Debate Blumenberg Löwith

Progress, Secularization and Modernity: The Lwith-Blumenberg Debate
Author(s): Robert M. Wallace

Source: New German Critique, No. 22, Special Issue on Modernism (Winter, 1981), pp. 63-79
Published by: Duke University Press
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Progress,Secularizationand Modernity.
The L'with-BlumenbergDebate
by Robert M. Wallace
I. Contempprary
AttitudestowardProgress
"Progress" is no longerthe watchword,the unquestionablybeneficial
goal and process thatit once was in the United States and the West. The
European intelligentsiashed its illusionsabout progresssome time ago,
under the impact of the world wars, the "Final Solution," etc. In the
United States, innocencelastedlonger,butwithVietnamand theenvironmentalcrises,the existenceof widespreaddoubt about the capacityof the
"progressive"trioof democracy,industryand science to resolveall problems has become a "normal" stateof affairshere too. It is no longeronly
ideologically "counter-cultural"typeswho doubt the possibilityor even
the meaning of progress. Even the advocates of nuclear power, the
of recombinant
builders of the latest Macdonald's, and the investigators
DNA, though they may still occasionallyapply the word "progress" to
these projects,defendthemnot as beingthemselvesbeneficialbutmerely
as generatingjobs, or ultimatelyas being "inevitable." For many of us
"progress" has thusbecome anothername forthesteamrollerof historya steamrollerwhichit now seems mayonlystop whenit has obliteratedits
else.
"drivers" as well as everything
Indeed, we may wonderwhetherthatwasn't the real natureof "progress" all along. The suggestionof the occasional socialitsthatthesepheof late capitalismand can
nomena are reallysymptomsof the irrationality
and must be overcome by the establishmentof a more thorough-going
democracy,of an industryorganizedto meet real needs, and of a science
which aims to solve people's real problems- such naively"progressive"
The "socialist"countriesnow in exissuggestionsare metwithincredulity.
tence seem more intenton progress as pollution than even our latecapitalist ones, and they don't inspire confidencein the possibilityof
progressin democracyeither.But even more basically,we doubtour own
abilityto distinguishreal needs fromfalse,"manipulated"ones, to define
really worthwhilegoals and to make "real progress"towardsthem.Our
experienceis so dominatedand suffusedbythemechanismsofofficialand,
we think, false progress that when we consider the possibilityof an
alternative,thatpossibilityalmostinevitablypresentsitselfnot as a differ63
64
Wallace
ent kindof progress,"real" progressthistime,butratheras no progressas an escape fromprogressand all thatitconnotes.And ofcoursethereare
plentyof "world-views"available to help thosewho would liketo definea
mednon-"progressive"mode of existence.Orientalreligions,mythology,
back-to-the-land
itation, fundamentalor maybe existentialChristianity,
neo-Scholastic,or Heideggeranarchism,neo-Platonic,neo-Aristotelian,
ian philosophy. . . everythingand anythingis capable of some sort of
revivalor appropriation,or even (perishthe thought)commercialization.
In the shadow of (and, often,by means of) the official,discreditedbut
ofprogress,the"alternatives"
proliferate.
"inevitable"ongoingmechanisms
However, these more or less escapist phenomena pose a less basic
threatto thesalvageabilityof anyconceptionof real progressthanis posed
by attemptsto explain the idea of progressitselfas a mistake or an
inauthenticversionof somethingelse. There have been a numberof recent
attemptsalong these lines, includingthe ecologically-inspired
attemptsto
trace the originof dominatingor exploitingnaturein Westernreligions.
Heidegger has suggestedthatthemodernpreoccupationwithtechnologyis
a phenomenon of the forgetfulness
of Being whichoriginates,perhaps,
somewherein Greek philosophy.One of the mostinteresting
and incisive
of these attempts,focussingon theconceptof progressitself,is notas well
known in this countryas the two just mentioned,probablybecause it
originatedlong beforetheecologymovementand has notlentitselfto the
kind of popularizationthatHeideggerhas received.This is the doctrine,
propounded pre-eminentlyby Karl Lowith, that the modern idea of
into worldlyformof Christianeschatology,
progress is a transformation
that is, of the Christianpreoccupationwiththe futureas thedimensionof
the "last things,"the end of the world, the Last Judgement,salvation,
damnation,etc.
II. Karl L)whith'sTheoryof Progressas SecularizedEschatology
Lowith's book, Meaningin History,was publishedby theUniversity
of
Chicago Press in 1949 with the unfortunatesubtitle,"The Theological
Implicationsof the Philosophyof History."The German edition,published in 1953 afterLowith's returnto Germany,carriesthe muchmore
accurate subtitle,"Die theologischenVoraussetzungender Geschichtsof the philosophyof
philosophie," thatis, the theologicalpresuppositions
history.L6with'sthesisis notabout theologyas such; rather,itis aboutthe
derivationof modernphilosophiesof history,withtheiralmostunbroken
celebrationof progress,fromChristianity
(and, throughit,fromJudaism).
It is about the - mostlyhidden- theologicalpresuppositions
ofmodern
historicalconsciousness,as exemplifiedbyleadingthinkers
of the 18thand
19th centuries(Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet,Comte, Proudhon,Hegel,
Marx).
TheLowith-Blumenberg
Debate
65
Lowith findsthe key to the derivationof thesephilosophiesof history

