0 Up votes0 Down votes

1 views11 pagesprocedimetno livre de inveja

Aug 11, 2015

© © All Rights Reserved

PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

procedimetno livre de inveja

© All Rights Reserved

1 views

procedimetno livre de inveja

© All Rights Reserved

- Minors
- lbs 400 math reflection essay
- Probability IB
- 01a_4MB0_Paper_1_(R)_-_May_2016
- lesson- first math fact families
- Business Mathematics - I (QTM-110)
- Kurwa Mac Strach Sie Bac Artykul
- Cmo Matrix
- aletiasplanningguide2 docx
- Ielts Essays
- Upcat Topics
- QRT4 WEEK 5 TG Lesson 93.docx
- ICM_Vol_3_76
- Palma,JJ 10 Garnet
- 221.pdf
- Problem 1 003
- sop
- Re
- pdfjoiner 52
- march 17 lesson plan

You are on page 1of 11

Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 102, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 9-18

Published by: Mathematical Association of America

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2974850 .

Accessed: 21/08/2013 13:49

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Mathematical Association of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

The American Mathematical Monthly.

http://www.jstor.org

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor

Our startingpoint is the well-knownparentalsolutionto the problemof dividinga

cake between two children so that each child thinks he or she has been treated

fairly:The parent instructsone of the childrento cut the cake into two pieces in

any way he desires. The other child is then instructedto choose whicheverpiece

she prefers. This two-step sequence of instructions,known as "cut-and-choose,"

providesa simple exampleof the kind of game-theoreticalgorithmthat Even and

Paz [11] call a "protocol."

Associatedwith the cut-and-chooseprotocolis a naturalstrategyfor each child:

The first child cuts the cake into two pieces that he considersto be equal, and the

second child chooses a piece that she considersto be at least as large as the other

piece. Notice that each child's strategy guarantees him or her "satisfaction,"

regardlessof what the other child does.

The general version of this problem involves n people ("players"),each of

whom has his or her preferencesover subsets of the cake given by a probability

measure.1An allocationof the cake amongthe playersis said to be proportional if

each playerreceivesa piece of size at least 1/n (in his or her own measure),and it

is said to be envy-free if each playerreceivesa piece he or she would not swapfor

that received by any other player. It is easy to see that an envy-freeallocationis

proportional,but the conversefails unless n = 2. Thus, for example,everyone of

three playersmay thinkhis or her piece is at least 1/3, but a playermay thinkthat

one of the other playershas a largerpiece.

The results on proportionaland envy-freeallocationsobtainedover the past 50

yearstend to fall into one of four classes:(i) ExistenceTheorems;(ii) Moving-Knife

Solutions; (iii) Algorithms;and (iv) Protocols. We say something about each in

turn.

Existencetheorems,datingback to the 1940s, are often based on some version

of Liapounoff'sConvexityTheorem[20]. Typically,they establishthe existence of

an ordered partitionof the cake correspondingto an envy-freeallocation,often

with some additionalpropertysuch as: all the measuresof all the pieces are exactly

1/n [21]; or the pieces are connected sets [27 and 31]; or the allocation is also

Pareto-optimal[30 and 4]. In the words of Rebman [24, p. 33], however, these

resultsprovide"no clue as to how to accomplishsuch a wonderfulpartition."

There are two well-knownmoving-knifesolutions. The first is due to Dubins

and Spanier [10] and is a moving-knifeversion of the Banach-Knasterlast1If one wantsto abandonthe cake metaphor,and literallyworkwith arbitraryprobabilitymeasures

on some set C, then even cut-and-choosecan fail. For example,if both childrenhave their preferences

given by the same 0-1 valued measure,i.e., the same ultrafilter,then both will want the same piece

regardlessof how the cake is divided.

For everythingwe do in the presentpaper,it sufficesto assumethat our measuresare all definedon

the same algebrav of subsetsof C and satisfythe followingtwo properties:(i) for everyset P E a?

and every finite k, P can be partitionedinto k sets of equal measure,and (ii) for every P, Q E a?,

either P can be trimmedto yield a subsetthe same size as Q, or vice-versa.

1995]

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

scheme is easy to describe:a knife is slowly moved along the top of the cake so

that all the slices made are parallel. Each player calls "cut" when he or she is

willing to take the resulting piece as his or her allocation.) The second is a

moving-knifescheme due to Stromquist[27] that yields an envy-free allocation

amongthree people. (This one is not so easy to describe,because envy-freenessis

considerablyharderto obtain than proportionality.)

