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The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1- Due Process Clause

Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Powell v. Alabama (1932) pg. 22- Sutherland
-Black boys throw white boys off train. 2 Women on train told to go w/ story that they were raped.
-Fundamental Right to appoint counsel for capital Ds (later expanded to felony Ds facing imprisonment in Gideon).
-Applied to ALL State cases!
Crim Pro Goals: (1) Accuracy
Crim law = innocence-weighted which, in theory, protects innocent Ds.
There are 2 ways that a high std of proof should benefit innocent Ds
(1) Encourages more innocent Ds to stand trial instead of plea bargain
(2) Influences juries to vote Not Guilty in cases involving innocent Ds.
Right to a speedy & public trial enhances accuracy in 2 ways
(1) Sooner trial happens after crime, more accurate memories of witnesses.
(2) Public nature of trial serves as deterrent to judges who might be inclined to favor 1 party over another.
(2) Fairness
Fairness implicates equality: rich/poor, smart/ignorant, should be able to deal w/ police interrogations on more or
less equal terms. Both sides should get advantages
(3) Limited Government Provisions
Dont want govt. to intrude in peoples (innocents) lives too much. To do this, must say, cant intrude on
anyones lives too much. BoR enumerates & protects indv rights.
(4) Efficiency
Trying to prevent crimes & investigate crimes that have happened w/o used huge amts of resources.
Goals conflict. EX: Exclusionary Rule. Cops barge into house for no reason; found cocaine; cops cant use evidence in
court. Sacrificing accuracy for a limited govt.


14 Amend limits the state in 3 ways: No state shall

(1) Make or enforce any law thatll abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the US;
(2) Nor shall any State deprive any person life, liberty, or property, w/out due process of law;
(3) Nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) pg. 48- White
Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental fairness to the American scheme of justice.
-Duncan sought trial by jury for his simple assault. Louisiana Constitution didnt allow it.
-Deep commitment of the Nation to right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense vs. arbitrary law enforcement
qualifies for protection under Due Process Clause of 14 th Amndt-must be respected by the States. Prevent Govt. oppression.
RULE: The 6th Amndts right to Jury Trial is a fundamental right & applicable to states pursuant to 14th Amndts Due
Process Clause via incorporation. Note: Selective Incorporation. Does this matter? 95% of state criminal trials settled by
plea bargain today BUT potential of a jury reinforces an underlying fairness to the bargain. Backstop!

Reasonableness Clause: [The right of the ppl to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, & effects, against unreas
searches & seizures, shall not be violated,] Warrant Clause [& no Warrants shall issue, but upon PC, supported by
Oath or affirmation, & particularly describing the place to be searched, & the persons or things to be seized.]
2 issues to the Amendments scope:
1. Relating to the category of persons who are searched
2. Nature of persons who do the searching & seizing

(1) The People is not all-inclusive.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990, pg. 66) A search/seizure of prop located in foreign country, which is owned by a
nonresident alien only briefly on US soil, isnt covered by Amndt, even if search conducted by US law enforcement agencies.
-The people refers to class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection w/US to be considered part of community. D not part of this class.
(2) Who can do the searching?
Burdeau v. McDowell (1921 pg. 67)
o 4th Amndt. only limits govt. action. It doesnt reach private searches or seizures.
EX: If B breaks into Js home & finds drugs; B hands over drugs to the police to avoid prosecution, J cannot object
to the Govts use of those drugs against her in a drug prosecution.
- 4th Amndt isnt violated if landlord searches tenants possession, or airline searches luggage, or private phone
company monitors phone calls of its employees without their knowledge.
- 4th Amndt IS implicated if police investigation/participation; (Officers ask landlord to search or helps in process)

Weeks v. US (1914) pg. 69; Day
-D charged w/ use of mail for purpose of transporting lottery tickets. D arrested by police, w/o a warrant, at his place of
employment. Police searched his house w/o a warrant.
-Evidence cannot be used at trial. Adopts Exclusionary Rule. Why? (1) Judicial Integrity; (2) Right implies a remedy.
-Here, Exclusionary Rule only applied to Fed Govt (no incorporation).
RULE: If a Fed Govt. agency conducts unauthorized S&S, its in violation of the 4 th Amndt. But, if indv wasnt acting on
Fed authority, Amndt isnt applicable.
Silver Platter doctrine: Ct in Weeks only applied exclusionary rule to evidence seized under Fed authority, left local
police free to conduct unreas S&S- then give evidence to fed prosecutors on a silver platter to be used in fed prosecution.
Byars v. US (1927) pg. 71
-State police conducted their search accompanied by Fed agent.
-Silver platter doctrine didnt apply to evidence unlawfully obtained during a search that in substance & effect was a
joint state-federal venture. Noted, however, that mere participation by Fed officer is not enough (need something more!)
Gambino v. US (1927) pg. 71
-State officers, acting alone, conducted search solely on behalf of Fed govt.
-Weeks exclusionary rule applied.
Wolf v. Colorado; (1949) pg. 72; Frankfurter OVERRULED by Mapp!
EXCLUSIONARY RULE is not Const required, & doesnt apply to States because not in the Const-it is judicially-created.
-D performing abortions. Convicted by State & evidence found at his home w/o warrant used against him. He said that his 4 th
Amndt rights were violated. 4th Amendment APPLIES TO STATES!!
-Due process isnt confined w/in a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of
fundamental rights. Test for Due Process: Is it implicit in concept of ordered liberty? Here, noted that many states do
different things, so it was obviously not implicit w/in this concept.
-Arbitrary searches & seizures by state/local police violate concept of ordered liberty => violate 14th Amndt due process
clausebut govt. can still use fruits of its agents Unconst conduct in criminal prosecution. Exclusionary rule has no teeth.
Rochin v. California (1952 pg. 74) Exclusionary rule in different clothing
Pumping Ds stomach is illegal search.
-Fundamental to bodily integrity. By pumping his stomach=violation of his bodily integrity. Due Process protects life, liberty,
& property (bodily integrity is property). Shocks the conscience so MUST Exclude.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961) pg. 75; Clark

CURRENT RULE- Overrules Wolfexclusionary rule applicable to Federal & STATE courts.
P in home wanted in connection w/ recent bombing. State Cops were refused entrance. Door forced open. Cops had a search
warrant. Mapp placed it down shirt. Handcuffed & taken to room- cops searched room & apt finding obscene materials
-4th Amndt Right of Privacy declared enforceable against States (DPC of 14 th), so enforceable against states by same
sanction of exclusion as used against Fed Gov. Exclusionary Rule binding on States
Why Exclusionary Rule? 1) Everything else (civil actions for damages/crim. prosecutions) has proven worthless;
2) Deterrence- will abide if know evidence will not be used in court;
3) Imperative of Judicial Integrity- courts shouldnt soil hands w/ tainted evidence.
4) Having the Right to Privacy enforced on states implies a remedy!
RULE: All evidence obtained by searches/seizures in violation of the Const inadmissible in Fed & STATE Ct.

What Govt. conduct = search of person, house, paper, or effect, & therefore, trigger 4th Amndt protection?
Reas. Clause: Right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, & effects vs. unreas. S&S shall not be violated
Katz v. U.S.; (1967) pg. 87; Stewart
Previous Trespass doctrine- physical intrusion into a given area & not mere voice amplification is required to constitute a
4th Amndt search (Olmstead v. U.S) is overruled
-D using phone booth. Cops warrantlessly listened in using recording device outside booth.
-D sought to exclude people from uninvited earnot intruding eye (phone booth was see-through)
-Warrantless wiretap on public phone booth was unreas serach in violation of 4 th Amnt.
-4th Amndt protects people, not places. Katz sought to preserve his convo as private (even in a public area) so it is Const.
protected. Who cares where you are.
Harlans Concurrence Katz Test
1) Victim must manifest subjective expectation of privacy.
2) If so, this expectation is one that society accepts as objectively reasonable. (Ct takes restrictive view)
#2 Is a function of both the setting it is observed from & vantage point from which observation is made (see below)
RULE: 4th Amndt governs seizure of tangible items & recording of oral stmts. Enclosed public phone booths are granted
protection because they are places ppl have a reas. expectation of privacy Obj. expectation & applies only to the police.

U.S. v. White; (1971) pg. 95; White
Policeman informant can report/testify convos w/o a warrant authorizing his encounters & w/o violating 4 th Amndt rights.
-Fed authorities, working w/ informant, electronically recorded convos w/ White- later used to convict White. Authorities
used radio equip to record several convos & personally overheard convos. Electronic recordings were shared w/ other agents.
-Ct said D had no justifiable, Const-protected expectation that person he talks to wont tell cops. Only way to
reconcile w/ Katz: its different when the person who youre talking to decides to rat you out.
RULE: Audio Recordings, obtained w/o warrant & through hidden recording devices by an invited guest, do not
violate 4th Amndt. Cant assume that the info youre disclosing to another will be safe & not used against you in any way.
Is this something that the public is going to deem reasonable? from the Katz test.

Friend talks to cops later
Low Risk (Not a Search)

Friend wired by cops

Friend feeds recording to cops Cops listen in

Misplaced reliance on the loyalty of others is not entitled constitutional protection

Smith v. Maryland (1979) pg. 105; Blackmun
As soon as you transmit info to 3 party, its not protectedlose reas. expectation of privacy- Pen Register Case
Are the phone numbers that one dials protected? Is finding that info a search?
rd order to use phone, you have to dial the numbers & transmit numbers to the phone company & they send it off &
record those numbers. In doing so, youve transmitted info to a 3rd party.
Similarly (U.S. v. Miller)- imparting financial info to bank in usual course of business has no expect. of privacy
RULE: A Search takes place within the meaning of the 4 th Amndt when:
(1) An indiv has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy (whether he has shown that he wants to preserve
something as private) HERE THIS IS NOT MET!, AND
(2) Whether the individuals subj. expect. of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
(Whether individuals expect., viewed objectively, is justifiable under the circumstances)
U.S. v. Dionisio (1973)- Ex. No reas expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice. Govt. can force someone to
submit exemplars of his/her voice- NOT a search (has been extended to handwriting/fingerprints)
However, note in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Association (pg. 441), Ct said blood, urine & breath analysis IS a search
because it is a physical attribute not on public display.
US v. Place, (1983); pg. 112; OConnor
-Categorizes dog sniffs as sui generis (unique); Problem: dogs are fallable.
-Luggage detained for 90 minutes while dog arrived. Dog sniff signaled presence of narcotics. Went to get a warrant.
-A sniff by a police dog specially-trained to detect the presence of narcotics is not a "search"
-The sniff of a dog is intended to reveal only presence OR absence of narcotics. Because a dog sniff is such a limited
test, Ct carved out this exception from broad category of "searches" for which a warrant is gen. required.
-But note: even a dog sniff of an apt is likely a search (place matters)- see Kyllo (pg. 5)
Illinois v. Caballes (2005) pg. 113; Stevens
Official conduct that doesnt compromise any legit interest in privacy isnt a search subject to the 4th Amndt
-Dog sniffed outside of car on highway that was stopped by police. Cops searched trunk & found marijuana.
-No reas./articulable suspicion reqd to use drug-sniffing dog. Note: dog=sui generis (what else can only detect contraband?)
-Here, doesnt compromise any legit privacy interest (no legit privacy interest in illegal activity).
-Dog only can find out that youre carrying cocaine, & nothing else => no legit interest in privacy of carrying marijuana
EX: If dog can sniff out cheese in trunk, then that is a legit. interest & unconstitutional


Hester v. US (1924) pg. 114; Wendell Holmes
Ct. first enunciates open fields doctrine: police entry of an open field doesnt implicate 4th Amndt.
-Open fields fall outside of scope of 4th Amndt- only prohibits searches of persons, houses, papers, & effects. Ppl
cannot demand privacy for activities that they conduct out of doors in the fields because it is in plain view.
Oliver v. US (1984) pg. 114; Powell
Open fields dont provide for intimate activities that Amndt is intended to shelter from govt. inference/surveillance.
-Cops, w/o warrant/PC, trespassed on Ds rural prop w/ No Trespassing signs, & discovered fields of weed.
-Open fields dont constitute person, house, paper, or effect. Entry of open fields doesnt constitute search
-Open Fields= Out of doors in fields. Curtilage= Land immediately surrounding & associated w/ home.

CURTILAGE (Land immediately surrounding & associated w/ home):

US v. Dunn (1987) pg. 116; White
-DEA w/o warrant crossed perimeter fence & other fences. Used flashlight to see drug lab in barn. Entered twice the next day
before receiving a search warrant. Court ruled barn was outside curtilage.
-Court explained curtilage: questions should be resolved with reference to 4 factors:
(1) Proximity of area claimed to be curtilage to home. (Rural vs. Urban setting may impact this)
(2) Whether area included w/in enclosure surrounding home (mark off area to which the activity of home life extends)
(3) Nature of the uses to which the area is put (Here, Cops personally knew that barn was not used for intimate activities)
(4) Steps taken by resident to protect area from observation by ppl passing by


California v. Ciraolo (1986) pg. 117; Burger
View from plane of Curtilage of home was not a search. Met Subjective Prong BUT NOT Reasonable.
Weed farm discovered from plane at 1,000 ft- Ct said since public could fly over field & see weed, its not unreasonable for
the police to do the same. Cops arent expected to avert their eyes.
-Respondents expectation (Built Tall Walls) that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable & isnt
an expectation that society is prepared to honor (2nd factor) Note: Backyard Here=Curtilage!
Florida v. Riley (plurality) (1989) pg.120; White
-Helicopter discovered weed farm at 400 ft. If this was a plane, then reas. expect. of privacy because airplanes cant fly at
400 ft (w/o violating regulations), but since it was a helicopter, no expectation of privacy. Four Limitations (highlighted)
-Must not interfere with normal use of prop, reveal no intimate details, & no undue noise.
Overflight cases show: Where police observations are made from location to which public has lawful access, the viewing of
otherwise protected areas may not implicate the 4th Amndt.


California v. Greenwood (1988) pg. 121; White
Garbage isnt private & anything in garbage has no expectation of privacy.
-D placed refuse at the curb w/ express intention to convey to a third party (garbage collector)
-Police cant reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by
any member of public. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to 4th
Amndt protection. See Smith v. Maryland (pg. 3)
Kyllo v. U.S. (2001) pg. 121; Scalia
Technology! Here, more than naked-eye surveillance of home = unreas. Search (would need warrant)
-Police scanned house w/ heat-seeker to find weed. Scan of home took a few mins. & performed from the passenger seat of
Agents vehicle across street from front of the house & also from street in back of house.
-Core of 4th Amndt stands right of a man to retreat into his own home & there be free from unreas govt intrusion. Silverman
-Distinguishes Katz- which said that a visual observation only isnt a search at all.
-Note: Scalia makes a BIG deal about sanctity of ones home. Intimate details within.
-Determining when new Tech of surveillance is a search: When sense-enhancing technology gives police info about
home that they could otherwise obtain only by physical intrusion AND technology is not in general public use.
US v. Knotts 1983 pg. 131; Rehnquist Beeper- FINE BECAUSE NO POSS. INTEREST IN CONTAINER YET!
-Biz consented to cops installing beeper inside 5-gallon container of chloroform intended for sale to suspects.
-Warrantless monitoring of a beeper isnt a search/seizure under the 4th Amndt because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy- movements of car could have been observed by naked eye! (If carried inside, then probably a search).
-Doesnt equate police efficiency w/ unconstitutionally. Augmented sensory faculties. Did not elicit any info not visible.
U.S. v. Jones (2012) pg. 133; Scalia
Govt. obtained info by physically intruding on a Const-protected area. GPS Case
-Jones under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics & made a police target by FBI. Cops (w/o warrant) attached GPS to car.
-Govts installation of a GPS device onto Ds car (personal effects) was a trespass that was to obtain information = Search!
Significance: Return to prop law concepts. install of device by trespass on prop. triggered Amndt. protection.
Left open: Warrantless use of GPS data w/o physical intrusion (wireless service providers; vehicle navigation services)
RULE: Attaching GPS device to vehicle & then using the device to monitor the vehicles movements constitutes a search.
(1) The Katz test remainsKatz is one option, Trespass is another (see (2)).
Can be a search if it invades reasonable expectation of privacy.
(2) Trespass Test: Search if (1) Govt., (2) in an attempt to get information, (3) trepasses on (4) persons, houses,
papers, or effects (item w/ possessory interest)- need not be any legitimate expectation of privacy!

