It is unnecessary to apply the Compelling State Interest
test because the RH Law already has an opt out clause that
gives medical professionals of non-maternity special
hospitals, and hospitals run by religious groups the option
to refuse to provide services regarding family planning
methods.

Conscientious objectors need only to point the person to the

nearest facility of health care service provider that provides
services regarding modern family planning.
Petitioners claim that pointing one to the nearest health
care service provider is already morally repugnant in that it
is essentially the equivalent of performing the act itself.
Sereno counters however, that availing of the health care
services is only one of the many possibilities that may occur
if the conscientious objector points the person elsewhere.
Said person may choose not to avail of these services after
all, or perhaps the medical practitioner may advise the
patient not to avail of these services for health reasons. In
short, acts which a conscientious objector may perceive to
be "morally repugnant are not an inevitable consequence of
their referral.
Furthermore, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights recognizes that Religious Freedom may be
subject to limitations in order to protect public safety, order,
health or the morals and fundamental freedoms of others.
It follows that the government may prohibit certain actions,
even if they are motivated by religious convictions, if they
disrupt important social duties or are subversive of good
order. When medical professionals entered their profession,
they accepted the moral values that come with their role,
and one of these is the duty to refer a patient to another
health facility or health service provider, if they are unable
to provide service. it is an ethical practice to ensure that
patients' needs are not ignored just because they are
against the principles of a particular medical practitioner.
Enforcing a penalty on medical practitioners who refuse to
refer is NOT violative of their religious freedom; rather, it
simply prevents them from imposing their religious
convictions on another.

What is being protected in the RH law is the freedom of

information.
Concerning the provision on abortifacients. This simply
refers to the use of abortifacients to remove dead fetuses
from women in order to save their lives. These are to be
reserved only for such dire situations and cannot be
requested for no right is more sacred than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his/her own
person.
On that note, the RH Law does not stop married couples
from making reproductive health related decisions together.
It simply gives the wife the final say in case of a dispute, as
it is her body that is in issue.
The RH law does not take away parental authority. Children
have rights over things that directly concern them and thus
children who are pregnant should be granted rights in
relation to reproductive health as these are sensitive to
their particular needs.
Different religions have different beliefs and none of them
can be considered the authority on the matter. The only
authority that can be referred to is the constitution, and this
is what the court should use in determining what is fair for
all.
Leonen, J. (Concurring and Dissenting)
There is only a case or controversy when there is a real
conflict of rights arising from actual facts. In this case, none
of the petitions presented an actual case or controversy.
The court should not exercise the power of judicial review
based simply on speculation.
Petitioners bring up the case of Province of North Cotabato
v. GRP as this case had no actual controversy as well. This

holds no merit as this case had a peculiar set of facts and

cannot be considered the general rule. The court itself in the
North Cotabato case acknowledged the requirement of an
actual case or controversy in exercising the power of judicial
review, and held that the case was only an exception.
This is also an improperly brought class suit because it
cannot be affirmed that the interests of the entire class are
being upheld. Four persons and a juridical entity cannot be
considered as sufficiently numerous and representative of
the interests of all other parents and individuals similarly
situated. If this class suit was maintained, the entire
Filipino nation, and those yet unborn, may be bound to a
position that they may not even agree with.
The constitutional right to life has many dimensions. Apart
from the protection against harm to ones corporeal
existence, it can also mean the right to be left alone. The
right to life also congeals the autonomy of an individual to
provide meaning to his or her life. In a sense, it allows him
or her sufficient space to determine quality of life. A law
that mandates informed choice and proper access for
reproductive health technologies should not be presumed to
be a threat to the right to life. It is an affirmative guarantee
to assure the protection of human rights.
Framing the issue as an issue of right to life or the right to
protection of the unborn from conception presupposes a
prior conclusive scientific determination of the point when
life commenced. The court cannot decide at what point life
begins. To declare a scientific truth amidst a lack of
consensus among members of the proper scientific/ ethical
communities can be dangerous.
For example, a mother or a health care professional who
chooses to remove the embryo to save the mother risks
being charged or stigmatized for that conduct. A rape victim
could be immobilized from obtaining the necessary

emergency medication should she wish to prevent an

unwanted pregnancy.
RECITATION-READY DIGEST:
The RH Bill has been pending in the congress for more than
a decade. With strong opposition from the church and
private sector, it seemed that the RH bill would be
continually shelved. However, R.A. No. 10354 or (RH Law)
was finally enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
After the president has signed RH Bill into the RH Law,
challengers from various sectors of society, including
spouses Imbong (petitioners) came to the court, asking it to
strike such law down for being unconstitutional.
The novel Constitutional issues in the case include (1) Right
to Life (2) Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech (3)
Privacy and the Family (4) Equal Protection of the Laws, and
(5) Involuntary Servitude.
The Right to Life contention of the petitioners is deemed
without merit. Therefore making the RH law constitutional
with regard to the right to life argument. The constitution
protects an unborn from conception. But, petitioners argue
that the constitution does not say when life begins. The
court said that life begins at FERTILIZATION based on its
ordinary and scientific meaning. It is a rule in statutory
construction that a word should be interpreted in its plain
and ordinary meaning. The RH law does not allow abortion
because life only begins at fertilization and not implantation.
The Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech of the
petitioners is deemed with merit. Although purely
ecclesiastical matters or matters of faith are outside the
province of the civil courts. BUT, the courts determine
whether the RH Law contravenes religious freedom. To
some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema (vehemently disliked).

Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality

(benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religious
beliefs under certain circumstances), their beliefs should be
respected.
Sec 23 and Sec 7 of RH Law contravene the Right to
Privacy
and
Family.
These
sections
are
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Section 23 (a) (2) (i) violates
the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. In case of disagreement, the decision of
the one undergoing the procedures (ligation,
vasectomy, etc.) shall prevail. RH law allows one
of the spouse to be excluded from in the decision
making process regarding the future of the family.
So, this is in contravention to Section 3, Art. XV of
the Constitution which defends the "right of the
spouses to found a family."
Sec 7 of the RH bill provides the exclusion of parents
with regard to the family planning of minor children
(who are parents themselves or suffered a
miscarriage) violates the right of parents over their
children. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
There is equal protection of the laws. There is no
merit in the contention the RH Law only seeks to
target the poor to reduce their number. Equal
protection means all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike. The purpose of the
law is to stabilize the population growth rate. Also, it
prioritizes the poor and marginalized couples who
suffer from fertility issues and desire to have
children.
There is no involuntary servitude. The required pro
bono services do not amount to involuntary
servitude. The practice of medicine is a privilege, not
a right. The court sees the pro bono scheme as a

necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the

furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Also it is not required for private practitioners but
only recommended. It is only those who work in the
public health sector.
The petitions are partially granted rendering the RH
bill constitutional with the exclusion of some
provisions.

3) Do you care for me?

Oposa v. Factoran
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented
and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as
a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against respondent Secretary of the DENR. Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further argued that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
respondent and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel
all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving or approving new
TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on

the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further
ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.

the judicious management and conservation of the

country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government
agency responsible for the governing and supervising
the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The
policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially restated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus,
right of the petitioners (and all those they represent)
to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

ISSUES:
a) W/N the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
b) W/N the complaint raises a political question.6
c) W/N the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
HELD/RATIONALE:
a) YES. Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this.
The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal
right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies
6

Political questions are those which are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or those issues that belong exclusively to the other
branches of government, not the Judiciary. With the ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran, the political question doctrine is no longer applicable.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who

has the duty to protect or respect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to
a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners'
complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.
b) NO. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows
the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the
decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

c) NO. The Court held that the Timber License

Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw
whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the State.
RECITATION-READY DIGEST:
An action was filed by several minors represented by their
parents against the DENR to cancel existing TLAs in the
country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed
that the resultant deforestation and damage to the
environment violated their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16
and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners
asserted that they represented others of their generation as
well
as
generations
yet
unborn.
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even
though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the
Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter: [it] concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of

which may even be said to predate all governments and

constitutions. The right is linked to the constitutional right
to health, is fundamental, constitutionalised, selfexecuting and judicially enforceable. It imposes the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class
suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding
generations as the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come (Inter-generational
responsibility).

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes

FACTS:
In 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through
the Dept. of Energy (DOE), entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract with the Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX). This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Taon Strait, a
narrow passage of water situated between the islands of
Negros and Cebu.
In 2005, DOE and JAPEX converted the GSEC into a Service
Contract (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Taon
Strait. This covers almost the entirety of the strait. In May
of the same year, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and
around the Taon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also
done to determine the area's underwater composition.

On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an

Environmental Compliance Certificate to the DOE and JAPEX
for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon
Strait. Later that year, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory
well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near a town in western
Cebu. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.

HELD/RATIONALE:
a) There is NO NEED to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing. Our Rules allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. The 1997 Rules of
Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural
or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It
further necessitates the action to be brought in the
name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a
representative.

Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals (the toothed dolphins,

whales, porpoises etc.) and Stewards (lawyers from Cebu)
aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed
that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70
percent. They also argue that the ECC obtained by JAPEX is
invalid because public consultations with the affected
stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC,
were not held prior to the ECC's issuance. Also, they claim
that SC-46 is unconstitutional because it failed to comply
with constitutional safeguards.