Moving-knifeschemes, however,are not the step-by-stepprocesses one usually

associateswith the term "algorithm."A good exampleof what one would call an

algorithmin this context is Woodall's scheme [32] for producing an allocation

wherebyeach participantgets strictlymore than 1/n of the cake (accordingto his

own measure).This algorithmrequires,as part of the input, a piece P of cake and

two distinctnumberscgand p such that Player1 thinksthe measureof P is cg,and

Player2 thinksthe measureof P is ,l3.An envy-freeversionof this algorithmis in

[5].

Finally,there is what Even and Paz [11] call a "protocol,"and this is the only

kind of result we are going to analyze in the present paper. Since we will be

presentingexamplesof protocols, as opposed to provingtheir non-existence,we

can afford the same level of informalityin the descriptionof what is meant by a

protocol as Even and Paz used.

A protocolis a computer-programmable

interactiveprocedurethat can issue

queriesto the participantswhose answersmay affect future decisions.It may issue

instructionsto the participantssuch as: "Choose k pieces from among these m

pieces"or "Partitionthis piece into k subpieces."The protocolhas no information

on the measureof the variouspieces as seen by the differentparticipants this is

private information.Moreover,if the participantsobey the protocol, then each

participantwill end up with a piece after finitelymany steps.

Still following [11], we define a strategyfor a participantto be an adaptive

sequence of moves consistent with the protocol, which the participantschoose

sequentiallywhen called upon by the protocol.A protocol is proportional

if each

of the n participantshas a strategythat will guaranteehim at least 1/n of the cake

(by his own measure),independentlyof the other participants'strategies.(Purely

for convenience,we will henceforthuse only the masculinepronoun.)Departing

from [11], we will call a protocol envy-freeif each of the n participantshas a

strategythat will guaranteehim a piece that is, accordingto his own measure, at

least tied for largest.

A constructiveproof of the existence of, say, a proportionalprotocol involves

producingthree separate things:the rules of the protocol, a strategyfor each of

the players,and an argumentthat the strategiesdo, in fact, guaranteeeach player

his proportionalshare.We distinguishrules and strategiesby demandingthat rules

be enforceableby a referee implementingthe protocol.

Thisfmeansthat a statementlike "Player1 cuts the cake into n pieces" is an

acceptablerule, whereasa statementlike "Player1 cuts the cake into n pieces that

he considersto be equal" is not. This is because the latter statement cannot be

enforced by the referee, who has no knowledge of Player l's measure and so

cannot tell if the rule has been followed or not.

In presentingprotocols, we will separate rules from strategies by placing all

strategicaspects in parentheses.This providesone with the option of readingthe

rules alone in a reasonablysmoothway. All argumentsthat the strategiesperform

as advertisedare placed between steps and labeled as "Aside." For example, in

our method of presentation,cut-and-choosebecomes:

AN ENVY-FREE CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL

10

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

[January

Cut-and-Choose

Step 1. Player 1 cuts the cake into 2 pieces (that he considersto be the same

size).

Step 2. Player 2 chooses a piece (that she considers to be at least tied for

largest).

Aside. Clearly,Player l's strategyguaranteeshim a piece of size exactly 1/2

in his measure,while Player2's strategyguaranteesher a piece of size

at least 1/2 in her measure.

The modern era of cake cuttingbegan with Steinhaus'observation"duringthe

war [World War II]" [25, p. 102] that the cut-and-choose protocol could be

extended to yield a proportionalprotocol for three players (see [18]). He then

asked if it could be extended to yield a proportionalprotocol for the case n > 3.

(Steinhaus,however,never used the word "protocol.")His questionwas answered

in the affirmativeby Banach and Knaster and reported in [25] and [26]. The

Steinhaus and Banach-Knaster protocols introduced two key ideas that would

resurfacein the envy-freesolutions 15 and 50 years later.

The first idea was that of having an initial sequence of steps resultingin only

part of the cake'sbeing allocated(to one playerin this case). The sequence is then

repeated a finite numberof times, after which the entire cake has been allocated.

The second idea and perhapsthe more importantof the two was that of having

a player trim a piece to a smallersize.

Explicit mention of the lack of a constructive procedure for producing an

envy-free allocation among more than two people dates back at least to Gamow

and Stern [14]. The first breakthroughson this problemoccurredin the late 1950s

and early 1960s, when the protocol solution to the envy-freeproblem for n = 3

was found by John L. Selfridge, and rediscovered independently by John H.

Conway.These solutions also involvedtrimmingand an initial allocation of only

part of the cake; they were widely disseminatedby R. K. Guy and others, and

eventuallyreportedby Gardner[15],Woodall[32],Stromquist[27], and Austin [1].

The moving-knifesolutionof Stromquist[27]was found two decades later, as was a

scheme due to Levmore and Cook [19], which can be recast as quite a different

moving-knifesolution to the envy-freeproblemwhen n = 3. Still other envy-free

moving-knifeschemesfor three people [7] and, more recently,four people [8] have

been discoveredand are summarizedin [6].

