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Charles S. Peirce

Logic, Considered as Semeiotic
An Overview of Charles Peirce's Philosophical Logic,
Constructed from Manuscript L75
Version 1
Analytical reconstruction by

Joseph Ransdell
Department of Philosophy
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, TX 79409 USA


Version 1 of MS L75 is a special editorial construction designed
to be read by default as a single linear­sequential text. It is not a
hypertext document proper but uses hypertext only as a tool for
management of the text for the purposes of on­screen
For technical reasons the MS is too large to present as a whole on
a single web "page" (i.e. as a single continuous document unit),
and so it is presented here in ten consecutive parts. It should be
understood, though, that these parts have no significance as
regards its organization and merely reflect the need to break it
into smaller units for technical reasons only.
The document is organized by successively numbered memoirs
and sections. The up and down arrowheads

at the top of each memoir or section move you, respectively, to
the beginning of the previous and the following memoirs or
sections, so that you can jump through the document in a
sequential order, forward or back, in that way if you wish.
The title, "Logic, Considered as Semeiotic," is editorially
supplied but echoes Peirce himself in related contexts. Peirce

sometimes used the spelling "semiotic" instead, and either
spelling is justified, given his variable usage. So far as I know,
Peirce never spelled it as "semiotics".
   Please read the Editorial Introduction if you are not already
familiar with this special reconstruction of the text and its
   Read the Scholarly Notes if you have a scholar's interest in the
purposes, compromises, and qualifications involved in
transcribing this material from its manuscript form and
arranging it for presentation here.
   Go to the separate Table of Contents page if you want to jump
directly to some particular section or memoir.


  Final Version ­ MS L75.345  

Milford, Pa., 1902, July 15
To the Executive Committee of the Carnegie Institution,
      I have the honor respectfully to submit to you herein an
application for aid from the Carnegie Institution in accomplishing
certain scientific work. The contents of the letter are as follows:
      1. Explanation of what work is proposed.
           Appendix containing a fuller statement.

EDITORIAL NOTE: By the "Appendix" Peirce means the entire
list of 36 proposed "Memoirs," including his accompanying
descriptions of their contents: thus he is referring by this to
what we are treating here as the body of the present work,
which we have supplemented extensively from the draft

      2. Considerations as to its Utility.
      3. Estimate of the Labor it will involve.
      4. Estimate of Other Expense involved.
      5. Statement as to the Need of aid from the Carnegie Institution.
      6. Suggestion of a Plan by which aid might be extended.
      7. Estimate of the Probability of Completion of the work, etc.
      8. Remarks as to the Probable Net Cost to the Carnegie
Institution, in money and in efficiency.
      9. Statement of my apprehension of the Basis of my claim for

  Final Version ‐ MS L75.346‐349  

      Some personal narrative is here necessary. I imbibed from my
boyhood the spirit of positive science, and especially of exact
science; and early became intensely curious concerning the theory
of the methods of science; so that, shortly after my graduation from
college in 1859, I determined to devote my life to that study;
although indeed it was less a resolve than an overmastering passion
which I had been for some years unable to hold in check. It has
never abated. In 1866, and more in 1867, I ventured upon my first
original contributions to the science of logic, and have continued my
studies of this science ever since, with rare interruptions of a few
months only each. Owing to my treating logic as a science, like the
physical sciences in which I had been trained, and making my
studies special, minute, exact, and checked by experience, and
owing to the fact that logic had seldom before been so studied,
discoveries poured in upon me in such a flood as to be embarrassing.
This has been one reason why I have hitherto published but a few
fragments of outlying parts of |347| my work, or slight sketches of
more important parts. For logic differs from the natural sciences
and, in some measure, even from mathematics, in being more
essentially systematic. Consequently, if new discoveries were made
in the course of writing a paper, they would be apt to call for a
remodelling of it, a work for mature reconsideration. Still, as far as I
remember, no definitive conclusion of importance to which I have

what I hereby solicit the aid of the Carnegie Institution to enable me to do is to draw up some three dozen memoirs. and |348| when the favor was accorded. 7‐3‐98)      From the beginning to the end of his career Peirce had as his goal the establishment of logic as a science. and that it can be understood methodically. were sent to almost every logician in the world. prevented my publishing has been.       As regards the first aim. I could not feel that I had done my best to do that which I was put into the world to do. My first papers. not to the fault of the scientific method. each complete in itself. such were the advantages of the scientific methods of study. that my desire to teach has not been so strong as my desire to learn. more than that cause. in the sense of persuading others to this effect such that it actually came to be publicly identified as such. that far from there having been any demand for papers by me. and second. Modification in details and changes (very sparse) of the relative importance of principles are the greatest alterations I have ever been led to make. and "establish" should be understood here in two senses: first. adding in each case. and so forth. if I did not spend all my available forces in putting upon record as many of my logical results as I could. which memoirs shall present in a form quite convincing to a candid mind the results to which I have found that the scientific |349| method unequivocally leads. the whole putting logic. and secondly.349 by Ransdell (Rev. as far as my studies of it have gone. in the sense of showing or demonstrating some things about it which would make it rationally plausible to regard it in that way. which is the primary—though not the only—sense of the dictum "all thought is in signs" that runs like a leitmotiv throughout Peirce's work.ever been led has required retraction. I have always found no little difficulty in getting what I wrote printed. I have had little ardor about printing anything. what needed to be shown was both that its subject‐matter is essentially public. Since then. "Methodically" does not mean "algorithmically": Peirce did not think of scientific . being upon the threshold of old age. in the manner of science generally. institutionalized appropriately in universities. rational explanations of how opposing opinions have come about. upon the undeniable footing of a science. but chiefly to my adherence to early teachings. Even those have been due. accompanied in many cases with letters. But what has. however. yet the whole forming a unitary system of logic in all its parts.       Therefore. Now. COMMENT to L75. first. which have since been pronounced good work. but for ten years thereafter I never could learn that a single individual had looked into them. it was usually represented to me that funds were sacrificed in doing so.

the last‐mentioned of which he regarded in terms of testing rather than generating general propositions.       Contrary to a continuing misconception. This is discussed in a little more detail in the Editorial Introduction. as a working scientist himself. For he also understood that the establishing of a science is not a matter of an ingenious tour de force of demonstration by an individual in a book or article. and induction. of whom a good many were in or connected in one way or another with the sciences. though unsuccessful.21­29         What I desire aid in doing is in bringing before the world the .) The attempt. Peirce was not an unknown figure in his time as regards academicians in general and scientists in particular. This second sense of "establishment" is especially relevant here. but means rather the actual establishing of a shared practice of inquiry by a community of inquirers with common and overlapping concerns.       To understand Peirce's logic and philosophy of science. for Peirce regarded this application to the Carnegie Institution as presenting the real possibility of establishing logic.     From Draft A ­ MS L75. (Transcriptions of these letters are currently being prepared and will be made available here at the Arisbe website in the near future. and the board of referees to whom he was appealing was a similarly prestigious board composed largely of people in the sciences. though.method in terms of a mechanistic procedure of generating or validating truths. was not quixotic: indeed. it is of the first importance to take due account of a second sense of "establish" which he. as philosophers are usually inclined to conceive it. knew to be at least as important as considerations of the sort just mentioned above. but rather in terms of the exercise of judgment in following complex cyclical and self‐corrective procedures involving hypothesis. there is reason to think it would have been successful had it not been for extensive clandestine activity aimed chiefly at discrediting Peirce's character rather than his plan. in a broad sense which includes what we now call "philosophy of science". deduction. and had quite an impressive backing for his application by way of letters of recommendation from important academicians. as an institutionally recognized scientific field on par with the hard sciences by appealing to his own scientific peers in the hard sciences to recognize it as such by supporting him in gathering and presenting it systematically as foundational work in the field.

forty years' work is about what my results have cost me. slightly developing some of them. Twice. and in Hegel's case. upon a New List of Categories. and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its radically different classes of |23| elements. For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle. I have made determined efforts to dismiss the subject from my thoughts. It is true that fragmentary papers mostly upon relatively unimportant topics have appeared. that of Aristotle. They merely took conceptions which they found at hand. and of tracing out all their modes of combination. (for Being and Substance are of a different nature. In May 1867 I presented |22| to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages. of |24| the 11th century thinkers. of the Greek commentators. It surprises me today that in so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly accurate. and German logicians. Quality. This was the most difficult task I ever ventured to undertake. in the sense of whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of experience. not to be compassed . Kant. especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. but corresponding to his nine Accidents I find only three. Such was the teaching of all the logic I knew. I ascertained that the latter was from the nature of things. Mediation. subtracting distractions. Reaction. English. This list is fortunately very short. and Hegel in attempting much more than they. at least. there are two conceptions which I call Being and Substance. Long after. already worked out. but the bent of my mind is such that I did not succeed in doing so for more than a few months each time. that is. seemed to be a problem which could be worked out by straightforward patience. when I had developed the only effective methods of doing the one thing and the other. arranging them. but the whole forms a unitary system to such a degree that no part which seems to have any importance can be set forth separately in a manner to do it justice. so that. of the great scholastic doctors. It was.) the business before me was the mixed one of making my apprehension of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as clear and plain as possible. without relying upon any previous philosophizing. at all. not until 1861 that I ventured upon any serious original research.result of my researches into logic. Their labor was limited to selecting the conceptions. of the modern French. I will explain how this came to be the case. This last. Corresponding to Aristotle's Substance. separating one or two that had been confused with others.       I began the study of logic in 1856. however. of rendering my apprehension clear and of finding the forms of combination of the categories. But what I undertook to do was to go back to experience. or about 4000 words.       These results have never been published. It was the result of full two years' intense and incessant application. and it has been my principal occupation ever since. either in respect to its meaning or in respect to the evidences of it.

this very statement will in some measure mere hard thinking. yes. specious as it is." But it never proved so. it is that I have been quite grotesquely misrepresented. after years of fruitless effort (I will not say they were wasted.       All this will explain—not distinctly. Some of these forms of composition have to be carefully examined in order to obtain distinct conceptions with which to build a theory of logic. This work is of its nature absolutely interminable. But. Then that in which I had failed must be feasible. It involves a logical doctrine which can never be completed. I had reached a mode of thought so remote from that of the ordinary man.—how impossible it was that any fragment of the truth that it has been granted to me to perceive should be adequately represented by itself. since they gave me great training. EDITORIAL NOTE: Peirce apparently means that he failed in finding the forms of combinations of the categories. But it was now worked up to the point at which the general method of research could be made evident to every mind. Everything that promised to refute the list. Another great labor was required in breaking a path by which to lead him |26| from his position to my own. Then began the long work of collecting the compounds and analyzing them into the categories. Hence. I spent five years in diligently. The evidence became irresistible. Thus in a draft version of his comments on Memoir 5 he says: "These three categories are compounded in a multitude of ways which can only be apprehended through experience.       But by that time. seeking facts which should refute my list. I have been . when carefully examined only confirmed it. this list of categories. The clear expression of my thoughts is still most difficult to me. They cannot be built up by an act of pure thought. in order to convey any hint of my real meaning. not then knowing this. that would be impossible without going into details. yet in some vague way. and at length I learned why it could not prove so. that it was necessary to wait for the compounds to make their appearance. To this solution I was guided by the very categories themselves. that I was unable to communicate with him. I had become entirely unaccustomed to the use of ordinary language to express my own logical ideas to myself. Thereupon. I found that I had a difficult art to acquire. until the list down to a certain point was complete. passionately. Never in my life have I been more thoroughly in earnest |25| than I was in that long struggle. I was obliged to make a regular study of ordinary ideas and language.) I said to myself. must be a delusion of which I must disabuse myself. It was in vain. His point seems to be that these cannot be ascertained a priori. and patiently to analyze them. How awkward I am at it.

I have been called a modern Hume. At almost the same moment. Hegelianism is one of the first three. I am supposed to be opposed to Hegel at all points. My main objection to Hegel is that of all exaggerators he is the most errant. The seventh type does nearly equal justice to all three. as it has been hitherto. although. though Kant's criticism was.3‐9         That which I desire aid in doing is to bring before the world the results of my researches into logic. not as most do. there are seven conceivable types of philosophy. But as to his main doctrines. while another was calling me a pure Schellingian. and for that reason there is a relative wholesomeness in it. and have used algebra as an aid in explaining the logic of relations.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. On the contrary. In my view. because Hume denied causality altogether. and I. or chief. Three more somewhat overrate two and almost utterly neglect the third.       I began this study in 1856. Vera used to say that while Hegelianism was rejected. which were reached by him before he ever lit up his dialectical procedure. I cannot lay claim to the slightest merit for the constancy with which I have pursued it. and that he carries onesidedness to its last extreme. it has been assumed that I regarded logical algebra as the whole. I do think that Hegel's processes. if regarded as proofs. it has been necessary for . my mother's |27| milk in philosophy. |28| I think that metaphysics. but as quite no rational satisfaction at all. has mainly consisted of pretty well‐grounded truths enormously exaggerated. part of logic. I think there is a good deal of truth in them. and Hegel's opinion that they are all one‐sided amounts to the same thing. since it has been an uncontrollable impulse. I have protested earnestly against the exaggerated importance attached by many to this instrument of logic. have not written one single piece of a general nature which did not sufficiently show that I regard pleasure. Because I pointed out the insufficiency of existing logical algebra. and you have something like the truth. after calling attention to the fact that all men set some limits to causality. in fact. dilute |29| Hegelianism by diminishing the importance it places upon mediation and by recognizing the due significance of the others. so to say. I who from the beginning of my career to this day. it had more or less filtered into and permeated all thought. Indeed. Three greatly exaggerate the importance of some one of my three categories and more or less underrate the others. One History of Philosophy sets me down as a typical sceptic. are quite the most absurd reasonings that ever were or could be.called a hedonist. Very well. and it has been my principal occupation ever since. endeavored to define these limits. But the category which it exaggerates is the one most commonly overlooked. as a small satisfaction. one eminent philosopher was referring to me as a sort of Büchner. till they become monstrous falsities.

      3rd. no matter how I had dressed it up. yet they both come from most competent and careful critics. and then only if they were made so brief as to be almost unintelligible. My boxes are full of unprinted MSS on the subject as carefully written as anything I ever wrote. I have not been able to learn that as many as half a dozen persons have ever read any paper of mine. It is therefore the results of about thirty‐five years work which I desire to present. A striking |5| example of how I am misunderstood is that while one of the histories of philosophy sets me down as a sceptic. and my incessant study of them. At any rate. and there was not a daily round of duties to occupy me. It was more than ten years after I published my first papers that I became aware in any way that anybody but myself and the printer had ever looked into them. but my experience is that there is only a small proportion of mankind who are able to make the earning or gaining of money their leading motive. I have had desperate struggles with my logic.       Though I began the study as far back as 1856 and spent almost all my time reading at that time the German philosophers and Aristotle. It has kept me poor. I have experienced |4| extremely little encouragement. with my aptitude for the subject. and relatively unimportant parts. to hold them all in my head at once in an orderly manner. Only those things could be printed which could pass as relating to some other subject. which moreover cannot be properly understood when standing alone.|6|       2nd. I note that one of the greatest living philosophers ranks me as a pure Schellingian. it was not until 1861 that I ventured upon any serious original research. and the difficulty of the task of arranging them in a lucid and convincing manner is such that several years of exclusive . a sort of Modern Hume. as I have been at all times to exercise all my control over myself. I am sure that I am not one of that class. that during all these years the vast volume of my results has been such that it has not been easy for me. I have thus had every reason except one for abandoning the pursuit.       Merely fragments of the work have been published. or else worked up so as to answer the purposes of popular magazines. that even so. Both [of] those classifications cannot be true. When I have found myself in a solitary situation. and not until 1866 that I was far enough advanced to offer anything for publication. I answer.       I shall be asked why I have published so little and in [so] fragmentary a way.       1st. for fear that my mind might be affected by such unceasing application to a particular subject. my personal interest in the discoveries. that I have had extreme difficulty in getting what I wrote on logic printed. but my bent was too strong. Twice I have made determined efforts to do so.

it has been absolutely impossible to present my views on almost any part of logic separated from the whole. The first was offered to a publisher. I found it to be written too much from its own standpoint. Since that development. without referring to earlier essays. It did not examine opposed opinions with sufficient sympathy and understanding. I can now write a treatise which shall restrain every assertion in it within the limits in which it shall be absolutely convincing. I have since thought much and experimented much upon how the book should be written. that I have no natural gift of making myself understood. when it was done. there was an offensive tone throughout. which shall notice everything of importance that has been said on each topic. but at the same time kept it far remote from the ordinary highway of men's thoughts. .devotion to that task would be requisite for its accomplishment. I discovered that the real reason of my difficulties lay not in my generalization. In May 1867. it was unconvincing.       7th. I began to think that some undiscovered error must lurk in it and that I was the victim of a self‐delusion. that up to within a few years [ago]. I have twice within my later years written a whole book upon logic. although my original result still seemed evident. turned out in the end to afford only new evidence of its truth. for a considerable series of years I was continually scheming to discover some downright refutation of my theory. but notwithstanding the recommendations of his readers. But every inquiry I made which promised |8| to lead to such refutation. I published a paper of ten pages which was either entirely mistaken or was one of the most important of philosophical generalizations. and utterly unworthy of the theory which it had the honor to defend.       4th. but in a view which had been accepted by all logicians without serious question.       6th. notwithstanding all I have said. I now returned with energy to my original position which I adopted. It brought great unity into the whole subject. new results were continually coming in in such profusion as to leave me no leisure to set forth old ones. as the result of two years of unceasing application. the chief reason remains unmentioned. and my thoughts appear to me in a garb so |7| foreign from the ordinary ways of thinking that it would be a difficult matter to translate them into the language used by readers. and shall meet every issue squarely and fairly.       5th. |9| The other was a very large work. he declined it. However. Almost persuaded that this must be so. with the utmost advantage as a sort of skeleton of my whole logical doctrine. done with much care. Several years next following were largely occupied in tracing the matter out into its developments. Finally. But here such difficulties were encountered that were so great that. and I have been very glad he did.

the scholastics. as I shall show. Berkeley. What little I could print had to be brief and fragmentary. penetrated with formalisms.  From Draft C ‐ MS L75. parallel to my reading.000 words in all. a certain amount of work upon my logic was a daily need. Hume.       What I desire is to divide my researches into a number of heads. The first was rejected by the publisher. I was already systematically studying logic. From 1856 until this day my passion for the study of logic has been so intense that no other motives could prevail. the chairs of logic at the universities have been occupied by men bred in theological seminaries. would have grown into the convincing book which I should recognize as somewhat worthy of the great theory it would attempt to expound. however. now a good many years that I have had this task under systematic study. By 1856. that which I seem to have been put into the world to do. devoid of any ideal of progressive science. I began to be initiated into the methods of physical science before I was ten years old. I have. there have been solid results. My perseverance was no merit. Finally. any more than my perseverance in breathing. and began to publish in 1866. beginning with the Critic of the Pure Reason. Herbart. however. say from a score to two dozen in all.|62|       But my studies were continued almost without interruption. Whatever distractions from my solitary position I might seek. last year some friends offered to buy of me the copyright of a few sections of such a work. The second. a more ambitious performance. and to set forth my . and I wrote several. I continued my reading diligently. etc. about 1861. The result has been that by this time I have built up such an elaborate system. Several people have at one time and another given me aid in pursuing my studies. I can never forget them.60‐64         What are the researches of which I speak?       They are the work of my life. I myself condemned. Aristotle. in its broad sense. and brought up in a scientific circle. amounting to about 200. passing to Hegel. Twice I have actually written treatises on logic. I first began serious original research. which if the funds had not |63| given out. published very little. Leibniz. In each case. in the proper place. and it has always been methods which have chiefly interested me. This fact naturally brought along an entire situation sufficient to discourage me from troubling a printer to set up what no man would read. I must select subjects concerning which what I had to say would be intelligible without previous studies. that the task of undertaking to explain it is one of the utmost difficulty.       It is. although the amount of encouragement that I have received has been so |61| small that I have mostly been in a desperate depression. I was born in 1839. I am very happy to say. During the greater part of my life. examining nothing with real exactitude. because there was no sort of encouragement to do so.

etc. while science can wait a century or five centuries. than any deduction from theory can be. If I lived to complete the plan. and the application of the theory does not require the logical instinct to be strained beyond its natural function. as such. on the average. if need be. but if it is heeded. but instinct within its proper domain is generally far keener. the whole when completed would make a large treatise on logic. the theory of purely scientific reasoning can be worked out with mathematical certainty. and above all swifter. except that it would suppose an acquaintance with those which had gone before. but I hurried more than I ought to have done. some ten weeks to prepare each. in reference to the expectations which would be roused in uninstructed minds by the word "logic. Probably it would require. is perfectly definite and simple. On the other hand.29‐33         But what would be the contents of my three ponderous volumes of logic? I answer. The different memoirs would range from 20.investigations of each together with an exhaustive critical examination of everything of importance that has been said or could be said against my results.000 words each. diagrams. at all events. in the first place.|31|       The methodeutic utility of logic is still further limited by the fact that the reasonings of pure mathematics are perfectly evident and . somewhat the largest ever given to the world. Besides. A good deal of it would contain formulae. These two would be shown to be governed by somewhat different principles. When I speak of the number of words. I mean that it would when properly printed occupy as much space as that number of words of ordinary matter set up solidly. and surer. On the other hand. the voice of instinct itself is that objective considerations should be the decisive ones. Another cause which acts still more strongly to differentiate the methodeutic of theoretical and practical reasoning is that the latter can be regulated by instinct |30| acting in its natural way. to be employed in applying the theory. if we attempt to apply natural logical instinct to purely scientific questions of any difficulty. the ultimate purpose of pure science. Theory is thus at a special disadvantage here." that it would contain a theory of scientific reasoning and also a theory of the reasoning of practical men about every day affairs. while [the] theory of how one should reason depends upon one's ultimate purpose and is modified with every modification of ethics. During the last year I have worked faster. as there is every reason to expect that I |64| should under the enormous stimulus which assured aid would give my vitality. inasmuch as the practical reasoning is forced to reach some definite conclusion promptly.000 to 100. before coming to any conclusion at all. logical instinct has. it not only becomes uncertain.   From Draft A ‐ MS L75. It might be something like a million words. it is true. Each such paper would be complete in itself.

      How much the psychical sciences have suffered from the lack of an exact logic can be understood from my memoir on the methods of research into history by means of documents. End of PART 1 of 10 of MS L75 Queries.       It follows that the only reasonings for which a science of logic is methodeutically useful are those of metaphysics.       In metaphysics the dependence is much stronger yet. ethics. the arts. the three normative sciences. is perfectly adapted to their reasonings after the subtle analyses of which these sciences themselves take cognizance have prepared the premisses. Now metaphysics affects physics and the physical sciences most intimately. and all the logical relations are repeated as meta|33|physical relations. To my prevision physics seems to be entering a period when such questions will be multiplied.ransdell@yahoo.have no need of any separate theory of logic to reinforce them.       Thus the methodeutic utility of the science of logic. esthetics. even more than it does the psychical sciences. of the physical and the psychical wing. are nevertheless so far practical that instinct in its natural operation. Physical science has hitherto done well enough without any appeal |32| to a science of logic. Mathematics is its own logic. . as representing. is pretty narrowly limited. comments. Namely. and the special theoretical sciences. Witness the still more difficult question of the constitution of matter. but it is in great part masked by the circumstance that metaphysics is utterly dependent upon logic in a different way which the categories of Kant and even those of Aristotle illustrate. although they do not come under that branch of science called practical. that is. although it is beyond price. and suggestions to Joseph Ransdell Dept of Philosophy Texas Tech University. Lubbock Texas 79409 joseph. and logic itself. metaphysics regards the universe as thinking. Witness the controversy between those who are about Poincare and those who are about Boltzmann. Metaphysics is hardly more than a corollary from logic. But at this moment questions of a logical nature have arisen which nothing but a scientific logic are likely to settle.

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Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                       Final Version ­ MS L75. in the present state of science. by supplying the shocking omissions which Comte's rage against nonsense led him to commit. and what contributions are commonly admitted into one journal. and is a natural classification in so far as that same purpose is determinative in the production of the objects classified. being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone states of science. That branch of which the student of any part is well qualified to take up any other part. namely. I have been guided in determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves into societies. That which forms the subject of the narrowest societies and journals. not of sciences in the sense of "systematized knowledge. Every unitary classification has a leading idea or purpose. cannot have the same convincing character as the others. except that he may not be sufficiently acquainted with the facts in detail. being merely an introductory memoir. It was necessary for me to determine what I should call one science. and this. so numerously as to justify exclusive societies and journals for it. I call a species of science. I call a . and third. my classification is simply an attempt to improve upon that of Comte. but not. The purpose of this classification is nearly the same as that of Comte. In fact. A study to which men devote their lives. by carrying down the subdivision as far as my knowledge enables me to do. so that any student of any part of it ought to be pretty thoroughly informed about every part. might very well pursue. so to arrange a catalogue of the sciences as to exhibit the most important of |351| the relations of logical dependence among them. by looking less at what has been the course of scientific history.350­357   MEMOIR 1 ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE THEORETIC SCIENCES OF RESEARCH       This will be a natural classification. For this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same man. I shall not undertake to prove that there is no other natural classification of the sciences than that which I give. and more at what it would have been if the theoretically best methods had been pursued. second. not of possible sciences. but of sciences as they exist today." but of branches of endeavor to ascertain truth. in the present stage of development of science. I call a variety of science. first.

I may say of all these memoirs that what I most desire is that their errors should be exposed. I will here set down the larger divisions of the scheme as well as I remember it (not having the notes in my possession). yet these orders are connected together so that students feel that they are studying the same great subject. Philosophy.   A. Mathematics            ii. Astronomy and geognosy are different families. and geology belong to different orders of science. If the types of inquiry of the different orders of a department are different. notwithstanding all the labor on my part that seemed economically recommended. I call pure science and applied science different branches. I call the department a branch of science. To illustrate. I say that general physics. I call the department a class of science. Ethics                      c. from a general survey of science. be but a sketch. down to sub‐varieties. etc. Entomology and ichthyology are different species of one genus. biology. Thermotics and electrics are different families. not the |355| scheme itself. Normative Science                      a. Science of Research            i.genus of science. I call the department a family of science. Optics and electrics |354| are now different genera. If there are different classes. Nearly a hundred schemes given hitherto will be criticized. It will have fully attained all I hope for if it is respectable enough to merit serious picking to pieces in its smaller and in its larger divisions. Theoretical Science       I. Logic [= semiotic]                           [philosophical grammar] . so long as they lead to further scientific study of the subjects to which they relate. Of course. Esthetics                      b. and even sometimes sub‐sub‐divisions. but yet there is one general animating motive. If different sorts of conceptions are dealt with in the different families of a depart|353|ment. Indeed. The relation of this present memoir to those which follow it in the series is that it gives.       Of course. the general conceptions remaining the same. the execution of this useful but ambitious design can. or Cenoscopy                 1. so that different students seem to live in different worlds. an idea of the place of logic among the sciences. there will be sub‐branches. but the general type of inquiry is the same. I call it an order of science. But it will be the discussion which will form the chief value of the memoir.. If the only new training necessary to pass from one part to another is a mere matter of skill. Categorics [= phenomenology or phaneroscopy]                 2. The study of Kant and the study of Spinoza are different varieties of one species. and call mathematics and the special sciences different classes. in the first instance. sub‐classes.

Biology                      c. Linguistics                           . or the Arts   EDITORIAL NOTE: Bracketed material in the above scheme is editorially supplied as a clarification. Perhaps he can be persuaded to write up a critical note to that effect which we can add to the present presentation by including it through a hypertext link. Optics and Electrics                      b. Classificatory                           . Dynamics                                1. Psychognosy                      a. Of particles                                2. Crystallography                           . Of aggregations                           . Physiognosy                      a. History                           . Ethnology |356|                      c. Archeology                 2. or Synthetic Philosophy            (Humboldt's Cosmos. Nomological or General Physics                           . This invitation applies to anyone else as well who wants to take exception to any of my editorial interpretation here or simply wants to add something to it by way of commentary for . though. Josiah (Lee) Auspitz has objected. that the simple identification of logic in the broad sense with semeiotic (also spelled "semiotic" by Peirce) is not correct. Biography                           . Astronomy                           . Classificatory                           . His reasons for this are not clear to me and I believe the currently prevailing opinion is in agreement with my own view that they are supposed to be identical. Science of Review. Critics                           . or Special Science                 1.                          [critical logic]                           [philosophical rhetoric]                 3. Idioscopy. Descriptive                           . Geognosy |357|       II. Comte's Philosophie Positive) B. Metaphysics            iii. Chemistry                           . but Lee Auspitz is a careful and talented scholar and his dissent is worth taking special note of. Elaterics and Thermotics                           . Nomological or General Psychology                      b. Practical Science. Descriptive                           .