fromChristianityin Hegel, the one modernphilosopherof historywho
a centraland overtfeatureof his
makes his relationshipto Christianity
system.This emerges in Hegel's doctrinethat the modernspiritualand
political world (which he claimed to bringto fullcomprehensionin his
("Aufphilosophy) arose througha "suspension and carrying-forward"
hebung") of theChristian-Reformation
phase ofworldhistory.'L6with,of
course, abandons Hegel's assumptionthatthisprocessconstituteda "step
forward,"but he preservesHegel's schematicoutlinein his own doctrine
thatthe modernidea of progresssuspends(i.e., forL6with,disguises)and
carries forward(in secularizedform)the Christianrelationshipto eschatology.The purposeof Lowith'sbook, he tellsus, is to showthat,contrary
to the consciousnessof mostexponentsotherthanHegel, the "philosophy
of historyoriginateswiththe Hebrew and Christianfaithin a fulfillment
and that it ends with the secularizationof [that faith's]eschatological
pattern."z
Lowith's book does not undertaketo presenta comprehensivehistory
or analysisof the phenomenonof "progress."Most of thetime,it stayson
the level of the historyof ideas (i.e., in thiscase, mostlyof philosophyand
formulations
of the
theology),beginningwiththe mostwidelyinfluential
optimistic"faithin progress"thatwas so prevalentin the 19thcenturyand
workingbackwards,lookingalwaysforearlierformsof theidea and forits
ultimatesource as an idea. The centralportionof the book is a discussion
of the theoriesof Marx, Hegel, Proudhonand Comte, the 19th-century
socialists, idealists and positivistswho all (despite their often radical
disagreementswithone another)in L6with'sview share a convictionthat
worldhistoryis unifiedand intelligiblein termsof an underlying
patternof
unbroken and seeminglyinevitableprogresstowardssome formof ideal
ultimatehuman condition.L6withridiculesthisattitude,not vociferously
butwiththequiet effectiveness
thatis possiblefora European whoseyouth
coincidedwithWorldWar One, youngmanhoodwiththeWeimarRepublic, and matureyearswiththe "ThirdReich", WorldWar Two, the"Final
Solution", and Hiroshimaand Nagasaki. He seeks continuallythe source
as wellas an
of thisnon-rationalfaithin a patternthatscientific
objectivity,
honest awareness of daily humanexperience,should have exposed as an
illusionbeforetimeand intellectualenergycould be wastedon it. And he
isn't bashfulabout statinghis conclusion,time and again, as he finishes
with each author, thatthispeculiaridee fixe is comprehensibleonly as a
disguised version of the Hebrew and Christianfocus on certainfuture
events, and on movementtowardsthem,as crucialforman's happiness.
inhisfirst
1. L6withdiscusses
Hegelatgreater
length
majorwork,FromHegeltoNietzsche
- TheRevolution
inNineteenth-Century
(NewYork,1964;German
original
published
Thought
in Zuirich
in 1941).
2. Meaningin History
(Chicago,1949),p. 2.
66
Wallace
One possible alternativeexplanationL6withdoes not consider.This is

what might be called the "materialist"or sociological type of theory,
according to which the illusionsof these intellectualsare merelyhighfalutin'versionsof the enthusiasmthatwas widespread,and would presumably have become widespreadeven withouttheirhelp, as a resultof
of science, technology,
the evident progressin the materialproductivity
in
18th
and
even
earlier
centuries.
etc.
the
19th,
industry,
Why L6with
does not consider this type of explanationI can, of course, only guess.
However, two possibilitiesdo occur to me. The firstis thatLowithmay
believe that intellectualphenomena (the historyof ideas) must be explained primarilyby referenceto otherintellectualphenomena;thatsociological explanationscontainan unacceptable"reductionism,"whichtaken
to the extreme would deny the possibilityof thoughtitself,and thus
suffocateeven itselfas a (self-conscious)theory.This kindof responseto
ofsocial reality
the materialist"unmasking"of theoriesas merereflections
certainlyhas some plausibility.The second possibilityis thatL6withhas in
the back of his mindthatthesecularizationof Christianideas and attitudes
is the fundamentalexplanationnot onlyof the idea of progressbut of the
verymotivationand powerof "progress"itself,as embodiedin thegeneral
dynamism (economic, military,scientific,etc.) of European capitalist
society since, say, the 16th century.He does offersome speculative
remarks,especiallyat the end of his book (pp. 202-203), thatsuggestthis
kind of account. If thisis indeed whathe reallythinks,thento explainthe
idea of progressas a reflectionof materialdevelopmentswould just lead
back to Christianityagain as the cause of those materialdevelopments.
And muchof the motivationforthematerialistreductionwoulddisappear
in view of such a circle.
But let us returnto what Lowith does give us: his historyof ideas.
Another recurringtheme in Lowith's thinking,along withthe thesisthat
the modernidea of progressis the resultof secularizationof Hebrew and
Christian"futurism,"is thecontrastof thisfixationon thefuturewithwhat
ancient(pre-Christian)attitude,one
Lowith takes to be the characteristic
whichsees historyas a successionof risesand falls,growthand decadence
etc., analogous to thenaturalcyclesoflivingthingsand oftheheavens,and
epitomized in the common Greek theory(elaborated as a historicalcosmologyin the doctrineof theStoics) of a continual"recurrence,"whichis
essentiallyunchangedthroughoutpast, presentand future.It is clear that
L6with feels drawn to this ancient world-viewmore even than to the
indifferenceto worldlyprogresswhichcharacterizeswhat he regardsas
true Christianity.While he mayhonorthe latter,stillitshistoricaladvent
and triumphwere theend of antiquityand thesourceof at leastone of our
most basic modernconfusions.
How exactly did the transformation
come about by means of which
Christianitygave rise to the modernidea of progress?L6with examines
several 18thcenturythinkers- Voltaire,Turgot,Condorcet- in whose
time the idea is commonlyagreed to have emerged in its full modern
The Lowith-Blumenberg
Debate
67
clarity.He also studies the enigmaticand isolated work of Giambattista

