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University of Bristol

Department of Historical Studies


Best undergraduate dissertations of
2015

Myfanwy James
The Refugees of Eastern Zaire: the Forgotten
Chapter of the Great Lakes Conflict

Winner of the 'Best History dissertation of


2015' prize

The Department of Historical Studies at the University of Bristol is committed to the advancement of historical knowledge and understanding, and
to research of the highest order. Our undergraduates are part of that endeavour.
Since 2009, the Department has published the best of the annual dissertations produced by our final year undergraduates in recognition of the excellent research work being undertaken by our students.
This was one of the best of this years final year undergraduate dissertations.
Please note: this dissertation is published in the state it was submitted for
examination. Thus the author has not been able to correct errors and/or
departures from departmental guidelines for the presentation of
dissertations (e.g. in the formatting of its footnotes and bibliography).
The author, 2015
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the prior
permission in writing of the author, or as expressly permitted by law.
All citations of this work must be properly acknowledged.

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The Refugees of Eastern Zaire: the Forgotten Chapter of the


Great Lakes Conflict (1994-1998)

Image 1: Mugunga refugee camp, 16/11/96, (Stringer-Reuters/Corbis/PBEAHUMYCDX).

Words: 9,896

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CONTENTS

Introduction...4
Chapter 1: The Kivu Crisis and UN Vacillation........8
Chapter 2: Invasion, Massacres and International Inaction........12
Chapter 3: Perpetrators and Victims: Hiding behind Oversimplification.....25
Conclusions..32
Appendices....34
Bibliography.65

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For a story to reach the most powerful level of compulsionyou need a clean-cut story
linea good guy and a bad guythats why the Rwandan story has worked so wellwe
should all be suspicious of stories with lines that cleanThe story of the Congo is a story
that doesnt seem to have any lines at all. You have to really take some time to invest your
attention in understanding this very complicated tangle of situations in a really big country
with conflict interspersed and interlaced at many levels, localities, regionsPeople just
conclude its another one of these African messesits not going to make a blip of different
in the history of mankind, so you turn the page.
Howard French1

H. French Interview: Story-line: Congo vs. Rwanda, (2011).

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INTRODUCTION
The Congolese conflict, or Africas world war, led to the highest death toll since the
Second World War. By 2004, almost 4 million people had died,2 approximately 200,000 in
massacres of Hutu refugees in 1996/7.3 However, the conflict remains neglected in the
historical record. Unlike the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Congolese conflict is not a household name, and remains air-brushed out of history.4 The two Congo wars (1996-1997, and
1998-2004) are difficult to follow: with their multiple, shifting factions and acronyms, they
have failed to attract the international and historical attention they deserve. To aid the
reader, a timeline, lists of acronyms and geographical locations, and a dramatis personae can
be found at Appendices 1-4.
Summary of Events
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in 1994, 1.1 million Hutu
refugees fled to the Kivu provinces of the Congo (eastern Zaire), in response to violent
reprisals. The civilian refugees were accompanied by the perpetrators of the genocide, the
former Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia, which then established
control over the Hutu refugee camps.5 Humanitarian agencies and the Rwandan
government urged the UN to separate the civilians from the militia, which had begun reorganising and attacking Rwanda. Following inaction on the part of the international
community, in 1996 the Tutsi-based Rwandan army (RPA) invaded Zaire, founding the
rebel group, the Alliance Forces (AFDL). The AFDL/RPA then dismantled the Hutu
camps, systematically massacring refugees.
In May 1997, the AFDL overthrew President Mobutu of Zaire, and Laurent Kabila, the
head of the AFDL, became the President of the country, renamed the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC). Three UN-sponsored teams investigated events in the DRC, and
concluded that mass human rights abuses had taken place. However, in 1998, Kabila blocked
any further investigations, presenting himself as a liberator who had ousted the corrupt
Mobutu with the help of the Rwandan Tutsis, the victims of the 1994 genocide. The
AFDL/RPA massacres of 1996/7 were forgotten, an inconvenient footnote. Subsequently,
International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report no. 104 (2006), 1.
E. Kisangani, The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: a case of UN peacekeeping failure and international law,
The Journal of Modern African Studies, (2000).
4 R. Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, Memory, (Philadelphia, 2011), 1.
5 UNHCR, The State of the Worlds Refugees, (Oxford, 2010), 268.
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in July 1998, Kabila ordered Rwandan troops to leave Congo, starting the 2nd Congolese
war.
No new investigations into the 1996-7 massacres followed until 2005, when the UN
discovered mass graves in the Kivus.6 This prompted renewed investigations that
culminated in the UN Mapping Report in 2010. The report concluded that the
RPA/AFDLs killings of Hutu refugees in the Congo were systematic, and a court could
consider them genocide.7 The reports publication was delayed by almost a year as President
Kagame of Rwanda attempted to get the term genocide withdrawn by threatening to pull
Rwanda out of UN peacekeeping missions. However, the report was leaked in Le Monde.
The Rwandan government denounced the report, calling it an insult to history.8 Yet, no
significant historical research has followed.
Historiographical Outline
Rather than historians, it has been political scientists and journalists, many who were in
Zaire at the time, who have written most of the accounts of the massacres during the
RPA/AFDL invasion of Zaire. Prunier, an African specialist and former advisor to the
French government, argues that the international community was caught in a web of its
own tangled guilt for not aiding the Tutsis during the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan
regime mobilised this guilt, and the US government overlooked RPA human rights abuses
in the Congo. Conflict in the Congo remained seenthrough the prism of the Rwandese
genocide.9 Political scientists, such as Smis, Oyatambwe, Kisangani, Okosun and Kibiswa
expound similar views: American sympathy for the Rwandans after 1994 ensured silence
over the massacre of refugees.10
Both Lemarchand and Reyntjens have explored the limitations of genocide as a framework
for the Great Lakes conflicts. Lemarchand agrees that genocide was instrumentalised to
allow the Kagame government to commit crimes with impunity.11 But, viewed through the
UN investigates DRC graves, BBC News, 01/10/10.
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, DRC 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise,
(August, 2010), 13. (http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/mapping_report_en.pdf) [Accessed 11/04/15].
8 C. McGreal, Delayed UN report links Rwanda to Congo genocide, The Guardian, 01/10/10.
9 G. Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War, (London, 2009), 332; 352.
10 S. Smis and W. Oyatambwe, Complex Political Emergencies, the International Community & the Congo
Conflict, Review of African Political Economy, (2002), 422; Kisangani, Massacre of Refugees, 183; T. Okosun
and N. Kibiswa, Human Rights Violations and Genocide in the DRC, Contemporary Justice Review, (2013), 492;
T. Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, (NY, 2007), 10.
11 R. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, (Philadelphia, 2009), 106.
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prism of history, the roles of victims and perpetrators become blurred.12 Rwanda played on
a logic dear to the Americans: the Tutsis were a victim of genocide and therefore, in the
Congo, the RPA were the good guys.13 The work of journalists constitutes a further
source, in particular Howard French of the New York Times, who investigated the Hutu
massacres in the Congo at the time. He argues Washington pretended not to know the
extent of murder, Americans being overly fond of good guy/bad guy dichotomies that
paralyze debate over central Africa.14
Methodology
The contemporary period must be analysed by historians with the same methodological
rigour applied to the distant past in order to fill in the gaps in current understanding.
Otherwise, the analysis of the contemporary will be left to journalists.15 This dissertation
examines the first Congolese War of 1996-1997. It draws on the ideas of political scientists
about the conflict, and searches for historical evidence and new source material. This
dissertation is multi-archival, threading together evidence from a variety of online archives
in a manner that has not previously been undertaken. It focuses on neglected UN
documents and reports, Security Council minutes from the UN archive, reports from the
archives of NGOs, and contemporary journalistic investigations. Hitherto, the degree of US
military and political support for the Rwandan regime in the face of human rights violations
has not been adequately explored due to a lack of source material. However, in March 2014,
top secret National Security Council files were quietly declassified, covering American
strategy to Rwanda and Zaire at the time. This new source has yet to be incorporated into
published historical accounts, but is examined here for evidence as to US positions and
actions.
Outline
This dissertation argues that the massacres of Hutu refugees by the AFDL and RPA reveal
a misunderstanding and simplification of the multi-faceted conflict in the Great Lakes
region on the part of the international community. After the Rwandan genocide, Tutsi and
Hutu became synonymous with victim and perpetrator. Consequently, the Tutsi human
rights violations committed against Hutu in the Congo were not readily understood by the
Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides, 6.
F. Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996-2006, (Cambridge, 2009), 100.
14 H. French, A Continent for the Taking, (NY, 2004), 143.
15 P. Catterall, What (if anything) is distinctive about contemporary history? Journal of Contemporary History,
(1997), 450.
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international community, and have been overlooked by the historical record. Speculative
debates about whether the 1996-7 massacres constituted genocide will not be explored: for,
genocide with its legal implications risks distracting from the historical focus. This account
describes how the Rwandan government actively employed the victim/perpetrator
dichotomy in the Great Lakes crisis to legitimise the invasion and atrocities in Congo/Zaire
and gain international support. The international community, in particular the US,
remained blinded by their sympathy for the Rwandan regime and guilt about their inaction
in 1994. Historically, the 1994 Rwandan genocide has had an Auschwitz effect.16 Just as
the atrocities at Auschwitz overshadowed the crimes in occupied Poland, the atrocities in
Rwanda overshadowed the massacres in the Congo.
Chapter One examines the challenge of the refugee crisis in eastern Zaire between 19941996, using archival evidence to demonstrate international inaction at the crisis, leading to
the Rwandan invasion and creation of the AFDL. Chapter Two examines the massacres of
Hutu refugees, mapping the atrocities from a range of sources, and demonstrating the way
in which a victim/perpetrator dichotomy was deployed by the RDA/AFDL. It explores UN
inaction and US support for the Rwandan denials of atrocities. Chapter Three will explore
the newly-declassified National Security Council sources that reveal a narrow
understanding of the conflict by the US, ignoring humanitarian issues in the interests of
political expediency.

16

T. Snyder, Holocaust: the Ignored Reality, New York Review of Books, 16/07/09.

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CHAPTER 1: THE KIVU CRISIS AND UN VACILLATION


Pre-existing Tensions in the Kivus
There were major tensions in the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo before the influx of
refugees from Rwanda in 1994. Relations were already fraught between both the
Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyamulenge of South Kivu and Banyarwanda of North Kivu, and
other groups in the provinces. The Banyamulenge were descendants of Rwanda Tutsis; the
Banyarwanda were a mix of Hutu and Tutsi. Tensions centred on competition for land and
the question of nationality. The influx of Rwandan Hutus heightened tensions and broke the
Tutsi-Hutu alliance among the Banywarwanda. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe started to
launch attacks on local Tutsi Congolese with the help of local ethnic groups, who saw an
opportunity to settle scores with the Tutsi.17
The violence was exacerbated by interventions by the Zairian authorities. On 28th April
1995, the Zairian parliament officially rejected all Banyamulenge claims to Zairian
citizenship.18 In November 1995, General Eluki, head of the Forces Armes Zaroises (FAZ),
declared the local population had the right to fight for the land of their ancestors and to
chase the foreigners away.19 Amnesty reported massacres of Banyamulenge and
Banyarwanda in the province, including extrajudicial killings by FAZ soldiers. On 8th
October 1996, the Governor of South Kivu demanded that all Banyamulenge leave Zaire
within a week: thousands of Zairian Tutsi fled to Rwanda. 20
Refugee crisis 1994-1996
Against this backdrop, the UN Security Council failed to separate the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe from civilians in the camps, despite repeated threats from Rwanda that it
would take military action if the international community did not do so. There could be no
effective repatriation of Hutus whilst the militia controlled the camps and prevented
refugees from leaving. Thus, the refugees remained in Zaire, the cross-border attacks into
Rwanda continued, and Rwanda concluded that the only way to dismantle the Hutu refugee
camps was to ally with the Banyamulenge and invade. An exploration of the Security
Council minutes reveals waning international interest in the complexities of the situation,
which was allowed to spin out of control.
Kisangani, Massacre of Refugees, 165.
UN, Mapping, 72.
19 Reyntjens, African War, 18.
20 AI, Zaire: Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South Kivu, AFR 62/14/96, 01/11/96, 14-15.
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Specifically, from 1994, the Secretary-General concluded that repatriation of Hutu refugees
to Rwanda was not possible until the refugees were separated from the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe militia.21 The Secretary-General offered several options to achieve this. He
recommended deploying a UN peacekeeping operation to maintain security, although
admitting that it did not provide the separation offormer Rwandese government forces
troops, due to logistical difficulties.22 By January 1995, international reluctance to commit
resources was evident. When considering the option of a peacekeeping operation, the
Secretary-General contacted 60 available troop-contributing countries. However, only one
country offered a unit.23 In the event, in February 1995, an agreement was signed with the
Zairian government to send 1,500 military personnel from the Zairian army to maintain
order in the camps.24
This proved insufficient. Boutroue, head of the UNHCR in North Kivu at the time,
explained that the Zairian military were more interested in making deals with the refugees
than in controlling them.25 The militia was not separated from the civilian refugees: reports
of cross-border incursions into Rwanda continued. In February 1995, the Security Council
acknowledged that this was destabilising for the sub-region as a whole,

26

and in June,

expressed concern. But no decisive action was taken, the Security Council simply
reaffirming the need for a long-term solution.27
In June 1995, the Security Council placed an arms embargo forbidding the sale of arms to
the states neighbouring Rwanda to prevent the re-arming of ex-FAR and Interahamwe in
the camps. However, by April 1996, an International Commission of Inquiry reported that
the supply of armsto former Rwandan government forces continued. The Security
Council response was a resolution that urged states to intensify their efforts to prevent
military training and the sale of weapons to militia groups.28 The Rwandan government
thought this inadequate, their representative reminding the Council that weapons were
being sold to those who carried out the genocide. He condemned the systematic lack of

S/1994/1133, Progress Report of the Secretary General, 06/10/94, 10.


