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Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid (Madrid, Spain

)

Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life.
The Development of Pragmatic
Normativity in Kant’s Lectures on
Anthropology *
As is well known, Kant held Anthropology lectures every winter semester from
1772 until 1796, namely for twenty-four years in all, covering the entire critical
phase of his career. This fidelity confirms Kant’s interest in laying down a new
basis for an ancient subject that deals with knowledge of the human being [Menschenkenntniß], i. e. anthropology or – as Kant asserts in one of the lectures –
Antropognosie1. One key feature of this knowledge is that human beings, in contrast with the stability of animal life, undergo an evolution that brings the species
closer to its moral destination by the efforts of generations of individuals:
Every bee is born, learns to make cells and prepares honey, and dies, and has come to the
highest degree of its vocation. But the bee has done that just as well from the beginning of
the world up to now; thus it does not alter itself at all.
With the human being it is entirely different. The ancient and first times were farther distant from their vocation than the following ones, and in recent times having achieved his
vocation seems to have been reserved for the human being.2

The text displays that the experience of time available for the human species cannot be compared with the activity of animals on the earth. But actually the sense
of existence itself is completely heterogeneous for each of them. As the Menschenkunde lecture ironically states, «if a horse could grasp the thought ‹I›, I
should dismount and consider it as my company»3. In contrast to animals, human
beings bring forth a pragmatic behavior. Therefore, they require prudence in
order to have success in society and not to ruin the most basic rules of human
coexistence. I share with others the view that we should approach these materials

* This paper is part of a research programme undertaken with the support of the research project Poetics of Selfhood: memory, imagination and narrativity (PTDC/MHC-FIL/4203/2012), granted by the FCT of the Government of Portugal, and also supported by the research projects Naturaleza humana y comunidad (III). ¿Actualidad del humanismo e inactualidad del hombre?
(FFI2013–46815-P) and Reto
´ricas del Clasicismo. Los puntos de vista (contextos, premisas, mentalidades) (FFI2013–41410-P), granted by the MINECO of the Government of Spain.
1 V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25.2: 1435.
2 V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25.2: 839.
3 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 859.

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Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . 19 f. I focus on the empirical traits of knowledge of the human being. We attend to nothing more than we attend to what can accrue to us in other people’s regard.: «Historically noteworthy. not nature but the human being is the object of our affects. that is. I shall first pose the following question: how far could the reader of these Kantian lectures assign an autonomous scope and a place outside the boundaries of Kant’s morals to anthropology? In this context. one which leads to an increasing consciousness of the meaning and limits of pragmatic normativity. 67: «Kant’s lecture notes are important documents. Cf. that nevertheless contribute to an enquiry on the character of the human species. 4 See Louden 2001. but rather ought to learn ‹how to philosophize›. Finally. one explanation for this noteworthy fact is Kant’s deep pedagogical conviction that his students should not ‹learn philosophy›. 41. the oral doctrine of Kant’s lectures stands in a special tension with his published works. Second. but they should be used conservatively as added support for claims made in his published works – not as stand-alone indications of his position». I claim that Kant’s Anthropology lectures display a certain evolution. which yields valuable help for guiding the actions of a man of the world [Weltmann]. I attempt to reconstruct the unity of scattered materials of a worldly prudence. Nature can offer us nothing but comfortableness and maintenance. As Allen Wood notes. since human existence should be thought as a permanent dialogue with others. See also Stark 1992. «the actions of others and the influence of society» must be regarded as part of the pragmatic self-making of the human being. Anthropology Friedländer especially highlights this sociable feature of knowledge of the human being: «Nothing interests us as much as another human being.164 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid of Kant’s philosophical legacy with caution. so that I chiefly aim at considering them as documents always subordinated to the main. Thus. is the fact that [Kant] never composed and published his own textbook for use in any of his courses. which goes far beyond the boundaries of phenomenal anthropological observation. 5 Wood 2003. 1 The Anthropology Lectures and the Empirical Side of Morals Kant holds that the proper study of human nature could never proceed physiologically or according to an experimental method. Presumably. the published works. with the publication of his ‹textbook› in 1798». however. It is only in the case of the Anthropology that Kant would later resolve this tension. Stark 2003. in terms of form. I deal with the relation of anthropological knowledge to Kant’s moral doctrine.5 This approach to the human being as a social product legitimates the assignment of the title of Weltkenntnis to the study of its worldly education.4 Taking this into account.

