2.

People v. Ramos, Jr. (G.R. No. 88301, October 28, 1991)

Facts: Acting on the tip of a civilian informant that there was a person
selling marijuana leaves or Indian Hemp at the "Hang Out" restaurant
located at the diversion road in Cabanatuan City, Capt. Maximo Dilla, the
NARCOM District Commander, organized a team operation to conduct a buybust operation. The group proceeded to the "Hang Out" restaurant. Sgt.
Maulon, together with the informant, went inside, while Capt. Dilla and AIC
Cabiao positioned themselves in a strategic place where they could not be
seen. While inside the restaurant, the informant approached appellant,
whispering to the latter that he had with him a man who wanted to buy
marijuana leaves, indicating Sgt. Maulon to be the buyer. After a brief
conversation, appellant left for a while and thereafter returned with a plastic
teabag containing marijuana which he gave to Sgt. Maulon. Sgt. Maulon,
after ascertaining that what was given him was indeed marijuana leaves,
gave the marked 10-peso bill to the appellant. Sgt. Maulon then lighted a
cigarette to alert his teammates. Thereupon, Capt. Dilla and AIC Cabiao
rushed toward the appellant, arrested him and brought him to the NARCOM
District Office for booking and investigation. On the basis of a "buy-bust"
operation, appellant Benjamin Ramos, Jr. was arrested and charged with
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6245, Art. II, Sec. 4) in Criminal
Case No. 5128, before the Regional Trial Court. In his defense, Ramos denied
any "buy-bust" operation, claiming that the marijuana leaves were planted
evidence, that he was arrested because of a heated argument with the
restaurant owner, Dr. Melvin Garcia, over an alleged P30.00-unpaid account.
Likewise, the defense claims that Tirso Y. Reyes did not hear the case, but
Judge Nathanael Gorospe (now Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan), and
therefore did not see the demeanor of the witnesses.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged
Held: Yes.
1. The defense did not present Dr. Melvin Garcia, the restaurant owner, or
Boyet Corpuz, the alleged companion of Ramos at the restaurant/beerhouse
to corroborate Ramos' contention that he was arrested because of a heated
argument he had with Dr. Garcia. The absence of the corroborative
witnesse(s) leads Us to conclude that the defense version was simply a
concoction devoid of any credibility. Thus, We note the trial court's
observation of "the direct and straight forward testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses" as against the mere denials by the accused"
2. We have ruled that "the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not
the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did
not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses during the

trial, but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the
judgment erroneous (Co Tan v. CA, et al., 101 Phil. 188).
3.

People v. Tac-an (G.R. No. 76338-39, February 26, 1990)

Facts: Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D.
No.1866 (Criminal Case No. 4007). An amended information for murder was
subsequently filed aggravated by the use of illegal possession of firearms
(Criminal Case No. 4012). Both cases stemmed from Tac-ans act of shooting
Francis Escano with an airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver,
which resulted to his death.
It was contended by appellant that because he had already been charged
with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No.
4007, aggravated by the use of such unlicensed firearm to commit a
homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of
punishment for the second time when he was charged in Criminal Case No.
4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed firearm," in violation of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of B.P. Blg.
179.
Issue: Whether there is double jeopardy
Held: None. It is elementary that the constitutional right against double
jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same
offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is
no prohibited double jeopardy.
In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised
Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in
themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having
placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging
appellant with unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition,
went on to state that said firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to
death Francis Ernest Escao III. We note also that the amended information
in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant with the unlawful killing of
Francis Ernest Escao III, stated that the killing had been done with the use
of an unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two

(2) informations did not have the effect of charging appellant with having
committed the same offense more than once.
4.

Fule v. CA (G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988)

Facts: A certain Roy Nadera sued Manolo Fule for violation of BP 22. The
parties during pre-trial entered into a stipulation of facts. Prosecution
presented evidence but the defense, in lieu thereof, only submitted a
Memorandum confirming the stipulation of facts. It appears, however, that
neither Fule nor his counsel signed the stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the
trial court convicted Fule based on the stipulation of facts. The CA affirmed
the conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the judgment of the RTC
convicting petitioner based solely on the stipulation of facts
Held: Yes. SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him
and his counsel. (Rule 118)
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. The use of the term "shall"
further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative,
operating to impose a duty, which may be enforced. The omission of the
signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the
Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that
the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of
Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused
and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should
have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of
Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the
elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of
the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of
the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established
beyond reasonable doubt.