Scalia: trespass itself is neither necessary nor sufficient

Not necessary because Katz test doesnt require trespass.
Not sufficienttrespass & way to get information is a searchbut strict trespass is not a search.

Interfering w/ liberty interests.
Things that you can seize:
(1) Contraband (evidence that youre not lawfully allowed to have)
EX: drugs
(2) Fruits of a crime
EX: what you stole from storepack of diapers
(3) Instrumentalities used in the commission of an offense
EX: weapon, getaway car, the mask
(4) Mere Evidence: what you own that happens to have evidence on it- didnt use it commit the crime
EX: splatters of blood from crime, fibers in car
U.S. v. Karo ( 1984) pg. 147; White
Search once you are no longer able to see the infolike when garage door closescant see whats inside.
-D ordered 50 gallons of ether from Govt. informant to extract cocaine from clothes. W/ informants consent, agents
substituted their own can w/ a beeper inside to give.
-Here, Karo accepted container that ether was in (beeper and all) Act of Installing Surveillance Product is NOT a seizure.
-BUT turning the beeper on & obtaining info that is not available through visual surveillance is S&S.
RULE: Installing beeper in a container of w/ orig owners consent is not a search/seizure. However, if info is obtained
through use of a beeper device which could not have been obtained through visual surveillance, that is a search.
US v. Jacobsen 1984 pg. 148- -Seizure occurs when there is meaningful interference w/ indivs possessory interests

in that property.

PC to arrest exists where facts & circs w/in officers knowl & of which they have reas trustworthy info are sufficient in themselves
to warrant man of reas caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed by person to be arrested. Brinegar
Procedurally, the issue of PC typically arises in one of 2 circumstances.
1) Police may apply to a magistrate for an arrest or search warrant.
2) Police may conduct an arrest or search without a warrant.

In absence of probable cause, you have an unreasonable search & seizure

Spinelli v. US ( 1969) pg. 152; Harlan
Totality of the circs is too broad. Informers tip is a necessary element in a finding of PC; its proper weight must be
determined by more precise analysis.
-Informant had info that Spinelli was gambling & using the phones to collect gambling info.
-Old AGUILAR test was cited: 1. Is the information reliable? 2. Is the informant reliable?
The court developed a new test, expanding Aguilar:
1. Basis of Knowledge How does the informant know what she claims to know?
2. Credibility Why should cops believe this person?
-Here, informants tip not enough to justify warrant because lacked detail- basis of knowledge, so no PC. The activity that
was alleged was innocent. 1) Unknown; 2) Not Enough;
-The info supporting each prong must be sufficiently specific so conclusions are meaningfully evaluated by a court.
-An affidavit used to support issuance of a search warrant must set forth sufficient underlying circs, which would cause a
magistrate to judge the informants info independently & support a finding that the informant is reliable/credible.
-If affidavit rests on hearsay (an informants report) Aguilar requires 1 of 2 things: Informant must declare either:

(1) That he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or
(2) There is good reason for believing himperhaps 1 of the usual grounds for crediting hearsay info.
-Draper (pg. 160) is distinguishable: When officer saw person getting off train at specified time, dressed in & conducting
himself precisely as informant had predicted, the officer had reas grounds to believe Draper was carrying narcotics.
Note: No factual basis for knowing Draper would have drugs BUT deficiencies overcome by detailed info & verification.
-Corroboration of innocent facts may support PC.
Proving Part 1- Basis of Knowledge- Firsthand account; told directly; self-verifying details; A,B,C logically implies D.
Bad: I Heard, I am Guessing
Part 2- Reliability/Veracity- Track record; potential crim liability? Admission/Declaration against his interests?
Must be more than INNOCENT facts
Court says you must know:
The basis of knowledge AND
(2) Veracitycorroboration. Helps basis of knowledge because then have some basis of what was being
said (& they were right)
Court says that you must do both of these things well (from Spinelli)
Draper: they corroborated everything; Spinelli, they corroborated only one thing.
Aguilar/Spinelli (4-1-4 Decisions) Test:
(1) Credibility

o Should we believe this person?

Innocent Details
(2) Basis of Knowledge
o Where did the info come from?
o Why does the person know?
o Used to filter out information: Ive seen it vs. I heard about it

Illinois v. Gates (1983) pg. 160; Rehnquist OVERRULES Spinelli Test!

The term PC, according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.
-Drug dealer husband & wifeanon tipster tells police of their drug arrangements (wife told hairdresser) Cops verify some
pointswhere they live (was wrong but they used to live there), that Mr. Gates has 1-way ticket to FL (get FL police to track
him to hotel to see wife w/ IL platesthe 2 drive north). On the basis of this info, cops ask for warrant & get one. These were
not freely-obtainable facts.
-The anon. letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police would not provide a basis for a magistrates determination that there was
PC to believe contraband would be found in the Gates car & home.
-Nothing in letter concludes honesty or reliability. (1st credibility prong fails)
-Found that Spinellis 2 prong test had not been satisfied.
-Ex. Tip from informant whose past reliability could not be determined might be deemed adequate if the info was sufficiently
detailed to justify the inference that she was speaking from personal knowledge of circs.
-Evidence must give someone of reas. caution reason to believe evidence of a crime will be found at place searched.
RULE: Where anon. tip is corroborated w/ actual police findings, a totality of the circs approach determines PC instead
of 2-pronged test of credibility & basis of knowledge from Spinelli. 4th Amndt requires no more than a finding by a
magistrate that there is a subst basis that search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Need suspicious details! (maybe)
SAMPLE INTRO: We must determine whether the facts & circs w/in the knowledge of the police & of which they had reas
trustworthy info were sufficient to warrant a person of reas caution to believe that contraband would be found in [insert
location]. Address basis of info (informants? Observations by cops?) Look at Spinelli factors. Credibility prong; basis of
knowledge prong; Gates alternative indicia of reliability (self-implication of the informant in criminal activity, the
indication of a close relationship to the subject, or the supplying of great details to subjects activities)? Innocent/Suspicious
facts? If 2 informants- mutual reinforcement may be powerful.
U.S. v. Harris (1971)- Suspects prior criminal activity may be used as confirmation of an informants tip.

Sibron v. NY (1968); pg. 366- Furtive actions & flight at the approach of law officers are strong indicia & when coupled
w/ specific knowledge on the part of the officers relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be
considered in the decision to make an arrest. See Illinois v. Wardlow (pg. 22)
Franks v. Delaware pg. 174 (1978)- Credibility Challenge to Warrant- See US v. Leon (pg. 26) for challenge on its face.
-Warrants founded on PC must be supported by Oath/affirmation Two requirements to challenge.
-D may challenge truthfulness of stmts made under oath in an affidavit supporting a warrant under limited circs:
-1) Must make a substantial preliminary showing that affidavit contains A) false statement, B) made by the affiant police
officer, C) either knowingly & intentionally or w/ reckless disregard for truth. (Neg/inadvertent misstatements nor false stmts
by informer are sufficient here)
-2) Must be demonstrated that false statement was necessary for finding PC. Otherwise, harmless error.
Anticipatory Warrant: Based on affidavit showing PC that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime
will be located a specified place. No different in principle from ordinary warrants.
-Must be true that (1) if the triggering condition occurs there is fair prob that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in particular place AND (2) there is PC to believe triggering condition will occur. U.S. v. Grubbs (2006) pg. 178

Payton v. NY (1980) pg. 179; Stevens
Even though cops had PC to arrest Payton, didnt have PC to enter the home & search for Payton. The only way they could
have entered the home were if there were exigent circs (or if had a warrant- w/ conditions)
-Cops had evidence to establish PC to arrest a suspect of murder. 6 officers broke into apt; suspect gone; gun was admitted as
evidence in murder trial. Need arrest warrant to enter arrestees house- Must have PC person is home
-Two Prong Test: Sufficient Basis to believe: 1) Suspect lives at address AND 2) Suspect was home at time of entry
-What creates a sufficient basis? Eyewitnesses, Other police, etc
-Public Area (No privacy issues; Easy to escape) vs. Home Arrest
-In terms that apply equally to seizures of prop & to seizures of persons, 4 th Amndt has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the
house. Absent exigent circumstances, threshold may not be reasonably crossed.

1. Arrest Warrant/Search Warrant (others house)

2. Exigent circumstances
Warrantless home arrests are presumpptively Unconstitutional!
RULE: 4th Amndt prohibits warrantless entries for searches of homes, absent exigent circs, even w/ PC.
Gerstein v. Pugh 1975 pg. 187 Remaining in Custody; Gerstein Hearing- determination of PC after warrantless arrests.
-Is an arrestee reqd to remain in custody pending trial w/o any judicial determination that arrest was lawful? NO. 4th Amndt
requires a judicial determination of PC as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.
Tennessee v Garner 1985 pg. 188 Unreasonable Force
-An arrest, even based on PC, constitutes an Unreasonable Seizure of the person if Unreasonable force used in the arrest.
-Here, deadly force was used.
Graham v. Connor 1989 pg 188 Unreasonable Force Standard
-All claims that law enforcement has used excessive forcedeadly or notin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other seizure of a free citizen should be analyzed under the 4 th Amndt reas. std.
Scott v. Harris 2007 pg. 188 What is Unreasonable Force?
-Deputy sheriff didnt use unreas. force when he rammed a motorists car from behind to end long public-endangering car
chase that began when the deputy sought to pull him over for driving 73 mph in a 55 mph zone.
Exceptions to the Payton rule:
Steagald v. US 1981 pg. 189 Need Search Warrant (w/ PC suspect is in house) to enter non-suspects home
-Agents had an arrest warrant for L. Searched Steagalds house (no L) but found cocaine. Ct said needed a search warrant
(which would require PC that L was IN Steagalds home) to enter non-suspects home.

-Arrest warrant, as opposed to a search warrant, is NOT adequate to protect 4th Amndt interests of persons not named in the
warrant, when their homes are searched w/o their consent & in the absence of exigent circs. Possibly extended by MN v.
Olson to guest houses. Cannot claim greater 4th Amndt protection in the home of a 3rd party than he can in his own house.
Requirements for Arrest Warrant: 1) Neutral/Detached Magistrate; 2) PC reqd based on facts/circs connecting
suspect to specific criminal activity; 3) Identify person by name or w/ sufficiently specific description so that officers
may locate him with reasonable effort.
Search Warrant
Search warrant gets you into place & lets you search whatever youre
looking for listed in the warrant.
Must be based on PC & supported by oath or affirmation.
Difference between PC & a warrant:
PC determined first by police officer.
PC + warrant is BEST because a magistrate has to approve it.

Arrest Warrant
Arrest warrant lets you arrest person in their
house (subj to Payton)
Need PC to get

Suggested 2 models for the quagmire of search warrant debates:
(1) No Lines: uses tort law as guide in proposing that hopeless quest of establishing detailed guidelines for
police behavior in every possible situation be abandoned.
-Suggests that a S&S must be reas., considering all relevant factors on a case by case basis.
(2) Bright Line: Ct. should enforce the warrant doctrine to which it has followed for many years.
o A warrant is always required for every search & seizure when practicable to obtain one.
o Make warrant less difficult (while only marginally reducing the safeguards it provides), so # of cases
where emergencies justify exception to the warrant requirement become very small.
Principle of Particular Justification (PPJ): MUST obtain advance judicial approval on searches/seizures through the
warrant procedure. ie: if looking for a gun, you can only search in a place a gun would be.
NEED: 1) Neutral/Detached magistrate; 2) PC; 3) Particularity of place & items/people
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. NY (1979) pg. 195; Burger
NO OPEN-ENDED WARRANTS to be completed while search is being conducted.
-Officer obtained search warrant to seize 2 obscene videos. Judge gave warrant for that & became part of search party to
obtain obscene materials (11 ppl total) Prior to judge going in, search warrant was 2 pages long. After, 16 pages long.
-Judge become a member, if not the leader, of search party which was part of the police operation.
RULE: Warrant must specify what the cops are looking for & must be signed by a neutral & detached magistrate.
More search warrant conditions:
1) Relatively gen. description is tolerated if nature of the object to be seized couldnt realistically be described
more specifically (like paper clips- look all alike)
2) Greater generality is allowed in case of contraband
3) Greater specificity is demanded if other objects or same general classification are likely to be found at
search site (like cartons of womens clothing wont do if police will be searching warehouse containing lots
of cartons)
4) Scrupulous exactitude demanded when search encroaches on 1st Amndt concerns, as in Lo-Ji Sales
Andresen v. Maryland, (1976) pg. 198- Warrant Specificity- no general warrants
-Business records/files do not offend 5th Amndt.
-Warrant for general files specific enough? Here, there was enough specificity in a lengthy list of particular items related to
Lot 13T even though it then said any book/record showing fraudulent intent

Knock & Announce Rule

Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) pg. 199 Knock & Announce Rule- Even with warrant/PC, must Knock/Announce
-4th Amndt. incorporates mandate to knock on door & announce identity/purpose before attempting forcible entry.

U.S. v. Banks; pg. 205 says rqmt. is governed by the reasonableness clause. 15-20 secs. Ok.
Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) pg. 200- When do you not need Knock & Announce?
Knock & announce (BOTH) is required unless exigent circumstances: Needs RS (not hunch) that:
o (1) Recently escaped suspect (Warden)
o (2) Fear of evidence being destroyed (Robinson-ish)
o (3) Fear of phys violence-need element of surprise to protect cops (Chimel, Robinson adds evidence element)
Illinois v. McArthur (2001) pg. 206- May freeze a situation to obtain a warrant.
-Although cops prevented McArthur from entering trailer home, cops effectively seized premises w/o warrant:
1) Cops had PC to believe Ds trailer contained evidence of crime & contraband.
2) Good reason to fear that, unless restrained, D would destroy drugs before could return w/ warrant.
3) Cops made reas. efforts to reconcile law enforcement needs & demands of personal privacy. Didnt arrest D nor
search trailer before obtaining warrant.
4) Cops imposed restraint for limited period of time, reasonable to get warrant.
Executing a warrant after entry: The scope of the search of the premises:
1) Cops may search containers large enough to hold criminal evidence for which theyre searching.
2) May seize object not described in the warrant, if they have PC to believe its a seizable item.
3) Third, see Maryland
Maryland v. Garrison (1987) pg. 207- Thought only one apt on 3rd floor- searched both instead.
-Info that becomes available to officers immediately before/during the execution of a warrant may require them to cease or
narrow their search, notwithstanding the dictates of the warrant. Must limit to what warrant intends. Here, they
recognized there were 2 apts instead of one on 3 rd floor. Duty to limit to correct apt- here, apts indistinguishable so okay.
Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) pg. 208- Must have independent PC particularized to person in order to search the person.
-Warrant to search a home or other premises does not provide implicit authority to search persons found at the scene, even
if the criminal evidence for which the police are looking might be on them.
-Here, D in bar searched because bartender supposedly dealing drugs. No independent PC here. Unreas. Search.

