IN  THE  SUPERIOR  COURT  OF  THE  STATE  OF  DELAWARE  

IN  AND  FOR  KENT  COUNTY  
 
 
CHRISTOPHER  KING,  d/b/a  KingCast/Mortgage  Movies,  
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)    CASE  NO.  K15C-­‐03-­‐028  
 
Plaintiff,  
 
 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)      JUDGE  YOUNG  
 
BETTY  LOU  MCKENNA,  HOLLY  MALONE  
 
 
)  
and  JOHN  PARADEE,  ESQ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants.    
 
 
 
 
)  
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S  FINAL  MOTION  TO  RECUSE  JUDGE  ROBERT  B.  YOUNG  
WITH  SUPPLEMENTAL  LAW  AND  TYPOGRAPHIC  EDITS  
 
I.  
The  August  5  2015  Payment  of  Trial  Fees  for  a  Trial  Scheduled  November  14,  
2016  Should  Not  Result  in  a  Draconian  Bar  to  Filing  Further  Memoranda  in  
this  Case;  Judge  Young  was  deceitfully  Wrong  on  the  Key  Case  of  Iacobucci  v.  
Boulter  and  Ignored  Pomykacz  v.  Village  of  West  Wildwood  out  of  Unlawful  
Bias  Against  Plaintiff.  
 
Plaintiff  has  via  overnight  courier  retendered  the  $150  Trial  Fee  along  with  a  copy  
of  all  documents  heretofore  rejected  by  this  Court:    Plaintiff  paid  his  Trial  Fee  on  or  about  5  
August,  2015.  Prior  to  that  time,  he  never  received  any  notice  from  Judge  Robert  B.  Young  
that  the  Trial  Fee  must  be  paid  on  or  before  23  July  2015.    In  point  of  fact,  that  Court  never  
took  adverse  action  until  a  full  week  later,  and  only  after  Plaintiff  filed  his  Waiver  of  Jury  
Trial,  noting  that  he  feels  particularly  unsafe  in  Delaware  given  the  five  (5)  mysterious  
lynching  deaths/murders  of  black  males  that  AG  Denn  claims  were  “suicides.”    Appendix  A.  
 

Meanwhile  after  mentioning  these  lynchings  in  a  global  email  to  supporters,  State  

employees,  First  Amendment  attorneys  and  several  high-­‐powered  area  attorneys  Plaintiff  
received  an  email  from  Detective  Hill  in  which  he  declined  to  provide  safety  for  Plaintiff  if  
he  came  to  the  Forum  State  whilst  simultaneously  threatening  Plaintiff  that  he  could  be  
subject  to  prosecution  for  the  content  of  the  emails  that  was  “alarming.”    Plaintiff,  with  
notice,  taped  the  entire  conversation  and  put  it  out  for  the  World  to  hear  on  6  August,  2015.  
 

 

1  

First Amendment Lawsuits Show Markell, AG Biden, AG Denn Coverup of Black Lynchings

http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2015/08/caught-­‐on-­‐tape-­‐kingcast-­‐and-­‐
mortgage.html  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QibeMFiaxgM  

 
Only  AFTER  production  of  this  video  did  the  Court  determine  that  Plaintiff’s  filings  
were  allegedly  Out  of  Rule.    These  filings  mentioned  the  lynchings,  the  lies  by  Judge  Young  
about  a  major  case  (Iacobucci)  and  the  fundamental  flaw  of  logic  by  the  Court  and  
Defendants  in  that  they  used  public  meeting  law  to  strike  Plaintiff’s  Constitutional  claims,  
only  now  to  turn  around  and  claim  that  Tisdale  is  completely  irrelevant  because  it  is  based  
on  public  meeting  law.    
This  unlawful  pattern  trails  back  to  the  Court  twice  returning  the  SD  video  card  
Offer  of  Proof  previously  submitted,  showing  Plaintiff’s  true  modus  operandi  when  shooting  
video  in  a  County  Recorder’s  Office,  which  is  NOT  to  go  into  private  areas  and  such.  But  
Judge  Young,  in  light  of  his  bias,  simply  MUST  whitewash  the  Record  to  make  Plaintiff’s  
position  appear  completely  untenable,  when  the  Plain  Trust  is  that  his  conduct  is  
commonplace  in  every  other  Jurisdiction  in  the  Country.  In.  The.  Country.  

