COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

TOPIC: INTRODUCTION
1. CORONEL vs CA and ALCARAZ (263 SCRA 15)
The case arose from a complaint for specific performance filed by
private respondent Alcaraz against petitioners to consummate the
sale of a parcel of land in Quezon City.
Facts: On 19 January 1985, Romulo Coronel, et al. executed a
document entitled “Receipt of Down Payment” in favor of Ramona
Patricia Alcaraz for P50,000 downpayment of the total amount of
P1.24M as purchase price for an inherited house and lot
(TCT119627, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City), promising to
execute a deed of absolute sale of said property as soon as such
has been transferred in their name. The balance of P1.19M is due
upon the execution of said deed. On the same date, Concepcion D.
Alcaraz, mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of P50,000.00.
On 6 February 1985, the property originally registered in the name
of the Coronels’ father was transferred in their names (TCT
327043). However, on 18 February 1985, the Coronels sold the
property to Catalina B. Mabanag for P1,580,000.00 after the latter
has paid P300,000.00. For this reason, Coronels canceled and
rescinded the contract with Alcaraz by depositing the down
payment in the bank in trust for Alcaraz.
On 22 February 1985, Alcaraz filed a complaint for specific
performance against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT 327403. On 2 April 1985,
Mabanag caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim
covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. On 25 April 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property in favor of Mabanag. On 5 June
1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name
of Mabanag under TCT 351582.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties agreed to submit the
case for decision solely on the basis of documentary exhibits. Upon
submission of their respective memoranda and the corresponding
comment or reply thereto, and on 1 March 1989, judgment was
handed down in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the defendant to
execute a deed of absolute sale of the land covered by TCT 327403
and canceling TCT 331582 and declaring the latter without force
and effect. Claims for damages by plaintiffs and counterclaims by

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the defendants and intervenors were dismissed. A motion for
reconsideration was thereafter filed, which was denied. CA affirmed
decision of TC.
Issue: Whether the contract between petitioners and private
respondent was that of a conditional sale or a mere contract to sell
Held: Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it
is perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a contract
of sale are the following: a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that
is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b)
Determinate subject matter; and c) Price certain in money or its
equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a
Contract of Sale because the first essential element is lacking. In a
contract to sell, the prospective seller explicity reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective
seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the
property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an
event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full
payment of the purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges
himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property
when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him.
In other words the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a
suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the
obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by
the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective
buyer. A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract
whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property
exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional
contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the
property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first
element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the
happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. If
the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the
contract of sale is completely abated. However, if the suspensive
condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such
that if there had already been previous delivery of the property

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto automatically
transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act
having to be performed by the seller. In a contract to sell, upon the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of
the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the
buyer although the property may have been previously delivered
to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the
prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a
conditional contract of sale specially in cases where the subject
property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted
with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to
sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person
buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for
instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the
prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property
will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no
defect in the owner-seller's title per se, but the latter, of course,
may be used for damages by the intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of
the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will
definitely affect the seller's title thereto. In fact, if there had been
previous delivery of the subject property, the seller's ownership or
title to the property is automatically transferred to the buyer such
that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to any third
person. Such second buyer of the property who may have had
actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller's title,
or at least was charged with the obligation to discover such defect,
cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such second buyer cannot
defeat the first buyer's title. In case a title is issued to the second
buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property
subject of the sale.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the
sellers herein made no express reservation of ownership or title to
the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which
prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of
sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title was
not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price.
Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in

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the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have
been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have
been executed and consummated right there and then.
What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject
document is that when the said "Receipt of Down Payment" was
prepared and signed by petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al., the
parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation
of which is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate
of title from the name of petitioners' father, Constancio P. Coronel,
to their names.
The provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to
the first buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in
good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b)
should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when
the second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the
property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer
satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to
him to the prejudice of the first buyer. In a case of double sale,
what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the
second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said
second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is,
without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. If
a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired
knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a
third party or that another person claims said property in a
pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad
faith and will not confer upon him any right.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner
Mabanag could not have in good faith, registered the sale entered
into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate
of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag
registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of
registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same
property had already been previously sold to private respondents,
or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous buyer
is claiming title to the same property
2. ROMERO vs CA (250 SCRA 223)
Facts:

Dr. the title given to it by the parties is not as much significant as its substance. was the party who could. she could not “get rid of the squatters” on the lot. to deliver and to transfer ownership of a specified thing or right to another (the buyer) over which the latter agrees. manufacture and exportation of perlite filter aids. under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. according to their nature. a civil engineer. a deed of sale. usage and law. From the moment the contract is perfected. also a jeweler. as corporate secretary of the bank. Purchase price = P1. a “Deed of Conditional Sale” was executed between Flores and Ongsiong.600. for a price certain. as the case may be. asked Remelia Dichoso andOlivia Mendoza to look for a buyer who might be interested in the Tanay property. Issue: WON there was a perfected contract of sale? YES Held: A sale is at once perfected when a person (the seller) obligates himself. Flores called on petitioner with a proposal that should he advance the amount of P50. has shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings owned by Dr. Later. except for the presence of squatters in the area. For example. Petitioner visited the property and. Ongsiong shall execute deed of absolute sale in favour of Romero. private respondent would agree to sell the property for only P800/square meter. Ninevetch Cruz. and a subsequent bid by Fule to buy them for US$6. Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered decision holding that private respondent had no right to rescind the contract since it was she who “violated her obligation to eject the squatters from the subject property” and that petitioner. upon full payment. Under the agreement. rescind the agreement. Cruz has declined Fule’s offer to buy said jewelry for P100. was engaged in the business of production. The lot was covered in a TCT in the name of private respondent Enriqueta Chua vda. Flores and his wife offered a parcel of land measuring 1. The ejectment of the squatters is a condition the operative act of which sets into motion the period of compliance by petitioner of his own obligation. This option clearly belongs to petitioner and not to private respondent. Gregorio Fule. Cruz.. to pay the balance of the purchase price. private respondent is obligated to evict the squatters on the property.000. Rizal (covered by TCT 320725) to the Rural Bank of Alaminos. the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which. Antonio Jacobe initially mortgage a 10-hectare property in Tanay.561.000 at $1 to P25 while making a sketch of said jewelry during an inspection at the lobby of Prudential Bank .” 3. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES conditional sale.00 she received from petitioner since. may be in keeping with good faith.000. Laguna to secure a loan in the amount of P10. he decided to put up a central warehouse in Metro Manila. Downpayment = P50K. if title to the property sold is not reserved in the vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment. Ongsiong sought to return the P50. he found the place suitable for a central warehouse. Said mortgage was later foreclosed and the property offered for public auction upon his default. permalite insulation and processed perlite ore. Balance = to be paid 45 days after the removal of all the squatters. i.000. may be treated as absolute in nature. It so happened that in January of said year.00. The two found one in the person of Dr. of the prescribed condition.000. She opted to rescind the sale in view of her failure to get rid of the squatters. FULE vs CA (268 SCRA 698) Facts: Fr. Private respondent’s failure “to remove the squatters from the property” within the stipulated period gives petitioner the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code.00 which could be used in taking up an ejectment case against the squatters.952 square meters. she said. Gregorio Fule. There was no potestative condition on the part of Ongsiong but a “mixed” condition “dependent not on the will of the vendor alone but also of third persons like the squatters and government agencies and personnel concerned. being the injured party. de Ongsiong.e. In 1988. although denominated as a deed of 3 Sales under Atty. (BILATERAL and RECIPROCAL CHARACTERISTIC OF SALE) In determining the real character of the contract. In June 1984.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS Romero. Romero agreed.