Seizure of persons during warranted searches

Michigan v. Summers (1981) pg. 209
-Warrant to search a residence for contraband founded on PC implicitly carries w/ it limited authority to detain occupants
of premises while a proper search is conducted. Reasonable to detain occupant leaving place to be searched to: (1) prevent
flight of suspect; (2) protect officers safety; OR 3) Facilitate an orderly search.
Muehler v. Mena (2005) pg. 209 Summers also allows cops to use reasonable force.
-Entered house & handcuffed sleeping woman at gunpoint. Ct says fine because danger of entering gang members apt.
-Right of cops under Summers to detain occupant during a warranted search of residence necessarily included right to use
reasonable force to secure & maintain detention of occupant.

Few specifically established & well-delineated exceptions (Katz)
US v. Rabinowitz (1950) pg. 192: Overruled by Chimel- Allowed warrantless searches immediately following arrest. The
search in its entirety fell w/in principle giving cops right to search place where arrest is made in order to find & seize things
connected with the crime. Test is not whether it is reas. to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reas.
Katz- No warrant is per se unreasonable; Exceptions: (1) Exigent Circs; (2) Search Incident to Arrest; (3) Cars/Containers;
(4) Plain View Doctrine; (5) Consent
Rationales for Warrantless: Originally: Impracticality of Warrant;

Now: More of a Reduced Expectation of Privacy

(1) Exigent Exceptions Requires PC- Emergency Exception Premised on Impracticality


Police must be faced w/ circs that would cause a reas person to believe that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to
the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts
Emergency Exception TEST: 1)The circs presented police w/ sufficiently compelling urgency, making the warrant
process both impracticable & risky; AND
2) Police had justification amounting to PC to believe that items relating to crime would be found (search) OR that the
suspect had committed a crime (arrest).
Warden v. Hayden (1967) pg. 209 Scope of Warrantless Hot Pursuit Search
-Cabbies saw robbers go into house; called police; entered home & found guns while looking for Hayden
-Warrantless entry into home. Found suspect; arrested him; grabbed weapons in plain view (evidence & for their safety); OK
Hot Pursuit: Cops immediate pursuit of suspect fleeing the scene of crime, then may chase him into bldg or home w/o
warrant to effect an arrest. Inside, may conduct warrantless search for weapons in access.
Requires: PC that suspect just committed crime & he is inside the dwelling. (As in Warden, PC can be from other sources.)
Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) p. 218; Extends Payton to scenario involving home arrest for non-crim traffic violation
-Heard Welsh was driving inebriated (or sick) & entered house. Justified their action on grounds of exigency- needed to
accurately ascertain Ws blood-alcohol content before the evidence would naturally be destroyed by passage of time.
-Warrantless entry of Ws house was unlawful. Hot Pursuit must be immediate & continuous pursuit. Once pursuit
turns cold, excuse for circumventing the warrant process evaporates.
Here, this was a minor offense so presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut. Gravity of offense for which
the suspect is sought is an important factor for emergency exception.

Totality of Factors Test

Minnesota v. Olson (1990) pg. 188
Police had PC that Olson was driver of getaway car involved in a robbery & murder day before but no warrant
-Whether the delay for getting warrant creates an imminent risk of destruction of evidence, escape of the suspect, or
danger to police or others is fact-specific to determine if warrant process was impracticable.
-Failure to obtain warrant unexcused; Factors: Gravity of crime & likelihood that suspect is armed. Although this was a
grave crime, Olson was only suspected to be the driver, murder weapon recovered, no suggestion of danger to others in
building, & building surrounded so no chance of escape.
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) pg. 219 Emergency Exception
-Officers responded to a loud party call & saw a physical altercation through a screen door.
-Cops may enter home w/o a warrant to render emergency assistance to injured occupant or to protect occupant from
imminent injury. No knock-and-announce violation.
Limitations: Hot Pursuit limited to those areas where the suspect or weapons may be hidden.
Kentucky v. King (2011) pg. 210; Alito
Necessity created by police for exigent circs to arise. Police smelled marijuana (PC); Knocked loudly on the door; Heard
shuffling inside & thought that drug imminent destruction of evidence.
RULE: Exigency doctrine may apply even if police action (knocking on door & announcing presence) foreseeably
created urgency, so long as police were not engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates 4 th Amndt.
Ginsburg dissent: Exception only if exigency exists before police come onto the scene.


Warrant Exception #2; requires PC
Rationale: Obvious danger that the arrestee may violently resist & use weapon on person/within reach. Also, evidence could
be destroyed & it is impracticable to obtain warrant after arrest.
Preliminary Analysis: (1) MUST be a lawful arrest (PC) & (2) If in private bldg, need valid arrest warrant.
Generally: Arrest MUST precede the search(Smith v. Ohio) Exception: Rawlings v. Kentucky- Allows officers w/ PC to
delay formal arrest until after the search is conducted.
Chimel v. California (1969) pg. 221; Stewart


A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest may generally extend to the area considered to be in the possession or
under the control of the person arrested. (Grabable Area)
-Cops came to Ds home w/ an arrest warrant for burglary. Cops asked to look around house. D refused & cops searched
entire home anyways. Cops made Ds wife remove drawers. Seized stuff used to convict D of burglary.
-Search was unreasonable. Cops were searching for Chimel & they found him. They cant search the rest of the house.
They can only search Chimel himself & grabable area. Need a lawful arrest, but no other suspicion.
RULE: Incident to a lawful arrest, search of any area beyond the arrestees immediate control, is unlawful unless theres a
clear danger that evidence may be destroyed or concealed or an imminent threat of harm to the arresting officers.
US v. Robinson (1973) pg. 229; Rehnquist
Privacy interest protected by 4th Amndt. is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest.
-Officer stopped D for driving w/o a license- searched his body, found cigarette package, opened it, found heroin
-Search by the officer & seizure of the heroin was permissible under established 4 th Amndt law.
-Extends Chimel by allowing opening of CONTAINERS!
RULE: In a case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement
of the 4th Amndt, but is also a reasonable search under that Amndt.
Scope of Warrantless Search Incident to Arrest:
(1) A search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.
(2) A search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee
Gustafson v. Florida (1973); pg. 237- Reaffirms Robinson- applies even for minimal crimes that end in arrest.
-G arrested & taken into custody for minor traffic offense (no license w/ him). In warrantless search as incident of lawful
custodial arrest, officer found weed.
-Arrest for a "benign or trivial in nature" offense & lack of police regulations that reqd the officer to take him into custody
didnt alter exception to the warrant rqmt that occurs upon a lawful arrest. Reasonable arrest.
US v. Chadwick (1977) pg. 282; CJ Burger Limitation on Search Incident to Arrest
Once officers have exclusive control over property (inaccessible by D) cant be searched w/o warrant unless exigent circs.
-FOOTLOCKER in a train- cops want to search it & they do. Needed a warrant to do this because the footlocker could not
be reached by the arrestee. Found weedindicted. No danger that arrestee would gain access to footlocker.
-Exigencies aside, warrant reqd when prop comes under exclusive dominion of police authority. By placing effects inside
double-locked footlocker, respondents expected contents would be free from public examination. Contemporaneous
-Factors that diminish privacy aspects of auto dont apply to respondents footlocker (this part overruled by Acevedo)
RULE: Search absent some exception has to be justified by PC & a Warrant.
Rule: Warrantless searches of luggage or other prop seized at the time of an arrest cant be justified as incident to that
arrest either if the search is remote in time or place from the arrest, or no exigency exists.
Need warrant for CONTAINER if have PC for container.
GEN RULE: Line drawn based on what you have PC forno gen warrant exception for containers like there is for cars.
What could cops do instead?
1. Arrest Ds & searched incident to arrest
a. Couldnt get into footlocker because locked & under cops control once arrest D
2. Search at station (INVENTORY SEARCH)can search footlocker there (following rules)
a. If following procedures, can do search at station w/o warrant.
Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) pg. 289 OVERRULED by Acevedo
-If PC to search auto, may perform warrantless search of auto & containers, but if only PC to search a container in the auto,
police must obtain a warrant.
Robbins v. CA (1981) pg. 291 OVERRULED by Ross
-Cops stopped car driving erratically. Approached vehicle & smelled weed, => PC to search. During search, found containers,
which they opened.
-Warrantless search was of containers impermissible under Chadwick & Sanders


NY v. Belton (1981) pg. 238; Stewart See Gant (pg. 13)

Container may be opened/closed; lawful custodial arrest justifies privacy interest infringement
-D speeding w/ others; cop stopped; not their car; cop smells weed & saw bag marked Supergold which officer said was
weed. Cop found cocaine in Ds jacket (which was in the back seat while he was outside the car)
-Ct opted for a bright-line rule. Cops may examine contents of any containers found w/in the passenger compartment.
This is w/in grabable area of arrestee.
RULE: When a policeman has made lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an auto, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that auto.
Thornton v. US (2004) pg. 247 Extended Belton- extends to recent occupants! See Gant (pg. 13)
-Cop noticed stolen plates; T was already out of his car; searched T; Found drugs; Arrested T; Searched auto & found gun
-Belton rule applies so long as arrestee is the sort of recent occupant of vehicle such as P here.
-Search incident to arrest exception allows cop to search vehicle of a person after they have been arrested
Arizona v. Gant (2009) pg. 248; Stevens
When justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist, a warrantless search of the car is NOT justified to protect the officers
or prevent destruction of evidence. Distinguishes Belton/Thornton
-D arrested for driving w/ suspended license, handcuffed, locked in back of patrol car, searched car & found cocaine in
pocket of jacket on backseat.
-Search not lawful; Returns to justifications of Chimel: (1) Prevent Destruction of Evidence & (2) Protect the Police. Belton
doesnt authorize vehicle search incident to a recent occupants arrest after arrestee has been secured & cant access
interior of vehicle.
RULE: Can only search car after lawful arrest if:
(1) Arrestee is unsecured & w/in reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search; OR
(2) Reason to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
Note: Both Belton & Thornton would have had a basis for search based on number (2). Drug arrests.
Here: (1) Not met (handcuffed/in patrol car); (2) Not met (what evidence can you find in a car about suspended license?)
Knowles v. Iowa (1998) pg. 243- Traffic Citation vs. Arrest
-Stopped for speeding. Issued citation (state law allowed cops to take speeder directly to magistrate). No reason to believe
weapon/evidence in car, conducted full search, as expressly permitted by state law. Found weed & pipe.
-Threat to officer less when issuing traffic citation than custodial arrest- full car search violates 4 th Amndt.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) pg. 244- Arrest for minor offense
-P arrested & jailed for hournot wearing seatbelt. Searched & required to remove her items. She claimed City lacked
constitutional authority to permit custodial arrests for such a minor offense.
-If cop has PC to believe that an indiv has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, w/o
violating 4th Amndt, arrest the offender & conduct search incident to arrest.
Virginia v. Moore (2008) pg. 247- Arrest for minor offense
-A custodial arrest based on PC (violation of state law) is lawful for purposes of the 4th Amndt analysis.
Example: O has PC to believe that P (hair is wet) has been trespassing in a private lake. Arrests her & seizes her small purse,
& finds a ziplock bag of heroin inside. Robinson allows right to search purse absent the 2 Chimel justification (no evidence of
trespassing to be found in purse, & no indication that it contains a weapon that could be used against the officer). Gant,
however, would require one of the Chimel factors. Is Gant limited to autos?

Warrant Exception #3 that Require PC
Rationales: South Dakota v. Opperman (1976); pg. 276; 280; 421-Impounded vehicle
-Because of mobility, less rigorous warrant rqmts govern (expectation of privacy w/ respect to ones auto is


significantly less than that relating to a home or office)

Cardwell v. Lewis (1974) pg. 279
Lesser expectation of privacy in auto because its function is transportation & seldom serves as a residence or
repository of personal effects. Car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. Travels public thoroughfares
where both its occupants & its contents are in plain view.
Carroll v. US (1925) (in Chambers case starting on pg. 268); Taft
Exigent circs exception applies to car- car is mobile & can be out of jurisdiction in moments
-Bootlegging liquor, cops had PC they were bootlegging. Didnt know who was doing it, but knew car. Stopped car, searched
car, found liquor, arrested person. Did a search before arrest.
-Dont need warrant for car because its mobile. Unlikely car will remain in place while cops get warrant.
RULE: Warrantless search okay if officers have PC to believe contraband or other evidence of crim activity in the vehicle
Chambers v. Maroney (1970) pg. 268; White Inventory Search
There is a warrant exception to CARS. Still need PC for search.
-Golf service station robbed. 2 teens saw station wagon speed away from parking lot. Within hour, car found, 4 men arrested
& car driven to station. Car searched at station, cops found glove w/ coins, 2 guns, & attndts cards.
-Upheld warrantless search. Cops had PC to believe the car contained evidence of recent robbery & thus couldve lawfully
searched it on the road (under Carroll)-immediate search, it was Const-permissible to conduct delayed search as well.
RULE: Theres no difference between seizing & holding a car before presenting the PC issue to a magistrate & carrying out
an immediate search w/o a warrant.
Carroll & Chambers subjected cars to warrantless search when they are stopped on the road & police have PC to
believe seizable items are present. Scope of search defined by Ross & Acevedo
US v. Ross (1982); pg. 290- Defines scope of warrantless search of car. OVERRULES Robbins
-Police w/ PC from informant believed narcotics in auto. Found paper bag w/ heroin in trunk. 2 nd search at station & found
leather pouch in trunk w/ cash. No warrant.

-Premised on assumption that citizens have considerably less privacy expectations in their autos (open roads &
subjected already to regulation). Can search every part of vehicle to search it (including containers inside), that
may contain object of search. (Ex. cant search glove compartment for stolen tvs)
Preston v. US (1964) pg. 269- Search made later at diff location (no PC to believe evidence would be concealed in auto)
-Arrested for vagrancy. Car towed to garage. Cops went to garage & searched car. Articles found later submitted at trial.
-Once accused is arrested & in custody, then search made at another place, w/o warrant= NOT incident to the arrest.
-More of a search incident to arrest case- Would not meet Gant (1) or (2).
California v. Acevedo (1991) pg. 292; Blackmun CURRENT RULE
No warrant requirement to search container in vehicle if PC exists. Overruled Sander.
-D put container in his trunk that cops suspected had weed. Cops stopped D & searched container, leading to Ds arrest.
RULE: May search an automobile & containers w/in it when they have PC to believe contraband or evidence of crime
is present anywhere inside. Limitation: May only search where items may be hidden
Here, cops had PC to search trunk (knew container in trunk), cant search glove compart cause knew container was in trunk.
Acevedo Lessened privacy in the car
Overruled Sander explicitlyauto exception allows you to get into containers even if thats all you had PC fordont
need warrant anymore if auto exception would apply.
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999); pg. 299- May inspect passengers bags even if only PC to search car
-During car search, cop found syringe for drugs in passengers purse- cop seized. Cops originally did NOT have PC to
suspect her of drug use, nor was driver under arrest.


-Cops w/ PC to search car may inspect any passengers belongings in car that are capable of concealing the object of the
search. Its reas. w/o showing PC for each container. Passengers, no less than drivers, possess reduced expectation of
privacy w/ regard to prop they transport in cars. Moreover, degree of intrusiveness on personal privacy & personal dignity
of prop search is less than intrusiveness of a search of ones person.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) pg. 273; Murder suspect with cars in driveway
Cops DO need a warrant to search a car unless it is on the highway.
-At time of his arrest, 2 of his cars were parked in driveway. Over 2 hours after he was taken into custody, cars seized w/o
warrant. Cops search car for microscope evidence 2 years later, 1 year later, & 5 months after that.
Automobile exception doesnt apply because:
1. Not on road; &
2. Search took place so long later
RULE: To search a car w/o a warrant, car must have been stopped on road NOT parked in the
fleeting in driveway. Must be danger of it driving away to justify a PC search w/out a warrant.
Can warrantless search an auto stopped on the highway where theres PC because the car is movable, occupants are
alerted, & cars contends may never been found again if warrant must be obtained. Opp to search is fleeting.
Clashes with Chambersautomobile is enough, no other particular exigencies.
California v. Carney (1985) pg. 275; CJ Burger; Kid, motor home, sex, weed
Automobile exception=lesser degree of protection for motor vehicles because they can be quickly moved out of the area.
-Ct added that open nature of vehicles as compared w/ a permanent structure would warrant a lesser expectation of
privacy. Govt regulation of vehicles would also suggest lower expectation of privacy for a vehicle as compared to a fixed
structure. No longer about the difficulty of getting a warrant- more about the lesser expectation of privacy!
RULE: Search of mobile home justified under PC automobile exception. Reas. due to the fleeting nature of a mobile
home. (Can extend to airplanes/boats?)
(However, if mobile home is parked on a road, it is more likely to be considered a car than a home. If it is moving, it
IS a car. If it is on a lot, more likely to be considered a home).
Example: Police have PC to believe that Driver supplying weapons. Stop car. Place under arrest & search vehicle. Find
documentary evidence in trunk. By lawful arrest, cannot search trunk incident to arrest. By auto exception, could search any
part of car & any containers but need PC that evidence will be found within. No PC here.