Vico, and the overtlyChristianhistorico-theological
writingsof authors
such as Bossuet, Joachimof Floris, Saint Augustine,Orosius - and the
writersof the Bible itself.These discussionsare veryinteresting,
but no
clear patternor sequence of transformation
does
not
seem
appears. L6with
to suggest,forinstance,thatChristianthinking
became increasingly
more
worldlyduringthe Middle Ages, foreshadowingan eventualtransformation into the (ostensibly) irreligiousmodern doctrinesof progress.Nor
does he definea point of stress,weakness,or potentialcrisisin Christian
(Nor, again,does
thinkingwhichwould help to explainthetransformation.
he put forwardany "materialist"or sociologicaltypeof explanation,such
as has been so temptingto othersin explainingthewaningof theChristian
Middle Ages, etc.) The secularizationof eschatologyis apparentlysuch an
elusive, or such a deep-lyingprocessthatitsstages,ifit has stages,are not
manifest in the documents of the historyof ideas. It is, perhaps, a
"theoreticalconstruct,"necessaryto explainwhat is observable,but not
itselfapparentin the data. A skepticmightwonderwhetherthe"materialist" explanationof theriseof theidea ofprogressis not,despiteitsunsatisfying"vulgarity,"just about as persuasiveas thissortof highlyspeculative
theory.
But L6with shows no signs of uncertainty.Apparentlyhe wasn't
of histheoryof
as foran "illustration"
lookingso muchfortheconfirmation
secularizationin thewritershe examines.Seeing no alternativeintellectual
account of themodernidea ofprogress- and therewas none, priorto the
appearance of Hans Blumenberg'sstudiesin the 1960s- Lowithis simply
confidentthat the account he has proposed must in some way be the
correctone.
What will be the consequences ifwe accept L6with'stheory?Its most
false conbasic implicationis that modern thoughthas a fundamentally
sciousness of itself.While claimingto be an expressionof authentically
human rationality,modern thoughtrelatingto historyin factderivesits
- thatof directiontowarda future
fundamentalpatternof interpretation
- from theology, from the very dogmas that the
goal or fulfillment
"historicist"heirswere concerned,if
Enlightenmentand its 19th-century
not to deny, at least to bracketofffromtheirexplanatoryendeavors.And
as it were,of "terminology"
thisis not just an innocent"borrowing,"
whichcan readilybe separatedfromtheoriginalcontextfromwhichitis
is so tightly
borrowed; in its originalcontextthispatternof interpretation
intertwinedwiththe conceptoffaiththatthe presenceof the patternin a
modern contextmustcast fundamentaldoubt on thatcontext'scharacter- once the source of
isticmodern claim to elementaryhumanrationality
the patternis recognized. "The modernmind has not made up its mind
whetherit should be Christianor pagan. It sees withone eye of faithand
one of reason. Hence its vision is necessarilydim in comparisonwith
either Greek or biblical thinking."(p. 207)
A grimconclusion,forthoseof us who would like to salvagesomething
68
Wallace
frommodern philosophy- and, for that matter,frommodernsociety.
itup. Fromthewreckofmodernity
entailed
L6withdoes nottryto pretty
by the recognitionof this false consciousness,he draws no reassuring

moral. Nor (at least in Meaningin History)does he suggestany"way out."
He praises the stoical refusal-of-illusions
of figureslikeJacobBurckhardt,
and depicts the classical Greek conceptsof nature,cosmos, etc. persuauntroubledbyhope, illusionsof
sivelyas a model of a world-consciousness
progress,etc. But he does not claim to inhabitsuch a natureor cosmos.
Perhaps it is an indexof theexhaustionofour timesthatL6with'sthesis
was not systematically
criticized- though,at least in Germany,it was
widelyknown,cited and elaboratedupon bytheologiansand philosophers
-- until 1962, and no book was devoted to its refutationuntil 1966.
Whatever the reason for the delay, thatcritiqueand refutationare now
available, and formthe subject of the remainderof thispaper.
III. Blumenberg'sCritiqueof theSecularizationTheory
Hans Blumenbergis a youngerGerman philosopherwho was known
before his debate withL6with as the authorof "Paradigmsfora Metaphorology," of a book on The Copernican Turn, and other relatively
specialized studies.At the SeventhGermanPhilosophyCongressin 1962,
Blumenbergread a paper containingbotha thorough-going
analysisof the
notion of "secularization" and the claims made on its behalf, and a
suggested alternativeaccount of the originof what he regardedas the
legitimatemodern idea of progress,and of the originof the grandiose
philosophies of historyin which ideas of progresshave played such a
central role. This paper was revised,expanded, and supplementedby a
dramaticallyoriginalaccountof theoriginof themodernage as a whole,in
a book Blumenbergpublishedin 1966 underthe titleDie Legitimitiit
der
Neuteit- The Legitimacyof theModernAge.3
Part One of the book (like Blumenberg'soriginalpaper) is entitled
"Secularization: Critique of a Categoryof HistoricalIllegitimacy."In it
Blumenbergasks what exactlyis meantby the assertionthata conceptor
structureis "the secularizationof" a Christianconceptor structure.4
First
he pointsout how thiskindof assertiondiffers
fromthemoregeneralkind
3. (Frankfurt
am Main,1966).An Englishtranslation
(bytheauthorofthisessay)ofthe
secondeditionofthisbookwillbe published
byMIT Press.
4. Blumenberg
usofmanyotherallegedinstances
reminds
ofthisprocess,
besidestheone
whichis supposedtohaveproducedtheideaofprogress.
central
of
Epistemology's
problem
is tracedbackto theChristian's
ofcertainty
ofsalvation;
themodern
work
certainty
problem
to divinesovereignty;
ethic,to Christiansainthoodand asceticism;
politicalsovereignty
communism
to paradiseor theapocalypse;
theinfinity
oftheuniverse
to divineinfinity;
etc.
criticizes
Blumenberg
onlysomeofthesesupposedsecularizations
individually.
The Lowith-Blumenberg
Debate
69
ofstatement,
thatoursis a "secularage," or thatitis alwaysgetting
more
in or dominatedby religion).
and more secular (i.e., less interested
from(and
are clearlyverydifferent
Whethertrueor not,suchstatements
to theeffectthatcertainmodern
muchless interesting
than)statements
phenomenaare secularizedversionsof Christianones. Turningto the
literthatLowith'sbookand thesubsequent
latter,Blumenberg
suggests
whichhe spellsoutin
atureimplya modeloftheprocessofsecularization
termsof threecriteria:
- First,thatan identifiable
thetransforcommon"substance"underwent
mationfromChristianto "secularized"form.(So that,forexample,
a continuous
without
processoftransformamerelyanalogousformation,
tionconnecting
won't
them,
qualify.)
to theearlier,Chris- Second,thatthe"substance"belongedproperly
And
tianframework.
- Third,thatthetransformation
notby
wasa "one-sided"oneperformed
so
to
but
an
outside
it.s
itself,
("secularizing"
speak), by agent
Christianity
three
to
the
first
of
these
will
refer
here
discussion
criteria,
mainly
My
ofLowithinparticular.
whichis centraltoBlumenberg's
(Blumencritique
a gooddeal
ingeneralcontains
theories"
of
"secularization
berg'scritique
thatcannotbe summarized
here.)
ofa common"substance"
oftheexistence
Turningthentothecriterion
whichundergoesthe supposedprocessof secularization,
Blumenberg
betweenthe
difference
ofall thatthereis an evidentformal
pointsoutfirst
all
The former
andtheideaofprogress.
ideasassociatedwitheschatology,
incursion(comingof the
involvesome formof dramatictranscendent
the
whichconsummates
Messiah, end of the world,Last Judgement)
however
of
idea
Whereas
the
world
outside.
of
the
progress,
from
history
it maybe in particular
versions,
alwaysdenotesa processat
spiritualized
from
workwithin("immanent
stagetostage(even
in") history,
proceeding
external
intervention.
not
to an ultimate"end") byan internal
by
logic,
atvariouspoints
ofthisproblem
Lowithhadshownsomeconsciousness
in Meaningin History,
especiallyin theEpilogue,wherehe tookpainsto
and modernideashad in commonas simply
describewhateschatological
as thecrucial"horizon"forman,andhope(or
to thefuture
an orientation
inrelation
tothathorizon.6
Thiswasclearly
as man'sattitude
expectation)
modesof "consummeantto directattentionaway fromthe differing
oftheidea. Lowith
versions
and thesecularized
mation"in theChristian
defends
on variousgrounds,
5. Thismodelhasbeencriticized
againstwhichBlumenberg
undSelbstbehauptung,
it in the secondeditionof hisbook (VolumeOne: Siakularisierung
No. 79, Frankfurt
taschenbuch
wissenschaft
1974,pp. 23-31, 37). To thebestof
suhrkamp
withcomparable
analysisof the conceptof secularization,
my knowledgeno alternative
doesnotundertake
toBlumenberg's
L6with'sresponse
hasbeensuggested.
critiques
clarity,
to presentan alternative
analysis.
6. Meaningin History,
pp. 84, 111,196,204.
70
Wallace
again emphasizedthisminimumcommonsubstancein hiseventualreplyto