8 MS.1: 244. Admittedly. and moral philosophy cannot endure without anthropology.] People are always preaching about what ought to be done. . Some Kant scholars have drawn attention to the strong declaration regarding these two subjects contained in the following introductory passage of Collins Moral Philosophy lecture: The science of the rules concerning how a human being ought to behave is practical philosophy.. but this thesis is compatible with the fact that moral anthropology displays «the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in carrying out the laws of a metaphysics of morals»8. which are tautological repetitions of rules that everyone knows already. if the preacher does not simultaneously attend to humanity. To put it in a nutshell. the Anthropology lectures shed light on essential issues regarding the human capacity to fulfill what the moral law commands. a behavior which inevitably occurs in a social context and is influenced by psychological reasons. It is naturally possible to consider anthropology without the knowledge of the subject.1: 470. and only insofar as we cannot have these in common with other people. but this is only a speculative [anthropology] or an idea. 7 GMS.10 Moreover. . in principle. for one must first know of the agent. AA 06: 217. 9 V-Mo/Collins. emphasis added. and nobody thinks about whether it can be done. so that even the admonitions. AA 27. Thus. helping to grant access [Eingang] to moral laws and efficacy for fulfillment of them [Nachdruck zur Ausübung]7 as they are applied to human nature. and the pulpit orations on the subject are very empty. 10 See Louden 2011.Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life | 165 which can only be used among human beings. the human being is the purpose of the nature.] The human being thus interests us more than nature. these two sciences [morality and practical anthropology] are closely connected. AA 04: 389. for nature exists for the sake of the human. AA 25. [.»6 Beyond its social genealogy.9 Of course. [. but because other people are better off than we are. in that nothing is said beyond what is already known. are we unable to bear all miserable circumstances in regard to comfortableness and maintenance.. all aspects of pragmatic anthropology are potentially moral anthropology: all that is needed to turn Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . and the science of the rules concerning his actual behavior is anthropology. pragmatic observations and rules – what we call pragmatic normativity – could go through many different applications. 70: «Pragmatic anthropology becomes moral anthropology when we choose to make use of our knowledge of human nature for moral purposes. whether he is also in a position to accomplish what is required of him that he should do. but the most purposive use of them will refer to morals. We do not complain about nature itself in regard to our meager circumstances. strike us as very tedious. the same schedule of Kant’s lectures proves 6 V-Anth/Fried. Kant’s practical philosophy often emphasizes that morals do not require any anthropological feedback in order to see its imperative fulfilled. anthropology supplies awareness of the empirical features of human behavior relevant to moral law.