State v. Ladson (Wash. 1999) pg. 260
Cops used traffic infraction as means to pull over ppl to initiate contact & questioning
Based on an unsubstantiated rumor, cops followed car to cite them for infraction, found w/ expired tags.
Stopped; driving w/o license; arrested; search incident to arrest; found weed.
Police had authority, unless the pretextual aspects of the case affect the analysis
Whren v. US (1996) pg. 261; Scalia
Cops subjective intentions dont matter in 4th Amndt
-Unmarked cop car saw suspicious motorist (looking at passengers lap). High drug area. Police turned around & car went at
an unreasonable speed. Cops stopped & observed 2 bags of cocaine.
-Unanimous. No judge thought reasonableness balancing test was a good idea. If there is PC, then seizure is fine.
-PC to believe law is broken outweighs private interest in avoiding police contact.
Illinois v. Lafayette (1983) pg. 238 Inventory Search
-Inventory search prior to getting into prison requires warrantless search w/o PC.
-Reasoning: (1) Protect arrestee from theft of her valuables in jail;
o (2) Reduce risk of false claims of theft by arrestee;


(3) Ensure that contraband & dangerous instrumentalities (might have been missed by police in initial search
incident to arrest) are not smuggled into jail.

Florida v. Wells (1990) pg. 263- Inventory Search must have a standardized policy regulating opening of containers
An inventory search must not be used as a ruse for general rummaging to discover incriminating evidence.
Colorado v. Bertine (1987); pg. 263 Inventory Search on the Scene
-Police stopped Ds van & arrested for drunken driving. Officer inventoried van on the scene w/o warrant. Police followed
standardized caretaking procedures & no evidence acting in bad faith for sole purpose of searching van for evidence.
-Inventory Search pursuant to standardized procedures is upheld unless Govt. acted in bad faith (searched car w/ sole
purpose of investigation).
US v. Villamonte-Marquez (1983) pg.264 Suspicionless boarding of a ship
-Warrantless boarding of sailboat by customs officials is valid. Accompanied by state policeman & following an informants
tip that a vessel in the ship channel was carrying marijuana. (Smelled marijuana while onboard reviewing documentation).
Officials relied on a statute that allowed them to come aboard to examine documents instead of PC, etc
Scott v. US (1978) pg. 264
-Subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.
RULE: Because of actual violation, doesnt matter whether cops had preconceived reason for stopping (racial or otherwise)


Searches unrelated to criminal investigations are judged on an open-ended reasonableness test
Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) pg.344 Health Code inspection of residential dwelling units.
-Reasonableness Clause: Balance public interest in enforcing safety codes vs. the relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizens privacy. This search was okay- not personal in nature/not aimed at evidence
-Limitation: need reasonable legislative/admin obj. standards for conducting an area inspection.
RULE: Rather than requiring individualized suspicion, look at reasonableness based on a weighing of the governmental
& individual interests. All that matters is evenhandedness in enforcement!
Warrantless: Under the new definition, PC existed & warrant clause was satisfied once Court concluded that the area
housing inspections, although lacking individualized suspicion, were reasonable.
Under PC- individual search looked at; With Admin reasonableness- examine entire program!
Weigh: Governmental Purpose
Privacy Concerns
Importance of the Administrative Objective to
1) Scope & Degree of Intrusion
the Public Interest
2) Degree of Discretion Allowed to Official
3) Degree of Expectation of Privacy
(Regulated vs. Non-regulated Business
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) pg. 432; OConnor
Primary Purpose matters!
-Invalidated traffic checkpoint program designed to interdict illegal narcotics because its primary purpose was to detect
evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Motivated by General Interest in Crime Control.
Illinois v. Lidster (2004); pg.439
-Police set up a highway checkpoint designed to elicit information from motorists about a hit-and-run.
-Here, primary purpose was NOT to determine whether motorists themselves implicated in crime but to seek their help in
solving the earlier crime. Additionally, only 10-15 sec. stops.
New Jersey v. TLO (1985); pg. 423 Special Needs Case- requires individualized suspicion (not PC)
-Principal searched students purse for violating public schools rule against smoking. Principal was seeking evidence.


-Balanced childs legitimate expectation of privacy vs. schools need to maintain an environment in which learning can take
place. No Warrant/PC std. Reasonable Grounds & Reasonable Search.
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009); pg. 424- Special Needs Case
-Intrusive strip search of subjects underwear for OTC drugs requires greater justification than TLO
Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001); pg. 442- Pregnant Women Drug Testing- Look at Ultimate Objective
-Not a special needs exception to warrant rqmt. Struck program down- pervasive participation of the police in monitoring
(and ultimately arresting users) precluded its characterization as Admin Special Needs
Veronica School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) pg. 441
-Policy required every student participating in athletics to submit to random urinalysis for drugs.
-Upheld testing. Athletes have lesser expectation of privacy because of routine medical exams; dress together in locker room
& voluntarily participate in regulated sports. Not an intrusive test either.
Intrusion on Students 4th Amndt Interests
Schools Legitimate Interest in Detecting Drug Use
Board of Education v. Earls (2002) pg. 441 Extended Acton
-Upheld Student Activities Drug Testing Policy requiring any middle/high school students participating in extracurricular
activities to submit to random drug testing.
NY v. Burger (1987); pg. 263 Warrantless Inspections allowed if entity part of closely-regulated industry IF:
-Admin Searches permitted in highly-regulated industries where scheme furthers a substantial govt interest, is authorized
by statute, there is notice to those regulated & limits on admins discretion. Upheld warrantless admin inspection at
Automobile Junkyard. Didnt appear to be a pretext for obtaining evidence.
US v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976); pg. 426 Fixed Checkpoints OK!
-Vehicle occupants may be stopped for questioning at fixed interior checkpoints w/o individualized suspicion.
US v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975); pg. 426; Roving Border Patrols need RS to detain
-Roving border patrols need reas. suspicion of criminal activity to detain the car occupants briefly.
-Reasonable Suspicion Test= Officers observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly & investigate the circs that provoke suspicion.
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990) pg. 426; CJ Rehnquist
Sobriety Checkpoints do not violate 4th Amndt.
-Balance: (1) State interest in preventing accidents, (2) effectiveness in achieving this goal, & (3) level of intrusion of an
individuals privacy caused by checkpoints. (Brown v. Texas balancing test)
Delaware v. Prouse (1979) pg. 428; Random stops to apprehend unlicensed drivers/unsafe vehicles NOT Const.
-No empirical evidence indicated that such stops would be an effective means of promoting roadway safety. (2) from Sitz
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989); pg. 441 Warrant Rqmt. would frustrate obj.
-Testing not designed to serve ordinary needs of law enforcement; so balance public interest against the privacy concerns
implicated by the tests to assess reasonability. Purpose frustrated if Warrant reqd because drugs/alcohol would dissipate.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn (1989); pg. 441 Warrant Rqmt. frustrates obj.
-Because of limited discretion under drug-testing regs, surpassing safety interests served by toxicological tests & diminished
expectation of privacy that attaches to info pertaining to the fitness of covered employees, it is reasonable to conduct tests in
absence of a warrant or RS that any particular employee is impaired.
Chandler v. Miller (1997) pg. 442 Unreasonable- drug screening for candidates of public office.
-Positions did not involve high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks.


Consent & search incident to a lawful arrest are the two of the most common exceptions to PC requirement.
Dont need PC at all when have consent.
-Can withdraw consent after giving it.
-Can place restrictions on consent (major ways, TIME & PLACE)
-But if during search, cops establish PC to continue, then they can continue despite your withdrawal of
-If cop says, I have a warrant to search your house, may I come in?
o This may be determined to be consent.
o But, if the paper isnt a real warrant, then definitely not consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) pg. 311; Stewart
Warrantless searches incident to arrest are justified on ground that cops must protect themselves from possible attack &
prevent destruction of evidence.
-Cop stopped car w/ 6 ppl inside- one headlight & license plate light out. Driver w/o license. Cop asked all get out & asked
permission to search vehicle. Said, sure, go ahead. Nobody threatened with arrest prior to this time.Bro helped w/ search
by opening trunk & glove compartment. No RS to search. Cops found stolen checks.
-Court Rejected knowledge of right to refuse as prerequisite for effective consent. This is just a factor.
-Adopts Voluntariness Standard evaluated on basis of Totality of Circumstances.
RULE: When subject of search isnt in custody & State attempts to justify a search on basis of his consent, 4 th/14th Amndts
require that it demonstrate that consent was in fact voluntarily given, & not result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
How to define voluntariness? Take into account evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, & lack of any
effective warnings to person of his rights; & the voluntariness of any statement taken under those conditions has
been carefully scrutinized to determine whether it was voluntarily given.
**Totality of the Circumstances**
Ohio v. Robinette (1996) pg. 319 Cop need not tell motorist he is free to leave. Knowledge of ability to leave just 1 factor
O pulled R over for speeding. Gave back license & issued warning. O sought consent & searched car finding small amt of
weed/pills. R argued consent was involuntary because wasnt informed by O that he was free to go after return of license.
-Affirmed conviction- Although knowledge is a factor in voluntariness analysis, no categorical requirement that cops inform
detainees that theyre free to go before consent to search may be deemed voluntary.
Bumper v. NC (1968) pg. 320 Coercion nullifies consent!
-4 white cops went to 66 yr old AfAm widow. Cop said had warrant to search house, she said, go ahead.
-Where there is coercion there cant be consent. No Consent here! Must not be the product of threats, pressure,
intimidation, or harassment. Mere submission to overpowering authority does not constitute consent.
Kaupp v. Texas (2003)- No Consent. 17 year boy awaken at 3 AM in bedroom. Cop asked to talk & boy said ok.
-This was NOT consent but a mere submission to authority.
See Also Florida v. Bostick (pg. 21) & United States v. Drayton (pg. 21)


Georgia v. Randolph (2006) pg. 322; Souter
-Separated Spouses live together. Wife consents to search, other doesnt. Police cant search.
-When ppl live together, resolution comes from voluntary accommodation- if disagree figure it out themselves. One does
not have greater authority than the other.
-Objection prevails over consent because of customary social usage. / Subjective expectation of privacy.
-If emergency situation exists likes domestic violence, warrantless entry might be allowed.
-Info from consenting co-tenant may provide enough information to establish PC to get warrant.
Note: Must have (actual or apparent) authority for AREA that evidence is taken!
United States v. Matlock (1974) pg. 322 Actual Common Authority


-GF sharing Ds bedroom could consent to search, thereby waiving his rights.
-If party is absent, & their roommate consents to search, the search is okay.
Minnesota v. Olson (1990) pg. 456
-Overnight houseguests have a legit. expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters because its unlikely that host will
admit someone who wants to see/meet w/ the guest over the objection of the guest. Customary Social Usage
Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) pg. 336; Scalia
If a person living at the home says its ok to search, then its ok to search. Apparent Authority
-Woman consented didnt live at the home. At the time, police had reas. belief that she did, so the search was still ok. If they
wouldnt have had reas. belief that she did, search would not have been ok. Objective basis for common authority.
RULE: Warrantless entry into home is valid if cops reasonably believe person has authority to consent.
3rd party need not have actual authority over the areaapparent authority will suffice.
Where facts & surrounding circs known to cop warrant a man of reas caution to conclude that consenting party had authority
over premises, consent is valid even if actual authority is absent.
Florida v. Jimeno (1991) pg. 342 Scope of Consented Auto Search
-Motorist consents for car search. Scope of the search may extend to anywhere in the vehicle where narcotics may be hidden
(including a paper bag inside the car). Typically, scope is whatever a reas person would have consented for cop to search.


Policy: Once item is spotted in plain view, warrant is needless inconvenience that would not help privacy.
Triggered AFTER lawful entry- never is justification for the entry.
Plain View Rules- Officer may make warrantless seizure of incriminating items while being lawful.
1. Officer is lawfully present at place from which evidence can be plainly viewed.
2. Seizing officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.
3. Immediately apparent that item is contraband or evidence of crime w/o necessity for any further exam. or search.
4. Horton: inadvertent viewing (didnt mean to see/wasnt planning on ahead of time) [not required]
Horton v. California (1990) pg. 299; Stevens
Search was authorized by the warrant; the seizure was authorized by the plain-view doctrine.
-PC to search home. Got search warrant. During search, no stolen prop, but saw weapons in plain view & seized them.
-Any manipulation of an object is a search itself & needs to be justified (e.g. looking for a gun & looked under a turntable)
RULE: Inadvertence is not a nec condition to plain view seizures. As long as cop had prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused & so long as the scope of the
search is not enlarged in the slightest, it is constitutional.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971); pg. 301
-Police seized 2 autos parked in plain view on Ds driveway in course of arresting D, violated the 4 th Amndt.
-The plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. Plain View alone is not enough to justify warrantless seizure of evidence (Prong 2)
-For Prong (2)- Ask whether the evidence is going anywhere. Is it in danger of disappearing or is there time to get a warrant?
Arizona v. Hicks (1987) pg. 305; Scalia
Had RS but no PC
-Gun fired through the roof & shot man in arm. Cops came into apt (because exigent circs), found & seized weapons.
Officer saw expensive stereo components & thought (no PC though) stolen so recorded their serial #s. Impossible for cop to
see w/o turning over turntable-that action amounts to a search (action unrelated to objectives of the authorized intrusion).
Called HQs & they said turntable from armed robbery- he immediately seized it. Articulable facts that provide a basis for RS.
Holding: Plain View S or S requires PC. (1) Was a search but was not a seizure. (2) Was not reasonable.
RULE: Need PC to invoke plain view doctrine. Plain view w/o PC cant replace PC requirement.



