DOES 1-40, Defendants. CaseNo. 04-CY-00473(DC)




Table of Authorities
Cases A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004(9th Cir. 2001) Abelev. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121(2d Cir. 1971) Abrahamv. Volkswagen America,Inc., 795 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986) of Alpha Int'l, Inc. v. T-Reproductions, Inc., 2003 WL 21511957,at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2003) Baker v. F&FInvestment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) Blesedellv. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408(S.D.N.Y. 1989) Buckleyv. American ConstitutionalLaw Found.,Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197-200
(1999) , 12

2 14 20 17 13 20, 21

Calder v. Jones,465 U.S. 783 (1984) (discussing "effects test" for personal jurisdiction) Capitol Records, Inc. v. John Does 1-250(S.D.N.Y. Jan.26, 2004) Careyv. Hume,492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974) Carrion v. City of New York,2002 WL 31093620,at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18,2002) Concerned Area Residents the Environmentv. Southview for Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410(W.D.N.Y. 1993) Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215(11th Cir. 1992) Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 1992WL 162636,at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June23, 1992) Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) Elektra EntertainmentGroup,Inc. v. Does 1-7, No. 3:04-CY-00607(D.N.J. Feb. 17,2004) FeistPubl'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) Guestv. Leis, 255 F.3d 325,335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. V.Nation Enters.,471 U.S. 539, 555-60(1985) Hsin TenEnter. USA,Inc. v. Clark Enters., 138F. Supp.2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) In reAimster CopyrightLitigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124S. Ct. 1069(2004) In re Subpoena Issuedto Friedman, 350 F.3d 65,67 (2d Cir. 2003) In re Subpoenas ServedUpon Wood,430 F. Supp.41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) In re VerizonInternet Servs.,Inc., 257 F. Supp.2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003)

17 8 13 7 14 7 15 13 8 13 11 10 17 2 6 6 11


Indianapolis 410 Kapara MK. Marsalis Mattei, WL McCleskey Merkos (2d v. (7th v. US v. Inc. 502190, v. Cir. Kuwait Colts,

' ." y'W!~';:


v. Metropolitan






F .3d 17

1994) Airways of 2002 Corp., Justice, WL 845 1996 1268006, Services, Y. 467 Inc. v. Mar. n.10 Otsar 10, F.2d WL at Inc., 2004) 1100 (D.C. at (S.D.N.Y. 03-Civ. Cir. *3 1988) (S.D.N. June Y. 6, 1996) 2002)

15 11 17

Department Schachner, v.

509724, *3-4 No.

ProcountBusiness at Zant, *2 (S.D.N. 499 Chinuch, U.S.



17 14 Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F .3d 94, 96 9

(1991) Sifrei

L 'inyonei Cir. 2002)

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Cal.2003) Moore Mosley Motown Office Oklahoma Puricelli Reporters 1030 RIAA Russell 1999), S.R. Smith Townes United v. n.67 v. of v. v. New General York Cotton Motors Co., L.P.











(C.D. 17

Exch., Corp., v. Does v. Co. v. 185 of Dobbs,

270 497 1-252

U.S. F.2d

593, 1330

610 (8th Ga. 956 186

(1926) Cir. Mar. (D.C. (1946) 1999) Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F .2d 1974) 1,2004) Cir. 1991) 20,21 8,


Record Thrift Press CAN Comm. (D.C.

(N.D. 931 327 139 F.2d U.S.

20 6 12 21

Supervision Publ'g Insur. for Cir. Nos. of 2001 Corp. 442 of New

Walling, F.R.D. the

Co., Freedom 1978) 03-7015

(N.D.N.Y v. American


12 & 03-7053, 74 Jan. F.2d at F. 5, 79 (1979) 138, 383 Does 13, 145-46 U.S. 715 One 2003) Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 15 (2d Cir. 1999) 14-15 Supp. 2001) (2d Cir. 1990) 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 14 6 10 7 20 Ten, No. 03cv1639, 7 14

Verizon, v. Board affd,

Plumbing WL v. 15628 Maloney, U.S. York, of of Am.

Examiners, (2d Cir. 909 743-44 F.3d Gibbs, v. John June

Mercantile v. Maryland, v. Mine City

735, 176 v. Inc. (N.D.


(1966) 11zrough

UnitedParcelServ. 2003 United 72 United United United United WL States (1988) States States States States v. v. v. v. Cox, 21715365, Catholic

Am., *1



v. Abortion





330,332 Corp., 2d 2d

(N.D.N.Y. 610 F.2d (D. Kan.

2002) 89,89 W. Va. (2d 1999) Cir. 1979)

11 6 11 11

Deak-Perera Hambrick, Kennedy, 55 81

Int'IBanking F. F. Supp. Supp.

504,507-09 1103 (D.