 

2  

Only Dirty Deeds Recorders Like Kent County DE's Betty
Lou McKenna Restrict Media Access and Cameras
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uPuF-­‐Z_Ft4

 
 
 
Moreover,  also  out  of  unlawful  bias  and  hegemony,  Judge  Young  ignored  Pomykacz  
v.  Village  of  West  Wildwood  as  well,  a  case  in  which  a  citizen  journalist  was  protected  by  the  
First  Amendment  after  shooting  police  personnel  at  the  police  station  at  all  hours  of  the  day.    
Pomykacz  was  a  self-­‐described  “citizen  activist”  who  expressed  concern  that  a  
suspected  romance  between  the  town’s  mayor  and  a  police  officer  were  leading  to  
nepotism,  conflicts  of  interest  and  preferential  treatment.  These  suspicions  led  

Pomykacz  to  “monitor”  the  two,  which  included  taking  
photographs.  Eventually  she  was  arrested  on  charges  of  stalking,  though  the  
charges  were  downgraded  to  harassment.    
 
Pomykacz  ended  up  filing  suit  asserting,  among  other  things,  that  she  was  arrested  in  
violation  of  the  First  Amendment  retaliation  for  her  monitoring  activities    (emphasis  
added  so  the  Defendants,  Court  and  Reviewing  Court  can  see  where  they  have  been  
completely  disingenuous  to  date).  
 
 

 

3  

On  the  night  of  October  7,  2002,  on  her  way  to  Wildwood,  Pomykacz  drove  past  
the  borough  municipal  building  and  observed  Officer  Ferentz  working  on  
renovations  while  she  was  on  duty.  Later  that  night,  after  Pomykacz  had  returned  
from  Wildwood,  she  photographed  Officer  Ferentz  in  the  police  

headquarters.  7  Another  police  officer  and    [*508]    Mayor  Fox  were  also  
present  in  the  police  station  at  the  time.  According  to  Pomykacz,  Mayor  Fox  came  
out  of  the  building  and  began  yelling  at  her.  Pomykacz  walked  home  without  
responding  (emphasis  added  so  the  Defendants,  Court  and  Reviewing  Court  can  see  
where  they  have  been  completely  disingenuous  to  date).  
 
U.S.  District  Judge  Joseph  E.  Irenas  noted,    
 
Pomykacz  has  put  forth  sufficient  evidence  that  she  was  a  concerned  citizen  who  at  
times  spoke  her  mind  to  Borough    [*513]    officials  and  other  citizens  about  her  
concerns  regarding  the  official  conduct  of  the  police  department  and  the  mayor.  
Such  speech  is  clearly  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.  14  See  Mills  v.  
Alabama,  384  U.S.  214,  218,  86  S.  Ct.  1434,  16  L.  Ed.  2d  484  (1966)  HN15 ("a  major  
purpose  of  [the  First]  Amendment  was  to  protect  the  free  discussion  of  
governmental  affairs.");  Roth  v.  United  States,  354  U.S.  476,  484,  77  S.  Ct.  1304,  1  L.  
Ed.  2d  1498  (1957)  ("The  protection  given  speech  and  press  was  fashioned  to  
assure  unfettered  interchange  of  ideas  for  the  bringing  about  of  political  and  social  
changes  desired  by  the  people.").  
 
That  is  a  virtually  identical  case  from  the  Third  Circuit  but  because  of  unlawful  bias  Judge  
Young  and  the  Defendants  ignored  it.    It  isn’t  the  first  time  that  First  and  Third  Circuit  
judges  –  citing  Iacobucci  –  have  completely  disagreed  with  Judge  Young’s  findings,  because  
his  findings  were  clearly  UNLAWFUL.  Here  is  the  more  of  the  substance  of  what  Plaintiff  
stated,  and  it  is  all  rock  solid  and  it  is  the  real  reason  why  Judge  Young  has  resorted  to  
striking  all  Docket  entries:  
The  point  is,  Defendants  and  the  Court  cannot  have  it  both  ways:    They  claim  
that  Tisdale  is  “not  relevant”  at  para  6  of  their  Memorandum  because  it  involves  a  public  
meeting.  But  If  public  body/public  meeting  analyses  are  inapplicable  now,  then  they  were  
inapplicable  in  the  first  place  -­‐-­‐  and  there’s  yet  another  compelling  reason  for  the  Supreme  
Court  of  the  United  States  to  give  this  case  a  prompt  Remand  in  the  name  of  Justice.  Gotcha.  
So  now  Defendants  claim  that  public  meeting  analysis  is  “not  relevant  to  Plaintiff’s  
claims”  well  then  that  conclusively  provides  proof  that  the  Court’s  underlying  rationale….  Is  
wrong  and  Plaintiff  thanks  Defendants  for  pointing  that  out  because  they  and  the  Court  are  
so  caught  up  in  their  lies  that  they  can’t  keep  them  straight.  In  any  event,  recall  that  the  
Court  specifically  cited  to  Whiteland  woods  as  “particularly  helpful  and  instructive.”    

