1

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DAVID W. SHAPIRO (NYSB 2054054) United States Attorney

0 R r GI '4.A FILED
HAR

J. DOUGLAS WILSON (pA BAR 44915) Chief, Criminal Division
scon FREWING (CSBN 191311) JOSEPH SULLN AN (FLSBN 988723) Assistant United StatesAttorneys 280 S. First Street, Room 371 San Jose, California 95113 Telephone: (408) 535-5060 FAX: (408) 535-5066

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Attorneysfor Plaintiff
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UNrI'l!.l) STATESDISTRICf COURT NORnIERN DISTRICf OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSEDIVISION

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UllfuED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.

No. CROl-20138 RMW UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS Date: April 1, 2002 Time: 9:00 am Court: Hon. RonaldM. Whyte

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ELCOM LTD., a/k/aELCOMSOFf CO. LTD., Defendant.

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GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUllONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLEOFAUTHORrrlES ..
INTRODUcnON

... ill

~

FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
5 6 7 8 9

Advanced eBook Processor.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 I. Elcomsoft's II. Adobe'sAcrobat eBookReader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ill. eBookEndUserLicenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IV. Elcomsoft's Refusalto Complywith DMCA ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

10
1.1.

STATEMENT ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 OF POINTSANDAUlHORffIES 6
6

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I.

Backgroundof the DMCA

It
15 16

A.
B.

Congress' ReviewofCopyrlghtLawin theDigital Age. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Statutory Framework. .................................... 9

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18
3.9 20
21.

ll. Congress ProperlyEnactedSections1201 and 1204of the DMCA Pursuant the (b) to

Commerce Clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . ~ II A.
Congress May Regulate ElectronicCommerce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12 Congress May Act Pursuant the Commerce to Clauseto ProtectRights Granted Underthe IntellectualPropertyClause 14

B.

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23
24

ill. Sections1201(b)and 1204Do Not Violate the First Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16

25
26

A.
B.

ElcomsoftMay Not Make a Facial First AmendmentChallenge. . . . . . . . .. 16 Elcomsoft's Saleof CircumventionTechnologyIs Not Speech

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27 28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

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2.

Elcomsoft WasSellinga Technology Product. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18
The AEBPR in ObjectCodeForm Is Not Speech. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19

c.

Even ifElcomsoft WasEngaged Expressive in Conduct,Its Challengeto Sections1201(b)and 1204Fails Under First AmendmentPrinciples. . . . .. 21

1

Sections1201(b)and 1204areContentNeutral. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22 Sections1201(b)and 1204Furtheran ImportantGovernmentInterest. 23 Sectionsl20l(b) and 1204Are Sufficiently Tailored to Satisfy

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8

2.
3,

9

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1.1.

Constitutional Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23 .

D.

A Fair Use DefenseIs Not Applicable in this Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24

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1.3

1.

ElcomsoftDoesNot Have Standingto AssertFair Use on Behalf of Third Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. . . .. . . . .. 24

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1.5 1.6

2. 3.

ThisCase Does Present Infringement Not an Claim. . . . . . . . . . . .. 24
Although the Court NeedNot Reachthe Issue,Sections1201(b)and 1204

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1.8

Are Consistent FairUse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25 with
IV. Sections1201(b)and 1204of the DMCA Comportwith Due Process. . . . . . . . . .. 30 A Sections1201(b)and Section1204Are Not UnconstitutionallyVagueas

19
20 21.

Appliedto Elcomsoft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 31

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24

B.

Elcomsoft's Process Due Arguments Fail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . .

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28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

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3 4 5 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Cases Random House,Inc. v. RosettaBooks,150F. Supp.2d613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) . . . . . . . . ..
Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2ndCir. 2001) . . . .

2,29

. .. 7, 18,20,21,23,24,26-27 7

SonyCorp. of America v. UniversalStudios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)

Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125 (2M Cir. 1982) . . ~. . . . . . . 7

7
8 9

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521,523 (9thCir. 1984)

7

UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514 U.S. 549 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12,13,14

Gibbons Ogden, Wheat.1 (1824) v. 9 UnitedStatesv.Moghadam, 175F.3d1269(11tbCir.1999)

12

1.0

. 13
. 14 . 14

1.1. TheTrade-MarkCases,100U.S. 82 (1879) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 13 14 15
1.6

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)

SouthDakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14
16, 18
16, 17,24

RailwayLabor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons,455 U.S. 457 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15 Roulettev. City of Seattle,97 F.3d 300 (9thCir. 1996)

Broadrick Oklahoma, U.S.601(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. v. 413

17 4805 ConvoyInc. v. City of SonDiego, 183F.3d 1108(9thCir. 1999)
18

16,17

Baby Tam& Co.,Inc. v. City of Las Vegas,154F.3d 1097(9thCir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16 16 16 16,17,23

1.9 New YorkStateClub Ass'n, Inc. v. City o/New York,487 U.S. 1 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20

City Council of Los Angelesv. Taxpayers Vincent,466 U.S. 789 (1984) for

21. Andersonv. Nidorj; 26 F.3d 100, 103-04(9thCir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22 23
24

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,

455 U.S. 489 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ohralik v. Ohio StateBar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) .. Giboneyv. Empire Storage& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)

. . . .. 17,31,32-33,34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19
19

25 26 27
28

Spence Washington, U.S.4OS v. 418 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19

GOV'T OPP.TO MonONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS

[CR01-20138] [RMW]

III

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2 3

Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6thCir. 2000) . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

19,20,21

Name. Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions,Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (200 Cir. 2000)

19

Bernsteinv. UnitedStates,922 F. Supp.1426(N.D. Ca!. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20
Karn v. United StatesDept. of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ca!. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
5 6 7 8 9

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ComputerAssoc./nt'lv.Altai,/nc. 982 F.2d 693 (2°OCir.1992) SonyComputerEntertainment Inc. v. ConnectixCorp., 203 F.3d 596 (9d1 2000) Cir.

Advent Systems v. Unisys Ltd. Corp.,925F.2d670,675(3rdCir.1991)
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)

21

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21

TurnerBroadcastingSys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,22,24
21 21

10 11

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public ServoComm In of New York,

447U.S.557(1980)

1.2 Pittsburgh PressCo.v. Human Relations Comm 413U.S.376(1973) 'n,

13 14
1.5 1.6

Wardv. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22

Universal Studios, v. Reimerdes, F. Supp.2d (SD.N.Y. 2000) City Inc. 111 294
Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985) . . .. FECv. Nat'/Right to WorkCommittee, U.S. 197(1982) 459

22,23,25
23,24,25,29 24
...24

Cir. 17 United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9d1 1993)

18

Campbellv. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510U.S. 569 (1994) . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26

1.9 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services. Inc. 20

923 F. Supp.1231(N.D. Cat. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

21. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194 (9thCir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 28

22 23
24

Laddv. Law & Technology Press,762 F.2d 809 (9thCir. 1985) .
Micro-SPARC, Inc. v. Amtype Corp.t 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984) . . . . .. .

. .. 28
. . . . . . .. 28 .28
29

Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, 597 F. Supp.5 (N.D. 1ll.1983) Greenbergv.Nat'IGeographicSoc.,244F.3d 1267,1274(1IIhCir. 2001)

25
26

S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday,Inc. 886 F.2d 1081(9d1 1989) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 Cir.

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GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

tv

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Group One,Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,Inc., 254 F.3d 1041(Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 Lipscherv. LRPPublications, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305(11th Cir. 2001) 29

ProCD v. Zeidenberg,86 F.3d 1447(7d1 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 Cir. AdobeSystems v. OneStopMicro, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d1086(N.D. Ca!. 2000) . . . . . . .. 29 Inc. Softman ProductsCo.,LLC v. AdobeSystems, Inc., 171F. Supp.2d1075(C.D. Ca!. 2001) .. 29
Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Gamemasters,

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8 9

87 F. Supp.2d976 (N.D. Ca!. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 30 SonyComputer Entertainment America,Inc. v. Bleem,214 F.3d 1022(9d1 2000) . . . Cir. Graynedv. CityofRockford,408U.S.104(1972}

.. 30
30

v. 461U.S.352(1983) 1.0 Kolender Lawson,

31

v. 415 1.1. Smith Goguent U.S.566(1974). . . . . . . . .°. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 31
Cir. 2000) 1.2 Forbesv. Napolitano,236 F.3d 1009(9th
1.3

. . . . . . . . . . . 31-32

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966)

. . . . . . . . . . . .. 31
33

14 Posters 'N' Things,Ltd. v. United States,511 U.S. 513 (1994)
1.S

Richmond Boro Gun Club v. City o/New York, 97 F.3d 681 (21M1 1996) . . . . . . . . . . .. 33 Cir.

1.6 ExxonCorp. v. Governorof Maryland, 437 U.S. 117(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 34 1.7 Melugin v. Hames,38 F.3d 1478(9thCir. 1994)
1.8

34

UnitedStatesv. Morales, 108F.3d 1031(9thCir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)

1.9 20

. . . . .. 35 . . . . .. 3S

Screws UnitedStates, U.S.91 (1945). . . .f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35 v. 325

21 Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35
22 23
24

United StatesConstitution

u.s. Const. I, § 8, ct. 18 Art. U.S.Const. I, § 8, cl.t8 .. Art.
U.s. Const. Art.!, § 8, cl. 3

11

. . . . . . . . . .. 11
12

25 26 27 28

U.S. Const.5thAmend.

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GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

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Statutes

17 U.S.C. §1201(b)
17U.S.C.§1204 18U.S.C. §2319(c)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
passim 7

6 7 8
.9 1.0

RecordRentalAmendmentof 1984,Pub.L. No. 98-450,98 Stat. 1727

(codified 17V.S.C.§ 109) at
SoundRecordingAct of 1971,85 Stat.391

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7

17U.S.C.§lOl
17U.S.C.§1201(a)

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9
10,24,27 26,30

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17U.S.C. 1201(d)-G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. §§ ..
17U.S.C. § 117 Le&islative Materials

17U.S.C. 107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. §

28

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1.8

s. Rep.105-190 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8-9,10, IS
~

H.R Rep. 105-551(II) (1998) 144Congo Rec. E2136-02

9,11,12,13,27 11, 13, 15

H.R.Rep.106-216 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23
H.RRep.94-1476(1976) Other Authorities 26

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The 21 JenniferL. Schenker, Trillion Dollar SecretBeneaththe Hype, theInternet Is Fosteringa 22
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SilentRevolutionThroughOnlineE.xchanges Allow Fast and Efficient TradingAmong that CorporateIT Systems, Time Magazine,Feb.28, 2000 available at 2000 WL 543326 . . . . 6 TheRiseof the Infomediary: TheInternet is Producinga String of RacyNew Business Models, The Economist,June26, 1999,available at 1999WL 7363618 . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 6 IntellectualProperty: TheProperty of the Mind - Digital Technology and the Development of

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GOV'T OPP.TO MonONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

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the Internet Are Making it Easy to Copy or Alter All Sorts of Information and Art, from

Music to ComputerSoftware.Can CopyrightStill Be Protected?The Economist,July 27. 1996,available at 1996WL 11247237. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 RobertLemos,SecurityExpertsProtest CopyrightAct, ZDNet News, Sept.6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4733227 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13 BennyEvangelista, Judge'sRulingsBoostStrengthof Digital CopyrightLaw, SanFrancisco Chronicle,Nov. 29, 2001, at B-3

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8 9

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13

Orin S. Kerr, Are WeOverprotectingCode? 11Ioughts First-GenerationInternet Law, on 57 Wash.Lee L. Rev. 1287(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20

1.0 Mark A. Lemley & EugeneVolokh, Freedomof Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property 1.1.
Cases,.48 DUke L.J. 147 (1998)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
""' '..'