Universityof Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182(1990)


12 7 11, 14 8 10 15


Valentinv. Dinkins, 121F.3d 72, (2d Cir. 1997) Verizon,257 F. Supp.2d at 263 n.22 Virgin RecordsAmerica,Inc. v. Does 1-44 (N.D. Ga.Mar. 3,2004) Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,574-78 (1977) Zelsonv. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969) Statutes Fed.R. Civ. P. 21 Fed.R. Civ. P. 42 , FederalPractice& Procedure § 1653,at 410 (2003) 3d

19 21 21


PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO JANE DOE'S MOTION TO QUASH AND RESPONSE TO THE MEMORANDUM OF AMICI CURIAE PUBLIC CITIZEN, ET AL. Plaintiffs respectfullyfile this oppositionto the letter motion filed by "JaneDoe" seeking to quashPlaintiffs' subpoena Cablevisionandin response the Memorandumof Amici to to Curiae Public Citizen, AmericanCivil Liberties Union, and ElectronicFrontier Foundation. JaneDoe'sletter motion must be deniedfor two reasons.First, the motion is moot. Thereis no live controversyfor the Court to resolvebecause Cablevisionhascompliedwith the subpoena.The Court thus neednot rule on any of the issuesraisedby JaneDoe. Second, evenif the Court entertained JaneDoe'sletter motion, it providesno basisfor retroactivelyquashingthe subpoena.Plaintiffs haveshowngood causeto justify discoveryfrom Cablevision. Plaintiffs haveallegeda prima facie caseof copyright infringement againstall of the Defendants cannotpursuetheir claimswithout the identifying information providedby and Cablevision. Moreover,Plaintiffs suffer irreparableharm every day that JaneDoe and the other Defendants continueto disseminate Plaintiffs' works unlawfully. Nor doesthe First Amendmentprovide any basisfor quashingthe subpoena.JaneDoe hasno right to engage copyright infringementand hasnever asserted shewas engagingin in that constitutionallyprotectedspeech when Plaintiffs caughther disseminatingcopyrightedworks over the Internet. Plaintiffs havesubmittedto the Court sworn testimonydescribingthe evidence that Plaintiffs havegathered concerningthe infringementof all Defendants, including JaneDoe. That evidencedemonstrates JaneDoe is a significant copyright infringer who is that disseminating hundreds Plaintiffs' works without their authorization. of Finally, the Court must reject the personal jurisdiction andjoinder issuesthat amici seek to inject into this case. No Defendanthasraisedthoseissues,nor do the arguments that amici


raiseprovide any basisfor quashinga subpoena this case. JaneDoe will have a full and fair in opportunityto raisesuchissues- if shewantsto - after Plaintiffs have amended their complaint to nameher. In any case,amici's arguments aboutjurisdiction andjoinder lack merit. For all of thesereasons, Court shoulddenyJaneDoe's letter motion and reject the the


arguments madeby amici.

. Plaintiffs' Claims


Plaintiffs in this caseare major recordingcompanies who own copyrightsin sound recordings. Collectively, they face a massive problem of digital piracy over the Internet. Every month, copyright infringers unlawfully disseminate billions of perfectdigital copiesof Plaintiffs' copyrightedsoundrecordingsover peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks. SeeLev Grossman, All It's Free, TIME,May 5,2003. A P2P network is an online mediadistribution systemthat allows usersto transformtheir computersinto an interactiveInternetsite, disseminatingfiles for other usersto copy. The most infamousP2Pnetwork was the Napstersystem,which was enjoinedby

a federalcourt. SeeA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004(9th Cir. 2001). Other P2Pnetworkshave,however,arisenin Napster's wake. As a direct result, Plaintiffs have sustained devastating financial losses. Seehttp://www.riaa.comlpdfl2002yrendshipments.pdf (detailingretail salesdeclinesof7% in 2000, 10%in 2001, and 11% in 2002). P2Puserswho disseminate (upload)and copy (download)copyrightedmaterial violate
the copyright laws. SeeA&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1013-14; In reAimster Copyright



Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,124 S. Ct. 1069(2004). Copyright infringementover P2Pnetworksis widespread, however,because userscan concealtheir

2 Ii I ! I


,;;;,. ~,

identitiesby meansof an alias. Copyright ownerscanobserveinfringement occurringon P2P networks,but cannot(without assistance) identify the true namesand locationsof the infringers. The Defendants this caseare activeparticipantsin the FastTrack network, the largest in currentP2Pnetwork.1 Second Declarationof Jonathan Whitehead~4 ("SecondWhitehead Decl.") (filed togetherwith this Memorandum).As such,eachDefendantoffers copyrighted soundrecordingsstoredon his or her computerfor othersto downloadand downloads copyrightedsoundrecordingsfrom other usersof the P2Pnetwork. Plaintiffs caughteachof the Defendants this caseopenly disseminating in soundrecordingswhosecopyrightsare ownedby Plaintiffs. By logging onto the P2Pnetwork,Plaintiffs viewed the files that eachDefendantwas offering to other usersof the network. EachDefendantin this caseis a significant infringer: eachhaschosento makeavailablefrom his or her computerhundredsor thousands sound of recordings, whosecopyrightsare ownedby variousof the Plaintiffs. SeeDeclarationof Jonathan
Whitehead in Support of Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to Take Immediate Discovery

~ 17

("WhiteheadDecl."); SecondWhiteheadDecl. ~ 5. As discussed the WhiteheadDeclarationsand summarized in below, seeinfra pp. 9-10, upon finding eachDefendantdisseminating largenumbersof copyrightedworks, Plaintiffs gathered substantial evidence eachDefendant's of illegal conduct. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs could not ascertain name,address, any othercontactinformation for any of the Defendants. the or Whitehead Decl. ~~ 16,21. Plaintiffs could, however,identify the InternetProtocol ("IP") address from which eachDefendantwas unlawfully disseminating Plaintiffs' copyrightedworks. An IP address a 10-digit number,suchas, specifically identifies a is that