 

4  

Well  come  to  find  out  that  Plaintiff  said  this  was  not  a  public  meeting  case,  ab  initio,  
while  the  Court  was  busy  giving  him  the  bum’s  rush  earlier:  It  is  the  Pomykacz,  Cirelli,  
Iacobucci  and  Glik  cases  and  their  progeny,  including  Third  Circuit’s  Montgomery  v.  
Killingsworth,  2015  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  7152  (January  22,  2015)  that  are  most  germane  because  
they  all  involve  journalists  filming  public  officials  in  and  out  of  their  offices.      
There’s  the  a-­‐ha  moment  of  this  entire  case  and  Defendants  offered  it  up  on  a  
platter.  That  having  been  said,  Plaintiff  maintains  his  public  body/public  meeting  
arguments  in  the  alternative  and  points  to  the  11th  Circuit  Tisdale  v.  Gravitt,  51  F.  Supp.  3d  
1378  (N.D.  Georgia  2014)  case  to  show  that  current  Courts  disagree  with  the  ancient  
Whiteland  Woods  case.    
Interestingly,  in  Defendant’s  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  para  8  they  try  to  
dismiss  Peloquin,  Tarus  and  Iacobucci  by  stating  that  the  Court  already  analyzed  them  in  the  
prior  order,  but  alas  that  analysis  was  fundamentally  wrong  as  proved  by  Iacobucci  as  well  
as  the  newly-­‐discovered  Third  Circuit  and  First  Circuit  (NY)  2015  First  Amendment  cases.    
As  Plaintiff  stated  in  prior  Memoranda:  
Next,  the  Court’s  Patent  Misrepresentation  (read:  lie)  -­-­  about  Iacobucci  v.    
Boulter,  1997  U.S.  Dist.  Lexis  7010,  No.  CIV.A.  94-­10531  (D.Mass,  Mar.  26,  1997)  is  
startling.    Iacobucci  specifically  found  that  an  independent  reporter  has  a  protected  
right  under  the  First  Amendment  and  state  law  to  videotape  public  meetings  and  the  
events  that  occurred  in  the  hallways  of  a  public  building.  
 
But  read  p17  FN  47  of  the  courts’  Opinion  where  Judge  Young  tries  to  limit  the  
holding  to  Fourth  Amendment  Grounds  he  writes:  
(holding  rested  upon  whether  Officer  had  probable  cause  to  arrest  video  reporter  
for  recording  public  event,  implicating  the  Fourth  Amendment)    
……..  the  problem  is,    one  does  not  get  to  the  Fourth  without  the  First,  as  noted  by  the  
Iacobucci  Court,  again,  so  simple  as  other  courts  concur:  From  Iacobucci  (cited  in  Glik,  infra).  
In  the  next  decade,  the  SJC  narrowed  this  definition  of  disorderly  conduct  to  
encompass  only  activities  not  implicating  the  “lawful  exercise  of  a  First  Amendment  
right.”  ….  
and  
Boulter's  repeated  demands  that  Iacobucci  cease  recording  do  not  change  the  
disorderly  conduct  calculus.  A  police  officer  is  not  a  law  unto  himself;  he  cannot  give  
an  order  that  has  no  colorable  legal  basis  and  then  arrest  a  person  who  defies  it.  So  
it  is  here:  because  Iacobucci's  activities  were  peaceful,  not  performed  in  derogation  
of  any  law,  and  done  in  the  exercise  of  his  First  Amendment  rights  (emphasis  
added  lest  the  Court  and  Defendants  miss  it  again)  Boulter  lacked  the  
authority  to  stop  them.  Id  at  678.    

 

5  

(emphasis  added  to  protect  against  the  sort  of  intellectual  disingenuity  that  has  
plagued  this  case,  as  noted  in  the  following  video  on  Plaintiff’s  YouTube  channel,  
which  is  approaching  2,500  subscribers  and  2M  views.  
 
