Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manufacturing Sector
Kapil Deb Subedi
Head- Department of Management
Saptagandaki Multiple Campus
1.1General Background
An efficient selection of investment projects is essential for sustained economic
growth of any country. In market economy, the decision process about investment can be
characterized as bottom to top process. In other words, investment is carried out by individual
firm and the firm itself decides whether to invest or not. The variation of firm investment
behavior in a perfect capital market is fully explained by the market opportunity and expected
profitability of the proposed project. Therefore, adjusting capital expenditure in response to
changes in expected future demand represents rational economic behavior at the firm level
that reduces inefficient investment outlays and lead to optimal investment at the aggregate
level.
In case of perfect capital market, the firm's financial structure is irrelevant since the market
value of the firm depends only on the expected profit stream from the investment project and
not on the financial structure. Firms are thus indifferent between the various (internal or
external) means to finance their investment. Investment project will be carried out if their
expected return exceeds the (given) cost of capital which is thought to be the same for all
firms. In this neo-classical view of financial markets internal and external funds are perfect
substitutes and investment can never be constrained by a lack of internal finance.
However, it is widely accepted that there does not exist perfect capital markets in real world.
Therefore, the other factors affecting corporate investment patterns has been identified as the
existence of capital market imperfections that restrict access to or increases the cost of funds
necessary to maintain, otherwise desirable investment level. As a result, capital expenditure
reduction will be accelerated during tough times and opposite results hold during period of
strong economic growth. Therefore, the corporate investment changes due to the existence of
financial constraint has been the subject of much attention by researchers and policy makers
for the study of investment pattern and behavior at corporate level capital market
imperfections lead to firms into different financing hierarchies facing different financing
constraints. When firms face financing constraints, investment spending will vary with the
availability of internal funds, rather than just with the availability of positive Net Present
Value (NPV) projects.
Existence of incomplete asymmetric information between the borrowers and lenders
of external funds leads to problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. These problems of
asymmetric information lead to a difference between the cost of internal and external funds.
The providers of external finance will require a (firm specific) premium because they are
unable to monitor or screen all the aspects of investment projects. The size of external finance
premium depends on firm characteristics, like firm size or net worth which provide an
imperfect indication for the lender of the creditworthiness of the borrowing firms.1 Due to
external finance premium, firms will albeit to a different degree; prefer to finance their
investment by internal funds. The upshot is that internal or external finance are no longer
perfect substitute
Considerable empirical evidence Myers and Majluf (1984) indicates that internal
funds play an important role in financing investment projects under asymmetric information.
What matters to the present purpose is that these problems of asymmetric information lead to
a difference between the cost of internal and external and external funds. As a consequence
investment by firms facing high information cost is not only determined by expected profits
but also potentially by the availability of internal funds. Investments by those firms expected
to face higher information cost are thought to be more constrained by the availability of
internal finance and vice versa. Therefore, the present study derives a theoretical investment-
liquidity constraint model to test the hypothesis that the investment decisions of more
financially constrained firm will be more sensitive to their internal funds as compared to the
less financially constrained firms. The basic idea to this notion underlies various empirical
studies on the severity of liquidity constraints for investment (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan
& Zingales, 1997).
1. It is off course also possible that information problems lead to quantity rationing of external
funds for firms, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
This study is directed to resolve the following issues in the context of Nepal
• Whether the internal funds are the dominant source of financing for all enterprises or
there are any significant differences on financing decisions of the firms under
different liquidity constraints?
• Whether the firm investment is sensitive to the investment opportunities of Nepalese
enterprises?
• Whether the managers choose to rely primarily upon internal cash flow for investment
despite the availability of additional low cost external funds or they ignore the cost of
internal or external funds?
• Whether the investment decisions of the smaller firms (according to assets size group)
are more sensitive to their liquidity than the investment decision of larger firms?
• Are there any differences in investment coefficient of Nepalese enterprises across
different groups of firms formed according to their financial status?