1 The only Defendantwho useda different P2Pnetwork hasalreadycontactedPlaintiffs (asa result of the notice sentby Cab1evision) hasagreed a settlementwith the Plaintiffs. Once and to all of the paperworkis complete,Plaintiffs intendto dismissthat Defendant. 3



particularcomputerusing the Internet. Second WhiteheadDecl. ~ 7. UsingtheIP address, Plaintiffs determined that Cablevision,an ISP headquartered New York City with a largepart in of its subscriber basein the New York metropolitanarea,servesas eachDefendant's ISP. Cablevisionmaintainslogs that match IP addresses with subscribers.Id. By looking at its IP address logs, Cablevisioncan (and,in this case,did) matchthe IP address, date,and time with the subscriber who was using the IP address when Plaintiffs observed infringement. Thus, the Cablevision- andonly Cablevision- could identify the Defendants this case. in ProceduralHistory After filing the Complaint,Plaintiffs soughtleaveto issuelimited discoveryto Cablevisionto ascertain identitiesof the Defendants.SeePlaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to the Take ExpeditedDiscovery(Jan.26, 2004). The Court grantedthat motion, seeJan.26, 2004 Order,and Plaintiffs servedthe subpoena February2,2004. On February3,2004, the Court on issueda secondorder re-affirming that its "January26,2004 order remainsin effect" and establishing processfor the resolutionof any motionsto quash. SeeFeb. 3,2004 Order. The a Court directedCablevisionto notify Defendants the subpoena of within 'five business days. Id. It further orderedthat if any of the "defendants wishedto move to quashthe subpoena, they shall do so beforethe return dateof the subpoena," which was February23,2004. Id. at 2. Cablevisionsentthe requirednotice to the Defendants.SeeMemorandumof CSC Holdings Inc. in Response the Court'sFebruary27, 2004 OrderConcerningPlaintiffs' to Subpoena Cablevision("CablevisionMem."). On February19,2004, JaneDoe (throughher to attorney,Mr. Hanko) senta letter to this Court and a separate letter to Cablevisionto demand that Cablevisionfile a motion to quash. SeeLetter from KennethHanko to Alfred Kiefer, Feb. 19,2004; Letter from KennethHanko to the HonorableDenny Chin, Feb. 19,2004. Jane Doe did not, however,file a motion. On February20, Mr. Kiefer from Cablevisionspokewith 4


.Mr. Hanko and infonned him that JaneDoe needed file a motion to quashin order to stop to Cablevisionfrom responding the subpoena.Mr. Hanko did not indicatethat he would be to filing sucha motion and madeno suggestion he intendedhis letter to the Court to be sucha that

motion.2See Declaration Alfred G. KieferJr.~~ 5-7 (attached CablevisionMem.). of to
Because subscriber no movedto quashprior to the return dateand Cablevisionhad no valid objectionto the subpoena, producedthe infonnation to Plaintiffs on February23, 2004. it On February27,2004, the Court enteredan order construingMr. Hanko'sletter as a motion to quashand directing Cablevisionto notify the otherDefendants that they could file a motion to quashby March 19, 2004. SeeFeb. 27, 2004 Order. Both Plaintiffs and Cablevision notified the Court that Cablevisionhad alreadycompliedwith the subpoena, Plaintiffs and infonned the Court that they believedMr. Hanko'sletter motion was moot. SeeLetter from ChristopherJensen the HonorableDenny Chin, March 2,2004; CablevisionMem. at 5. The to Court later extended deadlinefor motionsto quashuntil April 8. SeeMarch 25,2004 Order. the On April 7, 2004, JaneDoe senta short letter to the Court indicating her intention to rely on her counsel's February19,2004,letter asher "fonnal motion to quash." SeeLetter from Jane Doe to the HonorableDenny Chin, April 7, 2004. No otherDefendantfiled a motion to quash. JaneDoe'sletter refersto two groundsfor quashingthe subpoena:1) Plaintiffs madean inadequate factual showingin supportof the subpoena, 2) Cablevision'sdisclosureof and infonnation compromised "First Amendmentright to anonymity." Id.3 On April 8, 2004, her

2 Plaintiffs receiveda copy of Mr. Hanko's letter after Cablevisionhad responded the to subpoena.SeeLetter from ChristopherJensen the HonorableDenny Chin, March 2, 2004. to 3 Neither Mr. Hanko's letter nor JaneDoe's letter mentionspersonal jurisdiction or joinder. Rather,they focusonly on the claim that Plaintiffs "have not madea sufficient factual showing to warrantdiscoveryconcerningthe unnameddefendants."Letter from KennethHanko to the HonorableDenny Chin, Feb. 19,2004 ("On February2,2004, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,Public Citizen andthe AmericanCivil LibertiesUnion submitteda letter to the 5


amici filed a memorandum supportof any motionsto quash,arguingthe right to anonymity,as in well as severalother issues. ARGUMENT I. THE ISSUES RAISED BY JANE DOE AND AMICI ARE MOOT. Cablevision's compliancewith the subpoena rendersJaneDoe'smotion to quashmoot. Because Cablevisionhasalreadyproducedthe information soughtby the subpoena, thereis no longera live controversy. SeeUnitedStatesv. Deak-PereraInt'IBanking Corp., 610 F.2d 89,89 (2d Cir. 1979)(dismissingcaseas "moot" onceparty compliedwith discoveryrequest). As the Second Circuit held in a casein which one party soughtdiscoveryof information aboutanother party from the government:"[n]o live controversyregardingthe propriety of disclosureexistsin this casebecause government the alreadyhasdisclosedthe documents questionpursuantto the in district court order." S.R.Mercantile Corp. v. Maloney,909 F.2d 79,81 (2d Cir. 1990);seealso In re Subpoena Issuedto Friedman,350 F.3d 65,67 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that appealwas moot onceparty had agreedto comply with discoveryrequest);In re Subpoenas ServedUpon Wood,430 F. Supp.41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(noting that onceparty had "fully complied with subpoena," court "deniedasmoot a motion to quash");Office of Thrift Supervisionv. Dobbs, the 931 F.2d 956, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Amici makea half-heartedattemptto rescueJaneDoe'smotion from mootness, their but arguments lack merit. First, amici cite the criminal law's exclusionaryrule, which barsthe useof illegally obtainedevidence.Amici Mem. at 16. The SecondCircuit hasmadeclear,however, that the exclusionaryrule doesnot extendto non-criminalcontexts. SeeTownesv. City of