 

And  quite  frankly,  for  the  coup  de  gras,  the  Third  Circuit  Federal  Judges  who  outrank  

Judge  Young  understand  it  as  well  so  Judge  Young  should  recognize  that  the  Third  Circuit  
recetly  cited  Iacobucci  and  Glik  just  this  year  –  prior  to  Plaintiff  filing  suit.    This  Court  
ignored  Glik  when  Plaintiff  raised  it.    The  fact  of  the  matter  is,  if  a  citizen  in  the  Third  Circuit  
is  entitled  to  politely  criticize  a  police  officer  during  the  prosecution  of  his  or  her  duties,  
then  Plaintiff  had  dang  well  better  be  permitted  to  ask  a  couple  of  polite  questions  at  the  
County  Recorder’s  Office.  See  Montgomery  v.  Killingsworth,  2015  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  
7152  (January  22,  2015).  
In  Iacobucci  v.  Boulter,  the  First  Circuit  concluded  that  the  plaintiff,  Iacobucci,  had  
a  First  Amendment  right  to  film  local  government  officials  who  were  conducting  
public  business  in  a  public  building.  193  F.3d  14,  25  (1st  Cir.  1999).  Iacobucci  was  
arrested  after  he  refused  to  stop  filming  several  town  commissioners  while  they  
were  discussing  the  possible  approval  of  an  applicant's  building  permit.  Id.  at  18.    
Charged  with  disorderly  conduct  and  disrupting  a  public  assembly,  Iacobucci  spent  
four  hours  in  custody,  though  the  charges  were  later  dismissed.  Id.  Iacobucci  
initiated  a  §  1983  suit  in  which  he  claimed  false  arrest  and  excessive  force.  Id.  After  
losing  in  the  trial  court,  the  arresting  officer  appealed,  contending  he  was  entitled  to  
qualified  immunity  on  those  claims.  Id.  at  21-­‐22.  Rejecting  that  argument,  the  First  
Circuit  held  that  Iacobucci's  "right  to  act  as  he  did  without  being  arrested  for  
disorderly  conduct"  was  clearly  established  at  the  time  of  his  arrest.  Id.  at  24.  In  so  
holding,  the  First  Circuit  found  that  "Iacobucci's  activities  were  peaceful,  not  
performed  in  derogation  of  any  law,  and  done  in  the  exercise  of  his  First  
Amendment  rights."  Id.  at  25.  
 
Peaceful  criticism  of  a  police  officer  performing  his  duties  in  a  public  place  is  a  
protected  activity  under  the  First  Amendment.  As  the  Court  established  in  City  of  
Houston,  Texas  v.  Hill,  "the  First  Amendment  protects  a  significant  amount  of  verbal  
criticism  and  challenge  directed  at  police  officers."  482  U.S.  451,  461,  107  S.  Ct.  
2502,  96  L.  Ed.  2d  398  (1987).  This  type  of  speech  is  necessary  to  protect  and  
preserve  because  "[t]he  freedom  of  individuals  verbally  to  oppose  or  challenge  
police  action  without  thereby  risking  arrest  is  one  of  the  principal  characteristics  by  
which  we  distinguish  a  free  nation  from  a  police  state."  Id.  at  462-­‐63.  
 

 

6  

Accord  Gaymon  v.  Borough  of  Collingdale,  2015  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  93014  (July  17,  2015).  
 
 In  contrast,  qualified  immunity  was  rejected  for  the  remaining  First  
Amendment  claim  because  "peaceful  criticism  of  a  police  officer  that  neither  
obstructs  an  investigation  nor  jeopardizes  a  police  officer's  safety  has  strong  social  
value,  serving  as  a  valuable  check  on  state  power,  and  is  therefore  protected  under  
the  First  Amendment."  Killingsworth,  2015  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  7152,  2015  WL  
289934,  at  *8  (citing  Gentile  v.  State  Bar  of  Nev.,  501  U.S.  1030,  1034,  111  S.  Ct.  
2720,  115  L.  Ed.  2d  888  (1991)  ("There  is  no  question  that  speech  critical  of  the  
exercise  of  the  State's  power  lies  at  the  very  center  of  the  First  Amendment.").7  
 
There  is  yet  more  2015  Iacobucci  Analysis,  this  time  from  New  York.  See  Higginbotham  v.  City  
of  New  York,  2015  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  62227  (May  12  2015)  
The  Court  concludes,  however,  that  the  right  to  record  police  activity  in  public,  at  
least  in  the  case  of  a  journalist  who  is  otherwise  unconnected  to  the  events  
recorded,  was  in  fact  "clearly  established"  at  the  time  of  the  events  alleged  in  the  
complaint.  When  neither  the  Supreme  Court  nor  the  Second  Circuit  has  decided  an  
issue,  a  court  "may  nonetheless  treat  the  law  as  clearly  established  if  decisions  from  
.  .  .  other  circuits  [*23]    'clearly  foreshadow  a  particular  ruling  on  the  
issue.'"  Terebesi  v.  Torreso,  764  F.3d  217,  231  (2d  Cir.  2014)  (quoting  Scott  v.  
Fischer,  616  F.3d  100,  105  (2d  Cir.  2010));  see  also  Ashcroft  v.  al-­‐Kidd,  131  S.  Ct.  
2074,  2084,  179  L.  Ed.  2d  1149  (2011)  (requiring,  in  the  absence  of  controlling  
authority,  "a  robust  'consensus  of  cases  of  persuasive  authority'"  (quoting  Wilson  v.  
Layne,  526  U.S.  603,  617,  119  S.  Ct.  1692,  143  L.  Ed.  2d  818  (1999))).  
 