The extensionof the Selfridge-Conwayprotocolto the case of even four people

has remained an open, and much-commentedupon, problem. See, for example,

Gardner[15], Rebman [24], Stromquist[27], Woodall [31], [32], Bennett et al [3],

Webb [29],Hill [16],[17], and Olivastro[22].In what follows,we solve this problem

by producingan envy-freeprotocolfor arbitraryn.

We have chosen a uniform presentationof four protocols that highlightsthe

evolutionof two importantideas namely,trimming,and the use of sequences of

partialallocations.Historically,these four protocolsarose over a periodof 50 years

and nicely illustrate how ideas in mathematicsare built, one upon another. The

protocolswe present are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

1995]

The proportionalprotocolfor arbitraryn (Banach-Knaster).

The envy-freeprotocolfor n = 3 (Selfridge,Conway).

The envy-freeprotocol for arbitraryn.

AN ENVY-FREE CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ll

severalpeople. Our interestin fair divisionwas sparkedby Olivastro[22].Valuable

mathematicalcontributionswere made by William Zwicker and Fred Galvin.

Indeed, the presentversion of our envy-freeprotocolowes much to the reworking

of an earlierversionby Galvin.

Specificobservationsand commentsby David Gale, SergiuHart,TheodoreHill,

Walter Stromquist,WilliamWebb, and Douglas Woodall also proved helpful. In

addition, we have benefited from conversationsand correspondencewith the

followingpeople: Ethan Akin, Julius Barbanel,John Conway,MortonDavis, Karl

Dunz, Shimon Even, A. M. Fink, Peter Fishburn,MartinGardner,RichardGuy,

D. Marc Kilgour, Peter Landweber, Jerzy Legut, Herve Moulin, Dominic

Olivastro,BarryO'Neill, Philip Reynolds,WilliamThomson,Hal Varian,C:harles

Wilson, and H. Peyton Young.

The first protocolwe present is a generalizationof cut-and-chooseto a proportional protocolfor three people. This is the one found by SteinhausduringWorld

War II.

The ProportionalProtocolfor n = 3

(Steinhaus,circa 1943)

Step 1. Player 1 cuts the cake into 3 pieces (that he considersto be the same

size).

Step 2. Player2 is giventhe choice of either passing,i.e., doing nothing(which

he does if he thinks2 or more of the pieces are of size at least 1/3), or

not passing and labeling 2 of the pieces (that he thinks are of size

strictlyless than 1/3) as "bad."

Step 3. If Player 2 passed in step 2, then Players3, 2, and 1, in that order,

choose a piece (that they considerto be of size at least 1/3).

Aside. In this case, each playerreceivesa piece of size at least 1/3 in his own

measure.This is true of: Player3, because he chooses first; Player2,

because he thinks either 2 or 3 pieces are that large, and so at least

one of them will still be availableafter Player3 chooses his piece; and

Player 1, because he made all 3 pieces of size 1/3.

Step 4. If Player2 did not pass at Step 2, then Player3 is given the same tmro

options that Player2 had at Step 2. He ignoresPlayer2's labels.

Step 5. If Player 3 passed in Step 4, then Players2, 3, and 1, in that order,

choose a piece (that they considerto be of size at least 1/3).

Aside. In this case, as before, each playerreceivesa piece of size at least 1/3

ln nls own measure.

Step 6. If Player3 did not pass at Step 4, then Player 1 is requiredto take a

piece that both Player2 and Player3 labelled as "bad."

Aside. Note first that there certainlymust be such a piece. At this point,

Player 1 has received a piece that he thinks is of size exactly 1/3,

which both Player 1 and Player 2 think is "bad," i.e., of size strictly

less than 1/3.

Step 7. The other two pieces are reassembled,and Player2 cuts the resulting

piece into two pieces (that he considersto be the same size).

Step 8. Player3 chooses one of the two pieces (that he considersto be at least

tied for largest).

Step 9. Player2 is given the remainingpiece.

Aside. This is just cut-and-choosebetween Players2 and 3, which ends the

protocol.

*

12

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

[January

The second protocolwe present followed quicklyon the heels of the first. It is

the Banach-Knasterprotocol,offered in responseto Steinhaus'questionof whether

his result could be extendedfrom 3 to n people. Note here the introductionof the

idea of trimming,whichwill be furtherexploitedin both of the upcomingenvy-free

protocols.

ProportionalProtocolfor Arbitraryn

(Banach-Knaster,circa 1944)

Step 1. Player 1 cuts a piece P1 (of size l/n) from the cake.