Court pointing out that plaintiff havenot madea sufficient factual showing to warrant discovery concerningthe unnameddefendants.On behalf of my client, I join in the arguments forth in set the February2,2004, letter."). 6



New York, 176F.3d 138, 145-46(2d Cir. 1999). In any case,Plaintiffs did not obtain the infonnation illegally and thusthe exclusionaryrule could not apply. Second,amici note that courtssometimes orderthe return of privileged materialthat is inadvertentlydisclosedduring discovery. Amici Mem. at 16. That hasabsolutelyno bearingon this case. The infonnation that Cablevisionsuppliedis not privileged, and Cablevisiondid not produceit inadvertently. Moreover,courtsdo not requirereturn of material inadvertentlyproducedwhere,ashere,such materialis otherwisediscoverable.See,e.g., Carrion v. City of New York,2002 WL 31093620, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18,2002) (limiting useof privileged infonnation improperly obtained,but pennitting useof infonnation improperly obtainedthat was otherwisediscoverable). Because Cablevisionhascompliedwith the subpoena, Plaintiffs havethe infonnation they needto pursuethis lawsuit. The Court shouldthus deny JaneDoe'smotion asmoot. II. PLAINTIFFS MET THE GOOD CAUSE STANDARD FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY. Even if this Court considers merits of JaneDoe'sarguments, Court must still deny the the the motion. Plaintiffs havesatisfiedthe "good cause"standard requiredto take expedited discovery. SeePlaintiffs' Mem. of Law in Supportof Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to Take ImmediateDiscovery("Plaintiffs' App.") at 5-8. Indeed,it is an abuseof discretionto deny discoverywhere a plaintiff can show such discoveryis likely to revealthe Doe defendants' identities. SeeDean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215(11th Cir. 1992); Valentinv. Dinkins, 121F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997);seea/so Plaintiffs' App. at 4. Courtsregularly authorizediscoveryfrom ISPsto identify defendants using the Internetto breakthe law. See,e.g., UnitedParce/Serv.of Am., Inc. v. John Does One ThroughTen,No. 03cv1639,2003 WL 21715365,*1 (N.D. Ga. June 13,2003) (authorizingexpediteddiscovery from ISPsto determinethe identity of defendants).In 25 parallel cases, courtshave- asthis


Court did - authorizedexpediteddiscoveryfrom ISPsto identify defendants infringing copyrightsover P2Pnetworks. SeeOrder, WarnerBros. v. John Does 1-43 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2004); Capitol Records, Inc. v. John Does 1-250(S.D.N.Y. Jan.26,2004); Elektra EntertainmentGroup,Inc. v. Does 1-7, No. 3:04-CV-00607(D.N.J. Feb. 17,2004); Memorandum Opinion, UMGRecordingsv. Does 1-199(D.D.C. Mar. 10,2004); Motown RecordCo.,L.P. v. Does 1-252(N.D. Ga. Mar. 1,2004); Virgin RecordsAmerica,Inc. v. Does 1-44 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2004); Order,Fonovisa,Inc. v. Does 1-67 (D. Col. Apr. 8,2004); Order,Maverick RecordingCo. v. Does 1-12 (D. Col. Apr. 8,2004); Order,Motown RecordCo. v. Does 1-5 (D. Col. Apr. 8,2004); Order,Motown RecordCo. v. Does 1-3 (D. Col. Apr. 8, 2004);Order, WamerBros. Records Inc. v. Does 1-9 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5,2004); Order,Arista Records, Inc. v. Doe (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5,2004); Order,Atlantic RecordingCorp. v. Does 1-13 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2004); Order,Fonovisa,Inc. v. Does 1-2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2004); Order, London-SireRecords, Inc. v. Does 1-4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2004); Order,Priority RecordsLLCv. Doe (S.D. Ind. Apr. 2, 2004); Order,Atlantic RecordingCorp. v. Does 1-3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004); Order,BMGMusic v. Does 1-3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004); Order,Arista Records,Inc. v. Does 1-143 (B.D.Tex.Mar. 30,2004);Order,CapitolRecords, v. Does1-2(C.D.Cal. Inc. Mar. 30,2004); Order, WarnerBros. RecordsInc. v. Does 1-4 (C.D. Ca1. Mar. 30,2004); Order, InterscopeRecordsv. Does 1-4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30,2004); Order,InterscopeRecordsv. Does 1-7 (M.D. Tenn.Mar. 29, 2004); Order,InterscopeRecordsv. Does 1-5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2004); Order, Virgin RecordsAmerica,Inc. v. Doe (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2004).4 In all of thesecases, plaintiffs do not know who the defendants or where they reside. are Without discovery,plaintiffs injured by conductover the Internetwill neverbe ableto enforce

