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CINDY A. COHN(SBN 145997)
ROBIN D. GROSS(SBN 200701) LEE nEN (SBN 148216)
ELEC1RONIC 454 Shotwell FRONTIER Street FOUNDA nON

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SanFranciscoCA 94110 Telephone: (415) 436-9333xl04 Facsimile: (415) 436-9993 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae UNITED STATESDISlRICT COURT

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NORnlERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSEDMSION

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m..IITW STATES OF AMERICA,
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CaseNo.: CROI-20138 RMW AMICUS BRIEF OF mE ELECTRONIC IFRONnER FOUNDAnON, ACM ~OMMIT-l'EE ON COMPlmNG LA W

Plaintiff,

ELCOM LTD., a/k/a ELCOMSOFT CO.,
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L m., AND DMITRY SKL Y AROV,

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Defendant

~SSOCIATION OF LAW LmRARIES, NSUMER PROJECTON CHNOLOGY, ELECTRONIC RIV ACY INFORMATION CEN~ MUSICLmRARYASSOCIATION,AND

TECHNOLOGY, AMERICAN

IO.S.PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE OF JACM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO

DISMISS

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!Amicus Brief ofEFF ct. al.
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In ~upport of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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TABLE AUTHORInES OF
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III. 1F1\c:1rlJJ\I~~~()~()(JI~~

INTRODUCTION

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IIV. COPYRIGHT BOrn PROMOTESAND IS CABINED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT

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A. COPYRIGHT PROMOTESTHE FIRST AMENDMENT BY PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR CREATING AND DIS1RIBUnNG EXPRESSION.6
B. COPYRIGHT A VallS FIRST AMENDMENT CONSllT'JTIONAL COMFLICT WIlH BECAUSE OF ITS "SAFETY VALVES" 1HE 7

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THE DMCA PRESENTSSIGNIFICANT CONSllTUTlONAL
PROBLEMS

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A. DMCA'8 CHANGES mE COPYRIGHrBARGAIN TO
B. UNLESS NARROWLY CONSTRUED, mE DMCA ELIMINATES MUCH OF mE PUBLIC SIDE OF mE COPYRIGHT BARGAIN

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1. UNLESS LIMITED, THE DMCA ALLOWS PUBLISHERSTO TO CONfROL (AND EXTRACT PAYMENT FOR) WORKS
~THE I-UBLIC DO~

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2. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETAllON OF THE DMCA ALLOWS PUBLISHERS TONEGA TE CLASSIC FAIR USE. . 14 3. AN OVERBROAD INTERPRETATION OF mE DMCA ALLOWS EBOOK PUBLISHERS TOELIMINA TE nm PURCHASER'S

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FIRST-SALE RIGHTS

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4. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DMCA ALLOWS CONTENT HOLDERS TO ELIMINATE nIB
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PUBLIC'SRIGHT OF PRIVATEPERFORMANCE

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5.

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THE GOVERNMENT'S BROAD INTERPRETAllON OF THE DMCA CAN PREVENT PURCHASERS FROM ACCESSING THEIFlO~EBOOICS 19

IAmicus

Brief of EFF et. at. ,In Support of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

VI. THE DMCA MUST BE NARROWLY CONSlRUED OR INV ALmATED...19
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A. WITHOUT NARROWING CONSTRUCTION, THE DMCA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
<:()~<:~lJ~I()~

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I Amicus Brief of EFF et. a1. In Supportpf Motion to Dismiss CR-Ol-2138-RMW

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Universalv. Corley, 273 F3d 429 (2ad Cir. .2001)

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FEDERAL STATUTES 7 U.S.C.§1201
17 V.S.C. § 106
7 U.S.C. § 109(a) ,
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passim
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17 U.S.C. §§ 101-120 17 U.S.C. 121
.7 U.S.C. § SOl

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" In

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IH.R. REp.No. 94-1476,p. 66 (1976)

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LA W REVIEW ARTICLES
I Benkler, Yochai, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on

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Enclosure o/the PublicDomain,74N.Y.U. L. Rev.354(1999)

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Boyle, James, Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism the Net?, 47 A for Duke L.J. 87 (1997)
, 0

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Ginsburg,JaneC., Copyright Useand Excuseon the Internet, 24 Colwn.-VLA J.L. &
Arts 1, 8-9
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Goldstein,Paul, "Copyright and the First Amendment,"70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970) " Krarnarsky,Stephen,Copyright Enforcementin the Internet Age TheLaw
and. Technology of Digital Rights Management,
(2001)

DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L.

3,22

Lemley, Mark A. & Volokh, Eugene,FreedomOf Speech Injunctions In Intellectual and Property Cases,48:2 Duke L.J.147(Nov., 1998)
Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss I ! CR-OI-2138-RMW IV

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Statement of Interest The Electronic Frontier Foundation(EFF) is a non-profit, civil liberties

organizationworking to protectrights in the digital world. EFF actively encourages and challenges industry and government supportfree expression, to privacy, and openness in the information society. Foundedin 1990,EFF is basedin SanFrancisco. EFF has membersallover the world and maintainsone of the world's most linked-to Web sites

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(http://www.eff.org). EFF has.aninterestin this casebecause its longstandinggoal of of ensuringthat the Constitutionalrights that Americansenjoy in the non-digital world are transferredintact into cyberspace. furtherance that goal, EFF hasservedas legal In of

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counselto severalindividuals and organizations that have facedclaims underthe DMCA. The Associationfor ComputingMachinery (ACM) is a leadingsocietyof