Step 2. Player 2 is given the choice of either passing (which he does if he

thinks P1 is of size less than l/n), or trimminga piece from P1 to

create a smallerpiece (that he thinksis of size exactlyl /n). The piece

P1, now perhapstrimmed,is renamedP2. The trimmingsare set aside.

Step 3. For 3 < i < n, Player i takes the piece Pi_l and proceeds exactly as

Player2 did in Step 2, with the resultingpiece now called Pi.

Aside. For 1 < i < n, Player i thinks that Pi is of size less than or equal to

l/n. We also have that P1 z *** 2 Pn. Thus, every player thinks Pn

is of size at most l/n.

Step 4. The last playerto trim the piece, or Player 1 if no one trimmedit, is

given Pn.

Aside. The playerreceivingPnthinks it is of size exactlyl/n.

Step 5. The trimmingsare reassembled,and Steps 1-4 are repeated for the

remainderof the cake, and with the remainingn - 1 playersin place

of the original n players.

Aside. The player who gets a piece at this second stage is getting exactly

l/(n - 1) of the remainderof the cake; he, and everyoneelse, thinks

this remainderis of size at least (n - l)/n. Hence, he thinkshis piece

is of size at least l/n.

Step 6. Step 5 is iterateduntil there are only 2 playersleft. The last 2 players

use cut-and-choose.

Aside As before, each playerreceivesa piece that he thinksis of size at least

l/n.

This ends the protocol.

The next protocolwe presentis the Selfridge-Conwayenvy-freeprotocolfor the

case n = 3. (There are slight differences in the presentationsof Selfridge and

Conway;we follow the latter.)This protocolinvolvesan elegant combinationof the

trimmingidea introducedby Banach-Knasterand the basic frameworkthat Steinhaus used. It also introduces the important notion of one player's having an

"irrevocableadvantage"over anotherplayer,followinga partialallocation.

Envy-FreeProtocolfor n = 3

(Selfridge,Conway,circa 1960)

Step 1. Player 1 cuts the cake into 3 pieces (that he considersto be the same

size).

Step 2. Player 2 is given the choice of either passing (which he does if he

thinks two or more pieces are tied for largest), or trimminga piece

from(the largest)one of the three pieces (to create a tie for largest).If

Player 2 trimmed a piece, then the trimmingsare named L, for

"leftover,"and set aside.

1995]

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

13

be at least tied for largest)from amongthe 3 pieces, one of whichmay

have been trimmedin Step 2. If Player2 did not pass in Step 2, then

he is requiredto choose the piece he trimmedif Player3 did not.

Aside. Notice that only part of the cake has been allocated. This yields a

partition {X1, X2, X3, L} of the cake such that {X1,X2, X3} iS an

envy-free partial allocation. The lack of envy is true of: Player 3,

because he chooses first;Player2, because he made at least two pieces

tied for largest,and so at least one of them will still be availableafter

Player 3 chooses his piece; and Player 1, because he made all three

pieces of size 1/3, and the trimmedone has definitelybeen taken by

either Player3 or Player2.

Step 4. If Player2 passed at Step 2, we are done. Otherwise,either Player2 or

Player 3 received the trimmed piece, and the other received an

untrimmedpiece. Whichever player received the untrimmedpiece

now divides L into 3 pieces (that he considersto be the same size).

Call this playerthe "cutter"and the other the "non-cutter."

Aside. We will refer to Player 1 as havingan irrevocable

advantageover the

non-cutter.The point is that, since the non-cutterreceivedthe trimmed

piece, Player 1 will not envy the non-cutter, regardless

of how L is

later dividedamongthe three.

Step 5. The three pieces into which L is divided are now chosen by the

players in the order: non-cutterfirst; Player 1 second; cutter third.

(Each chooses a piece at least tied for largestamongthose availableto

him when it is his turn to choose.)

Aside. At this point, the entire cake has been allocated.Since the non-cutter

chooses his piece of L first, he experiencesno envy.Player1 does not

envy the non-cutter,since he had an irrevocableadvantageover him,

and Player1 does not envythe cutter,because he is choosinghis piece

of L before the cutter does. Finally, the cutter experiencesno envy

since he divided L into three equal pieces.

This ends the protocol.

The final protocolwe present is our envy-freeprotocolfor an arbitrarynumber

of players.This result was announcedin [9, 12, 13, 23]. A brief discussionof some

importantdifferences between this protocol and the three earlier ones, and a

couple of importantopen questions,follow.

The centralfeatureof our envy-freeprotocol,like that for the n = 3 protocol,is

that players trim pieces of the cake to create ties, rendering them indifferent

among these pieces. When n > 3, however,one needs to start the trimmingand

choosing process leading to an envy-free partial allocation with more pieces

than there are players.

As an informal illustrationof how to achieve an envy-freepartial allocation,

suppose there are four people. Have Player 1 cut the cake into 5 equal pieces.