Blumenberg'scritique.7
Blumenberg'ssecond line of criticismquestionsthe continuityof the
eschatological substance throughthe "secularizationprocess," not by
questioningthe identityof the end pointsof theprocess,butby suggesting
an entirelydifferent
derivationforthemodern"result":a different
"genealogy of the idea of progess."8Briefly,whathe assertsis thatthe modern
idea of progressarose in thecourseof twomainearly-modern
experiences:
the springforwardmade by astronomyin the 16thand 17thcenturies,and
the "quarrel of the ancientsand themoderns"whichragedin thelate 17th
century.The astronomicalprogressregisteredby Copernicus,Galileo and
Kepler was possible onlyon the basis of comparisonsof observationsover
centuries,an enterprisethe success of whichrequired(a) a timespan far
exceeding that of an individuallife-time,and (b) a theoreticaleffort(of
data-collectionand transmission)thatlikewisewould noteven in principle
be accomplished by a single individual. In this respect early-modern
astronomyexhibitednot only results,but also a structure(as a human
enterprise)whichwas entirelynovel in Westernexperience.No one would
doubt its importanceas a model formodernsciencedown to the present.
Blumenbergsuggeststhatas a model ofmethodicalprogressitwas relevant
and was in factinfluentialoutside "science" as well.
But before the idea could be generalizedin thatmanner,the mixwas
enriched by the "quarrel of the ancients and the moderns." Here the
crucial result was that in the course of theirdebates over whetherthe
achievementsof ancientart and literaturecould be equalled or surpassed
in moderntimes,theparticipantsgraduallyovercametheRenaissanceidea
that those achievementsconstitutedpermanently
valid models of perfection, in favorof a conceptionof the artsas expressingthecreativespiritof
theirparticularage. Unlike science, the arts did not requiremanyindividuals or generations for their success; but their success did inspire
reflectionon the dignityand creativepowerof man, in all ages. And what
happened in the 18thcenturyis thatbothconceptions- thenewscientific
idea of integrating
the effortsof manyindividualsin an overarching,"progressive"totality,and thenew aestheticidea thatifanyoneis in chargeand
is productive
here,it is notGod, and notnature,butman- werefinally
combinedin theconceptionof progressin generalas "man makinghistory"
in all departments(science, art,technology,society. . . )- the "idea of
of Voltaire,theEncyclopedists,
progress"thatspeaks throughthewritings
Kant et al.
What Blumenbergdescribes,then,is thegradualemergenceof an idea
7. In Philosophische
15 (1968),esp. p. 198.
Rundschau,
8. The astronomical
is tracedindetailinwhatis so farBlumenpartofthis"genealogy"
oftheIdeaofProgress,"
SocialResearch,
berg'sonlytextinEnglish:"On a Genealogy
Spring
1974.
Debate
71
of "progress in general" frompartial experiencesin the specificareas

where early modern human endeavor had some of its most pregnant
experiences. Only at the end of two centuriesdoes an "idea of progress"
emerge whichis comparablein its generalityto thatof eschatology.But it
is still cruciallydifferentfromeschatologyin its form- its "immanent"
ratherthan "transcendent"consummation-- as Blumenbergpointedout
initially.And its "genealogy," at least on the surface,has nothingto do
to do withwhatBlumenberg(in PartTwo
witheschatology,and everything
of his book) calls "human self-assertion,"the fundamentalirreligious
effortof modern (post-Christian)man to make the most of what is
available to him in thislifeand thisworld."
And this assertedlylegitimate(un-secularized,authentic)concept of
fromeschatologyin a further,
crucialrespect,despite
progressis different
the level of generalityit has now reached: unlikethe ambitious"philosophies of history"(Condorcet,Proudhon,Comte,Hegel, et al.) whichcome
later and whichare the focusof Lowith'sanalysis,progresshere is not yet
and not essentiallyconceivedof as an accountof theinherent"meaningof
history"as a whole. It is onlyas successfulas humanbeingschoose to make
it and succeedin makingit- thereis no wayit can be foundin all the

phenomena of recorded or unrecordedhistory,and it certainlydoes not
"justify" or "explain the meaningof" the miseryof the greaterpart of
that history. It is still only a partial account of an aspect of human
experience- thoughof a crucialaspect, in effect,formanyof us.
/IV.Lowith'sResponse
But allowing that such a relativelymodest authenticidea of progress
may have existed,and played a modestrole, in the 18thcentury- allowing thatitmay stillexist,amongtheremnantsof our traditionthatwe carry
with us and that some of us tend with loving care - the reader may
wonder how it was that this idea was so rapidly(if not immediately)
transformed
intothemuchmoreambitiousschemasofpeople likeCondorcet, Saint-Simon,Proudhon,Comte, Hegel and (as he is ofteninterpreted)
Marx, in all of whichthe readeris led to see the wholeof humanhistoryas
directed towardsa higherstate througha process of seeminglyinevitable
and predictableprogress.Isn't it this kind of thinkingthatmost sharply
distinguishesthe modern world-viewfromthose of the ancientsand of
oftenmakesuse ofreligious
9. Blumenberg
does notdenythatmodern"'self-assertion"
intentions
or, as a
language.He arguesthatit does so eitherto disguiseitsnon-religious
of
so thatthis"secularization
chosen "style,"to dramatizeits daringand extremism,
See Die Legitimitiit
ofthereligious
content.
language"does notcarrywithita secularization
der Neuzeit (hereafter:Legitimitat),