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1.2 Melville Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright(2001)

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VII

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INTRODucnON The United States America opposes of defendant Elcomsoft's motions to dismissthe indictmenton Constitutionalgrounds. Congress actedpursuantto its authority underthe Commerce Clauseto enact sections1201(b)and 1204of Title 17, United StatesCode,aspart of the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct ("DMCA "), to (1) address what Congress perceivedas new challenges copyright law arisingfrom the adventof electroniccommerce, to and (2) to implementthe World IntellectualPropertyOrganizationCopyright Treaty. Sections1201(b)and 1204do not targetspeech expressive or conduct andcannotbe subjected a facial First to Amendmentchallenge. Likewise, Elcomsoftcannotsucceed an as-applied in First Amendment

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1.0 challenge because was not engaged protectedexpression, evenif the Court concludes it in and

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incidentalprotectedexpression was involved, sections1201(b)and 1204arenarrowly tailoredto address Congress'compellingconcerns regardingelectroniccommerce.Finally, Elcomsoft's procedural process due challenge must also fail given that sections1201(b)and 1204clearly defineproscribedconduct. For thesereasons, Court shoulddenyElcomsoft's motionsto the dismissthe indictment.

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FACTS

I.

Elcomsoft's Advanced eBook Processor On or aboutJune20,2001, defendant Elcomsoftbeganoffering a softwareprogram,the

1..9 AdvancedeBookProcessor AEBPR"), for saleon its Internetwebsite,www.elcomsoft.com. ("

20
21.

Declarationof AlexanderKatalov in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Indictmentfor Violations of Due Process 3 (filed January25,2002) ("Katalov Declaration"). Elcomsoft advertised 1 the AEBPR programasa product for decryptingelectronicbooks ("ebooks") fonnatted for the AdobeAcrobat eBookReader,a softwareproductdistributedby Adobe Systems, Incorporated ("Adobe"). Affidavit of SpecialAgent Daniel O'Connell in Supportof Complaint16 (filed July 11,2001) ("Complaint Affidavit"). Elcomsoftstatedon its websitethat the AEBPR program would decryptany ebookfonnattedin the AdobeAcrobat fonnat andproducean electronicfile

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without anyrestrictionssuchas limitations on editing, copying,or printing the ebook. ld. II. Adobe's Acrobat eBook Reader Adobe's Acrobat eBook Readeris a producttargetedat publishersor distributorsof electronicbookswho wish to distributeelectronicbooksin a mannerthat permits them to control the distribution of the ebook,typically to thosewho pay for a copy of the ebook.Declarationof

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5

6 7 8 9

Thomas Diaz15 (filed concurrentlywith this opposition);seealso RandomHouse,Inc. v.
Rosetta Books, 150F. Supp.2d613, 615 (SD.N.Y. 2001) (describinguseof Adobe Acrobat eBookReader). As a result, Adobe's ebookproductsadd additional securityattributesto ebooks not found in electronicdocuments distributedin Adobe's PortableDocument("PDF') fonnat. [d. In contrastto "naked" PDF files, an Adobe ebookfile is intendedto remain on the computer

10

11 usedto purchase downloadthe ebookfile. A userof the Acrobat eBookReadermay readan or
1.2

ebookandmake otherusesof the ebookon the computerto which the eoookwas downloaded, but the usermay not e-mail or copy the ebookto anothercomputer. [d. Adobe distributesthe Adobe Acrobat eBookReaderfor free to consumers, who can obtainit from Adobe's websiteaswell as from ebookpublishersand distributors,and Adobe licenses Adobe ContentServer,a productthat allows for the creationof ebooksaswell as the
their distribution. [d. 1 6. Ebook retailerssuchasBames&Noble~com Amazon.comusethe and

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AdobeContentServerto managesalesanddistribution of ebooks. Id. A publisherof ebookscanusethe Adobe ContentServerto package PDF file that a would otherwisebe ableto be copied(a so-called"naked" PDF file) so that it cannotbe copied

21 or further distributed. [d. 1 8. The Adobe ContentServerpermits the publisherto choosefrom a
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nwnberof privileges to grant to, or withhold from, the conswneror readerof the ebook, including the following:

a.
ebook.

The publishercanchoosewhetherthe consumer will be able to copy the

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b.

The publishercanchoosewhetherthe ebookwill be able to be printed to

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

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paper. The publishercan decidewhetherto allow full printing of the ebook,to deny all printing of the ebook,or to limit the numberof pagesprinted during a specifiedperiod of time.

c.

The publishercanchoose whetherto enablea lending function that

..
5 6

permitsthe purchaser consumer lendthe ebookto anotherindividual on the samenetwork or to of computers the original purchaser.Justasin the physicalworld, when the original purchaser as lendsthe ebookto anotherindividual, the original purchaser unableto usethe ebook. The is lenderof the ebookcan seta time limit for the expirationof the loanedebook.

7
8

d.

The publishercanchoosewhetherto permit an ebookto be readaudibly

9 1.0

by a speech synthesizer program. Certainpublishersof ebookswho useAdobe ContentServer do not enablethe speech synthesis function on certainebooksbecause publishers the independently or licensethe audiorights to the ebookto other entities,suchas a publisherof sell

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books tapes. fd.' 8. on
When a consumer purchases ebookformattedfor the Adobe Acrobat eBookReader an from an Internetwebsite,the ebookis downloaded the consumer'scomputerfrom the ebook to distributor's Adobe ContentServer. Id.' 9. The copy of the ebookprovidedto the consumer is accompanied an electronicvoucherthat is recognized the Adobe Acrobat eBook Readerso by by

3.4

15
1.6

17 that the consumeris able to readthe book on the computerto which the ebookwas downloaded.
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20 21.

The AdobeAcrobat eBook Readerreadsthe voucherto "know" that the copy of the ebook purchased the consumer by may only be readon the computerto which it is downloaded(unless the book is borrowedusing the lending function described above). ld. HI. eBook End User Licenses Ebookspurchased usewith the Adobe AcrobateBook Readermay be distributed for subjectto an End User License("BULA").l SeeDeclarationof SpecialAgent Daniel O'Connell

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Ilronically, like the ebooksfor which it providedcircumventiontechnology,Elcomsoft distributedthe AEBPR programsubjectto a EULA. Declarationof SpecialAgent Kevin McGee , 6 (filed Feb. 8, 2002). In its licenseElcomsoftinvokedprotectionsunderUnited States copyrightlaw, aswell asprotectionsunderthe Defense Acquisition Regulationsof the United GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

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4

"3-6 (filed with this opposition)("O'Connell Decl."). At leastthreeof the purchasers of Elcomsoft'sAEBPR programwho soughtto useit to circumventprotectionson an ebookthey hadpurchased purchased ebooksubjectto an EULA. Id. One suchEULA includedthe had the following terms:
1. You may install and view the eBook on one computer, which may be a desktop computer or a portable laptop computer. You may not install the eBook for use over a network. If you want to have the eBook available on several computers in a network, a license to download the eBook will need to be purchased for each such computer (volume discounts are available; call [#]). The eBook may not be leasedor loaned to a third party. 2. You may occasionally print a few pages of the eBook's text for your personal use only (each printed page bears a diagonal watennark saying, "Copyright Law Prohibits Copying or Distributing"). Personal use means printing a few pages to set aside for your later readin~. You may not copy or distribute any eBook content to others WIthOutthe written permission of [publisher] (depending upon the nature of the request, a license fee may be char~). To request permission, send an e-mail to pennissioDS($[publisher].com. Include the following information: (a) the matenal you wish to use (specifying the page number(s»; and (b) a description of the planned use (including quantity).

5 6 7
8

9 1.0

11
12 13 14
1.5 1.6

Please allow severaldaysfor a reply. 3. All contentin the eBookis copyrightedunderthe U.S. copyrightlaws, and [publisher ownsthe copyright andthe eBook 1 itself. Purchaser may not modIfy, remove,delete,aue;ment, to, add publish, transmit,participatein the transferor saleof, create derivativeworks from, or in any way exploit any of the eBook's content,in whole or in part. The unauthorized submissionor distribution of copyrightedor otherpro\>rietary contentis illegal andcould subjectthe purchaser criminal prosecutionaswell as to personalliability for damages a civil suit. Purchaser in will be liable for any damage resultingfrom infringementof copyrightsor proprietaryrights, or from any otherharm arising from such submission.
4. Your \,urchase of the eBook license for a designated subscription \,eriod is non-refundable, except as described herein. If the eBook IS not successfully downloaded due to a malfunction with [distributor's] computer systems,the Internet network system or the purchaser's computer, [publisher] agreesto re-deliver the eBook at no extra cost. Each party will be given a reasonable period of time to repair their malfunctioning computer equipment,

17
3.8

19 20

21
22

23
24

25 26 27 28 States.[d.

GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

4

1
2
3

but if no delivery is madewithin 21 days,then the purchaser will be given a full refund.

...

4
5 6

7. Your useof the eBookconstitutes your agreement the above to termsand conditions. ld. 14, Exhibit A. Contraryto assertions Elcomsoft'smotions, at leastone publisherof in ebooks, a matterof policy, allows circumventionof the protectionson its publicationswith the as publisher'sapprovalin order to allow blind or dyslexiccustomers makethe publicationsinto to audiblebooks. Id. 1 5. One of the ebooksto which a purchaser the AEBPR intendedto apply of the programwas distributedby this publisher. Id. IV. Elcomsoft's Refusal to Comolv with DMCA On or aboutJune25, 2001,Adobe sentElcomsoftcease desiste-mails and and demanding Elcomsoftstop distributingthe AEBPR program.ComplaintAffidavit" that 10, 14.

7
8 9

1.0

11
1.2

13

Elcomsoftdid not comply with Adobe's request,and in the following days,after having its

14 websiteblockedby its United StatesbasedInternetserviceprovider, Elcomsoft indicatedthat it
underthe DMCA. Complaint Affidavit' 1.S did not intend to comply with Adobe's requests 16
1.7

14.

On August 28,2001, a Grand Jury in the NorthernDistrict of California indictedElcom Ltd., a/k/aElcomsoftCo. Ud, for conspiracy violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright and Act. See17U.S.C. §§ 1201(b),1204. Specifically,thegrandjurychargedElcomsoftwith conspiringto traffic for gain in technologydesigned circumventtechnologythat protectsa to right of a copyrightowner in violation of Title 18,United StatesCode,Section371; with

18 19 20

to 21 trafficking for gain in technologyprimarily designed circumventtechnologythat protectsa 22
23 24

right of a copyrightowner in violation of Title 17,United StatesCode,Sections1201 1)(A) (b)( and 1204;andwith trafficking in technology marketedfor usein circumventingtechnologythat protectsa right of a copyrightowner in violation of Title 17, United StatesCode, Sections 1201(b)(1)(C) and 1204.

25
26

27 28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

s

1
2
3 4 5 1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether Congress properly enacted sections 1201(b) and 1204 pursuant to the

Commerce Clause.

2.

WhetherElcomsoft's trafficking in the AEBPR programconstitutesexpression

protected the FirSJ by Amendment.

6
'7

3.

If someportion of Elcomsoft'sconductwas sufficiently expressive deserve to

protectionunderthe First Amendment, whethersections1201(b)and 1204further Congress' goal of promoting andprotectingelectroniccommerce with only incidentalrestrictionson First Amendmentfreedoms.

8 9 1.0

4.