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computerprofessionalsin education,industry, and government.Foundedin 1947,ACM is has75,000membersin the US and aroundthe world concerned with issuesof research,
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developmentand deploymentof advanced information technology, ACM has long been
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involved with issuesrelating to the interactionof computing,information, technology,
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andthe law. ACM studiesand expresses opinion on legal issuesthrough its its
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Committeeon ComputingLaw and Technology(ACM Law), which includes
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experienced technologistsand lawyers. The U.S. Public Policy Committeeof ACM (USACM) facilitates communicationbetweencomputerprofessionals policy-makers and
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with on issuesof concernto the computingcommunity. The variety of expertsassociated USACM study issuesof policy and then provide expertresources assistpublic leaders to in understanding ramifications of their decisions the

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Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Support"of Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

The American Associationof Law Libraries (AALL) is a nonprofit educational
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organizationof over 5,000members who respondto the legal infonnation needsof law professors and students, attorneys,and members the generalp'lblic aswell legislators, of judges,and other public officials at all levels of government, corporationsand small businesses. AALL's mission is to promoteand enhance value of law libraries, to the foster law librarianshipand to provide leadership advocacyin the field of legal and infonnation and infonnation policy. Copyright andthe preservation fair useare of amongthe centralpublic policy concerns the Association. of ConsumerProject on Technology(CPT) is a nonprofit startedby Ralph Nader in 1995. CPT is active in a numberof issueareas,including intellectualproperty. telecommunications, privacy and electroniccommerce, plus a variety of projectsrelating to antitrustenforcementand policy. The Electronic Privacy Information Center(EPIC) is a non-profit, public interest research organizationfocusingon civil liberties issuesin the field of electronic information. EPIC works to protectprivacy, the First Amendment,and constitutional

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valuesin new communications mediathroughpolicy research, public educationand
litigation

The Music Library Associationis the professionalorganizationin the United Statesdevotedto music librarianship,and to all aspects music materialsin libraries. of Foundedin 1931,MLA providesa forum for study and action on issuesthat affect music libraries and their users,and promotesthe establishment, growth, and useof music

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libraries.
Amicus Brief of EFF et. at. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-Ol-2l38-RMW

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Introd uction Intellectualproperty law haslong beenunderstood a constitutionalbargainthat as

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I"involves a difficult balancebetweenthe interestsof authorsand inventorsin the control
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and exploitation of their writings and discoveries the one hand,and society's on competinginterestin the free flow of ideas,infonnation, and commerceon the other

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hand," SonyCorp. of America v. UniversalCity Studios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Accordinglyt copyright hasalwaysbeenlimited by "safety valves" that prevent copyright ownersfrom unduly restrictingothers' freedomto speak,thus protectingour cultural commons. SeeNeil WeinstockNetanel,Locating Copyright within the First

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12 Amendment Skein, S4 Stan. L. Rev, .,4 n. II (2001 (listing "the distinction between
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copyrightableexpression uncopyrightablefact and idea,the fair useprivilege, and and copyright's limited duration"); Yochai Benkler,Free as the Air to CommonUse:First

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Amendment Constraintson Enclosureof the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Melville B. Nimmer, Does CopyrightAbridge the First Amendment Guarantees lo/Free Speech and Press?,17UCLA L. REv. 1180,1186-1204 (1970)("NimrnerFirst

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Amendment"). It is againstthis backgroundthat this casemust be understood: the heartof this At caselies a simple question: canthe law can be usedto protect technologythat undenninesthe copyright bargain? Put anotherway, if computercode allows publishers to eliminate unilaterally theseconstitutional"safety valves," may the law still enforce that code?
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AmicusBriefofEFF et.al.
In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW

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Thesequestions arisebecause Congress, throughthe Digital Millennium
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ICopyright Act ("DMCA "), created a new kind of protection for copyrighted works: a

ban on manufacture and "trafficking" in technologies designed circumvent to
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"technologicalmeasures" protecta copyright owner's rights. 7 U.S.C. §1201(b). that Under the government's indictmentof Elcomsofthere,the DMCA doesnot require intent

7 I to aid and abetcopyright infringementor any other unlawful act, not even for the
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imposition of criminal liability; it doesnot requirethat any copyright infringement actually be facilitated. Moreover,underthe indictmentthe DMCA doesnot ensurethat circumventiontechnologiessuchasAEBPR remainavailablefor fair usersor noninfringing usersof copyrightedworks. The DMCA assumes contentownerswill apply technologicalmeasures that to restrict the useof copyrightedwork. It attemptsto createa new level of protection for the technologicalmeasures themselves, insteadof for the underlyingworks, aspart of an overall goal of preventingcopyright infringement. What the government's application of
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the DMCA hereoverlooks,however,is that thosesametechnologicalmeasures deny can

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the public the rightful benefitsof the copyright bargain.As they havedonethroughout
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American copyright law, courtsmust act hereto ensurethat the copyright

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bargainretainsmeaningful"safety valves."