The hypothesis is that these variables will enable us to predict if firms will increase or
decrease dividend payments in the subsequent period. Coefficient values are estimated that
best distinguish each independent variable between the two groups according to the Zfs value.
where, i denotes the ith firm, Iit is investment in plant and equipment during period t, k is the
beginning of period book value for net property, plant and equipment, CF represents current
period cash flow to the firm as measured by net income plus depreciation; ∆ SAL/K denotes
the change in sales scaled by fixed assets and proxies for investment opportunities of the
firms and uit is the error term. The liquidity variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the
investment opportunity. A positive and significant coefficient of the liquidity variable, b2
(CF/K), is thought to indicate that liquidity constraints matter to the extent that investment is
sensitive to fluctuations in internal finance (in case of perfect capital markets, our bench mark
the liquidity co-efficient would be insignificantly different from zero). This is the basic
equation estimated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) among other, with
market to book ratio used in place of marginal Q as a proxy for growth opportunities, and
current period cashflow (CF) scaled by K, used to measure the availability of internally
generated funds. But in this study, the first difference of sales scaled by fixed assets as a
proxy for the investment opportunities of the firm has been used. This proxy is also used in
other studies on transition and developing economies (see e.g.; Lensink and Sterken, 1998)
where tradition of share market trading is not regular and only limited number companies are
listed. Similar to previous evidence, the reported regression results are estimated using fixed
effects to control for firm and time specific influences.
The equation mentioned above is estimated for different categories (for example;
predicted group 1, predicted group 2, FC, PFC, NFC group.. The basic test is to see whether
the liquidity coefficient is significantly higher/lower for the given more or less financially
constrained group of firms.
Presentation and Analysis of Secondary Data:
4.1 Introduction:
. This paper forms different portfolios of Nepalese enterprises under different
financial status groups as characterized by assets size, discriminant score etc. and it
estimates the investment liquidity constraint model for different portfolios using least square
regression estimate.
4.2. Firms Classification Methodology and Classification Result:
In present paper, firms are classified into groups according to a beginning of period
financial status index (Zfs), with classification model updated every period to reflect the fact
that financial status changes continuously. The index is determined using multiple
discriminant analysis, which considers an entire profile of characteristics shared by a
particular firm and transforms them into a univariate statistic. The multiple discriminant
analysis requires establishing two or more mutually exclusive groups according to some
explicit group classification. It is difficult to categorize explicitly which firms are financially
constrained without considering to a number of firm characteristics simultaneously. However,
it is possible to establish two mutually exclusive groups by making use of the past knowledge
that firms paid dividend or not. This basis suggests us dividing the sample into two
categories; group 1 firms which increase or do not change dividend per share in period t and
are likely not financially constrained; and group 2 firms which cut dividend or do not pay
dividends in period t and are likely financially constrained.
Discriminant analysis uses a number of variables that are likely to influence
characterization of a firm in one of the two mutually exclusive groups of interest. The present
study applies the following variables that are taken as proxy for firm liquidity, leverage,
profitability and growth. The independent variables chosen for the Discriminant analysis are
current ratio, debt ratio, interest coverage ratio, net profit margin and sales growth as selected
by the of study of Sean Cleary (1999). The hypothesis is that these variables will enable us to
predict, if firms will increase or decrease dividends payments in the subsequent period.
Coefficient values are estimated that best distinguish each independent variable between the
two groups according to the equation-1 presented in section three. More importantly, firms
are classified very reasonably according to their financial status as measured by traditional
financial ratio.
Table 4.2.1 reports summary statistics of mean and median and various financial variables for
the sample period which confirm that firms likely to reducing dividends or no dividends
(Predicted group 2 or financially constrained group) exhibit lower current ratios, higher debt
ratios, lower net profit margin and lower sales growth, than the firms that are likely to
increase or no change in dividend in period t (Predicted group 1or not financially constrained
group). Univariate significance level indicates that the net profit margin and debt ratio are
significant at 1 percent level of significance where as current ratio; sales growth and interest
coverage ratio are significant at five, seventeen, and thirty three percent levels of significance
respectively.
[Insert table-4.2.1 here]
Table 4.2.2 presents the correlations among the financial variables, as well as those used in
the subsequent regression analysis. The largest positive correlation between discriminant
score (Zfs) and the independent variable are 0.843 with net profit margin and 0.473 with
current ratio. These both coefficients are significant at 5% level of significance. These
observations suggest that firms tend to increase or make constant the dividend payout during
periods of increasing profits and liquidity. At the same time, the largest negative correlation
between discriminant scores (Zfs) and debt ratio is 0.71 and the coefficient is significant at
five percent level of significance. This result suggests that the firms tend to decrease or pay
no dividends at the period when they have higher debt ratio. The correlation coefficient
between fixed assets purchase and discriminant score (Zfs) is the lowest one (i.e.0.029) among
all these variables. This observation suggests that the firms are likely to be indifferent with
dividend payout and fixed assets purchase decision.