Whethersections1201(b)and 1204sufficiently defineproscribedconductto

to 1.1. provideproceduraldueprocess Elcomsoft.
1.2

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

13 14
1.5
16'

I.

BackKround of the DMCA
A.

Conlress' Review of Con~rilht Law in the Di&ital Ale

The Internetand the widespread digitization of variousproductsand serviceshave presented enormous opportunitiesfor internationalcommunication, meansof conductingtrade, andnew fonns of creativeexpression. See,e.g.,JenniferL. Schenker, The Trillion Dollar Secret Beneaththe Hype, theInternet Is Fosteringa Silent RevolutionThroughOnline Exchanges that Allow Fast and Efficient Trading AmongCorporateIT Systems, Time Magazine,Feb.28,2000 availableat 2000 WL 543326; TheRiseof the Infomediary: TheInternet Is Producing a String of RacyNew Business Models, The Economist,June26,1999, available at 1999WL 7363618. With its valuablepotential for global productdistribution at far lower transactioncosts, electroniccommerce also creatednew business has challenges, particularly for vendorsof intellectualproperty. SeeIntellectual Property: TheProperty o/the Mind - Digital Technology and theDevelopment theInternet Are Making it Easyto Copy or Alter All Sorts of Information of and Art, from Music to ComputerSoftware.Can CopyrightStill Be Protected?The Economist,

1.7

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20

21 22 23
24

25 26 27
28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS

TODISMISS coNsmunoNAL ON
GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]
6

1
2
3 4

July 27, 1996,available at 1996WL 11247237.Until fairly recently,artistsand authorshad only to contendwith the bootleg distribution of their works in hard-copyform, but now they face the reality of uncontrollable,worldwide on-line infringement. Embracingthe digital mediumas their own, infringersof copyrightedworks arenow ableto immediatelydistribute counterfeit copiesof copyrightedworks worldwide. As a result, infringers can threatento usurpmuch,if not all, of the Internetmarketfor a particularcopyrightedwork. lust as Congress previouslyupdatedcopyrightlaws to address impact of changing the technology,2 Congress soughtduring the 1990sto updatecopyright law to address adventof the electroniccommerce the Internet. The statutethat is the focus of this case,the DMCA, is and oneof severalstatutes Congress enacted address impact of the Internetand digital to the technologyupon copyrightlaw. 17U.S.C. § 1201et seq;seealso No Electronic Theft Act, 18

5
6

7
8 9

10 11

1.2 V.S.C. § 2319(c)(criminalizing reproductionand distribution of copyrightedworks without

13

requirement private financial gain). Congress of enacted DMCA after many yearsof the

hearingsseekingto address challenges copyright law presented the rise the to by 14 Congressional 15
1.6

of electroniccommerce.SeeUniversalStudiosv. Corley,273 F.3d 429,440 (2nd 2001). Cir. Congress recognized challenges the digital technologies presented the usesof to

17 copyrightedworks as early as 1974whenit created National Commissionon New the
18 19
20

Technological Usesof CopyrightedWorks ("CONTU") to study andmakerecommendations about,inter alia, computerusesof copyrightedworks. See Apple Computer,Inc. v. Formula Int'/Inc., 725 F.2d 521,523 (91b 1984). Out of the work ofCONTU grew an understanding Cir.

21
22 2Since founding of the republic,Congress updatedcopyright law to address the has new technologies.See,e.g.,RecordRentalAmendmentof 1984,Pub. L. No. 98-450,98 Stat. 1727 to 2~ (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(1984»; SoundRecordingAct of 1971,85 Stat.391 (responding piracy problemscreated the development the audiotaperecorder); SonyCorp. of America by of 25 v. UniversalStudios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.ll (1984)(citing EasternMicrowave, Inc. v. DoubledaySports,Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 129(2nd Cir. 1982» (describingthe enactment 17 of 26 U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(2)(B),111(d)(5)to address development technologythat madeit the of 27 possibleto transmittelevisionprogrammingby cableor microwave». 23 28 GOV'T OPB.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

7

1. 2
3

of the challenges evaluatingandprotectingcopyrightrights in the digital age. of In 1993,President Clinton formedthe InformationInfrastructureTask Force("llTF") to updateU.S. copyrightlaw regardingdigital transmissions to implementthe President's and vision for the National Information Infrastructure ("Nll"). S. Rep. 105-190,at 2 (1998). The llTF established Working Groupon IntellectualPropertyRights "to investigatethe effectsof the emerging digital technologyon intellectualpropertyrights and makerecommendations any on appropriate changes U.S. intellectualpropertylaw andpolicy." Id. The Working Group to issueda report in 1995known asthe White Paperwhich madevariousrecommendations to ensure copyrightlaw remainedcurrentin light of new technologies.[d. Among the activities conducted the Working Group in preparingthe White Paperwas holding severalhearingsthat by

4
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8 9 1.0

1.1. includedtestimonyfrom industries,libraries,educators, beneficiariesof the public domain. and

12 Id. at 2-3.
13 In 1995,Senators Hatch andLeahyintroducedthe National Infonnation Infrastructure CopyrightProtectionAct of 1995to implementthe recommendations the White Paper.ld. at of 3. Congress held varioushearingsregardingthe Nil CopyrightProtectionAct of 1995from late 1995through 1997that includedtestimonyfrom a numberof copyright industriesaswell as

l~
15 16

17 expertsfrom the World IntellectualPropertyOrganization, Commissionerof Patentsand the
18
1.9

Trademarks, the Librarian of Congress.Id. at 3-4. and Concurrent with Congress'efforts to updateU.S. copyright laws, the governingbody of the BerneUnion3calledupon the World IntellectualPropertyOrganization("WIPO") to fonD a committeeto considera supplementary agreement the Berne Convention. This resultedin to formal proposals updatethe BerneConventionto address to issuesarisingfrom the spreadof digital technology. In December1996tthe WIPO held a diplomatic conference culminatingin the adoptionof the WIPO CopyrightTreatyandthe WIPO Performances Phonograms and

20

21 22 23
24

25
26

27
28

~e BerneUnion is the internationalorganization responsiblefor the BerneConvention, ratified by the United Statesin 1989. See17 U.S.C. § 101(defining "Berne Conventionwork"). GOV'T OPP.TO MonONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

8

1. 2
3 4 5 6

Treaty. Id. at 4-6.

As a result of these joint domesticand internationalefforts, Congress enacted DMCA the in 1998to implementthe WIPO CopyrightTreatyand to define "whether consumers and businesses engage certainconduct,or usecertaindevices,in the courseof transacting may in electroniccommerce"andto address issuesrelatingto interstateand foreign commerce, "all including commerce transacted over all electronicmediums,suchasthe Internet,and regulation of interests and foreign communications." HR. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 22 (1998). Because Congress'focuson electroniccommerce, centralelementsof the DMCA of the statutearethe provisionsrelating to circumventionof technologies designed control access to to, anddesigned protectthe rights of ownersof, copyrightedworks sold in electronicform. See to

7
8 9

1.0

1.1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a),1201(b). Congress specificallysoughtto encourage protect the and

12 13 14 15
1.6

nascent marketfor electroniccommerce, more particularly, electroniccommercein and copyrightedworks. SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll),at 23 (1998). Congress wished to support"a thriving electronicmarketplace"that would provide "new andpowerful ways for the creatorsof intellectualpropertyto maketheir works availableto legitimateconsumers the digital in environment." Id.

1.7
1.8

B.

The StatutoQ: Framework

The DMCA containsthreeprohibitionsrelatedto circumvention. First, it prohibits the actof"circumvent[ing] a technologicalmeasure effectively controlsaccessto a work that protected[by the CopyrightAct]" 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(A) (emphasis added). A second provision forbids trafficking in technologyor productsdesigned circumventa technological to measure controlsaccess a copyrightedwork. Id. at § 1201(a)(2)(emphasis that to added). The third provision, the focusof this case,prohibits trafficking in technologyprimarily designed or marketed circumventmeasures protect a copyright owner's rights underthe Copyright to that Act See17 V.S.C. § 1201(b)(emphasis added). Whereas focusof § 1201(a)(2) technologythat blocks access the copyrighted the is to

1.9

20 21 22 23
24

25 26

27
28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUnONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

9

1
2
3 4

work - suchas a devicethat pemrits access an article on an Internetwebsiteonly by thosewho to pay a fee or havea password the focusof § 1201 is technologythat protectsthe copyright (b) itself - suchas a deviceon the samewebsitethat preventsthe viewer from copying the article onceit is accessed. S. Rep. 105-190,11-12(1998). See The DMCA providesseveralexceptions theseprohibitions. The statutepermits an to individual to circumventan access control on a copyrightedwork, or, in limited circumstances, to sharecircumventiontechnology:(1) in order for a schoolor library to determinewhetherto purchase copyrightedproduct; (2) for law enforcement a purposes; to achieveinteroperability (3) of computerprograms;(4) to engage encryptionresearch; asnecessary limit the Internet in (5) to access minors; (6) asnecessary protectpersonallyidentifying infonnation; or (7) to engage of to

5
6

7
8 .9

1.0

11 in securitytestingof a computersystem.See17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-G).
12 13 In addition,the DMCA providesthat its prohibition on the act of access circumvention,§ 1201 (a)(l)(A) (not the focusof this case),would not apply to usersof certaintypesof works if,

1.4 uponthe recommendation the Registerof CopyrightSt Librarian of Congress of the concludes that

15 16

the ability of thoseusers"to makenoninfringing usesof that particular classof work" is "likely

to be . adversely affected"by the prohibition. 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B). The statutemakes

17 clear,however,that any exceptions § 1201(a)(l)(A) adoptedby the Library of Congress to are
1.8

not defenses violations of the anti-trafficking provisionscontainedin § 1201(a)(2)and § to 1201(b). See17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(E). The DMCA providescriminal penaltiesfor thoseviolations of eachprohibition relatedto

19 20

21 circumventionwhenthe violations aremadewillfully andfor financial gain. See17 U.S.C. §
22 23
24

1204. Theseadditionalelements willfulness andprivate financial gain are centralto the case of beforethe Court, and arevirtually ignoredin the manybriefs filed by defendant Elcomsoftand
amIcI cunae.
- .

25 26 27
28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

10

1
2 3 4.

n.

CongressProperly Enacted Sections1201(b)and 1204 of the DMCA Pursuant to the CommerceClause The Framersentrusted Congress authority"[t]o make a111aws to the which shallbe

necessary properfor carrying into Execution"the powersvestedby the Constitutionin the and government the United States.U.S. Const.Art. I, § 8, ct. 18. of

5 6

Elcomsoftargues that enactment Sections1201(b)and 1204of the DMCA wasnot a of valid exerciseof an enumerated powerby Congress underthe IntellectualPropertyClause4 the of Constitution.S advancing In that argument, Elcomsoftbeginsfrom the flawed premisethat Congress enacted DMCA pursuantto its authorityunderthe IntellectualPropertyClause.6 the The legislativehistory of the DMCA reflectsthat Congress expresslybasedits exerciseof authorityover circumventiontechnologyon the Commerce Clauseratherthan the Intellectual PropertyClause.7SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 35 (1998)("Constitutional Authority Statement: Pursuant clause2(1)(4) of Rule XI of the Rulesof the Houseof Representatives, to the Committeefinds that the Constitutionalauthorityfor this legislation is provided in Article I, Section8, clause3, which grantsCongress power to regulatecommerce the with foreignnations, amongthe severalStatesand with the Indian tribes."); 144Congo Rec.E2136-02,2137. Coming out of the House-Senate conference finalized drafting of sections1201(b) that

7
8

9 1.0

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1.2

13
1.4

1S 16

17
1.8

19 20 21
22

I, Section8, Clause8 of the Constitution,which grantsto Congress power to the "promotethe Progress ScienceandusefulArts" is referredto hereinalternativelyasthe of IntellectualPropertyClauseor the CopyrightClause. SElcomsoft Memorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Basedon First Amendmentat 17-18.