S/1994/1308, Report of the Secretary General on Rwandese Refugee Camps, 18/11/94, 8.
23 S/1995/65, Second Report of the Secretary General on Rwandese Refugee Camps, 25/02/95, 6-8.
24 S/1995/127, Letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council President, 09/02/95, 1.
25 J. Boutroue, Missed Opportunities: The Role of the International Community in the Return of the Rwandan Refugees
from Eastern Zaire July 1994 December 1996, (UNHCR, 1998), 60.
26 S/PV.3500, 3500th Security Council Meeting, 10/02/95, 2.
27 S/RES/997, Resolution from Security Council, 09/06/95, 2.
28 S/1996/298, Security Council Draft Resolution, 18/04/96, 2.
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desire to give adequatesupport to the Rwandan government.29 The Secretary-General


admitted in a letter to the Zairian Prime Minister that there had been international
reluctance to devote the necessary resources to solving the issue of armed militia in the
camps. He stated: I believe that the best way for the UN to help improve security in the
camps is for the UNHCR to address this issue.30 Thereafter, attempts to address the
political situation were abandoned, and the crisis was left to the UNHCR, being treated as a
purely humanitarian matter.
The Secretary-General stated that the crisis represented an unprecedented challenge.31
However, Zaire remained distant from the priorities of Security Council members. In
November 1996, Nsanze of Burundi criticised the Security Council for not neutralising the
ex-FAR. Cabral, representative for Guinea-Bissau, asked the Security Council: Is respect
for human rights and humanitarian law in Zaire, somewhere over there in Africa, not as
important?32 Howard French concluded that, within 2 years of the genocide, the world had
largely forgotten Rwandas Hutu exiles, as this was central Africawhere life had always
been regarded as cheap, not Bosnia or Kosovowhere European lives and interests were at
stake.33
The US remained reluctant to lead on any solution to the crisis. This is evident from the
National Security Council files documenting deliberations in Washington. On August 2nd
1995, a memorandum to Wirth, under-secretary for State Global Affairs, from Bogosian, coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi in the US State Department, stated the refugee crisis
required the international communityto agree on an over-arching strategy.34 However,
it was not until a year later, in July 1996, that a plan was formulated. A memorandum to
Lake, National Security Advisor, from Ragan, Director of Humanitarian Affairs in the
National Security Council, acknowledged that the camps posea growing threat to
regional peace. They agreed to phase out assistance to the camps to stimulate voluntary
return.35 Yet this did not address the problem of the threat from the militia controlling the
camps. On August 2nd 1996, it was simply concluded that we can expect vigorous efforts by
ex-FAR and Interahamwe to thwart the plan and, if there is no effort to neutralise this
S/PV.3656, 3656th Security Council Meeting, 23/04/96, 3.
Letter dated 17/01/95, in Boutroue, Missed Opportunities, 53.
31 S/1995/65, Report of the Secretary General, 9.
32 S/PV.3713, 3713th Security Council Meeting, 15/11/96, 18.
33 French, Continent for Taking, 126.
34 NSC: Memorandum for Wirth from Bogosian, Rwanda/Burundi priorities, 02/08/95, 50.
35 NSC: Memorandum for Lake from Ragan, Rwanda Refugee Strategy, 26/07/96, 50.
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threat, the plan willfail.36 The US was unwilling to lead an international effort to
separate the militia from civil refugees.
In part, this can be explained by the remoteness of the Zairian conflict to American
interests. At the Committee on International Relations in December 1996, Rosenblatt,
President of Refugees International, referred to a reverse form of the CNN factor: Zaire
was peripheral to US interests and thus many feel that politically they can afford to ignore
it.

37

There was also the effect of the Somalia syndrome: the death of US rangers in

Somalia created an American backlash against peacekeeping.38 No doubt Somalia was fresh
in the minds of officials such as Bogosian, who had been the Co-ordinator at the US Liaison
Office in Mogadishu at the time. Inaction can also be explained by a rivalry between France
and the US. The French saw increasing American support for Rwanda after the genocide as
the beginning of Anglo-Saxon domination of central Africa, which could only be halted by
the survival of Mobutu in Zaire. As one French official told Prunier, we cannot let
Anglophone countries decide on the future of a Francophone onewe want Mobutu back.39
In the context of increasing tensions between Zaire and Rwanda, France and the US
blocked each others efforts. As the National Security Council concluded in October 1995,
efforts to deal with the conflict were hampered by the perception that the major powers
were supporting opposite sides in the conflict. This led to a poor showing of the
international community as the flow of arms to ex-FAR increased and few refugees were
repatriated.40 The Rwandan UN representative concluded that the refugee crisis had never
received satisfactory attention.41

NSC: Interagency Meeting, Rwandan refugee camps in Eastern Zaire, 02/08/96, 39.
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations hearing, 04/12/96, 101.
(https://archive.org/stream/refugeesineaster00unit#page/n5/mode/2up) [Accessed 11/04/15].
38 M. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping under Clinton, (London, 2000), xviii.
39 Prunier, From Genocide, 279.
40 NSC: Memorandum for Sens, Request for a meeting between Lake and Rwandan President Bizimungu,
11/10/95, 18.
41 S/PV.3640, 3640th Security Council Meeting, 08/03/96, 3.
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CHAPTER 2: INVASION, MASSACRES AND INTERNATIONAL INACTION


This chapter will explore the RPA/AFDL invasion and massacres of Hutu refugees, and
demonstrate the way in which a victim/perpetrator dichotomy was deployed by the
Government of Rwanda to legitimise its actions. It will map existing numerical information
on the massacres, presenting the extracted data in the form of bar charts. Finally, it will
examine the US and UN inaction in responding to the massacres, and American support for
the Rwandan denials of atrocities or missing refugees.
The Invasion
In October 1996, Rwandan troops invaded the Congo under the guise of a Banyamulenge
rebellion, and set up a new rebel organisation, the AFDL. The Rwandan government at first
denied any involvement in the rebellion, saying it was led by Kabila, a nativeof Zaire.42
However, in an interview for the Washington Post in July 1997, Kagame admitted that the
Rwandan government directed the rebellion. Kagame explained that the Rwandan army
trained Congolese Tutsis, forming the AFDL. Kagame argued that the invasion was
spurred on because of a plan by Hutus in Congo to attack the Banyamulenge. The goals to
the invasion were: to dismantle the camps, to destroy Hutu militia and to topple Mobutu.
He acknowledged that the senior commanders of the AFDL were Rwandan officers.43
Before launching the invasion, the Rwandan government had succeeded in lifting a UN
arms embargo on the country. In July 1995, the Rwandan delegate reminded the Security
Council that Rwanda had been decimated by genocide and that the arms embargo imposed
on the current Rwandese governmenthelps the criminals of the former government: in
the face of cross-border attacks from the camps, the government was weakened.44 Zaire
urged the Security Council not to lift the embargo on Rwanda when it is barely concealing
its war-like intentions, threatening to attack refugee camps.45 However, this plea was
ignored. The US put pressure on the UN: in a National Security Council meeting on
February 8th 1995, it was concluded that the US will initiate consultations in New York to
build the case to lift the embargo.46 The scenario of victims against perpetrators was
instrumentalised to win international support.
S/1997/109, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to UN, 05/02/97, 3.
J. Pomfret, Rwandans led revolt in Congo, The Washington Post, 09/07/97.
44 S/PV.3542, 3542nd Security Council Meeting, 09/07/95, 16.
45 S/PV.3566, 3566th Security Council Meeting, 15/08/95, 2.
46 NSC: Conclusions of Meeting on Rwanda, 08/02/95, 26.
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RPA/AFDL Massacres: 1996-1997


Between October 1996 and September 1997, the AFDL/RPA pursued and massacred
refugees, dismantling the camps. Kisangani, in a painstaking examination of sources,
estimated the number of refugees killed during the massacres, by using UNHCR population
figures for each camp to calculate those unaccounted for, as huge groups fled west over vast
distances (see Image 2). His meticulous calculations arrive at an estimation of total refugees
killed of 232,000.47

Image 2: Flight of Refugees (1996-7)48

47
48

Kisangani, Massacre of Refugees, 172-180, see Appendix 5.


UN, Mapping, 79.

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Contemporary Reports
Apart from this, there has been little academic research into the number of refugees
massacred. Contemporary reports are fragmented: the lack of hard data is striking.
Amnesty, Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and journalists
investigated in the region and published reports based on eyewitness testimony.
Additionally, there are three key reports conducted by UN investigators: the report of a
preliminary investigation by Garretn in April 1997,49 the Report of the UN Joint Mission
in July 1997,50 and the Report of the Secretary-Generals Investigative Team in June 1998.51
Garretn visited Goma and North Kivu for four days, interviewing humanitarian agencies,
NGOs, doctors, refugees and eyewitnesses.52 The Joint Mission report described only the
situation as it appears on the ground, through the collection of reports of alleged
massacres.53 The Secretary-General Teams report findings were based on fewer than 200
testimonies: its forensic team made only a preliminary investigation of one site. However,
the report also examined documents, photographs and notes of interviews provided by
Congolese organisations.54
The contemporary reports have six main findings in common. Firstly, the AFDL/RPA
systematically and indiscriminately massacred refugees: no effort was made to separate
women, children or civilians from armed militia.55 For example, Campbell, from HRW,
visited villages along a route followed by refugees who fled camps in October 1996,
interviewing villagers, who described killings of women and children by Rwandan soldiers.
HRW photographed bones and skulls that were identifiable as women and children.56
French and McKinley described how the rebels attacked the Hutus tent cities again and
again, driving them deeper intoCongos interior. A survivor of the attack at Tingi-Tingi,
explained how shells were fired into the camp. 57 Block, from The Wall Street Journal, visited
Mbandaka in June 1997, interviewing a Red Cross worker, who described how the soldiers
49 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire, by Special Rapporteur Garretn,
02/04/97.
50 A/51/942, Report of the Joint Mission charged with Investigating Allegations of Massacres in Eastern
Zaire, 02/07/97.
51 S/1998/581, Report of the Secretary-Generals Investigative Team charged with investigating serious
violations of HR in DRC, 29/06/98.
52 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Garretn, 4.
53 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 6.
54 S/1998/581, Secretary-Generals Team, 20-22.
55 AI, DRC: Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests, AFR 62/33/97, 03/12/97, 8.
56 S. Campbell, DRC: What Kabila is Hiding, Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, HRW, (October, 1997),
2.
57 J. McKinley and H. French, Hidden Horrors: A Special Report, Uncovering the Guilty Footprints along
Zaires long trail of death, The New York Times, 14/04/97.

