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CASE DIGEST

06/25/2015

2. People v. Regalario
Facts: Regalario and 6 others were found guilty of murder of Menardo Garcia.
RTC Judgment conviction was promulgated on January 17 and a copy of which
was received by the appellants counsel the next day, January 18.
January 31, appellants filed MR but the court denied on Feb 22.
RTC March 14, appellants filed notice of appeal but the trial court denied for
having been filed out of time.
Neither the State nor private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal
made by the appellants nor objected to the order of the trial court to forward the
records to the SC for appellate review
August 2, 1991, said court directed that the records of this case and the
transcripts of the proceedings had therein be forwarded to this Court
ISSUE:
1. On the matter of filing within the reglamentary period:
Whether the lower court erred in denying notice of appeal on the ground of being
filed out of time.
Appelants claim: computation of 15 days within which to file notice of appeal
should have been counted from Feb 23 (day after MR was denied) and not from
Jan 31 (day the verdict pre-MR was given)
o In Shourt, the appellants claim that the 15 day reglamentary period
should have restarted on the day of the denial of the MR.
2. On the matter concerning the syllabus topic, Estoppel by laches to bar attacks on
jurisdiction
(Counsel for the state questions authority of the Supreme Court to review the
case)
Ruling of the lower court:
(Issue of procedure is being questioned for the first time in the SC)
Ruling of the SC
(TRIAL COURT DENIAL OF NOTICEO APPEAL AFFIRMED):
1. The notice of appeal was filed beyond the reglamentary period set by law

Sec 6 of Rule 122 states thatappeal must be taken 15 days from promulgation
or notice of judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his attorney
o The rule states period shall only be interrupted thus appellants only had 1
day which to file notice of appeal with the trial court
2. Estoppel by laches to bar attacks jurisdiction of the court had already attached Neither
the public or private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal or objected to the
order of the trial court to forward records to the SC for appellate review. It was only after
appellants had already filed their briefs with the SC that the counsels for the state raised the
issue of belated appellate jurisdiction of the SC in the case.
RULING:
Accused-appellants Regalario, Pabillar and De Chavez are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority under paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, in the proper period. As reduced by one degree, the maximum imposable
penalty for these three appellants shall be within the range of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants Alex Regalario y Villagracia, Carlos Pabillar y Villon and Rolando de
Chavez y Montalbo are hereby each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The death indemnity to be paid by all the accused-appellants to the heirs of Menardo Garcia is increased
to P50,000.00. As thus MODIFIED, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

2.1 Cosco Philippines vs Kemper Insurance


This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the order of the RTC, which granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by
petitioner, Cosco Phil., and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Facts:
In 1998, respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef
(owned by Genosi, Inc.)
Upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by Genosi,
Inc. by reason of spoilage
a settlement of the claim in the amount of $64,492.58, which Genosi, Inc. (the
consignee-insured) accepted.
respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc. (the insured) in the amount of
$64,492.58
Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and refused
to pay the said amount.
October 28, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages
against petitioner before the trial court
November 29, 1999, petitioner insisted, among others, that respondent had no
capacity to sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required
license; that the complaint has prescribed and/or is barred by laches; that no
timely claim was filed

November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the same
was filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and
sign the corresponding certification against forum shopping. It argued that Atty.
Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping was a clear violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court
RTC -March 22, 2002, granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the
case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be
executed by the petitioner himself, and not by counsel.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an Order
July 9, 2002.
appeal by respondent, the CA, in its Decision dated March 23, 2007, reversed and
set aside the trial court's order.
o The CA ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory and that the same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal
party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the
physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity
by specifically authorized individuals. However, the CA pointed out that the
factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal application of the
rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was later denied by the CA in the
Resolution September 3, 2007
Hence, the petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE:
1. The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to
sign the certification against forum shopping on its behalf and
2. w/o petitioner is esptopped by laches from raising the defect in respondents certificate of
non-forum shopping.

HELD:
1. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be
signed by the principal parties.If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition,
the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. With respect to a corporation,
the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document.
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere
amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice. Same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on
behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized
to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat,
through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping
on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the
complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for
Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner.

The Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation
of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent
compliance with the requirement of the law.
2. Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the
defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, we held that if a complaint is filed for and in
behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An
unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and
sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered
not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice;
that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of
the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be
bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. [if !
supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8,
Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is
not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Regalado v. Go,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] the Court held that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack
of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case.
In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction
must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question
of jurisdiction.
The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present
case so as to make it fall under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Here, the trial court's
jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings,
and it cannot be said that considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to attach.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated March 23, 2007 and September 3, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75895 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated
March 22, 2002 and July 9, 2002, respectively, in Civil Case No. 99-95561, are
REINSTATED.