[Insert Table –4.2.2 here]
For classification purpose, 64 firms-year observations were taken into account for the
discriminant analysis using the independent variables as mentioned above. The discriminant
function classified the 33 observation as predicted group one (likely to increase or no change
in dividend) and 31 firms-year observation were classified as predicted group two (likely to
decrease or no dividends) firms. While in the original grouped cases, the 29 firms year
observations were classified into first group (increase or no change in dividend payout) and
35 firms-year observations were classified into second group (decrease or no dividend
payout) of firms. The table 4.2.3 presents the classification result. Overall, the independent
variables do a good job of successfully predicting the firms in group one if they will increase
or do not change in dividend payout in period t and predicting the firms in group two which
cut or do not pay their dividends in period t. In aggregate, the firms are being properly
classified at 66 percent of the time. The discriminant function result suggests that firms are
classified very reasonably according to their financial status as measured by traditional
financial ratios for the purpose of this study
[Insert table-4.2.3 here]
In addition to the predicted group classification, firms are also classified into three separate
groups according to their discriminant score (Zfs) value. The firms with discriminant scores in
the top third over the entire period are categorized as not financially constrained (NFC), the
next third as partially financially constrained (PFC), and the bottom third as financially
constrained (FC).
[Insert Table-4.2.4 here]
Summary statistics for these groups presented in table 4.2.4 indicate the classification
strategy has successfully captured the desired cross-sectional properties. The financial ratios
are superior for the NFC groups, inferior for the FC groups and for the PFC groups lying
somewhere between these two groups of firms.
Firms are also classified into groups according to another additional criteria designed
to measure financial constraint by reference to their susceptibility to market imperfection, as
articulated by Fazzari et al. (2000). This criterion classifies firms according to size, similar to
the approach of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), based on the notion that smaller firms will
be more financially constrained because they face higher informational asymmetry problems
and agency costs. In particular, firms are classified into three groups each year based on the
size of their reported total assets, with smallest third being classified as TA Group one, the
largest as TA Group three, and the middle groups as TA Group two.
The Table 4.2.5 reports the mean and median of various financial ratios according to different
group in firm size .The reported financial variables mean and median values indicates that the
smaller the firms have the healthier financial ratios. The financial ratios are superior for the
smaller firms, inferior for the larger firms and for the middle assets size firms lying
somewhere between these two groups of firms . (Insert Table –4.2.5 here)
Table – 4.2.1
Sample Summary Statistics:
The followings are the reports of financial variable means for the sample of firms-year
observations of Nepalese non-financial sectors of enterprises. All financial variables are for
the beginning of period of the fiscal year except for cash flow, investment and change in
sales(dsales) which represents firm cash flow , capital expenditure and difference in sales
during period t. k is the firm's beginning of period net fixed assets value. The discriminant
score (zfs) is calculated using discriminant analysis according to equation 1. A full-
description of the variables is included in the Appendix.
Sales Interest
Debt NP growt ∆sales/ coverag
Group Statistic ratio ratio h C/R CF/K FA/K k e
NFC
Group Mean .0402 .1736 .1612 2.100 .5871 .1874 .7363 11.63
n=33
.0000 .1039 .2052 1.788 .4663 .0637 .2269 10.94
Median
FC
Group .3999 -.0178 .0216 1.476 .2278 .1524 .0277 5.334
Mean
n=31
Median .4817 .0061 .0346 1.130 .0928 .0534 .0423 1.140
Total
Mean .2144 .0809 .0936 1.798 .4131 .1704 .3931 8.584
n=64 Median .0488 .0723 .0809 1.616 .2962 .0548 .0773 5.541
Table – 4.2.2
Correlation among Variables
The followings are the reports of financial variable means and their correlation for the
sample of firms-year observations of Nepalese non-financial sectors of enterprises. All
financial variables are for the beginning of period of the fiscal year except for cash flow,
investment and change in sales(dsales) which represents firm cash flow , capital expenditure
and difference in sales during period t. k is the firm's beginning of period net fixed assets
value A full-description of the variables is included in the Appendix.
Debt NP
C/r ratio ratio Int. cov CF/K FA/K ∆sales/k Sal.grt Dis. Scr
C/r 1
Debt ratio -.188 1
NP ratio .270* -.503** 1
Int.tcov.