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had someone shout in the local language Zairians get down. The Zairians dropped to the
ground while the Rwandans remained standing and were shot.58
Secondly, clean-up operations took place to hide the evidence of the killings. Campbell
explained that bodies of refugeeswere dumped in a nearby river.59 Amnesty described
AFDL/RPAs burning bodies and dumping them in rivers to conceal evidence.60 The
Report of the Joint Mission described attemptsto remove all trace of mass graves by
setting fire to them.61
Thirdly, refugees were lured to congregate in one place, and then killed. A refugee
interviewed by Amnesty described an attack in Uvira: the troops told refugees to gather in
a particular place in the camp for a meeting, but then shelled the area where they had told
people to gather.62 The Joint Mission described troops summoning inhabitantsto
meetingsso as to massacre them.63 MSF described how the AFDL/RPA used
humanitarian agencies to either locate refugees or lure them out of hiding in order to
eliminate them.64
Fourthly, starvation was used as a way of inflicting mass death. In November 1996, MSF
was not permitted to go within 30km of Bukavu. This was seen as a deliberate strategy by
the AFDL, aimed at the elimination of all remaining Rwandan refugees by preventing food
and medical assistance.65 The Joint Mission reported that in May 1997 the UNHCR was
prevented from travelling beyond km-42 south of Kisangani where thousands of refugees
were awaiting assistance. Subsequently, the mortality rate rose to 89.5 deaths a day per
10,000 refugees: nearly half of the victims were under the age of 5. The mission considered
this a tactic aimed at eliminating the refugees.66

58 R. Block, Blood Stains: Kabilas government is tainted by reports of Refugee Slaughter, The Wall Street
Journal, 06/06/97.
59 Campbell, Kabila is Hiding, 30.
60 AI, Deadly Alliances, 8.
61 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 23.
62 AI, Rwanda: Human rights overlooked, AF 47/02/97, 1997, 5.
63 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 23.
64 MSF, Forced flight, 12.
65 MSF, Forced flight, 12.
66 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 15.

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Image 3: Refugee Dying in Makeshift Clinic in Ubilo for those unable to continue walking after
fleeing Tingi-Tingi, 28/03/97, (Reuters/Corbis/42-70446019).


Fifthly, it was difficult to obtain accurate information due to obstruction by
Rwandan/AFDL forces. Garretn was prevented from visiting many massacre sites.67 In
July 1997, the follow-up team, the UN Joint Mission, had difficulty investigating. The
AFDL objected to Garretns participation, considering him partial. The team reported
intimidation: a member of the team had tried to go to Masisi, but a soldier fired five shots in
his direction at a distance of less than 10m. The patrol leader explained that the AFDL did
not require the UN to come and make sure the soldiers arent hurting anyone.68 In January
1998, the team was refused entry into the DRC, and suspended its activities.69
The UN gave into the Kabila governments objections: the investigative team was changed.
The Secretary-Generals Investigative Team was sent as a replacement. Their report
concluded that the killings by the AFDL/RPA constitute crimes against humanity and
may constitute genocide depending on their intent. It described a vicious cycle of
violations of human rights and revenge fuelled by impunity, and urged the UN to

E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Garretn, 4.
A/51/942, Joint Mission, 8.
69 E/CN.4/1998/64, Report on the allegations of massacres in eastern Zaire, Roberto Garretn, 23/01/98, 4.
67
68

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investigate the extent of participation by Rwanda. However, between its deployment in


August 1997 and withdrawal in April 1998, due to obstacles created by Kabilas
government, it was impossible to confirmmost of the allegations. The Kabila
government staged demonstrations against the teams presence in Kinshasa in August 1997
with banners reading no to the UN. In November 1997, the team tried to investigate
massacre sites in the west of the country: Mbandaka and Wendji. However, they were
forced to withdraw due to demonstrations that appeared staged, involving the same
banners seen in Kinshasa. The team tried to return in March 1998, but witnesses were
arrested, bodies had been moved, and the team were confronted by a crowd with spears and
machetes. Relations worsened: on 29th March, an investigator was held in Rwanda on
orders

from

the

Presidents

Office

in

Kinshasa.

Guns

were

drawn

and

documentscontaining highly sensitive information including witness statements were


confiscated.70 The government had gone to great lengths to prevent investigations in
Mbandaka and Wendji on the opposite side of the vast country, to which Hutu refugees had
been tracked down and killed.
Finally, as a consequence of these obstructions, the numerical data that the reports were
able to gather was limited. The graphs constructed for this dissertation from all available
data in the reports (see Appendices 6-8) show the following. No data as to number of deaths
is available for many sites. For others, only estimates of hundreds or thousands are
available. For example, the numerical evidence of massacres Garretn was able to gather
was visibly patchy,71 (see Figure 1).

Similarly, by mapping the Secretary Generals teams collection of accusations by province,
it is evident that obstacles restricted the amount of evidence the team obtained.72 There is a
wide range in the numbers killed at different sites. There are differences between reports in
estimates of numbers killed at some particular sites. Better data is available for the earlier
massacres (see Figure 2): the data available by the time the refugees reached the more
distant Maniema, Orientale and Equateur provinces became increasingly sparse. The
Secretary-Generals team explained that detailed information about the attacks on TingiTingi, Kasese, Biaro was scarce because the AFDL blocked access before attacking them

S/1998/581, Secretary-Generals Team, 21.


See Appendix 7.
72 See Appendix 8.
70
71

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and conducted mopping-up operations.73 In effect, contemporary investigations were more


qualitative than quantitative.
Garretn UN Report: estimates of numbers killed at sites in North Kivu*
7000
6000
5000
4000
Deaths

3000
2000
0

Jomba Rutshuru 11/96


Kasuga Masisi 12/1996
Bukombo 31/12/96
Birambizo Masisi 01/97
Bitonga
Chibumbi Masisi
Chanzu Rutshuru
Goma
Kahindo Rutshuru region
Kahira
Kapanzi camp
Karoba Masisi 01/97
Katale
Kibabi
Kibumba
Kimbumba parc
Kibumba village
Kilimanyoka
Kirumba
Lumbishi
Matanda Masisi
Munigi
Mugunga 14/11/96
Mushabwabwe
Ngungu Masisi 19/11/96
Nyakariba Masisi 22/12/96
Nyamitaba Bashali Masisi
Ruhegeri Masisi 12/96
Sake
Shinda January 1997
Tongo 19/01/97

1000

Location and Date


* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data

Figure 1: Estimates of numbers killed in North Kivu from Garretn Report74

The Rwandan government wrote to the Secretary-General denying that Rwandan soldiers
committed any human rights violations.75 The DRC government considered his report an
attempt to falsify history and trivialise the word genocide. It argued that the AFDL had
no intention of massacring anyone, but rather of liberating the country fromMobutu.76 In
September 1997, the UNHCR withdrew in protest.77 Significantly, no further investigations
followed. HRW called on the international community to ensure that accountabilityis not
sacrificed for economic or political expediency.78 However, instead of continuing
investigations, in July 1998 the Security Council called on the governments of DRC and
Rwanda to investigatethe allegations contained in the reportand bring to justice any
persons found to have been involved inmassacres.79 Amnesty stated: It is extraordinary

S/1998/581, Secretary-Generals Team, 50.


See Appendix 7.
75 S/1998/583, Letter from Rwandan Representative to Secretary-General, 25/06/98, 2.
76 S/1998/582, Letter from DRC Representative to Secretary-General, 29/06/98, 30.
77 UNHDA: IRIN Update 246, 9/11/97.
78 HRW, Uncertain Discourse: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo, (December 1997), 11.
79 S/PRST/1998/20, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 13/07/98, 1.
73
74

18

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for the Security Councilto expect the very authoritiesresponsible foratrocities to


bring the perpetrators to justice.80

1000
900
800
700
600
Deaths 500
400
300
200
100
0

Runingo 19/10/96
Lemera hospital 6/10/96
Kitemesho 20/10/96
Luvuba plantation 20/10/96
Kanganiro Ruzizi river 20/10/96
Lubarika October 1996
Kamanyola October 1996
Rushima 22/10/96
Kabogoye 23/10/96
Biriba 24/10/96
Runingo 24/10/96
SUCKI sugar planations 24/10/96
Mulongwe sugar plantations
Kalimabege Kalundu port
Kabimba village 26/10/96
Kigongo village 26/10/96
Kilimabenge valley Fizi 26/10/96
Makobola 28/10/96
Swima 28/10/96
Lusambo 28/10/96
Mboko-Centre 29/10/96
Inera camp October 1996
Chimanga 22/10/96
Bukavu 30/10/96
Kashusha camp 2/11/96
Hombo 2/11/96
Bwegera 18/10/96
Kashusha camp
Shabunda Feburary 1997

Secretary-General Team: allegations of massacres at sites in


South Kivu*

Location and Date

*N.B. The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data.

Figure 2: Allegations of massacres in South Kivu, from Secretary-Generals Team Report81

UN Mapping Report 2010


In September 2005, the UN discovered mass graves in Rutshuru believed to be those of
Hutus killed by the AFDL/RPA in 1996.82 This triggered the re-opening of investigations.
Human rights professionals investigated for twelve months to map violations committed
between 1993 and 2003. The reports evidence was formed by the analysis of information
contained inreportsmeetings and witness interviews. The report described massacres
it had reasonable suspicion had occurred, requiring a reliable body of material consistent
with other verified circumstances tending to show that an incidentdid happen. Each
incident listed was backed up by at least two independent sources.83

AI, Security Council shamefully abandons victims in the DRC, AFR 62/025/1998, 15/07/98, 1.
See Appendix 8.
82 UN investigates DRC graves, BBC News, 01/10/10.
83 UN, Mapping, 5.
80
81

19

Location and Date

* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data


[1] indicates an estimate that hundreds died
[2] indicates an estimate that thousands died

Birava camp Kabare territory 11/04/95


Runingu camp 13/10/96
Itara I and II 20/10/96
Kanganiro 20/10/96
Rubenga 20/10/96
Lubarika 21/10/96
Luberizi camp 21/10/96
Kugunga camp 24/10/96
Kiliba sugar mill 25/10/96
Ndunda village 1/11/96
Mwaba 24/11/96
Rushima ravine 22/10/96
Kahororo Kiliba sugar mill 25/10/96
Luberizi village 29/10/96
Bwegera village 3/11/96
Ngendo village 13/11/96
Rukogero 8/12/96
Ruzia 12/12/96
Ruzizi river, Ruzia, 22/12/96
Kamanyola refugee camp 20/19/96
Nyarubale Kalunga hills 21/10/96
Nyangezi & Nyantende 22/10/96
Nyantende/Walungu, Nyantende/Bukavu
Nyangezi 28/10/96
Kashusha/INERA 2/11/96 [1]
Chimanga 22/11/96
Bukavu-Walunga road
Nyabibwe village mid November 1996
Shanje 21/11/96 [1]
Kahuzi-Biega National Park 2/11/96
Bridge Ulindi river Shuabunda 5/11/97
Kigulube village and forest April 1997
Shabunda: Makese I, Makese II and Kabakita January 1997
Mpwe 13/02/97
Kigulube 15/02/97
Katshungu-Shabunda: ivela, Balike, Lulingu, Keisha,
30km block around Bukavu [2]

58932

The conclusions about the AFDL/RPA invasion were particularly damning: it described the

relentless pursuit of Hutu refugeesby the AFDL/APR forces across the entire Congolese

territory.84 There was no effort madeto distinguish between Hutu members of ex-FAR

and Interahamwe andcivilians.85 The UN postponed the release of the report because of

Rwandas objections that the reports claims were insane.86 The report significantly adds to
UN Mapping Report 2010: estimates of deaths at sites in South Kivu*

1200

1000

800

Deaths 600

400

200

Figure 3: estimates of numbers killed at sites in South Kivu, from 2010 UN Mapping Report. 87

84

85

UN, Mapping, 78
UN, Mapping, 9.
86 DR Congo genocide report delayed by UN, BBC News, 02/09/10.
87 See Appendix 9.

20

58932

the understanding surrounding the massacres. From the data collected, it is evident that the
team was able to investigate many more massacre sites in the Kivus than previous
investigators (see Figure 3.)88 The report also includes eyewitness testimonies from areas
previously forbidden to investigators. For instance, in Mbandaka and Wendji refugees who
were not armed were fired on indiscriminately. Massacres along the Kisangani-Opala road
between May-June 1997 are detailed.89
However, the AFDL clean-up missions in 1996-1997 ensured that details about the
numbers killed were impossible to obtain. In North Kivu, it proved impossible to determine
the number of refugees killed. The only exact figures are based on the number buried by
local NGOs.90 In the Orientale and Equateur provinces, few estimates of the numbers
massacred were possible. Overall, comparing the contemporary reports and the 2010 report,
there are only 29 massacre sites which feature in more than one report.91
The Numbers Game: the Art of Concealing the Truth 92
In 1996, the US actively worked against UN investigation. Brody, advocacy director of
HRW, deputy director of the UN team, explained that the US had been asked for satellite
photography and intelligence information to help the investigation, but did not respond to
requests.93 On November 15th 1996, the Security Council recognised that the situation
demands an urgent response by the international community and put in action a
multinational force (MNF) to facilitate the redeliveryof humanitarian aid to refugees
as well as to facilitate voluntaryrepatriation of refugees by the UNHCR.94 However, on
the same day, AFDL/RPA troops attacked Mugunga camp, forcing the repatriation of
500,000-600,000 refugees back to Rwanda.95 The Rwandan position was that all the
civilian refugees had returned, thus the proposed multi-national force is no longer
relevant.96 Although the resolution was passed, Rwanda, with the support of the US,
succeeded in shelving the plan. The US agreed that the MNF was not necessary, Orth, US
military attach, stating on November 23rd 1996 that there were no large groups of

See Appendix 9.
UN, Mapping, 111-118.
90 UN, Mapping, 90-94.
91 See Appendix 10.
92 Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides, 31.
93 B. Crossette, UN Team says Congo army killed Hutu, The New York Times, 01/07/98.
94 S/RES/1080/1996, Security Council Resolution 1080, 15/11/96, 2.
95 UNHCR, The State of the Worlds Refugees, (Oxford, 1997), 23.
96 S/PV.3713, Security Council, 5.
88
89

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Rwandan refugees left in Zaire.97 Amnesty criticised the focus on the return of 500,000
refugees whilst the human rights tragedy unfolding in eastern Zaire has been largely
ignored.98

Image 4: Refugees pass massacred women and children in Mugunga camp, 16/11/96.
(Reuters/Corbis/42-70422301).