  From Draft E ­ MS L75. and is of great importance for logic. although they are really studies of science.       In constructing my classification. geognosy). as they live today. and Comte's Philosophie Positive. ethics. not as "systematized knowledge. or special science. not having been very successful. such studies as Humboldt's Cosmos. astronomy." but as organizations of research. I should probably not attempt to go into that subject. My classification of the applied sciences.) and metaphysics.206­207         This [classification] would be restricted to sciences as they actually exist. and logic. chemistry. the categories. I divide philosophy into three parts. psychognosy (embracing psychology. as Bentham calls it. but its leading divisions are: mathematics. biology. . Moreover. My classification is quite minute. The last falls into two parts.e. Yet as my purpose is not to advance anything for which I cannot produce convincing proof. with some little provision of what is sure to be brought about soon. such criticism must be carefully and respectfully performed throughout all the memoirs. etc. philosophy or. and idioscopic. thus making it an addendum to the present account. based on universal experience). Geometry and the science of time form a connecting link between metaphysics and idioscopy.   Final Version ‐ MS L75. normative science (esthetics.further elucidation: write it up as a criticism or commentary and we will put a hypertext link‐button for that note in the text itself. so that the critical part of this memoir would be extremely laborious.357   MEMOIR 2 ON THE SIMPLEST MATHEMATICS       This is that mathematics which distinguishes only two different values.) and physiognosy |207| (embracing physics. or arts. I have carefully studied the reasons alleged for nearly a hundred other systems. It would consider sciences. linguistics. would not fall within the scope of my classification. history. ethnology. cenoscopic (i. which would thus be limited to the theoretical sciences.

this system calls for somewhat elaborate study as a propaedeutic to logic.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. mine was published six years before his. defend the method of infinitesimals conclusively. based upon the doctrine of infinitesimals. multiple algebra. continuity. I bring the whole together into one system. In this memoir. One of the learned academies of Europe has crowned a demonstration that my definition of a finite multitude agrees with Dedekind's definition of an infinite multitude. to the advantage of simplicity. measurement.207         This is the system which has a scale of values of only two degrees. although in respect to priority justice has not been done them. that the method of infinitesimals is more consonant with then (in 1883) recent studies of mathematical logic. in the Century Dictionary. multitude. infinity. It appears to me that the one is hardly more than a verbal modification of the other. although very imperfectly. In point of fact. no difficulty remains. infinitesimals. limit. In the sense in |209| the calculus. But the whole of topical geometry remains in .357   MEMOIR 3 ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF MATHEMATICS       Such are number. and give many new truths established by a new and striking method. dimension. though very fragmentary. I should show precisely how the calculus may be.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. have attracted attention in Europe. Many animadversions have been made by eminent men upon my remark. Many futile attempts have been made to define continuity. My former contributions. Since these may be identified (in an application of this pure mathematical system) as the true and the false.208‐209         My work in this direction is already somewhat known. etc. I am usually represented as having put forth my definition as a substitute for Dedekind's. imaginaries. and my paper contains in very brief and crabbed form all the essentials of his beautiful exposition (still more perfect as modified by Schröder).  From Draft E ‐ MS L75.

an exceedingly backward state and destitute of any method of proof simply because true continuity has not been mathematically defined. and as such.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. |358| and of the method of topical geometry.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. beyond all criticism. of substantive possibility. I have made several other advances in defining the conceptions of mathematics which illuminate the subject. Mathematical reasoning will be analyzed and important properties of it brought out which mathematicians themselves are not aware of.209‐210         I have hitherto only published some slight hints of my discoveries in regard to the logical processes used in mathematics. of which I have hitherto published mere hints. will here be fully elaborated.19         [This memoir] will examine the nature of mathematical reasoning. It remains . because it is evident. This is a matter of extreme importance for the theory of cognition. and a foundation is afforded for topical geometry. from which the required definition of a continuum results. By a careful analysis of the conception of a collection. I have succeeded in giving a demonstration of an important proposition which Cantor had missed. which I |210| distinguish as the corollarial and the theorematic. of the method of abstraction. I find that two different kinds of reasoning are used. But logic is interested in studying how mathematical reasoning proceeds.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. which branch of geometry really embraces the whole of geometry. The subjects of corollarial and theorematic reasoning. of which no mathematical definition has been yet published.357   MEMOIR 4 ANALYSIS OF THE METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION       I shall be glad to place early in the series so unquestionable an illustration of the great value of minute analysis as this memoir will afford. Logic can pass no judgment upon such reasoning.

By diagrammatic reasoning. but in fact it is logically defensible. differentials.90‐102         No science of logic is needed for mathematics beyond that which mathematics can itself supply. I also find that the most effective kind of theorematic demonstration always involves the long despised operation of abstraction. and it also has the advantage of leading the reader. it can be applied in a futile manner. surfaces. 1. Like every other logical transformation. but beyond that I had no idea of its nature. which has been a common topic of ridicule. showing. and expresses this in general terms. never dreamed of in advance. That the logic of mathematics belonged to the logic of relatives. was indeed obvious in advance. But I show that. I . I mean reasoning which constructs a diagram according to a precept expressed in general terms.unpublished. is ipso facto true. This principle is proved in No. I undertake to prove its truth. the mathematician would be shut off from operations upon lines.   From Draft C ‐ MS L75. no matter how simple it may be.       At this point. I go on to define precisely what it is that this operation effects. resting on the principle that a theory which is adapted to the prediction of observational facts. but in modern times it has been forgotten. This might be mistaken for repetitiousness. notes their results. performs experiments upon this diagram. and which does not lead to disappointment. I endeavor in this paper to enumerate. This was a discovery of no little importance. functions. for my part. to the compre|93|hension of an idea which he would not be able to grasp at once. step by step. although I ought to have guessed that there must be unexpected treasures hidden in this quite unexplored ground. Then my proof of grades of reality is inductive. and consists in often turning aside in the course of this series of memoirs to show how this theory is adapted to the expression of facts. assures itself that similar experiments performed upon any diagram constructed according to the same precept would have |92| the same results. and to the appreciation of an argument which he could not digest at one time. The general notion is old. without it. This is the operation by which we transform the proposition that "Opium puts people to sleep" into the proposition that "Opium has a soporific virtue". such as I. But the examination of the methods of mathematical demonstration shed |91| extraordinary light upon logic. operations—and even from the consideration of cardinal numbers. that all knowledge without exception comes from observation. and to the logic of triadic. as it does. unless possibly it be in regard to mathematical heuretic. I intend to insert a mention of my theory of grades of reality. classify. and define the precise mode of effectiveness of every method employed in mathematics. not of dyadic relations. The first things I found out were that all mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic and that all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning.

we find convincing evidences of such gradations. Suffice it to say that since reality consists in this.       My first real discovery about mathematical procedure was that there are two kinds of necessary reasoning.will not here undertake to explain what the theory is in detail. because the corollaries affixed to the propositions of Euclid are usually arguments of one kind. in the proper sense of the term. not even if the character consists in the thing's representing itself to represent itself. So when Charles Dickens was half‐through one of his novels. Even here. It is the operation of abstraction. Everybody would admit that the word might be applied in such cases by an apt metaphor. or of the Atlantic Ocean. then. and in point of fact the reader sometimes feels that the concluding parts of this or that novel of Dickens is false. When we come to consider the heuretic part of mathematical procedure. which. . there is an extremely low grade of reality. but I undertake to show that there is a certain degree of sober truth in it. that a real thing has whatever characters it has in its being and its having them does not consist in its being represented to have them. and in point of fact. and which the conclusion that he reaches by this means says nothing about. which neither the definition of the object of research nor anything yet known about could of themselves suggest. for example. the principal result of my closer studies of it has been the very great part which an operation plays in it which throughout modern times has been taken for nothing better than a proper butt of ridicule.       But to say that the reasoning of mathematics is |95| diagrammatic is not to penetrate in the least degree into the logical peculiarities of its procedure. I show that no considerable advance can be made in thought of any kind without theorematic reasoning. while the more important theorems are of the other. the question how such suggestions are obtained will be the central point of the discussion. since. The peculiarity of theorematic reasoning is that it considers something not implied at all in the conceptions so far gained. for example. there is no reason in the nature of reality why it should not have gradations of several kinds. and that it is important for logic to recognize that the reality of the Great Pyramid. It is easy to see that according to this definition the square root of minus 1 possesses a certain grade of |94| reality. not even in its representing itself to have them. Euclid. that is the nature of reality. since all its characters except only that of being the square root of minus one are what they are whether you or I think so or not. is nothing but a higher grade of the same thing. or of the Sun itself. which I call the corollarial and the theorematic. will add lines to |96| his diagram which are not at all required or suggested by any previous proposition.       Passing over smaller discoveries. he could no longer make his characters do anything that some whim of a reader might suggest without feeling that it was false. as all schools of philosophy now admit. although they give room for it. because all necessary reasoning is diagrammatic. I say.

however. "Almost any American can speak English". But it would be equally correct. it is difficult to make sure that my higher multitudes are the same as his. I was already largely anticipated by Cantor. has not influenced me. But I pursue the method of considering multitude to the very end. It may. For that reason. signify little to the person who is not acquainted with the properties of abstraction. Like Cantor and unlike Dedekind. to saying "The American nation is composed of individuals of whom the greater part speak English". such that in any |100| lapse of time there is room for any multitude of instants however great. or as Cantor erroneously calls it. the first and least of which is the multitude of all the irrational numbers of analysis.       It was not until I had been giving a large part of my time for several years to tracing out the ways in which mathematical demonstration makes use of abstraction that I came across a fact which a mind which had not been scrutinizing the facts so closely |98| might have seen long before. although its form is admirable. But I have little doubt that they are. the others the abnumerable multitudes. This turns out to be so essential to the greater strides of mathematical demonstration that it is proper to divide all theorematic reasoning into the non‐abstractional and the abstractional. while Cantor switches off to ordinal number. I begin with multitude. I call the first the denumerable multitude. I prove that there is an infinite series of infinite multitudes. But ideas which I have derived from Cantor are so mixed up with ideas of my own that I could not safely undertake to say exactly where the line should be |99| drawn between what is Cantor's and what my own. It is therefore necessary for logic to distinguish sharply between good abstraction and bad abstraction. which are not multitudes. there is an infinite series of forms of reasoning concerning the calculus which deals only with a collection of . although I did not know it. apparently the same as Cantor's alephs. suggest to him that the popular contempt for "abstractions" does not aim very accurately at its mark. I cannot see that Cantor has ever got the conception of a true continuum.converts the |97| proposition "Opium puts people to sleep" into "Opium has a dormitive virtue". I am able to prove that the most practically important results of mathematics could not in any way be attained without this operation of abstraction. This can. I however anticipated Dedekind by about six years. Dedekind's work. as Dedekind does. we perform a special kind of abstraction. that all collections are of the nature of abstractions. it is not of much consequence.       I show that every multitude is distinguished from all greater multitudes by there being a way of reasoning about collections of that multitude which does not hold good for greater multitudes. to begin with ordinal number. perhaps preferable. There is nothing greater than these but true continua. I know. namely. When we pass from saying.       When I published a paper about number in 1882. Consequently. From my point of view. cardinal number.

  From Draft C ‐ MS L75. is nothing but a special |101| problem to projective geometry. Yet it is evident that it is not altogether an appropriate scale. for example. Yet I distinctly disclaim. all pretension to having been remarkably successful in dealing with the heuretic |102| department of mathematics. not upon its procedure in discovering demonstrations. Cayley had shown. This. I set up for myself a sort of landmark by which to discern whether I was making any real progress or not. It is easy to see that projective geometry is nothing but a special problem of topical geometry. the power of the barycentric calculus in projective geometry. On the other hand. or perspective. before writing this second memoir. At the outset. I can already see some of the characters of an appropriate scale of values for topical geometry. is nothing but a special problem in projective geometry. was a sufficient explanation of the circumstance that mathematicians have never discovered any method of reasoning about topical geometry. the geometry of the elements. it would afford the best general method for the treatment of any branch. that metric geometry. as a boy.       My logical studies have already enabled me to prove some propositions which had arrested mathematicians of power. Probably.       I am quite sure that the value of what I have ascertained will be acknowledged by mathematicians. it would seem. proved that metrical geometry. My attention has been concentrated upon the study of its procedure in demonstration. or perspective. the geometry of the Elements.numbers of the first abnumerable multitude which are not applicable to true continua. while I was. and it may very well be that I am not so near to a thorough understanding of it as I may hope. which deals with true continua.129‐132         I now pass to a rough statement of my results in regard to the heuretic branch of mathematical thought. and it is easy to see that projective geometry is nothing but a special problem in topical geom . They have not really proved a single proposition in that branch of mathematics.       Cayley. while I was still a boy. something similar to a scale of values may be applied to every kind of mathematics. since every relation can be reduced to a relation of serial order. We see. It is essentially the method of modern analytic geometry. for the present. I shall make one more effort to increase it. just beginning to understand such things. This must come later. if the appropriate scale were found.

has three kinds of elements and no more. The question of names and other terminology for them still somewhat perplexes me. "relation". imagined. but has since been repeatedly subjected to the severest criticism I could bring to bear upon it.102‐108         My aim in this paper. upon which I have bestowed more labor than upon any other. It is proved. beyond doubt.] Great pains will be taken to make these three conceptions perfectly clear and vivid.358   MEMOIR 5 ON THE QUALITIES OF THE THREE CATEGORIES OF EXPERIENCE       An analysis and description of three irreducibly different kinds of elements found in experience and even in the abstract world of pure mathematics. The list was first published by me in May 1867. I. This memoir rests upon observation of the experience of every day and hour.   From Draft C ‐ MS L75. on the contrary. that there are no more than the three categories. I am inclined to call them "flavor". [EDITORIAL NOTE: Notice that elements of the first kind are qualities of feeling and not simply feelings. The categories were originally called "quality". and "mediation". or even the more extended work of Hegel. reaction. etc. this observation being systematized by thought. These are the qualities of feeling. supposed. and mediation. and "representation".Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ‐ MS L75.19         [This memoir] will show that all that is before the mind as perceived. rejected. with the result of making it far more evidently correct. or even that of Aristotle.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. "reaction". beginning two years before my first publication on the subject in May 1867. is far more ambitious than that of Kant. undertake to look directly |103| upon the universal . All those philosophers contented themselves mainly with arranging conceptions which were already current.

1998 (2) Jeffrey Downard:  June 19. Let me know at   ransdell@cspeirce. We have this sort of . proceeding at a leisurely pace and in the manner of a scholarly dialogue. I might name them "qualities". It is self‐essence. without any sense of change. It may be defined as that whose mode of |104| being consists simply in its being what it is. Yet I will give such hint as I can of the three kinds of elements. while the new violet‐odor will at that moment be its non‐ego. It cannot in this moment be conscious of the flow of time. that. the rose‐odor should suddenly change to violet‐odor. but the former rose‐odor will appear as its ego. aided by another special art developed for that purpose. "occurrences". of which I find that there are only three.phenomenon. I cannot make myself clear. that is. to pick out the different kinds of elements which I detect in it. If it is to remain the same consciousness. and "meanings". upon all that in any way appears.* Editorial Note (by Ransdell): Does anyone know what Peirce is referring to as regards these special arts? If you have any ideas on this let us know and we will post it here as an annotation. and to form clear conceptions of those kinds. Suppose next that the consciousness we have imagined should undergo the simplest possible experience. of self or anything else. whether as fact or as fiction. In order to get an idea of what I mean by a "quality". and what of the universal phenomenon remains is what I call a "quality". for example. Put yourself in that being's shoes. aided by a special art developed for the purpose. the object of its consciousness. still less convincing. 2007       In my present limited space. as its   and I'll post your response here: COMMENTS & RESPONSES: (1) Bo Larsson:  August 15. You need not have the "definitive" answer to this to post your comment here: the idea is just to get some cooperative work done on this and on other such questions as might arise. of duration. imagine a being whose consciousness should be nothing but the perfume of a damask rose. there must be a moment in which it is conscious of both odors.

of present fact. a maximum or minimum distance. which has just come to an end. Thus we might logically derive the notion of a thing. The future grows into accomplished fact by a gradual unrolling. Now. over against it as a non‐ego instantly passing into the ego. The sense of actuality. then the straight line whose equation is y = 4P2x will determine the condition of the moving particle reaching an apse. I do not mean to say that historically we actually do so reflect. or by any law equivalent to that. the new becomes gradually old. This is my second category. Hence the sense of actual fact is a sense of reacting efforts. The occurrence is essentially present. that if two particles are attracted precisely inversely as the cube of their |107| distance. But that the new experience always has to overcome a resistance on the part of the old is proved by the |106| fact that we feel it to be irresistible. for the flow of time involves a very different element. Now conservative forces necessarily produce cyclical effects. there can be no force where there is no resistance. Its effects remain. then if we use a system of rectangular coordinates in which x shall be equal to the square of the reciprocal of the radius vector.consciousness whenever we experience an event. if . This is an interesting point. It is true. which is just about to begin. It is usually broken down so instantly that it can only be detected in cases in which peculiar circumstances cause its continuance. the evidence certainly now is (although we may not think it likely that it is quite true) that all physical forces are at bottom conservative. Since we have been considering things as temporal. that is. The two are but reverse aspects of the same phenomenon. we may as well continue to take the same point of view. this second curve will be |108| concave downwards. with the new. We feel its force. According to legitimate physical presumption. we can |105| review our experience and place ourselves back to a moment when both the former and the latter states were non‐egos. probably not. 878 of my father's Analytic Mechanics show that if P is the rate of description of area of the Boscovichian point moving round a fixed attracting center. we have left out of account the staple element of the universal phenomenon. But I mean that that would be a logical reflection. but they dwindle in importance toward utter oblivion. of opposition. will determine how u2 will vary with 1/ 2.   If the attraction varies less rapidly than the inverse cube of the distance.        So far. appears as an ego. as something whose mode of being consists in a reaction against something else. is thus essentially a consciousness of duplicity. There is always a certain resistance to the unexpected. the one will move in a spiral nearer to the other forever. and thus we get the idea of a force acting between outward objects. Formulae given on p. and y equal to the square of the velocity. When we have thus got the idea of an inner and an outer. The old. When it is not present its peculiar mode of being is gone. Another curve. This resistance is a counter‐force. There is no time‐ constituent in it. and I have never seen it stated with precision. dependent on the law of the variation of the attraction with the distance.

which consists in its own peculiar self‐being. In Greek there is little or no feeling that a sentence without a verb is elliptical. What I mean can be understood by imagining a being whose consciousness should consist. one could not frame a sentence which should satisfy the mind as completely expressed. and the very quality itself. Indeed. of action. for example. but the logical analysis of it which is given in the books is inaccurate. for example. Now take away the consciousness in which there is an element of fact. in the sense of the perfume |135| of a damask rose. so that x will increase. are certainly not necessary in a language. I will name the three elements which I find and give some rough notion of the significations of the names. |137| It is. therefore. . and you have what I mean by the elements of quality in the universal phenomena. full nouns alone. By a "quality" is meant a self‐essence. a pronoun "that" usually takes its place. that the attar of roses has a consciousness which is just that. it would seem that the Shemites cannot think of a noun except as a part of a verb. or something which is what it is by and in itself alone. Mind. without any change. In ancient Egyptian. without any self‐ consciousness. we will say. I do not say that one can realize that in the imagination. it may describe the circle at that distance. But if it ever crosses the straight line y = 4P2x the body will have at that distance been at a maximum or minimum distance. They are called "qualities". for they give it a form as if it were of that nature. and "meanings".134‐139         Although I cannot in my present limited space make myself clear. there are Indo‐European languages in which the idea of the common noun is not completely hardened. "things".more rapidly. I am not speaking of the occurrence of that sensation. still less convincing. It is true that there are proper |136| names in all languages. but common substantives. Even if no such verb exists. concave upwards.   From Draft C ‐ MS L75. without attributing the smell to any object. and in my opinion they do not fully exist in the majority of languages. One can even suppose. because it is colored by the peculiar ways of thinking of the Indo‐ European languages. The element that I call a "thing" is more familiar. without any sense of time. For it is plain that with nouns. every common noun is regarded as a formation from a verb. and in which there is an element of representation. When it is below the straight line its velocity will be insufficient and the distance will diminish. however groundlessly. Now the majority of languages are destitute of any substantive verb "is". In the Shemitic languages. If it is tangent to that straight line. such as ours are. is any simple quality of sensation. Such. definitely not verbs. but one can perceive that such a state of consciousness there might be.

The word "man" would then be replaced by what we can nearest express as "something is a man". so prominent in the hieroglyphics. Hence to express the idea that "man is an animal".impossible that in those languages the common noun should be thought as a mere name. The sentence "Flying‐fishes are common in the gulf stream" is sufficiently intelligible to a person who never heard of a flying‐fish. When I call a phenomenon a thing. But to suppose that nothing existed but a single atom would be absurd. or existence. These are the points of view of qualities. of subjects. A proper name is always the name of something more or less familiar to both the utterer of the sentence in which it occurs |138| and the person whom he addresses. and representations. as we think it. although I cannot stop to explain what the names mean. in particular. They are simple qualities. It has been shown above that it is quite possible to conceive of a universe in which there |139| should be absolutely nothing but a rose‐odor. There is no room for doubt that that is the way the idea arose. There are three points of view from which these elements have to be studied before they can be clearly apprehended. From the point of view of quality. That the idea of a thing or. Actuality. or over against me. not only does not consist in self‐ subsistence. without time. For otherwise the sentence would have no meaning.140‐142         I will name these elements here. and of minds. they appear respectively as quality. a something acting ob. the pronoun "that" would naturally be more appropriate than "is". This is [the] . and mind. I mean that it is an object. It is nearly the Hegelian Begriff. or anything else. which really describes a quality. Suppose it should exist and not exist every other day: what difference would there be between the odd and even days? The difference between an actually existing magnet and a phantasm of a magnet is that one actually pulls and the other does not. relates. consists in reaction. is seen by trying to imagine a universe in which nothing should exist but a single atom. If I inform you that the first king of England was Arthur. and mediation. is a very different conception from that which is current. If I say "Arthur was the first king of England" I am using a faulty inversion. and you had never before heard of Arthur. Mind. it seems that the pictorial way of thinking. |141| reaction. In Ancient Egyptian. the word "animal" by "something is an animal". From the point of view of subjects they appear as quales. It is our idea of a common noun as a name which has caused the logicians to regard a thing as something self‐subsistent. space.   From Draft C ‐ MS L75. They would think "Something is a man that something is an animal". subjects of force. as the logicians say. but is downright repugnant to it. a substantia. still my description of him as the first king of England gives you some acquaintance with him before I use the word "Arthur". was more influential in their thought than it is with us. But a common noun does not suppose any such familiarity.

again. Remembering that by "the universal phenomenon" I mean everything which has got into the mind in any way whatever. In the next place. they render the object represented available for the |142| purpose. that is. they act as substitutes for those other things for some purpose. they are at distances from one another.       These three categories are compounded in a multitude of ways which can only be apprehended through experience. As a consequence of that act. C. finally. to take an example where. It is a particular kind of representation to B of the object C. things are related to one another in pairs. anyone can without difficulty see that there is an idea of a thing as it is in itself with certain qualities. EDITORIAL NOTE: Here is a tabulation of the nomenclature for the three categories which Peirce uses in the different versions of this memoir above: quality relation representation flavor reaction mediation qualities of feeling reaction mediation qualities occurrences meanings qualities things meanings simple qualities subjects of force mind quality reaction mediation . including every fiction and false notion. the three categories appear as feeling or immediate consciousness. But as long as A's act of gift is in process of performance. In [the] third place. and will appear the clearest to a beginner in the subject. that is. at first sight. this act consists in giving B a consciousness of having a power over C. B comes into direct relation with C. from the point of view of mind. Some of these forms of composition have to be carefully examined in order to obtain distinct conceptions with which to build a theory of logic. attract or repel one another. In the third place.point of view most familiar to ordinary thought. however occult. one does not perceive any element of representation. They cannot be built up by an act of pure thought. A gives B a present. etc. as the sense of fact. Thus. That is. and A has no more to do with the matter. and as conception or mind strictly. which do not consist in its actual relation to anything else. there are things which represent other things to some purposing mind.

  . Memoirs 6 and 7] develop and render clear a considerable number of conceptions of which I shall make constant use in the remaining memoirs.359   MEMOIR 7 OF THE CATEGORIES IN THEIR MEDIATE ASPECTS       These two memoirs [i. and which are of constant use in all parts of philosophy and even in mathematics.e.358   MEMOIR 6 ON THE CATEGORIES IN THEIR REACTIONAL ASPECTS [Peirce said nothing under this heading in any extant version of MS L75.quales relates representation feeling or immediate consciousness sense of fact conception or mind strictly       Final Version ­ MS L75.]       Final Version ­ MS L75.

(Journal of Speculative Philosophy. and I do not except Hegel's Phänomenologie from this criticism.359   MEMOIR 8 EXAMINATIONS OF HISTORICAL LISTS OF CATEGORIES       My list differs from those of Aristotle. and given some considerations generally overlooked. The latter dependence I had shown less fully in 1869.359­361   MEMOIR 9 ON THE BEARING OF ESTHETICS AND ETHICS UPON LOGIC       I begin by explaining the nature of the normative sciences. Having analyzed the nature of the precise problems of the three. and are so closely allied to mathematics that it would be a much smaller error to say that. and Hegel in that they never really went back to examining the phenomenon to see what was to be observed there. They simply took current conceptions and arranged them. . which appears in the distinctions of the beautiful and the ugly. right and wrong. and to this. Vol. 297 et seq.  Final Version ­ MS L75. II. together with their great abstractness. is really due to their being on the border between mathematics and positive science.) But the methods of reasoning by which the truths of logic are established must be mathematical. Mine has been a more fundamental and more laborious undertaking since I have worked up from the percepts to the highest notions.     Final Version ­ MS L75. and which is one cause of their being mistaken for arts. Kant. They have often been mistaken for practical |360| sciences. like mathematics. such reasoning alone |361| being evident independently of any logical doctrine. I show that ethics depends essentially upon esthetics and logic upon ethics. pp. is due their applicability to so many subjects. they were simply occupied in deducing the consequences of initial hypotheses. I examine those systems as well as some others. which also helps to cause their being taken for arts. truth and falsity. Their peculiar dualism. or arts. I show that they are at the opposite pole of the sphere of science.

As far back as 1869. or what it is that we would deliberately pronounce to be kalon k'agathon. For |233|this reason. Ethics. true and false). in its turn. so far from such science approximating to practical science. it nevertheless pronounces some things to be good and others bad. I commence with an attempt at outline . The argument is extremely |232| simple: All positive reasoning depends upon probability. ethics in the realm of action. or the question what we are deliberately prepared to aim at. II. All probability depends upon the supposition that there is a "long run. therefore.231‐233         I here show the peculiar character of a normative science. in a general and vaguer way in 1869. Logic in its turn essentially depends upon ethics (as I showed. that while it is a purely theoretical science. which imparts to it its peculiar dualism (fine and ugly. Preliminary sketch of the three great doctrines of logic. namely. its extreme abstractness. and at the same time makes it more nearly applicable to every subject than any other such science except mathematics and categorics.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. more or less dependent upon ethics. such reasoning being evident and therefore not requiring the support of any logical doctrine.  From Draft E ‐ MS L75. or art. Esthetics does so within the realm of the category of feeling. on the contrary. with the help of the categories. it is. good and bad. logic even depends upon esthetics. Ethics depends upon esthetics. 207‐208). I proved clearly that it is impossible for a man to be logical unless he adopts certain high moral aims. The precise problems of the three normative sciences are made clear in four stages or degrees of clearness. but the subsequent careful analysis of it has only shown that the argument has even more force than was supposed. therefore. closely approaching the nature of pure mathematics. |162| Journal of Speculative Philosophy. and not essentially practical. if his purposes are purely selfish he cannot be logical. That argument is open to some apparent objection. Now even if there be a future life. every man's course of experience with which his reasoning has to do comes to a speedy end. Therefore. The two leading doctrines of ethics. Logic is. or science of fact (which pure mathematics is not). we cannot know how we are deliberately prepared to aim to behave until we know what we deliberately admire.161‐162         [This memoir] will explain the nature of a normative science and show that. In what manner the truths of esthetics are to be discovered [is its] main proposition. Indirectly." But a long run is an endless course of experience. but its methods of reasoning must be mathematical. Other considerations have also appeared which make the dependence of what we ought to think upon what we aim at still more close. depends in a similar way upon esthetics. surpassing in abstractness all other positive science. and logic in the realm of thought.

the conventional but uninformative translation of which is "beautiful and good". combines the idea of that which excites or calls forth admiration and fascination and that toward which something is directed in its movement or change.htm Page last modified June 17. which is part of the Arisbe‐03. Lubbock Texas 79409 joseph.cspeirce. is http://www. Scholarly quotation from or reference to the content of this website will mention the URL of the web‐page where the content occurs.analyses of the problems of esthetics and of ethics. 1998 .ransdell@yahoo. and suggestions to Joseph Ransdell Dept of Philosophy Texas Tech University. EDITORIAL NOTE: The Greek phrase "kalon k'agathon". End of PART 3 of 10 of MS L75 Queries. The URL of the present page.