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Factual/technological background The technologiesat issuein this caseexemplify the problem createdby an

unchecked interpretationthe DMCA. Adobe's eBook Readertechnologyis one example ora new breedof technologiesknown as digital rights management "ORM." The or
Amicus BricfofEFF ct. al. In SuPPC'rt Motion to Dismiss of CR-OI-2138-RMW 4

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eBook Readerwas designedto give e-bookpublishersnearly perfectcontrol over what
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lawful ownersof copiesof e-bookscan do with their copies. As Adobe hassaid: "Lending, printing, copying, giving andtext-to-speech pennissionsenabledby the are publisher.'" SeeStephen Kramarsky,CopyrightEnforcementin the Internet Age: The
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Law and Technology Digital RightsManagement, of

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DePaul-LCA 1. Art & Ent. L. I,

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14 n. 43 (2001) (DRM systemsgive publishers"the ability to restrict the numberof times I a work can be played or copied,the kinds of usersor machines that can access whether i~ it can be given away or resold and whetherit will eventually'expire,' amongother Ithings"). The consequence this, of course,is that the publisherdecideswhich of "pennissions"are allowed to the purchaser an eBook. Thus, e-bookpublishersmay of (and most do) useAdobe's eBook Readertechnologyto prevent lawful purchasers from printing or copying any of the text for fair usepurposes suchas commentary,review or
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even a schoolproject, from "space-shifting"the copy onto a computerother than that on which the copy was originally downloaded,2 from exercisingfirst-salerights to lend or

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January28, 2002) 12Cf RecordingInd: Assoc.of America v. DiamondMultimedia Systems, Inc., 180F.3d 1072, 23 (9th Cir. 1999). At issuein Diamondwas the legality of a consumer devicethat storesand plays digital music recordingsunderthe Audio Home RecordingAct. 17 U .S.C. § 1001et seq. The
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Ninth Circuit said: "The [device] merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 'spaceshift,' those files that already reside on the user's hard drive. . . Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act." Id. at 1079 (citing

Sony,464 U.S. at 455).
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AmicusBrief of EFFet. al. In Support Motionto Dismiss of iCR-OI-2138-RMW

Thus this casepresents core constitutionalquestionarising from the DMCA the
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;quite plainly: can the creationand publicationof a computerprogramthat permits both Constitutionally protectedand unlawful usesof copyrightedworks be banned?Or must

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s restrictionson suchprogramsbe tailored to allow constitutionallyprotecteduses?5
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This court shouldconstruethe DMCA to protectconstitutionaland noninfringing

by to 1 I usesof copyrightedworks. This may be accomplished allowing usersaccess the
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tools necessary makethoseusesexceptwhen the distributor aids and abetsin copyrigh1 to infringementor engages a conspiracyto commit copyright infringement.Under this in

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construction,Elcomsoft'spublication of AEBPR doesnot violate the DMCA. Without this sort of limiting construction,however,the DMCA must be declaredunconstitutional. IV. Copyright Both Promotes and Is Cabined by the First Amendment. U.S. copyright law is boundup with the First Amendmentin two ways. On one
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hand,the economicincentivescreatedby copyright law encourage production and the disseminationof First Amendmentprotectedexpression.On the other hand,copyright law andjurisprudencehavealwaysensured that copyright interestsdo not unduly impair the First Amendmentrights of the public.

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Copyright promotesthe First Amendmentby Qrovidingincentivesfor creatine: distributing exQression. and

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5 Another core constitutional question arises from the constitutional protection afforded to the 25
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computerprogram itself. Elcomsoft hasexploredthoseissuesthoroughly in its motion.
Accordingly, this brief will focus on the constitutional issues raised by the uses of the AEBPR. AmicusBriefofEFF et.a1. 7 In Support Motionto Dismiss of
CR-OI-2138-RMW

Copyright protectsauthors' rights in order to servethe public welfare Twentieth
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Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S

51, 156(1975) ("The immediateeffect of our

copyright law is to securea fair return for an 'author's'creativelabor. But the ultimate aim is to stimulateartistic creativity for the generalpublic good."); Sony464 U.S. at

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429 ("The copyright law . . makesrewardto the owner a secondary consideration")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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A major aspectof this public good is a rich and vibrant public commonsof culture and infonnation. Accordingly, copyright was intendedto serveasthe "engine of free expression"by providing economicincentivesfor creativeactivity while ensuringthe

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public access thesecreations. Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, to

13 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); id. at 546; Neil WeinstockNetanel,Copyright and a 14 Democratic Civil Society, 106YALEL.J. 283, 288 (1996) Thus the fundamental bargain IS 16

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that underliescopyright law To encourage authorsto createand disseminate original expression, [copyright law] accordsthem a bundleof proprietaryrights in their works. But to promotepublic educationand creativeexchange, [copyright law] invites audiences subsequent and authorsto useexisting works in every conceivablemannerthat falls outsidethe province of the copyright owner's exclusiverights. Copyright law's perennialdilemma is to detenninewhere exclusiverights shouldend andunrestrained public access shouldbegin. [d. at 285 B
CoDVri2ht avoids constitutional conflict with the First Amendment because of its "safety valves"

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Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-QI-2138-RMW

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Copyright law is potentially in tensionwith the First Amendment.SeeMark A.
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Lemley & EugeneVolokh, FreedomOf Speech and InjunctionsIn Intellectual Property Cases,48:2 Duke L.J.147, 165(Nov., 1998)("Copyrlghtlaw restrictsspeech").The original English copyright regimewas foundedasa powerful instrumentof state

Icensorship.The booksellershelpedthe Crown suppress undesirable ideas;the Cro~
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protectedthe booksellers'monopolies.L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the
Clause, 47 J. Copyright Sac 'y 365, 378-79 (2000). Over time, copyright shed

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its censorialhistory, becominga systemaimed at preservinga limited incentive for the

I creationof new works. The Framerswere well awareof this history, and intendedthe

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Intellectual PropertyClauseto serveboth an anti-censorship function and an antimonopoly function. Patterson, supra, at 383. Accordingly, copyright law haslong found it necessary accommodate First to the Amendmentrights of individuals to useexpression.Copyright law strikesthis balancein severalways. Both the idea/expression dichotomy and the uncopyrightability of facts limit copyright's scope.Seee.g. Netanel,First Amendment Skein,supra, at 2. Copyright must be of limited durationso that all copyrightedworks eventuallyenterthe public i domain.And while copyright law grantsauthorscertainmonopoly rights over their

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works, eachof thoseis limited by the reservationof rights by the public, regardless the of
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copyright owner's wishes.The public's rights serveindispensable functions for both the First Amendmentand the copyright bargain.As explainedfurther below, these

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!imitations are severelyreduced,if not outright eliminat~ throughthe broad interpretationof the DMCA reflectedin the government's indictment.