3. People v. Magallanes
Facts:

Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder (of Gargar and
Lumangyao) were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against 14 persons, 5 whom
are members of the PNP.
Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment
Prosecution rested its case and started to receive the evidence for the accused
Private prosecutor, 24 June 1994, moved for the transmittal of the records of
the case to the SB on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994
in RP vs Asuncion, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases because the
offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers.
RTC issued an order denying the motion
The prosecution, represented by the OSG, prayed for a TRO challenging the
refusal of the respondent Judge Magallanes to transfer the cases to the SB
15 August 1994, the trial court, thru respondent Judge, ruled that the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the
informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers
o People vs. Montilla, it held that the allegation in the informations that the
accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of
the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating
circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent
element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense
intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer
of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case
should continue
On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying the motion
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of the
respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan
Issue:
w/n RTC of Bacolod City has jurisdiction over the case instead of the SB- YES
Ruling :
At the time the information in the said cases were filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of the SB was Sec 4 of PD NO. 1606
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and
not by the result of evidence after trial
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is not
enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the
offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office
For lack of an allegation in the informations that the offense were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected
with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within
the jurisdiction of the RTC and not of the SB
o Montilla vs. Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as committed in
relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such

The allegation of taking advantage of his position or taking advantage


of their respective positions incorporated in the informations is not
sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of offenses
committed in relation to public office.
still the Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject cases in view
of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, introduced by
R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on 30 March 1995, whose Section 2
provides:
The SB partly lost its exclusive jurisidiction in cases involving violations of RA NO.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corruption), it retains only cases where the accused are
those enumerated subsection a, Section 4 (RA 7975) and officials classified as
Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (RA 6758)
Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases
allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP officers in relation
to their office, it would appear indubitable that the cases would fall within the
jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further
amended by R.A. No. 7975
o However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. 36 Under the above
assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the
Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the
governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by
R.A. No. 7975?
jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative
enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with
the court until the case is finally terminated. 37 Hence, the
Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be
divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of
R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the
litigation
Also upon express provision of Sec. 7 of RA 7975, all criminal cases in which trial
has not yet begun in the SB shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence cases
which were previously cognizable by the SB under PD No. 1606, as amended, but
are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment
introduced by RA NO 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing
thereon has not yet been commenced in the SB.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2
thereof.
RULING :WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged orders are AFFIRMED, and the
motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED, and the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City is directed to immediately resume the hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to
thereafter resolve them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch

3.1
Adaza vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 154886
FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
the spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristela Adaza.
Two Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan: falsification of voucher by
counterfeiting the signature of PTA President Mejoranda and falsification of DBP
check by counterfeiting the signature of Mejoranda, relating to the construction of
a school bldg consisting of 2 classrooms.
Sandiganbayan found Mayor Adaza guilty in the first case, counterfeiting the
signature of PTA President Mejoranda, but acquitted him and his wife in the
second case.

ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction if there was no allegation showing
that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to
the duties of his office as mayor?
RULING: No. For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4;
and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
It is undisputed that at the time the alleged crime was committed, he was the
municipal mayor of Jose Dalman, a position corresponding to salary grade 27 under the
Local Government Code of 1991,[44] which fact was properly alleged in the information. It is
thus imperative to determine whether the offense, as charged, may be considered as having
been committed in relation to office as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted
provision of R.A. 8249. For, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and
the discharge of official duties be alleged in the information.[45]
In Montilla v. Hilario,[46] this Court held that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and
not accidental, such that the offense cannot exist without the office.
People v. Montejo,[47] by way of exception, enunciated the principle that although
public office is not an element of the offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, the accused is
held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
It bears noting that in Montejo,[58] where this Court held that the allegations in the
information for murder were sufficient to bring the case squarely within the meaning of an
offense committed in relation to the accuseds public office, the phrase committed in relation
to public office does not even appear in the information, which only underscores the fact
that said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus

The offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a public officer,
employee or notary public who does not take advantage of his official position.[62] Under
Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be
committed by a public officer, employee or notary who takes advantage of his official
position.
Although petitioner was described in the information as a public officer there was
no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was
intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made
use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. For the
purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the evidence
presented by the prosecution during the trial.
However, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against
him before the proper court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 19, 2002 and Resolution dated
July 3, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

7. People v. Cawaling (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over informations for murder committed by public officers, including a town
mayor
FACTS:
, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, 10 an Information for murder 11 against
the appellants and Andres Fontamillas.
o Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the
assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito Dimaano,
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988; 12 while
Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a plea
of not guilty on March 16, 1988. 13

After due trial, 14 the court a quo 15 rendered its Decision dated October 21,
1994, 16 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES
FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under the
Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law.