Boutroue described how the feud over figures between the UNHCR and US government
was interesting in its timing. In mid-November 1996, the US embassy in Kigali took over
the counting of number of returnees, and came up with daily estimated returnee figures
100,000 higher than UNHCR.99 Stockton of Oxfam stated that aerial photos
confirmedthe existence of over 500,000 refugees left in the region, countering US claims.
He argued the refugees were being air-brushed from history.100 By the start of July 1997,
the UNHCR said that 250,000 refugees from the camps were missing.101

J. Crisp, Who has counted the Refugees? UNHCR and the politics of numbers, in S. Lubkemann, L. Minear
and T. Weiss, (eds.), Humanitarian Action, (Providence, 2000), 53.
98 AI, Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire, AFR 62/29/96, 20/12/96, 1.
99 Boutroue, Missed Opportunities, 84.
100 N. Gowing, New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies,
Dispatches from Disaster Zones Conference, London 27/95/98, 57.
101 UN team to press rights probe in Kabilas Congo, Reuters, 01/07/97.
97

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The National Security Council files provide an insight into American thinking. A
Memorandum for the President from Lake, National Security Advisor, after the attack on
Mugunga in mid-November 1996, reveals that, despite its public statements, the US was
aware that several hundred thousand refugees were unaccounted for in Zaire. However,
they did not support the deployment of a multinational force (MNF), stating we must
obtain consent of the Government of Rwanda.102 By shelving the MNF plan and denying
the existence of large numbers of refugees, the US in effect helped facilitate massacres in the
region, as those who were said not to exist could be killed with impunity. It was not until
December 1996 that US officials openly agreed that between 200,000 and 400,000 refugees
were left in the Congo.103 By this time, the plan for the MNF was dead. In the absence of a
UN force, the RPA/AFDL continued to commit massacres.
Those remaining: the perpetrators
The RPA and AFDL portrayed all Hutus in Zaire as perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.
After mid-November 1996, the AFDL/RPA argued that the only Hutu refugees left behind
in Zaire were gnocidaires, and thus it was legitimate for them to be killed. In February
1997, the Rwandan government wrote to the UN in response to the Zairian Deputy Prime
Minister denouncing the massacres to the UN. The Rwandan letter asked: Is the Deputy
PM asking the international community to support this criminal armyknowing full well
their role in Rwandan genocide?104 The Kabila government argued that the 1951
Convention relating to the status of refugees, was not relevant, as it doesnt apply to
refugees who have committed awar crime,

105

such as the 1994 genocide. At a press

conference in Kinshasa with US Secretary of State Albright in December 1997, Kabila, when
questioned about the massacres in Bukavu, answered: We pursued them. They are members
of the ex-FAR, the former Rwandan armed forces, the Interahamwe. Kabila was critical: If
youkilled one of these assassins, the international community wouldname an
investigative team.106 Rwandese refugees were assassins, and the international community
was accused of being on the side of the gnocidaires by investigating massacres of refugees.

NSC: Memorandum for the President from Lake, Eastern Zaire: Update and Next Steps, 18/12/96, 18.
House of Representatives Committee hearing, 04/12/97, 17.
104 S/1997/109, Rwanda Letter, 4.
105 S/1998/582, DRC Letter, 16.
106 Albright and Kabila Press Conference, Kinshasa, 12/12/97, (http://www.state.gov/1997-2001NOPDFS/statements/971212b.html) [Accessed 11/04/15].
102
103

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The US supported Rwandan claims that all refugees had returned because they also
considered those who hadnt returned perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. A cable to
Washington from the US embassy in Rwanda on 21st January 1997 urged humanitarian
agencies to pull out of the refugee camp at Tingi-Tingi and stop feeding the killers or we
will be trading the children in Tingi-Tingi against the children who will be killedin
Rwanda.107 Even child refugees were criminalised as killers, who would later commit
murder in Rwanda. The de-classified National Security Council files reveal the same
thinking. In July 1996, a memorandum for Lake, National Security Advisor from Ragan,
NSC Director of Humanitarian affairs, explained: If the camps were closedthose who
remain behind would beidentifiable as members of the former government.108 The US
ensured the RPA/AFDL had free rein in Zaire because they considered the remaining
refugees legitimate targets.
The characterisation of all Hutu refugees as guilty of genocide in 1994 was misleading. As
Kisangani explains, former militiamen only constituted 6% of refugees.109 Of the 80,000
refugees at Tingi-Tingi, 12,000 were children under five.110 Yet, Angulu, AFDLs European
representative, told the Joint Mission team that, until the refugees are separated from
members of the former Rwandan armed forcesthey will all be viewed as the enemy. The
investigators highlighted that it was unacceptable to claim that one million peopleshould
be collectively designated as persons guilty of genocide and liable to execution.111 Amnesty
argued that the memory of the genocide is being twisted for political ends; given as
justification for attacking all Hutus.

112

For example, a refugee interviewed by French,

described watching soldiers beat a Hutu boys head against a tree until he was dead,
explaining here is the son of Habyarimana, the former Hutu leader of Rwanda.113 The 2010
Report describes AFDL public meetings decrying Hutu refugees as responsible for the
genocide of 1994 and planning a genocide against the Zairian civilians.114

UNHDA: IRIN update 88, 28/01/97.


Lake from Ragan, Rwandan Refugee Strategy, 50.
109 Kisangani, Massacre of Refugees, 184.
110 MSF, Forced flight, 4.
111 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 12.
112 AI, Rwanda: Alarming Resurgence in Killings, AFR 47/13/96, 12/08/96, 12.
113 H. French Refugees from Congo give vivid accounts of killings, The New York Times, 23/09/97.
114 UN, Mapping, 100.
107
108

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CHAPTER 3: PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS: HIDING BEHIND


OVERSIMPLIFICATION
This chapter will consider the instrumentalisation of genocide and its impact on US policy.
It will explore the declassified National Security Council files that reveal US support for the
Rwandan government. Finally, it will argue that historical analysis is needed to complicate
the simple victim/perpetrator story engrained in interpretations of conflict in the Great
Lakes region.
Mobilised guilt
The NSC files reveal that the US supported Rwanda, militarily and politically, whilst aware
of both the Rwandan intention to invade and then the massacres committed during the
invasion. How can this be explained? Ultimately, the guilt from the 1994 genocide was
effectively instrumentalised by the Rwandan regime. In July 1998, Rwandan minister
Mazimhaka explained that, after the Rwandan genocide, we were diplomatically
strongernobody could argue with us.115 Gribbin, US Ambassador to Kigali at the time,
explains that the RPF played the genocide card shamelessly, (correctly so, in my view),
and staked out the moral high-ground.116 As French argues, this guilt, combined with the
good guys versus bad guys preferred mode of American thinking resulted in almost
uncritical support of Rwanda.117
Comparisons with the Holocaust were mobilised by actors in the Great Lakes. In 1996,
Nsanze, the Burundian UN representative, criticised Western voices advocating dialogue
with neo-Naziswho are bent on carrying out genocide once again.118 In referring to the
Hutus in the refugee camps as neo-Nazis, Nsanze was appealing to Western sensitivities.
Gourevitch, an American author and journalist, exemplifies such simplistic thinking, calling
Rwandas involvement in Congo a struggle for national survival. He draws comparisons
between Rwanda and Israel, describing Rwanda as another small country with a vivid
memory of genocide and persistent threats of annihilation.119 Gourevitch said of calls for
investigation of the massacres in refugee camps: Its hard to imagine what anybody in the

L. Duke, U.S. Faces Surprise, Dilemma in Africa,The Washington Post, 14/07/98.


R. Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide, (NY, 2005), 199.
117 Prunier, From Genocide, 34.
118 S/PV.3656, Security Council, 6.
119 P. Gourevitch, Forsaken Congo seems less a Nation that a battlefield for Countless African armies, The
New Yorker, 25/09/00, 56.
115
116

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Congo stands to benefit.120 As Fein explains, comparisons with the Holocaust assume that
there is one mechanically-recurring script and are misleading.121 The analogy between
Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust engrained a simplistic equation between Hutu
murderers and Tutsi victims, insensitive to the complexity of conflict in the Great Lakes.122
Rwandan army massacres of Hutus were ignored, even before the incursion into Zaire. The
international community failed to recognise the severity of revenge killings within Rwanda
itself, which exacerbated the refugee crisis by discouraging voluntary return. In
August/September 1994, the UN had sent UNHCR Rwandan Repatriation Chief, Gersony,
to Rwanda to investigate. Gersony visited 50 sites and interviewed 200 refugees, concluding
that the RPA massacred Hutus in Rwanda between April and mid-September 1994, killing
between 25,00045,000.123 The UN buried the findings, and no further investigation
followed. A declassified telegram from the Secretary of State in Washington to the
Ambassador in Kigali, reveals that Under-Secretary-General Annan visited Kagame on 19th
September 1994, to discussinformation obtained by Gersony and inquire what steps
Kagame plans to take to halt these abuses as very soon thereafter the UNintend to make
the information public. 124 It was never made public, but was later leaked, together with its
covering letter written a month after the visit to Kagame, emphasising that the findings
must be treated as confidential.125 It seems that the guilt mobilized by the genocide was
sufficient to persuade the UN to suppress reports of RPA crimes within Rwanda. Yet, these
continued. A year later, 8,000 Hutus were massacred in Rwandas Kibeho refugee camp.126
Military support
Despite this, the US extended military support to the Rwandan regime from 1995 onwards.
On February 7th 1995, an NSC Memorandum to Advisor Lake explained that Kagame
wants the embargo lifted so the RPA may receiveequipment from the US.127 The
embargo was lifted through a presidential waiver. A memorandum for the Executive
P. Gourevitch Stonewall Kabila: Why the UNs word is as unreliable as the Congo Leaders, The New
Yorker, 06/10/97.
121 H. Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, (London, 1993), 55.
122 Lemarchand, Dynamics of Violence, xii.
123 Summary of UNHCR Presentation before Commission of Experts, 10/10/94, 8.
(http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/gersony_report.pdf) [Accessed 11/04/15].
124 Cable from Secretary State to Ambassador in Kigali, UNHCR team finds evidence in Rwanda, 2.
(http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/167165.pdf) [Accessed 11/04/15].
125 Letter from Fouinat to Molina-Abram, 11/10/94, 2.
(http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/gersony_report.pdf) [Accessed 11/04/15].
126 S. Kiley, Rwanda massacre reveals extent of vengeful hysteria, The Times, 24/04/95.
127 NSC: Memorandum for Lake from Rice, Rwanda-Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting, 07/02/95, 29.
120

26

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Secretary of the NSC explained that Rwandan troops have committed atrocitiesin
Kibeho: yet, in October 1995, President Bizimungu met with Defence Secretary Perry to
discuss the Rwandan acquisition of US military equipment.128 Lake was asked to remind
Kagame that ignoringhumanitarian principlesundermines the credibility of Rwanda.129
Human rights abuses were considered unfortunate, but did not prevent the US extending
military support to Rwanda. Even after the Kibeho killings, NSC officials described the RPA
as the most disciplinedforce in central Africa. They predicted that US military support
would lead to the RPA trying to aggressively contain the insurgence through cross-border
strikes on the camps. However, the difference would be a more professionalforce better
able to control itself, unlike in Kibeho.130 American sympathy for the Rwandan regime
meant they saw strengthening the Rwandan army as a way of improving discipline, and did
not pause to question whether it might result in more violence.
After reports of massacres in eastern Zaire, HRW recommended the US government
conduct investigations to determine whether any of the militia involved in civilian
massacreshave received training from US armed forces.131 Christopher Smith, Chair of
the House Subcommittee on International Operations, also voiced concerns. Yet, no review
followed. Instead, in July 1998, a new round of training between the US and Rwandan
military was approved.132 Despite continued human rights abuses, the US remained
committed to their close relationship with Rwanda.
Support for the Invasion
Campbell, concluding his investigation for HRW, argued that the US was aware of
Rwandas intention to attack refugee campsand either supported the idea, were unable to
propose alternative solutionsor did nothing to prevent it because of their desire to have
the problem of refugees resolved.133 An examination of the documentation now available
reveals that this analysis was remarkably accurate. American officials denied knowing in
advance that Rwanda would intervene.134 However, in an interview in The Washington Post,
Kagame explained that, in August 1996, he had travelled to Washington looking for a

NSC: Memorandum for Sens, Request for a meeting.