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental

Cases which allow for a citizen suit, and permit any
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws. This provision
liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule
on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature.7It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties and
not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioners

have no legal standing (locus standi) and that SC-46 does
not violate the 1987 Constitution. They claim that the ECC
was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
They further contend that the issues raised in these
petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the
fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the
parties
thereto
effective
June
21,
2008.
ISSUES:
a) W/N the Resident Marine Mammals have locus
standi.
b) W/N SC-46 is constitutional.

b) NO. SC-46 is unconstitutional. The court noted that

while there was a general law on exploration,
Presidential Decree No. 87,8the absence of the two
7

This is in line with the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, which allowed the suit
to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned."
8
This is also known as the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.
This was enacted by then President Marcos to promote the discovery and

other conditions: (1) that the President be a

signatory to SC-46, and (2) that Congress be notified
of such contract, renders it null and void. Paragraph
4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the President himself enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC46 appeared to have been entered into and signed
only by the DOE through its Secretary contrary to
the said constitutional requirement.9 Moreover,
public respondents have neither shown nor alleged
that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.
Also, Taon Strait, the court said, is among
the protected areas covered by Republic Act 7586 or
the National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS) Act of 1992. Thus, the exploitation and
utilization of the Taon strait may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress. Consistent with
this endeavor is the requirement that an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made
prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of
the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA
system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the
goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.
Finally, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
respondents contention that SC-46 falls under the
exceptions found in Sec. 14 of the NIPAS Act. This
production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government
and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to
the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
9
The alter ego principle cannot apply. This principle recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, the heads of the various executive
departments (i.e. the DOE secretary) are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive. This principle, however, does NOT apply in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally.

provision states that protected areasmay be

subjected to exploration only for the purpose of
gathering information on energy resources. The
Supreme Court said that while an exploration done
for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is
allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does
not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12. A statute must be
read as a whole and must be treated as emanating
from one general intent. Surveying for energy
resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from
complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12;
instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites
before any exploration for energy resources may be
done in protected areas.
RECITATION-READY DIGEST:
The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional
the oil exploration, development, and exploitation of
petroleum resources within Taon Strait, a protected
seascape in the Visayas known for its abundance in whales
and dolphins.
Petitioners
Resident
Maritime
Mammals
and
Stewards sought to nullify the service contract that the
Department of Energy (DOE) awarded to Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) for oil exploration and drilling.
On the issue of the legal standing of the maritime
mammals, the Supreme Court ruled that to give the
creatures legal standing is no longer necessary, as Our
Rules allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. On the issue
of the constitutionality and legality of SC-46, the Supreme
Court ruled that the contract failed to comply with the
safeguards under Section 2, Article XII, of the Constitution.
SC-46 was only signed by the DOE Secretary and not by the

President; neither was it submitted to Congress. The

contract also violated Republic Act Number 7586 or the
National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act of
1992. Taon Strait, by virtue of a presidential proclamation,
falls under the act as an environmentally-critical area where
exploitation of natural resources is restricted. To push
through with any such activity, the company should have
applied for an environmental compliance certificate (ECC)
and subjected its project to an environmental impact
assessment (EIA).

4) Phillenials All
Disini v. Secretary

show a realistic, imminent and credible danger to the

petitioner.
ISSUES+ HELD/ RATIONALE:
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the
strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with
the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be
struck down. However, the court finds that there is no need
to apply the Strict Scrutiny Test for there is no fundamental
right affected by the said provision. It merely punishes a
condemned action of accessing the computer system
without right.

FACTS:

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

On August 22, 2012 and September 7, 2012, Petitioner

Sonido posted two blogs in the Baratillo Pamphlet entitled
Sotto Voce: Speaking with Emphasis and Sotto and
Lessons on Social Media. In this blog, the petitioner
expressed his opinions regarding the Senator Sottos
alleged plagiarism of online material for use in his speech
against the Reproductive Health Bill.

Petitioners claim that the above mentioned provision

violates the overbreadth doctrine because it intrudes into
areas protected by the freedom of speech and expression.
The overbreadth doctrine states that a proper governmental
purpose may not sweep too broadly in the areas of
protected freedoms. However the court is of the opinion
that this provision merely penalizes a form of vandalism,
which in this case is the act of willfully destroying computer
data or system of another.

On August 30, 2012, Senator Sotto disclosed that the

Cybercrime Bill was already approved by the Congress and
is only awaiting the Presidents signature. He then warned
his critics that once signed into law, online defamatory
statements will be penalized. On September 12, 2012, the
President signed the Cybercrime Act into law.
With the passage of the law, the petitioner asserts that the
threat issued by Senator Sotto against his online critics has
become real. And that there are sufficient facts that will

Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

Petitioners claim that this provision violates the equal
protection clause because it will cause a user using his real
name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or
take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other
literary device. For instance a person who registers his real
name might be punished along with the person who
registers the same name in satire or parody. The court
however finds no merit in this contention for it is the evil

purpose that is condemned by the law, such as if a person

registers a certain name in bad faith in hopes of making a
profit.
Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
However, the law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause
damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government
effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the
right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to
due process of law.
With regard to the contention that this provision violates the
freedom of the press, the court opines that the law does not
aim to hinder the efforts of the press to access information
but to penalize those who commit identity theft for an illegal
purpose.
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
Petitioners claim that private communications of sexual
character between husband and wife or consenting adults,
which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code,
would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" or
in gracious kindness in cyberspace. However what the law
really intends to penalize is not the private showing
between two consenting adults but those who intend to use
cybersex to gain profit. This provision is intended to help
curb illegal acts such as white slave trade, prostitution, and
child/human trafficking.

Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes
it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture
or create any form of child pornography clearly relates to
the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core
offenses that ACPA seeks to punish. The question of aiding
and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be
discussed elsewhere below. For now the Court must hold
that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not
successfully challenged.
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications;
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited
commercial communications, also known as "spam." The
Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points
out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams
are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers. But, firstly, the
government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited
electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers."
Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited
ads by mail. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. The State
cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally
guaranteed
freedom
of
expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal
code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Acton Cyber Libel. Petitioners argue

that the standards for malice are higher because of recent

jurisprudence (Borjal v. Court of Appeals)requiring actual
malice (malice in fact) instead of presumed malice
(malice in law) to convict one accused of libel. There is
actual malice when the offender makes the defamatory
statement with the knowledge that it is false or with the
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The
defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement is false, is available where the offended party is a
public official as the court recognizes that these laws imply
a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a
defamatory statement where the offended party is a public
official.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement.
The petitioners also raise the argument that the both the
penal provisions and the Cybercrime Prevention provisions
on libel violate the countrys obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. They cite
Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, wherein the UNHRC
stated that penal defamation laws should include the
defense of truth. However it was never stated in that case
that the truth of a defamatory statement is an allencompassing defense.
Furthermore the UNHRC did not enjoin the Philippines to
decriminalize libel, as it simply suggested that defamation
laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle
freedom of expression.

Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt

in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5that
renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or
aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression.
Before answering this issue, the court first addresses the
effects of Liking, Commenting, or Sharing (in the case of
Facebook) and Replying or Retweeting (in the case of
Twitter) of a libelous statement. The court is of the opinion
that except for the original author of the libelous statement,
the aforementioned functions and the statements produced
from them are merely knee-jerk statements from readers
who think little of their response to the original statement.
Hence they cannot be considered as falling under the
offense of aiding or abetting
With regard to the petitioners contention, the court agrees
and concludes that the abovementioned provision on
Aiding or Abetting is vague and suffers from overbreadth
thus creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression. The court rationalizes that unlike in the physical
world, the concept of communication is quite vague in
cyberspace, thus there is a need for the legislature to craft
more specific guidelines to avoid interfering with protected
freedoms. The terms aiding or abetting constitute a broad
sweep that generates a chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace. Hence Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes aiding or abetting libel on
the cyberspace is a nullity.
With regard to the part of the provision which punishes a
person who willfully attempts to commit any of the other
offenses in the cybercrime law, the court deems it

constitutional because it allows the offended party to still

file a complaint regardless of the outcome as long as there
is an attempt of the offender to commit any of the other
crimes.
Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree
Higher;
In providing for a higher penalty for crimes committed
through the internet, the Solicitor General points out that
there exists a substantial distinction between crimes
committed
through
information
and
communication
technology and similar crimes committed by other means.
The difference lies in the fact that the offender aims to
evade identification while causing greater harm to a lot
more victims.
Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;

modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative

department.
Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic
Data;
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of
the power to collect or record real time data as tending to
curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official
abuse. The petitioners invoke their right to privacy when
incomes to their messages and information. In assessing
this query the court balances the legitimate concerns of the
state against constitutional guarantees, and with that the
court opines that the state has compelling interest in
enacting the cybercrime law and likewise be able to monitor
traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of
cybercrimes. This provision allows law enforcement
agencies the power they need to for spotting, preventing,
and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7merely

expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may
be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two
laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. However,
online libel is different, in the sense that if a libelous
statement is posted both in print and online, it should not
be subject to two separate complaints, as both statements
have the same elements. The same is true with regard to
the provisions of the Anti Cybercrime act with regard to
child pornography wherein it only expands the coverage of
the ACPA.