4Article

6Likewise,amici law professors inaccurately statethat "[ n]either the text nor the legislativehistory of the DMCA indicateswhich power Congress relied on." Memorandumof 24. PointsandAuthorities of Amicus Curie (sic) at 1. SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 35 (1998); 144 Congo Rec.E2136-02(1998). 2S 7Amici law professors leastrecognize at that Congress may haveactedpursuantto the 26 Commerce Clausein enactingthe DMCA. Memorandumof Points andAuthorities of Amicus 27 Curie (sic) at 13. 23 28 GOV'T OPP.TO MonONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

11

1
2
3

and 1204of the DMCA, and speaking beforethe Housevoted on the bill, Congressman Tom Bliley, Chainnanof the HouseCommitteeon Commerce, declaredthat "given that the Conference Reportcontainsseveralnew provisions,I want to supplement legislativehistory the for this legislationto clarify the Conferees'intent, aswell asmake clearthe constitutionalbases for our action." After first commentingthat the Committeeon Commerceactedunderboth the CopyrightClauseandthe Commerce Clausewith regardto the DMCA, and then acknowledging a concernthat the bill could be seenasa "paracopyrlght"measure extendingbeyondthe regulatorysphereof intellectualpropertylaw (andbeyondthe scopeof Congress'authorityto act underthe IntellectualPropertyClause), Chairn1an the specificallyrecognizedthat "[i]n this

4
5 6

7
8 9

then,the constitutionalbasisfor legislatingis the commerceclause,not the 'copyright' 1.0 respect,
1.1. clause." Id. Seealso H.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 22 (1998)(noting that the bill "is aboutmuch

and may in 12 morethanintellectualproperty- It defineswhetherconsumers businesses engage 13 certainconduct,or usecertaindevices,in the courseof transactingelectroniccommerce.Indeed,

realizesits 1.4 manyof theserules may determinethe extentto which electroniccommerce
1.5

potential. "} A.

1.6 1.7

ConKressMa1:R~ulate Electronic Commerce

Article I, Section8, Clause3 of the Constitutiondelegates Congress power "[t]o to the regulateCommerce with foreign Nations,and amongthe severalStates,andwith the Indian

18

power 'is the power to regulate;that is, to prescribethe rule by which 1.9 Tribes." "The commerce
20

commerce to be governed. This power, like all othersvestedin Congress, completein itself, is is

to no 21 maybe exercised its utmost extent,andacknowledges limitations, other than areprescribed 22 23
24

by the Constitution. '" UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (citing Gibbonsv.

Ogden,9 Wheat. 1, 196(1824». As definedby the Supreme Court, the terDl"commerce"as referenced the Constitutionis "commercialintercourse"which "is regulatedby prescribing in rules for carryingon that intercourse."[d. at 189-190. Specifically,suchregulationmaybe directedat protectingchannels interstate of commerce, instrumentalitiesof interstatecommerce

25 26

27
28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

12

1
2
3 4 5 6

or thingsin interstatecommerce.Lopez,514 U.S. at 558 (citationsomitted). In creatingsections1201(b)and 1204of the DMC~ Congress actedunderthe Commerce Clauseto directly regulatespecificthingsmoving in commerce (circumvention technology)and to indirectly protectchannels interstatecommerce(electroniccommerce). of The legislativehistory reflectsthat the statutedeveloped of "a wide-rangingreview of all the out issues affectingthe growth of electroniccommercett a concernaboutinappropriate and distributionof productshanDfulto the marketfor digital content.H.R. Rep lO5-551(ll), at 22; 144Cong.Rec.E2136-02,2137. Moreover,the factsallegedin the indictment in this case reflect suchan intent put into practice: charges againsta companyfor marketingand salesover the Internet(electroniccommerce) ora softwareprogram(circumventiontechnology). Evenmore thanthe civil provisions,the criminal provisionsof the DMCA charged this in casefall squarelyunderthe commerce power of Congress.Because sections1201 and 1204 (b) requirethe government prove trafficking "for gain," an elemententirely lacking in the civil to provisionsof the law, therecanbe no questionthat the statuteimpacts"commercial intercourse."sUnitedStatesv. Moghadam,175F.3d 1269(11thCir. 1999)(recognizingthat because anti-bootlegging the statute,18U.S.C. § 2319A(a),containsa "financial gain" element,

7
8 .9

10
1.1. 1.2
1.3

14 15 16

is 17 it necessarily intertwinedwith commerce). 18
1.9

20 21 22 23
24

25 26 27 28

S'fheeconomicgain elementis oneof the two significant distinctionsbetweenthe civil andcriminal provisionsof the DMCA. Amici law professors ignoredthis elementin their brief filed beforethe SecondCircuit in the Corley caseand in this case. The failure to appreciate the distinctionhasled to much unfoundedconcernin the academic community that well-intentioned scholars could be prosecuted criminally for sharingencryptionresearch.SeeRobert Lemos, SecurityExpertsProtest CopyrightAct, ZDNet News, Sept.6, 2001,available at 2001 WL 4733227. Unfortunately,this misperception beenfed by certainindividuals and has organizations pursuinga political agenda.SeeBennyEvangelista, Judge'sRulings Boost Strengthof Digital CopyrightLaw, SanFranciscoChronicle,Nov. 29, 2001, at B-3 ("But EFF attorneyRobin Grosssaidthe computerscientistsstill do not believe they are immune from lawsuits. 'The judge's denial is very problematicbecause puts the scientistsin a position now it wherethey haveto facethe threatof prosecution orderto be ableto challengethe in constitutionalityof this law,' Grosssaid."). GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

13

1
2
3 4

B.

CongressMay Act Pursuant to the Commerce Clause to Protect Rights Granted Under the Intellectual Pro»el1\: Clause

Congress may act pursuantto the Commerce Clauseto passlegislationthat protectsand creates rights in intellectualpropertyevenwherethat legislationwould not be pennittedunder the IntellectualPropertyClause. The Trade-MarkCases,100U.S. 82,99 (1879). The Supreme

5

Court haslong recognized that while eachof the powersof Congress alternativeto all of the is
6

others,"what cannotbe doneunderoneof them may very well be doableunder another."
7

Moghadam,175F.3d at 1276. For example,despitethe fact that the public accommodation
8

provisionsof the Civil Rights Act of 1964may havereached beyondthe authority of the
9 1.0 1.1.

Fourteenth Amendment,the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,379 U.S. 241 (1964),upheldthe legislationasa valid act predicatedupon the CommerceClause. See also SouthDakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207 (1987)(holding that Congress could act pursuant

12 to Spending Clauseto imposerestrictionsthat would be beyondits power to enactdirectly).
1.3

The Commerce Clausemay be usedasa basisto legislatewithin a context contemplated
1.t

by anothersectionof the Constitution,but the power of the Congress legislatepursuantto the to 15
1.6

Commerce Clauseis not without limitation. SeeLopez,514 U.S. at 553-59(discussing historical limits of Commerce Clauseauthority). While the Supreme Court in the vast majority of negative Commerce Clausecases devotedits efforts to limiting congressional has attemptsto regulate intrastate business activity, the Court hasalsorecognized that Congress may not usethe

17
18
1.9

Commerce Clauseasajustification to overridean otherwiseexisting Constitutionalrestraint.
20

RailwayLabor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons,455 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down act by Congress
21.

underCommerce Clausethat violated BankruptcyClause'suniformity requirement). 22 In Moghadam,175F.3d at 1277,the EleventhCircuit addressed very question the 23 broughtbeforethis court by amici law professors: "whetherCongress useits Commerce can
24

Clause power to avoid the limitations that might preventit from passingthe samelegislation 25
26

underthe CopyrightClause." Contrasting Trade-MarkCasesandHeart of Atlanta Motel the cases (authorizingCommerce Clauseto accomplishwhat may not be pennissibleunderthe GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

27 28

14

1
2
3 4 5 6

CopyrightClause)with the Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n case(prohibiting useof Commerce Clauseto eradicate limitation placedupon Congress anothergrant of power), and a by recognizingthat "modem trademarklaw is built entirely on the CommerceClause,"the court concluded that "the Copyright Clausedoesnot envisionthat Congress positively forbidden is from extendingcopyright-likeprotectionunderother Constitutionalclauses, suchasthe Commerce Clause." The EleventhCircuit found most persuasive both that "[t]he grant itself is statedin positive tenDS, doesnot imply any negativepregnant"that would suggest ceiling and "a on Congress'ability to legislatepursuantto other grants"and that "[ e]xtending quasi-copyright protectionalso furthersthe purposeof the CopyrightClauseto promotethe progressof the useful arts." [d. at 1280. As reflectedin the legislativehistory of the DMCA, Congress recognizedthat while the

7
8

9
1.0

1.1.

of 1.2 purpose the DMCA was to protectintellectualpropertyrights, the meansof doing so involved 13 a dramaticshift from the regulationof the useof information to the regulationof the devicesby

Rec.E2136-2. For this reason, legislatorsviewed the 1.4 which infonnation is delivered. 144Congo 15 16 the legislationas"paracopyright"legislationthat could be enacted underthe CommerceClause. Id. at 2137. Sucha stepby Congress protectthe marketfor digital contentas an actionunder to

Clausecannotbe saidto overrideConstitutionalrestraintsof the Intellectual 1.7 the Commerce 18 PropertyClause,because Congress'fundamental motivation was to protectrights grantedunder

recognizedthat traditional 1.9 the IntellectualPropertyClausein the digital world. Congress 20 intellectualpropertylaws regulatingthe useof infonnation borderon unenforceable the digital in

save 21 world; only regulationof the devicesby which infonnation is deliveredwill successfully 22 23
24

constitutionallyguaranteed intellectualpropertyrights. SeeS. Rep. 105-190,at 8 ("Due to the ease with which digital works canbe copiedanddistributedworldwide virtually instantaneously, copyrightownerswill hesitateto maketheir works readily availableon the Internetwithout reasonable assurance they will be protectedagainstmassivepiracy.") that

25 26 27 28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUnONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

15

1
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m.

Sections1201(b)and 1204Do Not Violate the First Amendment
A. Elcomsoft May Not Make a Facial First Amendment ChaUenie to the DMCA

A party may only make a facial challenge9to a statute under the First Amendment when the statute proscribes "spoken words" or conduct that is "patently 'expressive or
." with expression. Roulettev. City of communicative or integralto, or commonlyassociated

4
5 6

Seattle,97 F.3d 300,303 (9d1 1996)(quotingBroadrick v. Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601,612-13 Cir. (1973». Statutes only susceptible suchchallenges are to "'when the legislation allegedlyvests government officials with unbridleddiscretion' and 'when thereis a lack of adequate procedural safeguards necessary ensureagainstunduesuppression protectedspeech. 4805 Convoy to of ",

7
8 9

1.0 Inc. v. City of San Diego, 183 F .3d 1108, 1111 (9thCir. 1999) (quoting Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v.