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The DMCA presents significant constitutional problems A DMCA's Chan2es the CoRmght Bargain to

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Amicus Brief ofEFF ct. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss 'CR-OI-2138-RMW

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If copyright law is to continueto be true to the First Amendmentand its
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constitutionalroots,6the grant of additionalrights to copyright holdersshould foster

expansionof copyright law. To comprehend scope,and the First Amendment its
.s

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concentricrings of liability to copyright holders.8The chart below illustratesthis
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metaphor. 9

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6 Seege~erally Melville B. Nimmer First Amendment;Paul Goldste~, "Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970). " 7 Benkler, supra, at 386-89(1999); J~s Boyle, A Politics o/Intellectual Property: , , .. !Environmentalism/or the Net?, 47 DulCe 87, 89 (1997). L.J.
:

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8 SeeBenkler,supra at 358

19All threeof the chartsusedin this brief (seealso pages_& -> were developedby the ACLU 2S for the amicusbrief in the 2nd Circuit Appeal in Universalv. Corely. <htto://www.aclu.orgJcourt/corlev.i;!Qt'> (visited January29, 2002).
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IAmicus Brief of EFF et. al.
In Supportof Motion to Dismiss

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:CR-OI-213S-RMW

Pre-DMCA Liability
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Links TraffICking Circun,vcnt Above the lire: no fair use: an infrin~ing act: and - a sufrlCientrelationship bet\\'ccn Infringer and dcfel\danl

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/~;7'

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"'--~

/'

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lklow the Ii\e: .:itl1\.'f lair use: no inlhniina acl:or insumci~ relati()nship bel\veen
infrin~er and defendant

Shading liability

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At the core is direct liability for copyright infringement. 0 In the next ring are the I indirect liability doctrinesof contributory infringementand vicarious liability that courts haveread into copyright law. SeeSony,464 U.S. at 434-435 Thesefirst two rings of liability accommodate free speech concerns recognizingfair userights by The DMCA addsa third ring of indirect liability for circumventingtechnical

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:7 measures usedto protect access copyrightedworks ("the anti-circumvention to
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provision"),ll and a fourth ring for making or trafficking in circumventiontechnology ("the anti-trafficking provision").12 In addition to holding that the third and fourth rings

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1017 U.S.C. § 106, § 501 ill 17 V.S.C. §1201(a)(I)(A) "No personshall circumventa technologicalmeasure that
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effectivelycontrols access a workprotected to underthistitle."
12 17 V.S.C. §1201(b)(I). "No personshall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwisetraffic in any technology,product,service,device,component,or part thereof,that Amicus BriefofEFF et. at. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-Ol-2138-RMW

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of liability do not allow fair userights, the SecondCircuit in Universalv. Corley, 273
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F.3d 429, 455 (2nd Cir. 2001), supported the Governmentin its role as Intervener,13 by addeda fifth ring of indirect liability basedon merelinks to sitescontaining

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s circumventiontechnology.
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As the circles of indirect liability expandoutward,the quantumof free speech shrinks- unlessthe law incorporates limiting principlesto preservea robust domain for
free speech interests.14

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Courtshave imposedindirect liability for copyright infringementin situationsin which third partieshaveknowingly and materially participatedin illegal behavior.If

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indirect liability is expanded without regardto (I) whethertherewere any underlying acts of infringement;(2) whetherany relationshipexistsbetweenthe actual infringers and the

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.,
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(A) is primarily designedor producedfor the purposeof circumventinga technological measure that effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner underthis title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) hasonly limited commercially significant purposeor useother than to circumvent a technologicalmeasure that effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner underthis title in a work or a portion thereof; or (C) is marketedby that personor anotheracting in concertwith that personwith that person's knowledgefor usein circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure

thateffectivelyprotects right of a copyright a ownerunder title in a work or a portion this
thereof. 17 V.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2) similarly prohibits trafficking in technology"for the purposeof circumventingprotectionafforded by a technologicalmeasure that effectively controls access to a work protectedunderthis title" 13 Seee.g. <http://www.eff.ofg/IPNideo/MPAA_DVD_cases/2001 0620_ny _doj_supl_brief.html>(visited January26, 2002). 14SeeBenkler, supra, at 393 ("An increasein the amountof material one owns decreases the communicativecomponents freely availableto all others."). Amicus BriefofEFF at. et. 12

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iIn Supportof Motion to Dismiss
CR-OI-2138-RMW

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personthe plaintiff seeksto hold indirectly liable; and,most importantly, (3) whethera fair useor other free speech right applies,that expansion presents graveconstitutional problems.Unfortunately,this casetriggersthoseconcerns. Government Interpretation of DMCA Liability

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Abo\e the line; no fair use; an infriniing act; and - a sufficient relationshipbctw\.'Cn infrinaer altd delendant

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I direct infrinser Shading liability
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Below the linc: either fair u~: no infrin~ing act; or - illsuflicieJUrelationshiphet'\lcell infringer and defendant

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The governmenthereseeksto hold Elcomsoft criminally liable for activities in the
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bottom half of the "trafficking" circle in the chart above.This is because indictment the containsno allegation,much lessevidence, that the posting of the programcausedany underlying actsof infringement.Nor is thereallegationthat the defendanteither substantiallycontributedto copyright infringementor had any ability to control the acts of any usersof AEBPR as indirect liability standards would require. Finally, AEBPR is a tool that facilitates,and in somecases makespossible,fair usesand noninfringing uses011 eBooks,aswell as usesof works that are not protectedby copyright.