However the court states that the phrase due cause,

referring to the ability of government agencies to rely on
due cause when collecting data, is too sweeping and will
definitely intrude into an individuals right to privacy. The
court concludes states that while the intent of the
legislature behind this provision is by all means valid, its
means lack the necessary boundaries to ensure that
fundamental rights are protected.

Section 8 on Penalties;

The petitioners liken the preservation of computer data by

law enforcement authorities to the garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. It essentially
prevents internet users from accessing or disposing of their
data.

The court refuses to encroach upon the legislative

prerogative of fixing penalties. Judges and magistrates can
only interpret and apply them and have no authority to

Section 13 on Preservation of Computer

Data;

However, the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data

that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users
by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.
Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the
issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is wellsettled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively
a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to
issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Furthermore, what Section14 envisions is merely the
enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function
usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them
to carry out their executive functions.
Section 15 on Search, Seizure and
Examination of Computer Data;
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it
will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On
its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties
of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper
collection, preservation, and use of computer system or
data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant.
Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data
subject of previous preservation or examination violates the
users right against deprivation of property without due
process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the
user has a demandable right to require the service provider

to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in

its storage system.
Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access
to Computer Data;
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of
expression and violates the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. First off, it is indisputable that
computer data, produced or created by their writers or
authors may constitute personal property. Consequently,
they are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers
or in the service providers systems.
The court is of the opinion that the Government, in effect,
seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice
order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
Furthermore, not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial
intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines
established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech.
Therefore Section 19 is struck down as unconstitutional.
Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of
attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply
constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to
situations where noncompliance would be reasonable or
valid.
However the court states that the reference to PD1829
provides the necessary details for a person

SEPARATE OPINIONS
Leonen, J. (Concurring AND Dissenting)
1. Justiciability
In this case, there is no case or controversy as none of the
petitioners are being persecuted under the law for an act
which they have committed. For this reason alone the court
must not pass judgment of the case.
2. Complexity of the Internet and the
Context of Law
Cyberspace requires definite references to our constitution
as well as cooperation and a harmonic approach with other
countries because of territorial implications.
There is a trend towards a dependency to the Internet and
along with the increase in the use of the Internet comes the
increase of the instances of so-called cybercrimes. One of
the most famous criminal activity perpetrated online was
the spread of the I Love You Virus, which originated in the
Philippines, that caused $15 Billion in damages.
To combat the gaining popularity of cybercrimes, various
discussions on Internet governance have been made.
Despite these discussions however, the major challenges to
effective governance have yet to been addressed. One of
which is the challenge of jurisdiction as cyberspace is widely
considered to be ungovernable. The problem is further
complicated by the fact that private commercial bodies exist
for purposes of Internet regulation who , because of the
security and privacy they provide, have also contributed to
the increase of Internet usage.
Legal measures required to address the legitimacy, content
and accountability in the Internet then must not be too
general nor specific.

There is no uniform and definite description of cybercrime

when you look at more than 200countries worth of
legislation on cybercrime. Surveying these statutes will only
produce a basket of acts that would constitute a cybercrime.
Results of the survey on cybercrime legislations show that
cybercrimes can be divided into 3 categories: a) crimes
involving the confidentiality and integrity of data, computer
related crimes for finance or personal harm and content
related acts. The Cybercrime Act of 2012 adopts a similar
approach and tries to classify cybercrimes into categories.
Given the complex character of cybercrimes, it is not
possible to evaluate the implications of judicial decisions
regarding its constitutionality if there are no real affected
parties in the case.
3. A Limited Exception: The Overbreadth
Doctrine
When a statutes provision is so broad that there is a clear
and imminent threat that can actually operate or it can be
used as a prior restraint of speech. This court has previously
discussed how a facial challenge may be permitted to
statutes which are overbroad because of the possible
chilling effect it may have on protected speech.
The overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge a
statute though as applied to him it is constitutional but not
if applied to others not before the court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. This however can only apply to
free speech cases and not to penal statutes.
In applying the overbreadth doctrine, the court has laid
down the following guidelines: a) it is an analytical tool
developed for testing on their face statutes in free speech
cases b) it is considered as a manifestly strong medicine to
be used sparingly and only as a last resort c) the challenger

must establish that there are no instances when the law can
be valid thus it is the most difficult challenge to mount.
A facial challenge can be used to test a statute when a) the
challenge is grounded on the allegation that the statute
violates the freedom of speech and expression b) its
language is impermissibly vague c) the vagueness of the
statute allows for an interpretation that will allow prior
restraints d) clear showing that there are special
circumstances wherein the provisions maybe invoked by the
law enforcers thus providing fora chilling effect e)
application of the provision in question will entail a prior
restraint f) value of the speech restrained is such that its
absence would be socially irreparable.
The facial challenge is an exception to the as applied rule
because of the primordial position that the freedom of
speech and expression occupies in the hierarchy of rights.

Prior Restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on

the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Certain previous restraints
may be permitted by the Constitution but determined only
upon a careful evaluation of the challenge act as against the
appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
4. The Take Down Clause
Section 19 or more commonly known as the Takedown
clause clearly shows prior restraint and is the sole provision
that the Office of the Solicitor General believes to be
unconstitutional. The sheer possibility that the State has the
ability to unilaterally decide whether data, ideas or thoughts
constitute evidence of a prima facie commission of a
cybercrime will limit the free exchange of ideas, criticism,
and communication that is the bulwark of a free democracy.
5. Cyber Libel

Overbreadth is used in a facial challenge and not the

vagueness doctrine because the latter relates to a violation
of the right of due process. The vagueness doctrine
assumes that individuals will not be able to ascertain what
they are prohibited from doing because of the provisions
vague terms. The overbreadth doctrine on the other hand
assumes that individuals are aware of what they are
prohibited from doing even though it is a constitutionally
protected act.
A facial challenge can only be applied when there is a
chilling effect on free speech and expression. This is so
when the threat of legal sanction from statutes may
discourage and deter the exercise of these protected
freedom. Among the provisions of the cybercrime law there
are only 4 instances when the chilling effect on speech can
be palpable. They are the a) take down provision
b)provisions on cyber libel c) provision on cybersex) clause
relating to unbridled surveillance of traffic data.

Dissent disagrees with the majority holding that libel is not

a constitutionally protected speech. However it agrees that
the government has an obligation to protect people from
defamation but believes that this can be done through civil
liabilities and not necessarily criminal ones. For the dissent,
the continuing criminalization of libel, especially in platforms
using the internet, unqualifiedly produces a chilling effect
that stifles our fundamental guarantee of free expression.
The 1930 definition of libel as re-enacted by the Cybercrime
Act fails to conform to the jurisprudential refinements made
to the crime of libel. As currently read in the Cybercrime
Act, there is no distinction for the malice requirement for
criticisms of public figures.
Jurisprudence has provided that there can be no libel
against public figures unless actual malice on the part of the
speaker is proved and this is true even if the defamatory

publication is proven to be true. A public figure is a person

who, by his accomplishments or mode of living gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a public personage.
The provisions on libel of the Revised Penal Code as
referenced in Section 4 of the law in question are now
overbroad as it prescribes a definition and presumptions
that has been repeatedly struck down by this court. A
statute is void for overbreadth when a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means, which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invading the area of
protected freedom. There are other less restrictive means,
provided by other laws, of preventing abuse and attack on
the reputation of private and public individuals thus there is
no reason that a penal statute would over broadly restrict
the primordial right of freedom of speech.
In social media wherein ones friendly conversations can be
reposted, innocent messages between friends can be taken
out of context and read to mean something defamatory
regardless of whether or not the person defamed is a public
figure.
What is defamatory is also not clearly defined in the law
giving law enforcers the discretion to decide for himself. The
limits will not be clear to the speaker or writer hence they
will limit the expression of their ideas becoming victims of
the chilling effect.
There is also the problem of extraterritoriality as
enforcement of the crime of libel will only be viable if the
speaker is within Philippine jurisdiction. For the speakers
outside the country to be within our reach, they must be
located in jurisdictions with extradition laws that are similar
to ours.

Justice likewise surmises that the kinds of speech that are

actually deterred by libel law are more valuable than the
state interest that is sought to be protected by the crime,
from this he states that Libel laws in the Philippines both in
the RPC and in the Cybercrime Act be declared
unconstitutional.
Justice Leonen provides a brief history of how the libel laws
in the Philippines were developed; he describes it as a
fusion of Spanish Law on defamacion and the American law.
Libel laws in the Philippines started out as a tool to protect
government officials from critics, however through
jurisprudence its scope has also expanded to private
persons. However recent surveys suggest that libel cases in
the Philippines usually involve powerful personalities that
use their influence and the fact that there is a libel law to
silence their critics.
Furthermore, he reasons out that Civil Actions for
defamation are more appropriate not only for the offended
party but also the citizens of the state as a whole. He
explains that the legal remedy against defamatory
statements is contained in the Civil Code, specifically
Sections 19,20,and 21.The justice explains that if the
government decriminalizes libel and instead relies on the
aforementioned civil code provisions it would allow the
parties to dictate the terms of the complaint and thus it
would be more advantageous for the offended party,
because in a civil action the complainant decides what to
allege, how much damages, whether to proceed or at what
point to compromise with the defendant.