He must agree that things happen. that The Truth is a great power. showing that they are. He must therefore think that there is an external world. that any given question is susceptible of a true answer.Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ­ MS L75. Doubt and everyday belief are analyzed. and the difference between the latter and scientific acceptance is shown. He must agree that there is such a thing as the influence of abstract ideas. at least with reference to some questions.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. He must therefore think that there is some reality which is independently of its being represented to be. we cannot condemn scepticism as to how far they may be borne out by facts. such as The Truth. and that the real world is governed by ideas.18         [This discussion concerns] what it is that the sincere student of logic must certainly already believe beyond all doubt. and that there is some such thing as compulsion. This is one of the places where logic comes in contact with ethics. that being and being represented are different.361­362   MEMOIR 10 ON THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF LOGIC       I here show that much that is generally set down as presupposed in logic is neither needed nor warranted. these hopes are so completely justified that the smallest conflict with them suffices to condemn the doctrine that involves that conflict. But when we come down to specific cases. The true presuppositions of logic are merely hopes and as such. however intimately it may be connected with himself. upon hard facts. or at least hope. that there is such a thing as The Truth. and that this answer is discoverable. or he with it. or at least as force. that there is a reality. among other things which I enumerate. and no mere metaphor. I examine the matter of these hopes. That it is really true. He must believe. All these things it will be . when we consider their consequences collectively. Other doctrines are examined.

in the first place. and secondly." there are some which. whether there is anything additional which a person is committed to by the act of inquiring into logic. otherwise there would be no sense in his studying logic. hold that the mere fact of reasoning. My position here seems to be secured by the fact that all the differences between me and other logicians consist in my holding propositions not to be presupposed which they hold are so.shown that the student of logic. and that instead of our being bound to assert universal propositions. first. that the bulk of the propositions which the logicians say we are bound to affirm. they cannot say definitely how. I propose to examine with care. is very strong. In this number. which logic must assume to be true. or endeavoring to reason. in what sense anything is "presupposed" in merely entering upon an inquiry.110‐118         Logicians generally. I offer a proof which. and in the second place. the conclusions which they are really entitled to draw. commits us to the categorical assertion of a considerable body of doctrine. and if so. though the reasoner may not be bound to adhere to . those philosophical minds who have had no training in a progressive and living science exaggerate enormously. I oppose to that the fact that I do not presuppose them. that there can be no argument establishing such an ought. if not infinitely. At the same time. I find that most logicians have outrageously exaggerated these presuppositions. hold that there are certain "presuppositions.   From Draft C ‐ MS L75. If they say they ought to be presupposed. if he is sincerely such.       I undertake to show beyond the possibility of any attentive reader's doubt. only bound in consistency to hope for or expect. we are really. Now if they say that these things are presupposed by everybody." or postulates. and how he is committed to it. But I undertake to show that in this instance.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. at most. and especially the Germans. but they differ much as to what these presuppositions are. if not all. and just what it is.230‐231         Most logicians. These I endeavor to catalogue and define. what it is. we merely hope that certain quite narrowly personal propositions may be true. It is obvious that precision in this matter is quite indispensable. among the propositions that are said to be "presupposed. if not demonstrative. but that there nevertheless are certain beliefs which a man must hold firmly or at least hope are true. as in innumerable others. and even as to their forming a definite list or code. does believe.

I shall not affirm that my enumeration is complete. Genuine criticism of them is impossible. quite idle to inquire whether this is correct or not. Still. But the propositions which I shall show to be beyond criticism will be pretty nearly as follows. To be able to doubt a proposition. until we can contrive to doubt a proposition no real inquiry into its truth can take place. But I shall enumerate categories of them. For example. but shall only mention those which must be taken account of in logic. for they will be different for different persons and even for the same person at different times. but the operation of forming that perceptual judgment from the percept being utterly beyond our control.them. I further undertake to show that operations of which we are unconscious are beyond our direct control. Propositions which we cannot doubt have to be accepted without criticism. It is. That is a good reason for not hastily pronouncing that a proposition is indubitable by us today. as I hold. it will behoove me to admit that they are not free from the defect common to almost all propositions in philosophy. and that it is idle to ask whether an operation over which we have no control has been properly performed or not. it is quite clear that he does hold them to be evident or undoubted facts. but I do not think they will leave any really possible doubt in the reader's mind. This is a proposition. it must go unquestioned. if it means to doubt it this instant. at present. Nor shall I name all the individual propositions.       Having put these principles into a clear light. I open my eyes and look. But the proposition is supposed truly to represent the seeming of the percept.       I will first mention judgments descriptive of one's own state of .       I have not decided upon the order of my enumeration. It is out of our power to doubt it. It is conceivable that it should not be correct. Nor can these proofs be apodictic. A percept is not a proposition. It is true that we believe that among the propositions which seem evident to us there are some that are false and that we shall ultimately discover to be false.       I next undertake something like an enumeration of the indubitable propositions. that of being more or less vague and open to unwarrantable exaggeration. can include only actual doubt. Doubt may also be so slight that it is not decidedly recognizable. and I thereupon say "There seems to be a bay horse". I undertake to show that the principles are sufficiently definite for the purposes of logic. and examined all other possible objections to them. Nevertheless. nor will I be positive that upon reconsideration I may not slightly alter my present statement. It appears evidently. It is easy to find propositions of which we cannot positively say whether they can be doubted or not. These will be enumerated in the form of propositions which are not themselves indubitable in advance of the proofs of them which I shall adduce. They will leave room for hypothetical doubts. If the time be extended changes of mind may take place.

as Hegel does. I am referring to something out of thought. that being true in the sense I attach to the word "horse"." Now two things are indubitable. Consequently. It will be observed that I do not deny that its being beyond criticism is itself a proposition requiring careful examination. it may be said that Hegel does not admit it. I am quite sure that there is an animal. For example. For what I mean is that the proposition refers to a subject and misrepresents it. It is true that I am sometimes in doubt exactly what I do mean. if I say to myself "There seems to be a horse". Various objections might be made to it. the perceptual judgment that one hears that proposition enunciated. while certain propositions whose psychological genesis may be traced are nevertheless quite indubitable. is not itself beyond criticism. although. But I deny both branches of this opinion. I will undertake to put this beyond all real doubt. and this is an important result. when I said the sky was blue I was not referring at all to the possibility of its being orange‐ colored. that is. first. which it could not do if it referred only to the contents of thought. They will also include judgments as to the meanings which the person making the judgment himself attaches to words and other signs. that all judgments concerning the contents of our own thought are beyond criticism. But if he would open his eyes to the fact that his own opinion is denied. in fact. that to say that that proposition. I may declare that in saying the sky is blue I therein imply that it is not orange‐colored. the proposition is beyond criticism. For I am quite sure that by a horse I mean a kind of animal.       The proposition here laid down. These will include perceptual judgments. and some logicians virtually deny it. Consequently. For example.       Another class of propositions beyond criticism results from the application of one indubitable judgment to another.thought. if it were enunciated. if I say that a judgment is false. Thus. such as "The sky is blue". it would at once become impossible for him to retain that opinion. Precisely where shall I draw the line between "many persons" and "not many persons"? Moreover. judgments as to the character of present percepts. Their doctrine is that it is only the first impressions of sense or other immediate consciousness that are to be accepted without criticism. . and hold that the first impressions of sense and all immediate consciousness are of the most dubious character. I reply that it might be doubted if we overlooked what we actually perceive. then. and second. But I shall show that nevertheless all judgments concerning one's own thought are in the only reasonable sense of the words beyond criticism. so that it cannot be so incapable of doubt. It is a matter to be argued out. I may blunder about my meaning. would be false would imply that that proposition was not enunciated.       Another class of judgments exempt from criticism refers to objects of the mind's own creations. the following proposition is not confined to the thought of the person who judges it: "There is such a thing as a false proposition.

      The paper. and "concerning all things". philosophical minds untrained in the life of any progressive science fall into enormous. who hold that the validity of empirical reasoning depends upon the universe having a special constitution. I show that in this instance. as I mean that it shall be. and that this remains true no matter how the universe is constituted.       Logic.65‐90         {65} German logicians generally maintain that the mere incipiescence of reasoning commits the reasoner to the categorical assertion of a highly important body of doctrine concerning all things. however. and supposing that there is any such thing as the truth. I do not in this number profess to lay open the whole theory of such judgments nor to render their indubitable character perfectly clear and comprehensible. and whether we instinctively approve of the reasoning or not. which I easily prove. I thus oppose both the English logicians. read "concerning the matter in hand". not to say infinite. namely that some judgments are exempt |67| from criticism and that certain specified kinds of judgments belong to that class. is that |68| so far as operations are beyond our ken. But it will be observed that I limit my position. I shall have developed no logical method for dispatching. that they appear evident and are beyond all criticism. does make positive assertions of a very general nature. will necessarily be largely occupied with matters really irrelevant. it becomes evident that certain methods of procedure must in the long run lead science to the truth. and [the logicians'] doctrine becomes true. although to nearly every reader they will appear to be most pertinent. and the German logicians. in order to be convincing.       My general principle. because to do that would require certain conceptions which it is not necessary here to develop in order to show that the fact is as I say.  From Draft C ‐ MS L75. however it may come about. Of this programme of my logic (a very partial view of it) I limit myself in this memoir to satisfying every attentive reader of the truth of the first part. as in innumerable others. I shall not in this prospectus of the paper allude to them further. at this stage of the investigation. For the ground here fairly bristles with sophistical objections which. for the present. For "assertion". we cannot control them. and so far . read "hope". and that accepting these as certain. to the reasoning of science. What do they rest upon? I undertake to show that certain kinds of judgments are indubitable. who hold that the validity of all reasoning ultimately consists in a feeling of rationality. leaving the practical reasonings of the individual for further consideration. exaggeration. supposing that |66| they lead to any results at all.

no judgment really is literally infallible. and that I explicitly make this judgment. I have convinced myself that I am looking at a horse. Whether we can judge |70| otherwise or not of the percept before us is. then until that time had elapsed we should have to treat the judgment as infallible. criticism is silenced. being an entirely different sort of mental product from a sensation. This is a specimen of the kind of objection which will require elucidation. or in other words analyses of consciousness in the form of judgments. they may be drawn with so much deliberation as greatly to diminish the chance of a judgment not of that class being mistaken for one of that class. there are two important varieties of such judgments. For what I mean by a horse is a perissid ungulate. It is conceivable that this judgment. when I say "The sky is blue".as we cannot control them it is idle to inquire whether they are performed well or performed ill. One of these consists of perceptual judgments. I am not speaking of any external reality but mean only that when I look up I have a sensation of blueness. judgments to the effect that the content of our consciousness includes certain elements. The other variety of this class of judgments which merits mention consists of judgments concerning our own meaning. in the sense in which I use it. and criticism. Yet if I am persuaded that no amount of deliberation could cause me to judge |71| otherwise than that what I now mean be a horse is necessarily a perissid ungulate. Namely.       There is one of those irrelevant apparent difficulties that perhaps I had better just touch upon. then that powerlessness to judge otherwise must cut off all dispute. in the philosophical sense. a question to be carefully considered. and up to date there is not the slightest ground for a suspicion that we ever can make it otherwise than we do. But as soon as it is settled that we cannot. I conclude that I am looking at a perissid ungulate. it is utter nonsense to inquire whether it is made right or wrong. Then. for example. Should it be proved that we cannot help judging as we do within the next three months. But if we cannot help making that judgment. But. In particular. In other words. to say that a judgment is beyond criticism is to say that it not only ought to be [but] forcibly must be treated as infallible. It is certain that blunders are frequently committed in such analyses. Suppose. "ought" and "ought not" have no meaning. Although such judgments are not subject to external criticism. no doubt. The following dialogue might be imagined: "How do you know that A is A?"   . and so far as this inquiry is idle. of course. For example.       |69| I shall go on to apply my principle to show the following classes of judgments are exempt from logical criticism:       First. I analyze the meaning of the word horse. should misrepresent the sensation. is out of the question.

there is nothing for it but to accept his judgment of that present intention. considerably like an induction. and acted deliberately. I cannot think of anything that I could call A and not judge that A is A. For in all reasoning. Then there will be there two distinct endless sequences. But as long as I cannot help thinking that that is what I mean by 'is'. I cannot help thinking that I should do so and so. if he really cannot otherwise judge his present deliberate intent. namely that of the objects in the oddly numbered places. of course. draw an analogous conclusion."   "How do you know it is involved?"   "Because. The judgment is the result of a psychical process of experimentation.       A third class of judgments not open to criticism are judgments concerning objects created by one's |73| own imagination. Still. Whether the facts would bear him out or not is. what would you do under such and such circumstances. That this is so is not to be discovered by merely analyzing what one had in mind. if he considered the matter sufficiently. there is an accompanying judgment that from analogous premisses one would. Imagine. for example. torture my imagination as I will. the analysis of that idea does show that it will be applicable to any endless series. an endless succession of objects. accurately. It is true that after one has once lit up the idea that there are two endless series whose members so alternate. but supposing I remained as I now am. supposing you were to act so as to be deliberately satisfied with what you were doing? A man might reply. in the light |72| of it I might change my mind. it is nonsense to question it."Because that is involved in what I mean by 'is'. Such judgments of how one would behave under circumstances of a general description occur every time a man reasons. Yet this proof will rest on some proposition . If I were to undergo such an experience. But it differs from any kind of reasoning in not being subject to control. Figures on the surface of consciousness may interfere with his insight into himself. and that of the objects in the evenly numbered places. another question. and this analysis can be thrown into the form of a proof that it will be so. Intentions are sunk deep in the dark lake of consciousness."       A second class of judgments that are beyond criticism consist of those which would answer the question. A man may not descry his own."   "Perhaps that is because you have not hit on the right kind of a subject to substitute for A."   "Possibly.

He then joins to by a straight line. until something suggests that other idea to the mind. 2) that from the extremity of a straight line can be drawn continuously with that line a line of any given length. and he then proposes to prove that the angle is greater than the angle . As such. But as long as one only has the idea of the simple endless series. after the most deliberate review. upon judgments in which the foreign idea is first introduced. He |76| ought to have appealed to the third postulate to show that would be the center of a circle passing through and . exempt from all criticism. The sixteenth proposition of the first book of Euclid affords an example. so that the whole demonstration falls to the ground. and argues that the angle is greater than the angle because the whole is greater than its part. It is. Neither can it be rendered less evident. 2. the whole thing may be a mistake. For that purpose. Judgments of this kind are the very foundation of logic except insofar as it is an experiential science. using it. he bisects in . however. to be quite self‐evident.a triangle . True.       He prolongs the side a little beyond to a point . Every such proof rests. then. The second postulate was that every terminated right line can be continuously prolonged. through to .which is simply self‐ evident. Kai peperasmenên eutheian kata to suneches ep' eutheias ekballein. and not discover the theorem. but he has not proved that cannot fall as in Fig. and leave no room for doubt. This |75| is by no means saying that it can be prolonged to an indefinitely great length. until some loophole for doubt is discovered. draws and prolongs it. therefore. He is thinking of Fig. for its evidence is perfect already. and which are simply self‐ evident. He. it certainly cannot be rendered more evident. making . What I call the theorematic reasoning |74| of mathematics consists in so introducing a foreign idea. they are exempt from criticism. virtually has proved (in prop. however. If a proposition appears to us. and finally deducing a conclusion from which it is eliminated. He imagines. 1. and therefore by definition IS within the circle (why else then for such purposes should the . one may think forever.

that would not prevent a Berkeley from raising the difficulty that since we can have no experience or imagination of anything but representations. Though this first book of Euclid has been for twenty centuries under a fire of criticism in comparison with which the strictures of professed logicians are blank cartridges pointed by babes. that the axiom is false. It is curious that there is not one downright fallacy in the first Book of the Elements (the only part of the work drawn up with supreme circumspection) into which Euclid is not drawn by that axiom that the whole is greater than its part. 2 was inadmissible. to prove that Fig. Still. which are phenomenal.2. as an act. as long as he continued to overlook the possibility of Fig. there does not seem to be any . nor is this axiom ever appealed to without resulting in a fallacy. In all these cases. but still. It simply shows how rare a thing correct reasoning is among men. he could not have saved it at all. Had he omitted from his definition of the circle the clause represented in our language by the single word 'within' (tôn entos |78| tou schêmatos keimenôn). It is always as here because it tempts him to draw a figure and judge by the looks of it what is part and what whole. not seeing any other way of accounting |79| for the sky's seeming blue. For example. Again if a man analyzing his idea of matter deliberately judges that he means by 'matter' something which in its nature is not a representation of anything. of whatever class. as |77| its real merits. it is only the act of judging that is exempt from criticism in the strict sense of an inquiry whether an operation has been performed rightly or wrongly.      If Euclid had not been able to save his sixteenth proposition by means of the third postulate about the circle. For his first postulate is not that only one right line can join two points as its terminals. Yet it is not its falsity which causes Euclid's fallacies. he would have had no logical way of proving that the sum of the angles of a plane triangle do not exceed two right angles. and there would have been no criticism to make upon it. as Euclid himself half‐knew. There is nothing to prevent the resulting proposition from being confronted with objections showing that there is something wrong somewhere. not be open to any criticism. his judgment would. but not that there were not two limited straight lines having those points as terminals. We know now. yet one can imagine a person to be so thoroughly persuaded of the falsity of Goethe's theory of colors that. but only that all right angles are equal. yet to this day its real faults have escaped's being within have been so emphatically insisted on?). as some moderns would have had him do. his proof would have appeared convincing. He does not postulate that only one straight line can be drawn through two points. but merely that there is a right line from one point to the other. That postulate would have enabled him to prove that only one unlimited straight line cannot be drawn between two points (a proposition he does not give because he deals only with what is limited). Êitêsthô apo pantos sêmeiou epi pan sêmeion eutheian grammên agagein. though the act of judging that the sky looks blue is itself exempt from criticism. that he might suspect that it does not seem blue.

possible way in which a man ever could attach such a meaning to a
word consistently. So again, certain saints have declared that they
would go voluntarily and deliberately to Hell, if such were the will
and good pleasure of the Lord; but a Hobbes would not be prevented
from suspecting that they had deceived themselves, since Hell
means a state of utter dissatisfaction, and it is absurd to say that a
person could find any |80| satisfaction in complete dissatisfaction.
So in the present case, had Euclid omitted the word 'within' or
rather the corresponding Greek phrase, from his definition of the
circle, it might have occurred to him that he was provided with no
postulates about straight lines in a plane that were not equally true
of great circles on a sphere, and therefore, since a spherical triangle
may have the sum of its angles anything up to six right angles, or
even ten, if you please, there must be something wrong with the
proof that this is impossible in a plane.
      This third class of judgments exempt from criticism coincides
with that of evident judgments or judgments of evident
propositions. For 'evident' means manifest to any mind who clearly
apprehends the proposition, no matter how lacking in experience he
may be. The truth of a perceptual judgment, analysis of meaning,
|81| or declaration of intention, is manifest only to the one person
whose experience it concerns. It is only when we judge concerning
creatures of the imagination that all minds are on a par, however
devoid of experience some of them may be.
       When a mathematical demonstration is clearly apprehended, we
are forced to admit the conclusion. It is evident; and we cannot
think otherwise. It is, therefore, beyond all logical criticism; and the
forms of syllogism cannot lend it any support. Pure mathematics,
therefore, stands in no need of a science of logic. Methodeutically,
mathematics is its own logic; and the notion that a calculus of logic
can be of any help to mathematics, unless merely as another
mathematical method supplying a speedier process of demonstration
(which is just what a logical calculus rather opposes), is futile.
Mathematics, however, is of great aid to logic. The reasoning of
mathe|82|matics is also an instructive subject for logical analysis,
teaching us many things about the nature of reasoning. But although
a mathematical demonstration, once completely apprehended, is
evident, indubitable, beyond control, and beyond criticism, yet the
process of arriving at it is certainly a matter of skill and art, subject
to criticism, and controlled by anticipated criticism. This control
implies that different ways of proceeding are considered
hesitatingly; and until the demonstration is found there is doubt of
the conclusion. The theorem is not self‐evident or it could not really
be proved. But over what elements of the process is the control
exercised? Over two: the invention of the proof, and the acceptance
of the proof. But the process of invention of the proof is not of the
nature of that demonstrative reasoning which we call mathematical.
There is nothing evident about it except that, as it turns out, it
evidently answers the purpose. |83| It is, in fact, a piece of

probable reasoning in regard to which a good logical methodeutic
may be a great aid. As to the acceptance of the proof, after it is
framed all the artifices which may be employed to assist it are of the
nature of checks. That is to say, they are merely equivalent to a
careful review of the proof itself in which some minor details may
be varied in order to diminish the chances of error. In short, this is
an operation by which the proof is brought fully and clearly before
the mind. That the proof is absolute is evident and beyond criticism.
The theorem which was not evident before the proof was
apprehended, now becomes itself entirely evident, in view of the
proof. Such reasoning forms the principal stage of logic. It is not
itself amenable to logic for any justification; and although logic may
aid in the discovery of the proof, yet its result is tested in another
way. This disposes of the German objection that to use reasoning in
order to deter|84|mine what methods of probable reasoning will
lead to the truth begs the whole question, so that the only way is to
admit that the validity of reasoning consists in a feeling of
      A fourth kind of judgment which must be regarded as beyond
criticism, although they are reached by a sort of process of
reasoning, are those in which a proposition is presented to
perception, the meaning of which proposition either supports or
conflicts with what is presented to sense. I will give a couple of
examples to show what I mean, because such propositions throw
much light upon logic. Take the proposition, "Some actually
enunciated proposition is false". The meaning of this proposition is
such that the falsity of that meaning, that is, the non‐enunciation of
any false proposition, would conflict with this proposition's
enunciating what we perceive that it does enunciate. Therefore, the
proposition must be true, |85| that a false proposition is actually
enunciated. Yet it is quite possible to imagine a paradisiacal world in
which no false proposition should ever have been suggested. We
cannot, therefore, say that there necessarily must be a false
proposition, but only that the existence of this proposition
constitutes the certainly that a false proposition is enunciated,
although the assertion of this proposition itself is perfectly true.
This forces us to recognize the correct and extremely important
logical doctrine, namely, that every proposition asserts two things,
first whatever it is meant to assert, and secondly, its own truth.
Unless both these are true, the proposition is false. Although,
therefore, the meaning or matter of this proposition is true, the
proposition itself may be false; and it will be so in case there is no
other false proposition than itself.
      Suppose however we find a piece of paper quite blank except
for these two [sic: read "three"] sentences:
|86| Something that the second sentence on this
paper says of the third is false.

Something that the third sentence on this paper says
of the first is false.
Something that the first sentence on this paper says
of the second is false.
Now, disregarding the implication by the first sentence of its own
truth, is whatever it says of the second true? If so, it is false that
something that the third sentence on this paper says of the first is
false. Then whatever the third sentence says of the first is true.
Then something that the first says of the second is false, contrary to
the hypothesis. Then we are driven to assume that something that
the second sentence says of the third is true. Then, something that
the third says of the first is false. Hence, whatever the first
sentence says of the second is true, again contrary to the
hypothesis. I prove by an elaborate necessary argument that the
only admissible solution is that every proposition, even if not
asserted, necessarily and essentially involves as part of its meaning
that the reality, or truth of things, or the real universe, is truly
repre|88|sented by what it says, and that the three sentences are
true in other respects, but false in their inseparable implication that
they represent any truth of being, or the real universe in any
respect. This they fail to do because, though each refers to the
others, yet together they do not represent any real being
independent of being represented.
      This brings me to the examination of the matter of the hope
which we entertain concerning the matter in hand when we start
any inquiry. I find it convenient to use the term proposition to
denote that meaning of a sentence which not only remains the same
in whatever language it is expressed, but is also the same whether it
be believed or doubted, asserted (by somebody's making himself
responsible for it), or commanded (by somebody's expressing that he
holds another responsible for it), or put as a question (when
somebody expresses an attempt to induce another to make himself
responsible for it). Now I prove in a man|89|ner which will
command veritable assent, that every proposition whether it be
believed, doubted, asserted, commanded, or put interrogatively,
supposed, etc. essentially represents itself to represent an absolute
reality, the very same for all propositions, which is definite (that is,
subject to the principle of contradiction) and individual (that is,
subject to the principle of excluded middle). This reality is not in
any respect constituted by being represented as so constituted in
any definite proposition or representation. That there is such an
absolute reality we hope; and in every inquiry we hope that the
proposition which is put in the interrogative mood represents that
reality. If a proposition represents that reality and represents it
rightly in whatever respect it represents it, the proposition is true.
If the proposition does not represent the absolute reality or in any
respect represents it wrongly, it is false.

being dissatisfied with the idea of doing either. and how do you know they are true? Have you not to rely upon instinct again. namely. We never need abandon that hope. In order to answer those questions. and their pressing them with confidence in their unanswerable difficulty is a good example of a characteristic of those writers. My position. I doubt the proposition.42‐52         There is one point which I have so far passed over without notice which is of great importance for the solidity of the foundation of my method of ascertaining whether a reasoning is good or bad. it is necessary to distinguish between a proposition and the assertion of it. To confound those two things is like confounding the writing of one's name idly upon a scrap of paper. Where do you get the premisses from which this proof proceeds. is that in the science of the logic of science it will not do to rely upon our instinctive judgments of logicality merely. Have you not. to rely upon the veracity of the logical instinct in judging of the validity of this proof? and Secondly. it is necessary to prove that. in which case I put it .       It follows that the methodeutic task of logic is to find such methods as must hasten the progress of opinion toward its ultimate bourn. the given method of reasoning will conduce to the truth in the sense in which it professes to do so.   From Draft A ‐ MS L75.       It is plain that I cannot outline the contents of all my proposed [memoirs] as I have done this since such an outline would fill five hundred pages of manuscript. I may state it to myself and worry as to whether I shall embrace it or reject it. with the attachment of one's signature to a binding legal deed. and often overlook plain facts before their faces. A proposition may be stated without being asserted. after all. perhaps for practice in chirography. here? These questions are pressed by the German and other subjectivist logicians. In that case. In the first place. The representation of the reality in such destined opinion is the reality. it is necessary to recognize certain very plain and easy distinctions which the German logicians habitually overlook. I may state the proposition to you and endeavor to stimulate you to advise me whether to accept or reject it. But here two questions arise: First. that they look at everything through the spy‐glass of logical forms and metaphysical theories. in opposition to almost all the German logicians and those who blindly worship them in this country. from the nature of things.      |90| I further show that we hope that any inquiry which we undertake will result in a complete settlement of opinion. I can only say that this first memoir is not one of those which is most completely in shape.