4 Plaintiffs areproviding theseordersto the Court in an appendix. 8 ~; "",,




their rights. Suchdiscoveryis particularly critical herebecause Plaintiffs suffer irreparablehann everyday that Defendants continueto disseminate Plaintiffs' copyrightedworks without authorization.SeeMerkosL'inyonei Chinuch,Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch,Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (a prima facie caseof copyright infringementgenerallyis irreparablehann). JaneDoe contends that "plaintiffs havenot madea sufficient factual showingto justify productionof my personalinformation." Letter from JaneDoe to the HonorableDenny Chin, April 7, 2004. Plaintiffs, however,do not needto provide additionalevidencein order to receive a response a subpoena to they lawfully served. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs supported their motion to takeimmediatediscoverywith substantial evidence. With respectto eachDefendant,Plaintiffs specifiedthe IF address, date,andtime of the infringement;that information uniquely specifieda Cablevisionsubscriber the sourceof the infringement. WhiteheadDecl. ~ 16. Plaintiffs as downloaded list of the files disseminated eachDefendantanddownloadedseveralfiles a by being disseminated eachDefendantto confirm that Plaintiffs ownedthe copyrightsof the by soundrecordings.Id. ~~ 16, 17. For eachDefendant,Plaintiffs provided a list of several copyrightedsoundrecordingsthat the Defendantdisseminated without authorization. See Exhibit A to the Complaint. That list, however,is only a small subsetof the copyrightedsound recordingsthat eachDefendantis unlawfully disseminating.As explainedin the two Whitehead Declarations, eachDefendantwas offering hundredsof additionalcopyrightedsoundrecordings ownedby variousof the Plaintiffs without authorization. SeeWhiteheadDecl. ~ 17; Second Whitehead Decl. ~ 5. Finally, Plaintiffs providedthe Court, as an example,detailedlists of the hundreds of files beingdistributedby threeof the Defendants; theselists are "screenshots"showingprecisely what copyrightedworks eachDefendantwas disseminating otherusers. SeeExhibit 1 to to


WhiteheadDecl. Plaintiffs also submitteda sworn declarationthat they possess virtually identical evidencefor eachof the other Defendants, including JaneDoe. SeeWhitehead Decl.' 17; SecondWhiteheadDec1.' 5. Plaintiffs thushaveprovidedvoluminousevidenceof infringementby Defendants, including JaneDoe, and seekonly limited information to vindicate their rights. Plaintiffs have satisfiedthe "good cause"standard requiredto take expediteddiscoveryto uncoverher identity. III. THERE IS NO RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN ANONYMOUS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. JaneDoe'sonly other argumentis that Cablevision's compliancewith the subpoena "compromise[ed] First Amendmentright to anonymity." Letter from JaneDoe to the my HonorableDenny Chin, April 7, 2004. As with her first argument,JaneDoe offers no explanationor legal citation to supporther claim, althoughamici try to fill the void. JaneDoe hasno right to engage copyright infringement,anonymouslyor otherwise. in SeeHarper & Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enters.,471 U.S. 539, 555-60(1985); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-78(1977). JaneDoe doesnot deny that sheis committing massivecopyright infringementand makesno claim that shewas engagingin constitutionallyprotectedexpression when Plaintiffs caughther disseminatingtheir copyrighted works. Absentsuchan assertion, thereis no First Amendmentright at issuein this case. Because JaneDoe was not engaging constitutionallyprotectedexpression, in amici attemptto createa generalized "qualified privilege" in anonymityon the Internet,seeAmici Mem. at 4, but thereis no suchprinciple of law. Individuals haveno expectationof privacy (underthe First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments) preventsdisclosureof the business that recordsof third parties,suchasISPs. "[A] personhasno legitimateexpectationof privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Smithv. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44(1979);



-UnitedStatesv. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-45(1976). Justastelephone usersforfeit the expectation that the telephonecompanywill concealrecordsof their calls, seeSmith,442 U.S. at 742,ISP subscribers haveno legitimateexpectation that ISPswill concealtheir identities in response legal process. SeeGuestv. Leis, 255 F.3d 325,335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[C]omputer to usersdo not have a legitimateexpectation privacy in their subscriberinformation because of they haveconveyedit to anotherperson- the systemoperator.");UnitedStatesv. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.2d 504, 507-09(D. W. Va. 1999),affd, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (table);MK. v. U:S Departmentof Justice, 1996WL 509724,at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)("A telephoneuserhasno expectation privacy in the billing recordsmaintainedby the telephonecompany,eventhough of theserecordsconcerncalls madefrom his own telephone line."); United Statesv. Cox, 190F. Supp.2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (no right to privacy in subscriberinformation given to ISP). This is especiallytrue here. Eachof the Defendants this casechoseto log onto a P2P in network andto make availablethe contentsof his or her computerto millions of other people. As one court explainedin rejectingthe arguments amici makehere,given that an ISP subscriber "openshis computerto permit others,throughpeer-to-peer filesharing,to downloadmaterials from that computer,it is hard to understand what privacy expectation or shehasafter just he essentiallyopeningthe computerto the world." In re VerizonInternet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244,267 (D.D.C. 2003),rev'don other grounds,351 F.3d 1229(D.C. Cir. 2003); seealso UnitedStates Kennedy,81 F. Supp.2d 1103,1110(D. Kan. 2000) (activationof file sharing v. mechanism showsno expectation privacy). of Moreover,Defendants cannotreasonably expectCablevisionto preservetheir anonymity because Cablevisioninforms them, in no uncertainterms,that copyright infringementis forbiddenandthat it will disclosetheir namesin response legal requests.SeeCablevision to