This Court's Ruling


We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve the following
issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2) double jeopardy
ISSUE: Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed
jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular
courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public
officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation
to their office.
HELD:
We do not agree.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it
may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new
legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal.
The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case
at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the
statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter. 33
In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861,
quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan
may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000). 34 Sanchez
vs. Demetriou 35 clarified that murder or homicide may be committed both by
public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive
element of said crime, viz.:
Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it
is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to
have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their
offices."
Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation
that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their
office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 36 "[I]n
the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not
involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 37
In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the
office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their
functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. 38

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of earning
capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs against appellant.

8. Subido v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., Commissioner of BID and Rene Parina, a BID
special agent, while in the performance of their official functions, issued and implemented a
warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimukm knowing fully well that the BID decision
requiring Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him undue injury.
Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by
Art 124 of RPC. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed, Subido was no
longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 27
Issue: w/o Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
Yes. The SB had jurisdiction over the case by virtue of SECTION 2 of RA 7975,
which amended SECTION 4 of PD No 1606
Sec 2: Sec 4 of PD NO 1606 is hereby further amended to read as follows:
o Sec 4: Jurisdiction- the SB shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of RA no 3019, where or one more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether
in permanent, actiong or interim capacity, AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE:
Officials of the executive branch grade 27
All other national and local officials classified as grade 27
o b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
o c. civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with the executive
oder nos 1,2,14 and 14-A
In case where non of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to the salary grade 27 or higher, PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper RTC
Finally, the petitioners' invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of
penal laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws
or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation; 28 or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. 29 R.A. No. 7975, in further
amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, mode of
appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, RA 7975 applies since what is considered is
the time of the commission of the crime, during which Subido was still Commissioner of
BID. Similarly, although Parina was holding a position with a classification lower than salary
grade 27, it still applies to him since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the
principal accused. Jurisdiction is only vested in other courts if none of the principal accused
where occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27.

All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there
being no impairment of contractual or vested rights. 33
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned resolution and orders of the
respondent Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

9. Cuyco vs. Sadinganbayan


Facts: Graft Investigation Officer Ma. Lourder M. Yap found probable cause for the
indictment of Ramon G. Cuyco, Genoroso Germino and Melcy Wee for violation of Sec 3(a)
RA 3019, and Cuyco with Rolando R. Madarang for violation Section 3 (e) of the same act.

She recommended the filing of two informations against Cuyco.


The Ombudsman approved the recommendation, and prosecution filed with the
(1)Sandiganbayan two informations against Cuyco for both offenses.
Cuyco (2) filed a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction
over the cases. On June 20, 1997, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the cases under Republic Act No. 7975, which was subsequently
amended by Republic Act No. 8249, approved on February 5, 1997
The SB (3) issued resolutions denying the motion to quash and ordering
the preventive suspension of Cuyco and his co-accused for ninety (90) days.
Cuyco (4)filed a motion for reconsideration to set aside the resolution in
question and to dismiss the criminal cases for want of jurisdiction.
(5) THIS WAS DENIED.

ISSUE: is whether or not at the time of the filing of the informations on November 2,
1995 the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the cases against petitioner for violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
HELD: NO. The SB did not have jurisdiction.
RATIO:
The SB has jurisdiction over offenses and felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where
the position accused holds a position with salary grade 27 or higher.
At the time of the commission of the offense, in 1992, he was occupying the position
of Director II, salary grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the RTC.
The SB has no jurisdiction over violations of Sec 3 a and e as amended, unless
committed by public officials and employees with salary grade 27 or higher, in relation to
their office.

the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, issued on August 5, 1998, September 21, 1998, and December 16, 1998, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 23016 and 23017, and makes the temporary restraining order permanent.

10. Binay v. Sadinganbayan

In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said
cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate
informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code, 6 and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987
during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the
suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set aside the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan
dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit
petitioner to file said reply.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16,
1995.
June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the "proper
court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995,
were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases

The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or
thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus
since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and
the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade "27", it is a conclusion
beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.