From the trial court’s adverse decision. thatthe contract was valid even if the agreement between the parties was principally a barter contract. Fule. Belarmino to finally execute a deed of absolute sale. On 23 October 1984. Cruz to Fule. Fule then accused Dichoso and Mendoza of deceiving him which they. On 26 October 1984. On 20 November 1984. Fule expressed his satisfaction by nodding his head when asked by Dr.00 and some pieces of jewelry.000. His motion for reconsideration having been denied on 19 October 1993. On 20 October 1992. the same court lifted its previous order and denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Cruz had already agreed to the proposed barter. Fule inspected the jewelry. at the bank. Fr. negotiations for the barter of the jewelry and the Tanay property ensued. Cruz attended to the safekeeping of the jewelry. He did not. arrived at the residence of Atty. In an effort to cut through any legal impediment. Fule signed the deed and gave Atty. give them half of the pair of earrings in question. that the agreement has been consummated at the time the principal parties parted ways at the bank. Fule paid the agents. Informed that Fule was at the lawyer’s house. Belarmino at the latter’s residence to prepare the documents of sale. Fule arrived at the residence of Atty. who borrowed the car of Dr.000.00.00 and not P80. as pre-arranged. Cruz to check the property and found out that no sale or barter was feasible as the 1year period of redemption has not expired. went there posthaste thinking that Fule had finally agreed to give them half of the pair of earrings. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES Belarmino. Jacobe sold the property to Fule for P75. and issued a certification to the effect that the actual consideration of the sale was P200.. complaining about the fake jewelry. for 10-15 minutes. For services rendered. immediately declared them counterfeit. petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.00 as indicated in the deed of absolute sale (the disparity purportedly aimed at minimizing the amount of the capital gains tax that Fule would have to shoulder). Reynaldo Alcantara residing at Lakeside Subdivision in San Pablo City. Fule filed a complaint before the RTC San Pablo City against private respondents praying. however. After trial. a deed of redemption on behalf of Fr. Thereafter. Issue: Whether the sale should be nullified on the ground of fraud .000. since the exchange rate appreciated to P19 per dollar). however. and that damages are due to the defendants. Subsequently. the amount of US$300. Since the jewelry was appraised only atP160. The haste with which the two deeds were executed is shown by the fact that the deed of sale was notarized ahead of the deed of redemption. Belarmino complaining that the jewelry given him was fake. however. that the contract of sale over the Tanay property be declared null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit. Thereafter. only to find Fule demonstrating with a tester that the earrings were fake. Jacobe purportedly in the amount of P15. 4 Sales under Atty.00. Fule reported the matter to the police station where Dichoso and Mendoza likewise executed sworn statements. and on even date. Atty. Dr. Fule met Atty.00 and jewelry he had given them. Fule went to one Atty. the parties agreed that the balance of P40. Belarmino the amount of P13.700.00 would just be paid later in cash. Atty. holding that the genuine pair of earrings used as consideration for the sale was delivered by Dr. Dichoso. Dichoso and Mendoza. As Dr.000. among other things.00 for necessary expenses in the transfer of title over the Tanay property. to have the earrings tested. and delivered the contents thereof to Fule. a jeweler. the group decided to go to the house of a certain Macario Dimayuga. the lower court issued a temporary restraining order directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to refrain from acting on the pertinent documents involved in the transaction. denied. the Court of Appeals. Cruz. Fule went to Prudential Bank to take a look at the jewelry. which he had earlier promised.000. Belarmino accordingly caused the preparation of a deed of absolute sale while Fule and Dr. however. Cruz and the cashier opened the safety deposit box. called up Atty. Upon being advised by the latter. Fule nonetheless took back the US$300. the lower court rendered its decision on 7March 1989. The following day.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS (the latter instance was declined. At around 9:30 p. however.78.987. Belarmino was requested by Dr. Later in the evening. They countered that Fule could not have been fooled because he had vast experience regarding jewelry. the petition for review on certiorari. rendered a decision affirming in toto the lower court’s decision. Cruz if the jewelry was okay.m. Fule executed on 19 October 1984. together with Dichoso and Mendoza. On 30October 1984. near the electric light at the bank’s lobby. after taking one look at the earrings. Hence. Dimayuga.

As such. The nature and value of the thing he had taken preclude its return after that supervening period within which anything could have happened. Being consensual. Contracts that are voidable or annullable. intimidation. undue influence or fraud. ONG vs CA (310 SCRA 1) Furthermore.000. Cruz if he was satisfied with the same.499. Jaime Ong and spouses Miguel and Alejandra Robles executed an “Agreement of Purchase and Sale” respecting 2 parcels of land situated at Barrio Puri.500. they are bound by the contract unless there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its nullification.4M to be paid in 4 equal quarterly installments of P350. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar the transfer of ownership and possession of the things exchanged considering the fact that their contract is silent as to when it becomes due and demandable. piggery) for P2M (initial payment of P600. Ong 5 Sales under Atty. petitioner was afforded the reasonable opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code within which to examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when asked by Dr. even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties are: (1) those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract. Quezon (agricultural including rice mill. but ordered Dr. surrenders and transfers the parcels of land including all improvements thereon and to transfer the operations of the piggery and rice mill to the buyer. Ownership over the parcel of land and the pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings had been transferred to Dr. upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. That after two hours he later claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in exchange for his Tanay property. Said contract of sale being absolute in nature. its nonpayment by Dr. Cruz. The records. petitioner executed an act which was more consistent with his exercise of ownership over it. building. not excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its being switched with an inferior kind. and that all payments due and demandable under the contract effected in the residence of the seller unless otherwise designated by the parties in writing. Cruz to pay Fule the balance of thepurchase price of P40.000 broken into P103. binding themselves that upon the payment of the total purchase price the seller delivers a good and sufficient deed of sale and conveyance for the parcels of land free and clear from liens and encumbrances. Facts: On 10 May 1983. Ong took possession of the subject parcels of land together with the piggery. and balance of 1.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS Held: A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Cruz and petitioner. are bare of any evidence manifesting that private respondents employed such insidious words or machinations to entice petitioner into entering the contract of barter. and (2) those where the consent is vitiated by mistake. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay property. a contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments. This gains credence when it is borne in mind that he himself had earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr.000 the first of which due and demandable on 15 June 1983). Cruz by affixing his signature to the contract of sale.91 directly paid to seller on 22 March 1983 and P496. residential house and other improvements thereon. rice mill. however. violence. respectively. It is evident from the facts of the case that there was a meeting of the minds between petitioner and Dr.09 directly paid to BPI to answer for part of seller’s loan with the bank. It was in fact petitioner who resorted to machinations to convince Dr. that seller delivers. San Antonio. The Supreme Court affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals. While it is true that the amount of P40. Cruz. title passed to the On 15 May 1983. Pursuant to the contract. SALES vendee upon delivery of the thing sold since there was no stipulation in the contract that title to the property sold has been reserved in the seller until full payment of the price or that the vendor has the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. could not sever the juridical tie that now bound him and Dr.00 forming part of the consideration was still payable to petitioner. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL . with costs against petitioner.000 within 10 days from the finality of the decision. By taking the jewelry outside the bank. 4.

Failure to pay. in this instance. the Court of Appeals noted that the failure of petitioner to completely pay the purchase 6 Sales under Atty. Hence. Subsequently. as distinguished from a contract of sale. sent Ong a demand letter asking for the return of the properties. in accordance with their stipulation that petitioner pay the loan of the spouses with BPI. so. To answer for his balance of P 1. they filed with the RTC Lucena City. while in a contract to sell. by agreement. on 2 September 1985. Ong only managed to dole out no more than P393.00 each (Check 137708-157711). which ong. as per agreement. Ong. is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents the vendor's obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force.000.000 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Ong introduced major improvements on the subject properties by constructing a complete fence made of hollow blocks and expanding the piggery. while the case was still pending with the trial court. which affirmed the decision of the RTC but deleted the award of exemplary damages. the checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Ong deposited sums of money with the BPI. the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the spouses: ordering the contract entered into by the parties set aside.411. the spouses. which the trial court granted. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. casual or serious. A careful reading of the parties' "Agreement of Purchase and Sale" shows that it is in the nature of a contract to sell.4M. From this decision.679.179. the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold.499. Issues: (1) whether the contract entered into by the parties may be validly rescinded under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code (2) whether the parties had novated their original contract as to the time and manner of payment Held: Article 1191 of the New Civil Code refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. however. ordering the return of the sum of P497. . but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Hence. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. Rather. out of theP496.91 2 by depositing it with the UUCPB. petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.00 loan of the spouses with BPI. He. however. his failure to do so brought about a situation which prevented the obligation of respondent spouses to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other. and thus enjoined Ong from introducing improvements on the properties except for repairs.000 for exemplary damages and P20. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES price is a substantial breach of his obligation which entitles the private respondents to rescind their contract under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. continued to be in possession of the two parcels of land while the spouses were forced to use the rice mill for residential purposes. It must be stressed that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation. voluntarily gave the spouses authority to operate the rice mill. but not because of a breach on the part of petitioner for failure to complete payment of the purchase price. in eturn. ownership is. When the bank threatened to foreclose the spouses’ mortgage. through counsel. they sold 3 transformers of the rice mill worth P51. On 2 August 1985. a complaint for rescission of contract and recovery of properties with damages. Later.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS paid the spouses the sum of P103. In a contract to sell. with the knowledge and conformity of Ong.51 to Ong by the spouses. the petition for review on certiorari. In a contract of sale. the failure of which is not a breach. reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Their demand was left unheeded.00 to pay off their outstanding obligation with said bank. the agreement of the parties in the case at bench may be set aside. the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition.60. should have paid. ordering the delivery of the parcels of land and the improvements thereon to the spouses. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause. Branch 60. ordering Ong to pay the spouses P100. To make matters worse. In affirming the decision of the trial court. Ong promised to replace the checks but failed to do so. When presented for payment.500. On 1 June 1989. Ong issued 4 post-dated Metro Bank checks payable to the spouses in the amount of P350. These prompted the spouses to ask for a writ of preliminary injunction.