6. Cybersex is Unconstitutional
Justice Leonen vehemently disagrees with the way the
ponencia goes beyond the text of the provision and replace
it with topics discussed during the deliberations. He
criticizes that the questioned provision does not mention or
refer to prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for
favor and consideration.
Sweeping Scope of Section 4(c)(1)
In this section Justice Leonen questions the power given to
law enforcement authorities to use their preference as the
standard of what is lascivious exhibition and the meaning
of sexual organ or sexual activity. The police can be strict
or loose depending on their tastes. The provision thus
produces a chilling effect and it provides no restrictions to
power in determining what is lascivious and what is not.
Standards for Obscenity
Justice Leonen points out to the landmark case of
Miller v. California in referring to the standards of what is
obscene, in that case the guidelines of obscenity are as
follows:
a. Whether the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest;
b. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and
c. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

He states that these standards were not met by the

provision in question for a variety of reasons.
First off he points out that the current text does not refer to
the standpoint of the average person applying
contemporary standards, but rather it only refers to the
law enforcers taste. Second there is no requirement that
the work depicts or describes a patently offensive way of
sexual conduct properly defined by law it simply requires
exhibition of sexual organs without reference to audience
impact. Lastly, there is no reference to the work taken as a
whole or that it lack artistic value, it simply needs to be
lascivious.
Obscenity and Equal Protection
Justice Leonen presents two schools of thought one
provided by Mackinon and another by Baker. The former
points out that by classifying pornography as protected
speech he state is adhering to the males point of view. She
reasons out that pornography is an expression which
depicts female subordination and the fact that the
government allows it shows that they agree with it.
Meanwhile Baker counters that the expression is
independent of the action and that pornography is not
necessarily prejudicial towards women. He reasons out that
pornography what it expresses are received by anyone,
male or female, and it is up to them to do what they want
with it.
Through these points of view Justice Leonen concludes that
threatening to punish or punishing lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity through the aid of a
computer system for favor or consideration does nothing
to alleviate the subordination of women. Rather, it
facilitates the patriarchy. It will allow control of what a
woman does with her body in a society that will be
dominated by men or by the ideas that facilitate mens

hegemony. He concludes that if freedom of expression is a

tool for minorities to be heard, then the provision ails to
protect such expression, and thus it should be struck down
as unconstitutional.
Child Pornography different from Cybersex
Justice Leonen states that this provision should survive the
constitutional challenge for that issue is not raised in this
case, and further the provision does not expand what was
stated in the ACPA which has already provided the adequate
standard within which to apply the law.
7. Traffic Data and Expression
Justice Leonen opines that empowering law enforcement
officers to intercept data according to due cause will
produce a chilling effect on internet users. He further states
that because the parameters on the collection of traffic data
are so loose the boundaries of the police in terms of the
technology they can use to collect data are unknown. It
therefore amounts to a carte blanche and roving authority
whose limits are not statutorily limited. Affecting as it does
our fundamental rights to expression, it therefore is clearly
unconstitutional.
Traffic Data and Privacy Rights
In this part Justice Leonen explains the concept of a
search. He states that there are generally two kinds of
searches, one is where there is generally no suspects and it
is merely a surveillance, and another is when a crime has
been committed and a suspect has been targeted. He then
went on to discuss the concept of Zones of Privacy and
more importantly a persons reasonable expectation of
privacy. When a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy then an officer cannot simply intrude into his
person, his house, or his effects.

Justice Leonen also explains that a search is valid when

there is a warrant. However there are cases that warrants
are not needed. Through these exceptions Justice Leonen
makes an analogy in relation to intrusions to computer data.
The first analogy is with regard to the search of a moving
vehicle and the other analogy is when a crime has been
committed. He uses these two cases to justify the intrusion
into computer data. To conclude Justice Leonen is not ready
to declare the whole provision on collection of real time
traffic data as unconstitutional, but only have it more
specific guidelines, particularly to the powers of the police.
8. Limitations on Commercial Speech are
Constitutional
This is a dissent from the majority holding that Section 4 (c)
(3) prohibiting unsolicited commercial information, more
commonly known as spam mail, is unconstitutional.
Commercial speech is speech of lower value however it is
still accorded some protection as long as it is not false or
misleading. Other forms of speech are essential to the
democratic and republican ideals of the state as it is
through them that the peoples voices can be heard.
Business organizations, the main propagators of commercial
speech are not the sovereign and do not directly contribute
to this ideal. Its basis for protection rests in its informative
character thus when it is clearly a false and misleading
advertising it loses its claim for protection and can be
subjected to prior restraint. There is no occasion therefore
for Section 4 ( c ) (3) to chill speech of fundamental value.
There is valid purpose in prohibiting unsolicited commercial
information. Compared with other forms of advertising,
spam is known as a negative externality meaning it imposes
some cost to an individual despite such individual not
choosing to engage in any activity engendering such cost.
Spam messages are also used to attack IT systems through

viruses hidden in the message. As spam mails are designed

to mislead internet users into clicking on them, a lot of
people have fallen victim to their harmful effects.
Prohibiting unsolicited commercial information then is a
direct way of curtailing spamming and its deleterious
effects.
RECITATION-READY DIGEST:
Petitioners assail 19 provisions of the Cybercrime Act of
2013 for allegedly being violative of different provisions of
the Constitution. Out of the 19 assailed provisions, only 3
were struck down as unconstitutional and they are the
provisions prohibiting unsolicited commercial information,
allowing the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected computer data and allowing the
recording of traffic data in real time. (Brace for questions on
the specifics of each of the assailed provisions)

On the chilling effect of imposing a penalty one

degree higher when committed with the use of
Information Communication Technology (Sec. 6)
Section 6 does not violate the equal protection clause. The
Congress has the exclusive power to fix the penalties for
violations of penal laws. Moreover, Section 6 merely
qualifies existing crimes committed through the Internet.
Cybercrimes are more perverse. Cybercriminals enjoy the
advantage of anonymity, hence, crimes are consummated
without exposing the perpetrators identity and shielding
him from prosecution and detection.
On the increase of penalty for online libel
The increase does not violate the freedom of expression.
Libel is not a protected speech. There is no freedom to
unjustly destroy. Moreover, the penalty truly targets those
who choose to use the most pervasive of media without
qualms.

DISINI MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On Legislative Bicameral Committees Insertions
The Supreme Court has no power to investigate the
insertions made by the bicameral committee, which are not
found in the House bill nor the Senate bill, provided the
passage of the law complies with the constitutional
requirements. The Congress has the sole prerogative to
insert provisions in the bill. Therefore, any issues regarding
the alleged non-compliance with the governing rules must
be resolved internally by each house.
On the absence of a definition/parameters
Information Communication Technology (ICT)

one another. These along with the common usage provide

the boundary within which the law may be applied.

of

The parameters of the ICT exist in many other laws. It is a

basic rule that statutes should not be read in isolation from

On the vagueness and being overbroad of Section

4(c)(4)
Online libel is not a new crime. It is essentially the crime of
libel found in the Revised Penal Code and transposed to
operate in the cyberspace.

5) Peace be with you.

Cruz v. DENR
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371
(Indigenous Peoples Rights of 1997).
a) Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain in violation of the regalian
doctrine10embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains,11 and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
define sancestral lands;12
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a),which provides
that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within
ancestral domains are private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;

10

This doctrine holds that all lands of public domain belong to the state.
Essentially, if the land is not clearly private property, then it is state
property.
11
Consists of all areas generally belonging to the Indigenous people
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein possessed by them since time immemorial
12
Refers to land possessed, occupied, and utilized by Indigenous people
since time immemorial

(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and3(b) which

defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous
peoples
in
the
harvesting,
extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization
of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25
years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found
to be necessary for critical watersheds ,mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.
b) Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.
c)

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of

the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these

provisions violate the due process clause of the

Constitution.
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples.
d) Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part
II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series
of 1998,
which provides that
the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office

of the President is characterized as a later al but

autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination. They contend that said Rule
infringes upon the Presidents power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution.
7members of the court
voted to dismiss the petition and 7 others voted to
the grant the petition. The necessary majority was
not obtained and the case was again deliberated
upon.
However, the voting remained the same. Pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Summary of PRO Opinions: Ancestral lands are not public
domain they are private, belong to IPs. But the ownership
over ancestral domains does not include the natural
resources. The right to negotiate & enter into agreements
covers only exploration but not exploitation of nat.
resources& for the purpose of protecting the same only.
Also, though the IPs have priority of rights to
explore/exploit the resources, it is not an exclusive right.
State does not lose control over such resources (may still
enter into co production, etc. w/ private entities to exploit
them). (Justices Davide, Kapunan, Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
Santiago, Puno and Mendoza)
Summary of ANTI Opinions: Amounts to abdication of
states rights over vast patrimony, including relinquishment
of control over natural resources vested by the Constitution
upon state in favor of IPs. This was provided by the law
itself. This violates the Constitutional provision that the
State owns all natural resources. (Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Panganiban and
Vitug)

Individual Opinions

exclusive. Hence, the IPRA Law complies with the Regalian

Doctrine.

