University of Glasgow

The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community
Author(s): Mike Bowker
Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 7 (Nov., 1998), pp. 1245-1261
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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124 on Fri. As Moscow tilted towards the Serbs. 1245-1261 The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community MIKE BOWKER As YUGOSLAVIA COLLAPSED INTOWARin 1991-92 Moscow had its problems closer to home and paid relatively little attentionto events in the Balkans.33. Moscow was quick to distance itself from its Balkan ally when its lack of influence over the Serbs was publicly exposed to the embarrassmentof the Russian leadership. which were more willing to defy the internationalconsensus on Yugoslavia. Russia rarely stood alone. Moscow was preparedto play a largely passive role in supportof Western diplomatic efforts. it was Germanyand America.16. Russian opposition to any form of externalmilitaryinterventionwas felt to have delayed the end of the war and made a just settlementmore difficult to achieve. symbolised by the success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his so-called Liberal Democratic Party in the December elections of that year. Vol. saw Bosnia as an opportunityto reassert itself on the internationalstage as a great power whilst at the same time re-emphasisingits nationalistcredentialsto an often doubting domestic audience. but from 1993 Moscow showed a greater willingness to adopt a more independent pro-Serb line-a development not universally welcomed in the West.Belgrade saw Moscow as a useful ally because of its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its consequent power of veto over UN resolutions but. for its part. particularlyas it coincided with the emergence of a virulentstrandof nationalismin Russian political life. Nevertheless. the Serbs were quite preparedto ignore Russian diplomatic initiatives even at the expense of Russia's internationalprestige. 1998. for betteror worse. the above view is simplistic for two main reasons. First. whilst Washington played a role in underminingthe Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in 1993 and then the following year refused to monitor the arms embargo on the republics of the former Yugoslavia. No. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . As its voting recordin the UN shows. 7.1Although Moscow often used vituperative language and occasionally acted in an obstructionistway. Second. In contrast.2In fact. critics argued that Russian policy was encouraging Serb aggression and helping to protect their subsequentterritorialgains. Moscow's influence over the Serbs was often exaggerated-not least by the Russians themselves. Bonn swept aside EC policy and unilaterally recognised Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991. Initially. when it suited them.EUROPE-ASIASTUDIES. Moscow. Although there was a lot of rhetoric about the historical and cultural links between the two Slavonic nations. Moscow remained 0966-8136/98/071245-17 ? 1998 University of Glasgow This content downloaded from 155. Russian policy-even after its pro-Serbtilt-remained within what might be called the parametersof the internationalconsensus. in practice opportunismdominated their relationship. 50.

Many strategists feared that intervention would do more harmthan good. independentYugoslavia was 'an importantelement of stability in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole'. to forcibly increase the power of Serbia at the expense of the other republics and ethnic groups. Russian concerns. the move was condemned by the leading members of the internationalcommunity. The main criticism of Moscow's Yugoslav policy related to its opposition to the use of externalmilitaryforce in the region. The descent into war The fragmentationof Yugoslavia was the result of a combination of factors. refused to deploy US ground troops in Bosnia until after a cease-fire had been signed.not least because they signified a change of political will in Westerncapitals. that Russia's policies (or those of Britain and France) were beyond criticism. under the leadership of Milosevic. declaring their formal independence. However. These included the formation of the Muslim-CroatFederation in Bosnia in 1994. refute the suggestion that Moscow was acting unilaterallyand in defiance of Western interests. It does. and it was noticeable that even President Clinton. These included long-standingethnic rivalries.1246 MIKE BOWKER closely allied to Britainand Francethroughoutmost of the crisis.the NATO air strikeswere important. a Serb bid. however.33. most notably.Washingtonplayed a crucial role in the creation of the Muslim-Croat federation and in giving support to the Muslim and Croat military.WithoutBelgrade's willingness to make concessions at Dayton. The Soviet Foreign Ministry summed up the views of the majority when it stated that a single. who was a leading advocate of a more activist policy. the emergence of a much stronger Croatian army from 1994. but there is a dangerof placing undue emphasis on this aspect of policy. from warmongerto peacemaker. including Moscow. were mirrored in all the capitals of Europe and America. Nevertheless. The process of disintegrationculminatedin a joint statementon 25 June 1991 by the two wealthiest Yugoslav republics. and a policy shift in Belgrade over time which favoureda cease-fire and a negotiated settlement.4Any such action also endangeredthe lives of the UN peacekeepers already in Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly.widening income differentialsbetween the six republics. but Moscow deserves at least some credit for its diplomacy in Belgrade which encouraged the transformationof the Serb leader. Slobodan Milosevic. The air strikes were effective only because other factors. Moscow's implacable opposition to the use of even minimal force against the Serbs seemed largely discredited when the NATO air strikes of late summer 1995 were swiftly followed by the Bosnian cease-fire and the Dayton peace agreement in November.3Far from it. both political and military. power struggles between the ethnic elites and. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .124 on Fri. Militaryinterventionrisked escalation and the spread of the war to the rest of the Balkans whilst offering few hopes for a successful and speedy conclusion to the conflict.however. Tensions were rising against a background of economic decline at home and communist collapse in the rest of EasternEurope. of course. were already in place.16. This does not mean. Croatiaand Slovenia. This will be shown below. no peace settlement in Bosnia would have been possible.5 Moscow's position was scarcely surprisingsince Gorbachev was involved at that This content downloaded from 155.