5.

People v. Castro-Bartolome (G.R. No. 45037, November 21,

1991)
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint before the CFI Rizal for adultery against
Sochayseng and Paz.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondents Sochaysen and Paz filed
their respective demurrer to evidence (motions to dismiss) substantially
raising similar grounds for the dismissal of the adultery charge. Nine (9)

months after the prosecution rested its case and before respondent Judge
could resolve the motions to dismiss submitted by Sochayseng and Paz, the
private prosecutor (Atty. Fernandez) filed a motion to reopen the case for the
purpose of presenting the following additional evidence to prove the
marriage of the complainant witness and accused Sochaysen. In an Order,
respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome denied the motion to reopen trial, stating
that The Rules of Court do not provide for any reopening of criminal case
and that nowhere is it provided (rule 121, new trial) that it may be granted
upon motion of prosecution. Whatever caption the prosecution may give to
the action it seeks to be granted, whether reopening or new trial, there is no
specific provision of the Rules to back it, and is probably why the decisions
cited by the prosecution are rife that the court motu propio may, for its own
clarification, allow the introduction of evidence prove jurisdiction, which
would not be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.
Issue: Whether the denial of the motion to reopen case is proper
Held: Yes. It must be stressed that there is no specific provision in the Rules
of Court governing motions to reopen a case for the reception of evidence
after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment. Judicial
action is controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of
justice and rests entirely on the sound discretion of the trial court. Its grant
or denial by said court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed
on appeal unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.
Additional jurisprudence is to the effect that:
. . . It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further
evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion
will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. More, it is
within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case
to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or
request for a non-suit, or a demurrer to the evidence; and the case may be
reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its on the request,
motion or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied same, or after the
motion had been granted, if the order had not been written, or entered upon
the minutes or signed.
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have
produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no
abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed
when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through

inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct

evidence previously offered.
Under the factual milieu of the case at bar, we find that respondent Judge
correctly rejected petitioner's motion to reopen the trial. Even the so-called
paramount interests of justice cannot free petitioner from his self-imposed
predicament. His counsel took a big gamble in not presenting the certificates
attesting to the fact of marriage between petitioner and Leonor Sochayseng
on the erroneous belief that said marriage had been amply established by
the testimony of the aggrieved husband. Petitioner's counsel realized his
folly when private respondents understandably moved for the quashal of the
complaint on the material ground that coverture was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
6.

People v. Ocimar (G. R. No. 94555, August 17, 1992)

Facts: Ocimar, Mendoza, Bermudez and two more others were charged in
the trial court for violation of P.D. 532, otherwise known as the "Anti-Piracy
and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. They were properly arraigned and after
the prosecution had already presented four witnesses, the prosecuting Fiscal
moved for the discharge of accused Bermudez to be utilized as state witness.
Although he had already entered a plea of guilt earlier, no judgment was as
yet rendered against him. The same was granted. After he testified for the
prosecution, Bermudez was released.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding accused Ocimar and
Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime
charged. On appeal, Ocimar contends that Bermudez does not satisfy the
conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He
argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and
utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of
appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused
Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.
Issue: Whether the discharge of Bermudez as a state witness is proper
Held: Yes. Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 9.
Discharge at accused to be state witness. When two or
more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any
offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of

the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute

necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested: (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused
does not appear to be the most guilty; (e) Said accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
As may be gleaned from the aforequoted Sec. 9 of Rule 119, the trial court
must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. The court
therefore, upon prior determination by the public prosecutor, retains the
prerogative of deciding when a co-accused may be discharged to become a
state witness. With Sec. 9 providing the guidelines, the discharge of an
accused depends on sound judicial discretion. Once that discretion is
exercised under those guidelines and a co-accused is discharged to become
a state witness, and subsequently testifies in accordance with his
undertaking with the government, any legal deficiency or defect that might
have attended his discharge from the information will no longer affect the
admissibility and credibility of his testimony, provided such testimony is
otherwise admissible an credible.
First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite
the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively
identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the
highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other
valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without his
testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it
was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial
court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most
guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party
without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery.
But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty
will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail.
And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense, and not necessarily the
severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least
guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration
of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Besides, the matter of discharging a co-accused to become state