By  November  2011,  the  First,  Ninth  and  Eleventh  Circuits  had  all  concluded  that  the  
right  exists.  So  had  a  number  of  district  courts.  See  Pomykacz  v.  Borough  of  West  
Wildwood,  438  F.  Supp.  2d  504,  512-­‐13  (D.N.J.  2006)  (denying  summary  judgment  
in  a  First  Amendment  retaliation  claim  involving  a  plaintiff  who  was  arrested  for  
repeatedly  photographing  a  police  officer);Robinson  v.  Fetterman,  378  F.  Supp.  2d  
534,  541  (E.D.  Pa.  2005)  (holding  that  the  plaintiff's  "recording  the  activities  of  
Pennsylvania  state  troopers  as  they  went  about  their  duties  on  a  public  highway"  
was  protected  by  the  First  Amendment);Alliance  to  End  Repression  v.  City  of  
Chicago,  No.  74  C  3268,  2000  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  6342,  2000  WL  562480,  at  *21  (N.D.  Ill.  
May  8,  2000)  (holding  that  "taking  photographs  of  the  police"  was  
"First  Amendment  conduct");  Connell  v.  Town  of  Hudson,  733  F.  Supp.  465,  471  
(D.N.H.  1990)  (holding  that  the  police's  interest  in  securing  an  accident  scene  did  
not  outweigh  the  plaintiff's  right  to  photograph  the  scene,  and  rejecting  the  
defendants'  qualified  immunity  argument);  Channel  10,  Inc.  v.  Gunnarson,  337  F.  
Supp.  634,  638  (D.  Minn.  1972)  (recognizing  the  right  of  a  newsman  to  film  a  crime  
scene  from  any  location  to  which  the  general  public  had  access,  unless  he  
unreasonably  interfered  with  or  endangered  the  police).    
 

 

7  

The  Court  is  unaware  of  any  decision  holding  that  the  recording  of  police  activity  by  
a  journalist  otherwise  [*24]    unconnected  to  the  events  recorded  is  categorically  not  
protected  (rather  than  holding  merely  that  the  right  to  record  was  not  "clearly  
established").  At  the  time  of  Higginbotham's  arrest,  there  was  thus  a  "robust  
consensus  of  persuasive  authority"  in  favor  of  the  right  that  "clearly  foreshadowed"  
an  analogous  ruling  by  the  Second  Circuit  or  the  Supreme  Court.  See  Crawford  v.  
Geiger,  996  F.  Supp.  2d  603,  615-­‐17  (N.D.  Ohio  2014)  (holding  that  the  right  to  
openly  film  police  officers  was  clearly  established  by  2012,  despite  the  absence  of  
Sixth  Circuit  authority).  
In sum, the point is that while a Judge could argue that Pomykacz shot pictures through a window,
while Plaintiff was in the building, an unbiased Judge could never just truncate Discovery and rule that
there is clearly no possible way that Plaintiff’s Constitutional claims had any merit. That is why Judge
Young put specific little items into the Record involving items that were not in the Record to start with, see
Section II, infra.

That  is  not  just  a  simple  case  of  a  Court  making  an  incorrect  decision  on  which  a  
litigant  cries  sour  grapes:    No.  Anyone  with  any  Constitutional  integrity  knows  that  the  Fourth  
Amendment  is  not  implicated  in  a  case  involving  a  journalist  unless  she  or  he  has  First  
Amendment  Rights,  ab  initio.  
***********  
II.  

Judge  Young’s  Unlawful  Bias:      He  Assumed  Facts  Not  in  the  Record  and  
Intentionally  Downplayed  Plaintiff’s  Professional  Acumen  to  Shade  the  Case  in  
the  Light  Most  Favorable  to  Defendants  in  Violation  of  Several  Judicial  Canons.  