Significance of Terry v. Ohio

1) Terry transported Caramas reasonableness balancing test from realm of admin searches to traditional
criminal investigations & used it to determine the reas. of certain warrantless S&Ss, rather than merely to
define PC.
2) Terry recognized that S&Ss can vary in their intrusiveness
3) Because of Terry, cops may now conduct a wide array of S&Ss that are considered less than ord intrusive, on
the basis of a lesser std of cause than PC
Terry v. Ohio (1968) pg. 34; CJ Warren
-Cop suspicious w/ D & 2 friends from his experiences. Went up after suspicious movements (casing store) & considered
his duty to investigate. Only knew what he saw. Cop used authority & told them to stop. Cop frisks them & finds guns.
Less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence but
Substantial Chance or Fair Probability of Criminal
considerably more than an inchoate & unparticularized
Activity (Illinois v. Gates)
suspicion or hunch. Officer may use unique experience &
training (U.S. v. Arvizu) to make determination.
-No PC, but reas prudent man wouldve believed Terry was armed & presented threat to officers safety. Weapon found. This
seizure not a violation of 4th Amndt. because seizure was meant to protect officers safety. Officers safety outweighed
Terrys right to personal security.
RULE: Stop/Frisk is search & seizure regulated by 4th Amndt & must be reas; to be reas, must be based on reas suspicion.
Ct defines seizure as: physical force or showing of authority, has restrained liberty of citizen
Ct defines search as: Serious intrusion on sanctity of a person.
PC standard: substantial chance or fair probability of criminal activity
Scope: Ltd by exigencies that justify its initiation, therefore restricted to that which is nec. to discover weapons
(usually an initial pat-down) to determine if weapon followed by reach into pockets if pat down reveals the likely
presence of a weapon.
US v. Hensley (1985) pg. 363
-Stops are allowed if cops have RS, grounded in specific & articulable facts that a person they encounter was involved
in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony. Terry stop may be applied to investigate that suspicion.
Here, wanted flyer from robbery sent to other police precincts. Police recognized suspect from flyer.
Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) pg. 363 Plain Feel Doctrine- If cop lawfully pats down a suspects outer clothing &
feels an object whose contour/mass makes its identity immediately apparent, then may warrantlessly seize.
-Here, Cocaine inadmissible because cop had to squeeze around, feel, & manipulate contents in pocket to figure out it was
cocaineregular frisk showed no weapon.
Contour of Mass- Ex. Handgun; Officer can call upon his training & experience (other factors) to make this determination.
Adams v. Williams (1972) pg. 365 High Crime Area factored into Reasonableness
-Informant told officer (in high-crime area) that D had gun. Saw D in car; D rolled window down. Cop reached in & grabbed
gun from Ds belt. Here: (1) Tip was not PC BUT allowed to make forcible stop; (2) When approaching car, ToC
warranted officer to believe safety at risk= allows ltd Terry search to uncover weapons; (3) Discovery of gun
corroborated informants tip & authorized arrest of suspect. (4) Search of vehicle was incidental to arrest.
Illinois v. Caballes (2005) pg. 365 Dog Sniffs & RS
-Cops lawfully stopped D for speeding. Used dog to sniff vehicle for drugs. Cops lacked RS to believe car contained drugs.
-Seizure thats justified only by interest in giving warning ticket can become unlawful if prolonged beyond time reasonably
required to complete mission. Here, dog-sniff didnt extend Ds seizure.
Arizona v. Johnson Traffic Stop Rule (2009) pg. 366 Terry Automobile Stops
Rqmts: 1) Detention must be lawful; 2) Cop must reasonably suspect person armed & dangerous.


-Here, driver suspected of carrying a weapon so police ordered passenger out of vehicle and conducted a patdown (officer
had a reasonable belief that passenger was armed & dangerous).
-Cops inquiries into matters unrelated to justification for traffic stop dont convert encounter into something other than
lawful seizure; as long as inquiries dont measurably extend duration of stop


Dunaway v. NY (1979) pg. 367; Brennan
An investigatory stop that lasts too long turns into a de facto arrest.
-Cop had lead from informant that P was involved in attempted robbery that killed pizza shop owner. Not enough for PC.
-Picked up P and brought him into station. Not under arrest but not free to leave.= De Facto Arrest
-Arrest violated the 4th Amndt. Didnt matter that cops didnt actually arrest P; since P was seized for an unreas. amt of time,
he was under a de facto arrest, & therefore the cops needed more than RS to keep him there.
Line crossed from seizure to de facto arrest when the person is not free to go; long duration; interrogation
RULE: Violates 4th & 14th Amndts when, w/o PC, seized petitioner & transported him to police station for interrogation.

FACTORS to consider: (1) Duration, (2) Degree of Intrusion, (3) Amount of Force
Florida v. Royer (1983) pg. 370- Degree of Intrusion- Airport Ticket/License
-Here, cops at airport approached D & asked questions. Cop took license/ticket & asked to accompany to room; D followed
to room & they asked for consent to search luggage. Approaching & asking questions is fine. Here, went beyond.
-Cops conceded lacked PC to arrest Royer. Enough of a seizure to make it a de facto arrest.
-More intrusive than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention authorized by Terry. What Cops should have done:
Given back ticket/license & said he was free to leave BEFORE asking to accompany to room.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) pg. 372 Degree of Intrusion
-Cop saw bulge in jacketwas a gun. Wouldnt have been seen if not asked to get out of car.
-When cop legally stops car for traffic violation, he may order driver out of car w/o further justification- being asked to
expose very little more of his person than already exposed.
May stop car IF at least articulable & reasonable suspicion
Maryland v. Wilson (1997) pg. 372 EXTENDS Mimms to passengers!
-If car is stopped for traffic stop (or under RS), cop justified to order passengers out of car too- public interest of cop
US v. Sharpe (1985) pg. 373- Rejected 20-minute limit proposed by Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
-Camper/car driving in tandem pulled overofficer smelled weed, found bales, & arrested.
-Much as a bright line rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreas, common sense &
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.

US v. Mendenhall (1980) pg. 375; Stewart & Rehnquist joined
Person is seized if, in view of all circs surrounding incident, a reas person would believe she was not free to leave.
-After observing D de-board a plane (she fit in a manner characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics, DEA asked
to see her ID & ticket, which were issued in diff names. They gave her ticket back (could walk away). Agents asked her to
accompany them to the airport DEA office for further questions. She agreed to a search (after being told she could refuse).
-Problem in Mendenhall: Cops intimidate people into thinking they cannot leave. See Drayton (pg. 21)
-Here- not seized. Mendenhall voluntarily consented to search & accompany to office.
RULE: Person has been seized w/in meaning of 4th Amndt. only if in view of all of circs surrounding incident, a
reas person would have believed that he was not free to leave.
Distinction here w/ Royer- Gave papers back!
US v. Drayton (2002) pg. 383; Kennedy CURRENT RULE


4th Amndt. says that the officers dont have to tell people then can refuse to be searched.
-Officers searched a bus. Did not inform ppl of their right to refuse search, but asked everyone if they could search them.
-This was fine; Must scrupulously look at whether consent was coerced, however. Reas. Person test here said no coercion.
-Coercion signaled by: Force; Intimidating Movement; Brandishing Weapons; Blocking Exits; Threats; Command
-Consent can be invalidated if ppl didnt reasonably feel as though they could TERMINATE THE ENCOUNTER w/ cops.
-Although ppl may not have felt ok to leave, a reas person could have terminated the encounter. No seizure here.
RULE: Officers dont have to tell people then can refuse to be searched. Depends on if a reas person would feel free to
decline officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Florida v. Bostick (1991); pg.3852 cops requested bus passengers consent to search luggage- found cocaine after he
agreed. In this case, feeling free to leave a bus is difficult. Remanded for addl info. Turns on whether there was coercion
-Use Drayton Rule of reasonable person. Location can be one factor into whether there is coercion.
-Factors here: Guns not removed or pointed, advised he could refuse consent to search luggage.
INS v. Delgado (1984); pg. 368 Asking Questions/ID is not, by itself, a seizure. Weapon in holster not dispositive
-INS agents wearing badges & questioning workers in factory = NO seizure- presence of a holstered firearm is unlikely to
contribute to the coerciveness of encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973); pg. 311
-Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that cops must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when
seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search
Bus Sweeps: Cops act w/o articulable suspicion in deciding which buses to board & which passengers to approach
for interviewing.
California v. Hodari D. (1991) pg. 391; Scalia
Dont have to submit to authority to be seized. If you feel free to terminate the encounter, if theres been a show of
authority that has been submitted- they must grab you (thats a seizure) or must order you to do something & you do it.
-Cops in street clothes in unmarked car. 5 kids huddled around red car, saw unmarked cop car & fled- car left at high rate of
speed. One ran by foot, chucked a rock (later found cocaine) & tackled by cops.
-Kid wasnt seized at time he dropped drugs. Seizure isnt when cop yells, Stop, in the name of the law!
-Must be actual application of force or submission to police authority for a seizure to occur.
RULE: Hands on OR submit to officer + getting booked OR detained for a long time = ARREST
In order to be seized: 1. The officer must have applied physical force OR
2. The D must have submitted to the authority of the officer.
Here, no physical force AND D did not submit to authority (he ran)
Brendlin v. Cal. (2007) pg. 394 Standing implication- See Rakas (pg. 24)
-A car passenger, not only the driver, is seized as result of a police-ordered traffic stop. Note, if passenger jumps out of
car and starts running, then Hodari would say no seizure.

Reasonable Suspicion Justification needed for a Terry stop.
Less than PC; More than a hunch; Must be some articulable facts
Facts must point to somethingobjective & articulable about particular person
If based on anon tip, need some sort of predictive quality to it if you dont know anything about basis of knowledge
Alabama v. White (1990) pg. 396; White
Here, ToC used to establish RS in order to do a Terry stop of car (Michigan v. Long) vs. in Gates, where the ToC was used to
establish PC to get a warrant.
-An anon tip received by cops. Ability of the informant to predict future behavior plus the detail of his tip led tip to be ok.
Plus, cops investigated & corroborated the tipsters claim.
Both facts-quantity & quality-considered in the totality of the circumstances (as Illinois v. Gates,- PC).


RULE: When the officers stopped D, the anon tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish RS that D was engaged in
criminal activity & that the investigative stop therefore did not violate the 4 th Amndt.
Florida v. JL (2000); pg. 401- ANON TIP: NO innocent info; Need Predictive Info for RS.
-Anon tip that young, black man in plaid at bus stop has gun isnt, alone, sufficient to justify cops stop & frisk of them.
-Problems w/ Anon Tips: 1) No ability to assess credibility/reputation for honesty of tipper; AND 2) No ability to hold
informant accountable for false reporting. A known informant may be assessed for reliability.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial D.Ct. (2004); pg. 403; Asking for Identification
-Asking for ID alone not a seizure. BUT officers action must be justified (reason. related in scope to the circs that justified
interference in the first place); Here, asking for identification has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, & practical
demands of a Terry stop. Additionally, if asking for ID is reas.-related, a state can criminalize failure of D producing ID.
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000); CJ Rehnquist
Running from cops+being in a high crime area=RS. RS is less than what you need for PC, but more than a hunch.
-2 Cops part of police caravan in high crime area. D looked in direction & then fled. Court notes this was unprovoked flight
vs. holding in Florida v. Royer (pg. 21) where ct said no indication of guilt if just go on your business.
Note: See Sibron (pg. 8)- Flight alone would not be sufficient for RS.
RULE: Nervous, evasive behavior & location in high crime area are relevant factors in determining RS nec for Terry stop.


Maryland v. Buie (1990) pg. 410; White
Terry frisk of a housecalled a protective sweep. Must be in conjunction w/ arrest? (some lower cts say just lawful entry)
-Armed robbery at pizza place. Guy in red running suit. Arrest warrant for B. Called Bs home first to ensure there (Payton
(pg. 8)). Cops went in & said 3 times: this is the police, show me your hands. Guy showed & arrested, searched,
handcuffed. Red running suit found.
-Must be articulable facts which, taken together w/ rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reas. prudent
officer in believing that area to be swept harbors an indvidual posing a danger to those on arrest scene.
-Scope: May extend only to cursory inspection to where person may hide.
When go into house w/arrest warrant & worried for officer safety, you can search for a person.
Cant search for a gun because only usable when person is there.all subject to reason. std.
-When find person, can arrest & then do a search incident to arrest. Dont have to stop protective sweep when find
person, but can stop search for person.
-Can also use evidence in plain view attained during sweep.
US v. Place (1983) pg. 416 (See pg. 24 for dog sniff analysis); Duration as beyond scope of Terry
-DEA approached P at airport- requested info & sought consent to search bagsrefused. Said theyd take his bags to get
search warrant. Instead, took to dog sniff. Positive to 1 bag. Agents held bags all weekend for warrant.
-Seizing a persons luggage for an entire weekend until a warrant may be obtained beyond scope of a valid Terry stop.
Michigan v. Long (1983) pg. 418 Terry extended to search of passenger compartment of AUTO
-Car swerved into ditch. D looked drunk. Cop saw hunting knife on floorboard. Cop subjected L to frisk & no weapons. Put
light inside for other weapons & found weed. Arrested for weed. Had articulable facts.
-If cop has reason to believe driver or occupant is armed & dangerous, then may frisk & also conduct ltd search of
interior of car immediately w/in subjects control. Even if suspect held outside car. Possible may break away or have
access to weapons in car after released. About safety, but if finds contraband, it is admissible.

Requires suppression of evidence obtained in violation of Ds constitutional rights See Mapp v. Ohio
Deterrence Motivation: Cops less likely violate 4th Amndt if know that fruits of unconst. conduct excluded from crim trial.
Standing: The Starting Point
Alderman v. US (1969) pg. 445; White


-Ds sought to have incriminating stmts excluded because 1 or both of them were the subject of unlawful govt wiretap
-Each D would have to prove that he, personally, had standing to raise the 4th Amendment claim. Here, they did.
-Ex. Bs home subjected to unlawful search & A implicated. A cannot claim unlawful search of Bs home.
Rule: Suppression of product of a 4th Amndt violation is successfully urged only by those whose rights violated by search
itself, not by those aggrieved solely by intro of damaging evidence. Co-conspirators & Co-Ds have no special standing.
Rakas v. Illinois (1978) pg. 448; Rehnquist
-Police stop car. Passengers seek to suppress rifle/shells in glove compartment. Did not own car. Claimed items not theirs.
STANDING: Has this particular Ds reas. expectations of privacy been intruded upon?
-Doesnt matter if there is a prop right, it is whether D has a reas. expectation of privacy in place/property.
-What Constitutes a Legit Expectation of Privacy?- (1) Right to Exclude (exercising exclusive control); (2) Using place in
a private manner? (Ex. Open Fields distinction); (3) Took normal precautions to maintain privacy?
-Here, rights not violated- no asserted prop interest in the place (glove compartment & area beneath seat) searched nor in
items seized (claimed rifle/shells werent theres) => no expect. of privacy. See Brendlin (pg.22), if stop was illegal, then
passenger could use fruits doctrine to challenge.

SAMPLE: The right to challenge a search or seizure as a violation of the 4th Amndt turns on whether the person
who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place (through
a possessory interest, use interest, or within exclusive control- Rawlings holds that ownership of item seized is not
dispositive). Rakas required a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of
the D which the 4th Amndt was designed to protect. Burden is placed on D. Factors examined for this inquiry
include (see above 3); (Ex. Keys? Financial/Possessory interest in items seized?)
Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980); pg. 466; Ownership alone is NOT Dispositive!
-D challenged a search of his companions purse (he had hidden drugs).
-Although he had ownership claim, rights not implicated. The following facts relating to Ds interest in purse were
relevant: 1)Rawlings had known his companion for only a few days at the time of the sudden bailment;
2) He had never sought nor received access to the purse before;
3) No right to exclude others from purse & on the very morn of search, friend had rummaged through the purse;
4) Precipitous nature of Rs placing drugs in purse showed failure to take normal precautions to maintain privacy;
& 5) R admitted no subjective expectation that purse would be free from govt. intrusion.
Minnesota v. Olson (1990) pg.456 Standing ltd to persons who own/have close connection to place searched
-Overnight guest (no key) & was never alone in the home has standing. Court said that society recognizes a guests
expectation of privacy in the hosts home in such a situation.
Minnesota v. Carter (1998) pg. 458; Rehnquist
-D went into apt for sole purpose of packaging cocaine in exchange for some of the product, spent only 2 hrs there & had
never been to the apt before. Using house simply as a place of business.
-No standing to challenge a search. Business guest had no expectation of privacy.
-Lacking a possess. interest in or a close connection the place searched, D will not be permitted to pursue their claims of
unconstitutional search & seizure.
Standing should be observed before ANYTHING!
US v. Calandra (1974) pg. 467 4th Amendment exclusionary rule doesnt apply in grand jury proceedings.
-Exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy rather than a Const. right. Cost-benefit analysis weighed minimal deterrent
effect of suppression in grand jury proceedings vs. cost of keeping relevant info from GJ.
US v. Janis (1976) pg. 468- No Exclusionary Rule for civil actions (Here, brought by IRS to collect taxes)
-Exclusionary rule, never applied to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, fed or state.
-Deterrence benefit of extending exclusionary rule to non-criminal proceedings (civil suits, deportation or disbarment
proceedings) would be comparatively slight, whereas the social costs of exclusion would be severe.