witness is left largely to the discretion of the trial fiscal, subject
only to the approval of the court. The reason is obvious. The fiscal
should know better than the court, and the defense for that matter, as to
who of the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become state
witness. The public prosecutor is supposed to know the evidence in his
possession ahead of all the rest. He knows whom he needs to establish his
case.
The rationale for the rule is well explained thus:
In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be
expected to err. Where such error is committed, it cannot, as a
general rule, be cured any more than any other error can be cured
which results from an acquittal of a guilty defendant in a criminal
action. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform
himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to
everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission
of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or
possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. In
coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested," as to "availability or
non- availability of other direct or corroborative evidence," as to
which (who) of the accused is the "most guilty" one, and the like,
the judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the
information furnished by the prosecuting
officer . . . .
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on
the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at
his actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which
may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused.
Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on
the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said
then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be
a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
7.

People v. Amaro (G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014)

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her
way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a
man, whom she later identified in court as the appellant, who asked her to
buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the

latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly
became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant.
When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then
undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into
her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but appellant covered her
mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped five
(5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellants penis touched the outer
portion of her vagina.
Issue: Whether the appellant is properly charged of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape given the facts stated
Held: Yes. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical
findings that the victim suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part
of the introitus.
Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape. AAAs abduction was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual
intercourse with AAA was facilitated and ensured by her abduction.
8.

People v. Calantiao (G.R. No. 20398, June 18, 2014)

Facts: Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that
the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered
during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of
possessing a gun and firing at the police officers. Calantiao contended that
the marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him
because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the
apprehending officers "plain view."
Issue: Whether the contention can be upheld
Held: No. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person
of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his

immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos
possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any
weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the
black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search. The Plain View Doctrine finds no applicability
in Calantiaos situation because the police officers purposely searched him
upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it,
as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful arrest.
9.

Zafra v. People (G.R. No. 190749)

Facts: Petitioners Zafra and Marcelino were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Possession of Dangerous Drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002). The conviction was based on the testimony of SPO4 Mendoza, the
lone witness for the prosecution. It was revealed that he (Mendoza) were the
one who saw the incident, marked the seized illegal drug and did all the acts
necessary with the given situation.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty beyond reasonable double of the
crime charged
Held: No. In the case at bar, the solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all
the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts
the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself in serious doubt.
No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who
possessed what at the time of the alleged apprehension. More significantly,
we are left in doubt whether not the two sachets of shabu allegedly seized
from the petitioners were the very same objects offered in court as the
corpus delicti. ). A reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the
conviction was arrived at upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of Mendozas official duty. It is noteworthy, however, that
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by
its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the
hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust
on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his
culpability.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that

the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the
accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the
balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
37. People v. Edano (G.R. No. 188133, July 07, 2014)
Facts: The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate
Informations.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August
6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed
of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo Alcancia,
Jr., together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds,
West Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain alias
Nato.
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by
Siochi. The informant approached the appellant and talked to him inside the
vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe
was approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran
away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia chased the appellant; PO3
Corbe was able to grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the ground.
PO3 Corbe recovered a knot-tied transparent plastic bag from the
appellants right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the
appellants waist.
The other members of the police arrested Siochi.
Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to
the police station for investigation. The RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in
toto. The CA found PO3 Corbe to be a credible witness. The CA also found
the appellants warrantless arrest to be valid; it explained that the
appellants act of running when PO3 Corbe was approaching him reinforced
the latters suspicion that something was amiss.
Issue: Whether the conviction was proper
Held: No. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an
arrest in flagrante delicto.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be

valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed,
was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3
Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with
each other when he approached them.