NSC: Memorandum for Lake, from McCormick, Meeting with Rwandan VP Kagame, 08/08/96, 9.
130 NSC: Paper for the Senior Africa Director, Possible Consequences of Lifting the Arms Embargo against
Rwanda, 18/07/95, 9.
131 Campbell, Kabila is Hiding, 10.
132 Duke, U.S. Surprise.
133 Campbell, Kabila is Hiding, 53.
134 McKinley, French, Hidden Horrors.
128
129

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solution to the refugee crisis from State Department officials, but they didnt come up with
any answers. Kagame said that he warned the US that Rwanda would take military action
against the refugee camps. Kagame commended the US for taking the right decision to let
it proceed.135
No source material about Kagames Washington visit was available until March 2014. The
declassified NSC files contain notes on the meeting with Kagame which occurred two
months before the AFDL/APR invasion of Zaire. Although the documents do not explicitly
state US support for an invasion at this early stage, they give an implicit green light to
Kagame. The NSC memorandum briefing Lake before his meeting with Kagame, stated:
Kagame will want to discuss continued cross-border attacks from elements of the former
regime based among the camps in eastern Zaire and to seek furtherpolitical support.
Kagame may express concern about how best to separate ex-FAR fromrefugees. Lake
was instructed to highlight important government of Rwanda role inwelcoming refugees
home, but was given no further instructions, let alone any view to express on Rwandas
developing plans for intervention in Zaire.136 As Gribbin explained, we did not use all the
leverage at our disposal to limit Rwandan involvement in the Congo.137
Black/White View
The effective mobilisation of American guilt led to a simplistic understanding of conflict in
the Congo in US policy circles: Tutsis were the good guys, and the simplified idea of
struggling against the gnocidaires became an article of faith in US policy.138 Massacres of
Hutus in the camps were overlooked. In the US House of Representatives Committee on
International Relations hearing at the end of 1996, the question was asked: Is there any
truth to the reports that refugees are being systematically killed by the allies of our allies? If
so, what have we done to put an immediate end to the killings? Bogosian told the
Congressional panel that he was concerned about the allegations, but that adequate
measures had been taken. However, all that had been done was talking to the Rwandan
governmentto urge restraint.139 In January 1996, a NSC memorandum was sent to Lake
from Rice, Senior Director for African Affairs, urging that we need to continue impressing

Pomfret, Rwandans led revolt.


Lake, from McCormick, Meeting with Kagame, 10.
137 Gribbin, Aftermath, 199.
138 Prunier, From Genocide, 340.
139 House of Representatives, 04/12/96, 11.
135
136

28

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upon them [Rwanda] that our support is not unconditional.140 Yet, there is no evidence that
any specific conditions were imposed by the US. In effect, the US turned a blind eye.
The massacres in eastern Zaire were not a prime concern of US policy. On 2nd November
1996, the NSC Meeting on Zaire noted that rebel troops, supportedby Rwanda,have
captured Uvira and Bukavu, from where refugees are fleeing. However, the meeting
focused on the threat of genocide against Tutsis in Zaire, which Rwanda had used as
justification for their invasion.141 As relations between Kabila and Rwanda soured in 1998,
an NSC paper on Countering Genocide explained that the threat of resurgent genocide
persists as soldiers of the ex-FARcontinue to sow terror with the aim to exterminate
the Tutsis. The massacres of Hutu refugees received only passing mention, characterised as
the collateral civilian damage of Rwandas counter-insurgency campaign that had
contributed to hundreds of civilian deaths, a gross minimisation of the numbers killed. The
NSCs favoured policy was to directly contribute to Rwandas military efforts
toneutralise gnocidaires. The only con noted to this approach was: Because of publicised
human rights abuses within the context of its counter-insurgency operation, providing
lethal military aid to the RPA would be highly controversial.

142

Despite this, in 1998

military aid was extended.143


In March 1998, Clinton visited Kigali and explained that the Rwandan genocide haunts the
international community who must bear its share of responsibility.we owe all those who
died and who survived. He commended the Rwandan regime for their efforts to create a
single nation in which all citizens can live freely.144 The more complex reality remained
overlooked.
A Convenient End to the Refugee Crisis
The AFDL/RPA invasion relieved the international community of the burden of the
refugee camps. As Lake was reminded before his meeting with Kagame, of the million-a-day
spent on the camps by the international community, the US provided 30%.145 An alternative

NSC: Memorandum for Lake from Rice: Report on Trip with Ambassador Albright, 30/01/96, 82.
NSC: Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios, Meeting on Eastern Zaire, 02/11/96, 64.
142 NSC: Memorandum for J. Steinberg, from J. Prendergast, 06/05/98, Briefing Memo for Deputies
Committee Meeting on Countering Genocide in the Great Lakes, 78.
143 NSC: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee, 28/05/98, 88.
144 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 30/03/98, 479-523.
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1998-03-30/pdf/WCPD-1998-03-30.pdf) [Accessed 11/04/15].
145 Lake, from McCormick, Meeting with Kagame, 9.
140
141

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solution was sought. The NSC sources are particularly revealing, indicating that the US
overlooked the Hutu massacres because US officials had suggested the option of
encouraging Rwanda to use Tutsi-led forces to dismantle the camps in the first place. A
memorandum to Lake from McCormick, NSC Africa Director, dated 1st November 1996,
days after the AFDL/RPA invasion, discussed a push-pull strategy to ensure repatriation.
McCormick explained that the UNHCR now acceptsa policy of aggressive repatriation
must begin. On the push side, the NSC was divided over which force to deploy to force
refugees to return to Rwanda and dismantle the camps. Rice wanted to use Zairian Tutsi
rebels (AFDL), whereas others suggested FAZ forces. The CIA was to assess the benefits
and risks of such a strategy. However, the remainder of the document is redacted in the
public record, with the explanatory note: We omitted the following information from the
paper...due to its sensitivity.146
At a meeting on November 2nd 1996, officials from the state department, NSC and CIA met
to decide on an aggressive repatriation plan including all or some of their push options.
Once again, much of the document has been redacted, and thus it remains unclear which
force the US explicitly chose. However, given the descriptions of the incompetenceand
indiscipline of the FAZ in comparison to the well-armed, trainedTutsi opposition,
evidently the AFDL was preferred. The NSC suggested the US urge Rwanda to press
Zairian Tutsi forces to deploy in a fashion that spurs repatriation, as fear is what motivates
refugeesThe refugees are almost certain not to return to Rwanda unless fear of staying in
Zaire exceeds fear of return to Rwanda. There was no guarantee that the Zairian Tutsi
troops would be disciplined: Repatriation without significant bloodshed...is uncertain, and:
If the mission fails and is perceived as a US idea, the political fall-out could be
significant.147 This is hugely revealing. Firstly, from the beginning of the AFDL invasion,
the US was aware that Rwanda was in charge. Secondly, the use of AFDL intimidation,
even with the risk of murder of the refugees, was considered a viable idea by the US. Given
these facts, the US was unlikely to comply with Amnestys request to stop their praise the
AFDL for forcing repatriation withoutcondemning the human rights abuses committed
in the process.148

NSC: Memorandum for Lake from McCormick, Briefing Memo for Ad hoc Interagency on Eastern Zaire,
01/11/96, 74.
147 NSC: Ad Hoc Interagency Meeting on Eastern Zaire Issues Paper, 02/11/96, 64.
148 AI, Deadly Alliances, 32.
146

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The Manipulation of Memory and History


It is important to consider how the conflict in the region has been remembered, and the
relationship between memory and history. As Lemarchand describes, memory matters, not
just for what it says about the past, but for what it forgets to tell us, as what to forgetis a
political choice. The dominant narrative projects the victors version of history and
silencesdissenting voices.149 Hoffman concludes that academics must look beyond the
fixed moment of trauma tolonger historical patterns to supplement partisan memory with
a more complex encompassing view of history. This enables us to criticise dubioususes
of collective memory.150
The Rwandan government has made considerable efforts to manipulate the way in which
the conflict is remembered. In 2013, it published a report to counter studies which it said
were spreading false information - the Gersony, Garretn and 2010 UN Mapping reports.
The Mapping report is described as distorting history, inventing a crime of
genocidecommitted against Hutu refugees in Congo. The report was seen as trivialising
the genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 using the trick of showing that both
sidescommitted genocide. Yet, the emotionally and politically charged term genocide is
not historically useful in examining the dynamics of violence in the Great Lakes: in effect, it
has become a weapon for the Rwandan government, used to solidify the representation of
Hutus as perpetrators and Tutsis as victims. Conflict in the Great Lakes must not be
reduced to charges of genocide committed by both sides. Instead, historical assessment is
required to reveal it was a complex series of mass killings: as the UN Mapping Report
describes, in the Congo victims became perpetrators while perpetrators were themselves
subjected to serious violations of human rights.151

Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides, 16.


E. Hoffman, The Balm of Recognition, N. Owen (ed)., Human Rights, Human Wrongs, (Oxford, 1999), 296.
151 UN, Mapping, 1.
149
150

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CONCLUSIONS
Historical analysis of the sources now available reveals important conclusions about the
massacres in the Congo. Firstly, the international community failed to act to separate
civilian refugees from militia in the camps, due to the limited significance of eastern Zaire to
western interests. Consequently, Rwanda invaded in 1996, allied with the AFDL, and
systematically and indiscriminately killed Hutu refugees. Secondly, the Rwandan regime
deployed a narrative based on the rigid dichotomy between Tutsis as victims and Hutus as
perpetrators, mobilising Western guilt and instrumentalising the 1994 genocide, in order to
legitimise their actions. This impacted hugely on US policy. The US supported Rwanda
militarily and politically, overlooking human rights abuses, and arguing that all refugees
left in the Congo were perpetrators of the genocide and legitimate targets.

The US

prevented UN action, giving the Rwandan troops free rein. Finally, not only did the US
support Rwandas invasion, but the NSCs meetings reveal that the US favoured Rwanda
deploying their rebel troops in a way that forced refugees to return to Rwanda, even if this
caused bloodshed. Logistical convenience coincided with a simplistic understanding, fuelled
by guilt after their inaction in 1994, to legitimise the invasion and the atrocities that
followed.
When the UN Mapping Report was published, Human Rights Watch released an article
emphasising the importance of its findings to the general public. It listed questions many
would ask, and provided explanations. It asked: But wasnt there a genocide against Tutsi
in Rwanda? How can there also have been a genocide against Hutu?152 This typifies the
narrative still propounded by some political scientists, such as Winter, who continues to
echo the Rwandan government line that what Rwanda did in 1996 was justified, arguing
that the Rwandan leadership is seldom given credit for its achievementsscattering of the
gnocidaires and the ousting of Mobutu.153 Historical exploration is necessary to escape a
restrictive framework centring solely on the 1994 genocide. The reality is never a
black/white depiction: the historical record is characterised by grey areas.
There is significant scope for further historical inquiry that must examine the events, not
focus on judgements as to what was justified. The lack of sustained academic interest in
HRW, Q&A on the UN Mapping Report, 01/10/10.
R. Winter, Lancing the Boil: Rwandas Agenda in Zaire, in H. Adelman and G. Rao, (eds.), War and Peace
in Zaire/Congo, (NJ, 2004), 128-131.
152
153

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Zaire has allowed the Rwandan governments narrative to remain dominant. The Rwandan
genocide was a tragedy that deserves the historical attention it receives. However, sustained
academic attention to the wider complexities of violence in the Great Lakes region,
including events in the Congo, is essential to enable full historical understanding.

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APPENDIX 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS


1994:

April: 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus are killed in Rwanda. The Tutsi-led RPF
forms a new government.

Exodus of Rwandan refugees to camps in Kivu provinces. From these camps, attacks
are lunched against Rwanda and against Tutsi in Congo.

Gersony sent to investigate allegations of RPA massacres of Hutu in Rwanda.

UN grapples with refugee crisis.

1995:

February: 1,500 Zairian security forces sent to camps.

April: 8,000 Hutu refugees are massacred by the RPA in Kibeho in Rwanda.