the bond with respect to the Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company expired with no sale of the approximately 24. with the Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. Fonacier constituted and appointed Fernando A. On 8 December 1955. Fonacier entered into a “Contract of Mining Operation” with Larap Mines and Smelting Co. on the same day. wherein Gaite transferred to Fonacier. improvements. Camarines Norte.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS Novation is never presumed. as additional surety. opening and paving roads within and outside their boundaries. plus 10% of the royalties that Fonacier would receive from the mining claims. and all the records and documents relative to the mines. situated in Jose Panganiban. Fonacier likewise transferred. and facilities in or outside said claims. it must be proven as a fact either by express stipulation of the parties or by implication derived from an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligation.000 tons of iron ore. On 19 March 1954. Fonacier promised to execute in favor of Gaite a surety bond. GAITE vs FONACIER (2 SCRA 830) Facts: Isabelo Fonacier was the owner and/or holder of 11 iron lode mineral claims (Dawahan Group). 5. In order for novation to take place. For some reason or another. The subsequent acts of the parties hardly demonstrate their intent to dissolve the old obligation as a consideration for the emergence of the new one. together with the improvements therein and the use of the name “Larap Iron Mines” and its goodwill. in consideration of certain royalties. Isabelo Fonacier decided to revoke the authority granted by him to Gaite. the right to use the business name “Larap Iron Mines” and its goodwill.000. for the consideration of P20. Thereafter Gaite embarked upon the development and exploitation of the mining claims. but it provided that the liability of the surety company would attach only when there had been an actual sale of iron ore by the Larap Mines & Smelting Co. the complete title to the approximately 24. To secure the payment of the balance. a document entitled “Revocation of Power of Attorney and Contract” was executed on 8 December 1954. for an amount of not less than P65. and (4) there must be the validity of the new contract.000. The aforesaid requisites are not found in the case at bench. making other improvements and installing facilities therein for use in the development of the mines. all his rights and interests on all the roads. A second bond was executed by the parties to the first bond.000. and in time extracted therefrom what he claimed and estimated to be approximately 24. As a result. of which was paid upon the signing of the agreement.680. By a “Deed of Assignment” dated 29 September 1952. to grant it the right to develop. in the same document. Both bond were attached and made integral parts of the “Revocation of Power of Attorney and Contract. to the Larap Mines & Smelting Co. Gaite transferred to Fonacier all his rights and interests over the “24. and Gaite assented thereto 7 Sales under Atty. delivered on 8 December 1954 with Fonacier as principal and the Larap Mines and Smelting Co. in consideration of the sum of P75. and its stockholders as sureties. more or less” that the former had already extracted from the mineral claims. and the balance to be paid out of the first letter of credit covering the first shipment of iron ores or the first amount derived from the local sale of iron ore made by the Larap Mines & Smelting Co. and explore the mining claims. In the same document.. with costs against petitioner Ong.50 per ton of ore that might be extracted therefrom. (3) there must be the extinguishment of the old contract. the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation. P10. Inc.000 tons of iron ore. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES subject to certain conditions. owned solely by him.000 tons of iron ore which he acquired from Gaite.000 metric tons of iron ore. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals with the modification that the spouses are ordered to return to Ong the sum P48.” On the same day that Fonacier revoked the power of attorney. exploit. inconsideration for the signing by the company and its stockholders of the surety bonds delivered by Fonacier to Gaite. nor had the 65.000 balance of the price of said ore been paid to Gaite by .000. (2) there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract. Gaite as his true and lawful attorney-in-fact to enter into a contract with any individual or juridical person for the exploration and development of the mining claims on a royalty basis of not less than P0..00 in addition to the amounts already awarded. Gaite in turn executed a general assignment conveying the development and exploitation of said mining claims unto the Larap Iron Mines.

ACAP vs CA (251 SCRA 30) Facts: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran. a security that Gaite considered essential and upon which he had insisted when he executed the deed of sale of the ore to Fonacier.720 sq. and the fact that appellants did put up such bonds indicates that they admitted the definite existence of their obligation to pay the balance of P65. The subject matter of the sale is. Issue: (1) Whether the sale is conditional or one with a period (2) Whether there were insufficient tons of ores Held: (1) The shipment or local sale of the iron ore is not a condition precedent (or suspensive) to the payment of the balance of P65. therefore. A contract of sale is normally commutative and onerous: not only does each one of the parties assume a correlative obligation (the seller to deliver and transfer ownership of the thing sold and the buyer to pay the price). The appellant have forfeited the right court below that the appellants have forfeited the right to compel Gaite to wait for the sale of the ore before receiving payment of the balance of P65. After both spouses died. Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT R-12179.but each party anticipates performance by the other from the very start. The lot has an area of 13. a determinate object. but was only a suspensive period or term. notwithstanding that the quantity delivered is less than the amount estimated by them. the Larap Mines & Smelting Co. consequential damages. Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled . (2) The sale between the parties is a sale of a specific mass or iron ore because no provision was made in their contract for the measuring or weighing of the ore sold in order to complete or perfect the sale.00. and not the actual number of units or tons contained therein. plus costs.00. Gaite demanded from Fonacier and his sureties payment of said amount. so that the other understands that he assumes the risk of receiving nothing for what he gives (as in the case of a sale of hopes or expectations.000. an not only upon a bond by Fonacier. In 1975. second par. emptio spei). From this judgment. The expiration of the bonding company's undertaking on December 8.000. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from. New Civil Code). because of their failure to renew the bond of the Far Eastern Surety Company or else replace it with an equivalent guarantee. While in a sale the obligation of one party can be lawfully subordinated to an uncertain event. Whereupon. or that Fonacier understood that Gaite assumed any such risk. it is not in the usual course of business to do so. 1955 substantially reduced the security of the vendor's rights as creditor for the unpaid P65. P65.00. their only son Felixberto inherited the lot.m.000 with interest at 6% per annum from 9 December 1955 until full payment. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES insisted on a bond a to guarantee payment of the P65. 1480. defendants jointly appealed to the Supreme Court as the claims involved aggregate to more than P200.(see Art.000 balance of the price of the ore.000.000. the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.000. accordingly.00. What characterizes a conditional obligation is the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force (as distinguished from its demandability) is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event.. the contingent character of the obligation must clearly appear. with costs against appellants. and the company's stockholders. The title was issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. This is proved by the fact that Gaite 8 Sales under Atty. the latter filed a complaint against them in the CFI Manila (Civil Case 29310) for the payment of the P65. rendered in favor of plaintiff Gaite ordering defendants to pay him. nor was the price of P75.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS Fonacier and his sureties. so that all that was required of the seller Gaite was to deliver in good faith to his buyer all of the ore found in the mass. Nothing is found in the record to evidence that Gaite desired or assumed to run the risk of losing his right over the ore without getting paid for it.000. jointly and severally. so that if the suspensive condition does not take place.. When Fonacier and his sureties failed to pay as demanded by Gaite. and attorney’s fees. but also on one by a surety company. 6.00. the mass.00 agreed upon by the parties based upon any such measurement. Judgment was.000. hence.