But the sum of exterior and interior angles at each angle is two right angles. a habit would have been formed so that he would thereafter always act on the theory that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is two right angles. A third important characteristic of belief is that while other habits are contracted by repeatedly performing the act under the conditions. and being aware of it does not struggle against it. in this sense. I use the word belief to express any kind of holding for true or acceptance of a representation.interrogatively. and this mere imagination at once establishes such a habit that if the imagined case were realized we should really behave in that way. not every habit is a belief. for if I had stood at one point or hardly moved I should have had to make a complete rotation before the North Star would again be in front of me. Any one of them would probably imagine himself to be in a field facing the north. for example. affects imagination. and be deliberately satisfied to base my action on it whenever occasion may arise. belief may be. Belief. I may state it to you. This habit would have been the consequence of what he imagines would be forced upon his experience in that situation. I . He would imagine himself to march some distance in that direction. Thereupon. in which case I judge it. not sharps. and this imagination being due to another habit which. the way in which ninety‐nine ordinary men. I should. have turned through four right angles. I may impose the responsibility of its agreeing with the truth upon you. is a composite thing. in which case I assert it. Subtracting from these six the four right angles equal to the sum of the exterior angles. in effect. unless there is a special inhibition. turn through an angle. in consequence of which he would act. to acknowledge that it is one thing to be and quite another to be represented. by merely imagining the situation and imagining what would be our experience and what our conduct in such a situation. All of these are different moods in which that same proposition may be stated. and since there are three angles. This confusion is a part of the general refusal of idealism. Its principal element is not an affair of consciousness at all. A belief is a habit with which the believer is deliberately satisfied. out of every hundred would form the belief that the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles. but is a habit established in the believer's nature. march again. and commonly if not invariably is contracted. I find two right angles left as the sum of the interior angles of a triangle. The German word Urtheil confounds the proposition itself with the psychological act of assenting to it. Then he would say. If anybody says that in this description of belief I make too much of conduct. and therefore the sum of my three turnings would have been four right angles (there would be his fallacy). However. like every belief. Take. and assume a responsibility for it. This implies that he is aware of it. just as it does real conduct. turn again so as to face his original position and then turn again so as to face as he did in the first place. in which case I command it. I may state it to myself. the sum of the sums of exterior and interior angles is six right angles. which still considerably affects almost all German thought. Therefore the sum of the exterior angles of a triangle is four right angles. should occasion present itself in certain ways.

admit it frankly. Thence comes a critical attitude. doubt sets up a reaction which does not cease until the irritation is removed. indeed he feels himself forbidden. equally well‐informed and equally competent with himself. belief is a state of the connections between different parts of the brain. than he begins by doubting it himself. that is to say. at first of a purely external nature. Its first effect is to destroy the state of satisfaction. Speaking physiologically. doubt an excitation of brain‐cells. perhaps. It will not be so in the book itself. Yet the belief‐habit may still subsist. The most important character of doubt is that no sooner does a believer learn that another man equally well‐ informed and equally competent doubts what he has believed. it is not necessary that one should actually meet with a man who doubts. But imagination so readily affects this habit. in which the idea of two incompatible modes of conduct are before the doubter's imagination. then. on the contrary. but the two questions I am preparing to answer are of such fundamental importance in regard to the value of the methodeutical part of my book that the . It is an uneasy feeling. a special condition of irritation. not of the consciousness. and nothing determines him. and it is only accidentally that attention can be drawn to it in a manner which suggests the idea that there might be a doubt. and therefore cannot produce any argument tending to allay such doubt. Doubt acts quite promptly to destroy belief. A belief is chiefly an affair of the soul. a genuine doubt may arise. and before long the habit will be destroyed. It is this critical attitude that must be examined. but a sense that it is possible we may come to doubt it. not a genuine doubt. Such. or feeling of uneasiness. Probably the first symptom of this state of irritation will be anger at the other man. but we can no more call up doubt than we can call up the feeling of hunger at will. doubt is not the direct negation or contrary of belief. is what a belief. sets up as reaction an effort to enter into the doubt and to comprehend it. I regret very much the necessity of entering into such details. but in the present statement I do so in order to counteract the effect of the neglect of a certain point the statement of which would be too long. doubt actually begins to set in. What one does not doubt one cannot doubt. From this follows the important corollary that if a man does not himself really doubt a given proposition he cannot imagine how it can be doubted. that the former believer will soon begin to act in a half‐hearted manner. for such is the influence of imagination in such matters that as soon as a believer can imagine that a man. is chiefly an affair of consciousness. should doubt. Indeed. or holding for true is. We can throw any proposition into the interrogative mood at will. If we accept this account of the matter. Like irritations generally. Of course it is not necessary that the degrees of dissatisfaction with the opposite alternatives should be equal. roughly. It thus appears that it is one thing to question a proposition and quite another to doubt it. a doubt. for the two mainly affect different parts of the man. A doubt is of a very different nature. to adopt either and reject the other. Such anger is a virtual acknowledgment of one's own doubt. in his own state of feeling. Such doubt. and finally.

therefore. and suggestions to Joseph Ransdell Dept of Philosophy Texas Tech‐04. the process which led to the acceptance of the ideas. This is what one does when one reads over a letter one has written to see whether some unintended meaning is suggested. The criticism is always of a process.briefest account of what is to be characterized must necessarily dwell upon these matters.door. is http://members. The mere fact that it has been adopted. and one cannot correct what one cannot control.ransdell@yahoo. comments. which is part of the Arisbe website.htm Page last modified June 15. The critical attitude consists in reviewing the matter to see in what manner corrections shall be made. as if hastily. but which we remark that we have not deliberately adopted. Lubbock Texas 79409 joseph. is always deliberate and. It supposes that this process is subject to the control of the will. End of PART 4 of 10 of MS L75 Queries. though it does not necessarily create a doubt. Reasoning. for its whole purpose is Scholarly quotation from or reference to the content of this website will mention the URL of the web‐page where the content occurs. that is. The URL of the present page. 1998 . without deliberation. The word criticism carries a meaning in philosophy which has so little resemblance to the criticism of literature that the latter meaning throws no light on the former. suggests the idea that perhaps a doubt might arise. Philosophical criticism is applied to an idea which we have already adopted. in the proper sense of the word. is always subject to control.

362­363   MEMOIR    11 ON THE LOGICAL CONCEPTION OF MIND (This memoir is here placed. This is a question of methodeutic. and indeed in any case. The categories are applicable to the logical analysis of mathematics. also. After No. It is even a question whether this fact does not derange my classification. then he must mean by "mind" something quite different from the object of study of the psychologist. they might better be placed last among the first eleven memoirs. In that case. 12. for the sake of perspicuity of exposition. the only changes possible are shifts of boundaries in order to equalize the lengths of memoirs. or perhaps better before No. which is not so exact in its conclusions as is critical logic. and this logical conception of mind is developed in this memoir and rendered clear. But if I were to decide to postpone the mathematical memoirs until after the categories. The present arrangement has been pretty carefully considered. 9. it might be well to place the memoir on the logical conception of mind before that upon esthetics and ethics.       (My order of arrangement of the first eleven memoirs is subject to reconsideration.Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ­ MS L75.)      If the logician is to talk of the operations of the mind at all. as it is desirable that he should do.162‐163   . It further seems to me better to let the categories first emerge in the mathematical memoirs before explicitly considering them.)   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. The matter of it will have to be somewhat transformed at a later stage. though it is not scientifically indispensable. although I have carefully considered it. I think the arrangement I here propose is favorable to the reception of the categories. and have provisionally concluded that it does not. and the last transposition is the only one that I think there is much likelihood of my deciding upon.

we find that some logicians deny that logic is a science. it will do something appreciable to aid the movement now beginning to extricate science from the slough of materialism. I undertake to show that when a man performs the simplest voluntary act. Accordingly. it must be in a different sense from that in which modern psychologists study the mind.233‐235         It is almost universally held that logic is a science of thought (so far as it is a science at all). is to make logic logically dependent upon the very one of all the special sciences which most stands in logical need of a science of logic. while others maintain that it is a mere description of our feelings. the nature of his efficiency upon matter is precisely the same as that which we attribute to truth when we say "Truth. were it perceived. that thought is a modification of consciousness. somewhat novel. and decidedly elevating. I promise myself that if ever this memoir receives the attention that it ought.363‐364   ." in which most scientific men have more or less faith. I show that there is nothing which it properly belongs to the logician to say about mind. and that consciousness is the object of the science of psychology. does not involve the self‐contradiction which it appears at first blush to express. highly interesting. crushed to earth. which is needed in our studies. and yet each can act upon the other without the intervention of a tertium quid. and that the psychologists inquire into the phenomena of mind in another sense of "mind".      If the logician is to talk of mind and its operations at all. shall rise again. I have performed this analysis. and I believe that it will be found convincing. It is beyond my province to say what the psychologists aim to study. which cannot be established on the basis of universal experience. At the same time. but it is perfectly proper for me to determine by analysis what mind is in the sense in which logic is concerned with it. I will further make it mathematically evident that to say that while matter can act immediately only upon matter and mind can immediately act only upon mind. Each of these views has had disastrous effects upon several branches of science.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. Indeed. This conception of mind. It has occurred to me that perhaps logic relates to mind in one sense of the word "mind". will be developed in its four successive grades of clearness. without appealing to any special science whatever. The effect of this.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. in his sense.

then that fact is irrelevant to logic. Therefore. together with a definition of "formal". That is implied in correspondence. In order to render it so. into the same sort of correspondence with something.MEMOIR   12 ON THE DEFINITION OF LOGIC       Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. has some sort of meaning.       The above argument is hard to escape but not convincing. which brings something. it is only the connection of logic with esthetics through ethics which causes it to be a normative science at all. I am obliged to review about fifty attempts to define logic and to show that the consideration of them only leads back to that one. part by part. I reply that by the definition thoughts are themselves signs. because not all the principles of logic are normative. its object. At the same time. which it is not. . by virtue of this definition. I define a sign as something. The proof that it is irrelevant is that all the principles of logic are deducible from my definition without taking any account of the alleged fact. during a lapse of time. it is perfectly irrelevant to logic. A. as that in which itself stands to C. its interpretant sign determined or created by it. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies. In this definition I make no more reference to anything like the human mind than I do when I define a line as the place within which a particle lies during a lapse of time. I say nothing in the definition about normative principles. its object. much more clearly than if any attempt is made to introduce this allegation as a premiss. as that in which itself stands to C. C. a sign. which brings something. a sign is something. B. into the same sort of correspondence with something. Indeed. It is from this definition. though not generally recognized.235‐237         I define logic very broadly as the study of the formal laws of signs. that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. C. or formal semiotic. its interpretant. unless this allegation be regarded as itself a truth of logic. But many will object that the only signs we can study are signs interpreted in human thought. but that my non‐ psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held. since it is not of a formal nature. I also define very carefully what I mean by a "formal" law.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. A. B. I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic and show not merely that my definition is no novelty. Now meaning is mind in the logical sense. Namely. and that if it happens to be a fact that all other signs are ultimately interpreted in thought‐signs.

and would be so. then. We cannot by any purely mathematical definition build up the peculiar idea of straightness. but simply because it is interpreted as a sign in . So a weathercock is a sign of the direction of the wind. We can only define a straight line as one of a continuous family of lines having certain relations to one another. and it is far better to leave it out of account. Now mathematical reasoning requires a diagrammatic or pure constructive notion of the thing reasoned about. however.       In this paper. Of course. and in fact may give a mathematical definition of a mind in the same sense in which we can give a mathematical definition of a straight line. we can define the formal character of mind in a manner perfectly adequate to all the purposes of logic. which are mixed ideas into which enter all sorts of elements in a manner which prevents any strict mathematical reasoning about them. All these ideas of the mind are. I cannot trace out the development here. We must begin by getting diagrammatic notions of signs from which we strip away. however. An icon is a sign which is such by virtue of a character which it might equally possess if the object it represents had no being (although of course it could not then be a sign) and which it might equally possess if it never were interpreted in another sign. or signs. and after we have made those ideas just as distinct as our notion of a prime number or of an oval line. That peculiar feeling has nothing to do with the logicality of reasoning. nor by virtue of any mechanical connection with its object. is a sign which is such because it is in reaction or real relation with its object. we may then consider. representations. though it never were interpreted as a sign. An icon is therefore a sign by virtue of its own quality and is a sign of whatever else partakes of that quality. therefore. A symbol is a sign which is such. not by the mere virtue of a quality which agrees with that of its object. concepts. An index. judgments. acts of concluding. all reference to the mind.143‐147         We cannot safely employ in logic any kind of reasoning which is subject to doubts which a science of logic is needed to remove. But there is nothing to compel the object of such a formal definition to have the peculiar feeling of consciousness. This is because it is long and slender. indices. on the other hand. Thus a chalk mark on a blackboard may serve as the icon of a geometrical line. In like manner. restricted to mathematical reasoning. what are the peculiar characteristics of a mental sign. since that is nothing but a feeling. But I may say that I begin by dividing all signs into icons. We are. and symbols. But the ordinary logicians talk of acts of the mind. at first. just the same.  From Draft C ‐ MS L75. But there might be just such a family composed of lines none of which would appear straight to us. But it would be long and slender just the same even if the geometrical line had no kind of being. I shall precisely analyze and define the various kinds of signs and their characteristics. if need be.

but because the bell will ring when the clock has run to the hour which the little hand indicates. or because it will at that hour be parallel to the large hand (which may or may not be the case). But the word "man" has no particular relation to men unless it be recognized as being so related. and "philosophical grammar". the print is a sign simply by virtue of the fact that the voice will so interpret it. We have a somewhat imperfect example in the small hand of an alarm clock which is set to cause the bell to ring when the time according to the clock is a given hour. The various historical divisions of logic are considered. The bell is the interpreting sign. however. or if the book is read silently. stechiology. A chalk mark is like a line though nobody uses it as a sign. But in the case of the symbol. I show that the primary division of logic should be into stechiology. "speculative grammar". It may be objected that no kind of sign operates as a sign unless it is interpreted. That is not only what constitutes it a sign. to which three kinds of signs. but in the cases of the icon and index. if the fact of its being interpreted is left out of account.another sign. critic. "Critic" is usually referred to as "critical logic" or simply as "logic" (in what he . critic. it is possible to leave that circumstance out of account. its peculiar relation to its object will be left out of account. This is quite true. whether anybody notices it or not. and methodeutic are quite differently related. "universal grammar". This little hand is a sign of the clock's having gone to the hour. and still have a perfectly correct idea of the relation of the sign to its object. as in fact we commonly do. There is a cross‐division into the doctrines of terms. and methodeutic. propositions. the succession of images in the mind will so interpret it. So when a person reads aloud from a book. a weathercock turns with the wind. not because it follows the large hand.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.g.364‐365   MEMOIR 13 ON THE DIVISION OF LOGIC       By an application of categoric. but what gives it the peculiar relation to its object which makes it significant of that particular object. and arguments. EDITORIAL NOTE: Other Peircean terms for "stechiology" (or "stechiologic") are e.

237‐244         By virtue of the categories. propositions. The peculiar flavor which belongs to a sign. because it depends upon a principle which is applicable to . however. the study of the laws to which a sign must conform in order really to correspond to the object to which it is intended to conform. and "philosophical rhetoric". "speculative rhetoric". of irrelevant definitions. The object upon which a sign as such reacts is the object to which it corresponds. critic. it remains to submit the hypothesis to methodeutic in order to determine whether it should be the first among the justifiable hypotheses to be considered. that is. It does. in its peculiar flavor. as reacting with an object. treat of meaningless and absurd terms. and those laws to which a sign must conform in order to determine the interpretant to which it is intended to appeal.       The history of divisions of logic is examined. These three departments have been called stechiologic. and methodeutic. however. and it is shown that my division has been virtually quite generally approved. Logic relates to terms. "Methodeutic" is also "universal rhetoric". or explicatory. Methodeutic has no direct bearing upon any terms or propositions or upon any kind of reasoning except that which starts hypotheses. anything whatever may be considered under three aspects. Consequently. or denotes. as represented. except so far as it has been deranged by other divisions I make. critic. Critic has no direct bearing upon terms. The representamen which belongs to a sign as such is its interpretant. nor upon necessary reasoning as such.   From draft E ‐ MS L75. and third.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. which are defined in terms of the categories. I regard this division as primary. to be true. or meaning. second.164‐165         Logic is primarily divided into stechiologic.calls "the narrow sense. No such supplementary inquiry is called for in the case of a deductive or an inductive conclusion. and arguments. the study of those laws to which a sign must conform in order to mean what it is to mean. to advance knowledge. propositions. After critical logic has pronounced a hypothesis to be justifiable (being a verifiable hypothesis which explains the surprising fact). that is. Indirectly. Stechiologic treats of every variety. upon analytic." in distinction from the broad sense in which it is equivalent to "semiotic"). is its imputed flavor. as such. methodeutic treats of all kinds of signs. first. of fallacious demonstrations and of probable deductions. formal semiotic falls into three departments. and methodeutic.

stechiology will have direct concern with terms. is shown by the categories. however. if it separately signifies what interpretant is to be determined. Such is a name. are true. or quality. notwithstanding the great part that definition and division have always played in this branch of logic. can have no direct concern with terms. and the doctrine of arguments. can have no direct and primary concern with anything but arguments. Moreover. For a sign may have as its sign‐flavor. Such is a proposition. secondly. or significant character. or image. I have not paid sufficient attention. finally. Secondly. which accounts for the small importance of icons and indices in logic. especially of symbols. but may appeal to whatever interpretant can interpret it. Such is an icon. perhaps. Every pure icon is necessarily of this description. For a sign may be such that it shall denote whatever object it may be fitted to denote and appeal to whatever interpretant may be fitted to interpret it. Critic. Or. to the formal laws of indices and icons to see that the study of them ought to be separated from that of symbols. since a term simply denotes whatever object it is fit to denote. the doctrine of propositions. If it does this. which belongs to it just as anything has a flavor or quality. It will then serve as a sign of that object to any interpretant that represents it as so reacting with that object.       But another division of signs. of which the conclusion is the intended interpretant. propositions. because. and so are all signs which become such because they are naturally taken to be such. and arguments. a sign may have as its significant character the fact that it stands in real relation to its object. Methodeutic. properly be restricted to symbols. That is a symbol. whatever is the object of the sign is thereby separately indicated as the object of the interpretant. perhaps. critic cannot . My not very decided opinion is that they should all be studied together. a sign may separately indicate the object which it is intended to denote. a sign may have as its significant character its being represented to be a sign. as ideas. which represents any object just so far as it resembles that object. Logic might. propositions. All merely conventional signs are symbols. whose business it is to consider whether signs are really related to their objects. for a similar reason. and arguments. Symbols alone can be arguments. it must also indicate what object it is intended to denote.       The categories show that signs are themselves of three kinds.anything whatsoever. that is. Such a sign definitely signifying what interpretant it is intended to determine is an argument. Thirdly. Or. a sign may definitely signify what interpretant sign it is intended to determine. merely the flavor. and in this case it will stand for whatever its thing‐flavor adapts it to standing for.       Making the former division the primary one. and consequently there is a cross division of logic into the doctrine of terms. We thus have a division of signs into terms. This is an index.

But it will be shown that. In like manner. For there can be no general theory proving the general validity of necessary reasoning.       The methods of discovering logical truth can naturally not be numerous when discovery is pretty nearly at a standstill. Nor can it directly deal with all kinds of arguments. which I shall endeavor to trace through all its metamorphoses. divisions of logic itself. there is [no] doubt about it to be removed. but I shall show in another memoir that the objections are due to confusion of thought. For such reasoning makes its conclusion evident.       I shall then proceed to the critical examination of the different modes of dividing logic.directly deal with all kinds of propositions. . and shall show that the above divisions have been generally recognized. notwithstanding these considerations. and that others are not.465‐366   MEMOIR 14 ON THE METHODS OF DISCOVERING AND ESTABLISHING THE TRUTHS OF LOGIC       I shall here show that no less than thirteen different methods of establishing logical truth are in current use today.       I shall show that the majority of these methods are quite inadmissible. since there can be no question as to the truth of a definition. and that of the remainder all but one should be restricted to one department of logic.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. and mostly without any principle of choice and in a deplorably uncritical manner. I explain my own method. I know that this will be contested. and so long as it is evident. I hope to give this its quietus. or are mere subdivisions of little importance. properly. the indirect relation of critic and methodeutic to those signs which do not directly concern them is important. The one universally valid method is that of mathematical demonstration. the direct concern of methodeutic is restricted still more narrowly to a single class of arguments. I shall show in the clearest manner that this notion is due to a confusion of thought. and this is the only one which is commonly avoided by logicians as fallacious.

The rejoinder is obvious enough. such as that doubt is not removed if we question the validity of the reasoning. and that of the others only one is properly applicable in all parts of logic. there are few logicians who show any vestige of any definite method except that of reading what others have written. the only one they scrupulously avoid being the only one that is generally valid. I show that this is the case.   From Draft A‐ MS L75. But owing to the confused state of mind of logicians. or thirteen methods in use for establishing logical truth. they make various attempts to answer this. although there are one or two of the others which I apply to a very limited extent as confirmatory only in settling minute details. Only one of these thirteen methods is generally employed by me. it follows that pure mathematics does not stand in need of any science of logic to determine whether a reasoning is good or not. For I shall prove conclusively that the majority of the methods are absolutely worthless. most of them resort indifferently to any one of twelve. Of course.       In regard to methods of discovering logical truth. and by a review of the different disputes which have arisen between mathematicians.245‐247         It need not be said that a science whose methods are all at sixes and sevens is in poor case. This first of these objections. however. although unavowed. though there are . and I contrast this with a number of instances in the history of other sciences. I shall show that there are at present actually in use six plus seven. I show that the most successful of these really consist in an unconscious and ill‐ defined application of one method which I describe. is that. To this I reply that as long as all doubt is removed by a method. We are here with certain objections which weigh with almost all logicians but which I shall undertake to show are merely due to a feeble grasp of the conceptions of logic. and deducing their consequences by mathematical reasoning. which lies behind them all. That one method consists in proceeding from universally observed facts. logic being the science which establishes the validity of reasoning. a few methods which have been employed. without counting the method of authority which is really operative. formulated abstractly. it begs the question to employ reasoning to establish the principles of logic. The great mass of the twelve methods I regard as altogether unscientific and worthless in scientific logic. where logical doctrines were sadly needed. There are. nothing better can be demanded. which I consider. While there are some logicians who are more or less scrupulous in their choice of methods.33‐35         No less than thirteen different ways are employed by different logicians for ascertaining what is good reasoning and what is bad reasoning.  From Draft D ‐ MS L75.

the reasonings of a person about the affairs of life. and the matter of any such judgment is that a given method of reasoning is good or bad. Science. it is necessary to consider separately theoretical reasonings. when closely . there is no definite period within which science must reach its final conclusion. if it leads to any conclusion. it must be shown that whatever be the constitution of the universe. must in the long run reach a true conclusion.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. as for example in linguistics. It is a faculty which produces distinct judgments. while it may not be so good a method as some other where the approximation is more rapid. In particular. and to be responsible for grave errors of procedure in the German psychical science. yet it cannot be pronounced absolutely bad for scientific purposes. on the other hand.certain unscientific and inexact parts of logic. to be much worse than leaving the whole question to the direct decision of instinct. that is. where there is no particular objection to their use. or five centuries. Namely. The instinct of rationality is not a simple feeling. Most of these will be shown to be worthless. so that the question must be settled with some degree of promptitude. It will be shown that thirteen different ways of determining whether reasoning is good or bad are now in use. etc. makes its pronouncement relative to the reasoner's purpose. to my knowledge. the method of reasoning adopted. For that reason. in the historical criticism of documents. But one sole method is generally valid. My position against this subjective logic is this. I hold the ordinary subjective method of the German logicians‐‐which bases logic upon the feeling of logicality to such an extent that good reasoning is defined as such reasoning as we deliberately approve as satisfying that feeling‐‐to be simply disastrous to science. engaged upon an investigation. if it is quite evident that a method of reasoning is such that it must reach the truth in the long run of probabilities. The doctrine to which this is prominently opposed is that the only way of judging of the validity of a reasoning is by means of our instinctive feeling of rationality. Indeed. and if there is any such thing as the Truth to be reached. The voice of instinct itself. may be a century. A few may be sparingly employed in special cases to which they are adapted. will or will not answer its purpose as certainly and completely as any that can be found.       I undertake to show that every reasoning professes to proceed according to a method that is calculated to lead to the truth. The instinctive judgment of rationality. and practical reasonings.10‐18         [I] will give some preliminary idea of the present state of logical inquiry. the reasonings of pure science. Therefore. where reasoning is mainly regulated by the logical instinct. therefore. The latter proposes to act speedily upon his conclusion. and a good reasoning is a reasoning which in fact fulfills its profession in this respect.

Practical reasonings. it is evident that there is no such necessity. But in the case of a person's practical reasonings the case is different. and instinct. that one of these will evidently lead to the truth in the long run. if it leads to any conclusion and if there is any truth. Indeed. For an individual whose purse is finite.cross‐questioned. The objective theory is not strictly applicable. within its proper domain is far keener and surer than any human theory whatever. For if we consider two methods of reasoning which the instinctive sense of rationality in the first instance pronounces to be upon a par. assents to this. here instinct is within its own proper domain. instinct will change its mind and prefer the method which the objective criterion prefers. while as to the other. instinct confesses its own inadequacy to decide upon reasonings which may be continued through many ages. ought not to be guided by scientific logic. and if we show. but by instinct. Besides. therefore. there really is no such thing as the "long run" of probabilities. and the only logic which is applicable to t . as we can.

not as above defined. or Erkenntnisslehre. we are met with the fact that some of the best German logicians maintain that it should be what is known as a theory of cognition. I show by careful analysis that psychological truths are not relevant to the theory of cognition.   Final Version ‐ MS L75. and that this is simply stechiology as I have defined it. I then examine universal grammar as it is generally conceived.366   MEMOIR  15 ON THE NATURE OF STECHIOLOGIC       This will contain especially a discussion of Erkenntnisslehre. This doctrine is supposed to be built. and but one way. I undertake to show what a theory of cognition becomes when it is stripped of everything irrelevant and inadmissable. with such others as happen to resemble them. but as whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic.247‐248         Conceiving of stechiologic.366   . but on the contrary that the establishment of those truths depends upon special points of the doctrine of logic. of reaching a sort of grammatica speculativa. I then show that there is a way. such as the association of ideas. and show that most of its propositions are merely matters of certain special languages. some of the indo‐ european languages. what it must be. if it is an indispensable preparatory doctrine to critical logic.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. upon truths discovered by the psychologists. in part. and that it then becomes a sort of grammatica speculativa. In this memoir.Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ­ MS L75.

" Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 7. 2 of the Collected Papers. The historical part.       Practice has shown that that paper needs extension in several directions. 1 of Houser and Kloesel's The Essential Peirce.MEMOIR   16 A GENERAL OUTLINE OF STECHIOLOGIC EDITORIAL NOTE: Peirce had no comment on this in any version. I prefer the term "philosophical grammar" myself because one of the collections of Wittgenstein's notes has been given that title. and this helps to situate Peirce in the proper context. which means literally "theoretical grammar" but is perhaps most aptly referred to by the term "philosophical grammar" or as Peirce himself indicate. Besides.* * EDITORIAL NOTE: "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension. 2 of the Chronological Edition. unusually interesting. needs great . Vol. and in Vol. you will find Peirce's depth/breadth or comprehension/extension distinction. 1867 (reprinted in Vol. too. If you think of Frege as the discoverer of the sense/reference or Sinn/Bedeutung distinction. account has to be taken of important classes of terms there barely mentioned. The term "stechiologic"—sometimes "stechiology"—is used here for what he more typically refers to as "speculative grammar" (or "grammatica speculativa").       Final Version ­ MS L75.366   MEMOIR   17 ON TERMS       This memoir will be based on my paper of November 1867."universal grammar". and his tracing of this back to Aristotle. Peirce also provides a formal definition of "information" in terms of this distinction.