Player2 then trims 2 pieces, creatinga 3-waytie for largest.Player3 then trims 1

piece, creatinga 2-waytie for largest.The playersnow choose in the order:Player

4, Player3, Player2, Player1, with the middle two playersrequiredto take a piece

they trimmedif one is available.Clearly,each playerthinkshis piece is at least tied

for largest.The burdenof our demonstrationof the n-personenvy-freeprotocolis

to show that a full allocationof the entire cake can be accomplishedin a finite

numberof steps.

14

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

[January

The extension to arbitraryn is fairly straightforwardand left to the reader. In

outline form, the protocol goes as follows:

One player(chosen here to be Player2 for later notationalsimplicity),cuts the

cake into 4 equal pieces, handsthese out, and asks if anyoneobjects.If, say, Player

1 objects,then Players1 and 2 (alone) go throughseveralsteps whichyield six sets

(the Ys and Zs in Step 7 below) to be used as a startingpartition(in place of the

five equal pieces) for the kind of trim-and-choosesequence amongall four players

that we illustrated two paragraphsearlier. This trim-and-choosesequence is

repeated again and again until we arriveat a partial allocationin which Player 1

has an irrevocableadvantageover Player2 (the "aside"after Step 15 below).From

this point on, we never have to worryaboutPlayerl's objectingbecause of envyfor

Player 2. Repeating this at most once for each pair of players results in an

envy-freeallocationof the entire cake after finitelymany steps.

Envy-FreeProtocolfor Arbitralyn

(the n = 4 version)

(1992)

Step 1. Player2 cuts the cake into 4 pieces (that he considersto be the same

size), keeps one piece, and hands one piece to each player.

Step 2. Each of the other three playersis askedwhetheror not he objectsto

this allocation.(A playerobjectsiff he envies some other player.)

Step 3. If no one objects,then each keeps the piece he was given in Step 1,

and we are done.

Step 4. Otherwise,we choose the smallest i so that Player i objected. For

notational simplicity,assume i= 1. Player 1 now chooses a piece

originallygiven to some other pIayer(whomhe envied) and calls that

piece A. The piece originallygiven to Player 1 is called B.

Aside. Once we have A and B, the other two pieces in the allocationfrom

Step 1 are reassembled.That part of the cake will be allocatedlater.

Note that Player1 thinks A is largerthan B. Player2 thinks A and

B are the same size.

Step 5. Player1 now names a positiveinteger r 2 10 (chosen so that, for any

partitionof A into r sets, Player 1 will prefer A, even with the 7

smallest accordingto Player 1 pieces in the partition of A removed, to B).

Aside. Player 1 can easily choose such an r. That is, the union of the 7

smallestpieces is certainlyno largerthan 7 times the averagesize of

all r pieces.,Hence, Player 1 simplychooses r large enough so that

7,u(A)/r < ,u(A) - ,u(B), where ,u is his measure.

Step 6. Player2 now partitionsA into exactly r sets (that he considersto be

the same size), and does the same to B.

Step 7. Player 1 chooses (the smallest) 3 sets from the partitionof B and

names these Z1, Z21 Z3 He also chooses either (the largest) 3 sets

from the partitionof A (if he thinksthese are all strictlylargerthan

all the Zs), and trims at most 2 of these (to the size of the smallest

amongthe three), or he partitions(the largest)one of the sets in the

partitionof A into 3 pieces (that he considersto be the same size). In

either case, he names these Y1,Y2,Y3.

Aside. Playerl's strategyin Step 7 guaranteesthat he will think all three Ys

are the same size, and each strictlylargerthan all three Zs. This is

1995]

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

15

Step 8.

Step 9.

Aside.

Step 10.

Aside.

Step 11.

Step 12.

Step 13.

Step 14.

true even if he chooses the second option.2 Player2 thinks all three

Zs are the same size, and each is at least as large as all three Ys.

Player 3 takes the collection of 6 pieces, and either passes (if he

thinks there alreadyis at least a 2-waytie for largest),or trims (the

largest)one of these (to the size of the next largest),thus creatingat

least a 2-waytie for largest).

Players4, 3, 2, and 1, in that order,choose a piece from amongthe 6

Ys and Zs as modified in Step 8 (that they considerto be largestor

tied for largest),with Player3 requiredto take the piece he trimmed

if it is available.Player 2 must choose Z1, Z21 or Z3. Player 1 must

choose Y1,Y2,or Y3.

This yields a partition {Xl, X2, X3, X4, L1} of the cake such that

{X1,X2,X3,X4} is an envy-free partial allocation, and L1 is the

leftoverpiece. Moreover,Player1 thinkshis piece X1 is strictlylarger

say by E than Player2's piece X2.