US v. Havens (1980); pg. 469 Impeachment Exception

-Havens subjected to search & shirt seized that linked to cocaine carried by other person. Shirt was suppressed. At trial,
Havens denied having any connection to shirt. Prosecution was then permitted to introduce shirt to challenge credibility.
-Prosecution may not use illegally-obtained evidence during its case-in-chief, but may do so if D misrepresents.
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991); pg. 556- Harmless Error Doctrine extended to admission at trial of coerced confession.
-If Ct. determines jury would have convicted D even in absence of coerced stmt, then conviction affirmed. Cts consider: (1)
whether conviction depended on jurors believing confession; (2) whether jurys evaluation of an addl uncoerced confession
relied on its relation to coerced confession; & (3) whether admission of coerced confession led to admission of other evidence


When violate Const. rights- whether violation is intentional, reckless, negligent, or even innocentevidence obtained in
violation of those rights may not be used at that Ds criminal trial. Bright-line rule doesnt apply anymore
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US (1920) pg. 469
-To protect 4th Amndt, the essence of a provision forbidding acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all
Walder v. US (1954) pg. 470 Primary Fruits Case
-Govt. cant violate the 4th Amndt & use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction.
-Nor can the Govt. make indirect use of such evidence for its case, or support a conviction on evidence obtained through
leads from the unlawfully obtained evidence.
Independent Source Doctrine
Warrant is based on sources independent of the
illegal entry.
Attenuation or Dissipation of Taint Illegally-seized evidence is not fruit if: (1) an act of Wong Sun & Ceccolini
freewill by D; (2) Lengthy causal chain between
illegality and seizure of the evidence; OR (3) long
time period between illegality & seizure of evidence.
Inevitable Discovery Exception
An in-progress search would have resulted in the
discovery of the evidence in question.
Murray v. US (1988) pg. 471; Scalia
Officers illegally entered & found weed bales. Got warrant, then reentered warehouse to seize weed.
-Independent Source Doctrine: Evidence admissible if warrant based on sources independent of the illegal entry.
RULE: So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may be difficult to
establish where seized goods are kept in polices possession) there is no reason why indpt source doctrine shouldnt apply.
Nix v. Williams (1984)- Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Derivative Evidence Doctrine
Cops deliberately elicted an incriminating stmt from W in absence of his counsel. Christian burial speech. Despite violation
of 6th Amndt, evidence concerning body was later introduced at trial.
-If the prosecution can est info inevitably wouldve been discovered by lawful means- here, the volunteers search- then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.
Otherwise, the Govt. would be put in a worse position than if no illegality had transpired.
-There must be a basis in fact, readily verifiable, for the conclusion that discovery would have occurred.
-OTHER EXAMPLES: Unlawful search incident to arrest produced evidence that would have inevitably been discovered
by drug-sniffing dog; Drugs in plain view discovered in violation of Miranda admissible because already had search warrant;
Inevitable discover did not apply when failure to abide by knock-and-announce rule & saw items in plain view.
Wong Sun v. US (1963) pg. 478; Brennan
Toy told cops about drugs at Laundromat. Cops went to Laundromat & asked Yee. Cops arrested him w/o reas cause,
searched place, found nothing, & then Yee said Wong Sun had drugs. Cops went there & found drugs.
-How far does Taint from Poisonous Tree go? What are admissible fruits?
-Toy stmts excluded because direct product of unlawful arrest. Yees stmts & narcotics found in his home also suppressed
because arrived at solely/directly by using illegally-obtained info from Toy.


-However, Wong Suns stmts were admissible against Toy because its connection to the initial illegality was attenuated. Wong
Sun made stmts voluntarily AFTER being released. Free Will!
Factors in assessing whether the poison of a const. violation has been attenuated:
1. Time period between illegality & acquisition of secondary evidence: In Ceccolini, 4
2. Occurrence of intervening events: More links in causal chain => more attenuation.
3. Flagrancy of the initial illegality: More deliberate means a more flagrant const.
violation. In Ceccolini, officer inadvertently discovered evidence- exclusionary rule
would not have deterred.
4. The presence or absence of an act of free will by others resulting in the seizure of fruitActs that demonstrate free will (Wong Suns voluntary stmt) may break chain
altogether. Miranda warning also could be intervening event in the analysis.
Brown v. Illinois (1975) pg. 482- Miranda Warnings & Attenuation
-Rejected proposed bright-line rule that Miranda warnings automatically untaint subsequent confessions.
-Whether a post-Miranda-warning stmt (which is a fruit of a 4 th Amndt violation) is untainted is resolved on a case-by-case
basis, based on the totality of the circs. Miranda Warnings just ONE factor!
New York v. Harris (1990);
-Police had PC but no arrest warrant when arresting Harris in his home. Harris made incriminating statements.
-Must weigh costs of exclusion vs. deterrent purpose served. Station house stmts not excluded (only house stmts because of
violation of Payton). Distinguished Brown, because there was no PC there.
U.S. v. Ceccolini (1978) pg. 483 Attenuation
-Unlawful discovery of betting slips led police to a witness who testified against shop owner.
-A witness willing to testify requires a closer, more direct link between illegality & type of testimony to justify
suppression as compared to physical evidence.
-Why? Witnesss exercise of free will in deciding to testify is a significant intervening act that breaks the chain of
causation from the initial illegality.


US v. Leon (1984) pg. 484 White
-Search Warrant for Leons home. Judge made a mistake issuing warrant & it was invalid. However, police acted in good
faith so their search was ok. Leon challenged that warrant inadequate on its face.
-The officers reliance on the magistrates determination of PC was obj. reas & application of extreme sanction of exclusion
is inappropriate. Marginal/nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cant justify the subst costs of exclusion.
-Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if magistrate in issuing a warrant was misled by info in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or wouldve known was false except for reckless disregard of truth. Franks v. Delaware
RULE: In absence of an allegation that magistrate abandoned his detached & neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if
officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing affidavit or could not have harbored an obj. reas. belief in existence of PC.
Good faith exception applies if: reas cop relies on it & has everything reqd. to make it valid so could go execute it.
If dont know violating the 4th Amndt, how can you be deterred from it? (meaning exclusionary rule wont apply)
Mass v. Sheppard (1984); pg. 496- Magistrate said he would fix error in the description of items to be seized- never did.
-Court permitted intro of evidence obtained from a search conducted pursuant to warrant (violated particularity requirement)
because officers executing the warrant acted in objective good-faith.
Groh v. Ramirez (2004); pg. 497- Warrant did not say anything to be seized- was particularized only in affidavit.
-Warrant issued was plainly invalid- failed altogether to comply with the particularity rqmt. of the 4th Amndt.
-Warrant was so obviously deficient that Court must regard the search as warrantless w/in meaning of case law.


NOTE: Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1) limits period during which search warrant may be executed to 10 days!
Hudson v. Michigan (2006) pg. 498; Scalia
-Warrant for drugs & firearms at Hs house. Cops found both. Cops knocked & waited 3-5 seconds before entering unlocked
door. No exclusionary rule for violation of knock & announce rule!
-Social costs of applying exclusionary rule to knock & announce violations are considerable; incentive for violations is
minimal to begin & the extant deterrences against them are substantial- incomparably greater than factors deterring
warrantless entries when Mapp was decided.
RULE: Exclusionary rule doesnt apply because little extra amt of deterrence. Must look at incremental deterrence, each
little part of the rule. (like an extra 20 seconds)
Herring v. US (2009) pg. 513 CJ Roberts
-Similar to Leon except person who made mistake was clerk for police dept.- supposed to maintain arrest warrants. Faulty
database info on arrest warrants
-Police action must be deliberate. Here, not deliberate, so exclusion has little deterrent effect.
Davis v. North Carolina (2011); pg. 520 Rule Change
Police followed Belton in searching Ds car incident to arrest, but Gant modified those rules while his case was on appeal &
search was now unlawful.
-Police conduct was not deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, so no exclusion.

3 ways regulating law of confessions/interrogations
1) Due Process (14th Amndt Fundamental Fairness)Voluntariness
Rule 1: Torture creates involuntary confessions- sufficient condition for involuntary confession, thus
violating Due Process Clause (if govt agents torturing you)
Rule 2: Not torture
2) Self-IncriminationMiranda
3) Right to Counsel- Massiah
Why is Voluntariness/Due Process Important? Provides alternative method for challenging confessions where Miranda is
not applicable (not in custody or not subjected to interrogation)
Brown v. Mississippi; (1936) pg. 12; CJ Hughes
-Guy (black) beaten until confessed
-Confession was coerced due to the beating/whippings/pain suffered.
RULE: Confession will not be admitted into evidence if coerced through substantial physical abuse.
Rogers v. Richmond (1961) pg. 555- Cop pretended to summon mans ill wife for questioning- caused confession.
-Court must ask whether the suspect was subjected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused shouldnt
be subjected. Concern: not-freely self-determined confession. Will overborne.
Colorado v. Connelly (1986); pg. 537- C initiated contact w/ police & later confessed to unsolved murder from months
earlier. Psychiatrist said he suffered from command auditory hallucinations => involuntary?
Ct says No! Not the product of police overreaching. It is police-conduct that determines involuntariness.
Must be the product of POLICE Overreaching! Police must have exploited this mental condition.
P after Connelly must show: (1) police subjected him to coercive conduct & (2) conduct operated on him (given his
vulnerabilities & the conditions of interrogation) to produce the involuntary statement. See Below
DUE PROCESS INVOLUNTARINESS TEST (Is confession voluntary or involuntary?)
1) Police must have subjected the suspect to coercive conduct; THEN Court will look at:
2) Conduct was sufficient to overcome the will of the suspect (given the suspects particular vulnerabilities & the conditions
of the interrogation) thus producing an involuntary statement.


-(2) Invokes ToC. Factor Set 1: Vulnerabilities/Characteristics of suspect including: age, education level, mental stability,
state of sobriety, & familiarity w/ criminal justice process.
Factor Set 2: Manner of Police Conducted Interrogation including: trickery, deception, threats, promises of leniency, the
deprivation of access to family, friends, or nourishment, police advisement of rights, whether subjected to any physical or
psychological mistreatment.
Ex. The manipulative tactics used here did not produce psychological pressure strong enough to overbear the will of a
mature, experienced man, who was suffering from no mental/physical illness and was interrogated for less than an hour at a
police station close to his name. Extremely Fact-Specific!
Same test to determine if compelled for Miranda
Promises (not dispositive): Bram; Threats: Fulminante Drugs: Townsend
Lisenba v. California (1941) pg. 538; Roberts
-Interrogation w/o torture. Guy killed wives to collect double insurance. Double Indemnity.
-Cops illegal conduct (prolonged questioning of D before arraignment w/o counsel) didnt coerce confession-stmt voluntary
Inducements, promises, threats, violence are all forms of coercion. Did it overbear will of person?
RULE: When a prisoner, held incommunicado, subjected to questioning by cops for long periods & deprived of advice of
counsel, must scrutinize record w/ care to determine whether, by use of his confession, hes deprived of liberty or life
through tyrannical or oppressive means.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944); pg. 554
-Const stands as a bar against the conviction of any indiv in an American court by means of a coerced confession.
Reasons for Suppressing Confessions
1) Prevent unreliable evidence from reaching jury
2) To use only statements taken without overbearing police pressure
Spano v. New York (1959); pg. 549 CJ Warren
-Spano beat up by ex-boxer. Went back & shot him. Confessed to his cop friend, then later to police.
-His sentence to death conviction couldnt stand.his statement was involuntary
-He suffered from psychiatric disorder, subjected to leading questions of a skilled prosecutor, foreign-born, never been
questioned for a crime before, nor committed one ever.
-Factors taken into consideration determining involuntary confession:
Lack of education; Sympathy falsely aroused by friend; Time of night; Many officers interviewing; Detained long
enough; No physical violence; Mental capacity; Leading Questions
RULE: If Ds will is overborne by official pressure, fatigue & sympathy falsely aroused, taking into the totality of the
circumstances, Ds confession should not be admitted. Also, officers refused D counsel.
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991); pg. 556 THREATS
-Confession obtained as a direct result of extreme coercion (to a fellow inmate cooperating w/ govt) & was tendered in
belief that Ds life was in jeopardy & would be afforded protection only if he confessed. This is a true coerced confession in
every sense of the word. No interrogation=No Miranda. Due Process kicks in!
Townsend v. Sain (1963); pg. 558 Drugs
-Even though police did not know that truth serum injected in suspect at hospital, it was still involuntary.
-After Connelly if police really didnt know, then would have not acted coercive & would be voluntary?!
Payne v. Arkansas (1958); pg. 555 Easy Case of threats.
-Involuntary if police threaten to turn suspect over to a mob or threaten to have suspects kids taken away from her.
Chavez v. Martinez (2003); pg. 558; Civil Damages- No! Unless Shocks the Conscience
-Held that the due process inquiry in civil cases 1983 was the shock the conscience test of Rochin.
-Suspects have a due process right not to have involuntary confessions admitted in a criminal case against them but no
right to sue for a due process violation unless the police conduct shocks the conscience.


Miranda- More precise and efficient than Voluntariness ToC approach.

Bram v. U.S. (1897); pg. 560 White PROMISES FROM POLICE
-Confession may not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however, slight. No longer followed; a promise is not dispositive to a due process violation.

Problem: Lengthy incommunicado interrogation creates an atmosphere ripe for coercion!

Different Custodial Interrogation Techniques: [purpose is to get confession]
Custodial Interrogation = Compulsion
Use of either is against the right against self-incrimination
-Offer legal excuses for actions to obtain initial admission of guilt
-Identification Situation (placing in line-up & having witnesses (coached if necessary) come in & ID him as the
Reverse Line-Upplace in line up & identified by fictitious people
Discouraging Silence: Silence means youre hiding something
Good Cop Bad Cop
Discourage talking to lawyer or relative: Im only looking for the truth; if youre telling the truth, then thats it.
To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction & to deprive him of any outside support.
Malloy v. Hogan (1964); pg. 48- Extended the 5th Amndt to the States!

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination & the Involuntary Confession Rule 5th AMNDT!
Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) pg. 564
-Impossible that meaning of 5th Amndt is only that a person cant be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution against himself.
-Extended the privilege avail. to criminal Ds & to witnesses called before formal bodies like GJs or Congress. Committees
Bram made privilege the source of protection against compelled confessions in fed prosecutions.
-Protections differ in 2 other ways:
(1) As to scope, privilege offers a broader protection
Schmerber v. Cal US S.Ct. 1(1966); pg. 565 Testimonial OR Communicative ONLY!
Privilege protects accused only from being compelled to testify against self, or otherwise provide State
w/evidence of testimonial or communicative nature. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating
product of compulsion, was neither petitioners testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by the petitioner, it was admissible on privilege grounds.
-Requiring suspect to stand in a line-up, provide a writing sample, or speak certain words doesnt
implicate suspects right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
(2) 2nd diff. between due process right against coerced confessions & 5 th Amndt privilege goes to when a violation occurs.
Kastigar v. US;
-Witnesses called to testify before GJs are compelled to testify if theyre given a use-and-derivative-use immunity.
-Doctrine forbids use of the compelled testimony & its fruits, in a crim case vs. person providing the testimony.
-Witness isnt being compelled to be a witness against himself if the compelled testimony is never used in a criminal
case against him. Violation of 5th Amndt only occurs when the compelled testimony is used in a criminal case.
Chambers v. Florida (1940) pg. 568
-White man robbed & murdered; Sheriff rounded up 20-40 black men. Ds claimed continually threatened & phys mistreated.
-Court found compulsion was applied so unable to use any confessions if offered.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) pg. 567- Miranda resulted from this!
-Repeatedly asked to consult with attorney (at the police station)
-Court held 6th Amndt violated; Suspect who has become the focus of an accusatory interrogation is entitled to the guiding
hand of counsel during that process. Here, charges were not yet filed but investigation focused on him.