after which the communist hard-liners were removed from office and influence.YUGOSLAVIA. the USSR. Milosevic lost an importantbase of external support. The dispute over Krajinaled to fighting from autumn 1990. but the defeat of his allies in Moscow seemed to have little immediate effect on the Serb war effort. Dmitrii Yazov. At the Moscow summit in July.7Gorbachev's hard-lineopponents in the Kremlin. the issue of recognitionbecame a source of tension This content downloaded from 155. The war in Slovenia lasted just 10 days. The EC (without any participationfrom Moscow) brokered a cease-fire at Brioni on 7 July 1991. dominated by Serbs. Gorbachev argued for integration. carved out of the existing republics of Croatia and Bosnia where the majority of the Serb diaspora lived. As the war in Croatiaescalated.124 on Fri.33. moved against Ljubljanaafter its declarationof independencein June 1991. with encouragementfrom Belgrade. As a result.much weakened after the August coup. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1247 very time in a protractedstruggle to maintain the integrity of his homeland. Despite his commitment to democratisation. Serbia's withdrawalfrom Slovenia symbolised the end of Yugoslavia as a state. Although the West seemed slow to recognise the implications of the agreement.however. which was very much in line with his own thinking regarding the resolution of internationalconflicts.Gorbachevremained suspicious of national self-determination.9However. A secret $2 billion arms deal was negotiated by the Soviet Defence Minister. Gorbachev was disappointed as the agreement. Gorbachev. After the election in Croatiaof the nationalist. was not honouredby either side. he was not alone. Thus Milosevic's initial goal of creatinga strong Yugoslavia dominatedfrom Belgrade was abandonedfor a new cause-a GreaterSerbia. found that his influence over his fellow Slavs in Serbia and Bosnia was strictly limited.the CroatianSerbs.8 It only failed to go throughbecause of the abortive coup in Moscow later that month. Gorbachev supportedthe UN resolution. This became a familiar experience for all future Russian politicians and diplomats. on 10-11 August 1991. Bush and Gorbachev issued a joint statementcondemning the violence and demandingrespect for human rights.16. and declared independencethe following spring.FranjoTudjman. The fighting continued as a series of cease-fire agreements was negotiated in the conference hall but ignored on the battlefield. War flared first in Slovenia when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).In the hope of containing the conflict.he gravely underestimatedthe power of nationalism. as he later acknowledged. the UN decided to impose an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia in September 1991. Gorbachev's analysis might well prove correct in the long term but.ratherthan disintegration. The following month Gorbachev also indulged in some personal diplomacy of his own when he met Milosevic and Tudjman in Moscow and hammered out yet another cease-fire agreement. like others negotiated by the EC. and favouredthe EU as a model for the futureratherthan the micro-statesadvocated by some of his nationalistopponents. escalating into all-out war after Croatia's formal declarationof independence in June 1991. Moscow soon discovered that it had lost the influence and power of the Cold War days. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .believing nationalism to be a genuinely reactionary force in world politics. backed the Serbs. Internationaldiplomacy in Yugoslavia failed both to maintainthe federationand to preventthe ensuing conflict. set up the autonomousrepublicof Krajina(which comprised West Slavonia.6In the case of the Balkans. East Slavonia and Krajina itself) in August 1990.

10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .The Germansfavouredrecognitionon both moral and pragmaticgrounds. proved unstable. Bonn. It also upset the Westernpowers. Yet it was the rest of the EC ratherthan Bonn which compromised and agreed to recognise the two breakawayrepublics on 15 January1992.The Russian deployment was limited. was having the unintendedeffect of legitimising military action by the Serbs against the breakaway republics. This decision representedthe high point of Moscow's pro-Westernforeign policy.One importantreason for the EC's earlierreluctance to recognise the breakaway states in Yugoslavia was to avoid embarrassingGorbachev as he struggled to keep the USSR together.was once again flexing its muscles and preparingto extend its influence into the Balkans. Such worries were rendered superfluous.1248 MIKE BOWKER within the internationalcommunity. Bonn argued that the EC should not oppose the democratic will of the peoples of Croatia and Slovenia for independence. a readiness on the part of the internationalcommunity to defend the sovereignty of the newly independentstates.13 Thus.which had historicallinks with the Croats. but it would appear that alliance managementtook priority over a consistent policy towards Yugoslavia. It evoked fears in Serbia that a newly reunifiedGermany. For the Germandeclarationcame at a time when Bonn was lecturing the rest of the EC at Maastrichton the need for unity and a common foreign and defence policy.10 The EC set up the Badinter commission to look into the issue. but Moscow. Agreementwas reached only after This content downloaded from 155. however. however. At first. The truce in Croatia.This was an insensitive move at in the Soviet Union also had an impact. the new Russian leader.however. Bonn's argumentthat internationalrecognitionwould facilitate a settlement in Croatia appearedvindicated when a cease-fire agreement was signed in January 1992. Internationallaw is a muddle on the issue.16. accepted a UN peacekeeping role and deployed 1000 soldiers in the Serb-occupiedKrajinaregion of Croatia. erroneously. but it provided a useful opportunityfor El'tsin to emphasise Moscow's break with the past and its willingness to play a more positive role in the future of Europeansecurity. Undoubtedly. one of El'tsin's first foreign policy decisions was to follow the EC's lead and recognise both Slovenia and Croatia in February 1992-some two months before Washington. A UN ProtectionForce (UNPROFOR)was set up and 14 000 troops were sent to Croatiain June to monitor the agreement. The commission reportedback in December 1991 and advocated recognition of Slovenia but not of Croatia. Boris El'tsin. It accords no absolute right to minorities to secede.which was neitherin full control of its territorynor in a position to guarantee civil rights to its ethnic minorities.No US or Germanground troops were deployed. declared his support for the concept of national self-determination12 and saw no reason to back the Serbs since Milosevic had backed his opponents at the time of the Moscow coup in August 1991. Other states-most notably Britain and France-argued that recognition would encourage the complete disintegrationof Yugoslavia and imply. but it also argues that central authorities have no right to use force to maintain the integrity of the state.Europeansupportfor a single Yugoslav state. it would be unfair to say that was the only reason.33.124 on Fri. refused to accept the Badinter recommendationsand declareditself ready to unilaterallyrecognise both Slovenia and Croatia. for the first time in its history. when the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991." Nevertheless. it was said. The exact reason for the EC's U-turn is still unclear.