Robert Louden argues that without moral anthropology. but the «public matters» which require pragmatic skills could not prevail over the moral ends that only the doctrine of wisdom conveys. i. «a knowledge of the art of how one human being has influence on another and can lead him according to his purpose»12. there is something inconsistent in the idea that these sometimes fragmentary materials can shape an independent matter. as well as displaying a moral education program for the destination of human species. AA 25. One finds in the Menschenkunde lecture a broad definition of what practical knowledge is. Kant never hints at a similar assumption regarding the science of the human being.17 any aspect of pragmatic anthropology into moral anthropology is the decision to apply it to moral rather than nonmoral ends». 8. where.2: 1436. 2011. apart from the basic tenets of morals. Moreover. 32 and Gregor 1963. Cohen shares basically this point of view. AA 25. 14 See V-Anth/Busolt. That all pragmatic doctrines give us «the means to make a proper use of everything»15 unfailingly refers to the moral feature of the Klugheitslehre.11 Despite interpretations such as Foucault’s commentary on Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. how and why to apply them in daily life. the discretionary ends of culture and those corresponding to the worldly cognition characteristic of every civilized society are subordinated to the ends that reason deems appropriate for the moralization process. we are travelers without a map who know neither our destination nor our means of reaching it. 82: «If people’s chosen ends are moral ones. Weltkenntnis has to be considered as an indirectly moral Weltkenntnis. 17 Louden 2011. stamped by an evident cosmopolitan commitment.2: 855. 513: «The moral guidance of anthropology thus consists in recommending what helps the realization of duty (for Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM .14 Since anthropology delivers essential information about the subject’s hindrances and helps to fulfill the commands of the moral law. AA 25. AA 05: 173). AA 25.2: 856. see 2008. defended by scholars as Paton and Gregor16. 15 V-Anth/Fried.166 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid that from winter 1772/73 he regularly held a course on Ethics with a parallel course on Anthropology.1: 471. 12 V-Anth/Mensch. 16 Paton 1971. anthropological knowledge of human beings can also be of service». Against a narrower understanding of Kant’s practical secondary writings. Louden. then they can apply anthropology as a means towards this goal. Alix A. Both argue that anthropological concepts could not belong to practical philosophy insofar as they are empirical. so that they would not be «entirely [grounded] on the concept of freedom» (KU. But if their ends are nonmoral. 77. e. 13 V-Anth/Mensch. We do not know how to make moral principles and commitments efficacious. 11 See Stark 2003. Actually. pragmatic knowledge will be called so «insofar as it serves to fulfill our overall aims»13. and we lack judgment concerning when. 23 f.

Cohen. in order that they begin to hold moral laws in high regard and turn to their principles.18 Another Kant scholar who has written about the Anthropology lectures. Without knowledge of the human being the sovereign cannot lead such a instance. has also argued that Kant’s anthropology is an integral part of his philosophy (including his critical philosophy). for instance in the Moral Mrongovius II22. For being sympathetic and polite is not sufficient to be genuinely moral: but it certainly helps. one of the most articulated lectures of Kant’s Anthropology. 21. which at least allows us to regard anthropology as an important part of philosophia moralis applicata.19 For this purpose. Yet Kant holds that this subject is «of great utility» for its «influence on morality and religion»21. 20 GMS. so that the educator and preacher do not produce mere sobs and tears but are in a condition to produce true resolutions. knowledge of the human being can give us the opportunity for this. so that we do not chatter empty exhortations to people but know how to lead them. compares anthropology with a GPS device that shows the subject which path leads to her moral destination. AA 25. Stark. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . 19 Cohen 2008. she uses the analogy with the metaphor of the compass that Kant shaped in order to clarify how common human reason knows a priori what is good and what is evil without drawing this evidence from experience20. Independently of its supplementary outcomes. Knowledge of the human being is just as indispensable for politics. politeness and sympathy) and warning against what hinders it (for instance. The following passage from the Menschenkunde. The fact that anthropology shall always remain an unfinished and imperfect matter has misled some readings of this part of Kant’s philosophical legacy that tend to reduce it to a mere prudential appendix. 22 V-Mo/Mron II. Of course. I must know which avenues of human dispositions I can have in order to bring forth resolutions.» 18 Stark 2003. these helps and hindrances are by no means a guarantee of virtue. and [. AA 04: 404.] it is not to be reckoned as a mere appendage to the system.Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life | 167 One of the two editors of volume 25 of the Academy Edition. passions).. Alix A.2: 1437. since it facilitates performance of the duties which stem from moral laws. focuses decidedly on this link: All morals require knowledge of the human being. 513. AA 29: 599. empirical knowledge of the human being ought to help in the application of practical philosophy. W. . 21 V-Anth/Busolt. for in order to be able to rule human beings one must know human beings. which Kant distinguishes from metaphysica pura.