11

City of Las Vegas,154F.3d 1097,1100(9thCir. 1998». "[ A] facial freedomof speech attack '" expression conductassociated or with expression. Roulette,97 F.3d at 305. Hence,Elcomsoft

statute'is directednarrowly and specificallyat 1.2 must fail, unlessat a minimum, the challenged
1.3

1~ canonly make sucha challengeif the court finds that "every applicationof the statutecreate[s]
3.5

an impennissiblerisk of suppression ideas." New YorkStateClubAss'n, Inc. v. City of New of York,487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (citing City Councilo/LosAngeles v. Taxpayers/or Vincent,466

16

added). 17 u.s. 789,798, n.15 (1984» (emphasis 18 19 20
21.

In this case,the statutein questionis not directedspecifically at expression conduct or associated with expression, the statutehasnumerous and pennissibleapplications.See17U.S.C. §§ 1201(b),1204. Sections1201(b)and 1204arestatutes generalapplicationfocusedupon of trafficking in technologyfor private financial gain; they arenot focusedupon speech.See Andersonv. Nidorj; 26 F.3d 100, 103-04(9thCir. 1994)(holding that California antipiracystatute 9It is not entirely clear whetherdefendant Elcomsoft's challengeto the DMCA underthe First Amendmentis a facial or as-applied challenge. CompareMemorandumof Points and Authoritiesin Supportof Motion to DismissBasedon First Amendmentat 9-12 with Memorandum Points andAuthorities in Supportof Motion to DismissBasedon First of Amendmentat 15,line 16.Regardless, both typesof challengefail for the reasons statedin this opposition. GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

22 23
24

25 26 27 28

16

1
2 3 4
5 6

not subjectto facial challenge,in part because statutefocusedupon infringementfor the commercialadvantage private financial gain). The statutetargetsmany forms of technology, or suchashardware, that do not constitute"spokenwords" or "expressiveor communicative conduct"andthe statute,therefore,is not susceptible a facial challenge.1o Broadrick v. to See
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973).

Not only is the statutenot targeted speech expressive at or conduct,the statuteexplicitly providesfor adequate proceduralsafeguards ensure to that First Amendmentconcernsare addressed. 4805 ConvoyInc. v. City of SanDiego, 183F.3d 1108,1111.( citing absence See of proceduralsafeguards an elementin facial challengeanalysis). For example,thesesafeguards as includedirecting the Librarian of Congress ensurethat noninfringing usesof copyrighted to

7
8 9

1.0

1.1. works arenot prevented.17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(B). 1.2
1.3

Further,the overbreadth doctrineprofferedby Elcomsoftas a facial challengeto the DMCA doesnot apply.I I First, the statutedoesnot pose"a realistic dangerthat the statuteitself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendmentprotectionsof third partiesnot before
the COurt."12New York State Club Ass 'n, 487 U.S. at 11; Anderson v. Nidorj; 26 F .3d at 103-04.

14
1.5

1.6

Second, overbreadth the doctrinedoesnot apply to commercialspeech.Village of Hoffman

17 Estatesv. Flipside, HoffmanEstates,Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) (Flipside). Hence,to the
1.8

extentthat sections1201(b)and 1204reachanytype of speech a position the government does not concede sections1201(b)and 1204aretargetedexclusivelyat commercialconduct,namely -

19 20

21
22

23
24

can include computersoftwarewhich, according Elcomsoft,implicatesexpression, to sections1201(b)and 1204do not, on their face, targetcomputersoftware. Indeed,the statuteis aimedat many typesof technology,including hardware devicessuchas so-called"black boxes."SeeS. Rep. 105-190,at 27 (1998). "See Memorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Basedon First Amendmentat 9-10 n.6.

10 Although the technology targeted the DMCA by

25 26 12Elcomsoft's claim regardingfair useby third partiesis not sufficient for an overbreadth claim asfair useis not a true Constitutionalor First Amendmentdoctrine. Seeinfra section 27 Ill.C.3.a. GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

28

17

1. 2
3
j

the willful offering, importing, andtrafficking of technologyfor private financial gain. 17U.S.C.
§§ 1201(b), 1204.

Sincedefendant Elcomsoftmay not makea facial challenge,this oppositionbrief now turnsto the reasons Elcomsoftcannotsuccessfully sustainan as-applied First Amendment challenge sections1201(b)and 1204. SeeRoulette,97 F.3d at 302 (indicating that facial First to Amendmentchallenges shouldbe distinguished from as-applied challenges).
B.

5 6

7
8 9 1.0

Defendant's Sale of Circumvention Technolo2VIs Not Soeech.
1.

Defendant Elcomsoft Was Sellin2 a Product.

The first stepin any First Amendmentanalysisis to determinewhetherany form of speech implicated. Elcomsoft asksthe Court to find that it was engaged speech the basis is in on

speech.13 Sections1201 and 1204and the (b) 1.1. that the AEBPR programitself constitutes
1.2

indictmentin this case,however,do not targetthe mereexistence the AEBPR program. of Instead,sections1201(b)and 1204prohibit trafficking in or selling the AEBPR for private financial gain. In this respect,this caseis different than UniversalStudiosv. Corley, 273 F.3d

13
1.4

Cir. 1S 429 (200 2001),which involved the postingon a websiteof sourcecodeand object codeto a
1.6

computer programthat decrypteddigital versatiledisksor "DVDS.,,14Corley did not involve commercialtrafficking in the circumventiontechnology. The questionthat confrontsthis Court, therefore,is not whetherthe AEBPR is protected speech whetherElcomsoft's act of selling and trafficking in the AEBPR constitutes but expressive conduct. Justbecause technologyin this casehappens be computersoftware the to that mayor may not be considered speech, government the "does not loseits power to regulate

17 18
1.9 20 21.

22 23
24

13Memorandum Points andAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Basedon First of Amendmentat 3-6.
14 Although Corley providessubstantial supportfor

25
26

this Court denyingElcomsoft's

27 28

motions,Corley is also different in at leastone otherrespect:the technologyat issue circumvented access controlsin violation of 17U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2) ratherthan the copyright protectionsat issuein this case. Compare17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b). GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSmullONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

18

1. 2 3 4 5
6

commercialactivity deemed harmful to the public wheneverspeech a componentof that is activity." Ohralik v. Ohio StateBar Assn.,436 U.S. 447,456 (1978). "'[I]t hasneverbeen deemed abridgement freedomof speech pressto make a courseof conductillegal merely an of or because conductwas in part initiated, evidenced, carriedout by meansof language, the or either spoken, written or printed. /d. (quoting Giboneyv. Empire Storage&/ce Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). That Elcomsoft's act of selling the AEBPR programdoesnot constituteexpressive conductis apparent from the factual contextin which its salesoccurred. SeeSpence v. Washington, U.S. 405 (1974) (holding that whethera nonverbalact constitutesspeech 418 depends upon the natureof the activity, the factualcontextin which it occurs,whetheran intent

7
8 9

10

waspresent,andwhetherthe message would be understood). 1.1. to conveya particularizedmessage 12
1.3 1.4

Elcomsoft'sinitial statements regardingthe AEBPR programdemonstrate Elcomsoft engaged in the conductof trafficking merely to sell copiesof the AEBPR program,not to engage any fonn in of commentary protest. SeeO'Connell Decl. 17, Exhibit D. or The act of trafficking in the

15
1.6

AEBPR programhad no expressive purposeandwas solely aimedat generating profits.

2.

The AEBPR in Object Code Form Is Not SReech.

1.7

As part of their evolutionaryapproach new computertechnologies to and the First Amendment, courtshave struggledwith the questionof whethercomputercodeconstitutes IS expression.SeeCorley,273 F.3d at 429; Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (~Cir. 2000). A consensus appears be emerging,however,that sourcecode(as opposed object code)16 to to can

18
1.9

20
21.

22
23 24

ISInevaluatingFirst Amendmentlaw in the digital age,courtshave appropriatelytakenan "'evolutionary' approach the task of tailoring familiar constitutionalrules to novel to technologicalcircumstances, favoring 'narrow' holdingsthat would permit the law to matureon a 'case-by-case'basis." Corley, 273 F.3d at 445 (citing Name.Space, v. Network Solutions, Inc. Inc. 202 F.3d 573, 584 n.ll (2nd 2000». Cir.

25 16Computer programsarewritten in specialized alphanumeric languages, "source or code."In order to operatea computer,sourcecodemustbe translatedinto computerreadable the 27 form, or "object code." Object codeusesOsand Is in combinationswhich represent
26

28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

19

1
2
3 4 5 6

be a protectedfoml of expression.SeeCorley,273 F.3d at 445-49; Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6thCir. 2000) (noting that "issueof whetheror not the First Amendmentprotectsencryption source codeis a difficult one because sourcecodehasboth an expressive featureand a functional feature"but concludingthat sourcecodeis protected). In contrastto sourcecode,no consensus arisenwith regardto whetherobject code has constitutes First Amendmentprotectedexpression.CompareCorley, 273 F.3d at 445-46 (suggesting object codemay be protected)with Bernsteinv. UnitedStatesDept. of State,922 F. Supp.1426,1436(N.D. Ca!. 1996)(holding that sourcecodeconstitutesspeech not reaching but objectcodequestion),and Karn v. UnitedStates Dept. of State,925 F. Supp. 1, 9 n.19 (D.D.C.1996)(assuming that sourcecodeis protectedspeech whenjoined with commentary, but

7
8 9 ],0

a 1.1. statingthat sourcecodealoneis "merely a meansof commanding computerto perform a 12 13
1.4

function~" thus indicating the object codewould be lessdeservingof protection); seealso
Name.Space,Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F .3d 573, 586 (200Cir. 2000) (holding that

functionalInternettop level domainnames protectedexpression); not Orin S. Kerr, Are We OverprotectingCode?Thoughtson First-GenerationIntemetLaw, 57 Wash.& Lee L. Rev, 1287(2000); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedomof Speech Injunctions in and

15
1.6

48 softwareis best 3.7 IntellectualProperty Cases, Duke L.J. 147,236-37(1998) ("most executable
1.8

treatedasa virtual machineratherthanasprotectedexpression"). Computerprogramsare "essentiallyutilitarian" works. Computer Assoc.Int'l v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693,704 (2Jx\ 1992). A computerprogramis in its most functional form when Cir.

1.9 20

21 it is in object code,a fonD that generallyonly hasmeaningto the computerexecutingits
22 23
instructions. See Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F .3d 596, 600 n.2

(9th Cir. 2000). The AEBPR productwhich Elcomsoftdistributedas a completedproductin

2.
characters the sourcecode.See,e.g.,SonyComputerEntertainmentInc. v. of 2S alphanumeric ConnectixCorp., 203 F.3d 596, 600 n.2 (9thCir. 2000);SegaEnters.v. Accolade,977 F.2d 1510, Inc., 866 F.2d 1173, 26 1515n.2 (9thCir. 1993); JohnsonControlsInc. v. PhoenixControl Systems,
"

27 28

1175 n.2 (9thCir. 1989).

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

20

1
2
3

objectcodefonn possessed only functionalcharacteristics; was not usedto conveyinfonnation it or to assert valuesto its users. Similarly, the AEBPR programdoesnot "speak" to its usersin anyexpressive mannerwhen it is used. The Court shouldbe reluctantto extendFirst Amendmentprotectionto the act of trafficking in a functionalproductor goodthat merelyactsas a machine. SeeLemley & Volokh,
48 Duke L.J. at 236-37; see also Advent SystemsLtd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F .2d 670, 675 (3MCir.

4
5 6

7
8

1991)(holding that softwareis a goodfor purposes Pennsylvania of UnifOml CommercialCode).

c.

Even if Elcomsoft Was Engagedin Expressive Conduct, Its Challenge to Sections1201(b) and 1204Fails Under First Amendment Princi(!les.