Acap allegedly complied with said obligation. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES under PD 27 and his farmholdings. delos Reys field a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Acap. prompting delos Reyes to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran. Thereafter. the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. covering an area of 9. On 20 August 1991.000.00 as attorney’s fees. ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. Subsequently. Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land. Hence. and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. The MAR invited Acap. the return of the farmland in Acap’s possession to delos Reyes.000. Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter. who sent his wife. there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of P10. title to the property continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Negros Occidental. While title is the juridical justification. the petition for review on certiorari. and ordering the dispossession of Acap as leasehold tenant of the land for failure to pay rentals. On 28 April 1988.” wherein they declared to have adjudicated upon themselves the parcel of land in equal share. petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. holding that de los Reyes had acquired ownership of Lot No. quitclaim all right. one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing. In 1983. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. the sum of P1. Issues: (1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent (2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of private respondent Held: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act. after the lapse of four (4) years. Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title. The wife stated that the she and her husband did not recognize delos Reyes’s claim of ownership over the land. Acap refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido. to his widow Laurenciana. The controversy began when Pido died interstate and on 27 November 1981. Upon the other hand. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot1130 Hinigaran Cadastre. Hence. mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.00 as actual damages. upon Pido’s death. and Acap to pay P5.500 sq. Since 1960. delos Reyes sought for Acap to personally inform him that he had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Negros Occidental based on a document entitled “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights”.000. however justified. It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido’s death. alleging that as his leasehold tenant. Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document. a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. the lower court rendered a decision in favor of delos Reyes. interests and participation over the parcel of land in favor of Edy de los Reyes. Aggrieved.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS “Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of Cosme Pido. however. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran. The first presumes the existence of a contract or . In a Contract of Sale. Hence. ordering the forfeiture of Acap’s preferred right of a Certificae of Land Transfer 9 Sales under Atty. m. Acap refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of 10 cavans of palay despite repeated demands. and that they waive. is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. In 1982. The document was signed by all of Pido’s heirs.

the petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents (Mondejar. Agusan del Sur. On 29 July 1962. and that the deed of sale in favor of Mondejar did not carry the conformity and acquiescence of her children considering that Trinidad was already 63 years old and a widow. de Sequeña and Paz Corvera Cabiltes and brother Epapiadito Corvera executed a conditional deed of donation of the 2-hectare parcel of land in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon. de Quijada. the condition being that the parcel of land shall be used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed provincial high school in Talacogon. On 5 April 1956. dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Acap for failure to properly state a cause of action. without prejudice to private respondent taking the proper legal steps to establish the legal mode by which he claims to have acquired ownership of the land in question. Rodolfo Goloran. the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date. the proposed provincial high school having failed to materialize. Rodulfo and Ernesto Goloran. In 1980. Ras. Trinidad remained in possession of the parcel of land despite the donation.Abiso. In the meantime. The second is. Private respondent. Cresente. Asis. Consequently. and Warlito) are the children of the late Trinidad Corvera Vda. Apparently. or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. Mondejar sold portions of the land to Fernando Bautista. It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven. In 1987. dismissed for failure to prosecute. cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale. Eliuteria. however. Demetrio. the heirs of Trinidad. holding that Trinidad Quijada did not have legal title or right to sell the land to Mondejar as it belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon at that time. On 5 July 1988. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES Petitioners (Alfonso. while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on both parties. situated in the barrio of San Agustin. QUIJADA vs CA (299 SCRA 695) Facts: 10 Sales under Atty. a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it. and Ernesto Goloran. and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court. Eulalio. in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. recovery of possession and ownership of parcels of land with claim for attorney’s fees and damages. who at that time was already dead. Efren Guden. Trinidad Quijada together with her sisters Leonila Corvera Vda. which complaint was. being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido. Macasero and Maguisay) for quieting of title. or a donation. Reynalda. there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Bautista. Trinidad was one of the heirs of the late Pedro Corvera and inherited from the latter the 2-hectareparcel of land subject of the case. Subsequently. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. filed a complaint for forcible entry against Mondejar. the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof thereof. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS deed of sale between the parties. 7. technically speaking. Talacogon. Trinidad verbally sold the remaining 1 hectare to Mondejar without the benefit of a written deed of sale and evidenced solely by receipts of payment. the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Talacogon enacted a resolution reverting the 2 hectares of land donated back to the donors. The Supreme Court granted the petition. set aside the decision of the RTC Negros Occidental. A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner. Trinidad sold 1 hectare of the subject parcel of land to Regalado Mondejar. and any person acting in . The trial court ordered the defendants (private respondents).

but only in sales of services. which is manifested the moment there is a meeting of the minds as to the offer and acceptance thereof on three (3) elements: subject matter. 186 of the NIRC. What the law requires is that the seller has the right to transfer ownership at the time the thing sold is delivered. Thereafter. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The consummation. as well as the deeds of sale/relinquishments executed by Mondejar to the other defendants. what the donor sold was the land itself which she no longer owns. which is a tax on sales of services. price and terms of payment of the price. however. Sale. it paid taxes equivalent to 7% on the gross receipts under Sec. however. A perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged 11 Sales under Atty. is perfected by mere consent. and P30. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment a quo ruling that the sale made by Trinidad Quijada to respondent Mondejar was valid as the former retained an inchoate interest on the lots by virtue of the automatic reversion clause in the deed of donation. or is merely a special service provider Held: Celestino Co & Company habitually makes sash. The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals 8. However. but only upon special orders from the customers. ordered the cancellation of the deed of sale executed by Trinidad to Mondejar.000." This rule applies not only when the subject matter of the contract of sale is goods. sash and windows for the public. in 1952 it began to claim only 3% tax under Sec. being a consensual contract. the sale is still valid. Issue: Whether the petitioner company is engaged in manufacturing. CELESTINO vs CIR (99 Phil 841) Facts: Celestino Co & Company is a general co-partnership registered under the trade name “Oriental Sash Factory”. which is a tax on the original sales of articles by manufacturer. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES on the ground of non-ownership on the part of the seller at the time of its perfection. Such inchoate interest may be the subject of contracts including a contract of sale. the amount of P10. Ownership by the seller on the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale is not an element for its perfection. Petitioner claims that it does not manufacture readymade doors. windows and doors. On appeal. respectively. P8. That it "manufactures" the same is practically admitted by appellant itself. it is not engaged in manufacturing. The fact that windows and doors are made by it . When the CA denied their motion. Perfection per se does not transfer ownership which occurs upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold. Issue: Whether the sale between Trinidad and Regalado is valid considering the capacity of the vendor to execute the contract in view of the conditional deed of donation Held: The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property during the time that ownership of the land has not reverted to her.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS defendants’ behalf to return and vacate the 2 hectares of land to the plaintiff. petitioners instituted a petition for review to the Supreme Court. expenses of litigation and moral damages. From 1946 to 1951. Consequently. ownership is transferred to respondent Mondejar and those who claim their right from him. hence. producer or importer. It would have been different if the donor-seller sold her interests over the property under the deed of donation which is subject to the possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition. but also to other kinds of property. and to remove their improvements constructed on the lot. in solidum. Such circumstance happened in this case when petitioners who are Trinidad Quijada's heirs and successors-in-interest became the owners of the subject property upon the reversion of the ownership of the land to them. of the perfected contract is another matter. Article 1434 of the New Civil Code supports the ruling that the seller's "title passes by operation of law to the buyer. It occurs upon the constructive or actual delivery of the subject matter to the buyer when the seller or her successors-ininterest subsequently acquires ownership thereof. including real property. and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs.000. hence. as it has represented in its stationery and advertisements to the public. 191.000 as attorney’s fees. In this case.