Player 1 names a positive integer s (chosen so that [4,ul(L1)/S]s< ,

where ,u1is Player l's measure).

The integer s specifies how many times the playerswill iterate the

basic trim-and-choosesequence to follow. Notice that if the rules

were instead to allow the iterations to continue until Player 1 said

"stop" (which he could strategicallydo at the point at which he

thinks the leftover crumbis smaller than the advantagehe has over

Player 2), then there is no guaranteethat a strategicallymisguided

Player 1 would not keep the game going forever.

Player1 cuts L1 into 5 pieces (that he considersto be the same size).

Player2 takes the collectionof 5 pieces, selects (the largest)3 pieces,

and trims(the largest)2 or fewer of these (to the size of the smallest,

therebycreatingat least a 3-waytie for largest).

Player3 takes the collectionof 5 pieces, perhapstrimmedin step 12,

selects (the largest)two, and trims,if he wants to, (the largest)one of

these (to the size of the smallest,thus creatingat least a 2-waytie for

largest).

Players4, 3, 2, and 1, in that order,choose a piece (that they consider

2The proof runs as follows:We are assumingthat both A and B have been partitionedinto r

pieces,and that B is not only smallerthan A but smallereven than A with the smallest7 pieces of A's

partitionremoved.Arrangethe sets in both partitionsfrom largestto smallestas A1, A2,. . ., Ar and

B1,B2,. . ., Br. Let ,u denote Player 1's measure, and suppose, for contradiction,that both of the

followinghold:

1. ,u(Br_2) 2 ,u(A3), which holds if A1, A2, and A3 are not all strictlylargerthan Br_2, Br_l,

and Br.

2. ,u(Br_2)2 ,u(Al)/3, which holds if Al cannot be partitionedinto 3 sets all largerthan Br_2,

Br_1, and BrIt followsfrom 1 that:

3. ,u(B7U *** U Br_3)2 ,u(A3 U *** UAr_7) since there are r - 9 sets in each union, and the

smallestone of the Bs is at least as largeas the largestone of the As.

It followsfrom 2 that:

4- y([B1 U B2 U B3] U [B4 U Bs U B6]) 2 ,u(Al u A2),

since each of the blocksof 3 Bs is largerthan each of the As.

But 3 and 4 clearlydemonstratethat:

5.y(B)2y(AlU

*--

UAr-7)

This is the desiredcontradictionsince the set on the rightis A with the smallest7 pieces of its partition

removed.

AN ENVY-FREE CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL

16

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

[January

{1,2,3,4} x {1,2,3,4},

Step 15.

Aside.

Step 16.

Step 17.

Step 18.

Step 19.

Step 20.

Aside.

a piece they trimmedif one is available.

Steps 11-14 are repeated s - 1 more times, with each applicationof

these four steps applied to the leftover piece from the preceding

application.

This yields a partition {X1, X2, X3,'X4, L2} of the cake such that

{X1, X2, X3, X4} iS an envy-free partial allocation, and such that

Player 1 thinks that X1 is larger than X2 U L2. We now declare

that Player 1 has an irrevocable

advantageover Player 2, and we

begin creation of a subset of {1,2,3,4} X (1,2,3,4}, which we call

">v" for "irrevocableadvantage,"by putting(1, 2) E AS.

Player 2 cuts L2 into 12 pieces (that he considers to be the same

size).

Each of the other players declares himself to be of type A (if he

agrees all the pieces are the same size), or type D (if he disagrees).

Player2 is declaredto be of type A.

If D x A c - S, then we give the 12 pieces to the playersin A, with

each of thetn receivingthe same numberof pieces. In this case, we

are done.

Otherwise, we choose the lexicographicallyleast pair (i, j) from

D x A that is not in AS, and we returnto Step 4 with Player i in

the role of Player 1, Playerj in the role of Player2, and L2 in place

of the cake.

Steps 5-18 are repeated.

Each time we pass throughStep 15, we add an orderedpair to AS.

Notice that since D x A c {1, 2, 3, 4} X {1, 2, 3, 4}, and - a?c

divisionof the entire cake.

This ends the protocol.

There is an importantway (pointed out to us by several people) that the

envy-freeprotocol for even n = 4 differs from the envy-freeprotocol for n = 3:

For n = 3, the number of cuts needed is at most 5, regardlessof what the

measu-s are. For n = 4, the numberof cuts needed can be made arbitrarilylarge

by a suitable choice of the four measures(althoughthe moving-knifesolution [8]

for the four-personproblemgives a bounded numberof cuts). This raises:

Question 1. Is there a boundedenvy-freeprotocolfor n = 4 or n > 4?