UN continues to grapple with refugee crisis.

1996: First War begins

August: Kagame visits Washington to discuss how to solve the security threat of
refugees camps in eastern Zaire.

October: Rwanda invades Zaire, disguised as a local Banyamulenge Tutsi rebellion,


and capture Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. Refugee camps in the area are dismantled.
AFDL is announced, with Kabila as its leader.

November 15th: The Multi-National force is authorised by the UN, and AFDL/RPA
troops hit Mugunga, forcing the repatriation of 500,000-600,000 refugees back to
Rwanda.

November 23rd: US agrees with Rwanda that there are no refugees left in Zaire.

1997:

March: Garretns preliminary investigation conducted in Zaire. He urges further


investigation.

May: Kinshasa falls to Kabila, Mobutu flees.

July: Kagame admits Rwanda planned and orchestrated the rebellion.

July: Follow up UN team, the Joint Mission, investigates. DRC government objects
to the team.

July: UNHCR says 250,000 refugees are missing in DRC.

August: Secretary-Generals team sent as a replacement to investigate in DRC.

September: UNHCR withdraws from the Congo.


34

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1998: Second War begins

April: Secretary-Generals investigative team withdraws from the Congo.

August: Relations between Kabila AFDL and Rwanda RPA disintegrate. Anti-Kabila
rebels, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, advance.

October: Lusaka peace talks collapse.

November: Rwanda acknowledges its forces are fighting alongside Rally for
Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels.

1999:

July: ceasefire agreed by all in conflict except RCD rebels.

2000:

February: UN authorizes 5,500-strong force to monitor the ceasefire: MONUC.

35

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APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS
AFDL - Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. Also known by
its French acronym, ADFL, Alliance des Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du CongoZare.
AI Amnesty International.
CIA Central Intelligence Agency, foreign intelligence service of the U.S.
ex-FAR ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-Forces Armes Rwandaises).
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire until May 1997).
FAR - Rwandan Armed Forces until July 1994 (Forces Armes Rwandaises).
FAZ Zairian National Army (Forces Armes Zaroises).
HRW Human Rights Watch.
MNF - UN Multi-national force authorised November 15th 1996.
MONUC Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo.
The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN peacekeeping
mission sent to the Congo in 2000. Later renamed MONUSCO "Mission de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo" in 2010.
MSF Mdecins Sans Frontires.
NGO Non-governmental organisation.
NSC National Security Council.
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army. Army of the Tutsi Rwandan Government (RPF) from
July 1994.
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front. Ruling political party of Rwanda from 18th July 1994.
UN United Nations.
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Later renamed the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
US the United States of America.

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APPENDIX 3: DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) - A coalition


of rebel groups in eastern Zaire, supported by Rwanda, that took power in the Congo in
May 1997.
Albright, Madeleine US Ambassador to the UN (1993-1997), US Secretary of State
(1997-2001).
Angulu AFDLs European representative.
Annan, Kofi Under-Secretary-General of the UN from March 1994, Secretary-General of
the UN from January 1997 to December 2006. Joint recipient of the 2001 Nobel Peace
Prize.
Banyamulenge Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsis living in the Congo, descendants of
Rwanda Tutsis who had migrated before the colonial partitioning of 1885.
Banywarwanda Rwandan immigrants who settled in the Congo during the colonial
period, (post-1886). Kinyarwanda-speaking, mix of Hutu and Tutsi.
Bizimungu, Pasteur President of Rwanda from July 1994 until March 2000.
Block, Robert reporter for The Wall Street Journal. His coverage of Congo won the U.N.s
Elizabeth Neuffer Award in 2004.
Bogosian, Richard National Security Council Co-ordinator for Rwanda and Burundi
(1996-1997).
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros Secretary-General of the UN from January 1992 until December
1996.
Boutroue, Joel Head of UNHCR, North Kivu (1995-1998).

37

58932

Brody, Reed - Brody was Deputy Director of the UN Secretary Generals Investigative
Team 1997-8. An American human rights lawyer and advocacy director for Human Rights
Watch.
Cabral, Alfredo - Guinea-Bissau's ambassador to the UN (1996 -1999).
Campbell, Scott Consultant for Human Rights Watch Africa, acting head of the office for
UNHCR in DRC (1996-1997).
Clinton, William President of the United States (1993-2001).
Eluku, General Army chief of staff of Zairian Army (FAZ) (1993-1996).
Ex-FAR ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-Forces Armes Rwandaises). Forces of the
Rwandan Government before July 1994, involved in the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in
Rwanda, who fled to eastern Zaire and established themselves in the refugee camps,
conducting attacks across the border.
FAZ Zairian National Army (Forces Armes Zaroises) under Mobutu, until 1997.
French, Howard Senior foreign correspondent at the New York Times. Reported on
central Africa, 1994-1998. Currently associate professor at Columbia University Graduate
School of Journalism.
Garretn, Roberto UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights for the Congo (19942001). A Chilean human rights lawyer.
Gnocidaires Term attributed to those who committed the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
Gersony, Robert UNHCR Rwandan Repatriation Chief. Freelance American consultant.
Gribbin, Robert Ambassador of the US to Rwanda (1995-1999).
Habyarimana, Juvnal President of Rwanda (March 8, 1937 April 6, 1994).
Hutu - group forming the majority population in Rwanda and Burundi.
38

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Interahamwe - militia backed by the Hutu-led government during the 1994 genocide. In
Kinyarwanda, the name signifies those who stand/work/attack together.
Kabila, Laurent Head of the AFDL. President of DRC from May 1997 until his
assassination by one of his bodyguards in January 2001.
Kagame, Paul Vice-President of Rwanda and head of the RPA from July 1994. Became
President in 2000.
Lake, Anthony National Security Council, National Security Advisor (1993-1997).
McCormick, Shawn National Security Council, Africa Director (1995-1997).
Mobutu, Sese Seko President of Zaire, ousted by Kabila May 1997.
Nsanze, Terence Burundi Ambassador to the UN during first Congo war.
Orth, Richard U.S. army officer, who served as Central Africa Analyst for the US Defence
Intelligence Agency, (1994-1996), and US Defense Attach in Rwanda (1996-1998)
Perry, William US Defence Secretary (1994-1997).
Prunier, Gerard - French academic specializing in the Great Lakes region. Employed by
the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, a French governmental multidisciplinary
scientific research organisation, for which he travelled extensively in Africa in the 1990s.
Ragan, Richard National Security Council, Director of Humanitarian Affairs (19941997).
Rice, Susan Senior Director for African Affairs at the US National Security Council
(1995-1997).
Rosenblatt, Lionel President of Refugees International, (1990 onwards). Former U.S.
State Department desk officer for Asia.
39

58932

Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) Army of the Rwandan Government (RPF) from July
1994.
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Ruling political party of Rwanda from July 1994.
Smith, Christopher Republican US Congressman since 1981. Chair of the US House of
Representatives Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights in the mid1990s.
Stockton, Nicholas Oxfam Director of Emergencies (1995-2000).
Tutsi group forming a minority of the population of Burundi and Rwanda.
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) - a United Nations
(UN) body formed in December 1991 by the General Assembly to strengthen the UN's
response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. Later renamed the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) A United Nations agency,
based in Geneva, mandated to protect and support refugees at the request of a government
or the UN itself. It assists in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement
to a third country.
Wirth, Tim US National Security Council, Under-Secretary for State Global Affairs
(1994-1997).

40

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APPENDIX 4: GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS


Biaro town in the Orientale province of the DRC, 484km from the Rwandan border at
Goma.
Bukavu capital city of the South Kivu province in the east of the DRC.
Burundi small country in the African Great Lakes region, bordered by Rwanda to the
north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the
west. (Land area 25,649 sq km).
Congo used as shorthand for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Democratic Republic of the Congo - the former Belgian colony, called Zaire until renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Kabila government in May 1997. In
the Great Lakes region, it borders the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic
and South Sudan to the north, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania to the East, Zambia
and Angola to the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Geographically, it is the second
largest country in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world (land area almost 1 million sq
km).
Equateur one of the ten provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, located in the
north of the country, bordering the Republic of the Congo to the west, the Central African
Republic to the north, the Orientale province to the east, the Kasai-Oriental, KasaiOccidental and Bandundu provinces to the south.
Goma largest city in the North Kivu province of eastern DRC.
Great Lakes region in central Africa including the countries Rwanda, Burundi, Congo,
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Kasese town in the Maniema province of the DRC, 1,345km from the Rwandan border at
Goma.

41

58932

Kibeho small town in the south of Rwanda, location of massacre of internally displaced
people by the RPA in 1995.
Kigali Capital city of Rwanda.
Kinshasa Capital city of DRC, located in the far West of the country, 1,574km from the
Rwandan border at Goma.
Kisangani capital of the Orientale province, 659km from the Rwandan border at Goma.
Maniema province in the DRC, borders the provinces of Kasai-Oriental to the west,
Orientale to the north, North Kivu and South Kivu to the east, and Katanga to the south.
Masisi town in the North Kivu province of the eastern DRC.
Mbandaka city in the Equateur province of the DRC, 1,236km from the Rwandan border
at Goma.
Mugunga site of a refugee camp near Goma in the North Kivu province of the DRC.
North Kivu - province bordering Lake Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. It borders the provinces of Orientale to the north, Maniema to the southwest, South
Kivu to the south, and to the east it borders Uganda and Rwanda.
South Kivu South Kivu borders the provinces of North Kivu to the north, Maniema to the
west, and Katanga to the south. To the east it borders Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania.
Orientale province in the northeast of the Congo, bordering quateur province to the
west, Kasa-Oriental province to the southwest, Maniema to the south, and North Kivu to
the southeast.
Rutshuru a town in the DRC province of North Kivu, and 30 km from the Rwandan
border.

42

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Rwanda small country in the Great Lakes region, bordered by Uganda, Tanzania,
Burundi and bordered by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the West. (Land area
26,338 sq km).
Tingi-Tingi location of a refugee camp in the Maniema province of the DRC
Wendji city in the Equateur province of the DRC, 17km from Mbandaka
Zaire the former Belgian colony, the Belgian Congo. Named Zaire until May 1997, when
it was re-named the Democratic Republic of Congo by the Kabila government.

43

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APPENDIX 5: SUMMARY OF KISANGANIS CALCULATIONS AS TO NUMBERS


OF REFUGEES KILLED
Below is a summary of Kisanganis estimations of numbers of refugees missing at each stage
of their flight across the Congo, using UNHCR population figures for each camp. The
names can be related to the map at Figure 2. The data is extracted from:
E. Kisangani, The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: a case of UN peacekeeping failure
and international law, The Journal of Modern African Studies, (2000), 172-180.
According to the UNHCR, 1.1-1.2 million refugees were in the Congo - 850,000 in Goma,
200,000-300,000 in Bukavu and 62,000 in Uvira. In mid-November 1996, the RPA attacked
Mugunga near Goma, forcing the return of 500,000700,000 refugees to Rwanda. Some
550,000 remained in the Congo. From Goma, the refugees fled in several directions (see
Figure 1), an extraordinary movement of mass populations over huge distances. In
December 1996, 215,000 were found in Walikale and 60,000 in Masisi. From Bukavu, the
refugees also fled: 115,000 were found in South Kivu hiding in the mountains and 60,000
near the border crossing to Lake Kivu. In late 1996, UNHCR relocated 52,500 refugees to
Shubunda. From Uvira, 25,000 were relocated and headed further south. Therefore, of the
550,000 refugees who had remained in the Congo, 527,500 had been located and 22,500
remained unaccounted for.
In the second series of attacks, in December 1996, the AFDL/RPA hit Walikale and Masisi,
where 275,000 refugees were living. 140,000 refugees fled to Amisi and Tingi-Tingi.
However, 135,000 remained unaccounted for. Thus, 135,000 plus the already missing total
of 22,5000 meant 157,500 refugees were missing. On the 5th of February 1997, the rebels
attacked the 52,500 refugees in Shabunda. The UNHCR found 28,000 refugees in Kalima,
thus 24,500 more remained missing. When added to the previous total, 182,000 refugees
were missing at this point. In March 1997, 140,000 refugees in Amisi and Tingi-Tingi
camps were attacked. Only 85,000 were found again, leaving 55,000 unaccounted for. In
March 1997, the UNHCR settled 17,000 refugees in Biaro and 68,000 in Kisesa. However,
between 21st and 26th of April 1997, the camps were attacked. The UNHCR repatriated
45,000 back to Rwanda. On the 12th May 1997, 30,000 refugees resurfaced in Mbandaka, a
large distance away in the very west of the country, and 12,000 in Wendji; thus the number
of missing refugees decreased to 235,000. On the 13th May 1997, Mbandaka was attacked
44

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and massacres occurred in Uvira. It is estimated that around 5,000 were killed; thus, the
number of refugees missing increased to 240,000. MSF estimated that 20-30 refugees died
everyday from disease. Therefore, from mid-November 1996 to mid-September 1997,
approximately 6,600-9,900 refugees died. This brings the adjusted estimation of total
refugees killed to 232,000.