.016 -.661** .416** 1
CF/k .031 -.560** .390** .623** 1
FA/K .092 -.001 .056 .156 .413** 1
∆sale/k .075 -.051 .062 .047 .379** .259* 1
Sal.grt -.095 -.026 .281* .068 .296* .136 .612** 1
Dis. Scr .473** -.719** .843** .259* .419** .029 .209 .362** 1
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table-4.2.4
Firm's financial status group-wise sample summary statistics
The followings are the reports of financial variable statistics for the sample of firms-year
observations of Nepalese non-financial sectors of enterprises. The FC, PFC and NFC groups
are formed by sorting all firms according to their discriminant scores. Every year, the firms
with the lowest discriminant scores (the bottom one-third) are categorized as financially
constrained (FC); the next one third are categorized as partially financially constrained
(PFC); and the top one-third are categorized as not financially constrained (NFC).
firms Interest Sales
Debt Covera ∆Sales/ Growt
ratio NP ratio CR ge CF/K FA/K k h
NFC Median .0000 .1056 1.8043 10.94 .4663 .0340 .7121 .2459
N=21 Mean .0318 .2145 2.2323 10.64 .6044 .1386 1.1187 .2246
PFC Median .0120 .0923 1.7100 20.00 .4435 .1081 .0081 .0075
N=22 Mean
.0647 .1010 1.7374 13.92 .5975 .2190 -.0607 .0233
FC Median .5501 -.0201 .9600 .79 .0111 .0319 .0519 .0490
N=21 Mean .5317 -.0660 1.4413 1.51 .0544 .1545 .1335 .0356
Table-4.2.5
Firm’s assets size wise financial summary statistics
The followings are the reports of financial variable statistics for the sample of firms-year
observations of Nepalese non-financial sectors of enterprises. All financial variables are for
the beginning of period of the fiscal year except for cash flow, investment and change in
sales(dsales) which represents firm cash flow , capital expenditure and difference in sales
during period t. k is the firm's beginning of period net fixed assets value A full-description of
the variables is included in the Appendix. Firms are sorted into size groups according to
total assets. TA Group 1 includes the smallest third of firms according to total assets every
year, while TA Group 3 includes the largest third and TA Group 2 the middle third.
firms Debt NP Interest Sales
ratio ratio CR Cov. CF/K FA/K Sales/k Growth
TAGrp Median .5222 .0101 1.400 .9714 .167 .04 .1241 .1121
Three Mean
n=21 .3873 .0516 2.087 3.725 .239 .119 .4894 .1187
TAGrp Median .0595 .0820 1.5700 8.130 .286 .113 .0216 .0080
Two Mean
.n=22 .1783 .0468 1.6184 10.69 .343 .209 .0757 .0218
TA.Grp Median .0104 .0929 1.6310 7.417 .510 .063 .1087 .1272
One
n=21 Mean
.1194 .1155 1.6317 10.47 .682 .178 .6237 .1419
Table – 4.4.2
Regression Result for Sample Split based on Discriminant Score:
Reported coefficients are the within fixed firm and year estimates over the sample period (t-
statistics are in parenthesis). Investment in fixed assets divided by the net fixed assets is the
dependent variable the first difference in sales divided by net fixed assets and the cash
flow/net fixed assets are the independent variable. The FC, PFC and NFC groups are formed
by sorting all firms according to their discriminant scores. Every year, the firms with the
lowest discriminant scores (the bottom one-third) are categorized as financially constrained
(FC); the next one third are categorized as partially financially constrained (PFC); and the
top one-third are categorized as not financially constrained (NFC).
Investment-Liquidity Constrained Model Estimated for FC, PFC, NFC Group
FC Group PFC Group NFC Group
Constant 0.138 -0.029 -0.103
T-statistic (1.566) (-0.204) (-1.482)
Probability (0.13) (0.84) (0.15)
SAL/K, First dif. Sales to -0.025 0.091 -0.025
Fixed Assets
T-statistic (-0.431) (1.043) (-0.763)
Probability (0.67) (0.30) (0.45)
CF/K, Cash flow to Fixed 1.404 0.392 0.446
Assets
T-statistic (3.574) (1.926) (3.882)
Probability (0.00) (0.06) 0.00
Adjusted R² 0.443 0.114 0.445
F-statistic 8.55 2.41 9.004
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.00 0.11 0.00
Number of Observation 21 22 21
Table 4.4.3
Regression result for effect of firm leverage on investment-liquidity constraint model
estimated for FC, PFC and NFC group
Reported coefficients are the within fixed firm and year estimates over the sample period (t-
statistics are in parenthesis). Investment in fixed assets divided by the net fixed assets is the
dependent variable the first difference in sales divided by net fixed assets and the cash
flow/net fixed assets and long term debt/total assets are the independent variable. The FC,
PFC and NFC groups are formed by sorting all firms according to their discriminant scores.