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Amicus BriefofEFF et. al. I In Supportof Motion to Dismiss I CR-OI-2I38-RMW

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The government's broadinterpretationof the DMCA therebylays the legal
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foundationfor eliminating the public benefitsof the copyright bargain,replacing traditional copyright law with a systemthat givespublisherstotal control over how works can be experienced. Under that interpretation,the DMCA' s anti-trafficking provisions IS permit copyright ownersto nullify the public's ability to access, use,and copy expression wheneverthat expression shieldedby technology.As a result, they presenta is tremendous threatto free expression negatingthe limiting principles designed by to
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preserve copyright bargain. the B. UnlessNarrowly Construed. DMCA EliminatesMuch of the Public Sideor the the CoRmgbt Bargain The Copyright Act, of course,grantscontentownerscertain"exclusive" powers

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over in their works. 7 U.S.C. § 106. But theseare limited in many ways. 7 U.S.C. §§ 107-120. Copyright hasneveraccorded copyright owner completecontrol over all the possibleusesof his work. Sony,464 U.S. at 432. A useora copyrightedwork doesnot infringe copyright unlessit conflicts with one of the specific, exclusiverights enumerateu in the Copyright Act. Twentieth-Centwy Music, 422 U.S. at 154-155. As explained further below, the government's interpretationof the DMCA effectively eliminatesmuch of the public side of the copyright bargain,or, at best,puts the public's ability to exercise
it's rights -. into the exclusive control of the content owners.

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This ~hift, if not restrainedby

a narrow interpretationof the statute,runs afoul of the Constitution.
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15 SeeDavid Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Usein the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 727-39(2000) (providing examples);PamelaSamuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Whythe Anti-CircumventionRegulationsNeedto Be Revised,14 BerkeleyTech. L.J. 519, 536-57(1999).
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Amicus Brief of EFF ct. al. In SuPPOrt. Motion to Dismiss of CR-oI-2138-RMW

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1. UnlessLimited. the DMCA Allows PublishersTo Control (And
Extract PavmentFor) Works In The Public Domain.
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Under the Intellectual PropertyClause,copyright must be limited in time such all works eventuallypassinto the public domain. "[Copyright] is intendedto allow the public access the productsof their geniusafter the limited period of exclusivecontrol to hasexpired." Sony,464 U.S. at 429; seeJessica Litman, ThePublic Domain, 39 Emory

s
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L.J. 965 (1990).Although the DMCA purportsto protectonly copyrightedworks, unless
7 8
9 10 11

limited its prohibitions reachmuch further, including into the public domain. SeeDavid
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. fA. L. REv.

673,727-32 (2000) (presenting casestudiesshowinghow DMCA could renderillegal otherwiselegal activity)("Nimmer Riff'). Consider,for instance,a Shakespeare with a new introductionpublishedin play eBook Readerformat.Nimmer Riff, supra, at 712 (compilation of 19th-century

12

13 :cookbooks given new introductions "considered as a whole[] would be subject to
14

copyright protection") (footnoteomitted). But while the new compilation as a whole would be copyrightable,only the new material is actually protectedby copyright; Shakespeare's words are in the public domain. Copying or printing thosewords is not infringement. Despitethis, eBook Readertechnologypermitsthe publisherto deny the lawful owner of the eBook the ability to print or copy any of Shakespeare's unprotected expression.

I'
16
17

18

19
20

21

circumventionfor non-copyrighted works is not itself unlawful undercopyright law or
22

the DMCA. In order to accomplishthis legal act, however,the userwill needa software
23

tool. Yet underthe government's view of the trafficking prohibition, thesetools may not
24 2S 15

be distributed.This is because governmentasserts the DMCA prohibits the the that

Amicus Brief of EFF et. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss
CR-O 1-2 I 38-RMW

creationor "providing" of circumventiontechnologies, even if the goal is to allow access
2 3 4
I and copyright circumvention of non-copyrighted works.

The result is the sameevenif the e-bookincludesonly Shakespeare's play. So long as the book is protectedby eBook Readerand the publisherchooses to "permit" not

s j legitimateuses,suchusesare effectively impossiblebecause the lack of suitabletools of
6

By the sametoken, a copyright owner can effectively preventan e-book from ever effectively enteringthe public domain,despitethe expirationof copyright. Oncethe I book hasbeenplacedinto the eBook fonna~ the tools necessary circumventthe eBook to
I

.,
8 9

"permissions"are prohibited.

10

II
12
13

2. The Government's lntemretationOf The DMCA Allows Publishers
To Ne2ateClassicFair Use. One key elementof the copyright bargainis fair use. "Any individual may reproducea copyrightedwork for a 'fair use'; the copyright owner doesnot possess the
I

14 IS
I

exclusiveright to sucha use." Sony,464 U.S. at 432 ("all reproductionsof the work. . . are not within the exclusivedomainof the copyright owner; someare in the public

16 17

I domain.").