45

0
Kiliba 18/10/96 [AFR/62/29/96]

Uvira 25/10/96 [AFR/62/29/96]

46

Location, Date and Amnesty Report Reference

* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data

Crisis in Eastern Zaire, AFR 02/15/96, 08/11/96

Amnesty International Condemns Massacre of 500 refugees, AFR 02/29/96, 26/11/96

Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests, AFR 62/33/97, 03/12/97.

Wimbi, Alela, Abanga, Talama 2/08/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Kahongole 29/07/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Katale 22/07/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Uvira town 26/05/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Boende [AFR 62/33/97]

Mbandaka 13/05/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Biaro [AFR 62/33/97]

Kasese camp 22/04/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Mweso river [AFR 62/33/97]

Kabizo Rutshuru district 12/04/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Lwana 13/03/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Mushabambawa village 11/03/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Tingi-Tingi 1/03/97 [AFR 62/33/97]

Langue-Langue [AFR 62/33/97]

Mpwe [AFR 62/33/97]

Bukavu-Shabunda axis Feb-March 1997[2] [AFR 62/33/97]

Katale, Kahindo [AFR/02/29/96]

Kimumba camp [AFR/02/29/96]

Chimanga 22/11/96 [AFR/02/29/96]

Goma 01/11/96 [AFR 02/15/96]

Bukavu 20/10/96 [AFR 02/15/96]

Mboko 28/10/96 [AFR/62/29/96]

Deaths

Luberezi camp 20/10/96 [AFR/62/29/96]

Lamera hospital 06/10/96 [AFR/62/29/96]

58932

APPENDIX 6: DATA FROM THE AMNESTY REPORTS

Below, data are extracted from four Amnesty reports and plotted on a bar chart for the

purposes of this dissertation. The reports are:Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire, AFR 62/29/96,

20/12/96

The chart illustrates the number of sites identified, the date-range, and the gaps in precise

information as to numbers killed, in the contemporary Amnesty investigations and reports.



Amnesty International reports: estimates of numbers killed at
different sites in Eastern Zaire (Oct 1996 - Aug 1997)*
2500

2000

1500

1000

500

58932

Data extracted from the Amnesty reports and plotted in the above chart
Massacre Site
Lamera hospital 06/10/96
Kiliba 18/10/96
Luberezi camp 20/10/96
Uvira 25/10/96
Mboko 28/10/96
Bukavu 20/10/96
Goma 01/11/96
Chimanga 22/11/96
Kimumba camp
Katale, Kahindo
Bukavu-Shabunda axis Feb-March 1997
Mpwe
Langue-Langue
Tingi-Tingi 1/03/97
Mushabambawa village 11/03/97
Lwana 13/03/97
Kabizo Rutshuru district 12/04/
Mweso river
Kasese camp 22/04/97
Biaro
Mbandaka 13/05/97
Boende
Uvira town 26/05/97
Katale 22/07/97
Kahongole 29/07/97
Wimbi, Alela, Abanga, Talama 2/08/97

Deaths
300
60
600
300
83
300
500
1515
Thousands
100
200
200
500
800
2000
120
800

47

Report
AFR/62/29/96
AFR/62/29/96
AFR/62/29/96
AFR/62/29/96
AFR/62/29/96
AFR 02/15/96
AFR 02/15/96
AFR/02/29/96
AFR/02/29/96
AFR/02/29/96
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97
AFR 62/33/97

58932

APPENDIX 7: DATA FROM THE PRELIMINARY GARRETN INVESTIGATION


Garretns first investigation was preliminary in nature: he was only present in Zaire for 4
days between 25th-29th March 1997. The information he obtained was limited. However, it
established the need for further investigation. The data is extracted from his report below,
then plotted in two bar charts.:
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire, prepared
by Special Rapporteur Robert Garretn, 02/04/97.
Garretn visited only North and South Kivu provinces in the east of Zaire. Below, the
figures are presented separately to aid comparison with subsequent reports in later
appendices.
1) South Kivu province

Mitiba
22/02/97

Luseke
20/02/07

Kingulube
13/02/97

Shabunda

Kasiba

Chimanga
22/11/96

Burhale Bukavu
South Kivu

2500
2000
1500
Deaths
1000
500
0

Bigira

Garretn Report: estimates of number killed at sites in South


Kivu*

Location and Date


* The absence of entires for some sites indicates missing data

Data on South Kivu province taken from the Garretn report, used in the above chart
Massacres and Date: South Kivu
Bigira
Burhale Bukavu South Kivu
Chimanga 22/11/96
Kasiba
Shabunda
Kingulube 13/02/97
Luseke 20/02/07
Mitiba 22/02/97

Deaths
100
2000
500
103
100
29
16
48

58932

2) North Kivu province


Garretn UN Report: estimates of numbers killed at sites in North
Kivu*
7000
6000
5000
4000
Deaths

3000
2000
0

Jomba Rutshuru 11/96


Kasuga Masisi 12/1996
Bukombo 31/12/96
Birambizo Masisi 01/97
Bitonga
Chibumbi Masisi
Chanzu Rutshuru
Goma
Kahindo Rutshuru region
Kahira
Kapanzi camp
Karoba Masisi 01/97
Katale
Kibabi
Kibumba
Kimbumba parc
Kibumba village
Kilimanyoka
Kirumba
Lumbishi
Matanda Masisi
Munigi
Mugunga 14/11/96
Mushabwabwe
Ngungu Masisi 19/11/96
Nyakariba Masisi 22/12/96
Nyamitaba Bashali Masisi 21/11/96
Ruhegeri Masisi 12/96
Sake
Shinda January 1997
Tongo 19/01/97

1000

Location and Date


* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data

Data on North Kivu province taken from the Garretn report, used in the above chart

Massacres and Date: North Kivu

Deaths

Jomba Rutshuru 11/96


Kasuga Masisi 12/1996
Bukombo 31/12/96
Birambizo Masisi 01/97
Bitonga
Chibumbi Masisi
Chanzu Rutshuru
Goma
Kahindo Rutshuru region
Kahira
Kapanzi camp
Karoba Masisi 01/97
Katale
Kibabi
Kibumba
Kimbumba parc

5
300
134
207
200
77
143
100
49

58932

Kibumba village
Kilimanyoka
Kirumba
Lumbishi
Matanda Masisi
Munigi
Mugunga 14/11/96
Mushabwabwe
Ngungu Masisi 19/11/96
Nyakariba Masisi 22/12/96
Nyamitaba Bashali Masisi 21/11/96
Ruhegeri Masisi 12/96
Sake
Shinda January 1997
Tongo 19/01/97

1500
46
250
6500
1500
300
4500
400
38

50

58932

APPENDIX 8: DATA FROM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERALS


INVESTIGATIVE TEAM

The Secretary-Generals team conducted investigations and information gathering in the


DRC between August 1997 April 1998. The data below is taken from the teams report
and plotted on bar charts:S/1998/581, Report of the Secretary-Generals Investigative Team charged with
investigating serious violations of HR in DRC, 29/06/98.
Most data is available about South Kivu, with substantially less about North Kivu. The team
also gathered information about provinces to the west of the Kivus. The tables and charts
below demonstrate that information as to numbers killed became more difficult to acquire as
the refugees fled west across the country, where the AFDL was able to restrict access and
conduct more clean-up operations.

1) South Kivu province

Location and Date

*N.B. The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data.

51

Kashusha camp

Shabunda Feburary 1997

Bwegera 18/10/96

Hombo 2/11/96

Bukavu 30/10/96

Kashusha camp 2/11/96

Chimanga 22/10/96

Mboko-Centre 29/10/96

Inera camp October 1996

Swima 28/10/96

Lusambo 28/10/96

Makobola 28/10/96

Kigongo village 26/10/96

Kilimabenge valley Fizi 26/10/96

Kalimabege Kalundu port

Kabimba village 26/10/96

Mulongwe sugar plantations

SUCKI sugar planations 24/10/96

Biriba 24/10/96

Runingo 24/10/96

Rushima 22/10/96

Kabogoye 23/10/96

Lubarika October 1996

Kamanyola October 1996

Kanganiro Ruzizi river 20/10/96

Kitemesho 20/10/96

Luvuba plantation 20/10/96

Runingo 19/10/96

1000
900
800
700
600
Deaths 500
400
300
200
100
0

Lemera hospital 6/10/96

Secretary-General Team: allegations of massacres at sites in


South Kivu*

58932

Data on South Kivu province extracted from the Secretary-General teams report and
used in chart above
Massacres and date: South Kivu
Runingo 19/10/96
Lemera hospital 6/10/96
Kitemesho 20/10/96
Luvuba plantation 20/10/96
Kanganiro Ruzizi river 20/10/96
Lubarika October 1996
Kamanyola October 1996
Rushima 22/10/96
Kabogoye 23/10/96
Biriba 24/10/96
Runingo 24/10/96
SUCKI sugar planations 24/10/96
Mulongwe sugar plantations 24/10/96
Kalimabege Kalundu port 25/10/96
Kabimba village 26/10/96
Kigongo village 26/10/96
Kilimabenge valley Fizi 26/10/96
Makobola 28/10/96
Swima 28/10/96
Lusambo 28/10/96
Mboko-Centre 29/10/96
Inera camp October 1996
Chimanga 22/10/96
Bukavu 30/10/96
Kashusha camp 2/11/96
Hombo 2/11/96
Bwegera 18/10/96
Kashusha camp
Shabunda Feburary 1997

Deaths
421
541
435
334
850
648
527
136
50
615
887
201
115
12
26
211
27
55
59
687
500
525
30

52

58932

2) North Kivu province

Shanje

Kaguza Masisi 12/12/96

Location and Date

Mugunga camp 15/11/96

Goma 01/11/96

45
40
35
30
Deaths 25
20
15
10
5
0

Kibumba, Katale and Kahindo


camps October 1996

Secretary-General 's Team: allegations of massacres at sites in


North Kivu*

*N.B. The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data

Data on North Kivu province extracted from the Secretary-General teams report and
used in chart above
Massacres and Date: North Kivu
Kibumba, Katale and Kahindo camps October
1996
Goma 01/11/96
Mugunga camp 15/11/96
Kaguza Masisi 12/12/96
Shanje

53

Deaths
30
40

58932

3) Maniema, Orientale, and Equateur provinces

Location and Date


* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data
[1] indicates an estimate that hundreds died.

Mbandaka ONATRA port 13/05/97

Wendji 13/05/97

Biaro camp 22/04/97

Kasese I 22/04/97

Obilo 26/03/97

Kilometer 52 Oapala road


22/03/97

Lubutu

Tingi-Tingi 1/03/97 [1]

Walikale-North Bunyakiri road

3500
3000
2500
2000
Deaths
1500
1000
500
0

Walikale 18/12/96

Secretary-General 's Team: allegations of massacres at sites in


Maniema, Orientale and Equateur*

Data on Maniema province extracted from the Secretary-General teams report and
used in chart above
Massacres and Date: Maniema
Walikale 18/12/96
Walikale-North Bunyakiri road
Tingi-Tingi 1/03/97
Lubutu

Deaths
3200
500
Hundreds
-

Data on Orientale province extracted from the Secretary-General teams


report and used in chart above
Massacres and Date: Orientale
Kilometer 52 Opala road 22/03/97
Obilo 26/03/97
Kasese I 22/04/97
Biaro camp 22/04/97

Deaths
80
500
-

Data on Equateur province extracted from the Secretary-General teams


report and used in chart above
Massacres and Date: Equateur
Wendji 13/05/97
Mbandaka ONATRA port 13/05/97

Deaths
270
54

58932

APPENDIX 9: DATA FROM THE UN MAPPING EXERCISE


The following data are extracted from the 2010 UN Mapping Report and plotted in bar
charts:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Democratic Republic of the
Congo 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise, (August, 2010).
(http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/mapping_report_en.pdf) [Accessed April 2015].
The Mapping Exercise was a much more substantial investigation than the contemporary
reports summarised above in appendices 6-8, with the project lasting 12-months. In
consequence, it greatly adds to the data gathered by its predecessors. However, as with the
other investigations, it can be seen from the charts that less precise information was
obtained for those who were killed in the interior and west of the country, as the AFDL
consolidated its power and carried out more effective cleaning-up operations.
The charts and data tables can be found overleaf.