There is another slightlymore subtle (and perhaps related) way in which the

envy-freeprotocol differs from the others:The three earlierones also work in the

coXntext

of what are called "CD preference relations" in [2]. (A CD preference

relationis a complete, reflexive,transitivebinaryrelationthat satisfiesa partitioning postulate,a trimmingpostulate,and a weak additivitypostulate.)The envy-free

protocol,on the other hand, requireswhat is call an "ArchimedianCD preference

relation"in [2]. The main result in [2] is the fact that a CD preferencerelationis

induced by a finitely additive measure in the obvious way iff it is Archimedian.

This raises:

Question 2. Is there an envy-freeprotocol for n = 4 or n > 4 that works in the

context of non-Archimedian

preferencerelations?

It turns out that techniques similar to those used in the n-person envy-free

protocolcan also be used to solve the "chores"problem[15],wherein each player

1995]

AN ENVY-FREE CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL

17

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

wants to minimize the amount of cake he or she receives. This and related

questions(e.g., the Pareto-optimalityof allocations)are discussedin [6].

REFERENCES

1. A. K. Austin,Sharinga cake, MathematicalGazette66, no. 437 (1982),212-215.

2. J. Barbaneland A. Taylor, Preferencerelations and measuresin the context of fair division,

Proceedingsof theAmericanMathematicalSociety(to appear).

3. S. Bennett, et al, FairDtvisions:GettingYourFair Share,HIMAP[HighSchool Mathematicsand

Its Applications]Module9 (Teachers'Maunal),1987.

4. M. Berliant,K. Dunz, and W. Thomson,On the fair divisionof a heterogeneouscommodity,

Journalof Mathematical

Economics21 (1992),235-240.

5. S. J. Bramsand A. D. Taylor,A note on envy-freecake division,Journalof Combinatorial

Theory

A (to appear).

6. S. J. Brams and A. D. Taylor, Fair Division:Proceduresfor AllocatingDiuasibleand Indivasible

Goods (to appear).

7. S. J. Brams,A. D. Taylor,and W. S. Zwicker,Old and new moving-knifeschemes,Mathematical

Intelligencer(to appear).

8. S. J. Brams, A. D. Taylor, and W. S. Zwicker,A moving-knifesolution to the four-person

envy-freecake divisionproblem,preprint.

9. P. J. Campbell,Mathematics,1995 EncyclopediaBritannicaYearbookof Scienceand the Future

(1994),379-383.

10. L. E. Dubins and E. H. Spanier,How to cut a cake fairly, AmericanMathematicalMonthly68

(1961), 1-17.

11. S. Even and A. Paz, A note on cake-cutting,DiscreteAppliedMathematics7 (1984),285-296.

12. D. Gale, Mathematicalentertainments,MathematicalIntelligencer15, no. 1 (1993),48-52.

13. For AU PracticalPurposes:Introductionto Contemporary

Mathematics,3d ed., W. H. Freeman,

New York, 1994,ch. 13.

14. G. Gamowand M. Stern, Puzzle-Math,Viking,New York, 1958.

15. M. Gardner,aha! Insight,W. H. Freemanand Company,New York (1978), 123-124.

16. T. P. Hill, Stochasticinequalities,IMSLectureNotes 22 (1993), 116-132.

17. T. P. Hill, Fair-divisionproblems,preprint.

18. B. Knaster,Sur le probleme du partage pragmatiquede H. Steinhaus, Annalesde la Societe

Polonaisede Mathematique

19 (1946),228-230.

19. S. X. Levmoreand E. E. Cook, SuperStrategiesfor Puzzlesand Games,Doubleday,GardenCity,

NY (1981),47-53.

20. A. A. Liapounoff,On completely additive vector functions, Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR (1940),

465-478.

21. J. Neyman,Un theoremed'existence,C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 222 (1946),843-845.

22. D. Olivastro,Preferredshares,TheSciences,March/April(1992),52-54.

23. D. Olivastro,'Object Lessons"(Solutionsand Sequelae),TheSciences,July/August(1992),55.

24. K. Rebman, How to get (at least) a fair share of the cake, in MathematicalPlums, Ross

Honsberger,editor,MathematicalAssociationof America(1979),22-37.

25. H. Steinhaus,The problemof fair division,Econometrica16 (1948), 101-104.

26. H. Steinhaus,Sur la divisionpragmatique,Econometrica(supplement)17 (1949),315-319.

27. W. Stromquist,How to cut a cake fairly, AmericanMathematicalMonthly87, no. 8 (1980),

640-644. Addendum,vol. 88, no. 8 (1981),613-614.

28. W. Stromquistand D. R. Woodall,Sets on which severalmeasuresagree, J. Math. Anal. Appl.

108 (1985),241-248.