 
As  dictated  by  several  cases  set  forth  below  –  some  of  which  were  ignored  or  
misrepresented  in  the  dismissal  of  Plaintiff’s  Original  Complaint  (i.e.  Pomykacz,  Iacobucci  
and  Glik)  -­‐-­‐  there  is  simply  no  plausible  way  that  this  case  can  be  decided  on  the  Pleadings.      
First  of  all  it  is  pretty  obvious  as  noted  on  prior  occasion  that  Judge  Young  ignored  
all  of  Plaintiff’s  professional  accomplishments  and  even  the  description  as  set  forth  on  the  
Pleadings  to  malign  Plaintiff  as  a  “guerrilla  journalist.”  But  that’s  not  in  the  Record.  What  is  
in  the  Record,  is  this:  
THE  PARTIES  
 
2.  Plaintiff  is  a  former  daily  news  reporter  and  escrow  attorney  who  has  
closed  several  dozen  commercial  real  estate  purchases  and  refinances.  He  has  
successfully  tried  several  First  Amendment  Jury  Trials  and  has  operated  
several  politically  and  legally-­charged  online  journals  over  the  past  decade,  
most  notably  Chris  King’s  First  Amendment  Page  and  Mortgage  Movies  
Journal.    
 

 

8  

That  is  what  Plaintiff  holds  himself  out  to  be  as  noted  in  the  Complaint  and  that’s  all  
the  Court  claimed  to  be  reviewing,  so  the  pejorative  “guerrilla”  nomenclature  is  reflective  of  
the  short  shrift  that  this  Plaintiff  ultimately  received  from  the  Court.  Further,  Plaintiff  did  
provide  the  Court  with  excerpts  and  materials  from  his  website  and  such  description  
comports  with  the  information  on  his  website  -­‐-­‐  which  was  not  once  mentioned  by  the  
Court.    The  Mortgage  Movies  Journal  description  has  read  this  way  for  several  years  now:  
 

Mortgage Movies Journal
Christopher King has worked in residential and corporate
real estate in various capacities for the past fifteen
years, clearing title, filing zoning applications and
reviewing wireless tower contracts. He and his
associates are now teaming to provide video coverage
of America's imploding Mortgage market. All images
video and text subject to copyright.
 
Mortgage  Movies  Journal    
 
Christopher  King  has  worked  in  residential  and  corporate  real  estate  in  various  
capacities  for  the  past  fifteen  years,  clearing  title,  filing  zoning  applications  and  
reviewing  wireless  tower  contracts.  He  and  his  associates  are  now  teaming  to  provide  
video  coverage  of  America's  imploding  Mortgage  market.  All  images  video  and  text  
subject  to  copyright.  
 
So  in  the  first  instance,  Plaintiff  is  not  a  guerrilla;  he  is  a  professional  journalist  as  
well  as  a  mortgage  industry  professional  who  has  made  hundreds  of  thousands  (if  not  
millions)  of  dollars  for  the  banking/mortgage  industry.  Higginbotham  v.  City  of  New  
York,  2015  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  62227  (May  12  2015)  explains  why  Judge  Young  did  what  he  did  
by    
i.

Whitewashing  the  professional  acumen.  

ii.

Putting  Plaintiff  in  an  interior  office  near  employee  cubicles  when  he  was  
nowhere  near  either  such  place.  

 

9  

From  Higginbotham  (in  addition  to  prior  citation  noting  the  proper  analysis  of  Pomykacz):  
Certainly,  the  right  to  record  police  activity  in  a  public  space  is  not  without  limits,  
and  some  uncertainty  may  exist  on  its  outer  bounds.  For  instance,  it  may  not  apply  
in  particularly  dangerous  situations,  if  the  recording  interferes  with  the  police  
activity,  if  it  [*26]    is  surreptitious,  if  it  is  done  by  the  subject  of  the  police  activity,  or  
if  the  police  activity  is  part  of  an  undercover  investigation.  As  alleged,  however,    
Higginbotham's  conduct  falls  comfortably  within  the  zone  protected  by  
the  First  Amendment.    
 
The  complaint  alleges  that  he  was  a  professional  journalist  present  to  record  a  
public  demonstration  for  broadcast  and  not  a  participant  in  the  events  leading  up  to  
the  arrest  he  was  filming.  There  is  nothing  in  the  complaint  suggesting  that  his  
filming  interfered  with  the  arrest.  Accordingly,  and  in  light  of  the  case  law  consensus  
described  above,  a  reasonable  police  officer  would  have  been  on  notice  that  
retaliating  against  a  non-­‐participant,  professional  journalist  for  filming  an  arrest  
under  the  circumstances  alleged  would  violate  the  First  Amendment.  
 
......This  is  why  Judge  Young  had  to  fashion  Plaintiff  as  a  "guerrilla  journalist"  and  completely  
ignore  the  professional  acumen  specifically  stated  in  the  complaint.    And  that  is  unlawful,  
hegemonic  and  potentially  racist  bias.  
 