Regalian Doctrine
Puno (PRO)
The Regalian Doctrine provides that all lands of public
domain as well as all natural resources therein, whether on
public or private land, belong to the State. This concept was
brought to the Philippines from the West by the Spaniards.
Back then, the Spaniards claimed patrimony and dominion
over the newly discovered land of the Philippines. This
doctrine still applies today and is embodied in the
Constitution. According to Justice Puno, the IPRA Law did
not violate the Regalian Doctrine. The Indigenous Peoples
(IP) have been occupying said lands since time immemorial,
even before the Spaniards came to the Philippines. The said
lands have never been declared as public lands and have
been held that way since. The IPs, therefore, have Native
Title over these lands. In the case of Oh Chio v. Director of
Lands, it has been held that This exception would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial.
Native Title is considered as an exception to the Regalian
Doctrine.
Moreover, Native Titles pertain to a different kind of
ownership. According to the law, the indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the
ICC/IPs private community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource
rights. It does not mention that the IPS own all the natural
resources found within the ancestral domains. It only
mentions that lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains. As such, the rights
given to IPs to these lands are mere priority rights and not

Vitug (ANTI)
According to Justice Vitug, the assailed provisions
contravenes the principle that all natural resources belong
to the State. Abdication of State's authority over country's
patrimony
Due process
Puno (PRO)
According to Justice Puno, customary Law is a primary
source of rights under the IPRA. The indigenous concept of
ownership is recognized and co-exists with civil law.
Kapunan (PRO)
-National Commission of IPs (NCIP) is composed wholly of
IPs but it doesn't mean that the judge would not be
impartial.
-Art. XII, Sec. 5(2) of the Constitution provides that
Congress may provide for applicability of customary laws
governing property rights in ancestral domains and lands
-IPRA recognizes 'vested rights' to both IPs and non IPs.
-It imposes strict procedural requirements and the decision
of NCIP is appealable
-The IPRA doesn't annul Torrens Title in ancestral domains.
Vitug (ANTI)
-Taada v. Tuvera says that customary laws must first
undergo publication for it to be binding.

RECITATION-READY DIGEST:
Constitutionality of provisions of Indigenou Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) challenged as violative of regalian doctrine, &
due process. Provides that ancestral domains form
communal property of IPs, granting them rights to
harvest/exploit natural resources, enter into agreements
concerning the same, application of customary law &
traditions/practices in resolving disputes, all doubts resolved
in favor of IPs. SC Voting: 7-7 (tie). Thus, still
constitutional.

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

Panel
A. Comprehensive Digest
Consolidation of 5 cases, namely:
GR No. 183591
Petitioners Province of North Cotabato (represented by
Gov. Jesus Sacdalan and Vice Gov. Emmanuel Pinol)
Respondents Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)
Note: Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria represents GRP, as well
as Secretary Rodolfo Garcia, Atty. Leah Armamento, and
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Presidential Adviser on Peace
Process)
GR No. 183752
Petitioners City Government of Zamboanga, represented
by Mayor Celso Lobregat
Respondents same
GR No. 183893
Petitioners City of Iligan, represented by Mayor Lawrence
Lluch Cruz

Respondents same, with Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermita
GR No. 183951
Petitioners Provincial Government of Zamboanga del
Norte, represented by Gov. Rolando Yebes, etc.
Respondents GRP
GR No. 183962
Petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, Aquilino
Pimentel III
Respondents GRP, MILF Negotiating Panel represented by
Chairman Mohagher Iqbal
Petitioners-in-intervention Franklin Drilon, Adel Tamano,
Senator Manuel Roxas, City of Isabela, Province of Sultan
Kudarat, peoples in Mindanao not belonging to MILF, etc.
Consolidated Case: Cases involving common cases of law
or fact may be tried together. It resolves similar issues all
at once, and economizes judicial resources (and saves time
too)
GENERAL OVERVIEW:
Center of Controversy: MOA-AD, or the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain, Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 between GRP and MILF. It
is scheduled to be signed on August 5, 2008 at Kuala
Lumpur (TAKE note that it was already signed with
the initials of the parties, and that what was lacking
was the formal signatures to be conducted in the said
place).
The petitioners contended that GRP and Presidential Adviser
on Peace Process drafted the terms of the MOA-AD even
without consultation with the local government units
affected (see petitioners). They are invoking their right to
information on matters of public concern (Article 3, Section
7 of the 1987 Constitution), seeking the disclosure of the

complete contents of the MOA-AD. In addition, the

petitioners pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded
from the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, or the BJE (to be
discussed later).
FACTS:
MILF, or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front was established
in March 1984 under the leadership of Salamat Hashim. It
splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (headed
by Nur Misuari), because Salamat perceived that the MNLF
is shifting away from Islamic ideologies to MarxistMaoist orientations.
Since 1996, there was already a long process of peace
negotiations between the government and the MILF such as
the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (1997), and
General Framework of Agreement of Intent (1998), but still
it was not successful.
1999-2000: President Estrada declared an all-out war when
the MNLF took control of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It
lasted until PGMA assumed office (2001): peace negotiation
resumes, with the help of the Malaysian Government
through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. The GRP and
the MILF finally negotiated. The two panels had a meeting
in Tripoli and came out with the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace.
Some basic aspects are:
Security Ceasefire Status between parties.
Rehabilitation

Implementing
guidelines
on
the
Humanitarian Rehabilitation
Ancestral Domain parties simply agreed that it will be
discussed in their next meetings
Despite the efforts, there were still incidents of violence. In
2003, Hashim passed away and replaced by Al-Haj Murad.

The chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher

Iqbal.
In 2005 several talks were held in Kuala Lumpur between
the GRP and the MILF, until they drafted the MOA-AD in its
final form, ready to be signed on August 5, 2008.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain
The terms of the MOA-AD were divided into 4: Concepts and
Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance (Sidenote:
There are too many terms in the MOA-AD. What you are
about to read are the most important parts of the
memorandum)
Concepts and Principles
Bangsamoro People referred to as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands, including
Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, including their descendants and spouses.
Bangsamoro Homeland
Bangsamoro People

ownership is vested

in the

Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) granted the authority

and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of Bangsamoro (Sidenote: Think of it as a
substate.)
Territory
Core: Present geographic area of ARMM which includes
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Marawi City, and some municipalities of Lanao del Norte,
and other provinces which will vote on a plebiscite as to
whether or not they want to be included in the BJE. BJE and
the RP shall exercise joint jurisdiction, management, and
authority over all natural resources.

Resources

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

BJE is free to enter into trade relations with other countries.

c) W/N the GRP violated the Constitutional and Statutory

provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when the negotiated the MOA-AD by not
disclosing to the public each stage of the negotiation
process YES.

External defense is the responsibility of RP.

Natural resources production: 75-25 in favor of BJE
Governance
There will be a multinational third party who will implement
the Comprehensive Compact, to ensure that the terms in
MOA-AD are followed.
Relationship between RP
associative, characterized
responsibility.

d) W/N the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution

and the laws YES.
HELD/ RATIONALE

and BJE is described as:

by shared authority and

c) Right of access to public documents is a self-executory

provision. A law need not be enacted for the provision to be
enforceable.

Any provisions that will amend the existing legal framework

shall take effect upon the signing of the Comprehensive
Compact.(Sidenote: Is this legal or not? It will be discussed
later that this implies an amendment to the Constitution)

MOA-AD is a public document because it involves the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.

BJE can also establish own institutions such as the civil

service, electoral, financial, banking, education, legislation,
legal, economic, etc.

Since it is a public document, MOA-AD must be disclosed

because the public has a legitimate interest in matters of
social and political significance. It aids the people in decision
making by giving them a better perspective in the vital
issues confronting the nation.

ISSUES
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
a) W/N the constitutionality and legality of MOA is ripe for
adjudication YES.
b) W/N petitions are moot and academic NO, as the issue
is of paramount interest to the public.