Every year, the firms with the lowest discriminant scores (the bottom one-third) are
categorized as financially constrained (FC); the next one third are categorized as partially
financially constrained (PFC); and the top one-third are categorized as not financially
constrained (NFC).
Effect of firm leverage on investment-liquidity constraint model estimated for FC, PFC
and NFC group
Group SAL/K CF/K LTD/FA R² n
FC -0.022 (-.376) 0.1.388 -0.116 0.410 21
(3.359) (0.229)
PFC 0.046 (.496) 0.501 (2.29) 1.112 (1.26) 0.25 22
NFC -0.021 (-.586) 0.440 (3.68) -0.218(0.34) 0.504 21
Table –4.4.4
Regression Estimate for Size group:
Reported coefficients are the within fixed firm and year estimates over the sample period (t-
statistics are in parenthesis). Investment in fixed assets divided by the net fixed assets is the
dependent variable the first difference in sales divided by net fixed assets and the cash
flow/net fixed assets are the independent variable. Firms are sorted into size groups
according to total assets. TA Group 1 includes the smallest third of firms according to total
assets every year, while TA Group 3 includes the largest third and TA Group 2 the middle
third.
Group CF/K SAL/K R² n
TA Group 1 0.656(3.205) 0.008 (0.332) 0.412 22
TA Group 2 0.526 (2.56) 0.025 (0.192) 0.299 21
TA Group 3 0.166 (0.651) 0.054 (0.247) 0.111 21
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Appendix A
WINSORIZE
A number of observations are "winsorized" (if the value of the variable exceeded
cutoff values) according to the following rules:
(i) assign a value of 50 percent (-50 percent) if growth in sales is greater (less) than 50
Percent (-50 percent)
(ii) assign a value of 2 (-2) if investment/fixed assets is greater (less) than 2 (-2).
(iii) assign a value of 20 if interest coverage ratio is greater than 20.
Appendix B
Description of Financial Ratio Calculation
Current assets
1. Current ratio =
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
2. Debt ratio =
Total assets
Cont…
SN Company Year ∆ SALES/K CASHFLOW/K FA/K
32 BNTL 2002 -0.58638 0.57103 0.20172
33 BNTL 2003 0.03123 0.44122 0.35252
34 BNTL 2004 -0.22474 0.32049 0.02055
35 SSM 2000 0.08899 0.01175 0.14120
36 SSM 2001 0.22610 0.05719 0.02404
37 STC 1999 2.60516 0.24217 0.11431
38 STC 2000 -6.22410 -0.30561 0.05490
39 STC 2001 3.87149 0.38101 0.06830
40 STC 2002 3.10332 0.90697 9.45582
41 STC 2003 1.31454 0.15491 0.03336
42 STC 2004 3.14295 0.22230 0.01923
43 BBCL 1998 0.06505 0.37304 -0.02297
44 BBCL 1999 0.02817 0.42210 0.24868
45 BBCL 2000 0.13765 0.45384 0.03404
46 BBCL 2001 0.07498 0.55478 0.01894
47 SHL 1998 0.05499 0.27469 0.15381
48 SHL 1999 0.00806 0.27077 0.11947
49 SHL 2000 -0.05781 0.24597 0.10811
50 NIL 1998 0.75874 0.41087 1.32183
51 NIL 1999 0.05339 0.01208 -0.08513
52 NIL 2000 -0.22304 -0.07817 -0.16701
53 NIL 2001 -0.53356 -0.80322 -0.19723
54 BPC 2001 -0.21390 0.20190 0.03003
55 BPC 2002 0.06728 0.21681 0.01097
56 BPC 2003 -0.19408 -0.00373 0.05342
57 BPC 2004 0.24469 0.39086 -0.37987
58 NBCL 1995 0.71208 1.33496 0.56934
59 NBCL 1996 1.62891 0.62242 0.13392
60 NBCL 1997 0.07966 0.52145 0.02696
61 NBCL 1998 -1.32487 0.56998 0.02393
62 NBCL 1999 4.96630 1.56445 0.13142
63 NBCL 2000 -2.19756 1.35596 0.07311
64 NBCL 2001 -0.17989 1.12362 0.27860