  From Draft D ‐ MS L75. and I propose to take occasion to give here an account of modern German logic. 15 and divide No. and taking into consideration all kinds of terms. This will probably be the longest of all the memoirs. I think I shall treat No. My very conception of what a term is has been much improved by studies subsequent to that paper. 21 into two parts to be handed in separately. I can bring into it all that is necessary to say about these treatises. which belong to near a dozen distinct schools. The study of "agglutinative" languages has been an aid to me. 16. 16 as a supplement to No. classification. I here propose to show that my method satisfies all conditions.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. yet I think. and will balance No.amplification.367   MEMOIR   18 ON PROPOSITIONS       The question of the nature of the judgment is today more actively debated than any other. It is here that the German logicians are best worthy of attention. and altogether original. the meaning of the matter of a judgment. in a much more thorough working out of my paper of November 1867.249         [This memoir will develop] the doctrine of logical depth and breadth.       I shall then show how my own theory follows from attention to the three categories. which will be short. that is.249‐250         No question of logic has of late years received more attention than that of the nature of the judgment. and shall pass to an elaborate analysis. and doctrine of the relations of propositions. symbolization. is a sign (regarded as identical with any full interpretation of it) which . Although this seems rather the subject for a book than for a single paper. The doctrine is that the proposition.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. by stretching this memoir.

equally involve easily defined acts. being dissatisfied with the idea of doing either.323‐324         An assertion is an act which represents that an icon represents the object of an index. This proposition need not be asserted. Thus. command. is . I may impose the responsibility of its agreeing with the truth upon you. with the attachment of one's signature to a binding legal deed. in which [case] I put it interrogatively. in which case I command it. in which case I assert it. All of these are different moods in which that same proposition may be stated."red‐headed" is not an icon itself. a sort of composite photograph of all the red‐headed persons one has seen. "Mary is red‐ headed".43‐45         It is necessary to distinguish between a proposition and the assertion of it. in the assertion. The German word Urtheil confounds the proposition itself with the psychological act of assenting to it. and the precise manner in which reaction enters into it is also clear. The question then arises whether a proposition does not involve a peculiar and indefinable element.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. Interrogation. In that case. I may state it to myself and be deliberately satisfied to base my action on it whenever occasion may arise.. Thus a portrait with the name of the person portrayed under it expresses a proposition.       I further give a classification of propositions. etc. To confound those two things is like confounding the writing of one's name idly upon a scrap of paper. I may state it to myself and worry as to whether I shall embrace it or reject it. it is true. I may state it to you and assume a responsibility for it. I doubt the proposition. Assertion is a separate act by which a person makes himself responsible for the truth of the proposition. "Mary" in like manner. But its interpretant is an icon. But although this element is indefinable.       I then examine the principal discussions of the nature of the judgment. This confusion is a part of the general refusal of idealism. A proposition may be stated without being asserted. and show exactly wherein they are right and wherein wrong. but a symbol. I may state the proposition to you and endeavor to stimulate you to advise me whether to accept or reject it.   From Draft A ‐ MS L75. which still considerably affects almost all German thought. to acknowledge that it is one thing to be and quite another to be represented. I show that it does so. perhaps for practice in chirography. it is easily identified with my second category.separately designates its object. in which case I judge it.

inductions. the synonym I then used for abduction. and subsequently led me into a further error contrary to my own previous correct statement. every assertion has a degree of energy. it belongs to the third. has a degree of intensity.       I shall then come to the important question of the classification of arguments. Thus. forgetting that according to my own earlier and correct account of it. owing to the excessive weight I at that time placed on formalistic considerations. But in my paper on probable inference in the Johns Hopkins Studies in Logic. but a thought. This act of force belongs to the second category.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. Consequently. The putting of these together makes another index which has a force tending to make the icon an index of Mary.interpreted by a sort of composite memory of all the occasions which forced my attention upon that girl. to confound abduction and abductive induction. or effort. the only error that paper contains is the designation as abduction of a mode of induction somewhat resembling abduction. Degree is not a reaction. abductions (my present name. But degree attaches to every reaction. namely. which may properly be called "abductive induction". Not that degree in itself belongs to the second category: on the contrary. I correctly defined the three kinds of simple arguments in terms of the categories. It will be scrutinized under all aspects.368‐372   MEMOIR  19 ON ARGUMENTS       I first examine the essential nature of an argument. and mixed arguments. when in the very same paper I mention the existence of the mode of inference which is true abduction. I fell into the error of attaching a name. In the following month. to a probable inference which I correctly described. In subsequent reflections upon the rationale of abduction. It was this resemblance which deceived me. I consider this to be the key of logic. abduction is not of the number of probable inferences. showing that it is a sign which separately signifies its interpretant. It is singular that I should have done that. and as such. which will be defended). My paper of April 1867 on this subject divides arguments into deductions. I was led to see that this rationale was not that which I had in my Johns Hopkins paper given . May 1867.

and in a statement I published in the Monist.       In this paper. through an unknown sea. I shall examine the most important of those which are opposed to it. while related to that category. If only one point were obscure. can find some way of making as important discoveries in logic as I have done while falling into less error. Thus far. Meantime. But if its errors are confined to that class. I can only say that if others. there was another. not upon the nature of their elements. I shall give a new classification of them based. with several hitherto unrecognized types. but the difficulty is at first that one is sailing in a dense fog. to all induction. nobody will be more intensely delighted than I shall be.of induction. according to the theory of the categories. Subsequently studying one of these kinds. not being clear‐headed enough to see that. the general fabric of the doctrine is true. All that I asserted about probable inference in my Johns Hopkins paper and in my Monist paper was perfectly true. but upon their modes of combination. I have had to find out for myself as well as I could.250‐252         Most of the German logicians who are free from traditional . My gratitude to the man who will show me where I am wrong in logic will have no bounds. distinguished from the typical form by being related to that category relation to which distinguishes abduction. I hastily identified it with abduction.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. I found that besides the typical form. without a single landmark. and one is unable for the time being to attain sufficient clearness of thought to make quite sure that the relation is of the precise nature required. I shall be very thankful to whomever can detect them. and I correctly described them. in fact. it would soon be cleared up. This is the form of error to which my method of discovery is peculiarly liable. Similar errors may remain in my system. All the difficulties with which I labored are now completely disposed of by recognizing that abductive induction is quite a different thing from abduction. besides very important improvements in the subdivision of the three kinds of simple arguments. which present many points of importance and of interest that have never been remarked. It is a very instructive illustration both of the dangers and of the strength of my heuretic method. after me. be it observed that the kind of error which I have been considering can never amount to anything worse than a faulty classification. Besides setting forth my own doctrine of the stechiology of argument. I was led to give the correct rationale of abduction as applying to abductive induction and so. and far greater clearness of exposition. it is not related to it in the precise way in which one of the primary divisions of arguments ought to be. I at first saw that there must be three kinds of arguments severally related to the three categories. I shall have much that is new to say about mixed arguments. One sees that a form has a relation to a certain category.

in the long run. Induction is reasoning which professes to pursue such a method that. and has never been published. I show that it follows from the definition of an argument. an abduction. it is necessary reasoning concerning probabilities. only. and the ground of such preference must be economical. it does not deserve to be called reasoning. as a sign which definitely signifies its intended interpretant. each special application of it (when it is applicable) must at least indefinitely approximate to the truth about the subject in hand. strictly speaking. to wit. I then show that from the definition of an argument it follows mathematically that every argument is either a deduction. though not necessarily each special application of it. In particular I distinguish deduction into two types. although a sign may be quite similar to an argument without being self‐controlled. an induction. and I formally define this self‐consciousness. Deduction is reasoning which professes to pursue such a method that if the premisses are true the conclusion will in every case be true. I show just how much truth there is in this. That is to say.       Of these three classes of reasonings abduction is the lowest. I further show that properly.influences have regarded the judgment as the logical element. and that there really is a peculiar element in the argument. So long as it is sincere. these three senses constituting three great classes of reasonings.   From Draft A ‐ MS L75. Abduction is reasoning which professes to be such that in case there is any ascertainable truth concerning the matter in hand. because they find in it something sui generis. the third category. the general method of this reasoning. the corollarial and the theorematic. This division is specially significant. there is only a relative preference between different abductions. necessary. abduction cannot be absolutely bad. without any resort to psychology or to the peculiar flavor of human self‐ consciousness. being persisted in.35‐39         There are three different ways in which a method may be calculated to lead to the truth. and if it be not. an argument is self‐ controlled. I proceed to show what the chief varieties of these [are]. cannot fail ultimately to attain any truth that is attainable. For sincere efforts to reach the truth. I show what the peculiarity of the German mind which leads to this and a number of other analogous views consists in. or an appeal to a vaguely defined logical doctrine. Consequently. I then analyze the nature of the argument. the better abduction is the one . Probable deduction is. that an argument must be a self‐ conscious sign. and show among other things that in all reasoning there is a logica utens. which will be one of the parts of this memoir most emphasized. must eventually approximate to the truth. and induction into three types of widely different natures. no matter in how wrong a way they may be commenced. or an argument which mixes these characters. They find nothing of the sort in the argument.

it is better than no classification of inductions at all. Deduction is divisible into sub‐classes in various ways. yet cannot be adequately represented as composite.       Mill's four methods of induction is a heterogeneous division.       Besides these three types of reasoning there is a fourth. Corollarial deduction is where it is only necessary to imagine any case in which the premisses are true in order to perceive immediately that the conclusion holds in that case.35. vitality. Such for example. Ordinary syllogisms and some deductions in the logic of relatives belong to this class. Theorematic deduction is deduction in which it is necessary to experiment in the imagination upon the image of the premiss in order from the result of such experiment to make corollarial deductions to the truth of the conclusion. hypotheses.       Induction is the highest and most typical form of reasoning.   From Draft A ‐ MS L75. of very trifling utility. is logically poor. is either corollarial or theorematic. one of which in undoubtedly the highest. habitually restricts himself to the highest form. But I cannot go into them in this statement. especially his last book. Still." Peirce apparently means "leaving probable deduction aside. of which the most important is into corollarial and theorematic.which is likely to lead to the truth with the lesser expenditure of time.       Deduction is only of value in tracing out the consequences of hypotheses. that on the orientation of temples. which it regards as pure. In my essay of 1883. however.* * EDITORIAL NOTE: By "in the narrower sense. which combines the characters of the three. as for example. It is displaced here because it was . The subdivisions of theorematic deduction are of very high theoretical importance. is an induction fortified by the consideration of some known uniformity. etc. not at all scientific. Uniformities are of four principal kinds of which Mill distinctly recognizes only a single one. In fact. I only recognized two closely allied logical forms of pure induction. 53         Necessary deduction. and. in part. in the narrower sense. I have since discovered eight other forms which include those almost exclusively used by reasoners who are not adepts in logic. There are also composite reasonings where an argument of one type is joined to an argument of another type. Some of his work. or unfounded. Norman Lockyer is the only writer I have met with who in his best work." In the MS this paragraph actually begins right after the sentence near the beginning of the above segment in which probable deduction is characterized. analogy.

Theorematic reasoning is reasoning in which this is not enough. as always—at a time when the formalist conception of mathematics. which was the proposition to be proved. then the difference of the sum from two right angles must be proportional to the area of the triangle. was in the ascendancy. I haven't seen him use this particular one elsewhere. The formalist David Hilbert's famous lecture in which his list of questions for 20th Century mathematics was put forth (which both Gödel and Turing later addressed) was given in 1900. but it is needful to perform experiments in the imagination in order to assure ourselves that the conclusion is true. It would be helpful if anyone who feels competent to assess the argument would address the question of whether it really adds up as it should. Hence the large triangle will have the sum of its angles equal to that of one of the small triangles diminished by a‐1 times 2 right angles or the sum of the angles of the large triangle less 2 right angles will be a times the sum of the angles of the small triangles after each of the a‐sums has been diminished by two right angles. Now when a large triangle is cut into a small triangles. a‐1 triangles are joined to a triangles so as not to increase the number of sides. we shall imagine a triangle to be cut into any number of equal triangles. the point being to show why mathematical reasoning is theorematic and not merely corollarial. Corollarial reasoning is that in which it is only necessary to consider what the premisses mean in order to find that the conclusion is as true as they. It is possible that Peirce himself didn't think so since it occurs in a paragraph the beginning part of which is marked through in a way indicating rejection. the sum of the angles will be increased by n‐2 times 2 right angles. Unfortunately. this page of the manuscript is difficult to read in several places and I don't understand the argument well enough myself to be certain that I am transcribing it properly. Consequently. For example. which holds that all mathematical reasoning is reducible to what Peirce calls "corollarial" reasoning.marked as rejected by Peirce.* * EDITORIAL NOTE: The argument in the above passage is intended to show that recourse to diagrammatic experimentation is both required and sufficient in the case in question to establish the conclusion. for example. This is an important and controverted thesis. in order to prove that if all triangles of equal area have the sums of their angles equal. put forward by Peirce—against the grain. but then Peirce's reason for rejecting the paragraph may have had nothing to do with his view of . Then we easily satisfy ourselves by experiment that when a triangle is added to a polygon so as to increase the number of sides by n. if m triangles be added so as to increase the number of sides by n the sum of the angles will be increased by n‐m times 2 right angles.

but if it is applied to probability. I can now say that he is presumably an ex‐ priest. overemphasizing formalities. however. then. and in order to test this. abduction.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. or mixed arguments. and I find that he is indeed tonsured. he should be tonsured. being seated in a street car. entirely overlooked an indispensable mode of inference. Abduction is distinguished from abductive induction in not being. Secondly. now supported by an inductive induction. Deduction is necessary inference. that paper. abductive induction. or problematically propounded hypothesis. Induction is a totally different sort of inquiry. All arguments are either deductions. I will in this present note illustrate the difference between abduction. He is the very image of such a person. though evidently far oftener than he would be one. Here at last is an indication that my theory is correct.the validity of that argument. where the question is how much. and probable deduction. But in my paper in the Johns Hopkins Studies in Logic. Since I barely escaped error on this matter. My earliest statements were correct in this respect. I failed to distinguish between abduction and a previously overlooked or little noticed variety of induction which may be called "abductive induction". properly speaking. How can this be? Suppose I find this problematic reply: Perhaps he is an ex‐priest. Here is an iconic argument. He does so. since I do not know how often I might find a man tonsured who was not an ex‐priest. itself starts a question. abductions. that is. although it would be inaccurate to say that there is any definite probability that he is so.       Suppose. I ask myself. to obtain an answer to a previously propounded question. That gives the doctrine of chances. I say something to him calculated to make him take off his hat. and although fully covering the subject of which it professed to treat. to explain a surprising observation. or abduction of it. in consequence of which. it makes its observations without reference to any previously propounded question. and the comprehensive. although correct as far as it goes. experimental. he presents an icon of an ex‐priest. it concludes a probability. it now occurs to me that if he is an ex‐ priest. on the contrary. that. where the question is to be answered by yes or no (or else is merely susceptible of a vague answer). It has two species: the extensive.163‐173         The nature of argument [is] fully examined in all its aspects. inductions. or abductive. I remark a man opposite to me whose appearance and behavior unite characters which I am surprised to find together in the same person. I myself having previously described the inference correctly. a weak form of . then. by means of experiment. proceeding. but. The supposition is. while remaining in itself necessary.

There is no escape from that. Belief in the theory rests now on factual reaction to the theory. I must think that the probability on that ground alone is over fourteen to one that he is an ex‐priest. I do not go into the question of how I come to be so confident of that. I ask the chancellor. I learn that that badge is the symbol of membership of a society which decided that its members should go to the polls in pairs and that one of each pair should vote Democratic and the other Republican. arguments consisting of two parts of which one taken by itself lends no support to the conclusion of the other. and that he will tell me the truth I equally believe implicitly. It is only a probability. but now that the name Michael Wu‐Ling Ptah‐Hotep Jerolomon signifies for me a probability of more than fourteen to one of being an ex‐priest. Fourteen of them reside in this town and are ex‐priests. "He is an ex‐priest. it matters not how doubt came to be destroyed. second. and to dismiss the question until it may acquire more importance. it rested on the flimsy support of similarity. it all the better covers the case. yet in consequence of this knowledge becomes a symbol of the man's being an ex‐priest. Under this head come inductions supported by . I have no doubt whatever that it is the man's name. taken together. It is what I consider myself certain of." "Is he the only man of that name?" "No. twenty years ago. too. and considering. and has never been heard of since. Thirdly. I get out of the car. or agreement in "flavor. or to establish two premisses from which. while the man's hat is off.) He replies. nor any such causal connection with the man's being an ex‐priest as was the tonsure. what is logically relevant. The first consists of those which tend to establish the same conclusion or contradictory conclusions.)       Mixed arguments are of three kinds. but tends to establish a fact which makes the other a stronger or weaker argument. combining the arguments into one mixed argument. fifteen. fourthly. there are. (Although the illustration is silly. Before. For example. As long as I have no doubt. for a symbol is a sign which becomes significant simply by virtue of the fact that it will be so interpreted. It stands on a widely different basis from that on which it stood before my little experiment. and I learn that one of them voted the Democratic ticket. Yet now." Now. I infer that the other did so. or may be. So. I consequently reverse my previous inference. a conclusion can be inferred. and go to call upon the chancellor of the diocese. to High Thibet. The fifteenth went. that I have no serious stake in the question. it might conceivably have been an accident that the man was tonsured. I see two men wearing both the same badge going to the polls together talking with great delight over the effect of their vote. facts have been constrained to yield confirmation to it by bearing out a prediction based upon it. I read in the crown of it a name that has been pasted into it. though having no striking "flavor" of ex‐priest about it. I am satisfied to consider the mixed argument as proof. "Who is Michael Wo‐Ling Ptah‐Hotep Jerolomon?" (Pardon my nonsense. But subsequently.symptomatic or indexical argument." It thus appears that the name read in the hat.

is‐06. division. The third kind of mixed arguments are those in which the same premisses form two different kinds of arguments.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. The URL of the present page. and suggestions to Joseph Ransdell Dept of Philosophy Texas Tech University.htm Page last modified June Scholarly quotation from or reference to the content of this website will mention the URL of the web‐page where the content occurs.door.uniformities. End of PART 6 of 10 of MS L75 Queries. Important subdivisions of induction and deduction will be defined and illustrated.372   MEMOIR   20 OF CRITICAL LOGIC. IN GENERAL       A thorough discussion of the nature. I examine other doctrines.       Having thus set forth my own doctrine of the stechiology of argument. comments. which is part of the Arisbe website. 1998 . Lubbock Texas 79409 joseph. and method of critical logic. of which there are four simple types.

anything unsupported by evidence. Consequently. or explicatory. It is fully admitted that what a man under given conditions cannot help believing is not amenable to criticism. I subject what goes under the title of the test of inconceivability to an elaborate examination. The test of inconceivability discussed. but only perceptual judgments. and indeed. These tests have been taken in two senses.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. not sensation nor even percepts are first premisses. bringing out various useful truths. cannot help doubting. and . judgments that a present percept presents a certain appearance. that is. I also examine the tests of universality and necessity. The different senses in which these test have been understood.173‐174         I here undertake to demonstrate that the only justifiable first premisses are perceptual judgments.372­373   MEMOIR  21 ON FIRST PREMISSES       My position on this subject comes under the general head of sensationalism. as well as another in which they may be understood to better advantage. and not a perceptual fact. he always can doubt. I examine the so‐called tests of universality and necessity.253‐259         Kant divided propositions into analytic. having shown that other characters are as well entitled to being regarded as tests of apriority.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. as long as those conditions subsist. Kant's "deductions" examined and his position shown to be untenable. But if he duly considers the matter. from his standpoint.Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ­ MS L75. first adding certain other characters which as much prove apriority as do those. and there is a third more advantageous than either. Certain well known and obvious objections are examined. but I contend that criticism is inapplicable to what is not subject to control. are considered and estimated.

and so on down to 0+5 = 5. There is. as the subject of the great _Critik_ (observe that Kant spells this word. if I remember rightly. But they are not so. is unusually extravagant. we naturally look to his examples in order to determine what he means. But he announces. He defined an analytic proposition as one whose predicate was implied in its subject. At any rate that is the correct doctrine. the definition of 7 is 7 = G6 and that of 12 is 12 = G11. the "Urtheile" of Euclid's _Elements_ must be regarded as mathematical. which in my opinion gives. in short. and that of 11 is 11 = G10. so that G5+5 = G10 is implied in 5+5 = 10. It is not even necessary to take account of the general definition of an integer number. Now turning to Rosenkranz and Schubert's edition of his works. The distinction is generally condemned by modern writers.synthetic. But further. he was led to believe that all mathematical propositions are synthetic. which he could not have done if he had been acquainted with the logic of relatives. no theorematic reasoning required to prove from the definitions that 7+5 = 12. or ampliative. borrowed . holds that no critical science is necessary to establish the validity of analytic propositions. Then it was open to him to say that if the proposition could be reduced to an identical one by merely attaching aggregates to its subjects and components to its predicate it was an analytic proposition. But this last is part of the definition of `plus'. "Mathematische Urtheile sind ingesammt synthetisch. the more important division. because he had not studied the logic of relatives. that G6+5 = G11 is implied in 6+5 = 11. He had his choice of making either one of two distinctions. The only fault that Kant's distinction has is that it is ambiguous. Consequently. Let definitions everywhere be substituted for definita in the proposition. and what they have in mind (almost always most confusedly) is just. For if we write `G' for `next greater than'. however. Now it is part of the definition of `plus' that Gx+y = G(x+y). Vol II (_Critik der reinen Vernunft_)." That certainly indicates the former of the two meanings. but otherwise was synthetic. 702. This was an objectionable definition due to Kant's total ignorance of the logic of relatives. it is a part of the definition of `plus' that x+Gy = G(x+y) and the definition of 5 is 5 = G4. we read. But the definition of 6 is 6 = G5. Thus. Kant maintains. The statement. too. that 7+5 = 12 is a synthetical judgment. which are certainly analytical. so the 0+G4 = G4 is implied in 0+4 = 4.       Kant. These two statements Kant would have supposed to be equivalent. to come from Kant. but otherwise was synthetic. and on down to 0+0 = 0. not being able to account for the richness of mathematics and the mysterious or occult character of its principal theorems by corollarial reasoning. and no less than 132 of them are definitions. That is. too. Since his abstract definition is ambiguous. p. Or he might have said that if the proposition could be proved to be true by logical necessity without further hypothesis it was an analytic one. But Kant was quite unaware that there was such a thing as theorematic reasoning. owing to his ignorance of the logic of relatives and consequently of the real nature of mathematical proof.

But this is not true.from the English of Hobbes and Locke. from the nature of propositions. True. and that from the nature of logical critic such judgments are not amenable to criticism. and says that if he had done so he would have been forced to say that there are not synthetical judgments a posteriori. and the justification of different classes of arguments will be considered in the memoirs immediately following the present one. he does not go into it minutely. But he does not state it quite accurately. my categories help me in a remarkable way to show. that such a judgment simply judges that a present percept has a certain appearance.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. Kant does consider the question on page 8 of his first edition and answers it in a totally different way from that described by Paulsen. but he does go into it far enough to show that he would have answered it in the general manner of my memoirs. that is. and I shall further show that such judgments are necessarily perceptual judgments. but it is in strictest harmony with Kant's general position. This discussion will be very elaborate and careful. By an ultimate premiss we must understand a judgment not derived by an ascertainably self‐controlled logical process. nature of doubt. which would be a psychological question. That page of the _Critik_ is a pregnant one. with a `C'). the question "How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?" I notice that Paulsen in his book on Kant remarks that Kant never considered the question "How are synthetical judgments a posteriori possible?".       I shall make a logical analysis of the logical. I shall not make his division of judgments into the a priori and the a posteriori the leading one. and shall show that no doubt can attach to an ultimate judgment.       As to ultimate premisses. In place of Kant's division of judgments into the a priori and the a posteriori. they are to be justified by the methods of argument by which they have been derived. that every judgment so formed must consist in judging that a present percept has a certain kind of appearance.       As to inferred judgments.325‐326         It is not the question of how synthetical judgments are possible. It shows that perceptual judgments alone are not amenable to criticism. which it is for the psychologists to explain. not psychological. but how they can be true and known to be true. Kant's precise question now comes before us for answer. I prefer to begin by dividing them into inferential judgments and ultimate premisses. . but how they can be known to be true. By an ultimate premiss we must understand a proposition not derived by an ascertainably self‐controlled logical process. but rather the division into derived and ultimate propositions. It is not the question how synthetical judgments are possible.

But I shall not make his division of propositions into the a priori and the a posteriori the leading one. I shall have to consider the opinion that logical criticism goes back to the first impressions of sense. but they are justified in the measure in which the arguments which lead to them are justified. the obviously sufficient answer would be it cannot help it. By an ultimate premiss we must understand a proposition not derived by an ascertainably self‐controlled logical process. we may for the moment compare a man who makes a judgment with a piece of paper on which a proposition is written. as far as we have ascertained. Still.315‐324         It is not the question how synthetical judgments are possible. and still more unlike the first impressions of sense. there has been no such control. In regard to underived propositions. and if it were asked how the paper was justified for carrying such a lie. but rather the division into derived and ultimate propositions. he does believe it perfectly. He cannot so much as make an effort to believe otherwise. and he cannot blame himself for believing what is manifestly true. floundering in a muddy bog of land and water. this judgment is entirely unlike the percept from which it is derived. he cannot doubt it. he does not in the least doubt it. Derived propositions are justified by the arguments by which they are derivable. he has not made himself responsible for the truth of the proposition.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75.      As for derived judgments. and as long as he does believe it perfectly. which would be a psychological question." But . It will suffice that. they must always remain open to doubt." somebody may say. and the justification of such arguments will be considered in subsequent memoirs. In like manner if a man looks at the moon and judges that it looks bright. If somebody has idly written on a piece of paper. We need not assume that there is any premiss over whose derivation it is impossible to exercise any control. "So. as long as he cannot help believing that the moon looks bright. "you believe in the test of inconceivability. No use could be made of such knowledge. In short it appears to him evidently true. in fact. We must be on our guard in defining this distinction not to fall into a mere matter of psychology. as Kant and many non‐Kantians assume. and Kant's psychological deduction is manifestly idle. a psychological deduction and a "transcendental" deduction mixed. then. and as long as he cannot help believing it. `The moon is made of green cheese'. as Kant does. The one perfectly sufficient justification is that the man can no more help judging that the moon he is looking at seems bright than a piece of paper can help what is written upon it. For who is to find fault with him? As long as he keeps his opinion to himself. but how synthetical propositions can be true and be known to be true. It will now be necessary for me to enter into a detailed criticism of all the opinions which are opposed to my conclusions. if we had it. we have no need of following Kant in attempting to make out what the psychological process is.

When he is once convinced. it is absurd for him to pretend that his not being able to doubt it is his reason for believing it. but that the phrase `test of inconceivability' is a self‐contradictory jumble of words. I might think viewing them collectively.e. we say he has a reason for his belief. it is quite possible that. until some positive reason shall appear for believing that it is so. it is fairly presumable that I am consistent in my opinions. as a matter of fact. unless there is some abstruse reason to the contrary which does not at once strike me. unless they are dominated by the narrowest associations of ideas. in the least doubt. while he cannot help believing it. But I deny it. and asking what are the things that I personally. and he "has" a reason for his belief only in the sense of having stored in his mind something which he feels would act as a reason should he ever be led to doubt the proposition. that some one of them. What those people mean who talk of the test of inconceivability [i. Doubt may be present in very slight degree. But many things are said by logically untrained minds to be inconceivable because they seem to them so strange that they do not know how to go to work to frame the conception. I do not. It will be shown that true inconceivability can only arise as a consequence of what is called self‐contradiction. I know not which. by simply supposing that all time forms a closed cycle which the two lives completely exhaust. still less any such ridiculous reason as that he does not doubt it.       Now what are the things which cannot be doubted? I will begin by abandoning the field of pure logic. or thinks he sees. Strictly speaking. not indeed that the test of inconceivability is untrustworthy. and it is simply because they cannot entertain a doubt on the subject. and consistency with what I have just been saying forces me to declare. as their language shows. I know that it may be said that the test of inability to doubt is one thing and the test of inability to conceive is another. as. It is true that their minds are in a confused state. that some people pronounce the idea inconceivable. A man has no reason for what he does not doubt. Certainly. and that nobody can either trust to it or distrust it. since there is no such thing. he is not now under the influence of the reason. A reason is only operative while a man is changing his mind. in fact. time does form a closed cycle. what this] means to them [is] simply erecting inability to doubt into a reason. Still. He has no reason whatever for believing it. On the contrary. many persons would say that a man's being the father of his own father was inconceivable. for reasoning is essentially self‐controlled. as far as I can see. For example. for example. the knowledge of the reason would silence his doubts. Suppose there are a thousand propositions that. but that only means that he can imagine himself to be oblivious of the reason and to doubt the proposition and that he sees. that if that were the case. it will be shown in another memoir that we are justified in disbelieving it. find I cannot doubt. At the same time. .nobody has any right to draw such an inference. If a man cannot help entirely believing that a proposition is true. But there are various ways in which such an event may be conceived.

Thus. I do not mean to deny that a surprising experience might create doubts not previously existing. I shall first trace the history of this doctrine. I shall examine the so‐called tests [of] universality and necessity which are supposed to prove the a priori character of certain propositions. and founded upon altogether different reasons. `Mary is red‐headed'. But when. For although a compulsion may conform to a general law. the judgment that a present percept has a certain appearance. it very frequently happens that I discover some circumstance which creates a doubt very much stronger. and as such. upon no more definite reason than that I have often found myself mistaken. I shall then show that the statement of it is incomplete. has a degree of intensity. perhaps. I certainly do believe that among all the opinions which I most firmly hold there are errors. But its interpretant is an icon. it must be a proposition the evidence for which presents itself in its entirety here and now. `Mary' in like manner. I am not able to discern. be no general proposition. This act of force belongs to the second category. I shall then show that there are two senses in which the test has been . I cannot.       Passing now to the pure logical doctrine. On the contrary. a sort of composite photograph of all the red‐headed persons one has seen. an assertion is an act which represents that an icon represents the object of an index. There are doubts. it cannot have any mode of being other than that of direct activity here and now. but a thought. is interpreted by a sort of composite memory of all the occasions which forced my attention upon that girl. Not that degree in itself belongs to the second category.       At the same time. doubt anything which I do not already doubt. in consequence of a slight doubt. in my mind which are so faint that with all the energy of attention which I can well bestow upon the scrutiny of my state of mind. there being a number of other characters which are equally entitled to be considered as tests of apriority. It can. `red‐headed' is not an icon itself. but a symbol. This could not be if I had not the smallest doubt of any one of them.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. Degree is not a reaction. by a mental operation. I cannot even review the evidence for a belief. I am led to reexamine the evidence. therefore. Consequently. But if there by anything that I do not doubt at all. that is. But degree attaches to every reaction. It must be a perceptual judgment. or effort. then. in the assertion.259‐262         Either at this point or later in the memoir. founded. it is true. every doubt which I entertain is founded upon some reason for a contrary belief. Moreover. very likely a good many errors. it belongs to the third. unless I entertain a doubt of it.may be erroneous. The putting of these together makes another index which has a force tending to make the icon an index of Mary. every assertion has a degree of energy.

A first premiss. we refer to ability conditioned upon such means as they have put into practice. will have contained an elaborate analysis of the logical nature of doubt which will be applied to the problems of the present memoir. Some persons who have believed themselves to be Kantians hold that as soon as a proposition is shown to be a priori. No doubt that for many persons there are such propositions. and that its only support is a purely experiential argument.       The previous memoir. that all that is required is a little good sense and reflection. if by doubt we mean any doubt that they recognize. universality and necessity are characters of propositions. it is beyond all criticism. In the next place. I am out of all real discussion of its truth. This seems to be the state of all those persons who think that philosophy and logic are idle things. and Kant's doctrine really seems to be nothing but nominalistic sensualism so disguised that it does not recognize itself. especially to show that judgments founded on the experience of every hour of every man's life are not subject to doubt of the ordinary kind and have some of the characteristics attributed to a priori propositions. etc.understood. Now it would [be] absurd to admit into that reasoning any a priori proposition as long as one maintains that such reasoning is necessary to support any a priori proposition. not the judgments. is inadmissible. In the first place. But it is quite true that if there is anything which I cannot help believing without any tincture of doubt. Propositions so believed are almost always false.e. even as Kant misrepresents him. but there is no way for their victims to be undeceived as long as they cherish that state of mind. not of terms. 20. But granting that he in this way proves the truth of an a priori proposition. That is utterly contrary to the spirit of Kant. I show that the test may be understood to embody several logical truths. Of course. would have been ready to admit that some forms of thought arise from the nature of mind. and that there is a third sense which makes a more defensible doctrine than either. to be a priori. In the third place. necessary. and in fact Kant's premisses appear to be quite evidently generalizations of common experience. it may be said that Kant only maintains the concepts. this is directly contrary to Kant's own opinions. and if by `can'. and all the more] in his true character. other than a fact of perception. the only logical position is that it is false. and that extensive reading and study are useless. yet if any proposition is universal. . But that is pure positivism. it follows that antecedently to this proof it was an idle hypothesis.       Other views will be critically examined. Kant's position is that it is easy to show by universality and necessity that certain propositions are a priori. and there is nothing to show that it is true. No... but that their truth remains to be proved by an abstruse line of reasoning. Hume himself. [and] much more [i.