Matters to information of public concern cover every step

and negotiation leading to the consummation of the
contract. Otherwise, this right cannot be exercised if
no contract is consummated.
Article II, Section 28 of the Constitution also provides that it
is the duty of public officials to give information even if
nobody demands.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between

the government and the people. Free political discussion

should be maintained. GRP failed in this aspect.
Three laws animate these imperatives, which was neglected
by the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process:
Executive Order No. 3 governs the GRP. It states that
peace process shall be defined not by the government
alone, but by all the Filipinos as one community.
Local Government Code of 1991 all national offices
should conduct consultations before any project or program
critical to environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality.
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 indigenous
people have the right to fully participate at all levels of
decision making in matters which may affect their rights,
lives, and destinies.
d) The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it has provisions
which are inconsistent with the international legal concept
of association, specifically the provisions pertaining to the
BJEs capacity to enter into economic and trade relations
with foreign countries, commitment of RP to ensure the
BJEs participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and
specialized UN agencies, and the responsibility of RP over
BJEs external defense.
These provisions indicate that the parties aimed to
transform ARMM into a juridical entity which has a status of
an associated state, or a close approximation of it. It is NOT
RECOGNIZED in the 1987 Constitution. It is a threat to the
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

Examples of Constitutional conflicts if the

MOA-AD is implemented:
Article 1 on the National Territory. During the oral
arguments, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria stated that this
provision would have to be amended to conform to the
MOA-AD.
Section 3, Article II on the role of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as "protector of the people and the State. Under
the MOA-AD, the AFP's role is only to defend the BJE
against external aggression.
Article III on the Bill of Rights. The MOA-AD does not state
that the Bill of Rights will apply to the BJE. The MOA-AD
refers only to "internationally recognized human rights
instruments" such as the United Nations Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian
Law, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. No reference is made to the Bill of
Rights or even to the Constitution.
Section 1, Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Legislative power shall no longer be vested solely in the
Congress of the Philippines. Under the MOAAD, the BJE shall
"build, develop and maintain its own institutions" like
a legislature whose laws are not subordinate to laws passed
by Congress.
Section 1, Article VII on executive power.[23] Executive
power shall no longer be vested exclusively in the
President of the Philippines. The BJE shall have its own Chief
Executive who will not be under the supervision
of the President.
Section 16, Article VII on the President's power to appoint
certain officials, including military officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. All public officials in the BJE,

including military officers of any rank in the BJE internal

security force, will be appointed in accordance with the
BJE's own basic law or constitution.
Section 17, Article VII on the President's control over all
executive departments. The President will not control
executive bureaus or offices in the BJE, like foreign trade
missions of the BJE.
Section 18, Article VII on the President as "Commander- inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines." Under the
MOA-AD, the President will not be the Commander-in-Chief
of the BJE's internal security force. The BJE's internal
security force will not be part of the AFP chain of command.
Section 21, Article VII on the ratification of treaties and
international agreements by the Senate.] This will not apply
to the BJE which, under the MOA-AD, has the power to
enter into economic and trade treaties with other countries.
Section 1, Article VIII on judicial power being vested in one
Supreme Court. Since the BJE will have "its own x x x
judicial system," the BJE will also have its own Supreme
Court.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Nachura (Dissenting) - Court cannot review an inexistent
agreement that does not create any demandable right;
Grave abuse of discretion only applies to consummated acts
or omissions.
B. Additional Notes
Atty. Sedfrey Candelarias Other side of the story
During your discussion with Dean Candelaria, he might
appear to disagree with the ruling in the case. His primary
contention is that negotiating with the MILF is a very

sensitive process. One cannot just disclose each and every

step of the negotiation, because it involves matters that
needs finalization. If the government really wants peace
with the MILF, then it should let the GRP do its job. The
constitution might have to be amended at this point.
Moreover, theories cannot exceed reality. Is the right to
public information still holds even if there are lots of people
dying each day because of the unresolved conflict between
the MILF and the government?
Was the MOA-AD "SIGNED"?
YES. It was already signed as the initials of the parties were
already there. What it lacked was the formal signatures of
the parties.
Basically, why was the MOA-AD unconstitutional in
relation to the people's right to information for public
concerns under Section 7 of the Bill of Rights?
First, the MOA-AD is undoubtedly one of public concern. No
question about that. Second, this is the right of the people
to DEMAND INFORMATION EVEN IF NOBODY DEMANDS.
The policy of public disclosure DOES NOT NEED an
implementing legislation as it is a RIGHT. Second, public
consultation is needed as part of the RIGHT to information.
The problem here was that the "public consultation" that
they made were only in the form of PLEBISCITE (the direct
vote of all the members of an electorate on an important
public question such as a change in the constitution), which
was deemed to be INSUFFICIENT as provided in E.O. 3,
which contains the mechanics of public consultations with
regard to the peace agenda. It mandates "REGULAR
DIALOGUES" to be sufficient. Thus, failure to have a
sufficient public consultation resulted in GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

Although, Nachura says in his dissenting opinion that since

the MOA-AD is an inexistent agreement, it does not create
any demandable right, thus, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
does not apply as it only applies to consummated acts or
omissions.

8) practically treats BJE as an associated state in

international law (a transitional device leading to full
independence as exemplified by Micronesia & Mashall
Islands w/ respect to US)
The court ruled that it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL!!

C. Recitation-Ready Digest
The RP Negotiating Panel entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (Ancestral Domain) w/ the MILF for creation of
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE):
1) recognizing the Bangsamoro peoples right to selfgovernance
2) empowering it to enter into trade relations w/ foreign
states

The concept of associated state is not recognized by

the Constitution. It implies powers that go beyond
anything that may be validly granted to LGUs under the
Constitution.

6) Of Pork and Beans

Belgica v. Ochoa
FACTS:

3) ensuring its participation in international meetings

(ASEAN, UN, etc.) on border agreements and other related
matters

General Concept of Pork Barrel

4) granting it rights to internal waters and territorial

waters and sharing of minerals/economic resources w/
national government over the latter (3:1 in favor of
BJE)

Its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling

out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of slaves who
would cast their famished bodies into the feast to satisfy
their hunger with the morsels coming out from the
generosity of their masters.

5) joint jurisdiction over territorial waters, but exclusive

jurisdiction over internal waters, w/ full right to exploit
resources therein

This practice was later compared to the action of American

legislators trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts

6) guaranteeing that it will secure its territory against

foreign invasion

In a more technical sense, pork barrel refers to an

appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely to bring money to a
representatives district.

7) stating that Bangsamoro ancestral domain not part of the

public domain (treated as Bangsamoro homeland)

History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines

Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972)
Act 3044 or the Public Works Act of 1922 utilization of
funds appropriated therein were subjected to postenactment legislator approval. It allowed transfers of
unexpected portions of any item of appropriation under this
act to any other item, subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives
In 1950, the post enactment legislator participation
broadened from fund release &realignment to project
identification, which was modified to the extent that the
discretion of choosing projects were transferred to the
legislators.
Martial Law Era (1972-1986)
In 1982, the Batasang Pambansa introduced a new item in
the GAA called the Support for Local Development Projects
(SLDP). Under the SLDP, legislators began receiving
P500,000 which covered not only public works projects or
hard projects, but also soft projects such as those
involving public health, education and livelihood.
Post Martial Law Era (1986-1992)
After the People Power revolution, the Congressional Pork
Barrel was revived in the form of the Mindanao
Development Fund and Visayas Development fund, which
were created with a lump sum of P480 million and P240
million respectively, which prompted the creation of the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), due to the demand
made by Luzon legislators which had a2.3 Billion funding to
cover small infrastructure and other priority community
projects.

Under the 1991 and 1992 General Appropriations Act, CDF

funds were released directly to the implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the list of required projects and
activities, with representatives receiving as much as
P12.5million each in CDF funds and P18 million for
Senators, without any limitation or qualification and given
wide discretion to identify either hard or soft projects.
Fidel Ramos Administration (1992-1998)
The DBM was now directed to submit reports to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.
In 1997, members of the congress and the Vice President
were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50 percent of
projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations
which shall be endorsed by the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee of Finance for the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the
Committee
on
Appropriations
for
the
House
of
Representatives, with the list of the remaining 50 percent to
be submitted after.
There were also other forms of pork which were harder to
monitor because they form part of the budget of the
executive departments. This gave the Legislators the power
to direct HOW, WHERE and WHEN these appropriations
were to be spent.
Joseph Estrada Administration (1998-2001)
It was in the year 2000 when the Priority Development
Assistance Fund or the PDAF appeared in the GAA.
There was a requirement for prior consultation with the
representative of the district before the PDAF funds were
released to the implementing agency.

Realignment of funds to any expense category was

expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount
shall be used to fund personal services and other personal
benefits.
GMA administration (2001-2010)

Malampaya Fund Created as a special fund under PD 910

issued by Marcos to set up a special fund to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to
the exploration, exploitation and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth.

PDAF articles were silent with respect to the specific

amounts allocated to the legislators as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF
projects to be funded

Presidential Social Fund Created under section12, title 4 of

PD 1986, or the charter of the PAGCOR. It is a special
funding facility managed and administered by the
presidential management staff through which the president
provides direct assistance to priority projects and programs
not funded under the regular budget.

Under this administration, the provisions which allowed

formal participation of NGOs in the implementation of
government projects were introduced.
Present Administration (2010 Present)

Controversies in the Philippines

The 2013 PDAF article now allowed LGUs to be identified as

implementing agencies if they have the technical capabilities
to implement the projects.

In July 2013, the NBI began its probe into allegations that
the Government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrels of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects.

Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects,

except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships
outside the legislative district, provided he secures a written
concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.

The investigation spawned 6 whistleblowers who declared

that the JLN corporations had swindled billions of pesos
using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for the past 10 years.
They claim that it went straight to Janet Lim Napoles
private account.

All requests of release of funds, realignment, modification

and revision of project identification were all required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance.

On August 2013, the COA released the result of a3-year

audit investigation covering the legislators PDAF from
2007-2009, to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the various infrastructures including local
projects by the DBM.

History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the PH

The term Pork Barrel has expanded to include certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.