9

Even if the Court concludes that Elcomsoft'sconductin trafficking in the AEBPR was
1.0

sufficiently expressive deserve to protectionunderthe First Amendment,sections1201(b)and
1.1.

1204nevertheless meetFirst Amendmentrequirements."When 'speech'and 'nonspeech'
1.2

elements combinedin a singlecourseof conduct,a sufficiently important government are interest
1.3

14
1S

in regulatingthe nonspeech elementcanjustify incidentallimitations on First Amendment freedoms." UnitedStatesv. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);Junger v. Daley 209 F.3d 481,485 (~Cir. 2000) (subjectingregulationsgoverningexportof encryptionsoftwareto O'Brien test).

1.6

17
1.8

Seealso Corley, 273 F .3d at 429 (holding that First Amendmentanalysisrequirescomputercode be treatedascombiningnonspeech speech and elements). A statutethat is contentneutralwill satisfythe First Amendment"if it furthersan importantor substantialgovernment interest;if the

1.9

governmental interestis unrelatedto the suppression free expression; if the incidental of and
20

restrictionon allegedFirst Amendmentfreedoms no greaterthan essential the furtherance is to of 21 22 23
24

that interest." TurnerBroadcastingSys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,662 (1994) (quoting 0 'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). Further,the Constitutionaccordsa lesserprotectionto commercial speech than to other constitutionallyprotectedexpression. Central Hudson Gas& Elec. Corp. I? v. PublicServ. Comm'nof New York,447 U.S. 557,562-63(1980).

25 26 27 28
17 The government may alsoban commercialspeech relatedto

illegal activity. Pittsburgh

Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,388 (1973).

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUnONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

21

1
2
3

1.

Sections12010!} and 1204are Content Neutral.

The principal inquiry in deternrining contentneutrality "is whetherthe government has adopted regulationbecause agreement disagreement a of or with the message conveys." it TurnerBroadcastingSys., 512 U.S. at 642 (quoting Wardv. RockAgainstRacism,491 U.S. 781, 791 (1999». "The government'spurposeis the controlling consideration." Ward,491 U.S. at 791 In evaluatingthe DMCA for contentneutrality,the Court shouldfollow the Second Circuit's reasoning Corley, in which the SecondCircuit detemIinedthat the DMCA targeted in only the nonspeech, functional components computersoftware.Corley, 273 F.3d at 454. The of Second Circuit statedthe following regardingthe DMCA and DeCSS,the DVD decryption

4
5 6

7
8 9

1.0

11 softwareat issuein that case:
1.2
1.3

14

Neither the DMCA nor the posting provision is concerned with whatever capacity DeCSS might have for conveying infonnation to a human being. . . The DMCA and the postin~ prohibition are applied to DeCSS solely becauseof Its capacity to instruct a computer to decrypt CSS. That functional

lS
16

capability is not speech within the meaningof the First Amendment. Id. Seealso UniversalCity Studios,Inc. v. Remierdes, F. Supp.2d 294,329 (S.D.N.Y. 111

1.7

2000)("The reasonthat Congress enacted anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA had the 18
1.9

nothingto do with suppressing particularideasof computerprogrammers everythingto do and with functionality.").

20

The Corley analysisappliesequallyto sections1201 and 1204which, in this case,only (b)
21.

targetthe nonspeech functional elements the AEBPR program. The DMCA appliesto the of 22 AEBPR programbecause the capacityof AEBPR to instruct a computerto circumvent of 23
24

Adobe'sAcrobat eBookReader. The statutedoesnot reachthe AEBPR because anycapacity of the AEBPR may haveto communicate ideasor information to a humanbeing. SeeCorley 273

25
F ,3d at 454; see also Reimerdes, 111 F, Supp,2d at 304-05 ("In an era in which, , '. computer 26

27
28

codealsois capableof inflicting otherhann, societymust be ableto regulatethe useand GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTfi'UTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138](RMW]

22

1
2
3

dissemination codein appropriate of circumstances. Constitution,after all, is a framework The for building ajust and democraticsociety.It is not a suicidepact.").

2.

Sections1201~) and 1204Further an ImRortant Government Interest

4
5 6

The Government'sinterestin preventingunauthorized copying of copyrightedworks is unquestionably substantial.SeeCorley,273 F.3d at 454; Andersonv. Nidorj; 26 F.3d 100, 10304 (9d1 1994). Congress repeatedly Cir. has found that copyright and,morebroadly, intellectual propertypiracy areendemic. Reimerdes, F. Supp.2dat 335 n.230.18 describedabove, 111 As Congress enacted DMCA specificallybecause wishedto protect American copyrighted the it works and"facilitate making availablequickly andconvenientlyvia the Internetthe movies, music,software,andliterary works that arethe fruit of American genius." S. Rep. 105-190,at 8.

7
8

9

10 11

The magnitudeof theseinterestsshouldnot be underestimated since"the Framersintended " Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation 1.2 copyrightitself to be the engineof free expression.
1.3

Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).

It
15
1.6

17
18 19 20 18The Reimerdes court cited H.R. Rep. 106-216(1999)which states that 22 "[n]otwithstanding[penaltiesfor copyrightinfringement]copyrightpiracy of intellectual propertyflourishes,assisted largepart by today'sworld of advanced in technologies. For 23 example,industry groupsestimatethat counterfeitingandpiracy of computersoftwarecostthe affectedcopyrightholdersmore than $11 billion last year(othersbelievethe figure is closerto 24 $20billion). In somecountries,softwarepiracy ratesareashigh as 97% of all sales.The U.S. 25 rateis far lower (25%), but the dollar losses($2.9 billion) arethe highestworldwide. The effect of this volume of theft is substantial:lost U.S.jobs, lost wages,lower tax revenue,andhigher 26 pricesfor honestpurchasers copyrightedsoftware.Unfortunately,the potential for this of 27 problemto worsenis great." 28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]
21.

~

1
2

3.

Sections1201(b)and 1204Are Sufficiently Tailored to Satisfy Constitutional Reguirements.

Sections1201 and 1204aresufficiently tailored for First Amendmentpurposes.The (b)
3

Supreme Court hasemphasized a content-neutral that regulation"neednot be the leastspeech4

restrictivemeansof advancingthe Government's interest." Turner Broadcasting,512 U.S. at
5

662.Seealso Corley,273 F.3d at 455. Rather,a statuteis sufficiently tailored "so long as. . . [it]
6

promotesa substantial government interestthat would be achievedlesseffectively absent the
7

regulation." TurnerBroadcasting,512U.S. at 662 (citationsomitted). The SecondCircuit in
8

Corleyconcludedthat the DMCA prohibitionsagainsttrafficking in circumventiontechnology
9

satisfythe "sufficiently tailored" standard.Corley, 273 F.3d at 454-55.
1.0

11 12
13

The numerous exceptionsto the DMCA also demonstrate, part, the closetailoring of in the DMCA. Congress carefully balanced, inter alia, the needsof law enforcement other and government agencies, computerprogrammers, encryptionresearchers, computersecurity and specialists againstthe seriousproblemscreated circumventiontechnology. See17 U.S.C. §§ by
1201(e) 1201(g), 12010). That defendant Elcomsoft'sconductdid not fall within the

14
1.5

-

exceptions doesnot suggest, aloneprove,the DMCA sweeps broadly. SeeFEC v. Nat'[ let too
1.6

17
18
1.9

" Right to WorkCommittee, U.S. 197,208 (1982)("statutoryprohibitions and exceptions459

regarding political contributionsby corporations unionsheld "sufficiently tailored and avoid unduerestrictionon the associational interestsasserted" political organization). by D. A Fair Use Defenseis Not ARRlicablein this Case

to

20

21 22 23
24

1.

Elcomsoft Does Not Have Standing To Assert a Fair Use Defense on Behalf of Third Parties

Elcomsoftdoesnot have standingto asserta fair usedefense behalf of third parties. on "[A] personto whom a statuteconstitutionallymay be appliedmay not challengethat statuteon the groundthat it conceivablymay be appliedunconstitutionallyto othersin situationsnot before the Court." Broadrickv. Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). Seealso United Statesv. Edwards,13 F.3d 291,295-96 (9th Cir. 1993),overruledon other grounds. Elcomsoft doesnot

25 26 27
28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

24

1. 2 3
4

claim to be making fair useof copyrightedmaterials;rather,it advances hypotheticalfair use a argument behalf of usersof the AEBPR program. on

2.

This CaseDoesNot Presentan Infrine:ement Claim.

Not only doesElcomsoft not havestandingto assertfair usein this context,but in addition,the fair useargumentis immaterialto Elcomsoft'sdefense. As this Court has previouslyobserv~ fair useis an affirmative defense a claim of copyright infringement. See to ReligiousTechnology Centerv. NetcomOn-line Communication Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,1242-43(N.D. Ca!. 1995);seealso Campbellv.Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510U.S. 569, 590 (1994)(statingthat fair useis an affinnative defense an infringementclaim); Harper & Row, to

5
6

7
8

9

Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,417 U.S. 539 (1985) (same). 1.0 Publishers.,

11

Fair useis nota defense a 1201(b)charge. In Corley, the SecondCircuit notedthat to

1.2 while "the DMCA targetsthe circumventionof digital walls guardingcopyrightedmaterial(and
1.3

trafficking in circumventiontools), [it] doesnot concernitself with the useof thosematerials after circumventionhasoccurred." 273 F.3d at 443. Thereforethe "alleged importanceof [the circumventingdevice] to certainfair usesof encrypted copyrightedmaterial [i]s immaterialto . . statutoryliability" underSection1201(b)0 at 4420Seealso Melville Nimmer & David [do Nimmer,Nimmer on Copyright §§ 12A.06[B][3], 12A.18[C] (2001). Because Elcomsofthas beencharged undersections1201(b)and 1204,which bar trafficking in a circumvention technologyand do not concerncopyrightinfringement,Elcomsoftwastesits breatharguinga fair usedefense a fictional charge. to

1t
lS
1.6 1.7
1.8

19
20

21
22 23 24

3.

Although the Court Need Not Reach the Issue, Sections1201(b)and 1204 are Consistentwith Fair Use.

a.

Fair useis not a static doctrine.

Fair useis ajudicially createddoctrinethat "limits the exclusiveright of a copyright holderby pennitting othersto makelimited useof portionsof the copyrightedwork, for 25 appropriate purposes, free of liability for copyrightinfringement." Universal City Studios,Inc. v.
26

27
28

Reimerdes, F. Supp.2d 294,321 (S.D.N.Y 2000). Seegenerally Campbellv. Acuff-Rose 111 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

25

1. 2
3

Music,Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Although someregardfair useashaving Constitutional underpinnings, court hasheld that fair useis a Constitutionaldoctrine. SeeCorley, 273 F.3d no at 458 ("[T]he Supreme Court hasneverheld that fair useis constitutionallyrequired."). Until enactment the 1976Copyright Act, fair useexistedonly at commonlaw. Congress of intended thenew Section107definition of fair useto maintainthe statusquo. 17U.S.C. § 107;H.R. Rep. 94-1476,at 66 (1976). While it providesguidelines,the statuterefrains from establishing bright-line rules on what constitutesfair use,reflecting the notion that "the courtsmust be free to adoptthe doctrineto particular situationson a case-by-case basis." H.R. Rep.No. 94-1476,at 65-66(1976). Seealso Campbellv. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (noting that the statutedoesnot createbright-line rules). Congress explicitly craftedthe statuteto avoid

4.
5

6 7
8 9

10

1.1. "freez[ing] the doctrinein the statute,especiallyduring a period of rapid technologicalchange."