Fair use includescopying all or part of anothercopyrightedwork in order to critical commentary,newsreporting,and other free speech-related activities.

18 : engage in

Enterprises,Inc. v. RandomHouse,Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966)(fair use 19 Rosemont
20 21 22
23 24 25
I
I

to reproduceportions of article in critical biographyof Howard Hughes);Triangle Pub.,
Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F .2d '71 (5th Cir. 1980) (fair use to

reproducecover ofTY Guide in comparisonof competingguide); Sony,464 U.S. at 425 (copy of entire work may be fair use) Fair use is rootedin the constitutionalpurposeof copyright. Campbelv. AcuffRoseMusic, 510 U.S. 569 at 575 (1994) ("some opportunity for fair useof copyrighted materialshasbeenthoughtnecessary fulfill copyright's very purpose"); id. at 577 (fair to
Amicus BriefofEFFet. al. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-QI-2138-RMW 16

I

use"pennits [and requires]courtsto avoid rigid applicationof the copyright statute
2 3 4

when, on occasion,it would stifle the very creativity which that law is intendedto foster") (internal quotationmarksand citation omitted). The fair usedoctrinehasalsoensured that copyright laws are consistentwith the First Amendment. SeeHarper & Row,47

,
6

u.s.at 560 (suggestingconstitutional

dimensionof fair usedoctrinein mediatingbetweencopyright and First Amendment interests, althoughruling againstnewsmagazine that had not madefair usein publishing key excerptsof a not-yet publishedmemoir);Nihon Keizai Shimbunv. ComlineBusiness Data, 166F.3d 65,74 (2d Cir. 1999)(First Amendmentconcerns protectedby fair use) Although the First Amendmentis often reference~courtshavegenerallynot needed rely explicitly on tf.e constitutionalbasisfor fair usebecause its to of

1
8 9

10

12
13

longstandingdoctrinal homein Americancopyright law See,e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard GeisAssocs.,293 F.Supp.130(SD.N. Y. 1968)(fair useto reproduceframesof Zapruder film in order to explain author'stheory of Kennedyassassination) When Congressfinally codified fair usein the Copyright Act of 1976,it identified severalcategories favoreduses,i.e., for "criticism, comment,newsreporting, of all usesof teaching , scholarship,[and] research," of which are free speech-related copyrightedworks. 7 U.S.C.§ 107 The codification of fair usewas meant"to restate the present judicial doctrineof fair use,not to change,narrow or enlargeit in any way

14 IS 16 11

19
20

SeeH.R. REp.No. 94-1476,p. 66 (1976). Congress intendedthat fair usecontinueto evolve, "especially during a period of rapid technologicalchange Ibid ("courts must be ." free to adaptthe doctrineto particularsituationson a case-by-case basis Tme to Congress'sintent, courtshavesince 1976frequently invoked fair useto mediatetensionsbetweeninterestsof copyright ownersand subsequent usersof copyrightedworks in casesinvolving new technologies that posedchallengingquestions for copyright law See,e.g.,Sony,supra (time-shift copying of television programsheld
I

21 22 23
24

25

j Amicus Brief of EFF et. al.

fair use);SegaEnterprises,Ltd. v. Accolade,. Inc., 977 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1992)(fair use
I,

1 In Support of Motion to Dismiss

- CR-OI-2138-RMW

2 3
4

,
6
'7

8
9

10 II 12
13

14 IS 16 7 18 19
20 21

22
23 24

25

Amendmentinterestsby ensuringthereare alternativedistributorsfor creative
2 3 Ibreedsprivate censorship.Allowing severalindividuals to learn from one copy of a work
4

Iexpression.Having only a single sourceavailablefor obtainingparticular infontlation
i

helpsspreadknowledgeand infonnation. Libraries and usedbook storesfunction almost
I solely from the privileges conferred by the first sale doctrine.

5
6 .,
I

Under the first saledoctrine,oncea personhaslawfully acquireda copy of a bookhe or sheis free to lend, sell, or give that copy to anyoneelse. 17 V.S.C. § 109(a). But technologicalmeasures pennit publishersto preventany transferof a work For instance the eBook Readertechnologyallows publishersto preventlending (temporarily forgoing
! one's I
I

8
9

10 II 12
13 14

own

use

of

the

copy)

or

giving

(pennanently

relinquishing

the

ability

to

use

the

copy) of an e-book by tying the purchased e-bookto the particular deviceon which it was

Idownloaded.
4.
The Government's lntemretationof the DMCA Allows Content HoldersTo Eliminate The Public's Rigi!t QfPrivate Performance.

IS
16

Similarly, while copyright ownershavethe right to control public display and perfonnanceof their works, private perfonnances deliberatelybeyondthe control of are

17 the copyright owner. Sony,464 U.S. at 468. One may, without any authorization,sing a
18 I copyrightedlyric

in the shower(Twentieth-Century Music v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 155at 155

or cf 19 1(1975); usea book for private reference. Stoverv. Lathrop, 33 F. 348 (C.C.D. Colo.
20

1888)("The effect of a copyright is not to preventany reasonable of the book which use is sold. may usethe book for reference, study,reading,lending, copying passages from it at my will."). Through the useof technologicalprotectionsystems and the legal protection of the DMCA, however,copyright ownerscan go beyondcontrol of public performances to usurpcontrol over certainprivate perfonnances. instance,individuals use"text-toFor
I

21
22

23
24 25

speech"softwareso that their computerscan readelectronicfiles aloud to them.
19 In Supportof Motion to Dismiss

I Amicus Brief of EFF ct. al.
I

CR-o1-2 38-RMW 1

Assumingthe file hasbeenlegitimately obtainedandthat no additional reproductionsare
2 3 4

required,suchreadingaloud which constitutesa privateperfonnanceof a literary work for which no pennissionis required.But in the face of restrictionsbuilt into the Adobe eBook Readertechnology,individuals will no longerbe able to usetheir own "text to

s speech"tools to exercisetheir private performance rights.
6

1
8
9

5.