Miranda v. Arizona (1966); pg. 570 CJ Warren

-D arrested & taken to station. In custody, questioned by 2 cops, not told he could have attorney present. Obtained written
signed confession from D.
-When an indv is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by authorities in any significant way & is
subject to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination (5th Amndt) is jeopardized.
-Ds failure to ask for atty doesnt waive right to atty unless specifically made after warnings were given.
-Mere fact that D signed stmt containing a typed-in clause stating that he had full knowledge of his legal rights didnt
approach the knowing & intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.
-To combat interrogation pressures & permit a full opp to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, accused must be
adequately & effectively appraised of his right & the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
-At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear & unequivocal
terms that he has the right to remain silent.
RULE: Unless & until warnings & waiver demonstrated by prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
Custodial interrogation is inherently coercive- way to get under coerciveness is to adequately inform people of their rights
& to respect their rights once exercised.
SAFEGUARDSMiranda Rights
1. Right to remain silent [this is your right]
2. Warned that stmt used vs. you [this is what your right means/consequences of invoking or not invoking your right]
1-2 means D knows his rights
3. Right to counsel [have this right, too]
4. If indigent, counsel appointed [have this right too, even if you didnt know]
3-4 means coercive interrogations wont happen
Are these rights Constitutional rights?
-NO. Cops must let you know your rights- has to happen, but not Constitutional.
-Like exclusionary rule, these 4 rights arent in privilege to the right of self-incrimination
-Even someone like Prof. Kreag, who knows his rights, MUST be given their rights.
Illinois v. Perkins (1990); pg. 588 LIMIT to Miranda for undercover officers.
-Encounters between suspects & undercover officers arent subject to Miranda, noting that warnings arent required when
suspect is unaware that hes speaking to a law enforcement officer & gives a voluntary statement.
Chavez v. Martinez (2003); pg 566 LIMIT to Miranda for evidence that will be introduced at criminal trial.
-Reiterates that Miranda rights are not Const. right
Issues to consider when a Miranda issue can arise
1) Custodial Interrogation (triggering mechanism for Miranda warnings)
a. Custody & Interrogation
2) Assuming a custodial interrogation finding, Miranda warnings required.
3) If warnings not given when they should or if given but valid waiver not secured, suspects stmts to cops are
generally inadmissible.
4) Exceptions to Miranda rule?
-Burden on police to prove D knew his rights- more than consent in 4th Amndt context. More protection!?
Waiver required is knowing & intelligent. Not just voluntary.
-In Miranda, must give warnings as soon as D is in custody. [deprived of libertylike seizure from 4th Amendment]
-Need interrogation. Court worries about CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION.
-Must Miranda someone before a custodial interrogation.

Custody Test is Objective (from perspective of Suspect)! From Thompson v. Keohane (Ginsburg);
1) What are the circs surrounding the interrogation;


2) Given those circs., would a reas. person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation & leave.
Relevant Factors
A) Examine if Curtailed Freedom of Movement (Mathiason); B) Examine Environment (Berkemer)
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) pg. 632; Marshall CUSTODY
weaving in & out of traffic. Pulled over. Failed sobriety test. Arrested, taken to jail.
-Not Mirandized Could argue that no Miranda rights given because D not in custody.
-A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda,
regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which hes suspected or for which he was arrested.
-Traffic stops dont require Miranda rights
-Traffic stops dont rise to the level of a police interrogation in a roompublic, everyone can see.
-But, if freedom taken & given a custodial interrogation, Miranda required.


RULE: If in custody while being interrogated, Miranda rights reqd. Routine traffic stops dont rise to level warranting
Miranda rights.
No meaningful or significant interference with right or freedom of movement because of environment (2). Expectation is
they arent being targeted for a serious crimeinstead, for speeding. 10-15 min stop.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011); pg. 639- Applying Miranda to a juvenile
-J was 13-years old; escorted by police officer to conference room at school; questioned for 30 min. No Miranda rights read
until the very end. Ct. said all relevant circs must be examined (expanded Thompson test).
-So long as childs age was known to officer at time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reas
officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the obj nature of that test (from Thompson)
Overall Test: The actual intention of officer to detain suspect is irrelevant to custody unless intention is communicated to
suspect. Std is an obj test based on the suspects perceptions, & determinative question is how a Reas. Person in his position
would have understood situation (in custody or not?); Look at: Location of interrogation; Duration; Persons present; Age;
Similar analysis to whether there is a 4th Amndt seizure.
Orozco v. Texas (1969); Custody not necessarily always at police station; Here, interrogation in Orozcos bedroom at 4
AM. Determination took into consideration that police testified Orozco was NOT free to leave if he attempted.
Beckwith v. U.S. (1976); Pressures assoc. w/ police-dominated station interrogation absent when IRS questioned at house.
Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) pg. 639; Just because at police station, doesnt mean automatically custodial.
-Parolee voluntarily reported to police station at request for mtg w/ officer. Had freedom to leave; told he wasnt under arrest
-In the absence of any restraint on freedom of movement, there could be no custody.
Page 640 Problems:
1. Cop sees 2 groups of men eyeing each other. 3 men have hands in pockets, officer took it as gang signs. Cop
lawfully frisks 3 & finds hunting knife. Cop asks, What are you doing w/ this? Suspect says going to scare the
other gang members? Is his response admissible? Yes, he hasnt committed a crime yet so nothing has happened.
-What if gun instead hunting knife? Miranda violation if gun is illegal? How likely is reas. person to think
theyre free to walk away?
2. R non-commissioned officer in Air Force suspected of downloading child porn. R meets cops at his home where
assured not about to be arrested & that cops werent worried about child porn but with the people who made the
porn. Officer admitted to downloading. No Miranda given. Never said you will not be arrested at all. Probably
not custody; facts similar to Mathiason.

Originally: Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers.- Miranda; Voluntary statements not covered.
Rhode Island v. Innis US S.Ct. 1980 pg. 641; Stewart


-Cabbie disappeared, body found 4 days later. Cop found guy who did it, arrested him, read Miranda rights. Didnt talk. Sgt
came & read rights again. Another came & read rights. Sgt said dont coerce confession. Cops talked about shame if little girl
found gun. D told them to take back to show them where gun was.
No question asked, but intention to gather information.
-D not interrogated w/in Mirandas meaning.
-Interrogation = questioning initiated by cops after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way OR knew or should have known would elicit response. EXPANSION HERE!
-Compare to Christian Burial SpeechHoping to elicit incriminating response.
TEST:, Look at particular susceptibilities of the suspect & whether officers knew of these susceptibilities at the time!
RULE: Interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Pennslyvania v. Muniz (1990); pg. 649 Routine background questions (name, address, related matters) not considered
w/in Miranda because Not investigatory; no psychological intimidation; not likely to illicit incriminating response.
(This was a sobriety checkpoint where officer was asking for birthday, etc)
Hiibel v. 6th Judicial District Ct of NV (2004); pg. 649
-Providing ones name to cops provides no reas danger of incrimination;

Harris v. NY (1971); pg. 594 Impeachment of Miranda-violated statements
-Statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach Ds testimony
NJ v. Portash (1979); pg. 595 Impeachment of Compelled statements
-Ds compelled stmts (not stmts that just violated Miranda) may not be put to any testimonial use vs. him in a criminal trial
-This is recognizing that you can have compelled statements that Miranda may not protect?
Michigan v. Tucker (1974); pg. 595; Miranda warnings are NOT Const. rights!
-Cops interrogated T before Miranda so failure to provide warnings was a good-faith failure.
-Evidence offered at trial wasnt Tuckers stmts but the stmts of a witness Tucker named to substantiate his alibi.
-No Const rights had been violated. Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Const but are instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.
-Because violation was of a prophylactic rule, Court balanced addl deterrence that would result from not allowing the
witness testify- Tuckers stmts to cops had been suppressed- against value of having all relevant & trustworthy evidence
presented to fact-finder.
Note: If stmt coerced/compelled (violation of DPC /5th Amndt) it cant be used in Court AT ALL. (diff. than Miranda)
-Due Process violation OR true violation of privilege against self-incrimination
Coerced confession violating privilege. Cant use that AT ALL at trial.
Violation of Miranda isnt as grave as pristine violation of privilege vs. self-incrimination. See Quarles
NY v. Quarles (1984); pg. 596; Rehnquist Public Safety Exception!
-Woman raped. Told cops. Cops found him, asked where gun was, guy told them. Cops read Miranda rights after found gun.
-Was Officer justified in failing to make available to respondent Miranda warnings?
-Was in police custody, but shouldnt have excluded the stmt of where gun was prior to reading Miranda rights.
-Public Safety Exception: Where officers questions are reasonably prompted by a concern for safety, he may engage in
noncoercive questioning w/o complying w/ Mirandas dictates.
-Determined objectively NOT on the motivation of the police officer.
-Here, the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic
rule protecting the 5th Amndts privilege against self-incrimination.
RULE: Public safety exception to Miranda warnings allows suspects answers to be admitted into evidence- pre-warning.


-So long as gun was concealed somewhere in supermarket, w/ its actual whereabouts unknown, it posed more than 1 danger
to public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later upon it, etc.
-Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to the officer about where his gun was, the cost wouldve
been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting Quarles.
-Doesnt agree there should be a public safety exceptionjust dont bring stmt into trial & then thered be no violation.
Miranda violation does not bear fruit.
Notes: Ct in Quarles: We conclude that need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat [like Times Square car
bombing] to public safety outweighs need for prophylactic rule protecting the 5 th Amndts privilege vs. self-incrimination.
Statement didnt violate Miranda; statement may have violated privilege to self-incrimination, in which case
statement itself couldnt be admitted
Oregon v. Elstad (1985); pg. 605; OConnor Miranda bears no fruit
-18 yr old accused of stealing from neighbors house. Cops go to house to talk to him in living room w/o parents there. Went
to station, given Miranda rights, said same stmts. Stmts used at trial.
-ISSUE: Must figure out if there were 2 different interrogations. 1 is Bad for Police; 2 Separate is Good
-If one: after confessed, Miranda rights, kept goingcounts as 1 interrogation & all stmts are Miranda violations-cant cure
Miranda violation by giving Miranda rights again
-But if 2 separate interrogations, like here1st stmt Miranda violation, other stmt non-Miranda violation. Miranda has no
fruit so 2nd stmt isnt tainted. Confession admissible.
Thus, question of how many interrogations were there is key question for future cases.
Error in prophylactic rule (Miranda) not necessarily a 5th Amndt violation.
NOTE: If there was compelled self-incrimination in 1st stmt, that WOULD be fruit for all other stmts.
Here, two separate interrogations; statements are admissible!
Missouri v. Seibert (2004); pg. 620; Souter Concerned w/ intent & good faith
-Son had cerebral palsy & died; mom afraid charge of neglect because bed sores. Devised plan to burn him & mobile home
making it appear that a boy living w/ her did it. Boy died in fire. Questioned w/o Miranda warnings.
-Ds ultimate stmt was largely a repeat of info obtained prior to the warning.
-Is a repeated statement inadmissible? Statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is inadmissible.
RULE: In order to use a post-Mirandized confession, after eliciting an un-Mirandized confession, police must give D
ample opp. to consider the effect of the Miranda warnings. MUST BE AN EFFECTIVE MIRANDA!
-When Miranda warnings are inserted in midst of coordinated & continuing interrogation, likely to mislead & deprive D of
knowledge essential to ability to understand nature of rights & the consequences of abandoning them.
-Because the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Mirandas purpose of reducing risk that a coerced
confession would be admitted, & because facts here dont reas. support a conclusion that warnings given couldve served
their purpose, Seiberts postwarning statements are inadmissible.
Note: Kennedys concurrence: 5 Factors are too broad; Only suppressed when party of a deliberate 2-step strategy that is
designed to undercut the effectiveness of Miranda warnings.
5 Factors Critical to Seibert Plurality Decision: What is an Effective Miranda Warning?
1. Completeness & detail of the questions & answers in the first round of interrogation
2. The overlapping content of the 2 stmts
3. Timing & setting of the 1st & 2nd rounds
4. Continuity of police personnel
5. Degree to which the interrogators questions treated the second round as continuous with the first
Court Applying Seibert should follow three steps:
1. Did cops deliberately employ the 2-round interrogations strategy for purpose of sidestepping Miranda.
a. If not, inquiry ends & no Miranda violation occurred
2. If yes, determine whether given situation is more like that in Elstad or Seibert, (apply 5 factors of Seibert)


3. If more like Seibert than Elstad, determine whether the interrogator took any curative measures (Kennedy)
a. Curative Measures: Break in time; explanation that 1st stmt was inadmissible.
b. Assuming no curative measures, confession is inadmissible.
Dickerson v. US (2000) pg. 613; CJ Rehnquist
-Dickerson indicted for multiple counts, moved to suppress stmt made at FBI office, on grounds that he hadnt received his
Miranda warnings before being interrogated. Congress had enacted 3501 to overrule Miranda to have Voluntariness Std.
-Miranda guidelines established that admissibility in evidence of any stmt given during custodial interrogation of a suspect
depends on whether cops provided suspect w/ 4 warnings.
-Congress cant legislatively supersede Court decisions interpreting & applying the Constitution.
RULE: Congress cannot overrule the Miranda decision because it interpreted the Const; not just court-made law.
Scalia & Thomas DISSENT:
-Court acts in plain violation of Constitution when it denies effect to this act of Congress.
-In imposing its Court-made code upon States, the original opinion at least asserted that it was demanded by the Const.
-US v. Patane (2004); pg. 631 Miranda violation bears no fruit (physical or otherwise) but must be non-coercive stmt
-Officers arrested Patane for violating a restraining order & one officer began to recite Miranda warnings.
-D stopped him after right to remain silent & said he knew his rights. Officers didnt attempt to finish warnings.
-Court (5 members) said confession (w/ Miranda violation) was admissible.
-Self-incrimination clause not implicated by admission into evidence of the physical fruit (gun) of a voluntary stmt.
-Cost-benefit balance produced decision to admit physical evidence discovered through unwarned statements.
-As long as statement is voluntary (not-coercive), a violation of Miranda does not require suppression of physical fruit
FRUIT CASES: Miranda violation bears NO Poisonous Fruit
D wasnt Mirandized &
17-18 yr old kid interrogated in
COMPLICATION- plurality. Other justices interested in
gave stmt; also told
house, incriminating stmts,
intent & good faith.
where gun was. Stmt
interrogated at police station after
was un-Mirandized w/
Miranda warnings & makes
After Elstad, cops would violate Miranda- fail to give
no waiver; therefore,
further incriminating stmts.
warnings & interrogate someone until confession. Then
stmt violated Miranda.
provide Miranda warnings & start over again until gave
Housewarningscop station
same confession.
Std fruits analysis would
say- found gun because
Ds wouldnt get benefit of Miranda warnings in 1st place &
Ct says: exclusionary rule
told where it was- no
wouldnt understand 1st stmts couldnt be used against
applies to statements taken in
inevitable discovery, no violation of Miranda- cant use
them. Ds made same stmts over again & would be more
indp source & close in
likely to get quick confession.
those statements.
Distinguishes Elstad & says: thats just about whether fruit
These statements, however, are
If fruit of poisonous tree NOT fruit of the poisonous tree. of tree doctrine applies. Ct decides it doesnt.
doctrine applied, keep
gun out.
Focus on the word effectively. Must give effective
As matter of policy- given
Miranda warnings.
Miranda warnings, sounds like
RULE: Court says that any taint from fruit dissipated.
physical evidence
Here, cops didnt because plan was not to- circs around it
Not what court says- says
(when uncoerced- or,
would think was 1 interrogation NOT 2 separate
Miranda warning should not
volunteered) is not
bear fruit. Keep out original
considered fruit even
statement or series of statements
though an un1. Not about subj. intent from officers- Ct is uncomf. about
taken in violation of Miranda
Mirandized statement
cops cheating Miranda rules.
but dont keep out any later
could be considered so. statements.
2. Not about fruits argument
Is it close enough to different interrogation?