12
1.3

H.R. Rep.94-1476,at 65-66 (1976). Congress soughtto establisha doctrinethat, though codified,was nevertheless flexible enoughto respondto changingneedsof society.

1.4

b.

Copyright owners do not have an affirmative oblieation to Rrovide meansfor fair use of works.

15 While the fair usedoctrine immunizescertainusesof protectedworks from infringement
1.6

claims,no elementof the doctrineguarantees usersthe meansfor exploiting the fair use.
1.7

Therefore,fair useallows a researcher quotelines from a copyrightedwork, but it doesnot to 18 guarantee researcher ability to cut-and-paste text from a digital copy, eventhoughthat the the the 19 might be more efficient that typing out the lines by hand. As JudgeNewmanemphaticallystated 20

21
22 23
24

in Corley,
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guaranteescopying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the original Fair use has never been held to be a guaranteeof accessto copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the original.

25 26 27 28

273 F.3d 429,459 (2nd 2001). Applying this notion to the circumventionofDVD access Cir. controls,JudgeNewmanconcludedthat "[t]he fact that the resulting copy will not be asperfect

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

26

1
2
3

or asmanipulableasa digital copy obtainedby havingdirect access the DVD movie in its to digital fornl, providesno basisfor a claim of unconstitutionallimitation of fair use."Id. at 459. Digital technologyfacilitatesaccess copyrightedworks, but it doesnot follow that our to right to exploit fair useshouldbe necessarily expanded.Fair use saysonly that you may freely makea certainuseof a protectedwork. The doctrinedoesnot promisethe ability to exercise that fair useright by the most expedientmethodavailable. A law that proscribescircumventionof a protectivedevicedoesnot constrainthe freedomto makelegitimate,fair useof a copyrighted work. SeeCorley, 273 F.3d at 458-59.

4 5
6

7
8

9 1.0

c.

The DMCA exolicitly accountsfor fair use.

The DMCA reflectsampleconcernfor the preservation a robustconceptof fair use. of The legislativehistory of the Act is rife with discussion how bestto ensureits preservation. of

11

1.2 SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 35-37 (1998). The statute makesnumerousexplicit allowances for

13
1... 1.5 1.6

traditional fair usesof protectedworks. Specifically,the statutepermitsnonprofit libraries, archives, educational and institutionsto circumventtechnologicalmeasures order to decide in whetherto purchase copy of a work. It creates exceptionto the circumventionban for a an activitiessuchasencryptionresearch, securitytesting,reverseengineering, shieldingchildren

online content,andprotectingprivacy interests'.See17U.S.C. §§ 1201(e)17 from inappropriate 18
1.9 1201(g), 1201(j).

Evenbeyondthe enacted exemptions, Congress instituted a "fail-safe" mechanism to assure if any significant constraints fair usedid in fact arisefrom the legislation,they that on would be addressed additional,warrantedexemptions and implemented. Section 1201(a)(I) providesfor a triennial rulemakingreview by the Library of Congress assess the basisof to on evidence collectedover the three-year period "whetherthe prevalence thesetechnological of protections, with respectto particularcategories copyrightedmaterials,is diminishing the of ability of individuals to usetheseworks in waysthat areotherwiselawful." H.R Rep 105-551 (ll), at 37 (1998). Given the proteannatureof the technologies that promptedthis legislation,

20
21.

22 23
24

25 26 27 28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

27

1
2
3 4 5

Congress wisely did not attemptto address within the scopeof the statutoryprovisions every perceived potential effect on users' access.

d.

The AEBPR gro2:ramis not a fair use device.

The claims of Elcomsoftand amici that purchasers ebooksrequirethe AEBPR of programto engage fair usesaremisleadingandwrong.19 in First, the activities identified by Elcomsoftdo not fall within fair use. For example, making a backupcopyof a literary work su<::h an ehookis not the fair usebackupright granted as in 17U.S.C. § 117. Section117 appliesonly to computersoftware,not to all digital works such asebooks.20 17 U.S.C. § 117.In addition,comparingtraditional bookswith ebooks See demonstrates fallacy of the backup-copy the claim; sellersof traditional books do not provide

6 7
8 9 1.0

11 back-upcopiesfor boundbooksthat arelost or damaged.Similarly, Elcomsoft's argumentthat
that 12 copyrightprotectionmeasures preventa computerfrom readingan ebookaloud improperly
1.3

forbid a fair useis not correct.A copyrightowner'sexclusiverights havealwaysbeendivisible,

14 andthe copyrightownermay apportionrights to different publishersasshewishes. SeeBagdadi
15
1.6

v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194,1197(9d1 1996);Ladd v. Law & Technology Cir. Press,762 F.2d 809,
813 n.4 (9thCir. 1985). A copyrightownermay legitimately assignprint and electronicrights to

and 1.7 different licensees, a distributor with print rights but not electronicbook rights may not
1.8

19 20
21.

19See Memorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to DismissBasedon First Amendmentat 14-16.

2O'fhe backupright in section117is construed narrowly. SeeMicro-SPARC, Inc. v. 22 AmtypeCorp., 592 F. Supp.33 (D. Mass. 1984);Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, 597 F. Supp.5 (N.D. lli.1983) (holding that a copy of a programembodiedin a ROM is not subjectto the privilege of 23 archivalreproduction). This narrow constructionis appropriate given that the needfor backup copiesof computersoftwarearoseat a time when softwarewas largely transferredon floppy 24 disks,which were particularly susceptible damage to from scratching,bending,or demagnetizing. Today,CDs and DVDs are far more reliablemedia,andthe backupneedarticulatedin section 2S 117is essentiallyobviated- or at leastthe risk of damage no greaterthan the risk that any is 26 book or videocassette be inadvertentlydamaged, will and'thedangers which a printed book is to havenot beendeemed warrantan archival copy privilege. to 27 exposed 28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUnONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

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1
2
3 4 5 6

distribute electronic books.21 See Greenberg v. Nat'! Geographic Soc., 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th

Cir. 2001)(holding that subsequent electronicpublicationof photographs previously printed in magazines constituteda derivativework andwas not a fair use); RandomHouse,Inc. v. Rosetta Boob, 150F. Supp.2d613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that claim for copyright infringementfor licensingof electronicbooksunlikely to succeed underlicensefor printed books). Likewise, purchasing copy of a printed book doesnot entitle a consumer alsoreceivean audiocopy. a to The Court shouldnot be misled by the fact that in a digital medium,varying fonnats suchas soundandtext, which in other contextsarenecessarily separate, exist as components a can of singleproduct. The natureof the divisible rights, however,shouldnot change.22

7
8

9 1.0 1.1.

21Divisibilityis especiallyrelevantin the digital realm,where licensingparticularrights, ratherthan selling a copy of the work, is common. The Court will want to considerthat usersof

12
1.3

Adobe's AcrobateBook Reader ebooks general be licensees boththereader and in may -

1.4
1.5

1.6

17
18
1.9 20

softwareandthe electronicbooksthemselves may be subjectto a license. While somecourts havequestioned scopeof theselicenses, practiceof contractingin copyright rights is the the clearlylegitimate.SeeS.O.S., Inc. v. Payday,Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087(9th Cir. 1989)(stating that licensee infringes copyright owner'scopyrightby exceeding scopeof the license);Group One,Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,Inc., 254 F.3d 1041,1053(Fed.Cir. 2001) (indicating that seller canrestricttermsof salethrough shrinkwraplicense);Lipscher v. LRP Publications,Inc., 266 F.3d 1305,1318-19(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that breachof contractclaim is not preempted by CopyrightAct); ProCD v. Zeidenberg,86 F.3d 1447,1450-53(7th Cir. 1996)(upholdingvalidity of shrinkwraplicenseunderUCC); AdobeSystems v. OneStopMicro, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d Inc. 1086(N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that EULA constitutes valid license). But seeSolimanProducts Co.,LLCv. AdobeSystems. Inc., 171F. Supp.2d1075(C.D. Cal. 2001).

22Indeed, cautionis warrantedin the digital fair usearenabecause heavy-handed a requirement publishersdistributemultiple typesof rights with a singleproduct could that 21 unintentionallysuppress productsthat would address needsof consumers new the (suchas 22 audiblebooks).SeeHarper & Row,Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (1985)("Economistswho haveaddressed issuebelievethe fair useexceptionshouldcome the 23 into play only in thosesituationsin which the marketfails or the price the copyright holder would askis nearzero. . . In the economists' view. permitting 'fair use' to displacenormal 24 copyrightchannels disruptsthe copyrightmarketwithout a commensurate public benefit.") (citing T. Brennan,Harper & Row v. TheNation, Copyrightability and Fair Use,Dept. of Justice 25 EconomicPolicy OfficeDiscussionPaper 13-17(1984); Gordon,Fair Useas Market Failure: A 26 Structural and EconomicAnalysisof theBetamaxCaseand its Predecessors, Colum. L. Rev. 82 1600,1615(1982)). Seealso Diaz Decl. 1 8.d.

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GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

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1. 2
3 4 5 6

Second, militating against potential fair use purposes of the AEBPR is the fact that the

AEBPR produces an exactcopy (or backup)of the original ebookbut a work that is better not classifiedas a derivativework. See17U.S.C. § 101(defining derivativework). Making an
adaptation or derivative work from a protected work is a right that attaches exclusively to the copyright owner; it is not deemed a fair use of the work. Absent permission from the copyright owner, a person who creates an adaptation or a derivative work engagesin copyright

7
8 9

infringement. SeeSonyComputerEnt. Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters, F. Supp.2d 976,990 (N.D. 87 Cal. 1999)(finding useof derivativework for commercialpurposes without pennissionof copyrightowner is barredby copyrightact); Campbellv. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994). The AEBPR programdoesnot simply bypassebookcopyrightprotections;it

10

them. The result is not a duplicatecopy of the copyright-protected ebook,but insteada 1.1. removes 12 13 14 15 16 copyof the work in plain-vanilla AdobePDF fonnat. This nakedPDF file, without any restrictionson copying,transferring,andprinting, is not the samework as an ebook file with numerous protectionsin place. Finally, a legitimateuserof an ebookmay avail herself of substantial usesWithout fair runningafoul of the DMCA, suchaswriting a review of the content,quoting portions of the text,

and eventaking screenshotsof pages. See17 1.7 readingit aloud, "lending" it to a colleague, 18 19
20 21.

u.s.c.§ 107; SonyComputerEntertainment America,Inc. v. Bleem,214 F.3d 1022,1026-30
(9dt Cir. 2000) (determiningthat useof screen shotsof video gamesconstitutedfair use).
IV.

Sections1201{b}and 1204of the DMCA Comaort with Due Process

22 23
24

The Fifth Amendmentto the Constitutionprovidesthat "No person...shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property,without dueprocess law." It is a basicprinciple of suchdue of process crimina11aws that may not be vaguein their prohibitions. Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108(1972). A law must clearly definewhat is prohibitedbecause: a vaguelaw (1) mayobfuscate ratherthanprovide fair warning to thoseseekingto steerclear of unlawful

25 26 27 28

GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUnONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

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1. 2
3

conduct;23 (2) a vaguelaw may encourage and arbitraryor discriminatoryenforcement by government personnel!4[d. The moreimportantaspect the vagueness of doctrine "is not actual notice,but the otherprincipal elementof the doctrine-therequirementthat a legislatureestablish minimal guidelinesto governlaw enforcement."Kolenderv. Lawson,461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (citing Smithv. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974».
A.