The Government'sBroad Intemretationof the DMCA Can PreventPurchasers from Accessine: Their Own Books.

10

Given the realitiesof modembusiness, inflexible interpretationof the DMCA an
11

Can also preventlawful purchasers eBooksfrom readingtheir own books. In January, of
12
13

2002,MightyWords, one of the premiereBook publishers,ceased business operations. 16 As a result, noneof the lawful purchasers thoseeBookshasany further ability to repair of

14

t,
16

a broken eBook or transferthe book to a new Machine(somethingallowed witch individual pennissionby MightyWords while it was in operation). In essence, to the due business failure of Might Words, its eBooksaretimed out - becoming completely inaccessible userswho undergoany significant changes their computersystems. A to in programsuchasAEBPR could allow ownersof Might Works eBooksto access use and

:7
18 19

their books despitethe fact that the companyno longerexists, Yet underthe
20

government'sinterpretation,providing AEBPR to a MightyWorks customeris a criminal
21
22
I

of violation of the DMCA. Thus directly contraryto the goalsandpurposes the copyright bargain,the DMCA effectively makestheseeBooksinaccessible only to the public, not but to someof thosewho havebought andpaid for them.

23
24

25
I

16 See <httpllmightywords.com> (noticeofshutdown of company); See also

<httpllsiliconvalley.intemet.com/news/article/O.2l98.3531_940111.00.html> AmicusBriefofEFF et. al. 20
In Support Motionto Dismiss of
CR..QI-2138-RMW

2 3
4
oS
I

VI.

The DMCA Must Be Narrowly Construed Or Invalidated

There is anlple evidencethat Congress not intendto eliminate fair or noninfringing did usein the 1201context. Firs~ and most importantly,with regardto fair userights, the statuteitself states:"Nothing in this sectionshall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses copyright infringement,including fair use,underthis title." 1201(c)(1). As to

6

7 8
I

9 10 II 12 13
14

the Registrarof Copyrightssaid: [T]his legislationclarifies existing law and expands specific exemptionsfor laudablepurposes.Thesespecific exemptionsare supplemented the by broaddoctrine of fair use. Although not addressed this bill, fair useis in both a fundamental principle of the U.S. copyright law and an important part of the necessary balanceon the digital highway. Thereforethe applicationof fair usein the digital environmentshouldbe strongly reaffinned." 17

.,
16 17 18 19
20

Fortunately,the DMCA is susceptible a constitutionalinterpretation.18 to Revisiting the chartsusedabove,the interpretationwould be as follows:

21 22 23
24
2$

17 TestimonyofMc.rybeth Peters,Registrarof Copyrightsand AssociateLibrarian for Copyright Servicesp. 40. (H.R. 2441 and S. 1284).Joint Hearingbeforethe Subcommittee Courts and of Intellectual Propertyof the HouseCommitteeon the Judiciaryand the Senate Committeeon the Judiciary - - NIl Copyright ProtectionAct of 1995. 18 This sectionof the brief incorporates arguments from the amicusbrief of the ACLU, et. aI. in the 2nd Circuit Appeal in Universal v. Corely, <http://www.aclu.orJ!Jcourt/corley.~f> (visited January29, 2002).
I

Amicus Brief of EFF et. a1.

21

In Supportof Motion to Dismiss 'CR-O 1-2138-RMW

Constitutional
2 3
4
/

Interpretation of Liabilif.'.' llnder DMCA

""./""-'~~~~~~~~"'~"'."

s
6
7

/

/~-~

"

-

i\~V~ t~ line:

nolair u~:
an inrringing &11:1: and a surr~ient rl.'lationship hctwcl.'n inlringer and dcfend&lnl

Circumvent Contrib.

8 9 10

\

'I.

'"

',,---, ;

Bclow Ih~ line: ~ilher
rair u~;

'"

""

11 12
13 14 IS 16 17 18

'~=::::/

/'

I
,/

-

-

no inrrin~ing act; or in)"Umc~nlr~lation~hip ~Iwcen in tnngcr and dcfcndanl

In other words, liability underthe DMCA occurswhen a Court has found 1. That there is no noninfringing use,fair useor free speech right to offer the program. 2. That a sufficient relationshipexist betweenthe publisherof the program and infringers underthe aiding and abettingor conspiracystandardsl9;and 3. That the programwas usedto infringe copyrightsor that an imminent dangerof copyright infringementexistsunderthe First Amendment stiindards.20