(herepp. 62-71; Siikularisierung
und Selbstbehauptung
after:Siikularisierung),pp. 119-133.
72
Wallace
primitivesocieties? Given the radical differencebetween ancient and

modernworld-views(whichBlumenbergdoes notdeny),and thepresence
of Christianity
as theprimaryexperienceintervening
betweenthem,itmay
seem - it certainlyseems to Lowith- to be an arbitraryand willful
blindnessto refuseto interpretthemodernidea of progressas a transposition - a secularizationof the Christianattitudeto the future."Who
could deny," Lowithwritesin his reviewof Blumenberg'sbook, "thatthe
inheritanceof a powerfultradition(and whattradition,as comparedto the
politicalauthorities,has been morepotentand stablethroughtwomillenia
of Westernhistorythaninstitutionalized
is a co-determining
Christianity?)
factor even of all relativelynew beginnings?That the idea of progress
should have only regional significanceand a partial derivation,namely
from the realm of the scientificdiscoveries and the literary-aesthetic
controversiesof the 17th century,and not touch the question of the
meaningand the course of historyas suchand as a whole,is as improbable
as the assertionthatthe rationalityand autonomyof man in the modern
one." to'
age is an absolutelyoriginaland free-standing
Now Blumenberghas not made his last assertion,since the whole of
Part Two of his book is devoted to showingthe historicalcontextand
provocationforthe modernclaimsto autonomousrationality
(part of the
complex of "human self-assertion").So there can be no question of
But if
Blumenberg'signoringpre-modernhistory,includingChristianity.
from"outside" history,
modernitydid notspringintobeingspontaneously,
as itwere, thensurelytheidea ofprogressmustbe traceableto pre-modern
ideas? And what alternativeto the secularizationtheorywould Blumenberg propose forthispurpose? and why?
Blumenberg has in fact answered these questions- thoughperhaps
not always at sufficientlengthand in sufficient
detail to make all of his
answerseasy to grasp. (Part One of his book was rewritten
and considerable expanded in thesecond edition,forthisreason.) Blumenbergis aware
that what he has reconstructedas the "legitimate"modern concept of
of the"ambitious"philosophiesof
progresswillnot meet therequirements
or
historywithwhichLowith is (and the restof us, in our disappointment
cynicism,tendto be) preoccupied.He has a wholetheorydesignedbothto
account forthisdifference,
and to showwhathe regardsas thetruerole of
Christianityin generatingthese "ambitious" modernphilosophiesof hisin the
tory. And he has a complete account of the role of Christianity
genesis of his "legitimate" idea of progressas well (the account of the
origin of "human self-assertion,"mentionedabove). I will sketchthese
explanations in that order: first,thatof the "ambitious" philosophiesof
and the idea of progress.
history,then thatof human self-assertion
10. PhilosophischeRundschau, 15 (1968), p. 197.
Debate
73
V. Blumenberg'sExplanationof theOver-Ambitious
"Philosophies of History"
First,then,whatare we to make of Condorcet,Saint-Simon,
Proudhon,
Comte, Hegel, et al.? Blumenbergwritesthat"The idea of progressas a
conceptionof the meaningand shape of humanhistoryas a whole did not
become possibleas a resultof thetransformation
of theologicaleschatology
and its deprivationof its 'original' intention,. . . rather [the original,
modest idea of progress]had to be extendedfromits originalregionally
circumscribedand objectivelylimitedarea of validityand exaggerated,
into the role of a 'philosophyof history,'ifmodernthoughtwas to be able
to respondto a questionwhichhad remained,

as itwere,unmastered
and
unsatisfiedsince theologyhad made itvirulent."" This was thequestionof