his optimism proved badly misplaced. had a reputationfor ethnic tolerance. Most of the weaponry from the JNA headquarterslocated in Bosnia fell into the hands of the Serbs. would help deter Serb aggression. The Serbs were now in occupationof about 70% of Bosnia and the Croatswere in the process of abandoning their uneasy alliance with the Muslims to launch their own land-grabin Bosnia. It seemed impossible to envisage the imposition of a military solution when such a large proportionof the population refused to accept the legitimacy of the Bosnian state.It seemed the majority of Serbs was not preparedto live in a state led by a Muslim. the Muslims were soon reducedto barely 10% of Bosnian territory.33.124 on Fri.'6But what to do? Peace enforcement was no longer an option and peacekeeping was practically impossible-there was no peace to keep. Izetbegovic hoped that independencewould not lead to war since Bosnia. The Bosnian government seemed unable to do anything to resist the onslaught.At this point the diplomatic options were greatly reduced. Bosnia rapidly descended into violence and the most brutalconflict seen in Europe since 1945. It appeared that Bosnia could only survive as an independent sovereign state with external military support. Yet the international community simply wrung its hands in despair. Izetbegovic also hoped that internationalrecognition. Sadly.16. From the spring of 1992 the Serbs launchedtheir war againstthe non-SerbBosnian population. As the war became a complex three-waybattle. No state or institutionwas willing to offer the estimated 40 000 troops requiredto repel the Serb offensive. Milosevic and Tudjmanmade well-publicised plans to partitionthe republic between themselves. the UN presence and the arms embargo notwithstanding. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1249 the Serbs were in occupationof as much as a thirdof the Croatianrepublic.he was able to slowly rebuild the Croatianarmy to that end.This was quite unacceptableto Zagreb and to many in the West who argued that the practical effect of UNPROFOR was the protection and consolidation of Serb war gains. and so they set up a parallel government at Pale with Radovan Karadzicas leader. and particularlyits capital Sarajevo. who made up a third of the Bosnian population. Both Zagreb and Belgrade perceived Bosnia not as a bona fide nation-state but as little more than an administrativearea of Yugoslavia created by Tito for his own political purposes. Thus. The only possible opportunityto defend Bosnian sovereignty in the spring of 1992 had been missed.Alija Izetbegovic. the Bosnian leader. boycotted the referendum. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .'4 In the circumstances.15 By the end of the year the situation had worsened. So.YUGOSLAVIA. The war in Bosnia The cease-fire in Croatia left the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina in a difficult position. Yet the brutality of the Serb offensive against the civilian populationof Bosnia created pressureon the outside world to 'do something'. This view was supported by an overwhelmingmajorityof Muslims and Croatsin a referendumwhich was held in March 1992. before the outbreakof war in Bosnia. Tudjman remained committed to regaining Krajina and. which followed the referendumresult. as a twin-trackedcompro- This content downloaded from 155. but the Serbs. viewed independenceas the only credible alternativeto the partitionof his country.

like every sovereign state. worst of all. who had been highly critical of George Bush's policy towards Bosnia during his election campaign. ratifiedethnic cleansing and. which later came in for criticism. However.17 Thus Moscow supportedeconomic sanctions against Serbia in May 1992. This ran directly counter to the diplomaticefforts of the rest of the internationalcommunity. the first peace proposal for Bosnia.16. This content downloaded from 155. Moscow accepted that the Serbs bore the heaviest responsibilityfor the war and backed Western initiatives at the UN to exert pressureon Belgrade and Pale. 'Lift and strike' did not go as far as peace enforcement.21 Clinton's initiative was greeted unenthusiastically by his European allies. which was enthusiastically received in Moscow. the internationalcommunityoffered humanitarianaid to help mitigate the worst excesses of war. In the first phase of the war (up to Christmas 1992) Moscow fully supportedWestern initiatives.Bill Clinton.124 on Fri. With memories of World War I still vivid.After the collapse of the VOPP.33. The implicit aim of 'lift and strike' was the escalation of the war. the new AmericanPresident. especially from the USA. the UN arms embargo did not apply to Bosnia since it had been imposed in September 1991. There was a fear that any escalation could lead to the conflict spreadingto other states in the Balkans. then the USA declared the moral duty to give the Muslims the means to do so themselves.19The VOPP aimed to maintainBosnia as a sovereign state within its current boundaries. approved the extension of UNPROFOR to Bosnia in September to deliver humanitarianaid. but it did involve an end to UN neutrality.The unwillingness of the USA to back the VOPP and offer American ground troops was generally perceived to have led to its failure. France and Russia favoured the speediest possible termination of hostilities in Bosnia-almost at any price. but proposed that it should be divided into 10 cantons roughly along ethnic lines. If the internationalcommunitywas not preparedto defend Bosnia. before Bosnia had been internationallyrecognised as an independent sovereign state. this was the nightmare scenario.18Moscow even agreed to a role for NATO in policing the No-Fly Zone as long as any military action was approved by the UN-the so-called 'dual key' strategy. with the Serbs requiredto give up approximately30% of their territorial war gains. and its good offices to help mediate a negotiated settlement. In January 1993 the EU and the UN formally unveiled the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. had the absolute right in internationallaw to self-defence. opposed the plan. but the new harmonybetween the great powers in the post-Cold War world gave reason to hope that a negotiated settlementin Bosnia might be possible. First. Whilst Washingtonwas encouragingthe Muslims to fight on to get a better deal.20Clinton's alternativeproposal was the so-called 'lift and strike' strategywhich called for an end to the arms embargo on the Bosnian governmentand supportfor the Muslim war effort against the Serbs throughthe use of NATO air strikes. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Washingtonsaid that the VOPP appeasedthe Serbs. thereby destabilising the whole of the region. the rest of the internationalcommunity felt that the Muslims had alreadylost the war and should sue for peace on the best terms possible. and backed a No-Fly Zone for all military aircraft over Bosnia in October. for causing paralysis in the decision-making process. offered no long-termsolution to the conflict since the plan was unjust and wholly unacceptableto the Muslim population. It was an unsatisfactorycompromisein many ways. Britain. Bosnia. Second. As a result.1250 MIKE BOWKER mise.The USA argued for this shift in policy on two grounds.