ISSUES

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the Presidential Pork Barrel

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Whether or not the phrases:

I. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated

petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy

(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter

directed by the President under section 3 of PD 910
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and

II. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated

petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review
III. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue
IV. Whether or not the Courts decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez and the decision
entitled Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v.
Secretary of Budget and Management bar the re-litigation of
the issue of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System
under the principles of Res Judicata and Stare Decisis

(b)to finance the priority infrastructure development

projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be divided and
authorized by the president of the Philippines under
section12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to
the Presidential Social Fund
Are unconstitutional insofar as
delegation of legislative power.

they

constitute

undue

HELD/ RATIONALE:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the Congressional
Pork Barrel
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF article and all other
congressional pork barrel laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on :

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

I. Existence of an actual case or controversy

calling for the exercise of judicial power
By Constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when
there is an actual case or controversy.

a. Separation of powers
b. Non-Delegability of Legislative Power
c. Checks and Balances
d. Accountability
e. Political Dynasties
f. Local Autonomy

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists

an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The
questions raised in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization are currently existing and
operational. Therefore, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.

II. Matters of Policy: The Political Question Doctrine

IV. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis

The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases

and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.

Res Judicata and Stare decisis are both procedural law

principles which deal with the effects of the previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases.

Respondents submit that the political branches are in the

best position not only to perform budget-related reforms
but also to do them in response for specific demands for
their constituents. They also urge the Court not to impose a
solution at this stage. The Courts must deny this.
The issues raised before the court do not present political
but legal questions which are within its province to resolve.
The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is
not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
III. Locus Standi
Petitioners have come before the Court in their capacities as
citizen taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they dutifully
contribute to the National Treasury. Taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through an enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law
Petitioners have sufficient Locus Standi to file the instant
case.

For the case at bar, the Court examines the applicability of

these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa
and LAMP.
The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and
second actions, there exists an identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.
This required identity is not attendant in the present case
since
Philconsa
and
LAMP
respectively
involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF article and
2004 PDAF articlewhereas the case at bar call for a
broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel
System.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the Congressional

Pork Barrel

Separation of Powers
The principle of separation of powers refers to the
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the
executive branch of government, through the President,
belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial
branch of government, through the Court, belongs the
power to interpret laws. Lack of independence would result
in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily

contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government.

states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of

the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Any
post-enactment-measure
allowing
legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional
basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference
and/or assumption of executive functions.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the2013 PDAF

Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
nondelegability since said legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which
as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.201 That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."

Any post-enactment congressional

limited to scrutiny and investigation

measure

should

be

From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously

doubted that legislators have been accorded postenactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated from themoment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
and
is
thus
unconstitutional.

Keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative

power, the Court hereby declares the2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby

declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional.

The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system

of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.

Non- Delegability of Legislative Power

Legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body
to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Checks and Balances

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance

would be the Presidents power to veto an item written into
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987Constitution which
reads as follows:

Sec. 27.(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the vetoshall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it
necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which
may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the
field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the
details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation
or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
of the Philippine Islands, an item of an appropriation bill
obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation
bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his
power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of
money "and not only "general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount ofP24.79 Billion
only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. In
particular, the lump-sum amount ofP24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending ,i.e., scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes
that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.

The Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all

Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be
unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a
greater degree of flexibility to account for future
contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires.
Accountability
Petitioners further relate that the system under which
various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies
public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of
checking itself or its Members.
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "public office is a public trust, "is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should
exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the
parameters of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust
connotes accountability.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the
proper expenditure of public funds maybe checked is the
power of congressional oversight. Congressional oversight
may be performed either through:
(a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation or
(b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation

Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of

post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall
he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office
of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be
tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. In sum,
insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional
oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the1987
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013
PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of
similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
Political Dynasties
The Petitioners submit that the Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to
accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in
contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution which states that the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined bylaw. At the outset,
suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered
as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may

be defined by law." Thus, the said provision does not

provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.
Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes
the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
Local Autonomy
The petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel
goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy
since it allows district representatives, who are national
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public
funds for local development.
In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former.
Thus, insofar as individual legislators a reauthorized to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the2013 PDAF Article as well as all
other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on the Presidential Pork

Barrel

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910and

Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD1993), which

respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the

Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of
Section 29(1), Article VI of the1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law(a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose.
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the
argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist.
The Court further observes that the real appropriation made
under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion
allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which are
occurrences outside of the law. Thus, the 2013 PDAF Article
does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it,
in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to
appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle.
Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used.
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed
adequate.
The first test is called the "completeness test. "Case law
states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the

policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the

delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners
that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used.
In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remain legally effective
and subsisting.
FINAL RULING:
The Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules
within which it operates. Insofar as it has allowed legislators
to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-

enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the

system has violated the principle of separation of powers.

funds for the local development without taking into account

the specific interests and peculiarities of the district.

RECITATION-READY DIGEST:

The court held that the Presidential Pork Barrel is

unconstitutional in that it constitutes undue delegation
of legislative power in that the Malampaya funds and
Presidential Social Fund are invalid appropriations
laws as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President's authority
with respect to its purpose, thus does not conform to the
two fundamental tests for delegated rule-making (i.e.
completeness test and sufficient standards test).

In July 2013, the NBI began its probe into allegations that
the Government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrels of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects. This was referred to Janet Lim
Napoles' using of at least20 dummy NGOs that went
straight to her private account.
Petitioners, Belgica, et. al., pray for the Congressional Pork
Barrel to be declared as unconstitutional for it being in
violation of the principles of separation of powers,
accountability, political dynasties and local autonomy.
They also pray for the Presidential Pork Barrel to be
declared as unconstitutional for it constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power.
The court held that the Congressional Pork Barrel is
unconstitutional in that it violates the separation of
powers under Sec.1, Sec.7(2),and Sec.29(1) of Art.VI
of the Constitution for its post-enactment measure that
allows a legislator enforcement of the national budget is an
interference to executive functions. The P24.79Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit as it gives legislators
discretion to appropriate PDAF funds. It also violates the
principle of accountability under Sec.1 of Art. XI and
Sec.14 of Art.VI of the Constitution, as legislators, who
are vested with post-enactment authority, would be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
For the principle of political dynasties, there is still no
legislation on it so the Court defers from this issue. It also
violates the principle of local autonomy as it allows district
representatives to substitute their judgments in utilizing

Araullo v. Aquino III

FACTS:
The Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP) originated
from a series of memoranda issued by DBM Sec. Florencio
Abad from October 2011 to May 2013. The first
memorandum was for the DAP funds worth P72.11 billion to
be sourced from unreleased and carryover appropriations
allegedly for the purposes of the Commission on Audits
infrastructure program and hiring of litigation experts, and
other projects. This was approved by President Aquino.
Subsequently, two memoranda were issued requesting for
authority to consolidate savings/unutilized balance and to
withdraw unobligated balances for fiscal years 2011 and
2012. The savings were allegedly pooled for the purposes of
new activities and to supplement Special Purpose Funds like
the PDAF. Again, these were also approved by the
President. In line with these memoranda, the president
issued National Budget Circular No. 541 authorizing Sec.
Abad to withdraw the unobligated allotments of agencies
pertaining to the continuing allotment against the GAA for
fiscal year 2011 and the current allotment charged against
the GAA of fiscal year 2012. Hence, the DAP funds were

consolidated based on the abovementioned sources. Later

on, another memoranda was issued, this time requesting
that all unobligated balances at the end of every quarter,
for continuing and current allotments, to be withdrawn and
pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects. The
allotments to be withdrawn would be based on the list of
slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies and
their catch-up plans to be evaluated by the DBM. The
president also approved this request.
A few month later, on September 2013, Sen. Jinggoy
Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate revealing
that he and other Senators, had been allotted an additional
P50 Million each as incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of CJ Renato Corona. Sec. Abad issued a
statement explaining that the funds released to the
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by
the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion. He clarified that the funds were released based
on the Senators request for funds. He also said that it was
not the first time that DAP funds were released because
DAP existed as early as 2011 to ramp up spending after
sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the GDP
to slow down. He explained that the funds under the DAP
were usually taken from unreleased appropriations under
Personnel Services, unprogrammed funds, carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year, and
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been
realigned to support faster-disbursing projects. Later, in its
website, the DBM claimed that the DAP releases had been
sourced from savings generated by the Government, and
from unprogrammed funds. These savings had been derived
from the pooling of unreleased appropriations and the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments earlier released to the
agencies of the National Government.
The DBM justified the DAPs use of savings by citing: (1)
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which

granted to the President the authority to augment an item

for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section
49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and
Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations),
Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) The General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013,
particularly their provisions on the a. use of savings; b.
meanings of savings and augmentation; c. priority in the
use of savings. As for the use of unprogrammed funds
under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special
provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of
2011, 2012 and 2013. As a result, nine petitions were filed
assailing the constitutionality of the DAP.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar
as:
a. They treat the unreleased appropriations and
unobligated
allotments
withdrawn
from
government agencies as "savings" as the
term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the
provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and
2013;
b. They authorize the disbursement of funds for
projects or programs not provided in the
GAAs for the Executive Department; and
c. They "augment" discretionary lump sum
appropriations in the GAAs.
2. W/N the DAP violates the following enshrined in the
1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the
release of funds upon the request of legislators:
a. The Equal Protection Clause
b. The system of checks and balances, and
c. The principle of public accountability