the meaning of the totalityof history- a question that the idea of
progress,and the Enlightenmentin general,could not rationallyanswer,
but whichwas felt,because of the powerfulinfluenceof Christianity
(the
that
had
Creation
and
as
the
fundaChristianity
Eschatology
presented
mental poles for the interpretation
of the whole of history)on people's
fundamentalexpectations, to be a question that any world-viewwas
somehow obliged to answer. "The formulationof the idea of progress,"
Blumenberggoes on, "and its takingthe place of the religiousinterpretation of history,are thustwo distinctevents. . . Belief in progresshad its
empiricalbasis in theextensionof therealityaccessibleto and manageable
of the scientificmethodemployedfor
by theory,and in the effectiveness
thispurpose. When this,whichwas experiencedand demonstrably
stable,
was translatedinto a faithencompassingthe future,then the self-consciousness of reason as the productiveprincipleof historywas made to
satisfya need whichin itselfwas not rational.. ." 12
But thisprocess of over-extension
or exaggerationwas not a necessary
or an inevitableone. It was natural,undoubtedly,because we have an
questionwe
ingrainedhabitof tryingto answereveryseeminglyimportant
are confrontedwith,but itwas notinevitable."We are goingto have to rid
ourselves,' Blumenbergwrites,"of the idea thatthereis a fixedcanon of
great questions," whichhave always orientedhumaninquiryand always
will. "Questions do not alwaysprecede theiranswers";'" some questions
only arise and become subjectsof concernwhenthe answeris believed to
be in hand. This holds forquestions like those of the originof evil, the
originof theworld,and thelike - questionsthattheGreeks,forinstance,
did notask (at least,did notexpectliteralanswersto) because theyhad not
heard of the (Gnostic) evil creator,or of originalsin, or of a God who
created matterfromnothing.And it also holds for the question of the
11. Legitimitat,p. 35. Cp. Siikularisierung,
p. 60.
12. Legitimitiit,
p. 36. Cp. Sakularisierung,pp. 60-61.
13. Legitimitarit,
p. 42 and p. 43; Siikularisierung,
p. 78.
74
Wallace
meaning and patternof historyas a whole - one reason the Greeks did
not ask themselvesthisquestion was because theyhad no notionof the
creation or of the end of the world(except perhapsas phases in a cyclical
and regeneration).And just as these quesprocess of world-destruction
tions have not alwaysbeen withus, neithermustwe alwaysregardthemas
bindingforour intellecutalendeavor.This is not to say thatwe can simply
dismissthemwitha derogatoryepithetlike"metaphysical."Thatwouldbe
the positivistprocedure,whichlimitsintellectualendeavor arbitrarily
in
advance by referenceto a particularmodel of knowledge(that of the
physicalsciences,usually)whichitpostulates,withouthistoricalreflection,
as simplydefinitiveforknowledgein general.But neithershouldwe refuse
to consider the genesis of a question (of a classic "problem") as having
some relevance to its status and claims on our concern,or regardour
(the kindof failureof which
ongoing failureto deal withit satisfactorily
consciousnessis so widespreadin contemporary
philosophy)as a phenomenon of mere inexplicableweakness, ratherthan as somethingdeserving
and demandinghistoricalinterpretation
in itsown right.Certainlyin a case
where a typeof intellectualendeavorhas been all butabandoned,as is the
case withthe philosophyof history(in the "ambitious"sense of something
more than just reflectionon the methodologyof historicalscience), it is
hightimewe considerwhyexactlyit arose, whatwas the originand status
of the questionwithwhichitwas trying
to deal, whetherthatquestionis or
should be a live questionforus, and forthatmatterwhetheritshouldhave
been a live question for the 18thand 19thcenturies,or shouldn'trather
have been neutralized(amputated,in effect,fromthe canon of questions
having a claim on modernthought)by means of criticalinquiryinto the
conditionsof its originand of its authenticsignificance.
Of course Lowith in his way is makinga similarstatementabout the
distortionof our thinkingby inappropriatequestions(inappropriateconcepts or attitudes,he would say); buthis diagnosisfindstheentiremodern
orientation and conceptual apparatus (at least in relation to history)
betweentheauthentically
modern
inappropriate,ratherthandiscriminating
in the
problems(such as how to assertour needs and concernseffectively
and
as
the
of
and
the
inauthentic
world)
concepts(such
concept progress),
and disastrousproblems(such as the "meaning"of historyas a whole) the
admission of which leads to the over-extensionand failure of those
concepts.
So Blumenberg's explanationfor the predominance,among modern
theoriesofprogressas thepattern
philosophiesof history,of over-ambitious
14. In the course of his book, Blumenbergcites several other instancesof this kind of
is uncritically
process, in whicha question put in place by Christianity
accepted by modern
thoughtas an eternal one which"must" be dealt with,and whichthen is "dealt with" in a
mannerthatis disastrousforthe consistencyof modernity.(See thepassagescitedin note 21,
below.)
The Loiwith-BlumenbergDebate
75
of historyas a whole, is that modern thoughtin general was unable to