I take pains to state opposing arguments in all their force. There appears to be no definite probability of a witness's telling the truth.       The rules of probability are stated in a new way. Pearson's developments examined. the calculus of probability has no sense at all unless it in the long run secures the person who trusts to it. In all these cases. it suffices to suppose that the events in question are subject to unknown laws. It cannot be rendered . Now it is idle to seek any justification of what is evident. in what sense there can be any probability in the mathematical world. Now this it will do only if there is no law. the application of probability to the theory of numbers.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. but I hope not of double length. there are grave difficulties. the nature of a "long run". The person who is to trust to the calculus ought to assure himself of this. This memoir is intended to form a complete vade mecum of the doctrine of chances. The doctrine of chances is easily seen to be applicable in the course of science. is not amenable to critic. for it is necessary reasoning. It is easy to specify cases where there would be none.    Final Version ‐ MS L75. On the contrary.       There are many matters here under dispute. Its applicability to insurance companies and the like is not in any case to be assumed off‐hand. more than I here set down. When it comes to the case of individual interests. and to be plentifully supplied with references. for the purposes of the doctrine of chances. known or unknown. with the application of high numbers and method of least squares according to several different theories. and to refute them clearly. as such. of a certain description. and as such renders its conclusions evident. especially when events are assumed to be independent.263‐268         Deduction. Inverse probabilities are shown to be fallacious. I show that it is not necessary that there should be any definite probability that a given generic event should have a given specific determination.373‐375   MEMOIR   22 THE LOGIC OF CHANCE       I here discuss the origin and nature of probability by my usual method. It will be somewhat long. also the connection between objective probability and doubt. I also show that it is quite a mistake to suppose that.

generally said that probability 1 represents absolute certainty. But on the contrary. both of the origin of probability and of the application of the calculus.       In the first place. and although these have no necessary signification. It is not necessary that this ratio should remain constant throughout the experience. for example. In point of fact. But. (I will endeavor to determine this with certainty before drawing up the memoir. It is easy to imagine cases in which there should be no such ratio. But it is requisite that there should be such a ratio.       Now as concerns the connection between probability and doubt. doubt has degrees of intensity.more than evident.       But when deduction relates to probability. In the next place. Ignorance is not sufficient. not insofar as it is deductive but insofar as it relates to a logical conception which in a sense deprives the reasoning of its necessary character. that is. is quite unadapted to expressing . it becomes open to criticism. It is evident that probability. probability is exclusively confined to cases where there is a "long run" of experience. in this crude form.       The rules of probability are easily deduced. and the processes of the doctrine of chance. But it is easy to show that the utility of the calculus depends on there being no law of the kind which would concern the application. it might be useful for us to believe more intensely in propositions which would less often deceive us than in such as would oftener deceive us. Objective probability is simply a statistical ratio.) It is commonly said that there is a law of the occurrence of the event. involving the conception of independent events. in a much clearer light than has hitherto been done. the majority of the books give formulae from which it would follow that the probability of a wholly unknown event is 1/2. may be criticized. perhaps even a universe in which there should be no such thing as probability. Fallacies. that is. we find the books stuffed with errors. I flatter myself that I shall put the whole matter. It is. we naturally "weigh" or "balance reasons. which shall not occur at any regular law of intervals. This is a matter requiring minute examination." as if the degree of our trust in them were significant of fact. only it is unknown to us. it is true. an endless series of events of a general character. probability 1 is that of an event which in the entire long run fails to occur only a finite number of times. but this subject will be postponed until all the legitimate modes of argument have been considered. besides that. I therefore in this memoir examine the nature of probability. From this follows the probability law. events such that the product of the number of occurrences of both into the number of non‐occurrences of both equals the product of the number of occurrences of the first only into the number of occurrences of the second only. regarding probabilities as statistical ratios. of which some definite ratio have a special character.

By way of illustration. I take out a handful. or at any rate. I show that there is no definite probability that a witness will tell the truth. at a perfectly even game. and whenever it is applied to do the work of induction or abduction it is utterly fallacious. when he retires from the table and gives place to a fresh player. which is a positive fact. though they are excessively complicated. and I now have strong reason for believing it approximately true. Pearson's extensions. The probability is 1 that any given player will ultimately net a gain. that it is by no means true that every contingent event has any definite probability. yet it becomes such when it deals with probability and certain allied conceptions.the state of knowledge generally. playing against a banker. Mathematical calculation is deductive reasoning. are not without value. The criticism is not properly of the deductive process but of those conceptions. It will have the advantage over Bertrand's book of being sound. But it is not true that there is any definite probability that it is true.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. Another point I make clear is the distinction between probability unity and certainty. applicable solely to hypotheses. This is illustrated by the case where a large number of players. From a bag of beans. For what would such a ratio mean? Would it mean that once in so often my conclusion is true? That depends on the general commonness of different distributions of beans in a bag. if this method is looked upon in an extravagant theoretical manner. but not if it is regarded as a way of formulating roughly an inductive inference. but other somewhat similar modifications of probability are called for. not a mathematical function. too. Mr.       This consideration affects the method of least squares. and yet the probability is 1 that in the long run the bank will not lose. I find this to be nearly so in the handful. and therefore that all will do so. there is an even chance that if the banker does not come out precisely even he will win. in order to test a theory which I have some other reason for entertaining. and thereby violate the very idea of least squares. that two thirds of the beans in the bag are black. each bet one franc each time until his [bet] nets a gain. and I shall endeavor to work out one or two of them. among other things. This is an important general maxim.       I give in this memoir a summary of all the ordinary scientific man needs to know about probability in a brief intelligible manner.311‐312         Although deduction is not directly and as such amenable to critic. I show that the "moral value" of a player's chances is quite irrelevant to the Petersburg . I describe the construction of an urn of black and white balls such that there is no definite probability that a ball drawn will be white. The relation of real evidence to a positive conclusion is not a mathematical function. and my theory is confirmed. I here examine the philosophy of probability and show.

and illustrate the bad influence they have had upon science. and their use exemplified.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.268‐270         It will be shown to be mathematically impossible that induction indefinitely persisted in should ultimately lead to a false conclusion in any case whatsoever. my subsequent discovery of forms of induction quite different from any there considered. whether there be any definite probability or not.       Rules by which all errors in the use of the doctrine of chances [can be identified] will be plainly laid down. but now stated in essential points more fully and clearly. Moreover. whether the universe be presided over by a malign power bent upon making inductions go wrong or not. and I correct various other errors current about probability. to which the applicability of the rules there developed is not evident. Such things might prevent inductions from being drawn. and rendering the whole more luminous. but they could not make them go ultimately . whether there be any real universe or not.paradox.375   MEMOIR   23 ON THE VALIDITY OF INDUCTION This restates the substance of the Johns Hopkins paper: relegating formalistic matters to separate sections.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. while formalistic matters are relegated to special sections. taking account of types of induction with which I was not acquainted twenty years ago. Other views will be considered more at large. Hume's argument about miracles will be analyzed. I shall now consider other views more fully.176         This memoir will repeat substantially the theory of induction given in my paper in the John Hopkins Studies in Logic. renders a new presentation necessary.

and demonstrate that assuming those premisses to be true. I show that the knowledge of certain uniformities (of which four types are the simplest) may so affect inductions.       I then proceed to inquire how far inductions may be strengthened or weakened by other arguments. which do not in themselves afford any information concerning the subjects of inquiry in the inductions.   From Draft A ‐ MS L75.wrong if they were rightly conducted and sufficiently persisted in. that the universe presents great uniformity. I show that that is erroneous. In particular. which not only have been put forward. upon the resemblance of the future to the past. Laplace's method would lead to the result that we know nothing about the truth of the conclusion. These rules are clearly formulated and illustrated historically. I go on to consider several other theories of induction which mostly amount to denying its validity. and it is false that the validity of the highest forms depends solely on that of any lower . The question of whether there is any objective sense in which they are true will be postponed to a separate memoir.39‐42         The doctrine commonly held that the validity of induction depends upon the uniformity of nature. But the doctrine is false in every sense. I find that there are no less than eight incompatible ideas of what the uniformity of nature consists in.       I now review all the other theories of induction. but which do give information strengthening or weakening any conclusions obtained. and that. I show that all such statements really mean nothing except that a badly conducted induction will lead to the truth. The most usual meaning attached to whichever of the two phrases happens to approve itself is really nothing but a dimly apprehended notion that some one of the lower forms of induction is valid reasoning. rightly applied. beginning with that of LaPlace which undertakes to assign a definite probability to the inductive conclusion. This will be proved incontestably in my book. Now it is nonsense to say that the validity of induction depends upon itself. From this principle follow certain rules of induction for each of the three types of induction. is erroneous. I next examine those theories that the future is like the past. and that they are not true. they do not in the least help the validity of induction. or what comes to the same thing. but are widely current.

it only amounts to this. The various maxims which are found in different books are passed in review and. are positively refuted. One question not very commonly studied is what is the character of a phenomenon which makes it call for explanation. . is simply meaningless. The theory of Dr. that a phenomenon demands explanation just insofar as it is surprising. however. Carus that it is irregularity. for the most part. if it be taken to mean that the truth of the hypothesis must be capable of being directly observed. Carus says it is irregularity.176‐178         History of the doctrine. But surprise is an emotion that arises as a sort of succedaneum for an explanation. Shall we. are found to sin only in vagueness. escapes the objections to other solutions.375   MEMOIR  24 ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF ABDUCTION       The categories furnish the definition of abduction. This. from which follows its mode of justification. or contrary to what might have been probably predicted from previous knowledge. Many other emotions have this same character. though the latter is defended with some power. give emotion a place in logic. Several rules of more or less value which have been given examined. Both these opinions can be decisively refuted. Venn that it is isolation. and that of Mr. such as a thing‐in‐itself. I consider the neglected question of what character it is in a phenomenon which logically makes that phenomenon call for explanation. or quite untenable. Comte's rule that a hypothesis must be "verifiable" is misunderstood. Venn says it is isolation. Dr. however. that a hypothesis must be intelligible. and from this again its rules. or such as supposing that in complete darkness all blue things turn bright scarlet. The true doctrine is nearly thus. If it is properly understood. perhaps all emotions.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. Mr.Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ­ MS L75. Another theory. This refutation does not apply to the theory that the character sought is that of being surprising. since an unverifiable hypothesis. is open to another kind of objection. then.

he is justified in unconditionally embracing the hypothesis which is alone consonant with the attainment of a comprehension of the truth. according to the theory of natural selection in its extended form. This justifies his assuming. The true doctrine [is] deduced mathematically from the categories. a certain lead will save the odd card. Idle interrogations are as noxious as can be. in the senses in which `self‐conscious' and `mind' are logically defined. What "can" be done depends on the amount of effort. the comprehension of the universe is the sole aim which a man can deliberately pronounce to be good. Still. Still. If. the whole interval between the moner and man has been traversed by insensible variations in reproduction. has no room to be false. no lead will do so. that our sole end may be reached. and from this in turn follow the rules of abduction. Induction. But no such psychological doctrine can be admitted into critical logic. The commander of an army is in battle. like natural selection. while if they do not lie in that way. and if. the case often comes to that. Perhaps the hypothesis that the universe is governed by a self‐conscious mind. that so the cards do lie. is the only one there is. take a concrete example. But he does know that if they lie in certain way. Possible hypotheses consist of such hypotheses as we can make. merely weeds out the unfit. But that is no sufficient answer to the question. as our ethical and esthetical discussions have shown is the case.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. I then show that all that an induction of this type really accomplishes is to ascertain the value of a ratio. for the purposes of the lead. How the cards lie. The battle is of such importance that the total sum of the . Nothing has any meaning aside from practical purposes. The justification of abduction follows from it. For so alone his end may be gained. an elastic word. for the purposes of conduct. It follows that the whole substance of science must come to us by abduction. it comes to this. Three rounds remain of a hand. Aside from its practical aspects a proposition cannot be false. But all belief is belief for the purposes of conduct. because a meaningless thing is not a proposition.270‐275         I open this intensely interesting question by showing that of the three types of induction one alone is of any real scientific value. in the same sense in which. and as such. The principle is that we are always justified in presuming. no doubt.and say that every emotion ought to be replaced by a scientific hypothesis? This is substantially what Socrates taught concerning fear. and whoever does not approve of an emotion will naturally say something analogous. abduction only concludes interrogatively. can be the justification for a hypothesis? In the first place. It need not be said that the hypotheses which perfectly fulfill that condition are extremely few. the effects of efforts converge toward a limit. that a certain hypothesis must be true or there is no comprehensible truth. the leader does not know. What. then. To fix our ideas. The only justification is that which is often illustrated in playing the game of whist. then. `Can' is. practically.

he will shrink from putting his darling theory to such a test. but otherwise cannot. I have for myself employed an algebraic notation to secure the accuracy of my work. As a unit of the scientific world. see in which there should be any comprehensible truth. he will not do half justice to the experiment.       Upon this theory of the validity of abduction I base certain rules for the practice of this kind of thought. at that time. in the limited time he has for considering the question. if he forgets his relation to general science. as an individual. If he is merely skeptical. notwithstanding their hard. he can wait five centuries. and Germanium. But as engaged in the investigation which it is his duty diligently to pursue. he must be ready the next morning to go on that hypothesis or to reject it. is the very exemplar of what the logic of abduction prescribes. if need by. before he decides upon the acceptability of a certain hypothesis. Then logic commands him to believe with his whole heart and soul that that position can be taken. . Now a scientific investigator is in a double situation. but I am not decided to make use of it in my memoirs. and think of the most surprising observable necessary consequence of it he can. What logic requires of him is that he should accept that hypothesis which is the only way that he can. As well as he can make out. He must combine the two attitudes. Yet it is here that they find themselves. which it is here that I find mine most efficaciously helpful. Scandium. That I should lay myself open to any just accusation of loose reasoning is not among the doubts which trouble me most. with which he in some measure identifies himself. logically. and yet not committing himself further than to do his best to try the experiment. drawing up his very rough arrangement of the elements. I am here only endeavoring to give a notion of the contents of this memoir. utterly deserted by their general conception of logic. if a certain position can be immediately taken. This illustrates how much the time that is allowed to form an opinion has to do. most of them.commander's duty is to win the day. In comparing these with those of other logicians I remark that I find in their doctrines far less that compels my dissent than in regard to induction. the battle may be won. with that opinion. although if he had time to make a reconnaissance it might be foolhardy and illogical in the extreme to come to such a conclusion merely from such data as are actually in his possession. and as a representative of the science of the race. inelastic conception of this kind of reasoning. and upon the basis of that risking his detailed descriptions of Gallium. and the next morning put that consequence to the test of experiment.       All this is inexact enough. at once ardent in his belief that so it must be. he ought to be in a double state of mind about the hypothesis. Being as he is in a double position. Mendeleef.

or cooperating. We have. views opposed to those which I deduce by my method will be carefully examined.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. as we may say. that is. we have arguments one of which concludes something. we have arguments which. but relating to the argument itself. produce the same identical conclusion in two different ways.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. both required to produce the conclusion. from identically the same premisses.       Finally.178         Among the matters specially interesting in this memoir are the influence upon different kinds of induction of different types of uniformities and the argument from analogy. either. and the argument from analogy is the chief example. first. This memoir is more important than might be supposed. arguments composed of independent arguments.       Next.376   MEMOIR   25 OF MIXED ARGUMENTS       This is a highly important memoir upon a subject of singular difficulty.377   .276         I here consider all kinds of mixed arguments.    Final Version ‐ MS L75. that is. competing. although at first blush one would not anticipate any difficulty or interest in it. These are the most remarkable of the mixed arguments. leading to the same result. In both cases. not relating to the conclusion of the other.

though it is not an attractive subject for a logician. 3rd. fallacies of the third class are extremely common. sophisms which cannot deceive a sound mind but which try the efficacy of logical rules. It would be like a chapter in a treatise on trigonometry which should treat of possible errors in trigonometry. mere slips. and I shall not confine myself to a purely logical consideration of it. The rules of good logic suppose good faith. 5th. and 5th. fallacies having their origin in loose logica utens or faulty logica docens. 2nd. showing under each head how they come about. 3rd. more so even than the first.178‐179         Few logicians of great theoretical force have manifested much interest in the general doctrine of fallacies. unless that objection is to be waived. and the remarks under this head ought to be serviceable. 4th. the fallacies of the fourth class are common enough. 2nd. too. 4th. the ignoratio elenchi and petitio principii are fallacies which presuppose that the logical process is sound.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. etc. Ought it to be treated as a branch of pure logic? Five classes of fallacies: 1st. but it is evident that no logical medicine can reach the seat of the disease. But since my purpose is that these memoirs should not only be scientific but that they should also be useful. I consider it a duty not to neglect this uninteresting subject. slips. 1st. 3rd. that I can make the discussion very useful. The five heads are: 1st. fallacies due to bad logical notions.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. but say what seems likely to be of service. misunderstandings. how to detect them and reply to others who fall into them. sophisms invented to test logical rules. fallacies due to moral causes.MEMOIR   26 OF FALLACIES       There would be no advantage in devoting a special memoir to a strictly scientific treatment of fallacies in general. 4th. I propose to devote this to fallacies because I think. 2nd. like errors in adding up a column of figures. certain rules may be given for checking our reasonings so as to correct slips. I shall not attempt a strict theoretical development. how we can avoid them in original reasoning and in controversy. according to their causes.276‐279   . fallacies having their origins in bad morals. misunderstandings. but shall discuss fallacies under five heads. Accordingly. 5th. logic began with sophisms and some of them still merit attention. no plea that an argument is one of these fallacies should be entered in case there is any objection to the logical process. This will thus be of an entirely exceptional character among the memoirs.

I call attention to a number of fallacies that are not mentioned in any of the books. I divide them into three classes. On the other hand. Another class of examples of fallacies. unless they be mere slips. I do not wish to be supposed not to admire the Germans. in the inexact logic docens. for all the latter's being one of the "Baconians" in Shakespeare‐ology. The Germans. I have carefully read a large number of German treatises on logic of a somewhat original and superior kind. Lambert. although some of the most magnificent reasoners have been Germans. in reality. Kepler is quite incomparable in inductive logic. Kant. sound. This is not true of English books. I am moved to say that they are not gods. I know no class of books in which fallacies so abound as works on logic and philosophy. is the extension of the doctrine of the burden of proof to cases where it has no meaning. such as the ignoratio elenchi and petitio principii. but where formalistic reasoners appeal to it as a source of knowledge. but when I see so many young Americans copying all their faults and generally worshipping them.      This is a subject which has very little attracted the attention of the stronger logicians and is consequently in the most deplorable condition. but which present problems in logic often highly instructive. In the third class. Among logicians. 2nd. To these may be added. I make an attempt to enumerate all varieties. a fallacy. as follows: 1st. . those which arise from misunderstandings. or more frequently. those which have their origin in loose logica utens. are naturally stupid about logic. 3rd. are objections to arguments as being fallacious which are. Leibniz. but are merely misunderstood by the objector to be arguments of a different kind from what they profess to be. any more than it would be to call attention to the ways in which there is danger of error in performing an algebraical computation. those fallacies which are mere slips. such as one may fall into in adding a column of figures. my observation leads me to conclude that persons of good sense whose minds are not vitiated by logical notions rarely fall into fallacies. My remarks about the petitio principii I hope will be useful. sophisms which really deceive nobody. indeed. The books are full of pretended refutations of fallacies where the reasoning criticized is really sound. But there is a vicious tendency to subjectivism in Germans whenever they deal with any subject that tempts that disposition. 4th. which is. but there are few English logics of any strength. Weierstrass and Georg Cantor superb in mathematical subtlety. But I do not think I ever met with a single one‐‐not even that of Schroeder‐‐which does not somewhere fall into an unquestionable and utterly indefensible logical fallacy. to which logicians are especially liable (and logicians are the most fallacious reasoners in the world). Such. yet still not utterly useless. as if it were a law of nature. Herbart are men of distinguished power. Indeed. for example. certainly at the least estimate over fifty of them. I think. Those of the first class are hardly worth notice.

But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment. should also evidently be included in methodeutic. and be true.378‐380   MEMOIR   27 OF METHODEUTIC       The first business of this memoir is to show the precise nature of methodeutic. there is no kind of argumentation that methodeutic can pass over without notice. how it differs from critic. an absolutely essential and distinct department of logical inquiry. its special subjects have always been understood to be the definition and division of terms. it is readily made useful to a researcher into any science. although it considers. upon the other hand. so far as its theory goes. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. abductions are the only ones in which. the reality. The formation of systems of propositions. Of the different classes of arguments. from the most strictly theoretical point of view. it has to develop the principles which are to guide us in the invention of proofs. Nor is methodeutic confined to the consideration of arguments. There is no such need of a subsequent choice after drawing deductive and inductive conclusions. how.279‐280         The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the nature of methodeutical logic. although it has been neglected. but what is advantageous. Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction. and how. In its method. it is nevertheless a purely theoretical study. it still remains to inquire whether they are advantageous. not what is admissible.  Final Version ‐ MS L75.   From Draft B ‐ MS L75. how it is. It strongly resembles the purely mathematical part of political economy. But just as critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended ultimate object. and not an art. But since the whole business of heuretic. after they have been admitted to be just. it is assumed that the signs considered will conform to the conditions of critic. or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. In methodeutic. falls under methodeutic. methodeutic is less strict than critic. Yet although methodeutic has not the same special concern with them. so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be pertinent to the purpose. which is also a theoretical study of advantages. those which are to govern the . On the contrary. even mathematics itself. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one.

In the economics of research the "laws" are mere general tendencies to which exceptions are frequent. so far as logic is concerned. and those which determine what problems shall engage our energies. Consequently. first. the principles of classification. throughout of an economic character. if we had not troubled ourselves to make the discovery. however. the conduct of abduction.380‐388   MEMOIR   28 ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH       In all economics the laws are ideal formulae from which there are large deviations. is to be governed by economical considerations. therefore. to expect to discover anything except such things as we may hope that time will reveal. It is proper.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75.general course of an investigation. at best. even statistically. and second. possible to attach a definite conception . Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made almost its only business are. the art of discovery is purely a question of economics. but utterly nonsensical. It is. Consequently. therefore. Now it follows from the nature of truth. as analyzed in an earlier memoir. The economics of research is. the principles of definition. Primarily. and of rendering ideas clear. to discover is simply to expedite an event that would occur sooner or later. which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic. The laws being so indefinite. and it extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic. It is. I show that it is here permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic or in critic.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. I show how this leads to methodeutic inquiries of other kinds and at the same time furnishes a key for the conduct of those inquiries. there is little advantage in very accurate definitions of such terms as `amount of knowledge'. that it is not merely hopeless. the leading doctrine with reference to the art of discovery.329‐330         I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. to begin with the study of heuretic. Consequently. methodeutic is nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone. in the study of methodeutic. Yet even as heuretic it indirectly has to consider other matters.

subject to similar large irregularities as in the case of the supply of a material commodity. we find that there is a "law. at least. while there are few branches of knowledge whose diffusion is already so great that a given increment of the diffusion will cost more and more. above which none at all would be sold. we know that in the latter case a given small increment in the supply is very expensive. The same general tendency appears in reference to the diffusion of knowledge. or amount thrown upon the market to fetch what it will. but here even greater. will correspond as before to the amount of attainment in scientific knowledge or in the diffusion of knowledge. the "law" is certainly very different from that. there is probably some maximum price for most things. I then consider the relation of each of these to the expenditure of energy and value required to produce them in varying conditions of the advancement of diffusion of knowledge already attained. Comparing knowledge with a material commodity. a small increment in that amount would actually diminish the total receipts from the sale of it. One would have to pay them to carry away more. With regard to the scientific utility of a small fixed advance of knowledge. the additional total amount that will be paid for the small increment of amount sold will correspond to the utility of the small fixed increase of scientific knowledge or of the diffusion of knowledge. as the diffusion is increased. For a material commodity we know that if it is given away people will only carry home a finite amount. In the first place. there is a point of attainment where the cost of an increment is at a minimum. in almost all cases. but there is this striking difference. that attainments in advance of sciences are very commonly actually on the upward slope where increments are costing more and more. The final increase of cost of an increment with the increase of attainment already achieved is marked. Putting instead of supply. while for any smaller amount the increment of receipts for a given small increment of amount sent to market would be less and less. Here. from which it increases to a very large but finite value of the supply where no further increment would be possible at any finite cost." or general tendency. the amount of knowledge attained. On the other hand. with varying amounts of that demand. This is to be compared with the variation of the total amount that will be paid for a commodity for a fixed small increment of the demand. this demand. To work this out will be the first business of the memoir. while the demand being equal to the supply. when the supply is very small. generally. there is no degree of . in most cases. I also establish a definite meaning for the amount of an increment in diffusion of one increment of knowledge being greater than another. It necessarily follows that beyond a certain amount thrown upon the market. that as the supply increases it sinks to a minimum.       I shall next pass to a study of the variation of the utility (meaning. while in many cases. or total amount that is sold. on the whole. the scientific utility) of given small increments of scientific knowledge and of the diffusion of knowledge in varying states of attainment.

not only is knowledge increased. Yet still. was this. The general effect. by preparing more men to be eminent researcher. but the facility of increasing knowledge gives us a return of more available means for research than we had before the necessary scientific energy was spent. now and then a small increment will be of great utility and will then immediately sink to its former level. the first increments cost more than they come to. and finally. for pure science exclusively. is nearly the same for the advancement as for the diffusion of knowledge. first. beginning with dense ignorance. Somebody furnishes a fund to be expended upon research without restrictions. knowledge is increased but scientific energy is spent and not at once recovered. of expending energy (which is of such a kind as to be equally capable of being directed either way) to the direct advancement of knowledge and to the diffusion of knowledge. This increases to a maximum.knowledge of which a small increase would be worse than useless. to give to research. to which I still adhere. should be continued while those conditions subsist. Researches for which men have been trained. that is.       I shall remark in the course of the memoir that economical . and a plant established. What sort of researches should it be expended upon? My answer. That is. by increasing general wealth. for the present. Namely. I find the latter so overwhelmingly more important (although all my personal sympathies are the other way) that it appears to me that. since like Rayleigh's small addition to our knowledge of the density of nitrogen. in which I considered this problem. Research must contrive to do business at a profit. at any rate without very important deflexions. a fortunate discovery may result in a new means of research. But I am not confident that this is so. I am inclined to think that the general tendency is that a given increment of diffusion is less and less advantageous to science the greater the attained diffusion. diminishes. instruments procured. will be profitable longer. But the new money should mainly go to opening up new fields. and. if it is persisted in. It is favorable in two ways. one or two per cent of what is spent upon education is enough. there is no further gain. however. in money. It cannot be believed that any increment of diffusion is positively unfavorable to science. But we very soon reach a state of knowledge which is profitable to science. No doubt it already does so. because new fields will probably be more profitable. in the case of energy expended upon research. But it would do well to become conscious of its economical position and contrive ways of living upon it. by which I mean that it must produce more effective scientific energy than it expends. and therefore the money bestowed on science. and while the general tendency is that the utility of such fixed increase becomes less and less. The scientific advantage of the diffusion of knowledge is difficult to determine. at any rate. I shall analyze as far as I can the relative advantages. and secondly. yet the curve is rather saw‐shaped.       Many years ago I published a little paper on the economy of research.