_I'" Mem. at 2 (citing Cablevision's termsof serviceinforming usersthat it will "discloseany information asnecessary satisfyany law, regulation,or other governmental to request"). Thus, althoughamici wish to protectthe Defendants' anonymity,Defendants have alreadyforfeited it.5 Amici try to distinguishthis well-established body of caselaw as "irrelevant," by arguing that the cases considerprivacy interestsunderthe Fourth Amendment,not the First Amendment. Amici Mem. at 7. That analysisis flawed because presupposes the Defendants it that have a First Amendmentinterestin anonymously violating the copyright laws. As discussed above,they do not. Moreover,the Supreme Court hasrepeatedly rejectedclaims that an assertionof First Amendmentinterestscompelsa heightened level of scrutinyprior to issuance (or response of to) a subpoena otherjudicial process.SeeUniversityof Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199-200 or (1990); OklahomaPressPubl'g Co. v. Walling,327 U.S. 186, 192-93(1946);ReportersComm. for Freedomof the Pressv. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1050n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejectingrequirement journalists receivenotice prior to issuance subpoenas toll that of for calling records). Amici further discussseveralcases which courtshaveengaged a balancingtest in in beforeorderingthe disclosureof an anonymous speaker's identity. Amici Mem. at 5-7. Amici ask the court to "draw[] by analogy"from cases involving subpoenas identify journalistic to sources.Amici Mem. at 5. Thosecases on far more significant First Amendmentinterests rest

5 Amici claim that a pamphleteer doesnot give up his right to anonymity if he is recognizedon the streetby a passer-by.Amici Br. at 8-9. But that claim hasno relevancehere. While the government may be limited in its ability to requirepampWeteers disclosetheir identitiesprior to to andas a condition on speaking, First Amendmentimposesno limit on the authority of a the subpoena other legal process commandthe passer-by provide information in his or her or to to possession the identity of the pamphleteer.It is the latter situationwe havehere. Seealso Buckleyv. American ConstitutionalLaw Found.,Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197-200(1999) (contrasting invalid requirement petitionerswear an identification badgewhile petitioning with valid that requirement that petitionerssign an affidavit attestingto signatures obtainedafter petitioning). 12


thanamici can musterhere. Cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,221 (2003) (the First

Amendment "bears heavilywhenspeakers less assert right to makeotherpeople's the speeches").
Even if, however,the Court were to apply the samestandard here,Plaintiffs would easily satisfy


it. To obtain the identity of ajournalistic source,a plaintiff needshow only that the information is relevant,the information cannotbe obtainedby anothermeans,and thereis a compelling interestfor providing the information. SeeCareyv. Bume, 492 F.2d 631,632 (D.C. Cir. 1974);


Baker v. F&F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972). Notably, Careydoesnot requirethe court to examinethe merits of a plaintiffs claims. Rather,a plaintiff must show that the information is soughtin good faith, is unavailablefrom any other source,and is centralto the plaintiffs claim. 492 F.2d at 632. Plaintiffs in this casehaveallegeda prima facie caseof copyright infringement,seeFeist Publ'nsInc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (requiring allegationsof ownershipof a copyright andviolation of an exclusiveright), and there is no disputethat the limited information soughtis unavailablefrom any other sourceand central to Plaintiffs' claims. Amici, citing other "balancing"cases, nonetheless arguethat the Court shouldlook at the merits of Plaintiffs' claims to determine whetherPlaintiffs haveevidenceto supporttheir cause of action. Amici Br. at 6-7. The merits of Plaintiffs' claims,however,arenot germane this at stageof the proceedings.Even if they were,however,Plaintiffs have exceeded standards the in any of the cases cited by amici. As discussed above,Plaintiffs have alreadyprovided sworn testimonyconcerningthe evidence supportingtheir claims,including downloadsof copyrighted songsactuallybeing disseminated lists of hundreds other soundrecordingsbeing and of unlawfully disseminated eachDefendant,including JaneDoe. Seesupra pp. 9-10; Second by

, ,





Whitehead Decl. 5.6 As the District Court for the District of Columbia held in examining '"'" virtually identical facts in the Verizon case,suchevidence more than satisfiesthe standards in any of the cases cited by amici. SeeVerizon,257 F. Supp.2d at 263 n.22.7




Amiciraisetwo issues personal jurisdictionandjoinder- thatneither Jane Doenor any
"'\ otherDefendanthasraised. It is well settledthat" amicuscannotraise or implicate new issues that havenot beenpresented the parties." Russellv. Board of Plumbing Examiners,74 F. by Supp.2d 349,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),affd, 2001 WL 15628(2d Cir. Jan.5, 2001). Seealso McCleskeyv. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 523 n.10 (1991) ("It is well established.. . that this Court will not consideran argumentadvanced amicuswhen that argumentwas not raisedor passed by on below andwas not advanced this Court by the party on whosebehalf the argumentis being in raised."). The Court shouldthus declineto consideramici's arguments. Concerned Area ResidentsfortheEnvironmentv. SouthviewFarm,834F. Supp. 1410, 1413(W.D.N.Y. 1993). Moreover,given that no party hasraisedany of the issuesmentionedby amici, the issues arenot ripe for judicial review. It is axiomaticthat legal issuesshouldnot be resolvedin the abstract.SeeAbele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1124(2d Cir. 1971). The federalcourts"resolve real issues betweengenuineadversaries" do not "give advisoryopinionswith respectto and

6 Amici's principal complaintis that Plaintiffs provided a sample,ratherthan the entirety,of their evidence.Amici Mem. at 9. Plaintiffs provided a samplebecause thereis no soundreason for requiringthe submission boxesof documents supportgood causefor a subpoena. of to Plaintiffs haveprovided sworntestimonythat they haveevidencewith respectto all Defendants that mirrors the samples provided. SeeWhiteheadDecl.' 17; SecondWhiteheadDecl.' 5. Plaintiffs cannotprovide more detailedevidenceof JaneDoe's unlawful actsbecause they do not know which Defendantsheis. 7 Public Citizen conceded the D.C. Circuit that evidenceidentical to that which Plaintiffs have in put forward meetsthe test amici proposein their brief. SeeBrief Amicus Curiae of Public Citizen inRIAA v. Verizon,Nos.03-7015 03-7053, 14-15 & at (filed May 16,2003).