***********  
But  going  into  the  substance,  there  is  more.  Much  more.    As  dictated  by  several  cases  
set  forth  below  –  some  of  which  were  ignored  or  misrepresented  in  the  dismissal  of  
Plaintiff’s  Original  Complaint  (i.e.  Pomykacz,  Iacobucci  and  Glik)  -­‐-­‐  there  is  simply  no  
plausible  way  that  this  case  can  be  decided  on  the  Pleadings.    This  time  around  if  the  Court  
and  Defendants  actually  respond  to  what  Plaintiff  wrote,  we  may  be  able  to  create  a  record  
that  is  actually  usable  by  a  reviewing  Court.  Let  us  commence  then,  in  light  of  the  below  
drawing  evincing  the  fact  that  Plaintiff’s  attempted  conduct  in  no  ways  threatened  
employee  privacy  or  the  function  of  the  office:  
That  is  because  the  only  items  downstairs  in  the  public  area  is  a  public  foyer,  a  
guard  desk,  a  service  desk  at  which  Defendant  Malone  stood  alone,  and  a  public  hallway  
leading  to  the  back  room  where  several  public  kiosks  are  situated.    
As  such,  if  the  Court  is  at  all  interested  in  Truth  and  Justice,  it  would  stop  hiding  
behind  facts  not  alluded  to  in  the  Pleadings.  To  wit:  Plaintiff  was  not  seeking  access  to  
“Interior  offices”  or  to  “film  employees  of  the  Recorder  of  Deeds  in  their  cubicles.”    SEE  
Plaintiff’s  drawing  on  page  12.  

 

10  

The  Review  of  Plaintiff’s  initial  and  Amended  Complaint  will  reveal  that  Plaintiff  
never  sought  nor  implied  such  access.  (29  June  Opinion  pp.  14-­‐15,  Fn  42).    The  Court  
assumed  facts  not  in  the  Record  in  order  to  help  Defendants  squash  this  case,  and  
Plaintiff  is  most  certainly  entitled  to  point  that  out  to  this  Court  and  to  the  Reviewing  
Courts.  
At  this  point  then  it  is  incumbent  of  Defendants  to  use  photographs,  video  or  
blueprints  to  disprove  Plaintiff  on  this  point.    That  is  how  the  burdens  of  persuasion  and  
proof  work,  the  last  time  Plaintiff  checked  when  he  was  busy  winning  First  Amendment  
trials  and  changing  First  Amendment  Law  and  receiving  Mayoral  Commendations  in  
Senator  Kelly  Ayotte’s  home  state  of  New  Hampshire,  where  he  routinely  photographs  
Ayotte’s  Office,  which  is  not  a  “public  body”  or  “public  meeting”  either.  See  Plaintiff  in  the  
U.S.  Senate  building  below.  And  see  Appendices  B  and  C  and  a  picture  of  Plaintiff  in  the  
office  of  the  elected  official,  just  like  Betty  Lou  McKenna  except  with  a  lot  more  power,  
prestige,  pomp  and  circumstance!1  

 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl4tS0W7RcQ  

 

                                                                                                               
1  For  the  Record,  Plaintiff  reminds  Defendants  and  the  Court  as  to  how  Defendants  raised  Kelly  
Ayotte  in  Defense  until  he  published  these  video  captures.  Yep.  The  World’s  biggest  backpedal.    
 

11  

 
While  playing  lip  service  to  deciding  the  case  on  the  Pleadings  let’s  review  what  the  
Court  actually  did:  
First  he  put  the  Plaintiff  physically  in  an  “interior  office”  near  employees  “cubicles”  
in  order  to  make  it  appear  that  Plaintiff’s  case  and  arguments  are  unreasonable.  
That  is  because  –  in  reality  -­‐-­‐  the  only  items  downstairs  in  the  public  area  is  a  public  
foyer,  a  guard  desk,  a  service  desk  at  which  Defendant  Malone  stood  alone,  and  a  public  
hallway  leading  to  the  back  room  where  several  public  kiosks  are  situated.  As  such,  if  the  
Court  is  at  all  interested  in  Truth  and  Justice,  it  would  stop  hiding  behind  facts  not  alluded  
to  in  the  Pleadings.  To  wit:  Plaintiff  was  not  seeking  access  to  “Interior  offices”  or  to  “film  
employees  of  the  Recorder  of  Deeds  in  their  cubicles.”    SEE  Plaintiff’s  drawing,  supra.  The  
Review  of  Plaintiff’s  initial  and  Amended  Complaint  will  reveal  that  Plaintiff  never  sought  
nor  implied  such  access.  (29  June  Opinion  pp.  14-­‐15,  Fn  42).      
 
 

 

12  

 
 
 

 

III.  