neutralize criticallyquestions (like that of the meaning and patternof
as easily as it had
historyas a whole) that it inheritedfromChristianity,
discreditedtheChristiananswers.(And in factBlumenbergpointsout that
Christianityitselfhad an exactlysimilarproblemin relationto the ancient
and the conseworld, and withsimilarresults.)Hence the over-exertion,
false
of
consciousness
quent suspicions
(i la "secularization"),thatarise
in this field.
VI. Blumenberg'sAccountof theOriginof theModern
So that is how, forBlumenberg,the "philosophyof history"is tracebutnotthroughsecularization,
able, in termsof a certainkindofcontinuity
to Christianity.'"But the idea of progressitself,the assertedlylegitimate
idea of progressbeforeit has been pressedinto serviceas an answerto a
question whichmodernthoughtshould not have triedto answer- does
Blumenbergthinkthatthisidea spranginto being fromnothing,thatits
originwas not "co-determined"by the greatChristiantradition?
No he does not. But again his account of the mannerof that "codetermination,"whichis foundin PartTwo of hisbook, has nothingto do
of any underlying
substanceor
withsecularization,or withthe continuity
tradition. As I have mentioned,Blumenberginterpretsthe concept of
which
of "humanself-assertion,"
"progress" as thatof theimplementation
of - and the legitimate
in turnhe sees as the fundamentalcharacteristic
And human selfcore of - the modern age in all its manifestations.'"6
assertionhe considersto be fundamentally
onlyas a responseto
intelligible
15. Unlike L6with,Blumenbergdoes not includeMarx withinthemoderncomplexof the
"philosophyof history"forwhichthe two theoristsoffertheirdiffering
explanations.Lowith
himselfremarkedthatin contrastto Hegel, Marx "maintainstheoriginaltensionof a transcendentfaithover againsttheexistingworld" (Meaningin History,p. 51). (So thisis the true
significanceof Marxist"materialism"!)Blumenbergcommentsthat"If the finalstate prowith'infinite
claimed by the CommunistManifestotranslatedimpatienceand dissatisfaction
progress'into a summonsto definitiveaction,thisnexusat least excludesthe possibilitythat
both conceptsof history,thefiniteand the infinite,
could be secularized."(Legitimitit,
p. 57;
compare Siikularisierung,
p. 101.) And he goes on to suggestthat the linguisticsimilarity
betwen the Manifesto'sappeal and that of the messianicand gospel traditionindicatesa
similar urgency,a "constantfunctionfor consciousness,"but not an identityof content.
(Legitimitiit,p. 58; Siikularisierung,p. 102.) Blumenbergwould presumablyagree with
currentcriticsthat the faithof some "Marxists" in an inevitablemechanismof progress
of Marx's model of social
throughthe final revolutionis the resultof a misunderstanding
which repeats the syndromeof the genesis of the ambitious
history(a misunderstanding
"philosophies of history").
16. It is probablyworthwarningagainstthe temptationto interpretthis"self-assertion"
of the latter
exclusivelyor even primarilyby referenceto technology,thoughthesignificance
is certainlyto be foundin itsrelationshipto theformer.On therelationship
see Legitimitiat,
p.
see
p. 225, p. 236. For Blumenberg'sdefintionof self-assertion
159, p. 170; Siikularisierung,
p. 159.
p. 91; Siikularisierung,
Legitimitiit,
76
Wallace
the self-destructive
working-outof the implicationsof the Christianity
formulatedin theera of the "Fathers" (Saint Augustineet al.), a workingout whichhe sees manifestedin thedoctrinesof late-medievalnominalism
and which he summarizesunder the rubricof "divine absolutism."The
great accomplishmentof the "Fathers" had been to overcometheGnostic
interpretationof Christ'smessage as one of world-denial(implicitly,of
the ancientpositively-valued
cosmos
world-demonization)by integrating
into Christiandoctrineand explainingthe evil in the world as (not its
nature but) the punishmentof man's originalsin. But the price of this
accomplishmentwas the introductionof the (entirelynovel) concept of
absolutelyarbitrary"freedomof the will," as both the source of original
sin and the "explanation" of God's implicationof all mankindin thatsin
and of his impenetrableacts of gracein redeemingsome (but notall) from
it. This will,in theformof "divineomnipotence,"was thecentralthemeof
medieval theology,and one whichincreasingly
undercutboth the Aristotelianizingeffortsof highscholasticismand everyattemptto re-emphasize
the "human" relevance and meaning of Christ and the gospel. This
situationis displayeddramaticallyin Ockham's doctrinethatthereis no
reason forthe creationof this(ratherthananyotherpossible) world,just
as thereis no reason forthe workingsof grace, beyondthe factthatGod
wills it (quia voluit). Both salvation and the creation had thus been
The attitudeprescribed
deprived of all accessible meaningand reliability.
to man in this situationis not faith(whichrequiresgrace), and not love
as
(ditto,presumably),butsimplyblindsubmission.Human self-assertion,
an alternativeto thisdesperateway of beingin the world,had to interest
itselfnot in fulfillment
butin power,and in a worldnotoforderbutofpure
causal contingency- because thesewere all thatwere leftto man at this
point.'7
Obviously thisconclusionis not drawnsimultaneously
by everyonein
Europe, so that one could date the "event" of the inaugurationof the
modern age. For some of us perhapsit has stillnot occurred.But forthe
intepretationof the documentsof the "historyof ideas" it is an extremely
powerfulhypothesis,as the extensivedetail in Blumenberg'sPartsTwo,
Three and Four shows. And forthose of us forwhomChristianity
is not
at stake
entirelydefunct,itis a fascinating
analysisofwhat'sfundamentally
and goingon in bothour Christianand our post-Christian
consciousnesses.
to Christianity,
itis
Concerningtheidea of progressand itsrelationship
hoped thatthislightning
summaryshowshow thatidea (as partof human
17. To the Christianof course this appears as pride, fundamentally
as self-deification.
Luther says man cannot by his naturewant God to be God, but ratherwants to be God
himself.We preferto say thatwe seek to do whatwould make sense and have a chance of
success "even if there were no God," or perhaps to reinterpret
God as the most perfect
oftheworld(as in Descartes,Leibniz,and
being" who guaranteesthegoodnessand reliability
Deism). See Legitimititd,
eighteenth-century
pp. 143- 144:;Sikularisierung,pp. 21(0-211.
The Lbwith-Blumenberg
Debate
77
can be "co-determined"
self-assertion)
(indeed,in a way,whollydeterfashionbyChristianity,
without
mined)inthemostintimate
beinga metaIt is a matter
ofresponding
to
ofChristian
material.
conceptual
morphosis
overanyidea
rather
a provocation,
ortakingup a challenge,
thanoftaking
thechallenge.
whosecrisisconstitutes
alreadypresentin thetradition
In addition,hopefully,
thissummary
howone can reasonably
suggests
incontrast
to theillegitimacy
impliedbysecularizaspeakof"legitimacy,"
tiontheories,
ininterpreting
ideas."Legitimacy"
theorigin
ofthesemodern
oflivingon stolencapital;itcan
need notimplyonlyinnocenceoftheft,
a
a justified
ofdrawing
oftaking
also referto theconsciousness
conclusion,
in thecircumstances.
Butto see whyself-asserstepwhichis appropriate
one has to take
tionis a justifiedstepto take underthecircumstances,
more
and especiallyitsinternal
and problems,
development
Christianity,
- thanis donebythosewhohypostatize
- andmorehistorically
seriously
it as simply"faith"overagainst(Greek)"reason."
VII. "Transforming
versus"Self-Assertion"
Appropriation"
theseideas. He
Lowithin 1968 has not assimilated
Unfortunately,
on the
book withsome thoughts
concludeshis reviewof Blumenberg's
historicalprocesswhichmake thisall too clear: ". .. actuallytherecan be
ofillegitimacy,
as appliedtohistorical
no talkoflegitimacy
epochs,sincein
the[juristic
thehistory
of concepts,ideas and thoughts
conceptof legitithe
and transform
macy]extendsitselfas faras thepowerto appropriate
The results,at anygiventime,of sucha transcontentsof a tradition.
reckonedup
or negatively
cannotbe positively
formingappropriation
failstorecogofgenuineownership.
toa standard
according
[Blumenberg]
the never
whetherpoliticalor any otherhistory,
nize thatin history,
fromwhatwasintended
different
completedresultsare alwayssomething
thattakeplacein
and expectedbythefounders
ofa newepoch.The births
lifeare all 'ilegitimate'."'8
historical
The firstthingthatthispassagemakesabsolutelyclear is thatfor
conceivable
is seemingly
transformation
L6withtheprocessof historical
- as appropriating,
substance
ofa pre-existing
onlyas oneofappropriation
Thatnewstructures
a tradition.
butin anycase continuing
transforming,
tradition
to a reigning
and ideas couldcomeintoexistencein opposition
"determined
as
or otherwise)
thatis (consciously
perceived bankrupt
as everyoppositionis determined
bywhatitopposes,
by" thattradition,
- seemstobe
ofthattradition
a metamorphosis
butnotintheirsubstance
is so permeated
to Lowith.Thisgreatcriticofhistoricism
inconceivable
by
in
newbeginning
of a relatively
it thathe cannotconsiderthepossibility
18. Loc. cit.(Phil.Rundsch.15, 1968),p. 201.
78
Wallace
history,except in its extremeclaim (in, e.g., Descartes) to absoluteorigi- a claim