supposing for the moment that the transactions were not sales. panels-as it ordinarily manufactured or was in a position habitually to manufacture. CIR case applicable in this case? NO. When this Factory accepts a job that requires the use of extraordinary or additional equipment. The Oriental Sash Factory does nothing more than sell the goods that it mass-produces or habitually makes. Issue: 1) WON Engineering Equipment is a manufacturer or contractor? CONTRACTOR. But as the doors and windows had been admittedly "manufactured" by the Oriental Sash Factory. such transactions could be. So. contested the tax assessment and requested that it be furnished with the details and particulars of the Commissioner’s assessment. appealed to the Supreme Court. pumping plants and steel fabrications. Anyway. undertakes to do a specific job or piece of work for other persons. representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work. panels. NBI and Central Bank conducted a raid and search on which occasion voluminous records of the firm were seized and confiscated. may order windows or doors of the kind manufactured by this appellant. 3) Is Celestino Co vs. CIR vs ENGR. The Commissioner. frames. During the pendency of the case the investigating revenue examiners reduced the Company’s deficiency tax. an engineering and machinery firm. Therefore it is not true that it serves special customers only or confines its services to them alone.000 be paid as compromise in extrajudicial settlement of the Company’s penal liability for violation of the Tax Code. they were neither lease of services nor contract jobs by a contractor. provided he pays the price. with sufficient money. The true test of a contractor is that when he renders service in the course of an independent occupation. Any builder or homeowner. . for it can easily duplicate or even mass-produce the same doors-it is mechanically equipped to do so. Surely. for it is obvious that it only accepted such orders as called for the employment of such material-moulding. CIR also reported about deficiency advance sales tax. however. 2) Corrollarily WON the installation of a centralized air-conditioning system a contact of sale or a contract for piece of work? CONTRACT FOR PIECE OF WORK. or involves services not generally performed by it-it thereby contracts for a piece of work filing special orders within the meaning of Article 1467. Held: 1) The word “contractor” has come to be used with special reference to a person who. The firm. using his own means and methods without submitting himself to control as to the petty details. may purchase from appellant doors of the same kind. Engineering appealed the case to the Court of Tax Appeals. and should be taxed as "transfers" thereof under section 186 of the National Revenue Code. not satisfied with the decision of the CTA. is engaged in the design and installation of central type air conditioning system. 9. CTA declared that Engineering is a contractor and is exempt from deficiency manufacturers sales tax. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES CIR received an anonymous letter denouncing Engineering for tax evasion by misdeclaring its imported articles and failing to pay the correct percentage taxes due thereon in connivance with its foreign suppliers. CIR assessed against the Company payment of the increased amount and suggested that P10. and likes. They were merely orders for work nothing is shown to call them special requiring extraordinary service of the factory. in the pursuit of the independent business. The orders herein exhibited were not shown to be special. the doors ordered by Don Toribio Teodoro & Sons Inc.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS only when customers place their orders. EQUUIPMENT (64 SCRA 590) Facts: Engineering Equipment and Supply Co. the appellant will not refuse. and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. frames. sash. And anyone who sees. Engineering was likewise denounced to the Central Bank (CB) for alleged fraud in obtaining its dollar allocations. does not alter the nature of the establishment. cutting them to such sizes and combining them in such forms as its customers may desire.. 12 Sales under Atty. mouldings.

with a discount of from 20 to 25 per cent. 2) NATURE OF OBJECT TEST: The distinction between a contract of sale and one for work. which “sales” were reflected in their books of accounts totalling P118. it did not have readymade air conditioning units for sale. the said air conditioning units were not intended for sale to the general public. and the sources of heat gain or cooling load on the plant such as sun load. it is a contract for a piece of work. Hence. or in cash. Celestino Co intended itself to be a manufacturer of doors. sash factories receive orders for doors and windows of special design only in particular cases. but the bulk of their sales is derived from ready-made doors and windows of standard sizes for the average home. Contractors and not as manufacturers. Relative to the installation of air conditioning system. Machinery Mechanical Supplies. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES Points of discussion: 1) Advertisement as manufacturer/contractor 2) Ready-made materials In Celestino Co. The Court found said sum difficult to have been derived from its few customers who placed special orders for these items. and in consequence of. Engineers. as it did register a special trade name for its sash business and ordered company stationery carrying the bold print “ORIENTAL SASH FACTORY.  3) Celestino Co compared to Engineering Equipment: 13 Sales under Atty. doors and windows manufactured in its factory. Quiroga was to furnish the Parson with the beds (which the latter might order. a contract was entered into by and between the Quiroga and J. From the very start. Engineering designed and engineered complete each particular plant and that no two plants were identical but each had to be engineered separately. but imported some items (as refrigeration compressors in complete set. according to their class. QUIROGA vs PARSONS HARDWARE Facts: On 24 January 1911. or a thing which would have existed and has been the subject of sale to some other persons even if the order had not been given. It likewise paid the contractors tax on all the contracts for the design and construction of central system.” As a general rule. the Court held the taxpayer to be a manufacturer rather than a contractor of sash. even though it may be entirely made after.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS Engineering did not manufacture air conditioning units for sale to the general public. lighting. The air conditioning units installed in a central type of air conditioning system would not have existed but for the order of the party desiring to acquire it and if it existed without the special order of Engineering’s customer. . or before. and in these last two cases an additional discount was to be allowed for prompt payment.754. heat exchangers or coils) which were used in executing contracts entered into by it. supply and installation of air conditioning units of the central type taking into consideration in the process such factors as the area of the space to be air conditioned. The price agreed upon was the one determined by Quiroga for the sale of these beds in Manila. it is a contract of sale. in Manila. and other electrical appliances which are or may be in the plan. and no change or modification of it is made at defendant’s request. Payment was to be made at the end of sixty days. Engineering undertook negotiations and execution of individual contracts for the design. 10. at the price stipulated) and that Parson was to pay the price in the manner stipulated. sashes etc. Similarly.69 for the period of only nine (9) months. If the article ordered by the purchaser is exactly such as the plaintiff makes and keeps on hand for sale to anyone. the number of persons occupying or would be occupying the premises. at Quiroga’s request. labor and materials is tested by the inquiry whether the thing transferred is one NOT in existence and which never would have existed but for the order of the party desiring to acquire it. the defendants order for it. if Parson so preferred. the company advertised itself as Engineering Equipment and Supply Company. windows. Parsons (to whose rights and obligations Parsons Hardware later subrogated itself) for the exclusive sale of Quiroga Beds in the Visayan Islands. In the present case. the purpose for which the various air conditioning areas are to be used.

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS SALES Quiroga files a case against Parsons for allegedly violating the following stipulations: not to sell the beds at higher prices than those of the invoices. Payment was to be made at the end of sixty days. to have an open establishment in Iloilo. on the part of the defendant. Indiana. and that the defendant was to pay the price in the manner stipulated. These are precisely the essential features of a contract of purchase and sale. such as. itself to conduct the agency.700 FOB factory Richmond. the latter. 14 Sales under Atty. on the same terms as the first order. inquiring about the equipment desired and making the said company to quote its price of $1. by reason of the contract hereinbefore transcribed. cables. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL For the foregoing reasons.700. The whole question. PUYAT and SONS vs ARCO AMUSEMENT COMP. due attention must be given to its essential clauses. and in these last two cases an additional discount was to be allowed for prompt payment. on behalf of Arco Amusement. etc.. was acting as exclusive agents in the Philippines for the Starr Piano Company of Richmond. desiring to equip its cinematograph with sound reproducing devices. in addition to the price of the equipment. (72 Phil 402) . and being agreeable to the price. Puyat informed the plaintiff of the price of $1. but if the plaintiff consents to fill them. But the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was his agent for the sale of his beds in Iloilo. or in cash. insurance. at the price stipulated. and upon delivery of the same to Arco and the presentation of necessary papers. in a letter dated 19 November 1929. without any other consideration and regardless as to whether he had or had not sold the beds. freight. another order for sound reproducing equipment was placed by Arco with Puyat. The Held: In order to classify a contract. He following year. About the same time. to keep the beds on public exhibition. the only one expressly imposed by the contract. Arco. to pay their price. or before. Inc. the effect of its breach would only entitle the plaintiff to disregard the orders which the defendant might place under other conditions. none of the obligations imputed to the defendant in the two causes of action are expressly set forth in the contract. it was agreed between the parties. we are of opinion that the contract by and between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of purchase and sale. In respect to the defendant’s obligation to order by the dozen. Arco. its name was changed to Arco Amusement Company. The equipment arrived about the end of the year 1929. at the plaintiff’s request. At the expense of the Arco. After some negotiations. the price of $1. but delivers to the principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a third person. There was the obligation on the part of the plaintiff to supply the beds. what was essential. With the exception of the obligation on the part of the defendant to order the beds by the dozen and in no other manner. Gonzalo Puyat & Sons. and that said obligations are implied in a contract of commercial agency. reduced itself to a determination as to whether the defendant. Indiana. in addition to its other business. was a purchaser or an agent of the plaintiff for the sale of his beds. either by agreement or by law. By virtue of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Puyat would. and. In 1930. plus all expenses. and does not pay its price. was necessarily obliged to pay their price within the term fixed. as constituting its cause and subject matter. and if he does not succeed in selling it. Puyat sent a cable to the Starr Piano Company. and to order the beds by the dozen and in no other manner. and that the obligations the breach of which is alleged as a cause of action are not imposed upon the defendant. 11. These features exclude the legal conception of an agency or order to sell whereby the mandatory or agent received the thing to sell it. was duly paid by the Arco to Puyat. In the year 1929. is that the plaintiff was to furnish the defendant with the beds which the latter might order. on receiving the beds. USA. was engaged in the business of operating cinematographs. he returns it.700. plus the 10% commission agreed upon the plus all the expenses and charges. therefore. formally authorized the order. which dealt in cinematograph equipment and machinery. banking charges. the ‘Teatro Arco’. In the contract in question. order sound reproducing equipment from the Star Piano Company and that Arco Amusement would pay Puyat. he waives his right and cannot complain for having acted thus at his own free will. Issue: Whether the contract is a contract of agency or of sale. 10% commission. and to pay for the advertisement expenses for the same. approached Puyat. if the defendant so preferred.