Judge  Young’s  Latest  Maneuver  of  Blocking  Filings  Results  in  Part  from  
Plaintiff’s  Constitutionally-­Protected  Online  Activity.  

 
Plaintiff  has  been  quite  vocal  in  pointing  out  facts  relating  to  Judge  Young’s    
handling  of  this  case.  A  reasonable  person  could  conclude  that  Judge  Young’s  latest  attack  is  
because  of  videos  such  as  this  one:    
 
Former  Trial  Attorney  Rips  Judge  Robert  B.  Young  
in  Delaware  Free  Press  First  Amendment  case.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Emq8pn6O34w  
 

 
 
Even  if  Judge  Young  claims  that  this  particular  decision  was  not  of  his  making,  there  
is  enough  before  us  to  clearly  demonstrate  that  he  has  not  maintained  any  air  of  neutrality  
in  this  case,  and  as  such,  he  must  recuse  himself.

 

13  

IV.  

Summary  and  Conclusion.  
The  Delaware  Supreme  Court  has  established  the  following  two-­‐part  test  for  

determining  whether  a  judge  should  recuse  himself  or  herself  where  a  party  has  alleged  
personal  bias  or  prejudice  under  Del.  Judges'  Code  Jud.  Conduct  Canon  2.11(A)(1):  First,  the  
judge  must,  as  a  matter  of  subjective  belief,  be  satisfied  that  she  or  he  can  proceed  to  hear  
the  cause  free  of  bias  or  prejudice  concerning  the  party.  Second,  even  if  the  judge  believes  
that  she  or  he  has  no  bias,  situations  may  arise  where,  actual  bias  aside,  there  is  the  
appearance  of  bias  sufficient  to  cast  doubt  as  to  the  judge's  impartiality.  BAC  Home  Loans  
Servicing  v.  Brooks,  2012  Del.  Super.  LEXIS  51  (Newcastle  Superior  2012).  
 

In  this  case  it  is  not  merely  the  remarks,  it  is  the  willful  ignorance  of  the  law,  the  

falsification  of  the  Record  and  assuming  facts  not  in  the  Record,  while  erasing  facts  that  
should  have  been  in  the  record,  even  going  down  to  Plaintiff’s  identification  of  himself  vis  a  
vis  what  the  Court  said  about  a  black  journalist,  i.e.  “guerrilla.”  An  extremely  poor  choice  of  
words  from  a  racist,  hegemonic  judge,  and  conduct  clearly  evincing  unlawful  bias  when  
viewed  by  any  objective  person.    The  Truth  hurs,  but  we  have  to  call  a  spade,  a  spade.  
There  is  a  whole  New  World  beyond  Delaware,  whether  Judge  Young  and  the  
Defendants  appreciate  it  or  not.  And  it  is  Plaintiff’s  Job  to  expose  it,  which  he  will  be  doing  
with  alacrity  in  the  coming  days,  months  and  years.  And  in  Sum,  Thomas  Paine  is  still  rolling  
in  his  grave,  abated  ever  so  slightly  with  the  promise  that  Plaintiff  will  stir  some  Common  
Sense  into  the  Delaware  Way.  
 

 

 

 

14  

Respectfully  Submitted,  
 
_____________________________________________  
CHRISTOPHER  KING,  J.D.  
kingcast955@icloud.com  
mortgagemovies007@gmail.com  
http://affordablevideodepo.com  
http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com  
617.543.8085m  
206.299.9333f  

 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE  
 
I,  the  undersigned,  swear  that  a  true  and  accurate  Courtesy  copy  of  this  document  
was  sent  via  email  and  via  Tracked  U.S.  Mail  to:  
 
Joseph  Scott  Shannon,  Esq.  
Art  C.  Arnilla,  Esq.  
1220  North  Market  Street  
5th  Floor  
P.O.  Box  8888  
Wilmington,  DE  19899-­‐8888  
 
and  to:  
 
John  A.  Elzufon,  Esq.  
Peter  McGivney,  Esq.  
300  Delaware  Avenue,  
Suite  1700  
P.O.  Box  1630    
Wilmington,  DE  19899  
 
This  18th  Day  of  August,  2015  
 
________________________________  
CHRISTOPHER  KING,  J.D.  
 

 

15  

APPENDIX  A  
 

 

 

16  

 
 

 

17  

APPENDIX  B

 

 

18  

 
 
 
A  
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

19  

 

 

20  

APPENDIX  C  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl4tS0W7RcQ  

 

 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLS0N_hH-­‐cc  
Here  one  of  her  constituents  said  that  Ayotte  “Is  pleasant  and  sweet  and  full  of  shit.”

 

 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXlHu2002Vc

 

 

21  

APPENDIX  D  
 

 

 

22