~ II

I .

, I

A. choice.



abstractor theoreticalquestions." Id. Resolutionof the legal arguments raisedby amici would amountto just suchan improperadvisoryopinion. Id. In any event,amici's personal jurisdiction andjoinder arguments on their merits. fail Personal Jurisdiction

This Court is in no position to issuea ruling of any kind on personal jurisdiction; indeed, to do so would be reversibleerror. Only a defendant standingto raise personal has jurisdiction. Moreover,the defenseof personal jurisdiction canbe (andregularly is) waived. See,e.g.,Nihon Keizai Shimbun,Inc. v. ComlineBusiness Data, Inc., 166F.3d 65,75 (2d Cir. 1999). Theremay be many reasons why the Defendants, regardless wherethey reside,may wish to litigate in of New York. Issuing a ruling now on personal jurisdiction would effectively deny Defendants that

For thesereasons, is settledlaw that this Court cannotraisethe issueof personal it jurisdiction sua sponte,andamici arein no position to raiseor litigate it on behalf of the Defendants.SeeKapara v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 845 F.2d 1100,1105 (D.C. Cir. 1988);Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969). Nor is a possiblelack of personaljurisdiction a basisfor denyingdiscovery(or, in this case,requiring discoveryalreadydisclosedto be returned). SeeUnitedStatesCatholic Conference Abortion RightsMobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. v. 72,76 (1988) ("even if it were ultimately determined that [the court lackedpersonal jurisdiction], the orderor processit issuedin the conductof the litigation would still be valid"). Plaintiffs soughtthe subpoena good faith in order to determinethe identitiesor geographiclocationsof in the Defendants that this casecould proceed. Cablevisionresponded good faith andcould so in not itself haveraisedpersonal jurisdiction asa groundsfor refusingto comply. SeeDuttle v. Bandler & Kass, 1992WL 162636,at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June23, 1992). Plaintiffs thus are entitled to usethe information obtainedto amendtheir complaint andproceedin this case(possibly 15



facing motionsto dismisson personal jurisdiction grounds)or in anotherfederalcourt, if that forum is more appropriate. Indeed,if any Defendanteverdecidesto raisepersonal jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss,this Court could only evaluatethat defense cataloguingDefendants' by contactswith the district, a process that cannotbegin until the Defendants identified. The Court would almost are certainly authorizediscoveryinto the Defendants' contactswith this District, beginningwith the Defendants' identity and residence.The specterof sucha motion in the future cannotpossibly serveas a basisfor quashingthat very discoverynow. In any case,thereis goodreasonto believe that this Court hasjurisdiction over all Defendants.To be sure,the information producedby Cablevisionindicatesthat most of the Defendants haveaddresses outsidethis judicial district; all Defendants appear, however,to live in New York, Connecticutor New Jersey. That fact, however,doesnot meanthat this Court lacksjurisdiction over them. EachDefendanthascontactswith New York directly relatedto the conductin this case. Eachhascontracted with an ISP headquartered New York andhas in agreed abideby New York law arising out of its contractfor Internet servicewith Cablevision. to
See Cablevision's Optimum Online Terms of Service at ~ 30, available for review at

http://www.optimumonline.coin/index.jhtmi. Moreover,Plaintiffs have evidencethat each Defendantengaged massivecopyright infringementdisseminating in hundredsof copyrighted works to anyonethat wantedthem (including residentsof this jurisdiction) and downloading copyrightedworks from otherswho offered them (including residentsof this jurisdiction).8 Although eachDefendantwas caughtcommitting infringementat a particular point in time, the 8 A userdownloadinga file on a P2Pnetwork suchasKaZaA may downloadthe samefile from multiple computers one time. SeeSecondWhiteheadDecl. ~ 6. Thus,whena userin New at Jerseydownloadsa file, he or shemay be receivingpartsof the samefile, at the sametime, from a computerin the New York, a computerin California, and a computerin Florida. [d. 16

sheernumberof works being disseminated demonstrates eachwas engaged a persistent that in courseof conductover a substantial period of time. Eachhad effectively transformedhis or her computerinto an interactiveInternetsite, allowing othersto completetransactions (by downloadingcopyrightedworks) over the Internet. It is clear that commercialwebsitesthat completetransactions over the Internetmay subjectthemselves jurisdiction basedon evena to single sale. SeeMatteI, Inc. v. ProcountBusiness Services, Inc., No. 03-Civ. 7234(RWS),2004 WL 502190,at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,2004) (holding that a singletransactionover the Internet with a forum stateresidentis sufficient to supportan exerciseof jurisdiction).9 The fact that P2P infringers,like Defendant,tradecopyrightedworks ratherthan sell them is irrelevantto whether the websitesare fully interactive. Amici Mem. at 11. The law of jurisdiction doesnot distinguishbetweenillegal actscommittedin exchange money and illegal actscommittedin for exchange bartered(and illegal) goods. 0 for 1