19 20
21 22

23
24 2S

19 Seee.g. Central Bank of DenverN.A~~.First InterstateBank of Denver.NA., 511 U .S: 164, 190(1994)(aidingand abettingrequiresintentionalacts); United Statesv. Superior Growers Supply,Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 177-78(6th Cir. 1992); UnitedStatesv. Campa,679 F.2d 1006, 101 (1st Cir. 1982)(aiding and abettingrequiresthat underlyingoffensein fact be committed); Direct SalesCo. v. United States,319 U.S. 703 (I 943)(conspiracy requirements). 20 Under traditional First Amendmentstandards, speakerliability even for subsequent violent acts is not allowed "unlessthat speech capableof producingimminent lawlessaction." is Amicus Briefof EFF al. et. 22
CR-Ol-213'8-RMW

In Support Motionto Dismiss of

f

~

2 3 4

One way to do this within the statutoryschemeis throughthe definition of the tenDsof the statute. §1201 carefully is, by its very terms,limited to technologies (b) that "effectively protect a right of a copyright owner." If the phrase"right of a copyright I owner" is limited to the list of exclusiverights grantedan owner undercopyright law (the
I

s
6

top half of the chart above),then actsdonefor purposes are outsidethe copyright that owner'srights (the bottom half of the chart),are simply outsidethe scopeof the statute. Alternately, the court could rely on the statute's express preservationof free

8
I

9

10
I

speech and fair use,seenin §1201(cXl) and (cX3).21 No matterhow the constructionis accomplished, creationof "safetyvalves" in the DMCA to matchthe longstandingones that exist in copyright law, is necessary the statuteto remainwithin the boundsof the for
constitution.22

12
13

14 IS 16

A.

Without a Narrowin2 Construction.the DMCA is Unconstitutional.

If this Court finds that the DMCA is incapableof narrowing constructionssuchas
18

thoseoutlined above,the statutemust be voided.SeeVirginia v. AmericanBooksellers Assoc.,484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971). Without free

19
20

21
I

Brandenburg Ohio,395U.S.444,447(1969). v.
21 SeeJaneC. Ginsburg,Copyright Useand Excuseon the Internet, 24 Colwn.-VLA J.L. & A,rts 1,8-9 (discussionof how §1201(c)(3)can be readto allow fair useunderthe DMCA). 22 "[T]here is no questionthat the copyright law is far more nuanced and containsfar more exceptionsthan the Digital Millenniwn Copyright Act. The technologicalprotectionsare much more rigid than the law they are intendedto protect." Comments Jonathan of Ban~ 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 363 American University Law Review December 2000Symposium PANEL ONE: THE ROAD TO NAPSFER:INTERNET TECHNOLOGY DIGITAL CONTENTWashingtonD.C. & Thursday,November 16, 2000. Amicus BriefofEFF al. et. 23

22

23
24

25

I

ln Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-QI-2138-RMW

speech safeguards expansionof indirect liability into a fourth ring of liability for the
2
3

trafficking in circumventiontechnologyunconstitutionallyrestrictsspeech that was
'iclearly in the public domain or otherwiseprotectedby the First Amendmentprior to the

.
s
6
'7

DMCA. SeeBenkler,supra, at 385-429;see,e.g.,Nimmer Riff at 739 (noting the "consciouscontractionof userrights" by Congress). a result, the broadly construed As anti-trafficking provision operates an effective ban on a variety of expressive as technologiescapableof substantialnoninfringing uses.Unlessnarrowly construed,such
J

8
9

an effective ban on protectedspeech violatesthe First Amendment.SeeACLU I, 521 u.s. 844 (1997) (striking down the Communications DecencyAct because operatedas it

10

12 13 14 IS
I

an effective ban on speech protectedfor adults).AEBPR is, of course,only one of I countless technologiescoveredby the statute.Without a narrowing construction,the

Istatutehashad and will continueto havea substantialchilling effect on the development
of new technologiescapableof importantnoninfringing uses.23

16
17

18
19 20

VII.

Conclusion

"Once encryptionbecomes norm, the rights-holders,not Congress, the will dictate what usescan and cannotbe madeof their properties." Kramarsky,supra, at 43. In askingthat the DMCA be construed narrowly, we do not questionthe right of
I eBook publishers to protect their works. We do not question their fears that digital

21
22

23
I

I

23 This includesreverseengineeringa Sony AiboPet to teachit new tricks and the threatsto a

24 25

Princeton/Rice/Xerox team of researchers by measures a scientific conference. e.g. led .the resultsof analysisof technologicalprotectionProfessorEdward Feltenwho soughtto publish at See
I <http://www.sciam.com/explorationsl2002/012102aibol> (visited January26, 2002) and

<http://www.cff.org/Legal/CasesiFclten_v_RIM/> (visited January27,2002).
I Amicus Brief of EFF et. a1. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss CR-OI-2138-RMW 24

I

publishing underthe prevalentbusiness model presents increased risks of copyright

2 3 4 5

Iinfringement.We only claim that when publisherschooseto publish copiesof their work~
in digital form, their ability to control consumer usesof thosecopiesbe subjectto
,

I
I

limiting principles long established copyright law, someof which derive from the in

6 7 8 9 10

I

Constitution. Even if codemay protectworks more completelythan the law, the law may reinforce that code only to the extentthe Constitutionallows.

Respectfullysubmitted:

Dated this 4d1 day of February, 2002

II

B

,:::: :~~~ii~~~[~~:===
C Y A. CO ROB D.GROSS LEE TlEN
ELECTRONIC FOUNDATION FRONTIER

13
14

IS 16 17
18

454 Shotwell Street SanFranciscoCA 94110 Telephone:(415) 436-9333 FacsImile: (415) 436-9993

19
20 21 22 23 24 2S

I Amicus Brief of EFF et. aI. In Supportof Motion to Dismiss 'CR-QI-2138-RMW

25