23 This did not mean. he had little alternative but to go along with the international consensus and accept the policy of containment. the declaration was based on bluff since little effort was made by the UN to demilitarisethese areas. The internationalstrategy of singling out Belgrade for economic sanctions was left without any obvious rationale. However. Clinton continued to press for a more activist stance in Bosnia but.If Belgrade. Clinton argued again for decisive action against the Serbs. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1251 containmentof the war almost became an end in itself. El'tsin's critics were vilified by many in the West as extreme nationalistsand slavophiles. only China supportedMoscow. In contrast. the growing divisions in the West. It was also true that many statements were made simply to embarrassthe Russian Presidentas part of the ongoing power struggle in Moscow.At a minimum. would have to give way to Realpolitik. Zepa. Moscow was heavily criticised at the time for failing to keep in step with the West.As a result. and threatenedair strikesto remove the heavy weaponry around Sarajevo. As part of this new containment strategy. the end of the Muslim-Croatalliance demanded a review of policy. that all nationalistopposition to El'tsin's Balkan policy was without merit. as well as the failure of Western policy to end the war. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . who were suspected of firingthe bomb. but it did demolish the common perception of Serbia as the sole villain of the piece.124 on Fri. Therefore.Although El'tsin ignored such demands and refused to act unilaterally outside the international consensus. and then extended in May to Sarajevo. Division over the fundamentalsof policy led to tension within the Atlantic alliance. In 1993 the nature of the war in Bosnia changed fundamentally when the Croats abandoned their alliance with the Muslims and began their own land-grab. Gorazde.22 Hopes for peace were low in the autumnand winter of 1993. the Serbs continuedto besiege the safe areas whilst the Muslims continued to use them as military bases to launch attacks against their enemies.16. why not Zagreb?Both states were supportingtheir compatriotsin the war effort across the borderin Bosnia. however. When Russia rejected the US proposal for air strikes at the UN Security Council.24 Russia began to tilt towards Belgrade. encouragedand legitimised Moscow's more independentrole in the Yugoslav crisis. Bihac and Tuzla. the UN approved a 'safe areas' policy-first in Srebrenica in April 1993. Parliamentwas critical of El'tsin's perceived servility towards the West at the expense of Serbia-Moscow's traditional ally. The ostensible aim was to defend the civilian population in these six designated areas from Serb attack. TV cameras were there to capture the event and the horror galvanised much of Western public opinion. as so often in the Balkans. the US position towards the Serbs toughened after a bomb killed 68 civilians and wounded 200 in the Sarajevo marketon 5 February1994.33.YUGOSLAVIA. The Croatbetrayaldid not exculpate the Serbs as some Russian parliamentarians claimed. owing to his unwillingness to back up his rhetoric with US ground troops.25but the proposal representeda dramaticand sudden shift in Westernpolicy. Air strikeshad been rejected back in the This content downloaded from 155. It was also a difficult year in Moscow. Justice. and it was quite true that many statements made in the Russian parliamentwere ill-considered and blindly pro-Serb. and only 7500 extra UN troops were deployed instead of the estimated 35 000 required. If a settlement involved the effective surrenderof the Muslims-so be it.the Russian parliament'sdemand for an end to the economic embargo on Belgrade was not without some justification.

10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Western critics argued that the Russian troops were providing protection for the Serbs around Sarajevo and encouraging furtheratrocities against the Muslims in other areas. so Moscow came out in reluctant supportof the NATO action. could mean 'eternal war' in the Balkans. NATO justified the air strike under UN resolution 824 which authorisedclose air supportfor UN troops under siege. viewed the Russian initiative with alarm.1252 MIKE BOWKER spring of 1993 and the reasons for that rejection seemed just as valid a year later. just a few days after the settlement in Sarajevo. it was only one among a series of atrocitieswhich had resultedin almost 10 000 deaths since the start of the siege in 1992. Vitalii Churkin. it announced. First.Clearly.31This was clearly hyperbole largely directed at his increasingly vocal domestic critics. but Moscow was not alone in believing NATO action had broaderimplications.especially in the USA. he warned. Yet the violation was blatant and undisputed. when NATO planes attacked Serb positions on the ground aroundthe safe-area of Gorazde in April. but as many commentatorspointed out at the time. How could the UN claim neutralityfor its troops on the ground whilst bombing Serb positions from the sky?26NATO air strikes would clearly endanger the lives of the lightly-armedUN peacekeepers. the air strikes were light and had This content downloaded from 155.was trustedby the Bosnian Serbs and able to do a deal. It seemed the shift in Westernpolicy was due to the presence of CNN rather than to any change on the ground. Although the guns fell temporarily silent.28Whilst most Western governmentswere relieved that the risks of NATO air strikes had been averted. As the Bosnian Serbs refused to comply with NATO's demands to withdrawtheir heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo.30 El'tsin expressed outrage at NATO's actions which. Russia was deeply suspicious of the motives behind the air strikes since there had been any number of violations in the past without any Western response.NATO interceptedSerb jets over the No-Fly Zone on 28 February.27 From Moscow's perspective the Sarajevo bomb changed nothing. However.124 on Fri. it does appearthat El'tsin was genuinely dismayed by the West's lack of consultation with Moscow on matters which could cause him embarrassmentat home.whilst offering little hope of materiallychanging the balance of power on the battlefield. This was a momentous decision for NATO since it representedits first military action since its creation in 1949. for two main reasons.29 In what looked like an attemptto show that the USA was not intimidatedby the Russian diplomatic intervention. For the Russian political class was fairly well united that the air strike was furtherevidence of America's determination to throw its weight about in areas of strategic interest to Moscow.32However.33. The Russian army newspaper. The deal was greeted in the Russian media as a triumph for Moscow. said the settlementshowed that Russia was still a great power. Russia's special envoy. Krasnayazvezda. the furore soon died down. this caused greater ructions in Moscow. Churkin got the Serbs to agree to NATO's demands in returnfor the deployment of 400 Russian troops to prevent the Muslims from moving into the positions vacated by the Serbs. conducted some bilateral diplomacy with Pale. At the same time.16. the removal of the heavy weapons did not end the siege of the city. Only Russia.An Americannewspaperwrote that the UN resolution was little more than a fig-leaf as the USA sought to up the stakes and take a more partisanposition in the Bosnian conflict. many commentators. the attackon the Sarajevo marketwas a tragic event.