Pirillo 2008. AA 25. V-Anth/Fried.2: 858. but if he knows how to bring it to the customer quickly because he repairs it according to fashion. For a different approach to this question see Kain 2003. AA 05: 121. they will all oppose him and he cannot lead them according to his will.2: 469. AA 25.25 Since. also confirms this subordination of anthropology to morals. Put differently.168 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid multitude of social classes.1: 007. but as a knowledge of «the stage upon which we can apply all skill» which is constantly in progress28. V-Anth/Mensch. according to which the highest interest of reason is always practical24. in Kant’s eyes. Only when we are able to acquire influence on human beings do we also have an influence on things. KpV. AA 25. pragmatic knowledge will be very useful for civilizing the human being and for educating him as a Weltmann.23 The text points out that to know how to reach purposes in general facilitates the identification of the most convenient means for accomplishing our own moral destination. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . prudence. «[t]he sciences are principia for the improvement of morality»26. by virtue of which we are in a position to direct others according to our purpose. then he is prudent. Kant’s distinction between skillfulness [Geschicklichkeit] and prudence [Klugheit] is also connected with this point. a sketch of science as anthropology should not be excluded from this commitment. Cfr. The famous claim of Kant. The remark that anthropology should stop being considered as a part of metaphysics in order to emerge as a «coherent science» [zusammenhängende Wissenschaft29]30 does not first and foremost affirm its identity with the empirical psychology.1: 462. A skilled person in the manufacture of clocks – Kant’s example – does not need to bear in mind the foresights and strategies aimed at increasing his influence on others. V-Mo/Collins. 305 f.2: 855.27 Skillfulness concerns only things. AA 25. because human hands produce everything out of raw nature. AA 27. Yet prudence cannot be understood as an allembracing skillfulness. The watchmaker is skilled if he makes a perfect watch. Prudence is therefore based merely on the knowledge of the human being. so that it does not entail a real feedback before other human beings. to which the Critique of Pure Reason assigned the status of a refugee «until it [could] establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology (the pen- 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 V-Anth/Mensch. as the Menschenkunde lecture reports: Skillfulness is directed toward things. 251. V-Anth/Collins. toward human beings.

in part because it does not at all belong to metaphysics. they have grown and expanded greatly.1: 009. AA 25. e.36 The knowledge about how world rules prevent an excessive abstraction in the moral realm and facilitate the implementation of the moral law in a space shaped by human beliefs and expectations brings forth a pragmatic normativity. i. Pirillo 2008. It even deserves a special set of lectures. V-Anth/Parow. and without Anthropology morals would be scholastic. 31 32 33 34 35 36 KrV. since the first are «practical qualities» [praktische Eigenschaften34]35 that concern the phenomena of human intercourse. the idea that to put the knowledge of the human being under a systematical articulation would be superficial. At the same time. but it is of service for the moral knowledge of the human being.Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life | 169 dant to the empirical doctrine of nature)»31. On the contrary. it had only a very small range.2: 1211. since one must create the motives for morals from it. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . 308. Cfr. anthropology attempts to discover what is natural in the human being and what proceeds from culture and civilization. AA 25. providing to morals the empirical space of its application. V-Anth/Mron. Within the boundaries of this phenomenal enquiry. not at all applicable to the world. V-Anth/Parow. V-Anth/Collins. without regard to problems such as the mindbody union in human beings.32 The passage states clearly that those who believe that anthropology does not require any discipline. AA 25. and was not expounded especially. AA: B 876 f. Anthropology stands to morals as spatial geometry stands to geodesy. and not agreeable to the world. because its contents are so naturally learned and easy to grasp that the mere civil intercourse would yield all the expected materials. repeat a terrible mistake which morals traditionally committed. Certainly the matters which anthropology considers should not be confused with the «conceptus puri» (sic) that stem from reason33. this approach opens a new enquiry that the ancients praised only nominally: It is to be wondered why the ancients did not occupy themselves more with human cognition. This opinion. But there is nothing more usual than the fact that one believes himself to know what he is accustomed to deal with and holds it not to be worthy of this investigation. in part because it can be learned by everyone without requiring any prerequisite sciences.1: 243. has done uncommon harm to the sciences. It is precisely so with empirical psychology. which is implanted in us. it is to be remarked that because the sciences are expounded in academies in a certain order and separated from other sciences. studied by scientists such as Charles Bonnet. and deprived us of the cognition of many things. AA 25. as the Mrongovius lecture illustrates by a puzzling analogy: Anthropology is pragmatic.1: 243 f. even though they declared this endeavor to be the most useful one. / A 848. for as long as it was dependent on metaphysics.