nality and freedomfromhistoricalcontextand conditioning
which forus now is so absurd as to refuteitselfand, in Lowith'seyes, to
refuteall in any way comparableclaimson behalfof modernity.
In a way, Lowith's positionhere seems familiarand innocentenough.
Certainlyhis doubtsabout theapplicationof notionsof "legitimacy"in the
of historysound like thevoice of our conscienceto all of us
interpretation
broughtup on the "scientific"distinctionof factand value. And yetwho
was it who in Meaning in Historycontrastedthe modern"mixture,"the
"one eye of faithand the otherof reason," withthe clear choices of the
Greek and the Christianworld-views?Does thisnotsuggesta special kind
of "illegitimacy,"peculiar to the modernage? Or are we to understand
thatChristianity
relatedto the Greek worldin thesame way as modernity
to Christinaity:by "transforming
appropriation"of the contentsof the
traditionsavailable to it, and thatitsclaimsto originality
and authenticity
are as transparently
vain as the modernones? This is certainlynot what
Lowith wants to assert. On the contrary,he thinksthat the advent of
was theone trulygreatbreakin thecontinuity
oftheWest,the
Christianity
entryof "not just one epoch amongothers,butthedecisiveepoch, which"
(unfortunately!)"separates us fromthe ancientworld."'9
Isn't it clear thatforLowithsome epochsare legitimate,in thesenseof
of whichtheycan claim
possessingan authenticprincipleand consistency,
genuine "ownership,"and some are not?
And isn't it reasonable, in the face of such claimson behalfof Christito seek to
anity(and on behalfof antiquity,forthatmatter),formodernity
vindicateitselfas somethingmore coherent,authenticand appropriatein
its turnthansecularizationtheorieswillallow? Is it notreasonable,in that
effort,for the modern historianto distinguish(if he can) between the
authenticconceptualequipmentand developmentoftheelementary
modern
endeavor (as in the idea of progress),and the exaggeratedand failed
results of attemptsto answer pre-modernquestions by these modern
means (as in the great"philosophiesof history"),ratherthantarringit all
withthe same brush?Isn't thatwhathe mustdo, in keepingwithhisprofession of scientificrigor?
VIII. PracticalImplications
L6with's and Blumenberg's positions,incompatibleon the level of
theory,also have sharplydifferentimplicationsfor social and political
practice. Lowith's attitudeto contemporarysocial phenomenais one of
systematicdetachment: recognizingtheir realitybut as far as possible
19. Ibid., p. 199.
TheLiwith-Blumenberg
Debate
79
entertainingneitherhope nor fearforthe future.A repeatedemphasisin

his writingsince Meaning in Historyhas been on the constancyof human
or call
nature: even the real possibilityof nuclearwarfaredoes not signify
for any fundamentalchange in man's relationto the worldand to other
men, forsuch a changeis impossible("Man is no less man at thebeginning
of his historythan he willbe at itsend"). For L6with,Polybius'sobservation of a naturalcycleof changesin constitutions,
of turnsfromvictoryto
defeat and fromsubjugationto domination,is stillthe last wordon man's
political nature.20Clearly the only attitudethat an individualcan clearand
sightedlyadopt in such circumstancesis one of stoicalself-sufficiency
acceptance of what fate may bring. (Unless, of course, he chooses the
Christianturning,away fromtheworld'sreasonand towardsfaithin transcendent salvation.)
Blumenberg,on the other hand, has taken pains to deny the fateful
of the "steamroller";to defendthe possibilityof man making
inevitability
and its
historymore bearable forhimself;and to defendtheEnlightenment
false
would-be continuers(such as Marx) fromchargesof fundamentally
a legitimate(un-secularized)conceptof
consciousness, by reconstructing
possible progress.He has also presenteda diagnosisand critiqueof such
traditionas we encounternot
distortionsand denials of theEnlightenment
in
the
"ambitious"
of
philosophies history,but also in theEnlightenonly
ment's own tendencyto leap too quicklyinto the disputesof optimism
versus pessimism;in the modernconcept of sovereigntyand of a public
sphere defined by the sovereignpower; and in the moderntendencyto
processesan
expect from"evolution" and other"natural" self-regulatory
eventual solution to problems that have so far baffledour effortsat
practicalsolution.2
I thinkthe practicalrelevancewhichall of theseefforts
of Blumenberg's
will have, iftheyare successful,should be clear. Lowith'sthinking,
forall
his disdain for the claim of the passing "age" upon philosophy,may
ironicallyat the momentbe more in tune withthe privatisticand cynical
"spirit of the age," but Blumenberg'sis clearly more relevantto any
contemporaryendeavor to take practical charge of events- to make
some real progress,ratherthan continuemainlyto sufferfromofficial
"progress" and its verypossiblyfatalconsequences. There is muchtraditional wisdom in Lowith's position, but traditionalwisdom is no more
adequate to our situation than is blind positivism.Hence the crucial
importanceof gettinga grasp on the processes in our historyand in our
own thinkingthatLowithand Blumenberg,in theirdifferent
way,attempt
to illuminate.
20. Gesammelte
zurKritik
dergeschichtlichen
1960),p.
Abhandlungen
Existenz
(Stuttgart,
160. (CitationfromJiirgenHabermas,Theorieund Praxis[Neuwiedand Berlin,19631,p. 363).

21. Blumenberg'saccounts of these lattersyndromes,whichI can mentionhere only in
p. 61, pp. 59-61, and pp. 192-200; Sakularisierung,
passing, are presentedin Legitimitiit,
pp. 103-118 and pp. 259-266.

Debate Blumenberg Löwith

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Debate Blumenberg Löwith

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Progress, Secularization and Modernity: The Lwith-Blumenberg Debate

Author(s): Robert M. Wallace

Lowith findsthe key to the derivationof thesephilosophiesof history

One possible alternativeexplanationL6withdoes not consider.This is

clarity.He also studies the enigmaticand isolated work of Giambattista

frommodern philosophy- and, for that matter,frommodernsociety.

by the recognitionof this false consciousness,he draws no reassuring

again emphasizedthisminimumcommonsubstancein hiseventualreplyto

of "progress in general" frompartial experiencesin the specificareas

it and succeedin makingit- thereis no wayit can be foundin all the

der Neuzeit (hereafter:Legitimitat),

primitivesocieties? Given the radical differencebetween ancient and

10. PhilosophischeRundschau, 15 (1968), p. 197.

to respondto a questionwhichhad remained,

unsatisfiedsince theologyhad made itvirulent."" This was thequestionof

of historyas a whole, is that modern thoughtin general was unable to

history,except in its extremeclaim (in, e.g., Descartes) to absoluteorigi- a claim

entertainingneitherhope nor fearforthe future.A repeatedemphasisin

160. (CitationfromJiirgenHabermas,Theorieund Praxis[Neuwiedand Berlin,19631,p. 363).

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