time. and helping the economy of every other science. Two such rules is particularly profitable to science. the less is likely to be the utility of a given increase of knowledge. The peculiarities of the individual case must always be considered. money. ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. upon the ground well prepared by Jevons and his teacher. which is. It was in the middle of the 13th century that a man distinguished enough to become pope opened his work on logic with the words. by far the most . costing little beyond the energies of the researcher.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. in its general analysis by Ricardo and others. and by the other great English researchers. required to produce a given increase of knowledge. etc. Berkeley. and Duns Scotus. Its chief fault is that no coefficient of average stupidity is introduced and no coefficient of average sentimentality. The cost is the amount of energy. that it relates to very large collections of individuals whose average character must be much more fixed than those of the single individuals.281‐287         Political economy. and that the more we already know. especially Boole. there are certain general rules. and it would express the purpose of my memoirs. Hence. especially the scientific utility. The irregularities are excessive. "Dialectica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum. a change of title which obscures an important feature of the science. whose gothic ornamentation proves upon scrutiny to involve no meaningless expression nor redundant clause. Political economy now goes by the name of economics. Jevons adopted the sentence as the motto of his most scientific contribution to logic. to lay a solid foundation upon which may be erected a new logic fit for the life of twentieth century science. Of course." This memorable sentence. both rules will be reversed. Glanvill. began a work wherein the idea of this sentence was executed satisfactorily enough for the dominant science of the middle ages. the consideration of which is far from being entirely useless. But if for the amount of knowledge we substitute the number of persons informed. that logical methodeutic and logic in general are specially valuable for science. the economy of research is perhaps the most profitable. their values would have to be determined for each class of society. Ockham. In the case of research we have something analogous although measures cannot be made with any precision. is a fine example of logical method. and that of all the branches of economy. DeMorgan. Whewell. which could have been introduced into the formulae. The chief factors to be considered are the demand at different prices and the cost of different amounts supplied. The amount of the commodity is to be represented by the amount of knowledge of a given subject. that the more we already know of a subject. subject to frequent exceptions. The price is represented by the utility of an addition to knowledge. the greater is likely to be the cost of a given increase of knowledge. Nevertheless.

it is bad economy to spend much on the advancement of science. In any given inquiry. decide the question between the respective utility of diffusing and advancing knowledge. But while you hold it. But if a hundred million were expended in teaching the people of the United States some things that are known respecting our protective tariff. I do not here mean by simple. other things being fairly equal or even considerably against equality. In the light of these considerations. the economy of research demands the opening up of new branches of knowledge as soon as the study of them can be conducted scientifically. so that unknown complications.       There are many economic reasons for preferring hypotheses which seem simple. For instance. and consequent expense of energy cannot arise. next whether it tends to infinity with x. ask whether y has a constant term. provided the more general are so by being simpler. because what is taught in churches is. But I wish one tenth of that amount could be appropriated to diffusing economic knowledge. prefer the hypothesis which if false can easily be proved to be so.valuable knowledge is that which is common experience. since people were nearly as good and happy before the days of steam and electricity. next whether its increments are approximately proportional to those of x. because that knowledge would produce the wealth requisite for the advancement and diffusion of all other knowledge. if it can very easily be dispatched. adopt it at once. instead of supposing y=a+bx+cx2+dx3+etc.       Now coming to pure science. and determining the coefficients. rather than in carrying to extreme perfection sciences from which the richest juice has already been pressed. For although steam and electricity are things of trifling value in themselves. This does not. having only one indeterminate element. it would produce a larger amount to be applied to the advancement of science. in itself considered. Among hypotheses choose one whose elements are well understood. prefer the latter. it is necessary to consider the economics of testing them more particularly. Carry forward the research that is promising: neglect the one whose outlook is dismal. I do not begrudge the money spent upon churches. if they are so by being complex. Ten millions is a small sum when we are thinking of seventy millions of people. yet I think it is evident that until people generally know enough to conduct affairs with reasonable economy. so as to do it full justice. the most valuable of all truth. it becomes a maxim of the economy of research that great encouragement should be given to applications of science. If for one inquiry several hypotheses are equally attractive. yet they become of extreme utility in causing great expenditures to be made for the advancement of pure science. in itself. hold it in good faith. etc. Prefer general hypotheses to special ones. and have done with it. although that is a manifest ground of . A great capitalist who is generous is a strange and wonderful phenomenon. and in another but one. while the people are naturally generous to the point of extravagance.

in using abduction you already commit yourself to the hypothesis that the truth is comprehensible to you. Especially. It is waste of energy.preference. besides being extremely compromising. How far there are any regularities in these relations. If our people could only learn enough political economy to see that it is a difficult science in which it is needful to trust experts. etc. do not attempt to explain phenomena isolated and disconnected with common experience.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75.       Nothing unknown can ever become known except through its analogy with other things known. there would be far more money to spend on science than the genius of the country could use to the best advantage. there is an application of economics to the preparation of men for becoming great when great men are needed. I also consider." That is the very reason why the study should wait. I examine the question of the kinds of knowledge of which the diffusion is most desirable. you scarcely make an additional hypothesis in assuming that that which is more akin to your natural way of thinking is more likely to be true. extending even into details of scientific procedure. I give what I have been able to deduce. It will not be ripe until it ceases to be so strange.180‐181         The chief factors are [the] relation of the amount of increments of knowledge. including economics. "scientific men ought to investigate this. of greatest importance. I give an account of certain investigations into the mode of development of great men. and therefore that what is akin to your mind is likely to be true. and second.       Do not waste your time over questions concerning which facts are scanty and not to be gathered. I find that the advantage to research from such diffusion is. Turn a deaf ear to people who say. in the present condition of things. If one has a great researcher it is a terrible waste not to use him. I find the conditions not dissimilar to those of the production of giant trees in a forest. I find the normative sciences. Therefore. to the scientific utility. to the necessary expenditure of energy. There is much to be learned from the study of the economics of research. but I mean simple to human apprehension. first. the economics of the diffusion of knowledge. supposing that energy to be equally available in either direction. Being committed to this. exclusively in the interest of the advancement of science.       All these maxims are so many theorems of logic which I shall endeavor in my memoir to present in systematic form. even greater than the same amount of energy expended in research itself. always in the interest of the advancement of science. because it is so strange. Consequently. The analytical part of political economy is directly .

dependent on logical methodeutic. It is a question whether it is not
a branch of logic.

End of PART 8 of 10 of MS L75

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  Final Version ­ MS L75.389­390  

      Comparing the two wings of the special sciences, i.e.,
psychognosy and physiognosy, and taking the history of their
development as a basis, but correcting the history, as well as we
can, in order to make it conform to what good logic and good
economy would have made it, we get the idea of rational courses of
development which these branches might have followed. Between
these two there is a striking parallel; so that we can formulate a
general rational course of inquiry. Now passing to the study of the
history of special sciences, also modified by the same process, we
find some traces of the same law; or to express it more clearly, it is
as if the special science showed us one part of the general scheme
under a microscope. By successively examining all the sciences in
this way (or all I am sufficiently able to comprehend), we can fill in
details and make the general formula more definite. We find here a
succession of conceptions which we can generalize in some
measure, but which we find it difficult to generalize very much
without losing their peculiar "flavors." These I call the categories of
the course of research. They have not the fundamental character of
the categories of appearance, but appear, nevertheless, to be of

  From Draft E ‐ MS L75.183  

      Endeavors to formulate a general method, as well as special
methods as much generalized as possible. Studies the connection
between, 1st, natural classification; 2nd, a general formula of
evolution; 3rd, a general formula in the history of intellectual
development; 4th, the general formula of the course of research.
Inquires into the proper method of attacking the present question.
There are results; but there remains much to be discovered.

  From Draft D ‐ MS L75.298‐302  

      One must suspect that a close relation exists between this
problem and that of classification; and since this one ought, one
would think, to be connected with some law exhibiting itself in the
history of science, we should expect a deep, sympathetic study of
the history of science to throw a light on the secret of the
categories of the classificatory hierarchy. It was owing to a hope
that this might turn out to be the case, and that those hierarchical
categories might have other useful applications, that I have
bestowed great study on the history of science.
      The general course of the history of science has been something
like this. The first scientific problems to be taken up were medicine,
pneumatology, cosmogony, etc., which mostly seem hopeless today.
The result was that some successes began to be attained in
arithmetic and in the simplest parts of astronomy, and shortly there
was some development of geometry. We find in Pythagoras the
beginnings of a true science of the categories. His numbers were
categories; that is, elements of the phenomenon; and they bear a
certain general resemblance to my categories. The duality on which
he so much insisted was my second category, that of reaction. His
examples show this. He looked too much on the formal side of it,
but this was a good fault. We next find the Greeks developing a most
extraordinary understanding of esthetic truths. A little later, in
Socrates, we meet with a lofty ethical science. Logic follows in
Plato, thoroughly worked out in Aristotle. Metaphysics also takes
important steps; and that of Aristotle (a mere reworking of Plato) is
in some respects better than what is current today. We also find in
Aristotle decided success in psychology, the doctrine of association
being well stated. His mechanics was excessively bad. His biology
very rudimentary. Then came further successes in the simpler parts
of astronomy. Statics was established. Grammar became worked
out. Thus the order of development was substantially, and quite
minutely, that of my table of the classification of the sciences,
which I drew up exclusively to express the present state of the
sciences as living today. The only exception is that the beginnings of
several descriptive sciences were made although I place them at the
bottom. Omitting them, and also geometry, in which additions were
continually [text obscure: ed.], the order was: arithmetic, the
categories, esthetics, logic, metaphysics, psychology, statics,
      Modern science is to complex to permit any such arrangement.
The general law is that of progress from the more abstract to the
more concrete. The history of any well‐developed science exhibits
the same law. In optics, the doctrine of rays and perspective came
first. The law of reflexion was early discovered. The law of
refraction was the first modern discovery early in the 17th century.
The velocity of light was ascertained in 1676. Polarization,
diffraction, and dispersion were discovered about the same time, as
well as phenomena which were really those of interference. Thus,

    Final Version ‐ MS L75. Then the main phenomena were discovered and mathematically formulated. In this way I work out a series of conceptions which I term the categories of systems. 29.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.391   MEMOIR   31 .       I have accumulated a considerable store of truth concerning the course of scientific discovery of almost all branches.       Here. Then the formal theory of the constitution of light was lit upon and worked out mathematically. I follow the same general heuretic method as in the memoir. a purely geometrical account of the phenomena of ordinary experience was worked out.390‐391   MEMOIR   30 0N SYSTEMS OF DOCTRINE       Singularly enough. The electrical theory of light dates from 1873. It was approved by Euler. and Hooke showed that it would explain the colors of thin plates. but I have not yet brought it into the form of a system. therefore. But it was not until 1817 that Young saw the vibrations were transverse. No. The general theory of undulations was suggested by Huygens. it seems to have been left to me to make a first attempt to formulate in detail what a system of doctrine ought to be. and imagining how they might be more rational. taking some of the most perfect systems extant.the main phenomena were already known. as I propose to do in this memoir. and finally the material theory of its constitution arose from a mathematical analysis of another branch of physics.

and all classification is more or less natural. All classes are more or less natural. that is to say. and I think with some success. Since then. The study of classification has been largely pursued by me in the light of actual classifications of objects wholly or partially artificial. sciences. etc. such." he surely must give some reason: he cannot be content with saying that it impresses him as such. From these I endeavor to elicit a general series of categories of classification. I do not know whether to say anything about it in this memoir or not. without obtaining any clear response. or it will be that this character is of an order of characters. if one asks a naturalist why he considers a character "important. because the naturalists did not seem to take to it. contrivances for keeping the skin warm. From these classifications I ought to be able to deduce an answer to the question whether there are any universal hierarchical categories of classification. be those . This importance must ultimately resolve itself into an importance of the first kind. It is an elusive question. words. by actually drawing up a number of classifications of the only sort of objects which we can sufficiently comprehend." Every class which embodies information. different classes of objects of human creation.ON CLASSIFICATIONS       I study classification. in the sense that something is true of all its members beyond what is involved in the definition of the class. like those of Agassiz. with a view to studying his method of classification. customs of various kinds. that subject being a branch of logic. for example. I have done an enormous amount of hard work that ought to bear on this question. sciences. as for example a particular likelihood to taking certain forms. If this purpose is the idea governing the production of the objects classified. so the importance consists in a character's universally carrying with it certain others. I had been a special student under Louis Agassiz for about six months.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. after some general considerations. as its relating to the skeleton of the animal. languages. I mean languages.288‐298         In 1867 I worked out a theory of natural classification which I never published. which are generally important. Now his reason will either be that this character involves certain others. the classification is "natural. etc. such as. is a natural class.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. alphabets. I have endeavored to penetrate further into the matter. so that their real nature is less occult than that of the forms of nature. By objects partially artificial. I continue to think that the definition I then gave of an important character is just.181‐183         All classification is based on a purpose. Namely.

or some tendency to an end. has reference to some purpose. and to a slight degree only upon force. except that it becomes sensible only at small distances. and with velocities also distributed according to a statistical law. taxonomic characters do not generally carry others with them. Take. The result is due to the statistics of the equal masses. and in such a way that if. The objection made by the naturalists was that above families. the phenomenon of the diffusion of gases. But in saying this they were evidently limiting too much their conception of a character. that it is composed of equal molecules distributed according to a statistical law. within limits. that so few characters are important. Namely. Force has very little to do with it. because the equation of motion is merely a differential equation of the second order. almost regardless of its character. and the motions of the molecules. the true objection to the definition is not. This is because crude and incomplete notions of "energy" and mechanical force have so taken possession of empty heads that they do not perceive that according to the general equation of motion no state of things is due exclusively to the action of forces. which all my study confirms me in holding to be correct. and that only insofar as there is a force. These features of a gas. that means that the character imports some other. so that there are six circumstances for each particle that are not due to force. it is that an important character must not only entrain others. or the problem would not attract any attention. and it is obvious that. its being brought about by one line of mechanical causation be prevented. appear as important under that definition. even quite trivial ones. it will be brought about. for example. I mean that a certain result will be brought about. that all characters. This definition is the one always virtually used by physiologists in determining whether there is a tendency to an end. and a very fundamental correction it is. Every classification has reference to a tendency toward an end. or some said above species. by an independent line of mechanical causation. on the contrary. the molecules not being appreciably under the influence of forces. For there must be some reason for regarding a character as important. or approached. By a tendency to an end. in the last analysis. as they always must. or approached. it is something of which there is a unitary conception. to the needed correction of the conception of importance. That brings us back to Agassiz's conception of natural classification. but. but it must entrain another which has relation to the purpose in view. at once. is an . every classification whatsoever. If this tendency is the tendency which has determined the class characters of the objects. This consideration leads. the positions. Namely. and it very generally happens that the most important characters are due to other factors. a general character of the result is due to other factors than force. In fact. as the naturalists said to me at that time.others no more than tendencies. be it merely arranging words in alphabetical order. Persons whose conceptions are in need of logical training may misunderstand the statement that the end is not brought about by mechanical force. Now in case these trillions of circumstances present any general character.

not in the opposite way. Petrie at Naucratis. I shall. in the sense of being governed mainly by force. the phenomenon of diffusion is a tendency toward an end. In order to illustrate this. was very old. We can even say. which is manifestly a tendency to an end. if not older. it will. and as far as individual weights are concerned. how often this occurs. and the Darwinian machinery for it is reproduction. Therefore. whatever flavor it may take. discuss the weights found by Prof. I will give another example to show that the general principle which seems to underlie the naturalists' notion. is false. It was Aristotle's. we soon find this idea refuted. But how far these errors affect their work. and if hindered.       As a specimen of what I refer to as erroneous notions entertained by naturalists about classification. when freed. within certain limits. least of all in the Darwinian flavor. roughly. that force is a subsidiary agency in nature. I do not know. it works one way. The neo‐Darwinians seem to wish to make reproduction and variation as mechanical as they can. that in certain cases. This is a praiseworthy effort. beyond all reasonable doubt and so clearly that every naturalist must see the force of this argument. I need not say that the idea itself. namely. I fancy that the study of nature must largely force the right ideas upon them largely. It is very easy to see by a general survey of nature. and Agassiz was right in saying that such a classification must have reference to an intellectual idea. a naturalist does not prove that two species are not natural classes by merely showing that they blend. If we turn to classifications of human works. and not the opposite way.intellectual character. recommence in such way as it can. therefore. As a consequence of this. that an object has not distinct parts unless those parts have definite limits. For natural development takes place in one way. although they can be separated statistically. and admirably worked over by him. by an application of the principles of probability. The two classes of weights merge. I only note that naturalists certainly entertain a number of opinions about classification which are not true of classification generally. Not only is an end an intellectual idea. I may mention the idea that if two classes merge into one another they cannot be natural classes. because it must inevitably eventuate in making the truth more plain that they are not mechanical. a weight intended to conform to the lighter standard was heavier than another weight intended to conform to the heavier standard. There ought. it is impossible to say which standard certain individual weights were intended to conform to. where the true principles of natural classification are beyond question. in the memoir. I do not know enough about biology to entertain a definite opinion that the work of classification is now conducted by a wrong method. but every intellectual idea governing a phenomenon produces a tendency toward an end. where weights were intended to conform to two different standards. to be discoverable natural classifications in nature. merge inextricably. like almost every profound and important idea of philosophy. Accordingly. The theory of natural development is in nowise opposed to this. . I show.

however. however. no other would ever be used. means of protection of human beings from cold. discovered any particular law of the succession of problems‐‐at least none that I should care to put forward. best studied in classifying different branches of human inventions and other human creations. a lake with two islands in it certainly consists of two simple parts. But I have found out some things. It will evidently be necessary to take account of the purpose of the classification. Indeed. I think there must be some general categories of classification.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. and that it may be that those of Agassiz approaches them. the latter point needs no attention. the first step must certainly be to analyze the conditions of the problem. I believe. resulting in new improvements. The first obvious suggestion is to surround it with a non‐conductor. or almost any way. The skin must be under atmospheric pressure. But several other conditions have to be fulfilled. It is merely the skin which must not lose heat too rapidly. I should also expect my general categories to be of aid in determining the categories of classification. whence comes thought. whether. Yet what I have found out seems worth giving. [illustrative graphical figures omitted]       I do not pretend to have had any signal success in my studies of classification. In these cases. or to decide what will best be done in a given case. and if no inconveniences attached to this method. I have made classifications of artificial contrivances whose genesis we can indubitably understand. The human body generates heat. and all that is requisite is to keep the skin and the air that is breathed at certain temperatures. if by a simple part we are to understand a part not enclosing an island. and yet not too rapidly.Namely. First. that there is some truth in them. at all events.       I have not. Practically. extended.335‐343         I do not pretend to have reached any signal result in my studies of classification. there is a form with its peculiar characteristic of flavor. for example. resulting in one or more new forms (all novelty involves the first category) which in process of time has to contend with new difficulties. at yet. without. a new analysis is made. But. the object be to gain a conception of what has been done. is. But the boundaries may be drawn as [below]. for example. which have been. the person must not be . wherever I have tried them they seem to answer the purpose. Let us consider. The reaction of experience develops manifest inconvenience. convincing me of more than this. sufficient evaporation must go on from its surface. it must be supplied with oxygen. we find a course of experience in which my three categories are repeated in order over and over again. Classification.

encumbered with heavy clothing, and the man must not be
imprisoned. On account of the last condition, the reliance must be
upon something in the nature of clothing, and yet on account of the
last but one, when the man is quiescent this clothing must not be
too heavy. On account of the vast difference in the evolution of heat
of a man in exercise and at rest, unless we can find some light
clothing which conducts heat better when the man is in motion than
when he is still, he must be differently protected in the two states.
Thus, if we are making our classification for the purpose of finding a
good solution of the problem of keeping the skin in good condition,
the first class of conceivable contrivances will be a clothing weighing
as little as possible, as devoid of elasticity and resistance as
possible, somewhat porous, and conducting heat much better when
the man is in motion than when he is at rest. Then the question
arises, shall this be carried out by means of some peculiar material
or by means of some mechanical contrivance. Either of these
methods would require some clothing not cumbrous and yet warm
enough to make it safe and comfortably for a man to sleep without
other protection. This might be devised; although it would be
somewhat expensive. But clothes must be changed, and the man
must bathe. These conditions are not impossible of fulfillment. But a
chemical change of conductivity is for the present out of the
question. Then the clothing must be so made that motion causes it
to open and admit air. This suggests very loose clothes capable of
being tightened, if one could find a fashion of loose clothes which
were not in the wearer's way in moving about. A man needs a house,
it is true; and we have adopted the unhealthy practices of living in
the house and of eating hot food. If we lived out of doors, it would
be unsafe to eat hot food. A house ought to be a storage place only.
However, granting that a man wants to live in the house, his plan
has been to put on extra clothing when he goes out. If he is going to
live in the house, the question is what clothing he should wear in
the house. If the mean annual temperature is high enough, he need
only have a large enough space to store sufficient air, and ventilate
it only when the sun shines sufficiently to heat the house by means
of a glass‐house arrangement. He will then wear just clothing
enough in the house to make up the difference, and no artificial
heat will be needed. It is obvious that if we are to live in the house,
the walls should be made so thick and impervious to heat that
artificial heat is unnecessary, except perhaps during the winter
storms. It is singular that we do not pursue this mode of life either.
We live in houses so ill ventilated as to cause frightful loss of life and
render old age rare, and yet we build them so wretchedly as to
involve great expense in heating them. We wear clothing which is
heavy, tiresome, and unhealthy, without being warm enough. Since
we insist in living in such places, and refuse to make use of the heat
of the sun, which would easily heat a house throughout the winter
with a proper contrivance, except in unusual weather, we have to
consider artificial heat. In order to generate heat, we must have a
source of energy. We ask, first, whether there is energy at our doors
to be used, and, second, where we can find it. Every man has the

sun, the wind and earth currents; many men have water‐power and
tides. All these might be utilized to heat a house, for nothing is so
easily done as to convert energy into heat, but so far it has not been
done economically, except by direct solar heat, which I have already
considered. The only sources of procured energy of any
consequence at present or hitherto are muscular energy and
combustion. The former is too expensive. We are reduced to
combustibles. Then the question is, shall the combustion be
performed in the house, or out of the house. In the former case,
shall our fuel be solid, liquid, or gaseous. In the latter case, are we
to bring a heated substance, say steam, into the house, or are we to
bring in an electric current? Going back to the former case, we have
a cross‐classification, according as the combustion is to be
performed in the very room that is to be heated, or hot air, steam,
hot water, or electricity is to be carried through the house.
      We thus have the beginning of a classification of means of
keeping warm, and our business now is to look this over and see
what we can learn about classification. The course of our discussion
has been this. Beginning with the purpose, which was somewhat
complex, we analyzed it; and owing to the complexity of the
purpose but one solution of the problem of attaining it seemed to
present itself. But it was found that that solution involved certain
inconveniences, which seemed to be due to the interference of
another purpose. A new problem thus arose which was analyzed and
solved. But this solution was found to involved inconvenience. The
result was a new problem whose conditions were simpler, for the
reason that the inconveniences had caused us to overrule some of
the original requisitae. Being simpler, half a dozen methods of
solving it arose. It is evident that any such discussion will present a
problem, where the third category is prominent; then a solution,
where the first category comes into prominence; then an
inconvenience, where the second category rises into prominence;
then another problem, and so on. At each solution we have
generally a subdivision. That is, there will generally be several
      If anything of this sort is to be found, say in zoological
classification, each branch would be a solution of the problem of
producing an animal. But an inconvenience arises in connection with
each, and each class is a solution of the problem of dealing with that
inconvenience, and so on. This, however, does not seem to accord
with the facts. It seems more reasonable, if we are to adhere to the
formula of alternate solutions and inconveniences, to suppose that
there was first a moner, which, owing to reactions with its
environment produced rhizopods, gregarina, etc. That finally, owing
to changed conditions, a sponge, a worm, and a hydra were
severally produced as solutions of the problem. That the hydra after
minor difficulties had resulted in various new forms until a greater
crisis gave rise to a crinoid, etc.

      But I attach no particular value to all this, in its present state.


  Final Version ‐ MS L75.391‐392  

      In January, 1878, I published a brief sketch of this subject
wherein I enunciated a certain maxim of "pragmatism," which has of
late attracted some attention, as indeed, it had when it appeared in
the Journal Philosophique. I still adhere to that doctrine; but it
needs more accurate definition in order to meet certain objections
and to avoid certain misapplication. Moreover, my paper of 1878
was imperfect in tacitly leaving it to appear that the maxim of
pragmatism led to the last stage of clearness. I wish now to show
that this is not the case and to find a series of categories of

  From Draft E ‐ MS L75.182  

      In January, 1878, I published a very brief sketch of my doctrine
of this subject, including a maxim of "pragmatism," which has of late
years attracted some attention. I there developed three grades of
clearness of ideas. I now propose to treat all these more completely.
Especially, my former account of pragmatism omitted most
important questions and limitations. Furthermore, I am now
prepared to show that there is a fourth, still higher grade of
clearness, which I think I ought to set forth clearly.

  From Draft D ‐ MS L75.287‐288  

      In 1877 I published a paper on this subject in which I set forth a
doctrine called "pragmatism" which has since been talked of. But I
know more about the clearness of ideas than I did a quarter of a
century ago. I there described three grades of clearness: 1st, that
which results from familiar use of the conception; 2nd, that which
results from logical analysis, and is expressed by a formal definition;
and 3rd, that which results from understanding the practical
implication of the conception. I propose in this memoir to develop

392‐395   MEMOIR   33 ON OBJECTIVE LOGIC       The term `objective logic' is Hegel's. maintain.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. keys. Having thus distorted both sides of the truth. I undertake in this memoir to show that so far from its being a metaphorical expression to say that Truth and Right are the greatest powers in this world. But when I. `objective logic' necessarily means more for me than it did for him. For instance. you direct a person to think of a man with a bad cold. its meaning is just as literal as it is to say that when I open the window in my study. I shall show. to define coryza. I give to objective logic a waking like which was absent from Hegel's dreamland. shirt‐buttons. For the mode of causation in the one case and in the other is precisely the same. which I . and what you have left is a beautifully clear notion of coryza. resulting from an appreciation of the intellectual relations of the definitum. Now take away his pocket‐ handkerchief. and fail in justice to that side also. it was a small thing for him to say that Begriffe were concrete and had their part in the activity of the world. Finally. loose change. he imagined he reduced it to a mode of being represented). and at the same time he was obliged to strain the nature of thought. nevertheless. In fact. and higher. I shall give the whole theory of definition and discuss its principal forms. and guard against extravagant applications. that ideas really influence the physical world. there are two modes of causation corresponding to Aristotle's efficient and final causation. I am really exercising an agency. and in doing so carry their logic with them. Hegel ignored the category of reaction (that is. gloves. boots. for him. and soul. Then successively take away his clothes. I shall develop a fourth. Then take away his watch. was merely represented activity. knife. and hat.these three grades with fullness and not in the sketchy manner of a magazine article. grade of clearness. but since I reject Absolute Idealism as false. pocket‐book. body. the great harm done by that definition by abstraction of which the Germans are so fond. since that activity. I hope quite convincingly. with my scientific appreciation of objectivity and of the brute nature of reaction. I shall explain the doctrine of pragmatism more fully. thus failing to do justice to being. In saying that to be and to be represented were the same. Let me explain.

although it would not be a truth germane to a physical investigation. 30. this gives a slight but steady pressure toward what is true and just. upon the whole. Now the fashionable theory is that my physical actions are entirely explicable from beginning to end by mechanics. Now it is. I may go through a process of thought ending in a desire to have my window open. true that Justice and Truth are not physical forces. a physical force is requisite.       If I. But that no more proves that Justice and Truth are not causes. In order that a physical effect should be produced.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75.       The remaining three memoirs are of the nature of elucidations of sound methodeutic by applying it in practice to the solution of certain questions. if one is determined to look upon the matter from one side alone. and to say that I can open my window is to say than an idea can be an agent in the production of a physical effect. are not causes. if one will. I pass beyond pure logic. but it has the advantage over the other statement of being the pertinent truth when we are considering the phenomena of the advance of Truth and Justice. are of special interest in the discussion of logic. and that. I say to myself. which. One may say. yet. 29. showing that both must concur to produce any effect whatever. sitting in my study. notwithstanding the miserable motives that seem to be the strongest in almost all men. and no more are men's minds. that my consciousness is merely an inward aspect of certain physical . The mind is nothing but an organism of ideas. but I pass this by. that human energy and physical force give Justice and Truth the only efficacy they have. but that the only agencies are men. than it proves that human minds. begin to feel warm. Justice and Truth are the greatest powers in the world. since their injustice and lies balance one another. although they do not belong to logic. I must rise from the table. and if I am to open it. The next thing I can clearly discern is that I am across the room opening my window. One may say. to the consideration of the outward influence of ideas. which act in precisely the same way. and go on to examine the logic of ideas in their physical agency. that they are not powers at all: that the fact simply is that men are somewhat disposed to tell the truth and to act justly when they can detect no disadvantage in doing so.analyze and make clear. This naturally looks toward a special metaphysics of the soul. Herein I find the key to the different series of categories which the studies of memoirs Nos. This is not only just as true.382‐387         In this memoir. It is a remarkable fact that. as not germane to my present subject. 31. I must open it. if I want my window open. 32 developed. no doubt. and thereupon my thought becomes sunk in the depths of consciousness. But it is quite as true to say that Justice and Truth animate their defenders and communicate power to them.