AA 25. AA 10: 145.2: 1435. from beginning to end.1: 007. Kant declares his intention to renovate substantially the approach and goals of this empirical discipline: This winter for the second time I am offering a collegium privatum on anthropology. is a scholastic book. this is acknowledged as an unavoidable task. VvRM. Br. But my plan is quite different. which provides «the sources of all the sciences»38 and «procure[s] the pragmatic element for all other acquired sciences and skills»39. I seek then more phenomena and their laws rather than the first grounds of the possibility of modifying human nature in general.1: 470. Br. which orders the collected material and puts it under a certain unity. i. a subject that I now intend to turn into a proper academic discipline.170 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid 2 The Reflective Gathering of Scattered Material Kant rejects a scholastic approach to anthropology such as the one executed by Platner. hence the skill of everything that pertains to the practical. which shares with the physiology of external senses the feature of gathering. of the method of educating and governing human beings. V-Anth/Mensch. V-Anth/Collins. Herz anthropology appears as a Beobachtungslehre. The intention that I have is to disclose through it the sources of all the sciences that are concerned with ethics. with the skill of social intercourse.1: 854 f. AA 25. Several Anthropology lectures also focus on this question42. find the lectures always entertaining and never dry. disparate elements previously provided by the observation and the experience. AA 25.2: 853. Kant highlights that the display of the multiplicity and variety of human characters and uses – the map of an Anthropographie43 – requires a previous grounding of anthropology. according to subjective principles. Hence the subtle and in my eyes eternally futile investigation concerning how bodily organs stand in connection with thoughts is left out entirely. AA 25. V-Anth/Fried. AA 25. V-Anth/Busolt. Kant is completely aware that the chosen handbook for his Anthropology lectures. from which «one could not obtain any enlightenment of common life»37. Moreover. On the contrary.40 Weltkenntnis should be worked out as a Kenntnis des Menschen41. the fragmentary structure of anthropological remarks should not discourage the reader from reconstructing the unity of the entire corpus of this heterogeneous array of remarks. AA 02: 443. In one of Kant’s famous letters to M. so that 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 V-Anth/Mensch. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. AA 10: 145 f. I include so many observations of ordinary life that my listeners have constant occasion to compare their ordinary experience with my remarks and thus. e.

AA 07: 120.47 The ability to use every learned science conveniently is a specific expression of permanent human endeavor to obtain happiness. as the Pillau lecture states with glaring words: 1) A local knowledge of the world. To accomplish the last demand is a duty to all human beings. AA 25. since human existence cannot ever leave aside «the skill in the choice of one’s own greatest well-being [Wohlsein]»48.1: 472. for that is tied to time and place.49 Kant argues that only a general knowledge of the world could provide the pragmatic rules for guiding the subject in common life. and is not constant [. as the distinction between a general and a local anthropology proves: anthropology is not however a local but rather a general anthropology. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . Concerning prudence and its relation to practical rationality. AA: B 834 / A 806. Local knowledge of the world is tied to place and time. see KrV. But this cosmopolitan purpose derives from a moral emphasis that internally concerns this anthropological project.1: 471. Anth. GMS. is the purpose of anthropology. and which is not empirical but cosmological. which the man of the world has. AA 25. have not yet had the idea which we have here before us. Nevertheless.45 One paradoxical feature which goes across Kant’s Anthropology lectures is the contrast between the empirical contents and the cosmopolitan vocation of their observations and commentaries. All anthropologies that we still have at this time. AA 04: 416. Everything that bears no relation to the prudent conduct of human beings does not belong to anthropology. but this should not shield the fact that the utility of every science must be subordinated to the instruments and means which contribute to the fulfillment of the moral destination of the human being. but of human nature. for the local properties of human beings always change. which is also called empirical.2: 1214. 2) A general knowledge of the world. but the nature of humanity does not. to bring their phenomena under rules. which merchants [Kaufleute] have. 44 45 46 47 48 49 V-Anth/Mron. Several passages of the lectures uphold the subordination of anthropological observation to a general guiding conception of human nature. as the following passage of Friedländer lecture suggests: To observe human beings and their conduct. This might emphasize the impression of a patchwork. V-Anth/Fried. . V-Anth/Fried. AA 25. In it one comes to know not the state of human beings but rather the nature of humanity. the ability of prudence [Klugheit] is not less necessary than the magnificent horizon of wisdom.Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life | 171 «many other considerations will enter in»44.] Anthropology is not a description of human beings. Everything seems disposed to fulfill Kant’s idea of setting up «knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world»46. but it is not a physical or geographical knowledge. Anthropology is thus a pragmatic knowledge of what results from our nature. .