55

0
Birava camp Kabare territory 11/04/95
Runingu camp 13/10/96
Itara I and II 20/10/96
Kanganiro 20/10/96
Rubenga 20/10/96
Lubarika 21/10/96
Luberizi camp 21/10/96
Kugunga camp 24/10/96
Kiliba sugar mill 25/10/96
Ndunda village 1/11/96
Mwaba 24/11/96
Rushima ravine 22/10/96
Kahororo Kiliba sugar mill 25/10/96
Luberizi village 29/10/96
Bwegera village 3/11/96
Ngendo village 13/11/96
Rukogero 8/12/96
Ruzia 12/12/96
Ruzizi river, Ruzia, 22/12/96
Kamanyola refugee camp 20/19/96
Nyarubale Kalunga hills 21/10/96
Nyangezi & Nyantende 22/10/96
Nyantende/Walungu, Nyantende/Bukavu
Nyangezi 28/10/96
Kashusha/INERA 2/11/96 [1]
Chimanga 22/11/96
Bukavu-Walunga road
Nyabibwe village mid November 1996
Shanje 21/11/96 [1]
Kahuzi-Biega National Park 2/11/96
Bridge Ulindi river Shuabunda 5/11/97
Kigulube village and forest April 1997
Shabunda: Makese I, Makese II and Kabakita January 1997
Mpwe 13/02/97
Kigulube 15/02/97
Katshungu-Shabunda: ivela, Balike, Lulingu, Keisha, 30/02/97 [1]
30km block around Bukavu [2]

58932

1) South Kivu province


UN Mapping Report 2010: estimates of deaths at sites in South Kivu*

1200

1000

800

Deaths 600

400

200

Location and Date

* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data


[1] indicates an estimate that hundreds died
[2] indicates an estimate that thousands died

56

58932

Data on South Kivu province extracted from UN Mapping Report and used in chart
above
Massacre and Date: South Kivu
Birava camp Kabare territory 11/04/95
Runingu camp 13/10/96
Itara I and II 20/10/96
Kanganiro 20/10/96
Rubenga 20/10/96
Lubarika 21/10/96
Luberizi camp 21/10/96
Kugunga camp 24/10/96
Kiliba sugar mill 25/10/96
Ndunda village 1/11/96
Mwaba 24/11/96
Rushima ravine 22/10/96
Kahororo Kiliba sugar mill 25/10/96
Luberizi village 29/10/96
Bwegera village 3/11/96
Ngendo village 13/11/96
Rukogero 8/12/96
Ruzia 12/12/96
Ruzizi river, Ruzia, 22/12/96
Kamanyola refugee camp 20/10/96
Nyarubale Kalunga hills 21/10/96
Nyangezi & Nyantende 22/10/96
Nyantende/Walungu, Nyantende/Bukavu
Nyangezi 28/10/96
Kashusha/INERA 2/11/96
Chimanga 22/11/96
Bukavu-Walunga road
Nyabibwe village mid November 1996
Shanje 21/11/96
Kahuzi-Biega National Park 2/11/96
Bridge Ulindi river Shuabunda 5/11/97
Kigulube village and forest April 1997
Shabunda: Makese I, Makese II and Kabakita
January 1997
Mpwe 13/02/97
Kigulube 15/02/97
Katshungu-Shabunda: Ivela, Balike, Lulingu,
Keisha, 30/02/97
30km block around Bukavu

57

Deaths
40
4
100
370
250
24
550
220
72
100
13
15
150
400
5
Hundreds
650
30
Hundreds
500
1000
125
200
Hundreds
Thousands

0
Kimumba camp 25/10/96
Katale 25/10/96
Kahindo/Katale 31/10/96 [1]
Kibumba 2/11/96 - 30/11/96
Kibumba camp 30/11/96 -
Kahindo camp 1/12/96 - 30/11/96
Katale camp 1/12/96 - 19/01/97
Nyiragongo volacano and Mugunga
Virunga national park 11/96 to
Mwaro 11/04/97 [1]
Mungunga 14/11/96
Sake 15/11/96
Mugunga camp-Sake road 15/11/96
Lac Vert camp, Mugunga 15/11/96
Ngunga village 19/11/96 [1]
Osso farm, Masisi November 1996
Mbseshe-Mbeshe 9/12/96 [1]
Miandja late November 1996
Karunda Bashali-Mokoto 04/97
Humule, near Karuba 22/04/97
Karuba 29/05/97
Ziralo, Bunyakiri, Ngungu 17/11/96
Musenge December 1996 [1]
Hombo bridge 9/12/96 [1]
Chambucha village 9/12/96 [1]
Biriko 17/12/96 [1]
Kifuruka near Biriko 12/96 [1]
Musenge locality 12/96 [1]
Mutiko locality 12/96 [1]
Walikale-Centre 16/12/96
Kariki camp 01/97

58932

2) North Kivu province


UN Mapping Report 2010: estimates of deaths at sites in North Kivu*

2500

2000

Deaths
1500

1000

500

Location and Date

* The absence of entries for some sites indicates mising data


[1] indicates an estimate that hundreds died

58

58932

Data on North Kivu province extracted from UN Mapping Report and used in chart
above

Massacre and Date: North Kivu


Kimumba camp 25/10/96
Katale 25/10/96
Kahindo/Katale 31/10/96
Kibumba 2/11/96 - 30/11/96
Kibumba camp 30/11/96 - 26/01/96
Kahindo camp 1/12/96 - 30/12/96
Katale camp 1/12/96 - 19/01/97
Nyiragongo volacano and Mugunga 11/96
Virunga national park 11/96 to 12/96
Mwaro 11/04/97
Mungunga 14/11/96
Sake 15/11/96
Mugunga camp-Sake road 15/11/96
Lac Vert camp, Mugunga 15/11/96
Ngunga village 19/11/96
Osso farm, Masisi November 1996
Mbseshe-Mbeshe 9/12/96
Miandja late November 1996
Karunda Bashali-Mokoto 04/97
Humule, near Karuba 22/04/97
Karuba 29/05/97
Ziralo, Bunyakiri, Ngungu 17/11/96
Musenge December 1996
Hombo bridge 9/12/96
Chambucha village 9/12/96
Biriko 17/12/96
Kifuruka near Biriko 12/96
Musenge locality 12/96
Mutiko locality 12/96
Walikale-Centre 16/12/96
Kariki camp 01/97

Deaths
Hundreds
2,087
1,919
281
970
Hundreds
166
Hundreds
60
Hundreds
100
53
4
Hundreds
Hundreds
Hundreds
Hundreds
Hundreds
Hundreds
Hundreds
-

59

58932

3) Maniema province
UN Mapping Report 2010: estimates of numbers killed at sites in
Maniema*
250
200
Deaths

150
100

Tingi-Tingi aid forbidden


14/03/97

Pangi, Kasongo

Kindu road Kalima


1/03/97

Lubutu, Lubilingi river


1/03/97

Tingi-Tingi 1/03/97

50

Location and Date


* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data

Data on Maniema province extracted from UN Mapping Report and used in chart
above
Massacre and Date: Maniema
Tingi-Tingi 1/03/97
Lubutu, Lubilingi river 1/03/97
Kindu road Kalima 1/03/97
Pangi, Kasongo
Tingi-Tingi aid forbidden 14/03/97

Deaths
11
200
216

60

58932

4) Orientale province

Kisangani Hospital 11/97

Lula camp 09/97

Alibuku 06/97 onwards

Bengamisa locality 05/97

Yaoleka and Anziroad, Opala,


04/97

Makako in Opala territory


04/97

Yalikaka Kisangani-Opala
road 28/04/97

Ubundu road km 52
22/04/97

Biaro camp 22/04/97

Kasese I and II 22/04/97

Obilo 26/03/97

Kisangani-Lubutu road April


1997

Kisangani prison 15/03/97

Wanie Rukula camps Ubundu


14/03/97

Deaths

500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Njale Ubundu 06/03/97 [1]

UN Mapping Report: estimates of numbers killed at sites in


Orientale*

Location and Date


* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data
[1] indicates an estimate that hundreds died

Data on Orientale province extracted from UN Mapping Report and used in chart
above
Massacre and Date: Orientale
Njale Ubundu 06/03/97
Wanie Rukula camps Ubundu 14/03/97
Kisangani prison 15/03/97
Kisangani-Lubutu road April 1997
Obilo 26/03/97
Kasese I and II 22/04/97
Biaro camp 22/04/97
Ubundu road km 52 22/04/97
Yalikaka Kisangani-Opala road 28/04/97
Makako in Opala territory 04/97
Yaoleka and Anziroad, Opala, 04/97
Bengamisa locality 05/97
Alibuku 06/97 onwards
Lula camp 09/97
Kisangani Hospital 11/97

Deaths
Hundreds
470
30
11
80
200
100
300
61
33

61

58932

5) Equateur province
UN Mapping Report 2010: estimates of numbers killed at sites in
Equateur*
250
200

Deaths

150
100

ONATRA port 13/05/97

Mbandaka 13/05/97

Bolenge 13/05/97

Wendji 13/05/97

Lomposo and Kalamba


12/05/97

Djoa and Ruki river


07/05/97

Wele 08/05/97

Bekondi/Buya
07/05/97

Djoa 07/05/97

Lofonda junction
9/05/97

Lolengi near Boende


04/97

Lifomi near Boende


24/04/97

Boende 22/04/97

50

Location and Date


* The absence of entries for some sites indicates missing data.

Data on Equateur province extracted from UN Mapping Report and used in chart
above
Massacre and Date: Equateur
Boende 22/04/97
Lifomi near Boende 24/04/97
Lolengi near Boende 04/97
Lofonda junction 9/05/97
Djoa 07/05/97
Bekondi/Buya 07/05/97
Wele 08/05/97
Djoa and Ruki river 07/05/97
Lomposo and Kalamba 12/05/97
Wendji 13/05/97
Bolenge 13/05/97
Mbandaka 13/05/97
ONATRA port 13/05/97

Deaths
20
10
9
9
140
18
200

62

58932

APPENDIX 10: MASSACRES RECORDED IN MORE THAN ONE REPORT

Comparing the information in the four reports by UN teams, only 29 massacres feature in
more than one report. The table below demonstrates that the overall picture is still far from
clear. Although some reports of sites are backed up by more than one report, estimates of
the numbers killed vary, and many sites still remain without an estimate. Only in Chimanga
are figures consistent between all reports.
Massacre and
Date.
[If known].

Amnesty
International
Reports.
(AFR 62/29/96,
AFR 02/15/96,
AFR 02/29/96,
AFR 62/33/97).

Chimanga,
22/11/96.
Kanganiro,
20/10/96.
Lubarika, 21/10/96.
Rushima, 22/10/96.
Bwegera,
November/October
1996.
Kamanyola,
20/10/96.
Kashusha camp,
2/11/96.
Shanje, 21/11/96.
Shabunda.
Bukavu.
Kimumba,
25/10/96.
Katale camp,
December 1996
January 1997.
Kahindo
1/12/96 - 30/12/96
Kibumba,

(November 1996)

(December 1996/
January 1997).

500

Garretn
Report
1997.

SecretaryGeneral
Team
(E/CN.4/1997 Report.

2010 UN
Mapping Report.

/6/Add.2).

(S/1998/581).

500

500

500

334

Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
550
Yes, number
unknown.

850
527
Yes, number
unknown.
648
Yes, number
unknown.
40
February
1997, 30.

Yes, number
unknown.
Hundreds
Hundreds
January 1997,
1000.

FebruaryMarch 1997
'thousands'
Thousands
1515

Yes,
number
unknown.
2000

Yes, number
unknown.

143

Yes, number
unknown.

Yes, number
unknown.

200

Yes, number
unknown.

281

100
1500

Yes, number
unknown.

2087
1919

63

525

Thousands'
Yes, number
unknown.
970

58932

Mugunga,
15/11/96.
Walikale, 1618/12/96.
Tingi-Tingi,
01/03/96.
Obilo, 26/03/97.
Kasese I and II,
22/04/97.
Biaro camp,
22/04/97.
Boende, 22/04/97.
Wendji, 13/05/97.
Mbandaka,
13/05/97.
Mbandaka port,
13/05/97.
Goma, 01/11/97.

6500

Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
2000
800

300

Sake.
Kashusha, 2/11/96.
Lamera hospital,
6/10/96.
Kiliba, October
1996.
Mpwe.

Yes,
number
unknown.
Yes,
number
unknown.
Yes,
number
unknown.

Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
80
200

Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
Yes, number
unknown.
80
200

100

100

Yes, number
unknown.
140
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unknown.
200

Yes, number
unknown.
140
Yes, number
unknown.
200

Yes, number
unknown.

Yes, number
unknown.

Yes, number
unknown.

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unknown.

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unknown.
125

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unknown.
125

300
60
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unknown.

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