HELD:
1. W/N the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Yes, the DAP violates Section 25(5),Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated
allotments
under
the
DAP
were not savings, and the use of such appropriations violate
the Constitution. While it is necessary to have executive
discretion and flexibility regarding the execution of budget,
any transfer done must correspond to Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution. Under Section 25(5), the following
requisites must exist:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from
the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices.
With regard to the first requisite, the SC said that Section
25(5) is not a self-executing provision and hence, must
have an implementing law. This law is the GAA for a certain
fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, these GAAs
must authorize the transfer of funds. However, the 2011
and 2012 GAAs did not carry the phrase for their
respective offices which is provided in Section 25(5), so as
to only authorize the transfer of funds within their offices.
These GAAs then were not in line with the Constitution. By

virtue of this, the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer
of funds from the savings to augment any item in the GAA,
even if such item did not belong to the Executive. This is in
contravention of the Constitution.
With regard to the second requisite, the SC stated that the
power to augment must only be utilized when the funds
have been allocated for their purposed, or the need for
these funds had ceased, because it is only then that savings
could be realized. The definition of savings in the GAAs
apparently reflected this interpretation. According to the
GAAs, savings were defined as free from any obligation
or encumbrance; this gave the notion that the
appropriation was already at the stage when it was
obligated and that such appropriation was already released.
In order for the unreleased appropriations herein to be
considered as savings, without it coming under the
statutory definition of savings, would undercut the
congressional power of the purse. This is because these
appropriations had not even been used by the agency
concerned and for the use for which had been allocated to it
by Congress.
It must be noted that the even though first part of the
definition of savingsportions or balances of any
programmed appropriations in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance,encompasses the unobligated
allotments, it is actually further qualified by three
enumerated instances when savings would actually be
realized. Therefore, unobligated allotments cannot be
declared as savings without a determination of whether any
of the three instances existed. Hence, the withdrawal and
transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of the
unreleased appropriations are considered invalid for not
having any ground of legal support. Despite this, these
withdrawals and retention of funds is not to be considered
as impoundments since it only entailed the transfer of funds
and not the retention or reduction of appropriations.

With regard to the third requisite, the SC said that no funds

from savings could be transferred under the DAP to
augment deficient items which are not provided in the GAA.
The 2011, 2012, and 2013 GAAs have a condition for
augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP (program,
activity, project) item to be augmented should be deficient.
The savings which were pooled under the DAP were
allotted to PAPs which were not covered by any
appropriations in the GAAs. Moreover, the Constitution
prohibits cross-border augmentations from savings. During
the oral arguments, Sec. Abad admitted making some
cross-border augmentations. Records prove that funds
amounting to P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were
transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA and the
House of Representatives. The President also allegedly
made available to the Commission on Elections the
savings of his department upon [its] request for funds.
However, Regardless of the variant characterizations of the
cross-border transfers of funds, Section 25(5), disallowing
cross border transfers, was not complied with. Cross-border
transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are
prohibited under Section 25(5).
2. W/N the DAP violates the Equal Protection Clause,
the system of checks and balances, and the principle
of public accountability.
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal
Protection Clause, pertaining to the release of funds under
the DAP to legislators, does not have factual and legal basis.
There was no relevant information regarding the allegations
about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the
existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some
of them having refused to accept such funds. Moreover, the
claim that the Executive had discriminated against
legislators by reason of receiving less than the others does
not support a finding of a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be

an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer

it. In these cases, such parties would be the few legislators
claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases
of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is
that only such affected legislators could properly and fully
bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in
their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Moreover, the argument that the release of funds under the
DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from
conducting congressional inquiries into the legality and
propriety of the DAP is speculative.
With regard to the issue on checks and balances, the SC
stated that it need not discuss whether or not the DAP and
its implementation through the various circulars and
memoranda of the DBM transgressed the system of checks
and balances in place in the constitutional system. On the
other hand, with regard to the issue on public accountability
being
transgressed
because
the
adoption
and
implementation of the DAP constituted an assumption by
the Executive of Congress power of appropriation, the SC
held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were
policies and acts that the Executive could properly adopt
and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they
sought to implement strategies to ramp up or accelerate the
economy of the country.
The SC also held in this case that the doctrine of operative
fact was applicable. The doctrine of operative fact
recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to
the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative
fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. In other words, while it
nullifies the void law, it sustains its effect. This is an
exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional
law produces no effect. The doctrine of operative fact is

applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP.

Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair
play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could no longer be undone. As Justice
Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply
only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP.
However, it cannot apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings
of good faith in their favor.
In light of the above discussion the SC declared the
following acts as unconstitutional for being in violation of
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
doctrine of separation of powers:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn
unobligated
allotments
and
unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year
and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the
Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that
were not covered by any appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act.
The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed
funds despite the absence of a certification by the National
Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the
revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions
provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.

DAY 3
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution:
Alternative can be Appropriate
Mainstreaming Mediation as a Dispute
Resolution Mechanism in the Law
Students Consciousness
What is the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
System?
"Alternative Dispute Resolution System" means any process
or procedure used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other
than by adjudication of a presiding judge of a court or an
officer of a government agency, in which a neutral third
party participates to assist in the resolution of issues, which
includes arbitration, mediation, conciliation, early neutral
evaluation, mini-trial, or any combination thereof.

serves as a clarifier and facilitator without dictating

settlement. The term mediation used under ADR Law (RA
9285) includes conciliation.
What are the two kinds of mediation?
(1) Court annexed (mandatory) - any mediation process
conducted under the auspices of the court, after such
court has acquired jurisdiction of the dispute. It is
mandatory, being part of pre-trial.
(2) Court-referred (voluntary) - mediation ordered by a
court to be conducted in accordance with an
agreement of the parties when an action is
prematurely commenced in violation of such
agreement.
Who can be a mediator?
In mediation, a person does not need to possess special
qualifications, background or profession unless the special
qualifications of a mediator are required in the mediation
agreement.

Is ADR a new concept in the Philippines?

What is meant by party autonomy in view of the

Alternative Dispute Resolution System?

No. ADR is already being practiced in labor proceedings

under the Labor Code (NLRC, Labor Relations cases, etc.);
under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and even in cases
already filed in court, under the court-annexed mediation.

Party autonomy is the freedom of parties to draw the course

towards the resolution of their own conflicts. This
may include the following:

What is mediation?
Mediation is a dispute resolution procedure in which an
impartial third party, mutually chosen by the parties, acts
as the referee to help the contending parties settle their
dispute. The mediator, unlike the arbitrator, has no
authority to make the parties reach an agreement. He

Selection and appointment of a mediator, arbitrator,

conciliator or an early neutral evaluator;
Agreement on the place of the proceedings where
the ADR shall take place. If the parties fail to reach
an agreement as to the venue, the place of the ADR
shall be any place convenient and appropriate to the
parties;
Agreement on the applicable rules to apply; and

Agreement on the language to be used in the

proceedings.

What is the
mediation?

protection

given

to

the

parties

in

In mediation proceedings, the information obtained shall be

privileged and confidential.
I.

Benefits of mediation

What are the benefits of mediation?

1. It is effective In a recent pilot project conducted by
PHILJA, 85% of cases referred for court-annexed
mediation
had
reached
settlement.
Surveys
conducted after mediation sessions reveal a high
level of satisfaction among disputing parties. As a
result of mediation, close to 100% comply with
agreements reached in mediation.
2. It is faster Many cases reached settlement in 1-2
sessions. The enormous time and effort expended in
litigation are avoided.
3. It is cost-saving Unlike rigorous court proceedings,
mediation is quick and devoid of legal intricacies.
4. It restores relationships Mediation is a proven way
to restore relationships long torn by conflict. The
process
addresses
deep-rooted
sources
of
misunderstanding which are inimical to business
concerns.
What is the lawyers role in the mediation process?
A lawyer remains a valuable counsel and partner in
mediation proceedings. He/she can attend mediation
sessions with a party. He shall provide legal assistance to
the party and the mediator in drafting the necessary
papers. A lawyer must help a party fully understand and

appreciate

the

rules

and

process

of

mediation.

Your lawyer may take a little less active role in a mediation

session than in a courtroom. In mediation, the parties take
responsibility
for
making
decisions.
But when matters in the discussion put a party at a
disadvantage and if the mediator does not seem to be doing
enough to settle the imbalance, the lawyer must participate
actively.
Lawyers in mediation also assist the mediator in putting into
writing the terms of the compromise agreement or a
withdrawal of the complaint or a satisfaction of claim so that
it may be approved by the trial court for judgment.

WELCOME TO THE ATENEO LAW SCHOOL!

GOOD LUCK, FRESHMEN!
Drag your weary spirit amidst the battlefront of life,
As nature never fails to toss a dying son above the sky,
Yours is not a petty quest,
But that which heroic mortals tread.
Do not despair, lest surrender!
It is but a minute challenge that beholds.
For tomorrow shall cast a myriad of mighty storms,
That only those with firm determination
And Utopian Vision do survive!
-Brod Edward Buenaflor, The Utopian Ode
For more information about the Fraternal Order of Utopia,
visit www.utopia.com.ph