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev went so far as to describe Milosevic as 'the leader of the peace party'. unlike Serbia. and second. but without response from Moscow.34 America's more active and partisan diplomacy continued in March 1994 when Washingtonsponsored both a cease-fire between the Muslims and the Croats and the creation of a Muslim-CroatFederationon Bosnian territory.Karadziccalled for 'total war'. the ContactGroupwas formed with just five members-the USA. This proved to be a turningpoint in the course of the war. When the ContactGroupplan.16. who had been interested in a peace settlement since the time of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1993. Moscow used the Milosevic-Karadzic split to freeze relations with the Bosnian Serbs. Churkin expressed outrage when his later diplomatic efforts over Gorazde were ignored. Milosevic cut economic ties with his compatriotsacross the Drina River in August 1994.36 The Muslim-Croatcease-fire soon began to shift the balance of power on the battlefieldfor the first time away from the Serbs.38In these new circumstances. was not constrainedby an economic embargo. the Contact Group put forward a new peace proposal which gave 51% of Bosnia to the new Muslim-CroatFederationand 49% to the Bosnian Serbs. and pressed for the lifting of economic sanctions on Belgrade once a cease-fire had been agreed. the UN effort appearedto be collapsing when 300 of its troops (including 13 Russians) were taken hostage by the Serbs in May after furtherNATO air strikes. Pavel Felgengauer. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .124 on Fri.YUGOSLAVIA. Washington also encouraged Tudjman's compliance by turning a blind eye to the delivery of military equipment to Zagreb in violation of the UN arms embargo and by allowing ex-US army officers to train the Croatianmilitary. the UN and the EU were effectively sidelined. came out firmly in favour of the proposal.37At the same time. the Serbs embarrassedthe Russians by defying their initiatives to defuse the crisis and end the bombardmentof Gorazde. was rejected by Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs. Moscow's objections to a second round of air strikes against Serb positions around Gorazde were lifted. estimated that Croatia. The following month. if not defeat.Moscow respondedwith restraintafter NATO air strikes hit Bosnian Serb targetsin early August in the region of Sarajevo. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1253 minimal effect on the Serb war effort. The Serb action was predictable. As a consequence. which. the Serb military effort. The subsequent climb down by Karadzic when faced with the prospectof NATO air strikes led some to suggest that air strikes should have been used earlier to weaken.39 However. Britain. As a result. Milosevic. Moscow moved closer to Milosevic in the hope that he could mediate a settlement.35A leading Russian defence correspondent. spent $1 billion annually on arms after its defeat by the Serbs in 1991-92.Tudjmanagreed to the proposal after the USA offered economic aid to rebuild the Croatian economy. Russia. France and Germany-in an attempt to streamline the decision-making process. gravely weakened the Russian claim to have effective leverage over the Bosnian Serbs. The independentRussian newspaper Izvestiya wrote: 'One gets the impressionthat the Bosnian Serb leaders have utterlydiscredited themselves in the eyes of Russian foreign policy makers. which was rathervague on details. In April.33His failure. and that henceforth the Kremlin intends to deal only with Slobodan Milosevic'.but it remained a humiliation for the international This content downloaded from 155. barely two months after the triumph at Sarajevo.33.

over a period of one to two years. on US insistence. For the Serbs in Croatia. who are in effect threatenedwith genocide'.. Second. Fourth. However.parliamentsand military.41This seemed all the more likely later at Dayton when Milosevic also agreed to hand over East Slavonia. Meanwhile. war criminals would be excluded from public office in Bosnia.43First. Thus. The Russian governmentcondemnedthe air strikes which. The UN was not only unable to protect the Muslim civilian population. Kozyrev backed the initiative and declared that Moscow would not seek to obstructit. British and Dutch soldiers) and the redeploymentof existing troops to less vulnerable regions outside Serb occupied areas..Instead. followed by the Dayton peace agreement on 22 November 1995. Croatia had used the four-monthcease-fire over the winter of 1994-95 to rebuild and retrainits military. was elbowed aside and the tough talking Richard Holbrooke was delegated by Clinton to get a peace settlement.33.1254 MIKE BOWKER community. but the Russian demand was ignored until 14 Septemberwhen the Serbs withdrew their heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo and finally lifted the siege of the Bosnian capital. The immediateeffect of relocatingUN forces was the fall to the Serbs of two more safe areas-Srebrenica in July and Zepa in August. Sarajevo would be the indivisible capital of the Bosnian Muslim-CroatFederation. Bosnia would contain two mini-states.16. the USA had decided to back up its more forceful negotiating strategy with militarypower. '.Third. the Muslim-CroatFederation and the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srspka) with both of these mini-stateshaving their own presidents. the Croats were finally in a position to challenge Serb supremacyon the battlefield. The complete withdrawalof UN troops seemed the only option unless there was a radical change in policy. Russia found itself sidelined once again. in May 1995 Croatianforces took back West Slavonia and swept through Krajinathe following August. it was unable to protect its own soldiers too.124 on Fri.42Moscow called for an immediate end to the NATO air strikes. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . At the same time. Fifth. The ease with which the Croats expelled the Serbs suggested to some cynics in Serbia that a deal of some sort might have been done with Zagreb. From 30 August 1995 NATO's operation'DeliberateForce' was launched with a two-week campaign of air raids and artillerystrikes against Bosnian Serb positions. the Croat advance representednothing less than a humiliating defeat as thousands were forced to abandontheir homes and seek refuge in Serbia. It contained five key elements. including the lifting of economic sanctions on Belgrade. and a settlementsoon followed. Bosnia was recognised as a sovereign state within its present borders. the USA resolved to take furtherunilateralaction in Bosnia. At a crisis meeting in London in July 1995 total withdrawal of UNPROFOR was rejected as politically unacceptable. As a result. calls into question the survival of the currentgeneration of Bosnian Serbs. it was said. NATO would police the agreement with support from other states-approximately 55 000 This content downloaded from 155. the Muslim-CroatFederation had taken advantageof the NATO bombing raids to push the Serbs back to roughly the 49% of territorystipulatedby the Contact Group plan. Milosevic was delegated. which was divided over many issues.40At the same time. the Contact Group. the only remaining Serb possession on Croatian territory. A cease-fire was signed on 5 October(with no Russians present). Thus. it was decided to provide better protection for the UN troops through the introduction of a rapid reaction force (including French. however. to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.