whereas general knowledge teaches the student to reflect about human nature through social intercourse51.172 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid and also gives no rules to a person to act in common life. nonmoral uses as well as to moral ones. 52 V-Anth/Pillau. civil intercourse gets the subject acquainted with basic human motivations. See Louden 2011. 50 V-Anth/Pillau. which. to consider with an attentive eye the human beings around us can take the place of frequent travels around the world. i. i. A businessman who uses his Weltkenntnis to expand his company’s market share is using it for pragmatic purposes. AA 25. so that it could train merchants. too tied to a concrete space and time. e. plays. no matter how plural their expressions may be. Secondly. knowledge yielded by experience. The reception of Thomasius’s distinction between Gelahrtheit. completely opposed to the scholastic point of view of the Wolffians. inasmuch as this «strong reflection» guides the observer to the anthropological sources of actions.2: 734.1: 471. was prudence as a guide for orientating human beings in ordinary public life. 51 V-Anth/Fried. The main content that Kant draws from this tradition. but people who use Weltkenntnis in order more effectively and intelligently to apply pure moral principles to the human situation are using it for moral purposes». novels. 73: «It can be put to pragmatic. compared to other scientific disciplines. then his knowledge of it also ceases. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . Third. for when the behavior in the place where he has been changes.50 The text casts light on the limitations of local knowledge of the world. To pay attention to the historical sources of Kant’s Anthropology could be to a large extent useful in order to go further in the understanding of the incompleteness of these courses. and Gelehrtheit. I shall argue that his Anthropology lectures display an approach to knowledge of the human being that reveals at least an indirect influence from the «experiential Enlightenment»53 cultivated by Christian Thomasius’s Court philosophy on the development of this pragmatic enquiry. history and biography provide a rich collection of remarks from which every reader can benefit. 53 I borrow this expression from Wilson 2001. First. Scholars interested in Kant’s Anthropology should not undervalue the fact that the tradition of Court Philosophy contributes significantly to this new academic discipline. AA 25. Kant mentions three main benefits that a general knowledge of the human being yields52.2: 734. AA 25. but not the man of the world [Weltmann]. however. I follow other Kant scholars – especially Stark and Louden – as I attempt to reassess anew what Baumgarten’s empirical psychology supplies to the basic framework for Kant’s Anthropology. 180. e. also lasts only for awhile. This kind of knowledge of the human being grasps only contingent and changing features of human behavior and situations. He who becomes acquainted with the world through travel has only this knowledge of it.