29. W. A. Webb,An algorithmfor a strongerfair divisionproblem,preprint.

30. D. Weller, Fair divisionof a measurablespace, Journalof MathematicalEconomics14, no. 1

(1985),5-17.

31. D. R. Woodall,Dividinga cake fairly,J. Math.Anal. Appl. 78, no. 1 (1980),233-247.

32. D. R. Woodall,A note on the cake-divisionproblem,Journalof Comb. Theory(A) 42 (1986),

300-301.

Department

of Politics

NewYorkUniversity

NewYork,NY10003

18

Department

of Mathematics

UnionCollege

Schenectady,

NY12308

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

[January

- MinorsUploaded byGrace Kon
- lbs 400 math reflection essayUploaded byapi-310050973
- Probability IBUploaded byridhi_puri
- 01a_4MB0_Paper_1_(R)_-_May_2016Uploaded bywill bell
- lesson- first math fact familiesUploaded byapi-252741387
- Business Mathematics - I (QTM-110)Uploaded byShariqShafiq
- Kurwa Mac Strach Sie Bac ArtykulUploaded byaetlantra110
- Cmo MatrixUploaded byParis Geronimo
- aletiasplanningguide2 docxUploaded byapi-236986415
- Ielts EssaysUploaded byTunnie Le
- Upcat TopicsUploaded byBrittany Ilan
- QRT4 WEEK 5 TG Lesson 93.docxUploaded byMadonna Arit Matulac
- ICM_Vol_3_76Uploaded byAldo Juan Gil Crisóstomo
- Palma,JJ 10 GarnetUploaded byZuellen Mae Garapan Bedaño
- 221.pdfUploaded byHello mister
- Problem 1 003Uploaded byOscar Sanchez
- sopUploaded byTej Pokar
- ReUploaded byfrank thomas
- pdfjoiner 52Uploaded byapi-347025977
- march 17 lesson planUploaded byapi-273186083
- Copie de Homework SolutionsUploaded byGerges
- How Did 99%Tilers Prepared for CATUploaded byKaran Kakkar
- Subjects and MathsUploaded byk_mer
- SPM add maths projectUploaded byWenan Chooi Wen Han
- Curriculum 2013Uploaded byshashankniec
- 2001 Lawson - Back to RealityUploaded byEsteban Leiva Troncoso
- Smarandache LogicUploaded byAnonymous 0U9j6BLllB
- Virzalo EladestaUploaded byEdo Vandima
- Gatoraid 3 4 10-1Uploaded bybianchi55
- Donkr Rational Bankroll Management Part1Uploaded bykustad33

- Cisco VPN Client for LinuxUploaded byAlex 'morz' Bergamini
- Project Work on Computer FundamentalUploaded bySampan Vikas
- 1 988HUploaded byiver_millan
- First ImpressionUploaded byVinod Sharma
- How to Write a Training Evaluation ReportUploaded byJames M Njoroge
- Anton Tedesko and the Introduction of Thin Shell Concrete Roofs in the United StatesUploaded bypiugabi
- Strategy Organization Design and EffectivenessUploaded byMartynas Vosylius
- Basic Concept of Discourse AnalysisUploaded byShabirin Almahar
- AYANMSAUploaded byAJIT
- RealityCharting_7 Steps to Effective Problem-Solving and Strategies for Personal Success_Dean Gano.pdfUploaded byArturo Villena
- Oracle 11i R12 ChangesUploaded byssunils7
- Lesson Plan New-Language Arts 2Uploaded byMohd Irwandy
- Chn Lecture NewUploaded byljarseniorn
- Co RelationUploaded byRamandeep Singh
- LID Discussion Paper Nov 2012Uploaded byJoshSiteman
- Selection and Placement.pptUploaded byeifrylle
- Glewwe Et Al. 2013 EdPol in Dev CountriesUploaded byPedro Cango
- Autocad Map 3d TutorialsUploaded byraulx
- Full Paper KeynoteUploaded byYQN
- Instructions for Filling the PBAS FormUploaded byRajni Sinha Verma
- introduction-a-l-econometrieUploaded bydriss_kaitouni
- 05_N006_2173Uploaded byGaoudam Natarajan
- Thin Layer ChromatographyUploaded byDinow DeLonge Chimpuiy
- Veteran Trees, a guide to risk and responsibility.pdfUploaded byChromaticghost2
- A Primer on Cash Flow ForecastingUploaded bysreesarma
- Ch2 Software ProcessesUploaded byMuhammadSalman
- Inventory 2Uploaded byHaider Shadfan
- Missing Data StataUploaded byFernando Alarid
- Quantitative Finance CollectorUploaded bytigerguob
- Use of Ash in ForestryUploaded bySteven Howell

## Much more than documents.

Discover everything Scribd has to offer, including books and audiobooks from major publishers.

Cancel anytime.