A compromisewas reached. Many Serb nationalists were dismayed by the loss of Krajinato the Croats and Sarajevo to the Muslim-CroatFederation. After four years of dominance on the battlefield.45The main advantage for the Russians in this arrangementlay in the fact that it gave Moscow greaterinput into policy making than otherwise would have been the case.47 but Moscow's participationin IFOR and SFOR has improved Moscow's reputationamongst Western leaders and is frequently cited as a model of co-operation for the future. this special relationship was rather simpler in practice than it sounded on paper. althoughthe difference was more formal than real. fortunes began to change for the Serbs in the period 1994-95. which placed the Russian contingent directly under the command of a Russian officer (at that time. the position of the Serbs in Bosnia had become militarily vulnerable after the loss of This content downloaded from 155. The Muslims lost most of all.driven out the Serbs. There were difficulties in finding an arrangementwhich would allow Russia to participatewithout its troops being formally under NATO command. The future of Bosnia as a sovereign state remains in doubt.however. They had won back Croatia. Despite differences over policy during the war. and Moscow has already indicated a willingness to serve on that basis beyond the current deadline of June 1998.Serbia was linked to the Bosnian Serb Republic. shifted the balance of power away from the Serbs. not a NATO commander in the field. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The first argues that the Serbs had little choice but to sue for peace.the Serbs had also become war-wearyby this time-they were militarily overstretched and economically close to bankruptcy. The return of war to Bosnia looks a possibility with Muslims still fearing the effective partitionof the country along the lines discussed by Tudjman and Milosevic before the war. but this seemed well short of Belgrade's war aims when the conflict started all those years ago. including 20 000 Americans and 1400 Russians. whilst in theatre the Russian troops were under the tactical control of a US-led multi-nationaldivision.16.non-partisanpeacekeepers. Colonel General Shevtsov) at SACEUR.33. most notably when an indicted war criminal was shot by British troops in July 1997.YUGOSLAVIA.44Moscow always emphasised that its troops were serving under an American. There have been differences of opinion over policy. The numbers were reduced to 35 000 when IFOR was replaced by SFOR (StabilisationForce) in December 1996. The formation of the Muslim-CroatFederation in 1994. The presence of SFOR appears to be the main barrierto the unravelling of Dayton. The other ethnic groups were less happy.49Importantly. and become legally confederatedto half of Bosnia in the Dayton agreement. Moscow was eager to participate in implementingthe peace.124 on Fri. followed by the rearmingand retrainingof the Croat army. In addition. Stability relies on a complex arrangementconsisting of one country. According to NATO sources. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1255 troops were deployed under IFOR (ImplementationForce). Their participationin IFOR and SFOR also showed that the Russian troops were capable of working alongside Westerntroops as independent. two independent states and three governments. Why did the Serbs agree to Dayton? There are two general explanationswhy the Serbs made concessions at Dayton.46The special relationship was extended for SFOR.48 The Croats emerged as the main victors from the Yugoslav wars.

Silber has written.51In the summer of 1994 Milosevic changed policy again and finally abandoned the concept of a Greater Serbia and put considerable political pressure on his compatriots across the Drina to sue for peace.50In the circumstances. LauraSilber. Milosevic. however. With the evidence currentlyavailable. Milosevic gave up Sarajevo to the Muslim-Croat Federation because this would 'irreparablydestroy Karadzic'spower base'. in his ongoing power struggle with Biljana Plavsic for political control of Republika Srpska.124 on Fri.16.1256 MIKE BOWKER Krajinato the Croats and the NATO air strikes of August-September 1995. the final Dayton agreement could be seen as a reasonable compromise allowing the Serbs to keep 49% of Bosnia and the right of Republika Srspka to keep close political ties with Belgrade. for he appearedto be backing Karadzic.and Karadzic'spopularitysuffered as a result. the power game seems to have shifted.In particular. Significantly. Despite leading the Serb people to disaster and internationalopprobrium. Therefore. was no ideologue. Milosevic's Machiavellian ways will always encourage rumours of conspiracies and hidden agendas. The economic embargo on Belgrade was also beginning to bite.33. accordingto this view. a distinguishedcommentatoron the Balkans. Over a period of a few years he was able to change from communist to nationalist to pragmatist with little apparent difficulty or personal embarrassment. it is difficult to know how much emphasis to place on such theories.52As a result. So when Karadzic began to challenge Milosevic for the unofficial post of supremeleader of the Serb nation. The second view accepts that reverses on the battlefieldreduced Serb options in the summerof 1995 but denies that this can offer a complete explanationfor Belgrade's willingness to accept a compromisepeace.he has been able to sweep aside any potential challenge for power with consummate ease.she wrote. as long as the region retained meaningful autonomy. has put forwarda rather different reason for Milosevic's willingness to compromise. Milosevic also offered to hand back Krajinato Croatia as part of a long-term settlement at the time of the VOPP. Milosevic was astute enough to recognise the weakness of the Serb position and agreed to a cease-fire to avoid furtherterritoriallosses. Milosevic appearedto acknowledge that the massive Serb war gains in Bosnia and Croatiawere unsustainablein the long term and he was no longer willing to pay the military and political costs of maintaining them. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .53Milosevic is certainlya wily politician. If he did. She has argued that his change of heart can best be understoodin terms of his protractedpower struggle with the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. it was in this context that Milosevic's concessions at Dayton should be understood. so Milosevic was eager to have the sanctions lifted. Milosevic was successful in deflecting responsibilityfor defeats on the battlefieldonto the Bosnian leadership.His one abiding belief was his own right to rule. What role did the internationalcommunity play in all of this? Did the NATO air strikes influence policy in Belgrade? Could they and should they have been used This content downloaded from 155. According to Silber. The extent to which he saw Karadzic as a real rival in 1995 is less clear. For Milosevic's campaignfor peace began at the time of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1993-long before the Serb setbacks on the battlefield.against the wishes of the West.54Inevitably. Milosevic was quick to abandon Karadzic's maximalist claims. a compromise peace began to look an attractive option long before the NATO air raids of August-September 1995.

First. Therefore. Moscow became concerned that Washington was using the Balkans as yet another opportunity to emphasise its power in the post-Cold War world. the international community had to be sure that Belgrade would not escalate the war by intervening militarily on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. The aim was simply to end the siege of Sarajevoand deter furtherattackson other safe areas. The main cause of dispute with the West related to Russian pride. the Russians neither had the military power nor the political will to intervene on behalf of the Serbs.57For the air strikes to have broader implications. Finally.but the impact of the air strikes should not be exaggerated. This.56 Furthermore. It is arguablethat its opposition to air strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo on the Muslims offered the Serbs some encouragementin their war against the Bosniansbut only at the margins. However.33. This was only the case after Milosevic abandonedKaradzicin August 1994. El'tsin continued to supportthe various internationalplans put forwardto end the conflict-including the VOPP and the Contact Group plan. other factors had to be in place. In the spring of 1993 Churkinsaid that Moscow 'will never get into a confrontationwith the world communityover the map of Bosnia'. the actual numberof sorties by NATO bombers was roughly equivalentto only one day in the Gulf War. As the USA acted more unilaterally from 1994. it also needed America to be firmly committed to the internationalpeace plan on offer. he favoured working throughthe UN or the Contact Group. both in intensity and in aims.59 and the Defence Ministry also warned against over-stretching the This content downloaded from 155. whilst the USA became increasingly frustratedover the lack of progress in both bodies-a fact only partly due to Russian intransigence. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .the air strikes were never intended to force the Serbs to agree to a cease-fire. Crucially.16. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1257 much earlierto bring the war to a speedier close?55As stated above.124 on Fri. the NATO action did place the Bosnian Serbs under pressure.58The international community had probably underestimatedits own power and overestimated the power of the Serbs throughoutthe conflict. in turn.YUGOSLAVIA. As is so often the case in war. For the Serbs made their biggest advances in Croatia and Bosnia at a time when Moscow's policy was most closely allied to that of the west. This was mainly because the air strikes were limited. Moscow was never willing to risk its relations with the West for the sake of Pale. never mind an overall peace settlement. In essence. Second. Moscow's role Moscow was criticised for its pro-Serb stance for much of the Bosnian war. was only possible after the formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the rebuilding of their respective armies. MaynardGlitman has convincingly arguedthat Dayton was successful because it was the first time that Washington had come up with a realistic plan which it was preparedto back up with force. El'tsin wanted Moscow to be consulted over decisions and treated as an equal partner by the Western powers. but it is still the case that air strikes on their own much before 1995 would have been unlikely to reverse Serb territorialgains in Bosnia. Although Moscow shifted to a more pro-Serb position later. For while the NATO air strikes in the summer of 1995 were far more intense than anythingpreviously witnessed in Bosnia. it was importantthat the Muslims and Croatswere in a position militarilyto take advantageof Serb weakness. timing was all important.