so that the knowledge that he conveys will be completely useless for the interests of human beings. a general knowledge of human nature and culture must be presupposed when conveying the scientific potential of anthropology.56 As formerly the magister pedaneus. as Kant will state later. Far from this cultural tradition. In conclusion. hence today the German word Pedant. Without this background every teacher loses her pedagogical capacity. 55 Anth. deprived of any social intercourse and apart from any interest in the world and its practical features. The Mrongovius Anthropology Lecture offers up an interesting anecdote. the pedant lives in his «study room». The Announcement of the academic 54 See Thomasius 1691. Cfr. which contains a catalogue of social virtues (the decorum). A pedant can only make a scholastic use of his knowledge because he does not know how to apply it any better and does not know any other use for it. 3 Conclusion Kant’s Anthropology lectures could be read as a decided tribute to the phenomenal existence of human beings. These people were supposedly not to be received outside their study rooms. AA 25. which yields up a surprising cooperative dimension in regard to their moral destination. they thus applied only their school knowledge when they were in social intercourse and therefore gave people the occasion to call a person who did know how to conduct himself with human beings a ‹pedant›. such a scholar who does not know how to contribute to the progress of the moral destination of human species comes up in the Anthropology lectures as a comical figure with an extreme worldly disability.Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life | 173 knowledge gained from scholarly concepts. which leads Kant to view the sciences as aids for the moralization process.54 by Kant’s opposition between the scholastic and the cosmopolitan concept of philosophy will be an eloquent example of this influence. for in Italy one called the domestic tutor magistri pedanei. Naturally. AA 07: 244.2: 1209. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . as one left off the magistro and changed pedanei into pedanto. Barnard 1971. akin to the rhythm and content of these courses: The word ‹pedant› originally comes from Latin. 56 V-Anth/Mron. but it is clear that Kant’s point of view about the use of these social abilities is nearer to Thomasius’s idea of man. The German scholar argues that with the support of this capacity all humans could learn how «to feel satisfaction [complacentia] in common with others (socially)»55. The Italian word pedanto came from this. one should not deny the fact that the third part of Baumgarten’s Ethics tackled the so-called officia erga alia.

› for here every human being can examine it. the observable actions. Stark 2003. leaving aside the mutable shapes that they can contingently adopt over the centuries. As Stark points out: The relationship between anthropology and moral philosophy is determined by the difference between is and ought: the same behavior can and will be considered from two perspectives. even for a woman. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . AA 25. literature and moral essays. what relates to human beings concerns me.2: 856. and his distinctive position within the creation»58. as Chremes in Terence says: ‹I am a human being. AA 25. See Munzel 1999.60 Yet to tackle empirical issues does not exclude the reconstruction of a certain purpose.1: 244.2: 857. 24. insofar as it establishes and grounds criteria for judgment. too. Despite the multiplicity of customs. because «[e]very human being is delighted over a rule»62.174 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid courses of 1765 declares that Kant’s lectures on anthropology begin with a historical and philosophical consideration of «what happens. «every trait of humanity» should be connected with its source. suggesting «a guiding thread where there is apparent disorder»63. V-Anth/Parow. so that the study of the empirical character becomes the core topic of the anthropology. The Menschenkunde lecture claims that anthropology discovers rules that will entertain even women at the dressing-table. while the intelligible character remains the subject of morals. before specifying what ought to happen»57. temperaments. AA 25. V-Anth/Mensch. these same actions. and the character of human beings that one presently finds «scattered» in sciences. should be systematically unified61. AA 02: 311. Moreover. Anthropology considers the actual behavior. V-Anth/Mensch. Ibid. As the Anthropology Parow lecture notes. all that is 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 NEV. Moral philosophy seeks to assess this behavior. A similar remark appears in the Mrongovius lecture [A] solid knowledge of the human being interests everyone and provides material for conversation.59 Kant’s portrayal of social behavior assumes the framework of three faculties according to Baumgarten’s empirical psychology. Kant argues that there is more regularity in this complex map of human nature than there seems to be. and practices in different nations and cultures. and all cultures contribute to the pragmatic normativity. decidedly useful for the moral development of the human species. which allows to better comprehend the world. the study of the human being deals with «the unchanging nature of human beings.

