SOCIAL JUSTICE

1. Social Justice is the virtue that ordains all human acts toward the common
good. It is a special virtue, specified and distinguished from other virtues, but
it is also a general virtue because, ordered to it under a certain aspect, are all
acts of other virtues and not only the acts of justice in the particular sense of
the term. Social justice is equivalent in meaning to general or legal justice,
being a modern expression for these traditional terms that are easily
misunderstood in the present day. It is of the essence of social justice to
demand from each individual all that is necessary for the common good. But
just as in the living organism it is impossible to provide for the good of the
whole unless each single part and each individual member is given what it
needs for the exercise of its proper functions, so it is impossible to care for
the social organism and the good of society as a unit unless each single part
and each individual member is supplied with all that is necessary for the
exercise of his social functions. The following paragraphs spell out some of
the implications of this statement.
2. Because man is a person, (1) in all his relationships within society, in all
institutions and in all environments, he can never be considered as a chattel
or as a mere instrument. (2) The work of human beings cannot be placed on
the same level as the forces of nature, and so cannot be a monetary value as
can merchandise; it is a free and conscious human activity, an expression of
the personality of the worker, and as such is always noble even when
expressed in modest forms and in economic activity. (3) Work is an obligation,
not only because the members of the human race perfect themselves
through work, but also because it enables them to enjoy a decent standard of
living, meet their family responsibilities, and fulfill their social obligations. But
if work is an obligation it is also a right, for every duty presupposes a
corresponding right in every human society, and thus man has the right to
work. Work itself thus becomes the natural source from which man draws his
livelihood. (4) it follows that the remuneration of work cannot be left to the
changing laws of the market, nor can wages be fixed by an arbitrary decision
of those occupying high places in the economic order or by those invested
with civil authority.
3. With regard to mans possession, (1) private ownership, even of productive
goods, is a natural right, a right that belongs to man by virtue of his dignity
as a person and not because of my concession by public authority. This right
to private property is mans because he is spiritual, intelligent, and free and
responsible for his own livelihood and destiny, each man is responsible for
the support and government of the family he decides to form and is bound to
contribute personally to the common good. (2) Private ownership serves an
individual function, since the individual is prior to society, and property itself
a defense and guarantee of the fundamental expression of human liberty. (3)

In the familial order, private ownership is considered an element of stability,

serenity, and efficiency in the pursuit of the ends proper to the family unit. (4)
Private ownership has a social function also, since the goods man owns can
serve the entire family of mankind, providing for the needs and for the
accomplishment of noble works without compromising the owners way of life
or his economic and social position. (5) Not only individuals and their
respective families but other organized groups, intermediate associations,
and public agencies can also lawfully own private property, even productive
property; and they can be owners insofar as it is necessary for the effective
attainment of their goals and the common good.
4. In the matter of the common good and mans social obligations, (1)
individuals as well as intermediate groups and social enterprises are obliged
to contribute to the interest of the common good, and they do contribute
when they pursue their own special interests in true harmony and without
damage to others. (2) the public authority is especially obliged to guarantee
the common good, for the latter is the reason for the existence of this
authority and the goal toward which it must work. It must do so, however, by
recognizing, respecting, and promoting the basic rights of the individual as
integral to the common good. (3) Man being by nature social, human beings
live normal lives when they mutually assist each other; again, each one
succeeds in perfecting himself when with the same activity he contributes to
the perfection of others. It follows that force cannot be accepted as the
supreme criterion in the control of human relations, as in the liberal doctrine
of free competition, the communist doctrine of class warfare, or the doctrine
of group pressure or economic or political superiority. Social relations must be
governed by men working together and mutually collaborating in truth,
justice, love, and freedom. All of this may be summed up as the principle of
solidarity.
5. Since individuals, families, intermediate groups, and public authority are the
units present and working in society, some criterion must be used to decide
the sphere of action proper to each group so as to assure the attainment of
social justice. Such a criterion is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this
principle intermediate associations and public authority do not claim to do
those things that individuals and families area able to accomplish unaided,
nor does public authority claim to do those things that intermediate
associations can and in fact do accomplish. The basic justification of the
principle is that human beings create or maintain a society not for the
purpose of being absorbed by it, but in order to reach goals that otherwise
they would not be able to reach, goals that they foster and pursue as means
of affirming their own personality.