Such language only served to convince sceptics that.1258 MIKE BOWKER military in areas no longer of vital strategic importance. It seemed to many that its cooperativepolicy was based more on weakness than a genuine belief in the benefits This content downloaded from 155. but it is undeniable that Russia's image suffered because of its conduct during the war in Bosnia. Furthermore. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .61The presence of only about 1000 Russian troops in SFOR was a clear indication of Moscow's declining interest in the region.64The apathy might be gauged by the fact that only about 500 Russian volunteers. according to Western intelligence.65This latter fact was not altogether surprisingsince all the belligerents in the conflict were Slavs. It was important.63 The former Soviet Premier. Although the Russian parliament articulated a more pro-Serb stance than the El'tsin government. enthusiasm for military interventions outside the former Soviet Union declined even further.that the Serbs were not isolated and that their interestswere representedin internationalfora.33.67 Moscow's efforts were acknowledged in many Europeancapitals. Even this cultural link was undercut. The more positive aspects of Russian foreign policy were too often lost in petty obstructionism and hyperbolic language. No negotiated settlement was possible without Serb compliance. Yet no country can claim much credit for their actions in Yugoslavia: 300 000 died during the conflict and an estimated two million were forced to leave their homes. The USA. were fighting in the former Yugoslavia in 1993. recognising parallels with their own circumstances inside a disintegratingSoviet Union. such as the UN and the Contact Group. Owing to its links with Belgrade.16. Most people in Russia did appearto have a natural empathy with the Serbs. particularlyafter the constitutional changes of December 1993. it was difficult for Russian pan-Slavists to demand a more pro-Serbstance from Moscow when Belgrade and Pale were at odds over the fundamentals of policy. Russia would always be an unreliable partner. therefore. Russia's policies were defensible. There was little public interest in the wars of Yugoslavia and Zhirinovsky's attempts to whip up supportfor the Serbs fell largely on deaf ears. to materially affect policy.124 on Fri.62but the appeal of pan-Slavism is easy to exaggerate. however.68yet this was at a time when his own troops were involved in a truly genocidal attack on the people of Chechnya. it lacked the power. For Moscow's continued links with Belgrade served a useful purpose.6 After the debacle in Chechnya. It could not even claim to be representativeof majority public opinion.not all of them were fighting on the side of the Serbs. After that. It was a policy based on Realpolitik ratherthan morality.66 Yet. Russia's policy towards Yugoslavia can be criticised for giving succour to the aggressors in the conflict. had virtually no contact with Belgrade at all until Holbrooke took over as Clinton's special envoy. although only the Serbs were Orthodox Christians. even went so far as to complain about the apathy of the Russian people in the face of the air strikes against Gorazde in spring 1994.It also created fears that Moscow's more cooperativepolicy towards the West would not last. Moscow recognised far earlierthan Washingtonthat Milosevic was serious about a compromise settlementand worked diplomaticallyto encourage such an end. on the other hand. El'tsin spoke of genocide when NATO finally took action against the Serbs in the summer of 1995. in times of crisis. in the overall context of the internationaleffort.Nikolai Ryzhkov. after the public split between Milosevic and Karadzic in August 1994.