On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007.
He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order
suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995
denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary
restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995,
resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining
the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen
days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general
circulation.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the
regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan
shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining
jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: 34
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction
over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior
to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The provision is
transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal
cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.

Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws
reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any
different.
The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent jurisdiction," and such
jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read
in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to "regular courts," but includes
as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have
not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or "regular courts"
instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27,"
or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1.
If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A.
No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2.
If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249,
then said law applies.
(a)

If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.

(b)
If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred
to the regular courts.
(c)
If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses
jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d)
jurisdiction.

If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains

Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.

Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that "criminal cases


involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts." The principal issue in this case is whether the term "regular
courts" includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it does not
while the respondent Judge and the intervenor-respondent hold otherwise.
Facts:
On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio,
PNP officer, was dispatched to respond to a complaint that a person
was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where
he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.
On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City an Information 2 charging Dionisio with
the crime of homicide
On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress, the
respondent Judge issued, motu proprio, an order 3 requiring the
prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court
should still proceed with the trial of the case:
o The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed
by public officials when penalty prescribed by law for the
offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c),
P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the petitioner carries
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of
death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate it.
Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. On September 4, 1992, the
Court issued an order requiring the prosecution and the defense to
comment on whether the Court has jurisdiction over the matter
RTC 4 September 1992, 4 the respondent Judge dismissed Criminal
Case No. Q-91-23224 "for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court,
has jurisdiction over the case.
As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to or
connected with or arising from the performance of official duty, it
must be investigated by the Ombudsman or any of its duly
deputized representative:

The clause "any (illegal) act or omission of any public official" is


broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official.
The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of
the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related
to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official
duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of


crimes, still can be classified as a regular court functioning within the
framework of the judicial department of the government.
It is a "trial court and bound by the rules governing trial courts. It is
one of the 'inferior courts' in Article X of the Constitution whose jurisdiction
may be questioned before the Supreme Court and whose judgments are
subject to its review, revision, affirmance or setting aside.

On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a


reconsideration
o citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice of 31 July 1991 6
that "crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan" because "[t]hey fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and "[t]he Sandiganbayan is not
a regular court but a special court."
The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7 October
o This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in
Sec. 46 of RA 6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine
National Police) includes the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses on felonies
committed by public officers in relation to their office,
whether simple or complex with other crimes where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional
On 6 January 1993, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
1. w/o SB is a regular court and is included in the term regular courts of
Sec 46. RA 6975
2. w/o the SB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD

1. In the first place, a comparison between the words regular and


special is inappropriate since the opposite of the latter is not the former and
vice versa. Special means "designed for a particular purpose; confined to a
particular purpose, object, person, or class," 39 and is, therefore, the
antonym of general. 40 On the other hand, regular means "steady or uniform
in course, practice, or occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. 41 In
other words, special and general are categories in the distributive order.
That the public officers or employees committed the crime in
relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the information
for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under
Section 4(a) (2). 48 This allegation is necessary because of the
unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of
the information.
Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that
offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the
public officers and employees in relation to their offices.
2.
It would appear to us that with respect to the issue of jurisdiction,
the parties only took into account the prescribed penalty, relying
upon Deloso vs. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider
important and relevant the issue of whether the offense charged
was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office.
But as stated earlier, Deloso vs. Domingo was modified by
Aguinaldo vs. Domagas

The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the


basis of Deloso vs. Domingo was erroneous. In the light of
Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and considering the absence of any
allegation in the information that the offense was committed by
private respondent in relation to his office, it would even appear
that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the case
However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged
therein was committed by the private respondent in relation to his
office, which fact, however, was not alleged in the information
probably because Deloso vs. Domingo did not require such an
allegation.

we shall direct the court a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in


this case to determine whether the crime charged in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-23224 was committed by the private respondent in
relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it
shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which
shall forthwith docket and proceed with the case as if the same
were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set
aside the challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and
render judgment thereon.
Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation 58 who is investigating an offense or felony committed by a
public officer or employee (including a member of the PNP) where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if the crime was
committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the
investigating officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman
which may either (a) take over the investigation of the case pursuant to
Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. 60 If the investigating
officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in
relation to his office, he shall then file the information with the proper court.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent
Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to
determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office, and
Facts:
On 5 April 1991, an information for Murder was filed against
petitioner Ferdinand Cunanan before Branch 46 of the Regional Trial
Court
o The Information alleged that petitioner was a member of the
Philippine National Police; it contained no averment that he
had committed the offense charged in relation to his public
office.
dated 4 November 1993, the parties having presented their
evidence, Judge Arceo required them to submit memoranda, after
which the case was deemed submitted for decision.