to hold the petitioner an agent of the respondent in the purchase of equipment and machinery from the Starr Piano Company of Richmond. Puyat acting as agent of Arco in the purchase of the equipment in question.04. Hence. Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent is that of agency where agent is bound to indemnify the principal for damages. Indiana. and sentenced Puyat to pay Arco alleged over payments in the total sum of $1. and which stipulation is not incompatible with the contract of purchase and sale. as well as to pay the costs of the suit in both instances. and that the defendant had obtained a discount from the Starr Piano Company. . mistake in their quotation.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS SALES equipment under the second order arrived in due time.600. such as change in prices. filed by one Fidel Reyes against Puyat. because in agency. and absolved Puyat from the complaint. In the second place.600 of the equipment. but a mere flat charge and rough estimate made by Puyat equivalent to 10% of the price of $1. held that the relation between the parties was that of agent and principal. the agent is exempted from all liability in the discharge of his commission provided he acts in accordance with the instructions received from his principal (section 254.671. for all expenses and charges. The facts and circumstances indicated do not point to anything but plain ordinary transaction where the respondent enters into a contract of purchase and sale with the petitioner. The respondent admitted in its complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila that the petitioner agreed to sell to it the first sound reproducing equipment and machinery. The trial court held that the contract between the parties was one of the outright purchase and sale. Civil Code). in connection with a civil case in Vigan. is incompatible with the admitted fact that the petitioner is the exclusive agent of the same company in the Philippines. together with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until said amount is fully paid. by reading reviews and literature on prices of machinery and cinematograph equipment. said officials of Arco were convinced that the prices charged them by the defendant were much too high including the charges for out-of-pocket expenses. petitioner. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL While the letters state that the petitioner was to receive ten per cent (10%) commission. they sought to obtain a reduction from Puyat or rather a reimbursement. however. Moreover.335. and $160. It is out of the ordinary for one to be the agent of both the vendor and the purchaser. loss of the goods not covered by insurance or failure of the Starr Piano Company to properly fill the orders as per specifications. and the principal must indemnify the agent for all damages which the latter may incur in carrying out the agency without fault or imprudence on his part (article 1729. the officials of the Arco discovered that the price quoted to them by Puyat with regard to their two orders was not the net price but rather the list price. The appellate court. the latter as exclusive agent of the Starr Piano Company in the United States. We agree with the trial judge that "whatever unforseen events might have taken place unfavorable to the defendant (petitioner).600 with its10 per cent commission. This amount of $160 does not represent actual out-of-pocket expenses paid by Puyat. or a mere contract of sale Held: The letters.52 or P2." This is incompatible with the pretended relation of agency between the petitioner and the respondent. the plaintiff (respondent) might still legally hold the defendant (petitioner) to the prices fixed of $1. this does not necessarily make the petitioner an agent of the respondent. For these reasons. Failing in this they brought an action with the CFI Manila. by which the respondent accepted the prices for the sound reproducing equipment subject of its contract with the 15 Sales under Atty. Three years later. as this provision is only an additional price which the respondent bound itself to pay. Code of Commerce). and the defendant was duly paid the price of $1. are clear in their terms and admit no other interpretation that the respondent in question at the prices indicated which are fixed and determinate.700 and $1. the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the purposed of reviewing its decision in civil case GR 1023.

On 30 November 1963. Isabela. This is the very essence of commerce without which merchants or middleman would not exist. denied the same. demanding the payment of only P3. Based on these findings. Secondly. After one hearing. Hence a petition to review the decision of the CTA. and up to around1952. The proceeds were either received by Osorio for Antonio or deposited by said agent in Antonio’s current account with the PNB. despite their insistence on the existence of the ante nuptial contract. and contending that the assessment for the years 1946 to 1952 had already prescribed.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS SALES It follows that the petitioner as vendor is not bound to reimburse the respondent as vendee for any difference between the cost price and the sales price which represents the profit realized by the vendor out of the transaction. the Collector considered the sales made by Antonia as Antonio’s original sales taxable under Section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code and. however. however. did not show that the document in question was among those recorded therein.68. the testimony that the separation of property agreement was recorded in the Registry of Property three months before the marriage. since such a prenuptial agreement could not be effective before marriage is celebrated. Finally. the logs cut and removed by the Antonio from his concessions were sold to different persons in Manila through his agent. Mariano Osorio. imposed a tax assessment on Antonio. Mariano Osorio. and absolved Puyat & Sons from the complaint in GR 1023. In 1949. did not act in accordance with its alleged covenants. the Collector issued a modified assessment. and which book was among those saved from the ravages of the war. for the first time. In the third place. Antonio sold to her almost all the logs produced in his San Mariano concession. MEDINA vs CIR (1 SCRA 675) Facts: On 20 May 1944. reversed the decision of the appellate court. Antonio filed a petition for reconsideration. had it really been registered as petitioner insists. and would automatically be cancelled if the union was called off.Antonio protested the assessment. Antonia started to engage in business as a lumber dealer. therefore. Before 1946. strangely enough. the existence of the supposed property separation agreement. without pronouncement regarding costs Antonio appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. the Day Book of the Register of Deeds on which the agreement would have been entered. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari. the Conference Staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue eliminated the 50% fraud penalty and 16 Sales under Atty. Later. TOPIC: PARTIES TO A CONTRACT OF SALE 12. as to have really urged them to enter into the supposed property agreement. the spouses had neither property nor business of their own. Antonio acquired forest concessions in the municipalities of San Mariano and Palanan. is patently absurd. the couple. Antonia. in his letter of 4 April 1955. The wife is authorized to engage in business and for the incidents that flow therefrom when she so engages therein. they neither had any property nor business of their own. the Collector insisted on his demand. in turn. but the Collector. which rendered judgment upholding a tax assessment of the Collector of Internal Revenue except with respect to the imposition of so-called compromise penalties. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL Issue: Whether or not the sales made by the petitioner to his wife could be considered as his original taxable sales Held: It appears that at the time of the marriage between petitioner and his wife. held that the taxes assessed against him before 1948 had already prescribed. From 1946 to 1948. It was not until July of 1954 that he alleged. On 9 July 1954. which were set aside.325. Antonio again requested for reconsideration. sold in Manila the logs bought from her husband through the same agent. Antonio Medina married Antonia Rodriguez. On the thesis that the sales made by Antonio to his wife were null and void pursuant to the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. . But the transactions permitted are those entered into with strangers. revealing for the first time the existence of an alleged premarital agreement of complete separation of properties between him and his wife. and do not constitute exceptions to the prohibitory provisions of Article 1490 against sales between spouses.