AA 25. The constitution of these higher powers makes up the character. a fourth element emerging from a consideration of the foregoing triad». Thus one also says nothing. [What matters is] how he makes use of them. AA 25. AA 25. thus does not belong here.67 Kant’s Anthropology lectures prove that pragmatic normativity is always subject to moral principles. a perspective which suggests taking a wider perspective regarding the materials gathered by the three preceding faculties. Yet it is equally true that the progress of anthropological knowledge prevents the mistakes resulting from abstraction and shows channels that make the application of moral commands easier. AA 25. although the point of view of anthropological analysis is empirical. It is a matter of fact that anthropological remarks will never see their incompleteness entirely removed. Such a correspondence should be rather regarded as impossible according to Kant’s conception of the human being.1: 244. Moreover. namely. etc. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . to sacrifice and to restrain sensations. 67 V-Anth/Collins.2: 1213. 66 Ibid. but there also lies a higher principle in him to make use of all the capacities and incentives. 64 V-Anth/Mron.1: 008 and V-Anth/Parow. AA 25. V-Anth/Collins. the evolution of the lectures leads to character. Kant states that the «subjective principles of all sciences»66 belong also to this anthropological scope. if one says the word ‹character› to refer to a human being’s capacities.2: 734 f. insofar as they are means through which teachers and preachers gain influence over the public. and what he wills to do. in each human being there lie the greatest incentives and preparations for every kind of activity. which precludes an exact correspondence between these two realms. but perhaps this is precisely the indisputable proof that the boundaries of life are always broader than those of morals.Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life | 175 abstract. inasmuch as this matter increases our self-knowledge and teaches us how to arrange our actions in order to enhance the sociability with others and to prevail over their intentions65. See also Stark 2003. cfr. 65 V-Anth/Pillau. Indeed. 28: «In a somewhat pointed manner one could say that the capacity for character is the fourth faculty considered in the anthropology. and which supports once more the dependence of these lectures from morals: Characters are nothing other than that which is peculiar to the higher capacities. what one must for the most part examine [only] with great effort.64 The order that anthropology brings to light in human discourses and uses has a high interest for human beings.1: 227. yet it must not be completely commonplace either.

: Kant’s Impure Ethics. Besoli. / Kain. Jacobs and P. Stark. B. J.: «Unsocial Sociability. Secondary Literature Barnard.: «The ‹Practical Philosophy› of Christian Thomasius». F. A. sapere. 2000. Chicago: Chicago University Press. W. 2010. A. Immanuel: Lectures on Anthropology.: Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 40. 2004. 1971. A. 2012. From Rational Beings to Human Beings. P. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press. by A. In: Isegorı´a 30. Thomasius. (eds. Wood. 2003. C. Martinelli.: Kant’s Human Being. and Critical Significance. 1. Stark. R. H. Louden. 299–310. 2008. 2011. Cohen.: Laws of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Louden. Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/23/15 11:47 AM . New York: Cambridge University Press. Halle: gedruckt bei Christoph Salfelden. 1691. Galatina: Congedo. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39. Louden. M. In: Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Its Origin. In: History of Philosophy Quarterly 18. 221–246. F.: Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology. The ‹Critical› Link of Morality. Gregor.: «Kant’s Answer to the Question ‹What is Man?› and its Implications for Anthropology». 2008. R. Ed. 7–40. Meaning. 506–514. In: Journal of the History of Ideas 32. Kain. G. New York: Cambridge University Press. W. Martinelli. 15–37. M. by B. 179–205. scienze. Paton. 1992. Ed.: «La conoscenza del mondo e la prudenza nelle trascrizioni delle lezioni kantiane di antropologia». 13–52. J. 2003. In: L’universo kantiano. Wilson. P. Jacobs. In: Philosophical Topics 19.: The Categorical Imperative. H. 2001. Anthropology and Reflective Judgment. Munzel. La Rocca and R. Wilson. by S. Vol.176 | Nuria Sa´nchez Madrid References Sources Kant. 325–351. Christian: Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre. Wood and R. H. In: Filosofia e storiografia. Macerata: Quodlibet. New York: Oxford University Press.: «Die Formen von Kants akademischer Lehre». 2. Essays on His Theory of Human Nature. Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.: «Antropologia». 1991. R.): Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. R.: «Kantian Experiential Enlightenment and Court Philosophy in 18th Century». N. New York: SUNY Press. 1963. The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics». Pirillo. Oxford: Blackwell. Brandt. Filosofia.: «Reflexiones acerca de la prudencia en Kant». 2006. 1971.: «Historical Notes and Interpretive Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology». 1999. 543–562.