11 March 1994, the Supreme Court promulgated its En Banc


Decision in Republic v. Hon. Asuncion, et a1., 5 which laid down the
rule that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction
to take cognizance of offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or
more or a fine of P6,000.00.
Applying the Asuncion rule, RTC shall conduct a preliminary hearing
to determine the existence or absence of this material fact. If this
material fact is found to be present, the RTC shall order the transfer
of the case to the Sandiganbayan for docketing, and the latter shall
proceed to hear the case as if the same had been originally
instituted with it. If it be determined that that fact is absent, the
RTC seized with the case shall proceed with the trial and render
judgment on the case.
21 April 1994, Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the evidence
adduced during the trial, petitioner had committed the offense
charged while in the performance of his official functions. He then
held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try this case and that,
accordingly, any decision it may render thereon would be null and
void.
dated 23 May 1994, Judge Arceo modified his earlier order and
deleted the clause dismissing the case:
o WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, this case is hereby
ordered forwarded to the Sandiganbayan and the complete
records of the same transmitted therewith as if it was
originally filed with the said Court. (Republic vs. Asuncion,
G.R. 108208, March 11, 1994).
24 May 1994, upon motion by the prosecution, Judge Arceo
inhibited himself from further hearing the case.
14 July 1994, Judge Sunga denied, among other things, petitioner's
Opposition to the Order directing the transmittal of the records of
his (petitioner's) case to the Sandiganbayan
Hence petition for review
petitioner continues, the Asuncion ruling is inapplicable to the
present case, since here trial had already ended and the case was
already submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling was
promulgated. A transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this
late stage will, accordingly, expose him (petitioner) to double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense

petitioner believes Judge Arceo's Order dated 21 April 1994


dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
amounts to an acquittal of petitioner
ISSUE:
whether the public respondent RTC judges had correctly applied the
doctrine laid down in Asuncion to this case, considering that here the
absence of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC became apparent to the RTC
after completion of the trial and submission of the case for decision.
HELD:YES
It is firmly settled that jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter
that is conferred by law. 24 Whenever the above two (2) requisites are
present, jurisdiction over the offense is vested in the Sandiganbayan. This is
true even though the information originally filed before the RTC did not aver
that the accused public officer had committed the offense charged in relation
to his office. In other words, the absence in the old information filed before
the RTC of an allegation that petitioner Cunanan had committed the offense
charged in relation to his office, is immaterial insofar as determination of the
locus of jurisdiction is concerned. Indeed, it may be recalled that the
Asuncion ruling involved a situation where the information similarly did not
contain an averment that the accused public officer had committed the
offense charged while carrying out his official duties. 25 It was precisely to
address this situation that the Supreme Court in Asuncion fashioned the rule
directing the conduct of a preliminary or separate hearing by a trial court to
determine the presence or absence of that jurisdictional element.
In the instant case, public office is not, of course, an element of the
crime of murder, since murder may be committed by any person whether a
public officer or a private citizen. In the present case, however, the
circumstances quoted above found by the RTC bring petitioner Cunanan's
case squarely within the meaning of an "offense committed in relation to the
[accused's] public office" as elaborated in the Montejo case. It follows that
the offense with which petitioner Cunanan is charged falls within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and that the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga had no jurisdiction over that offense.
that the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch
46 of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner
had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, is immaterial and
easily remedied.
RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders of the public
respondent RTC Judges dated 23 May, 14 July and 18 August 1994 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Facts:

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang


Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case,
with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with
the Sandiganbayan
Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution6 on July 20, 2005
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its
filing before the proper court
Hence Petition,

Issue: whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a


member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod,

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the


pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in
relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows


that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
their office.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have
been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive
to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not
held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office.18
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be
REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

FACTS:
Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by
Pres. Estrada as student regent of UP to serve a one-year term from Jan.1,
2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation
of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial
assistance for the said project. The source of funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent and system-wide alliances of students conseguently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman. After
due investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana
and her brother, charging them of Estafa.

Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the


Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged nor over
her person in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends that Estafa
falls under Crimes Against Property and not on the chapter on Crimes
Committed by Public Officers, only over which, she argues, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it was not the
governement that was duped, but Pres. Estrada, because the money came
from the Office of the President and not from government funds. As to
jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she
is not a public officer since she merely represents her peers, in contrast to
the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and
over Serana
HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly,
estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as
amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.
It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation
of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right,
authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an individual is
interested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The


Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in
PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of
Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)
(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the
Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of
a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a
public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.

Facts:

ISSUE:
the main issue is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
HELD: YES
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is
now under sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed
in the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the corporations
involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos,
Romualdez and many others. The records likewise show that petitioner
Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal agent of the PCGG and that as Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the PJI he was acting for and in behalf of the
PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds,
moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees," 3 civil or
criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme
Court. 4

Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG.


There can be no doubt, therefore, that the subject matter of the action (the
PJI its properties and assets) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such
capacity before the ordinary courts. The tribunal for such purpose is the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of
the trial court dated January 14, 1988. The restraining order issued by this Court dated February 4, 1988 enjoining
petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of the PJI from holding the special stockholders meeting on February
5, 1988 or at any date thereafter, and to preserve and maintain the status quo, is hereby lifted. The order of the
trial court dated January 14, 1988 is hereby SET ASIDE and another order is hereby issued dismissing the
complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

Facts:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC), is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It was under sequestration by the PCGG
July 24, 1987, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan complaint
against Rodolfo M. Cuenca for the sequestration of PNCC for
acquiring in an illegal manner assets in the Cuenca-owned
corporations, to wit: Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction
Corporation (CDCP/PNCC),
Asia Hardwood Limited (AHL), a Hongkong-based company owned
by Rodolfo M. Cuenca, WUTIC, through its attorney-in-fact, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati, a complaint
against CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgment
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of WUTIC/AHL
CDCP/PNCC filed with the trial court an appeal from said decision to
the Court of Appeals
October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming
the decision of the trial court.
July 7, 1997, the Supreme Court denied CDCP/PNCCs motion for
reconsideration of the minute resolution.

PCGG claimed that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to


entertain the complaint to enforce a foreign judgment and the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution considering that the
case involved a sequestered corporation, and sequestered
stockholdings of Rodolfo M. Cuenca.

PCGG contended that the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive


jurisdiction, pursuant to E. O. No. 14 and 14-A, over cases involving
sequestered assets.

December 1, 1997, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition


for certiorari to annul the Regional Trial Courts decision in Civil Case
No. 91-3291, and the corresponding writ of execution and notices
of garnishment.

the Sandiganbayan motu proprio dismissed the petition. The


Sandiganbayan ruled that it had no jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The Sandiganbayan held that
the case before the trial court was for enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and not for recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Hence, it ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the action for annulment
of the decision of the trial court. The Sandiganbayan ruled that not every
claim against a sequestered asset or entity falls within its jurisdiction.
SB that the Regional Trial Court decision in Civil Case No. 91-3291 has
become final, and that, pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to annul the judgment, not the
Sandiganbayan.

Hence the petition

ISSUE:
W/O SB has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition without a motion to dismiss filed by any of the
parties. We rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court in a sequestration-related case.

It will be noted that three corporations involved in this petition,


PNCC/CDCP, AHL and CDCPI, Hongkong, are under sequestration and are
defendants in the sequestration case pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Considering the interconnections between the participating
corporations in the said transaction, and the existence of the sequestration
case, PCGG should have been informed of the above cases to question and
verify the veracity of the claim.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan that it has no jurisdiction over an
action to annul the Regional Trial Courts judgment in a sequestration-related
case. We have held that the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of illgotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or
related to such cases.
Republic Act 7975, an act amending P.D. 1606, provides that the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
or the so-called ill-gotten wealth cases. Since we have ruled that the civil
case before the Regional Trial Court is considered as arising from, incidental
to, or related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, then the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction to annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court in such case.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the resolution dated January 8,
1998 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Civil Case No. 180. Let the records be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which
contains the following in part:
o August 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by
military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator
Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the
DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction
over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to
his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31
which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of


the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDGPNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ
Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003
directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
Hence the petition

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31
(Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan
Bayan.
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order
no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and
under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and
employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed
with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the
government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised
Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been
held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus,
there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any
stage of the investigatio
FACTS:
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the
impugned resolution11 recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and
Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of
less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans exercise of
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78.

Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their


persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975.30 As the
positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned
therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.31
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS.

HELD:

Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,32


Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,33 and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,34 we already
held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel
claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,35
provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring
supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note
that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary
grade of 27.38 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary
grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case
No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue
in petitioners favor.