p. "1Fora discussionon why the Germansdecidedto recogniseSloveniaandCroatiaandhow they persuadedthe other membersof the EC to supportthem. pp. the Russian government acted cautiously and within the generally accepted parameters of the international consensus. InternationalPerspectiveson the YugoslavConflict(Basingstoke. See. 19 March1993. Winter 1994-95. for example.Vintage.used this phrasefrequentlyin criticismof the mediawhich 12. see.but withoutindicatingwhat actionthatshouldbe. pp. Contrary to the view of the sceptics.and David Rieff. Moscow would soon be tempted to return to its Cold War ways. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 6 Gorbachevmade many speecheson nationalismand the dangersof breakingup the USSR. 'Russian Perspectives'. 10Izvestiya. 13 InternationalHerald Tribune. 3 Thereare (ed. Pravda. see HIannsW. Gorbachev.16. 4 See. Survival. 182-197. This content downloaded from 155. Yugoslavia showed that Moscow was able to play a positive role in European security even at times of great domestic crisis. for example.1996). International Affairs. manycommentarieswhicharehighlycriticalof the 'consensus'view on Yugoslavia promotedby Russia. p.29 November1994. 22 Owen.Victor 282.3rd edition(Harmondsworth.1996).p. 9 Glenny. Hurd. University of East Anglia 1 See InternationalHerald Tribune. 23 Foran overviewof the Russianparliament'sviews on the Yugoslavcrisis. for example. 20 January1993. 143-144.33. The Worldand Wars(New York.1 March1994. 'Dangerous Liaisons:Moscow.19 September1989.5 pp.see SuzanneCrow.Heinemann.Little. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West(London. 15Estimatefrom Freedman.1996). 29. such an interpretation seems too pessimistic. 7 Andrei Edemskii. there are grounds to hope that Moscow will continue to be a co-operative rather than disruptive force in Europe. Pravda.Europe'sBackwardWar: The Warin the Balkans(London.69. 27 September1989. Winter1995-96.p. availablein translation in SovietNews. on the basis of Russian policy towards Yugoslavia. for example.MarkAlmond. for Danchev& Halverson(eds). but Russia did play a part in bringing the war to an end.69 Moscow's role was never as important as that of the USA.LawrenceFreedman.'RussianPerspectives'.MikhailS.TheFall of Yugoslavia. 'The New United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia'. 11. RFEIRLReport. 'Germanyand the YugoslavCrisis'. 3. 21 See InternationalHerald Tribune.Macmillan. Goble.Douglas Hurd. Councilon ForeignRelations. 8 61. 17 See Kozyrev'scommentsin Nezavisimayagazeta.See.SearchingFor Peace: A Centuryof Peace Diplomacy(London. RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1259 of partnership. 29 June 1991.ForeignPolicy. pp.YUGOSLAVIA.BritainandFrance. 61. 20 Foran officialEU versionof this view. MishaGlenny. 4. see DavidOwen. and Paul A. it was argued. and DouglasHurd.124 on Fri. Penguin. pp. 'RussiaAdoptsA More Active Policy'.). Gollancz.). 1-5. or even that of Britain or France. 1993. in RichardH.his reportto the CentralCommittee.pp. 12 See.Fontana. 19See AndreiEdemskii.2. p. 1995). 137-138. 14Glenny. However.p. 94. 355. See.9 August 1990.the FormerYugoslaviaandthe West'. for example. Alex Danchev & Thomas Halverson(eds). 16 The BritishForeignSecretary.16 October1991.'Whythe WestFailed'. Once Russia regained its military prowess. Perestroika:New Thinkingfor our Countryand the World(London. p. 468. 129-131.37.8 December 1994. 1997).andon interdependence. As the future for Russia begins to look a little brighter. Yugoslavia's 2 See Ullman p. Ullman(ed.2 April 1993.1994). Rosalyn Higgins. Maull. 18 See Izvestiya. 1995).TheBalkanOdyssey(London. For despite all the rhetoric.El'tsin's famousremarkto the regionsof Russiain 1990 to 'take as much sovereigntyas you can digest'. 31.

30 International Herald Tribune. p. 4 March 1994.6 November 1997. 'US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach'. 41 For an outline of this case. March 1996. and Rieff. 103-104. 38. 13 April 1994. See also Ullman. Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman (eds). 43 The full Dayton agreement is available at the web-site http://dosfan. 'The Politics of Foreign Policy'. Charting 49 Glenny. March 1997. p. 37 Segodnya. 27 Laura Silber & Allan Little. 31 Pravda. 'The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. see. The Guardian. Survival. Ed Vuillamy. 44 NATO Office of Information and Press. On Belgrade's desire to end the embargo. see Glenny. 40 Moscow abstained on this issue at the UN. 53 Laura Silber. 5( Maynard Glitman. see Goble. 17 April 1994. for example.html. 2. 39 Izvestiya. See also Gregory L. David Owen. 270. 56 Rick Atkinson. 4 August 1995. 188. 59 Izvestiya. 64 The Observer. 'Dangerous Liaisons: Moscow. see Segodnya. 4. Penguin. 11 March 1996. 13 April 1994. 62 Conversations with various Russian people and academics over the course of the war. 39. in Stephen White. 26 This was the view of many. Winter 1996-97. 28 Krasnaya zvezda. 'The Hero of Dayton: Slobodan Milosevic and the Politics of War and Peace'. p. 1995). 27 April 1996. 52 The GNP in Serbia halved between 1990 and 1994. 54 International Herald Tribune. p. pp. 29-30. World Policy Journal. 287. 156-157. 'Serbian Perspective'. 63 See Izvestiya. This content downloaded from 155. 32 See. International Herald Tribune. 9 August 1994. 47Russia Today website. Survival. pp. p. pp. 46 Schulte. 75. 34 For this view. 38 3 August 1994. 69. 25-26 October 1997. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 'NATO's Role in Bosnia: a New Course for the Alliance'. 33. 11. 65 See International Herald Tribune. 1. see Ivan Vejvoda. Crow. p. 29 July-4 August 1994. NATO Review. for example. 35 Time. 60 Moscow News. 66 Ullman. Izvestiya. 217. 1997). p. two editions of Moscow News. for example. 44. 29 International Herald Tribune.lib. See Owen. see International Herald Tribune. 61 Nezavisimaya gazeta. p. 4. The estimated number of deaths during the siege of Sarajevo rose to 20 000 by its end in 1995. see Glenny. 21 April 1993.124 on Fri. 'Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO'. 5. 104. 'NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former NATO Basic Fact Sheet. p. 33 See Moscow News.16. 17 November 1995. p. 27-28 February 1993. in Danchev & Halverson (eds). XIII. 7 September 1993. p. 345. 32-33 on the details of the arrangements between NATO and the Russian troops. 4 February 1995. 1. Macmillan. 14 September 1995. 48 See. p. pp. 279. pp. the Former and the West'. 36 Segodnya. The Death of Yugoslavia (Harmondsworth. 74. 5 February 1994. 19 February 1994. 1-5. p. 45 Interviews with researchers at NATO lHeadquarters. 58 Glitman. April 1997. Developments in Russian Politics 4 (Basingstoke.uic. p. 1. 3. 8-9 November 1997. 55For this view. 24. 51 Glenny. NATO Basic Fact Sheet. for example. 5 July 1995. 15 July 1997. 'The Anatomy of NATO's Decision to Bomb Bosnia'. Spring 1997. p. 42 Rossiiskaya gazeta. No. 156-157. 15-21 April 1994 and 22-28 April 1994. p. 277. Secretary General of NATO. and Alex Pravda. 5 August 1995. p. Javier Solana. including the EU's representative. Yugoslavia 25 See. Yugoslavia'. no. MIKE BOWKER 24 For another example of this view. Schulte. see Rieff. 57 NATO Office of Information and Press. Spring 1996.

RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1261 67 Pauline Neville-Jones. see. for example.16. 38. 133-134. See also Glenny. 4. Ullman. 'Dayton. p. IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia'. 68 International Herald Tribune.124 on Fri. Survival. p. This content downloaded from 155. pp. 29-30. 12 January 1995. 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and Hurd. pp. 270.YUGOSLAVIA.33. 46. 69 For this view. Winter 1996-97.