Canullas sold the subject property with the house thereon to Daguines for the sum of P2.00.000. 13.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS Contracts violative of the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code are null and void. A petition for review on certiorari was filed with Supreme Court. Fernando Canullas and Corazon Daguines were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on 27 October 1981 by the then CFI Pangasinan. a basic policy in civil law. That sale was subversive of the stability of the family. Calimlim-Canullas resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing. They lived in a small house on the residential land in question with an area of approximately 891 sq. the sales made by the petitioner to his wife were correctly disregarded by the Collector in his tax assessments that considered as the taxable sales those made by the wife through the spouses' common agent. Canullas described the house as “also inherited by me from my deceased parents. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision with cost against the petitioner. m. however. In the document of sale. which is the cornerstone of family law. On 6 October 1980. a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. (2) The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. including the coconut trees on the land. In upholding that stand. which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Upon reconsideration and on 27 November 1980.” Unable to take possession of the lot and house. donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot. FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale. Canullas abandoned his family and lived with Corazon Daguines. as well as to protect the institution of marriage. Similarly. CALIMLIM-CANULAS vs FORTUN (129 SCRA 675) Facts: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married on 19 December 1962. Civil Case 15620) on19 June 1980 for quieting of title and damages against CalimlimCanullas. the lower court modified the judgment by declaring Daguines as the lawful owner of the land and 10 coconut trees thereon but declaring the sale of the conjugal house including 3 coconuts and their crops during the conjugal relation of the spouses null and void. otherwise. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other. that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership. After Canullas’ father died in 1965. On 15 April 1980. were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry. Branch II. located at Bacabac. Issues: (1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property (2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction Held: (1) Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. Pangasinan. he inherited the land. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. In 1978. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage. the trial court ruled in favor of Daguines as the lawful owner of the land as well as ½ of the house erected on the land. which judgment has become final. the Court below committed no error. "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal .. The law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES During the pendency of the appeal. And this is so because if transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage. Bugallon. however. Mariano Osorio. Being void transactions. Daguines initiated a complaint before the CFI Pangasinan (Branch 1. They begot five children. that the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to Daguines was null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale. 17 Sales under Atty.

who in turn replied that she was objecting to the sale. Her husband was nowhere to be found. 1). bought a 421 sq.50as transfer tax. the Corpuzes. P9. South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14. Harriet.00. of their home lot to the Guiangs. Luzviminda Guiang so that Guiang would advise her father. On 11 March 1990. the Guiangs spent P600. On 22 April 1988.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS union. Callejo. who were staying in different households. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES Jimenez Callejo. Koronadal.000. for trespassing (Barangay Case 38). She gathered her children. and Jodie or Joji. Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining ½ portion including their house. The consideration was payable in installment. in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz. Block 9.with the filing of the instant suit.000. with Gilda Corpuz as vendee. she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. South Cotabato. Annulment not having been made. As a consequence of the sale. On June 1989. Judie Corpuz sold the remaining ½ portion of the lot and the house thereon to Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as ‘Deed of Transfer of Rights’ (Exh. Judie Corpuz’s children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witnesses. certification fee of P5. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. 1). 14. (LRC) Psd-165408. Paulino Santos (Bo. P535.62 basic tax and special educationalfund on the lot. with the consent of her husband. Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another agreement over the lot with Manuela 18 Sales under Atty. For staying in their house sold by her husband.50 as the total documentary stamp tax on the various documents. Gilda approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Gilda Corpuz returned home. South Cotabato. On 16 March 1990. Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and the Guiangs.00 was to be paid in June 1990. and declared the sale of the lot. (LRC) Psd-165409) located in Barangay Gen. Unfortunately.00. having assumed the remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs. P127. Gilda stayed put in her house and lot. ‘A’) for a total consideration of P30. (LRC) Psd-165409. the parties thereat signed a document known as ‘amicable settlement’ requiring the Corpuzes to leave the house voluntarily on or before 7 April 1990. but instead gave the letter to Mrs. obviously to cure whatever defect in Judie Corpuz’s title over the lot transferred. On 28 May 1990. was not able to go abroad. P22.00 of which P5. Block9. house and improvements null and void. without any charge. did not inform her father about this.735.00. however. which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband.000.00 as the amount they paid to Mrs. The proceedings [are] still pending before the said court. null and . The new sale describes the lot sold as Lot 8. who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9. Block 8. widow of Manuel Callejo (the original registered owner). Harriet. and stayed for sometime in Manila. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale. m.00. Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale. Manuela Callejo. These expenses particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the Guiangs were incurred for the whole Lot 9. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already. The couple have 3 children (Junie. without costs. a standard fee of P17. lot (Lot 8.00.000." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties. to look for work abroad. GUIANG vs CA (291 SCRA 372) Facts: Gilda and Judie Corpuz were married civilly on 24 December 1968 in Bacolod City. Gilda Corpuz left for Manila. together and stayed at their house. filing the same with the MTC Koronadal. Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain.00for the preparation of the Deed of Transfer of Rights.72 for the capital gains tax. On 14 February 1983. Sometime in January 1990. They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. and on 1 March 1990. the Corpuzes sold ½ portion of their lot to spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The Guiangs followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution of the amicable settlement. The Supreme Court set aside the decision and resolution of the lower court. On 5 March 1990. Koronadal. a total of P759. However. P100. with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay 3 successive installments. Gilda was complained against by the Guiangs before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos (Bo. The latter have since then occupied the ½portion and built their house thereon.

TD 9533 and TD 10019 for1961. recognizing her lawful and valid ownership and possession over the remaining ½ portion of the lot. On 9 September 1992. the Guiangs filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The record was reconstituted in the CFI Iloilo (Land Case R695. the CA promulgated its judgment confirming the decision of the trial court dismissing the Application for Registration filed by Militante. Iloilo. with costs against the Guiangs 15. TD 8483 was revised by TD 9498 while TD 9584 . declaring the deed of transfer of rights and the amicable settlement null and void. Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties. The RTC Koronodal. 19 Sales under Atty. during the war with Japan. his son-in-law and a lawyer by profession. and paid the land taxes for 1940. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale. the Director of Forestry and other oppositors. whereby he was issued a plan Psu-99791 (containing an area of 171. Militante filed with the CFI Iloilo an application for the registration of title of the land technically described in Psu99791 opposed by the Director of Lands. the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES The Supreme Court denied the petition. The settlement. Militante has also declared the land for taxation purposes under TD 5172 in 1940. both with legal interests thereon computed from the finality of the decision. paying the land taxes under TD 8585 and TD 9533. under TD T-86 for 1945.3561hectares. and affirmed the challenged decision and resolution. the record of the case was lost before it was heard. and (3) consent. Militante appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR 13497-R). can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124. Issue: Whether the sale was void or merely voidable and was ratified by the amicable settlement Held: Respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. without pronouncement as to costs.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS void. The CFI heard the land registration case on 11 November 1952. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. (2) object. To constitute a valid contract. and for 1948 and 1949. South Cotabato (Branch 25) rendered a decision in favor of Gilda Corpuz. However. 54852).) Before the war with Japan. Demontaño paid the land tax under TD 2434 on 20 December 1939 for the years 1938 and 1959. On 22 September1958. which he caused to be surveyed on 18-31 July 1934. Barotac Viejo. By no stretch of the imagination. however. A petition for review was before the Supreme Court. and ordering Gilda Corpuz to reimburse the Guiangs the amount of P9. Isaias Batiller had declared for taxation purposes Lot 2 of Psu144241 under TD 8583 for 1957 and a portion of Lot 2 under TD 8584 for 1945. The sale wasduly recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Iloilo (Entry 13609) on 14 July 1960. TD 2434 in the name of Liberato Demontaño for the land described therein was cancelled by TD 5172 of Militante. for 1947 & 1948. under TD 7122 for 1948.000 corresponding to the payment made by the Guiangs to Callejo for the unpaid balance and another P379. Militante sold to Domingo Rubias. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. for 1948. TD 9868 for 1964. Domingo Rubias declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration (TD) 8585 for 1957. the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Pending the disposal of the appeal or on 18 June 1956. following the last sentence of Article 124. after which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent. GLRO Rec. On 30January 1996. so after the war Militante petitioned the Court to reconstitute the record of the case.62representing ½ of the amount of realty taxes paid by the Guiangs. the land technically described in Psu99791. Dissatisfied. does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. RUBIAS vs BATILLER (51 SCRA 120) Facts: Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio General Luna. and after trial the Court dismissed the application for registration. for 1945-46. for 1947.