4
5 6

Sections1201(b) and Section 1204Are Not Unconstitutionally Vague as ARRliedto Elcomsoft

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8

In this case,Elcomsofthasbeencharged with conspiringto violate and violating two separate laws. The indictmentallegesthat the companywillfully trafficked in a devicedesigned to circumventcopyrightprotectionin violation of Sections1201(b)(I)(A) and 1204of Title 17, andwillfully trafficked in a devicemarketedfor usein circumventingcopyrightprotectionin violation of Sections1201(b)(I)(C) and 1204of Title 17. Much of the two laws that Elcomsoft hasbeencharged with violating arethe same: (1) both sharethe sameintroductory language

9 1.0

11

12
13 from Section1201(b)that "no personshallmanufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,or otherwisetraffic in anytechnology,product,service,device,component, part thereof,that-"; or and(2) both sharethe samerequirementfrom Section1204that the personmust violate Section 1201"willfully and for purposes commercialadvantage private financial gain... The only of or
distinction between the two laws is that for purposes of 1201(b)(l)(A), the device being
1.8

It
lS
1.6

17

trafficked in must be "primarily designed producedfor the purposeof circumventing or 19 protectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure effectively protectsa right of a copyright that 20
21.

22 23
24

2300 Although only constructiveratherthan actualnotice is required,individuals must be givena reasonable opportunityto discernwhethertheir conductis proscribedso they canchoose whetheror not to comply with the law." Forbesv. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009, 1011(9thCir. 2000)(citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, U.S. 399,402-03 (1966)). 382 2~ere is alsoa concernthat a vaguelaw may cause personsto avoid constitutionally protectedspeech their efforts to steerclear of unlawful conduct,but suchconcernsare in addressed underthe overbreadth doctrine,which in any eventis not applicableto commercial speech.Village of HoffmanEstatesv. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982). Seeinfra section ill.A. GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUnONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW] 31

2S
26

27 28

1
2 3

owner," andfor purposes 1201 of (b)(l)(C), the devicebeing trafficked in must be "marketed[by the defendant]for usein circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure that
" effectivelyprotectsa right of a copyrightowner.

t
5

The Court shouldbegin its analysisof thesesectionsof law with the presumptionthat Sections1201(b)and 1204are constitutional. Forbes,236 F.3d at 1012(applyingpresumption of constitutionalityat outsetof dueprocess analysisof criminal law challengedfor vagueness). The Court shouldthen extrapolate allowablemeaningof the statutefrom the words of the law the itself. Grayned,408 U.S. at 110. The Court shouldnot, however,expector require
"mathematical certainty from our language" or "meticulous specificity" in the"drafting of the

6 7
8

9 1.0 1.1.

statute.[d. From the plain language, both sectionsof law containthe following elementsthat the

must prove: 12 government
1.3
1..

1

the defendant trafficked in a technology,product,or device; the defendant actedwillfully; and the defendant actedfor purposes commercialadvantage private of or financial gain.

2.

1.5 1.6

3.

1.7

For purposes 1201(b)(I)(A), the fourth elementthat the governri1ent of must prove is:

18 19
20

4.

the devicebeingtrafficked in was "primarily designed producedfor the or purposeof circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure that effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner."

of the must prove is: 21 And, for purposes 1201(b)(1)(C), fourth elementthat the government 22 23
24

4.

the devicebeingtrafficked in was "marketed[by the defendant]for usein circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure that effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner."

25 26

These statutoryprovisionsregulatingtrafficking in devices"designed"or "marketed"for

a particularpurposearevery similar to the statutoryprovisionsanalyzed the Supreme by Court in Villageof HoffmanEstatesv. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982),and the Court's analysisin this case GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20i38] [RMW]

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32

1. 2 3 4 5 6
7 8

shouldfollow the reasoning adoptedby the Supreme Court in that case. In Flipside, the owners of a retail storeclaimedthat a village criminal ordinance making it unlawful to distributeitems "designedor marketedfor use" with unlawful drugswithout a licensewas unconstitutionally vaguein its applicationto the plaintiff's saleof lawful materialssuchas"pipes, water pipes, pins, an herb sifter, mirrors, vials, rolling papers,andtobaccosnuff." The plaintiffs claimedthat the statutewas too vaguebecause did not identify with sufficient particularity the type of it merchandise the village was attemptingto regulateunderthe untbrellaphrase"designedor that marketed use." [d. at 500. for
The Supreme Court concluded that the language "designed or marketed for use" was not

9

1.0 vague in its application to the retailer primarily becausethe phrase "designed for use" would, to a

personof ordinaryintelligence,refer to "the designof the manufacturer, the intent not 1.1. business
1.2

of the retailer or customer,"and the alternative"marketedfor use" standard containeda scienter

and clearly encompassed retailer's intentionaldisplay andmarketingof "a 3.3 requirement 14 lS 16 merchandise."[d. at 502. Seealso Posters'N' Things,Ltd. v. United States,511 U.S. 513 (1994) ("primarily intended... for use" drug law not unconstitutionallyvague);RichmondBoro Gun Club v. City of New York,97 F.3d 681,685-86 (2nd Cir. 1996)("designed"for usegun law not

1.7 unconstitutionally vague).
1.8

In this case,the samestandards exist: the phrase"designedfor use" presentin the fourth elementof section1201(b)(l)(A), shouldbe readon its faceto refer to "the designof the manufacturer, the intent of the retaileror customer." Seeid. Likewise, with regardto the not phrase"marketedfor use" presentin the fourth elementof section 120I(b)(I)(C), this Court shouldfind that the scienterrequirement the express and language the statutemakeclearthat of the provision is applicableto the defendant's intentional"marketing of merchandise."Seeid.

1.9 20

21 22 23
24

B.

Elcomsoft's Due ProcessAreuments Fail

25 26 27 28

Elcomsoft's arguments that Sections1201(b)and 1204are unconstitutionallyvagueas appliedin this caseare flawed for the following reasons: 1 Elcomsoft'~primary argumentis that the statuteimpennissibly

GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW]

33

1. 2
3

encompasses Elcomsoft's conducfs regardless whetherthe company'spurposein making and of selling the AEBPR was "to allow unlawfi41 distribution of copyrightedworks" or to "allow a lawful owner to havemore freedomto readthe book how and/orwherethe owner wanted.,,26 That argument missesthe point of a proceduraldueprocess vagueness challenge;the analysisof a law regulatingdistribution of devicesdoesnot focuson whetherthe underlyingconductfor which the devicesareusedis unlawful or lawful, but whetherthe statuteclearly defines prohibitedconduct. Seeid. at 497 n.9 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governorof Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25(1978) (noting that an objectionto a law that would "inhibit innocentusesof items foundto be covered"by the law would be a substantive processchallengeratherthan a due

4 5
6

7
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due process challenge,andconcludingin any eventthat sucha claim would haveno 1.0 procedural "[ 11 merit because r]egulationof items that havesomelawful aswell asunlawful usesis not an
1.2 irrational meansof discouraging"the unlawful uses».
1.3

2.

Elcomsoftalsoargues that the absence scienterprovision in 1201(b) ora

1~ and 1204as appliedto Elcomsoftweighsin favor of a finding ofvagueness!7 Aside from the
1.5

fact that a scienterelementis not essential overcomingvagueness, suggestion in the that the statutedoesnot containany scienterrequirement incorrect. Section 1204requiresthe is government prove that Elcomsoftacted"willfully," which in this circuit, requiresthe to

1.6 1.7
1.8

19 20 21 22 23
24

2S A

constitutionaldueprocess vagueness challenge may be madeto the facial application

of a statuteor to the applicationof the statuteto the factsof the particular case. Flipside, 455 U.S. at 494. While a bit unclearfrom the text of the argument, Table of Contentsin the Elcomsoft'sMotion to Dismiss Indictmentfor Violation of Due Process (Section111"AS APPLIED TO ELCOMSOFf") clarifies that the company'smotion is only an as applied challenge.In any event,because party "who engages someconductthat is clearly proscribed a in cannotcomplainof the vagueness the law asappliedto the conductof others,"the government of will respondonly to the argumentthat Sections1201(b)and 1204violate due processasapplied to Elcomsoft.Id. at 495; Melugin v. Hames,38 F.3d 1478,1486 Cir. 1994). (9th 26Elcomsoft Motion to DismissIndictmentfor Violation of Due Process 4,16 at (e(I1phasis original). in 27Elcomsoft Motion to DismissIndictmentfor Violation of Due Process 18. at GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS [CR 01-20138][RMW] 34

25 26 27 28

1
2 3 4
5 6

government provethat the companyacted"voluntarily and intentionally, and not through to ignorance, mistakeor accident." UnitedStatesv. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036(9thCir. 1997) (citing Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructionsfor the Ninth Circuit, Section5.05 (1995». Seealso Posters 'N'Things, Ltd. v. UnitedStates,511 U.S. at 519 (discussingobjectivescienter
element rooted in language "primarily intended ... for use"). The presence of this scienter element eliminates the concern that a statute will trap those who act in good faith. Colautti v.

7
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Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); Screws UnitedStates,325 U.S. 91,102 (1945) (plurality v. opinion) (holding that "requirementthat act must be willful or purposeful... doesrelieve [a criminal] statuteof the objection that it punishes without warning an offenseof which the accused unaware.");BoyceMotor Lines v. UnitedStates,342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) was

1.0

challengebecause "statuteonly punishesthosewho 1.1. (upholdingcriminal law againstvagueness

12 knowingly violate the Regulation.
1.3

CONCLUSION For the foregoingreasons, government the respectfullyrequests Court deny defendant the Elcomsoft'smotionsto dismissthe indictment.

1.4

15 16

17 DATED: March 4, 2002
1.8

Respectfullysubmitted,
DAVID W. SHAPIRO United StatesAttorney

1.9 20 21. 22 23 24

SC As

~~~
ASsistant United StatesAttorney

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27 28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON CONSTrruTIONAL GROUNDS [CROl-20138] [RMW]

35

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3 4 5 6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE U.S. v. ELCOM LTD.. a/k/a ELCOMSOFT

CR-Ol-20138 (RMW)
I, Lauri Gomez,declarethat I am a citizen of the United States,over the ageof 18 yearsand not a party to the within action. I herebycertify that a copy of the foregoing:

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1.

UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT BASED ON FIRST AMENDMENT AND VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. by facsimile;- by FederalExpress-Xby first class

was servedtoday- by hand;-X-

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!mail by placing a true copy of eachsuchdocument(s) a sealedenvelopewith postagethereonfully in Inaid,eitherin a U.S. Mail mailbox or in the designated areafor outgoingU.S. Mail in accordance with the Donna!practiceof the United States Attorney's Office; by placing in the Public

12

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Defender'spickup box locatedin the U.S. District Courthouse addressed the following and to Counselof Record:
JOSEPH BURTON, ESQ. Duane, Morris & Hecksher LLP 100 Spear Street, Suite 1500

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CINDY COHN ElectronicFrontier Foundation 454 Shotwell Street
San Francisco~California 94110 Fax: (415) 436-9993

SanFrancisco,California 94105 17 !Fax:(415) 371-2201 (415) 371-2214 18 !Phone: Keker & VanNest Street 20 710 Sansome SanFrancisco,California 94111-1704 21 It'ax: (415) 397-7188 !Phone: (415) 391-5400 22
23

Phone:(415) 436-9333ext. 104 JULIE COHEN Professorof Law 600 New JerseyAvenue,N.W. WashingtonD.C. 20001 Fax: (202) 662-9411 Phone:(202) 662-9871

19 JOHN KEKER. ESQ.

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I declareunderpenaltyof perjury that the foregoingis true and correct,and that this certificate was executed SanJose,California. at !DATED: March 4,2002
/'

26

LegAlSecretary ~