Totality of Circumstances approach (Miranda hope for bright-line not achieved)
NC v. Butler (1979); pg. 650 Stewart
-D arrested & read Miranda rights- D had 11th grade education & read Bureaus Advice of Rights form. When asked if
understood, D replied yes. D refused to sign waiver- told D that didnt have to sign but was just going to ask questions. Then
made exculpatory statements. Waiver found implicitly- here, from understanding & course of his conduct.
RULE: Waiver doesnt have to be explicit- may be implicit if done intelligently, knowingly, & voluntarily.
Butler Test: (1) Intelligent/Knowing of rights; & (2) Voluntary waiver of rights
Silence alone is NOT ENOUGH for waiverbut can infer from conduct.
Saying something is also NOT ENOUGH for waiver.
Preponderance of the evidence rule
States burden of proof.
Intelligent & Knowing- how do cops figure this out:
Cops ask if you understand
Cops ask you to read rights out loud.
Cops ask if needs interpreter
What if Kreag says, No, I dont understand.
-Cops dont believetotality of the circumstances questioncops can disregard stmts if knew he taught Crim Pro.
Test for Intelligent & Knowing: (1) Suspect understood that he had the right not to talk to the police or to talk only w/
counsel present; & (2) that he appreciated the consequences of forgoing these rights & speaking to the police.
From: Tague v. Louisiana (1980); No presumption that rights are understood; (However, limited by Berghuis See Below).
Moran v. Burbine (1986); pg. 654; Deals with (2) Voluntary
-B arrested for murder. Bs sister had lawyer call cops & tell them shed be his lawyer if cops intended to question him. Cops
said wouldnt interrogate him that night. Hour later, asked him questions. B admitted to murder. Mirandized each time was
questioned. He signed 3 waivers of attorney [didnt know attorney was trying to get a hold of him].
-Court held waiver was valid.
-Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect & entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the
capacity to comprehend & knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.
-Here, waiver must be product of a free & deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception
Note: Court warns that a more egregious situation could result in a due process violation.
Note: Studies should that roughly 80% of suspects waive their Miranda rights.
Lego v. Twomey (1962); pg. 653
-Prior to Butler, Ct held that std for Miranda waiver was preponderance of the evidence.
Colorado v. Spring (1987); pg. 653 Waiver is NOT crime specific!
-S arrested for interstate possession of stolen firearms.
-Waived his Miranda rights, & cops questioned him not about stolen firearms but about a murder (S hadnt been charged w/)
-Ct held a waiver of Miranda is to interrogation in general & not to interrogation about a particular crime.
Thus, Miranda is NOT crime specific.
Question #4 pg. 655- J is 15 years old, suspect in murder. Mother is w/ him at police station. Police give Miranda and ask if
he wishes to answer questions. J answers no. Mother tells him to talk. J nods his head. Asks if need lawyer present and J
says no. Valid waiver?
No, parents cant waive right of their children- hes a minor, BUT, has his own indiv right.
What about instead of mom telling kid to talk, his mom starts beating him until he talks.
o Becomes involuntary despite that there was no state action.
o Moms cant waive for kids because they dont know what the consequences are for what the kid did
because mom may not know what kid did.


Listening to your parents & doing what they say, is likely a voluntary waiver.

Overall: WHEN A SUSPECT WAIVES RIGHT EXPLICITLY: For Statement to be admissible, Police must prove
that (1) waiver is valid (knowing/intelligent & voluntary) & (2) that confession was not coerced (due process)
constitutes an implied waiver; (2) Waiver was knowing, intelligent, & voluntary
No bright-line rule saying, until age 18, your What counts? I need food. When is my
parents cant invoke for you (unless
lawyer coming? no initiating discussion
w/ police.
Still an issue in
Does count: Id like to make a deal now/talk
confessionsdiscussing Can invoke in beg by waiving rights &
whether waiver was
asking for lawyer.
Questionable: Whats going to happen now?
voluntary or whether
Bradshaw says this is fine.
confession itself was
Important when you waive rights initially,
What if in Edwards, he said, I dont want to
but then go back & want rights. Must be
talk anymore.
Invocation of right to silence so interrogation
must then stop. Must be scrupulously
Michigan v. Mosely (1975); pg. 662
-D questioned by detective. Interrogation ended when D said he didnt want to answer any questions about robberies.
Few hrs later, detective from homicide bureau questioned D about fatal shooting during a diff robberty/holdup.
-Read Miranda rights & signed form, which Detective read & explained warnings to him & had him sign form.
-15 min interrogation, D made stmt implicating himself to homicide. D didnt ask for lawyer at any time.
-Admissibility of statements obtained after person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on
whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. Here, No Miranda violation.
o Right to remain silent IS crime specific.
-Under these facts, previous request not to talk to diff. detective from diff. bureau about diff. crime didnt extend to 2 nd
interrogation also preceded by warnings.
More protections if you ask for a lawyer rather than invoking right to remain silent.
Invoking silence doesnt disallow a diff cop to come along & discuss another crime
Invoking right to attorney DOES disallow different cop from coming along to discuss other crime
In order for prosecutor to introduce stmts from suspect who had initially invoked right to remain silent, must show
that (1) Right to silence, once invoked, was scrupulously honored; & (2) Knowing, intelligent & voluntary waiver
subsequently occurred.
1. Intelligent, Knowing
2. Voluntary

Edwards v. AZ (1981); pg. 658; White INVOCATION of Counsel Right

-D arrested, at police station, informed of Miranda rights. Said understood rights & willing to submit to questioning. Denied
involvement & sought to make a deal.
-D said wanted an attny before making a deal, questioning ended & D taken to jail.
-D said didnt want to talk to anybody & guard said he had to talk & took to meet detectives. Informed of Miranda rights.
D said would make stmt if not tape-recorded. Then implicated himself in the crime.
-D insisted on having counsel present & since cops didnt provide counsel during interrogation, he did not validly
waive the right.
-When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
cant be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if hes been
advised of his rights.
-Accused, like Edwards, having expressed desire to deal w/ the police only through counsel, isnt subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.


RULE: If D invokes right to counsel (includes I want an attny before making deal), all interrogation must cease until
lawyer present.
Once invoke right to counsel, D is allowed to initiate conductor can initiate more questioning.
Designed to prevent police from badgering D into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.
If Prosecution wants to introduce a statement from a suspect who initially invoked right to counsel, must show: (1)
Counsel was made available to him; OR (2) Suspect himself initiated the further communication; & (3) A Knowing,
Intelligent, & Voluntary Waiver subsequently occurred.
Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983); pg. 663 What is initiation by suspect who invoked right? Whats going to happen to me?
-Initiation occurs only when inquiry from suspect can be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to
open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.
-Asking for drink of water or to use a phone wouldnt constitute initiation => routine incidents of the custodial relationship.
-This stmt was ok as an initiation. Next step: Was it voluntary/intelligent/knowing?!
Minnick v. Mississippi (1990); pg. 663 Invoked Right To Counsel
-Interrogation but then Minnick said, Come back Monday when I have my attorney.
-Agents ceased interrogation & D talked to lawyer twice before Monday. Cops re-advised him of his rights & got
incriminating stmts.
-Held: Ds statements were inadmissible even though had consulted with counsel. He needed counsel present at time of
Maryland v. Shatzer (2010); pg. 665; How long to wait after Invocation?
-2.5 yrs elapsed between Edwards invocation & 2nd waiver request- Ct unanimously agreed that his waiver was valid.
-2 week cleansing period because that provides plenty of time for suspect to get reacclimated to his non-custodial normal
life, to consult with friends, family, counsel, & to shake off any residual effects of prior custody.
Davis v. U.S. (1994); pg. 665 MUST BE UNAMBIGUOUS request for counsel for invocation AFTER WAIVER!
-Suspect initially waived rights to remain silent & to a lawyer both orally & in writing.
-Suspect must unambiguously request counsel. Maybe I should talk to a lawyer was not a request for counsel.
A statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or its not.
Must state desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly so reas. cop in circs would understand stmt to be
request for attny.
No obligation to clarify ambiguous requests (although this would be a good police practice).
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010); pg. 667 Kennedy Silence (Implicit) Invocation must be UNAMBIGUOUS!
-ShootingSuspect fled, found 1 yr later & arrested. Went to interrogate in small room in school desk chair.
-Read Miranda rights; D read 5th warning out loud to ensure he could read & understand English. D declined to sign form.
-Do you pray to God that hell forgive you for shooting that boy down? Yes.
-Is being nonresponsive, but not expressly waiving right to remain silent, invoking the right to remain silent?
-D waived his right to remain silent.
(1) He understood his rights & knew what he gave up when he spoke.
(2) Ds answer to the God questions is a course of conduct indicating waiver of the right to remain silent. cops
arent required to re-warn suspects from time to time
(3) No evidence Ds statement was coerced
Here: 3 hours of silence is not an invocation.
RULE: A suspect who has received & understood the Miranda warnings, & hasnt invoked his Miranda rights, waives the
right to remain silent by making an un-coerced statement to the police.
Davis v. US (1994); pg. 665- If an accused makes a stmt concerning right to counsel that is ambiguous or equivocal or
makes no stmt, cops arent reqd to end interrogation or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his
Miranda rights.
Waiver has 2 distinct dimensions:
(1) Waiver must be voluntary: product of a free & deliberate choice (vs. intimidation, coercion, or deception); AND


(2) Made w/ full awareness of both nature of right being abandoned & consequences of the decision to abandon it.
-Subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the
decisions core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecutions case in chief.

6th Amndt: Guarantees an accused the assistance of counsel for his defense
Massiah v. US (1964); pg. 692; Stewart
-Ds incriminating stmts to co-D were admitted into evidence at trial. Co-D cooperating w/ police. Occurred AFTER D was
indicted, retained counsel, pled not guilty, and was released on bail.
-Ct: Once adversary judicial proceedings have commenced vs. individual, govt. efforts to deliberately elicit stmts from indiv
in absence of his attny (openly or surreptitiously) violate the 6 th Amndt.
Unlike Due Process Standard: No need to find coercion!
Unlike Miranda: Dont need custody NOR interrogation!
Massiah Doctrine Requirements: 1) Govt. deliberately elicited incriminating stmts from accused in the absence of counsel
(or a waiver of counsel); AND
2) Occurred after the initiation of judicial proceedings (the point at which right to counsel is triggered)-more than arrest.
3) AND Without Counsel
1) Whether officers attempts to gain incriminating evidence were deliberate or intentional (Note: Miranda requirements
for interrogation are broader because those say reasonably foreseeable);
Spano v. NY pg. 549 Deliberate Elicitation
-D consulted w/ attny who said to be quiet. Later, D gave into police friend to give confession; Confession was deliberately
elicited by cops after D was indicted; therefore at a time where he was entitled to a lawyers help.
Jailhouse Snitch Cases:
US v. Henry (1980); pg. 696 Passive Listener vs. Stimulating Conversations?
-Paid informant posed as cellmate of H. Cops told informant NOT to question H about crime, he was told to report
incriminating stmts back to them. Ct said Govt. set up a situation likely to induce H into making incriminating stmts.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986); pg. 697 Did not stimulate conversation; No deliberate elicitation
-Paid Informant must do more than merely listen. Here, no violation of 6th Amndt.
-6th Amndt isnt violated whenever State obtains incriminating stmts from the accused after right to counsel has attached.
-When cops plant informer w/ a jailed suspect & informer doesnt ask questions, suspects stmts to informer are admissible
unless informer took coercive steps [actual action] other than listening to elicit incriminating info that was designed
deliberately to elicit incriminating statements.
2) After initiation of judicial proceedings;
Brewer v. Williams (1977); pg. 699- Warrant issued for Williams; Spoke with Attny- said to be silent; Williams transferred to
different prison- cops expressly agreed w/ lawyer that they wouldnt question him en route. Cop gave Christian Burial
Speech knowing that Williams was deeply religious.
-Violation of 6th Amndt right to counsel after initiation of judicial proceedings at his arraignment!
Massiah is Crime Specific!
McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991); pg. 734- Questioned by police on unrelated murder after a hearing on charges of armed robbery.
M gave Miranda waiver & implicated himself in murder. Court said this was fine; Crime-Specific!
Kansas v. Ventris (2009) pg. 741; Scalia
-Statement can be introduced in violation of Massiah to IMPEACH D.
-V took stand at his murder trial and blamed his partner for the shooting. Prosecution permitted to contradict him w/
testimony of a jail plant to whom V had admitted the crime concededly a violation of Massiah.
Policy: Now, every single police dept should have an informant in cell to prevent defense from presenting D to testify
& prevent alibis. Nothing to lose here because chances that evidence can enter trial to impeach!


Question about Warrants Sample Intro: The 4th Amndt protects the right of the indiv against unreas searches &

seizures & provides that no warrants shall issue except upon showing of PC. The 4th Amndt is implicated when
the conduct in question involves a governmental actor, such as [Fill in Govt Actor] here (Burdeau v. McDowell).
We must also examine if [Name] is a member of the class the 4th Amndt is designed to protect. The 4th Amndt
protects a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
w/US to be considered part of community (Will fit this description). INCORPORATION ANALYSIS. A search occurs
where a person has a subjective expectation of privacy & is one that society accepts as reasonably objective.
(Katz) May also include Jones test[Trespass Test: Search if (1) Govt., (2) in an attempt to get information, (3) trepasses
on (4) persons, houses, papers, or effects (item w/ possessory interest)- need not be any legitimate expectation of privacy!]
[Lee]s public defender will argue that clearly a search has occurred based on the facts.

A warrant is a judicial authorization for police action, either to search a particular place (search warrant) or
arrest a particular individual (arrest warrant). A warrant must meet the following requirements:
1) Issued by a neutral/detached magistrate;
2) Adequate showing of probable cause based on oath or affirmation
3) Must describe with particularity a place to be searched and the items or persons to be seized.
Element #2, probable cause, is defined as that quantity of facts and circumstances within the police officers
knowledge that would warrant a reasonable person to conclude that the individual in question has committed a
crime. An adequate showing of probable cause requires specific and concrete facts, not merely conclusory
speculations. It can be based on reasonably truthful hearsay as well as an officers observations.
Standing Initially, standing was tied to property law concepts and standing was conferred on anyone legitimately
on the premises where a search occurred. More recently, the question of standing has come under substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The important question becomes whether the particular Defendants expectation of
privacy was intruded upon. The doctrine of standing implies that only a person who is injured or aggrieved has a
requisite right to challenge and exclude evidence.
Ex. for driver: Here, [David], the driver & owner of the car, would have standing to challenge the search because
his possessory interest creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of the car. He could thus object to
[the entry into the car and the subsequent search and seizure of the gun and the packet of cocaine]. As a mere frontseat passenger, Steven will attempt to demonstrate a legitimate privacy expectation in the area underneath his seat
where the gun was located and the console where the cocaine was located. Cases have been decided both ways as
to whether such an interest will enable him to challenge the search. As for Michael and Robert in the rear seats, it
is unlikely, as rear-seat passengers, they will be able to establish the privacy interest in the areas searched and
therefore be able to challenge the items seized.