who allegedly entered said portions of the lot in 1945 and in 1959. at a time when Militante's application 20 Sales under Atty. Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons. Francisco Militante in 1956. as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS was cancelled by TD 9584 both in the name of Batiller. Iloilo. Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e. Rubias filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under Psu-99791. viz. against its present occupant Batiller. holding that he has “better right to possess the land in question having been in the actual possession thereof under a claim of title many years before Militante sold the land to Rubias. On 22 April 1960.g. the CFI decided the case likewise in favor of Batiller. the court therein practically agreeing that the contract between Rubias and Militante was null and void. On 26 November 1964 and after the trial. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in.Rubias filed a motion for reconsideration. Rubias prayed also for damages and attorney’s fees. In his aspect. and (6) others especially disqualified by law. which was likewise denied by the lower court on 14 January 1966. and lawyers. however. identified as Psu 155241. judges. Rubias appealed from the decision of the Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo to the CFI Iloilo. under Article 1491. it does not retroact to the date of the first contract. On 31 August 1964. The land claimed by Batiller as his own was surveyed on 6-7 June 1956. or the service which was impossible may have become possible. the Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo decided the case in favor of the Batiller. and a plan approved by Director of Lands on 15 November 1956 was issued. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices. from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction. (2) agents. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. prosecuting attorneys. in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code. may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract. (4) public officers and employees. the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution. Thereafter.bought from his father-in-law. Thus." Indeed. judicial officers and employees. Batiller paid the land taxes for Lot 2 on 9 November 1960 for the year 1945 and 1946. Rubiasfiled an appeal before the Court of Appeals." . The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals." as follows: (1) guardians. which certified said appeal to the Supreme as involving purely legal questions. Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning. Rubias filed a forcible Entry and Detainer case against Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac Viejo. the CFI dismissed the case. or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property. On 17 August 1965. the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract. Issue: Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute Held: The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Civil Code). 1950 and 1960 as shown by the certificate of the treasurer.law in his favor. On May 1961 and after trial. the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians. (3) administrators. agents and administrators (Article 1491.

the late Marcelo Bernardo. were part of the properties inherited by Mariano L. however. and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale. required Roldan to pay him beginning with 1947 the fruits. plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated. On 27 July 1947. Roldan.700 with legal interest from 12 August 1947. a motion asking for authority to sell as guardian the 17 parcels for the sum of P14.200. 477. 1965 on the ground that. defendant for the first time since . out of the price of P14. authorized the minor to deliver directly to Emilio Cruz. In view of his minority.00. which the minor desired to have on Tindalo Street. as guardian. Bulacan. plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another. The trial court upheld the contracts but allowing the minor to repurchase all the parcels by paying P15. Ramos. and charged appellees with the costs. was to be paid by defendant directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the latter. September 15. sold to herself. filed before the CFI Manila a complaint against Roldan to annul 2 contracts regarding 17 parcels of land claiming that the stepmother in effect. Ramon Sua. The Supreme Court annulled the 3 contracts of sale in question. the land was still under lease to one.00.522 a year. reserving to herself the right to repurchase. for the sum of P15. was appointed his guardian.700 abovementioned.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal appealed. a deed of conveyance covering the same 17 parcels. Issue: Whether the sale of the land by the guardian is null and void for being violative of the prohibition for a guardian to purchase either in person or through the mediation of another the property of her ward 21 Sales under Atty. executed the proper deed of sale in favor of Ramos. in the eyes of the law.000.000.000. and the sale should be annulled for violating Article 1459 of the Civil Code prohibiting the guardian from purchasing the property of her ward. Socorro Roldan took by purchase her ward’s parcels thru Dr.000. the purpose of the sale being allegedly to invest the money in a residential house. wherein Socorro Roldan.700 to Dr. which her attorney admits. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on January 27. TRUST COMPANY vs ROLDAN (99 Phil 392) Facts: 17 parcels located in Guiguinto. within 1 year. the Company. Ramos. Roldan filed in said guardianship proceedings (Special Proceeding 2485. her brother-in-law.650. in the sum of P3. The motion was granted. surviving spouse of Bernardo and stepmother to Mariano. the sum of P3. guardianship proceedings were instituted. 1968 to January 1. Fidel C. with the obligation to return to Roldan the price of P14. PITCHEL vs ALONZO(3 SCRA 34) Facts: Respondent Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land in Basilan City in accordance with Republic Act No. The Philippine Trust Company replaced Roldan as guardian on 10 August 1948. Two months later. declared the minor as the owner of the 17 parcels of land. Bernardo from his father. in violation of law. as guardian. PHIL. On 21 October 1947. Even as of the date of sale. In July 1972. previous thereto. 1968. ordered Roldan and Emilio Cruz to deliver said parcels of land to the minor. TOPIC: SUBJECT MATTER OF SALE 17. and on 12 August 1947 obtained a judicial confirmation of the sale. the properties of her ward. The CA affirmed the judgment. and the trustee cannot be allowed to have any inducement to neglect his ward’s interest. with costs against Rubias. Manila). and that Article 1459 of the Civil Code applies. amounted to P1. 16. On 13 August 1947. Manila. plaintiff and his wife sold to defendant Luis Pichel all the fruits of the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land in question for the period. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES Held: Remembering the general doctrine that guardianship is a trust of the highest order. Ramos executed in favor of Roldan. Roldan sold 4 parcels out of the 17 to Emilio Cruz for P3. 1976. Hence. In 1972. the appeal. and in line with the court’s suspicion whenever the guardian acquires ward’s property we have no hesitation to declare that in this case. On August 14. Pending said payment plaintiff refused to allow the defendant to make any harvest. in consideration of P4. On 5 August 1947.

The grantee of a parcel of land under R. Herein respondent is not deemed to have lost any of his rights as grantee during the period material to the case at bar. The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during the years from September 15. No. immutability or immovability. The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale." thereby divesting himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven-year period.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. while in lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased. and its reacquisition of the ownership and possession of the land decreed by a competent court. It has the essential elements of a contract of sale. The purpose of the law is not violated when a grantee sells the produce or fruits of his land. Within said period. hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. Alonzo filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the provisions of R. from the cancellation of the award in 1965 to its reinstatement in 1972.A. planted or sown on the land which is characterized by fixity. to the principal (the land). The possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and enjoyment of the land itself because these rights are distinct and separate from each other. 1976. At the same time. the sale of the nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees. naturally or artificially. Permanent improvements on a parcel of land are things incorporated or attached to the property in a fixed manner. What the law expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any of the permanent improvements thereon. The essential difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things is that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership. Pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter of sale. (2) A perusal of the deed fails to disclose any ambiguity or obscurity in its provisions. trees and plants would fall under the category of permanent improvements. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code. 1968 up to January 1. for the grantee is encouraged and induced to be more industrious and productive. is null and void. which subject matter is 22 Sales under Atty. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES a determinate thing. 477 Held: (1) Until and unless an appropriate proceeding for reversion is instituted by the State. things having a potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale." The vendor sold.A. 1965 (2) Whether the contract is one for lease of the land. the accessory follows the principal. Issues: (1) Whether the respondent had the right or authority to execute the "Deed of Sale" in 1968. the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the second. i. which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation. transferred and conveyed "by way of absolute sale. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or disposing of the natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. buildings. Hence. Houses. A transfer of the accessory or improvement is not a transfer of the principal.. or for sale of coconut fruits (3) Whether the contract is an encumbrance as contemplated by R. the Government is . The terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal. all the coconut fruits of his land. On the contrary.A. the alienation or encumbrance of which is prohibited. machinery. otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled to apply for another piece of land. animal houses. 477. It is the other way around. They include whatever is built. nor is there doubt as to the real intention of the contracting parties. caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land.e. his award having been cancelled previously by the Board of Liquidators on January 27. the grantee cannot be said to have been divested of whatever right that he may have over the same property. The lower court ruled that the contract. which it held as a contract of lease. the aim of the law is thereby achieved. thus making it possible for him and his family to be economically self-sufficient and to lead a respectable life. much less extended further to include the lease of the land itself. The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits. respondent could exercise all the rights pertaining to a grantee.

blogspot.com/yumiganda http://princesslawyer. for otherwise.COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS assured of payment on the annual installments on the land. Paolo Dimayuga complied by atorni2be AUSL SALES .com 23 Sales under Atty.scribd. it would lead to an absurd situation wherein the grantee would not be able to receive and enjoy the fruits of the property in the real and complete sense. First 17 cases only. We agree with herein petitioner that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to prohibit the grantee from selling the natural and industrial fruits of his land. Sources: http://www. More compilation of cases on this subject matter will be posted.