      If my arguments are sound. You may say. Finally. and these ideas are mere aspects. then. it is not a real fact. I do not admit that it is an admissible hypothesis that consciousness and a chemical action in the brain are two aspects of something. consequently again no falsity. if there were nothing but matter there could be no such thing as reasoning. There is no way of overthrowing it except by hard fact. Then I am bound to say what sort of being it has. other than a mere aspect. If there is any falsity. it is not false to say that the mind is a substantial entity entirely independent of matter. Next I say. Since. Next. It has no being other than its being represented. But not performing any of the processes which logic criticizes. I will develop these arguments in the memoir.       Let us start then with the theory of pure materialism. Truth. a symbol could not determine a physical effect.phenomena. I propose to defend this proposition in this memoir. I shall be told. because that involves the hypothesis that there is a something for them to be aspects of. if there were nothing but matter there could be no habit. if you please. To this I rejoin that it cannot probably shown that habit would explain it. For my part. then. machines constructed by mind to fulfill a special process which they are made to fulfill by the action of mind on matter. that the only substance is matter. there could not be a law of nature. that if there were nothing but matter. and that if this aspect did not exist at all. and that I cannot admit because it is an utterly unverifiable hypothesis. I say. nor even any higher kind of mathematical reasoning. The mind is nothing but the complex of a brain's ideas. if there were no mind. An aspect is an idea. certainly no falsity. There are logical machines. and that mind is a mere aspect. if a chemical change is a mere aspect. but only uniformities. If there be no falsity. and I hope to make them convincing. that matter could not feel. Well. as it happens to do. I think this flagrant nonsense. an aspect is merely a mode of being represented. I grant that it is worthless. will be the answer. That will not involve the same absurdity. Right. In short. the whole physical universe must go by the board (for a chemical change is as real as any physical fact). the laws of mechanics would still make all my conduct from the cradle to the grave just what it is. Yes. I believe that such facts abound. I say. As for the common objection to materialism. there are no laws of nature. It is a fundamental position of logic. That is an intelligible position. But it is difficult for me to imagine that all the strong minds who pretend to believe in "psycho‐physical parallelism" really fail to see that it is utter nonsense. That is pure materialism. and even if it does. that being and being represented are entirely different. I say that if there were nothing but matter. without which there can be no distinction of truth and falsity. I join issue there. My opponents will say that habit explains it. there could be no such power as we observe in abstract ideas [such as] Beauty. This I postpone to the . an idea is not a mere aspect. a meaningless piece of metaphysics. being and being represented are different.

Moreover. but there is none of them [of which the] statement of my argumentation cannot be much amplified and improved. How? Von Hartmann's unconscious mind. I have discussed these different questions in half a dozen different papers. Proof that they really influence matter. by an accident of history. I am sure. by which I mean the logical processes of ideas acting upon the external world. if it can be called logic. Among the questions is that of nominalism and realism. between which positive facts must decide. Laws of nature are memoir. in connection with which I shall show that all modern philosophy.395‐396   MEMOIR   34 ON THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE       The vagueness of the language with which men commonly talk of the uniformity of nature at once masks the diversity of a number of distinct questions which are wrapped up together in that phrase. and ideas directly only upon ideas. Small weight of psychical research. This. A tertium quid inadmissable. and to which new historical matter cannot bring considerable light. I propose to give a sketch of this sort of logic. Recent physical research tends to favor the possibility. The logical process of active ideas. These facts will be discussed.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. . It appears to be true that matter can act directly only upon matter.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. and consider them together. Psycho‐physical parallelism is meaningless. Still it does not follow that matter cannot act on ideas and ideas on matter.183‐184         Have ideas any power in the physical world? Absolute idealism is contrary to fundamental principles of logic. and at the same time masks the great diversity of opinions that are very commonly held upon these questions. I wish to bring all the different questions to one focus. has been blind to consider‐ ations of the greatest evidence and moment. The two tenable positions are materialism and spiritualism. At present I wish to consider objective logic. will cause thinkers to be more favorable to the views which I have at different times defended.

    Final Version ‐ MS L75. I do not think any theory satisfactory which does not offer some explanation (a mathematically exact and evident one) of why space should have . This question is considered in the light of the methodeutic developed in previous memoirs. and also a mode of action substantially Aristotle's final causation. certainly no other modern philosopher.396‐397   MEMOIR   35 ON METAPHYSICS       The great distinction between Aristotelian philosophy and a modern philosophy is that the former recognized a germinal mode of being inferior to existence. I may say briefly that I defend the well‐known opinion of Newton. which hardly [even] Schelling does.    Final Version ‐ MS L75.308         {From Draft D (308)} In this memoir I defend essentially Aristotelian opinions which give room for the real being and agency of ideas. distinguishing an esse in futuro from an esse in praeterito and an esse in praesento. The result is applied to all the questions of high metaphysics.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. as well as physical action which is substantially his efficient causation.397   MEMOIR   36 ON THE REALITY AND NATURE OF TIME AND SPACE       This applies my methodeutic to the discussion of a question which will have repeatedly emerged during the course of the memoirs. But other questions are considered.

308         I hold. I discuss the question of whether they are so or not.   From Draft D ‐ MS L75. with Newton. that time and space are real entities. .three dimensions. and then consider their real properties.

I should. direct or indirect. Particularly is this true when the man has accumulated a large fund of unpublished results. not have gone so far as I have done. The latter kind of utility is not much diminished if I have fallen into some errors. These lines of thought are two. I will first venture upon a few suggestions along the latter line. suspicions as to the candor of his appreciations may be suggested by those who. that the person who was to do it should be saturated with faith in its utility and value. Beyond averring that conviction. any man over sixty years of age. is a better judge of his own powers and of the utility of his performances than other people can be expected to be. indeed.Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75       L75 Version 2                                                        Final Version ­ MS L75. Yet as soon as such a man assumes the attitude of seeking recognition for the utility of his work. were I not persuaded that the Executive Committee ought to require. for the other sciences? I am not of opinion that a science of logic is altogether indispensable to any other science. as one of the first conditions of extending aid to any work. for any reason. The one bears upon the value of my researches considered as contributions to pure science. which is at present in a bad way. who is endowed with reason. are unfavorable to the action he desires. upon the progress of other sciences. I shall confine myself to asserting in a general way my profound conviction of the utility of publishing my results. but still more as themselves stimulating a most important branch of science. that of logic. which he gradually corrects under the influence of . may determine an opinion in regard to the utility of the work I propose. I do not offer myself as a witness to the utility of the work. the other relates to their probable influence. as likely to influence some sciences.       For that reason.       I will indicate certain lines of thought which.       What would be the degree of utility of a really good and sound methodeutic.398­408   SECTION  2 ESTIMATE OF THE UTILITY OF THE WORK       To my apprehension. supposing that it existed. if pursued by the Executive Committee. because every man has his instinctive logica utens.

has had so beneficial an influence as unquestionably it has. it is strange to see a man like Poincare (whom I mention only as a most marked case among many) who. Indeed. because. which needed it most. so precisely it is. that of Mill. But think of a man whose business it is to lend out money. There are many fields in which few will maintain that any theoretical way of reaching conclusions can ever be so sure as the natural instinctive reasoning of an experienced man. and yet he is not guided by a theory of reasoning. within its proper domain. instinct. but that. enough has been done to make it manifest that there is such a thing as strictly scientific logic. Now it is displeasing to me to be forced to decry Mill's Logic. I mean a cry that those who have not closely studied are better judges than those who have. The doctrine of chances has been called the logic of the exact sciences. especially in Germany. But that general logic is today in a bad way would seem to be sufficiently shown by the fact that it is pursued by thirteen different methods.experience. The accuracy of his cool reason is what he relies upon. would hold it downright madness to trust to anything but the minutest and most thorough study. Its immense service to science will not be disputed by any astronomer. is indisputable. we are already in possession of a scientific system of logic. Think of the Hegelian generation in Germany! Is reasoning the sole business whose method ought not to be scientifically and minutely analyzed? To me. and a trust to a sort of "On to Richmond" cry. I approve of it. and as far as it goes. Yet let instinct tread beyond its proper borders but by ever so little. a veritable fish out of water. in his own science. looking at it in certain very broad outlines. The book has unquestionably done much good. is generally less liable to err and is capable of greater subtlety than is any human theory. Sciences do often go wrong: that cannot be denied. would it not seem to be desirable that the same subject should be pursued. But I must declare that quite no deep student of logic entertains a very high respect for it. as a matter of fact. that book. Perhaps it may sound like a contradiction to talk of "instinctive logic. but by scientific students of it? Surely." It may possibly be thought that instinct is precisely that which is not logic or reason. then. Their history contains many a record of wasted time and energy that a good methodeutic might have spared. That is what I call his logica utens. The utility of truly scientific logic. For instance. and it becomes the most helpless thing in the world. however.       Many will say that all that may be true. but much rather upon an intense love of money which stimulates his faculties of reasoning. I do not say by me. the doctrine of chances is nothing else. by a mere advocate of a shallow metaphysics. of which I. though written by a literary and not a scientific man. a very fallible . nor probably by any physicist. by any geodesist. If. and mostly by a confused jumble of those methods. nevertheless discussing questions of the logic of science in a style of thought that seems to imply a deliberate disapproval of minute analysis in that field. Pearson and Galton have shown how useful it many be in biological and psychognostic researches.

however. No doubt. have they not in some appreciable degree stimulated the production of such work? I point to the third volume of Schroeder's Logik. that logic produces useful truths. while yet the great danger involved in the admission of any others. Read his Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen. and then read my paper on the Logic of Number. Let me not be misunderstood. even if they contain some errors. dealing with the less important of my results. is coming to something not unlike the age of puberty. would it not be a pity not to have them presented to the world?       It is my belief that science is approaching a critical point in which the influence of a truly scientific logic will be exceptionally desirable. But metaphysics depends on logic. I am simply arguing that my papers have stimulated the science of logic.person of course but still a scientific man who has carefully weighed them.       Vast. It certainly influences science in no small measure. considering how much energy has been spent in obtaining my results. not desirable that an interest in pursuing logical inquiries in a true scientific spirit and by acknowledged scientific methods should be aroused? If it be so. that eminent mathematicians class it as a branch of logic. published six years earlier. there in metaphysics to be considered. as the utility of logic will be in that direction. it is hard to see how one can deny pure scientific worth to logic and yet accord such worth to pure mathematics. as the outlook seems to me. yet the pure theoretical value of it is greater yet. as one must. Everybody must have his Weltanschauung. and that one in bad odor. as likely to stimulate such studies as anything that could be suggested? Slight and fragmentary as my publications have been. Science. Probably there are naturalists of culture so narrow that they would deny absolute scientific value to pure mathematics. to take the ground that it is a composite of odds and ends. then. is not the publication of my researches. provided that logic shall at the critical moment have developed into that true science which it is surely destined some day to become. by the way. Everybody admires (nobody more than I) the beautiful presentation by Dedekind of the logic of number. or ask him. Is it. pronounce but one. I wish with all my heart the Executive Committee could have in view some other student of logic of vastly greater powers than mine. a crazy‐quilt of shreds and patches. is manifest enough. and ask yourselves whether there is anything in the former of which there is not a plain indication in the latter. But seeing that pure mathematics is so close to logic. and I think you will say that I have exercised some stimulating agency. while acknowledging. it is possible. The influence of the conceptions of methodeutic will at that moment be decisive. Its old and purely materialistic conceptions will no longer suffice. ineluctable as such admission is. I do not believe the Committee will embrace such views. pronounces all pure mathematics to be a branch of logic. Look at it. of no scientific value in itself. and Dedekind. But even if they had. And then. to be alone of general validity. not merely as any . and sent to Dedekind.

it is the very keystone in the arch of scientific truth. though for the most part that has often been done already. Indeed. the very conceptions of metaphysics are borrowed from the analyses of logic. how can it be said that logic is devoid of scientific value. Now if there is any such thing as pure scientific value. although I should confidently hope to finish the three dozen in five years. for persons who are disposed to think. then. in view of the relation of logic to metaphysics. have to be set into logical order. I am sure that my . although I am painfully conscious of my small literary ability.       I should be loath to inflict as many as a million words upon a student: it would so narrow my field of influence. and to the probable utility of that which I am about to do. I believe that there are some men. as distinguished from the admiration one might have for a newly discovered dye. It is also most desirable that the presentation of each should be as brief and as closely confined to what is pertinent as is consistent with completeness and with perspicuity. in what can it consist if not in intellectual relations between truths? If so it be. and that of metaphysics to all science. my experience of what I can do suffices to enable me to say that six memoirs a year is all I ought to promise. I believe that as far as in me lies I should make them even attractive. who will testify to the utility of the work that I have done.       Taking all these things into consideration. A certain amount of labor must be bestowed upon their literary polish. whose judgments must command respect in the world of science. if there by any such thing as scientific value? If logic is the science which my memoirs go to show that it is. according to the greatest metaphysicians. for my purpose requires that they should be read by persons who are not professional logicians.408‐410   SECTION   3 ESTIMATE OF THE LABOR REQUIRED FOR THE WORK       My results in each of the three dozen topics have to be carefully revised. but. and have to be presented in the fully convincing forms which they merit.       Little known as my papers have my occasionally need to appeal to a logical doctrine.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.

and that I have actually written 2000 words a day (which is my steady habit at all times). A very few which might be much shorter are overbalanced by quite as many or more that must inevitably mount to 50. I shall only have to turn in all the papers. and who are not troubled with having too much to say. but only by laborious and clever condensation.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.193‐194         When one calculates that this means only 400 to 700 words a day for six days in the week. I do not think that anybody will think it wise to endeavor to persuade the Executive Committee that indolence is my characteristic. When one takes into consideration the amount of careful reading almost every memoir involves.000 words each. At that rate. and that such a limit can only be set by indolence.results could not be presented as they merit.410‐411   SECTION 4   . is going to be a task calling for all my vigor but most needful. To bring the total within the million. in all their convincingness in half a million.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75.000 words each. seeing that they so increase in matter as the series advances that every one of the last quarter of the series is excessively dense in matter. may argue that 200.000 words a year is only 700 words a day for six days in every week.       Persons whose business it is to write. to say nothing of the intellectual labor of revising my results and putting them into shape and logical order. The majority of the memoirs could be compressed into about 20. To this I can only reply that it would be much easier to make the memoirs three times as long as I propose. But the whole would be too much. If anybody suspects me of indolence. taken singly. I fear the Executive Committee may receive suggestions that it is indolence which I am scheming for. dividing themselves advantageously into two parts. and it will be seen that I have in each case written from three to five times as much as I include in the final copy. they would be better. But I am willing to agree to send on with each memoir papers written in the preparation of it showing that it is the result of condensation to from 1/3 to 1/5 of what I was prepared to say.

but after them my supreme effort will be to give the world the results of logical studies. one must have it at hand in order to venture upon any remark about it. however. and my earnings are dependent on my books that such a step would be a dernier resort. My entire library contains only about 2000 books. Historical statements and critical examinations form an essential part of the plan. Books must be hand.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. I shall require 500 more. I should have to add 500 volumes to my present library of some‐ 2000.ESTIMATE OF OTHER EXPENSES INVOLVED       These other expenses are mainly books. Now no matter how familiar one may be with a book. as I like to do. It is true that I could then no longer give students the advantage of my instruction. books must be criticized. . They would cost me $2000. I might perhaps obtain the use of them for five years by agreeing to surrender my whole library at the end of that period. There are other books which are absolutely indispensable for this work. I do not know that I could make such an arrangement. costing say $2000. However.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.195‐196         It is desirable that during this work I should occasionally see something of scientific men and students of philosophy. Everyday duties must come first. and therefore that due notice should be paid to opposing opinions. For this purpose. It might prove mistaken. and I am fully satisfied that that faith is logically justified. except the most general. although the person who examines and reports upon the memoirs should be remunerated for his labor.411   SECTION   5 NEED OF THE AID ASKED FOR       I am bound to confess that should the Carnegie Institution refuse all cooperation. not indispensable. I should continue to be animated by a robust faith that somehow my results would be given to the world. That is.       But what is indispensable is that what is said should be said convincingly.

the Carnegie Institution should cause a sum of money to be remitted to me and should become the owner of the copyright in the memoir sent in.       The Committee might see fit to put a limit upon the number of units that would be receivable in one year.412‐413   SECTION   6 SUGGESTED PLAN FOR THE REQUISITE AID       I should suggest that each memoir. say within a week. If this plan is not agreeable. and that number could only be reached some year owing to special circumstances. and that the remittance should be so much per unit. is the whole plan. I do not think that under any circumstances it could exceed nine. I have no definite idea of how I could do so in default of the aid which I ask from the Carnegie Institution. say in an hour or two. But while I fully believe that I shall succeed in any case. Upon his favorable report. as finished.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. By making selections of subjects.000 it should count as a unit. not to go into any criticism of it but to look it over.and if it did. should be sent by me. my concern would be limited to knowing that I had performed my part. whose duty it should be. and report upon whether or not it seems to be such a solid piece of work as is worthy of acceptance. and in that sense I can truly say that such aid seems to be indispensable. I could write . This is a mere suggestion as.       The memoirs should be handed in in their regular serial order. I would agree that my whole library should go at my death to the free school of logic I desire to found or to any other party whom the Carnegie Institute might designate. if more as two units.       Since the books needed would be needed at the outset. indeed. I should ask in some form to receive extra help the first year. if the Carnegie Institution would supply me with 500 books of my choice to be kept for a term of years. or higher. I believe the Executive Committee will help me.000 to 30. in MS.       I should suggest that if the length of the memoir was from 15. or type written. to the office of the Carnegie Institution and should be at once placed in the hands of a man of my own rank as a thinker.

This would be a bad plan. as numbered above. The amount would have to be sufficient for the support of myself and wife. or some arrangement shall be made agreeable to the committee. if the Carnegie Institution will provide me with $2000 worth of books for a term of years. and could be sold for the benefit of the Carnegie Institution. or type written to the office of the Carnegie Institution and should be submitted to the judgment of a qualified person.nine memoirs in the first year. Or the amount might be invariable.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75.415‐420   SECTION   7 PROBABILITY OF THE COMPLETION OF THE WORK . There might be a limit as to the amount of work receivable in any one year. although it would be far better that the memoirs should be prepared in their intended order of consecution. I might the first year produce such memoirs as could be most quickly produced. and for the purchase of some books. but it would be a bad plan. it seems to remain the only feasible plan. none of it was nearly as laborious as this will be. but since I am informed that the Executive Committee will.        Since the books needed are needed at the very outset. The memoirs could be published separately. say so much for a memoir of 20. under no circumstances aid in furnishing books required for the work done under their auspices. and might thus make nine or ten. yet in order to enable me to obtain the needed money for the books. and that upon his favorable report the treasurer of the Carnegie Institution should remit to me a certain sum. I have usually been paid $25 a thousand words for such philosophical writing as I have been paid for. The memoirs ought to be written in the order of consecution. In case my information should be incorrect. and double that amount if the length exceeds 40.197‐198         I would suggest that each memoir when completed should be sent by me in MS. or it might be strictly proportionate to the number of words. on order that he should report whether it represented the expected amount of work and thought. my whole library shall go to a school of logic.000 words.000. Of course.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.

but not before. abstracts of the memoirs. However. I say "liberally. because. Still. but the Carnegie Institution during those first six months should contribute liberally to aid the production of these abstracts. I should be at liberty to do what I pleased with the abstracts. although I am not capable of making such an object a leading one. The science of logic will be completed not earlier than the sciences of biology and of history are complete. as a secondary object. But it is eminently desirable that the series of three dozen memoirs should be completed. it would leave the matter in such shape that a writer of ability coming after me would be able to rewrite this part of the series. on the other hand. I think I am justified in offering such assurance as lies in my power. are apt to overlook. I do not think there will be much danger of my breaking down in five years. For my observation is that the men are rare who are able to pursue steadily a purely egoistic purpose. a fact of psychology which those who are capable of it. the series of memoirs were completed then. in six equal monthly parts. the copyright of this abstract should pass to the institution. half of them published. total incapacity. if the Committee thinks there is. What I should be pleased to attempt would be to make out of them a logic for the people. I think.       I am in excellent health and capital trim for this work. omitting altogether the historical and critical parts. This would be a very great loss. I would suggest that in the first six months. though the plan might result in a tolerably complete presentation of the main argument. [EDITORIAL NOTE: the preceding two sentences were originally appended by Peirce as a footnote to the remark before them. in case the Committee should something of the sort. In this I am not peculiar. six memoirs in regular order being treated in each part. by persons of the highest credit. say. If. that the Committee would insist on some assurance that the whole would be finished. Having all my life long sacrificed every interest to logic.]       But a better plan. the most practically useful . it might seem that I was insulting the Executive Committee if I were to suppose their knowledge of human nature was such that they could doubt my finishing this series if death. a charming classic for the twentieth century. otherwise than by the action of the Carnegie Institution. thus." because books would have to be procured. however. It has been represented to me. sparing my old age the mortifications of extreme poverty. then this abstract (which I should have been continually polishing) could be used to complete the publication. would be to devote the first three months to writing abstracts of the last nine memoirs. or the necessities of daily life did not intervene. If the memoirs were. its convincingness would be unfelt by the mass of readers.      Each memoir is complete in itself. each of not less than 15. I write.000 words. Without permitting myself either to believe or disbelieve this. instead of writing the first three memoirs. Then in case the work of writing the memoirs (which under this arrangement would only begin at the end of six months) were broken off.

would. I am most anxious to meet what highly credible people believe to be the wish of members of the Committee. and no better plan occurs to me. failing in this. Otherwise.       As an additional or alternative security. I. have sometimes suffered great injustice there. I would yearly furnish bonds that such money should be refunded. the disinclination has always been on the side of those who were to pay . why am I not called upon to go ahead with the printing?       Excepting in the case of one early paper on the logic of mathematics. a conflagration. unless some visitation of providence (say. that I express no opinion about it. But I should always object to the publication of any such abstracts as long as there was any hope of my producing the full memoirs. and even then not exceeding five months. I stand ready to carry it out. in case any contract were made. which I concluded I did not know enough about to continue. and then I was accused. one year of the date of its approval. nevertheless. and it will be easy for members of the Committee to ascertain that that office has been.part. vaguely and in intangible forms. Of course. at time. and that I. a veritable hotbed of intrigue. I should suggest. should be bound to repay to the Carnegie Institution all money up to that time paid to me. in particular. like every evil reputation. that a contract be executed between the Carnegie Institution and me by which I should be bound to send in the memoirs with no interval between any successive two exceeding three months. the Carnegie Institution would by its terms become bound to persist in the arrangement to the end. lest the Executive Committee should deem this proposition ridiculous. which though they would not be satisfactory to me. I have often made this statement. Voluminous memoirs were prepared by me for publication which I never could get printed.       Of course. I suppose there is some basis of truth beneath it. while losing the copyrights of the printed memoirs. of not getting my work ready for publication. But it has been. I should secure my bondsman by putting into his hands first draughts of the memoirs for the ensuing year.       I have a reputation of not finishing things. If it is not true. I have never had a disinclination to go on with any series of publications which I had begun. a la rigueur conform to the agreement. or a domestic calamity) should intervene. so as to bring out the whole force of the argument. It should be remembered that I was connected for along time with the Coast Survey.       I beg to say. if desired. say. and to publish each memoir within. exaggerated out of all semblance of truth by calumny. if failure should occur within one year. On the contrary. this would be but partial security. supposing that other security were desired by the Executive Committee. a five month's illness. For the truth of this (except that the accusations were made) I stand responsible.

by no fault of mine. When such disinclination was manifested.for the printing. then I shall be obliged to refund all that has been paid to me.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. I will find security for such payment. shall be bound to continue the arrangement to the end. that it was supposed they were made with a view of getting some influence upon the Survey.       I have never had a disinclination to continue any series of publications which I had begun. and thus incapacitated.199‐201         I understand that it is thought that I have a disposition not to persist in my undertakings. especially because I have had comparatively small interest in anything but logic and the methods of science. the effect of finding that I could not get my work printed was that I busied myself with logic which alone I cared for independently of publication. I prepared for publication three voluminous memoirs for the Survey. I am now likely to sacrifice logic to indolence. ill. to sign a contract by which. for the reason. should more than three months elapse without my handing in a new memoir until the series is complete. I admit I have sometimes projected schemes which I did not carry out for one reason or another. Meantime. and each year. for at least five months. but these offers have always been declined. and then told people that I never got my material into form to be printed. according to a physician's certificate. then. The difficulty has always been that I could not get any more printed. on its side. It seems to me that this is a sufficient reply to the objection (which seems to me factitious) that because I have always sacrificed every interest to logic. unless I should die or have been. and to procure the publication of each memoir within a reasonable time of its being reported upon favorably. but my reputation in that respect is largely manufactured of Coast Survey intriguers.420‐421   . after the first. as I think. while the Carnegie Institution. of course I ceased to press the matter. I am informed that the Carnegie Institution will desire some assurance that the series of memoirs I propose will be completed. I am ready. The persons who were in power in the Coast Survey refused to print them. I have since then repeatedly offered to see these memoirs through the press.     Final Version ‐ MS L75.

then. To be sure. have 2500 books to dispose of. and the Executive Committee can judge how far the net cost of the assistance given me might turn out less than the amount first put in. if I get the aid asked from the Carnegie Institution. Of course. it would with little doubt pass to the Institution as a gift.SECTION   8 PROBABLE NET COST       Mill's Logic went through nine editions before the copyright expired. after a term of years. Great pains will be bestowed upon this. In time there will be some sale for them. I should.     Final Version ‐ MS L75. I may mention. there are several contingencies here. But still. that is. there will be some sale for them. I should not expect anything like that. and it will be perfectly proper that they be handed over to a publisher and sold like any books. that if my wife and I continue to live in this very lovely place. Now Mill's Logic went through nine or ten editions. For the price of 500 books. which has 60 acres improved with 112 acres woodland. For five or six years' support of me and my wife. was written by a literary man. no doubt. and should the place pass into my possession. the utility of these memoirs will require me to make them as agreeable reading and as little tedious as their scientific character will allow. if the Carnegie Institution should have any use for it. it was not so voluminous as my memoirs will be. I think its objects would profit by the transaction. In these respects. and should that flourish. and was just deep enough to please people who were not very accurate in their thinking. try to have a free summer school of logic here. and a large house. and in return will have the product of my pen for that time.202‐203         If the Carnegie Institution should adopt some such plan as that I have ventured to suggest.   From Draft E ‐ MS L75. the Carnegie Institution would receive the fruit of over forty years' meditation and labor. Still.422‐425   SECTION   9 . should learners and teachers come here. my memoirs will be at a great disadvantage. it would. as a possibility. they will advance me something like a professor's salary for five years. It would certainly make up in considerable part for the remittances made to me.

" Whether or not. nevertheless the impression which a reading of those explanations would create. that the subject of relations does not constitute any overwhelming part of the subjects of my researches. reason alone will determine your decision. "to discover the exceptional man in every department of study whenever and wherever found. and that. He has a sort of claim. the work for which I seem to have been designed is that of working out the truths of logic. I am called the "Hauptfoerderer" of "eine grossartige Disziplin. in the sense in which it is susceptible of completion." Although my explanations attached to the above list of proposed memoirs are of such a nature as to preclude their showing how greatly the logic of relatives really determines all my conclusions upon every topic of logic." the "Logik der Beziehungen. Should it seem to you to be true that the duties of an "exceptional man" in the department of logic have to be borne by me. if it be so. the reward of being enabled to complete it. namely. On page 1. looking probably into the third volume of Schroeder's Logik where my work is mentioned in some two hundred places. Logic is a "department of study."       Composed as your body is. that men seem to be specially designed for various kinds of work. vague only in being addressed to no particular party. and enable him to make the work for which he seems specially designed his life work.       If you should be led to this opinion. But the only reward which would be a reward would be that of being enabled to complete his life‐work. inside or outside of schools. I am an "exceptional man"‐‐and to be such is anything but a good fortune. that the work will get done. in this narrow field. it is my duty to believe. that he should be rewarded for what he has done. as the second of six emphasized aims. is no longer so vague. in such a direction nothing but a burden‐‐you will determine. and I do believe." I am frank to say that the idea that phrase embodies has long impressed me. At any rate.       At this juncture one of the most extraordinary figures of all humanity puts down an enormous sum of money and expresses the wish that it be used.BASIS OF MY CLAIM       A man has put nearly fifty years of singleminded endeavor into a work of benefit to science. but I shall then find in you a definite party upon whom I have that claim. is quite correct. then it will become one of your duties to aid me in the performance of mine to make the work for which this man "seems specially designed his life work.       Whatever action you may take. all that I feel much concern about is that I should do my very utmost to carry out my . then my claim to the reward for the life I have so far put into this work. you will only be carrying out one of the responsibilities which you have accepted. since in satisfying it.

net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/Ver1/L75v1‐10. I have no disposition to even ask myself what specifically your duty is. (signed) C. my application to your kindly wisdom. except so far as we shall all have to render account hereafter.door. which is part of the Arisbe website. Gentlemen. The URL of the present page. 1998 . I remain. etc. is http://members. With profound respect. etc. Submitting. Peirce End of PART 10 of 10 of MS L75 Queries. then.part effectively.ransdell@yahoo. S. comments. of which you are the sole judges. Lubbock Texas 79409 Scholarly quotation from or reference to the content of this website will mention the URL of the web‐page where the content occurs.. and suggestions to Joseph Ransdell Dept of Philosophy Texas Tech University.htm Page last modified June 15.