9 Seealso Hsin TenEnter. USA,Inc. v. Clark Enters., 138F. Supp.2d 449, 454, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Generally, an interactivewebsitesupportsa finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.");seegenerally Marsalis v. Schachner, 2002 WL 1268006,at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June6, 2002) ("active" site that allows transactions with residents New York sufficient to confer of jurisdiction); seealso Alpha Int 'I, Inc. v. T-Reproductions, Inc., 2003 WL 21511957,at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2003) ("Websitesthat permit information exchange betweenthe defendantand viewers aredeemed'interactive,' and generallysupporta fmding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant."). 10 Jurisdictionmay alsobe properbecause brunt of the harm in this case(at leastasto the severalof the Plaintiffs) is felt in this forum. Wherea defendant knowingly causes harm to a forum stateresident,suchasan owner of intellectualproperty,the defendantmay subjectitself to suit wherethe plaintiff resides. SeeCalder v. Jones,465 U.S. 783 (1984) (discussing "effects test" for personal jurisdiction); Indianapolis Colts,Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, Ltd., 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994)(action for infringementof IndianapolisColts' trademark properin Indiana);Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,Inc. v. GrokYter, Ltd., 243 F. Supp.2d 1073, 1088-89(C.D. Cal. 2003) (action for infringementby movie studiosproper in California). In this case,New York is hometo many of the Plaintiffs and is one of the epicenters the music of industry. Defendants clearly knew or shouldhaveknown that the theft of intellectualproperty from the major recordingcompanies would haveseriouseffectsin New York. 17


Thus,thereis a good faith basisto believethereis jurisdiction over Defendants this in case. But that issueis not beforethe Court at this time. The only questionis whetheramici's concerns aboutpersonal jurisdiction provide a basisfor compelling the Plaintiffs to return information lawfully obtainedin discovery. Clearly they do not. This Court will, however,have ampleopportunityto considerpersonal jurisdiction over Defendants, any Defendantchooses if to raiseit. Assumingthe Court deniesJaneDoe'smotion to quashand rejectsamici's arguments, Plaintiffs will contactthe Defendants discusspossiblesettlementwith them. It hasbeen and Plaintiffs' experience that, onceconfrontedwith the substantial evidencePlaintiffs havegathered, manyDefendants will electto settle. For Defendants whoselitigation proceeds without settlement, Plaintiffs andDefendants determinewhetherit is proper to continuein this can jurisdiction, whethertransferto anotherforum is preferable,andwhetherseverance some of numberof claims is desirable, infra. Any Defendants see who wish to raisepersonal jurisdiction (or joinder) issuescanmake sucharguments that time in the appropriatecourt. at Finally, amici's proposalfor how this caseshouldproceedmakesno sense whatsoever. Amici Br. at 11-12. They appearto concede that Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain the identitiesof the Defendants, providedPlaintiffs guess correctcourt in which to file suit, using the the admittedlyimprecisemethodsdiscussed amici's declaration. Under amici's plan, Plaintiffs in 11

11Amici's declarationis misleadingin suggesting copyright ownerscan determinethe that locationof Internetinfringersby meansof varioustools. SeeSchoenDecl. Thesetools do not provide the sort of accuracyof information that amici imply. First, amici refer to the useof geographical codes,id. at 7, 14, but thosecodescanbe misleading. ISPshavecompletecontrol over the codesthey useto describethe routersin their network. Someusegeographical codes, but othersdo not. Second WhiteheadDecl. , 9. Plaintiffs' andtheir trade association's experience that suchcodesaccuratelyidentify the region in which the infringer lives is significantly lessthan 100%of the time. Id. Wheresuchcodesare inaccurate, they canbe very inaccurate.Id. Second,asamici's own Declarationshows,suchtools reveal- at most- a major metropolitanareaor statethroughwhich Internettraffic to the subscriber must pass. Schoen Decl. ,~ 9, 10. Suchinformation may not accuratelyidentify thejudicial district or eventhe
~1:') ~: 18



would often haveto burdenthreedifferent federalcourtsto commence lawsuit. Plaintiffs a


would haveto guessthe district in which eachDefendantresides,and then file suit in that district. They would then haveto issuesubpoenas Cablevisionfrom this Court. Thus, to


regardless wherethe lawsuit is filed, this Court would haveto resolveany subpoena of enforcement proceedings and/ormotionsto quash(asit is doing now). Finally, oncethe Defendants identified andtheir locationsrevealed,Plaintiffs would, in many cases, are haveto


re-file in yet a third federalcourt. As a matterof judicial efficiency and fairnessto the Defendants, sucha merry-go-roundof courtsmakeslittle sense.Its primary effect is to place additionalburdenon the Plaintiffs without providing Defendants with any additionalprotection. B. Joinder

Amici provide no rationalefor litigating joinder prior to the identification of the Defendants.Because soleremedyfor misjoinderis severance, dismissaland not the the not quashingof a subpoena, Fed.R. Civ. P. 21, litigation of joinder at this point serves see no purpose,other thanto delayproceedings.Joinderis unrelatedto the "anonymity" that amici seek to protect,and amici can explain no benefitsthat severance this time would provide. at fudeed,severance this time would be harmful to Plaintiffs, Defendants, the Court. at and Plaintiffs would be requiredto file multiple virtually identical lawsuits,followed by virtually identical motions for immediatediscoveryin eachcase,followed by virtually identical subpoenas Cablevision. Defendants to may prefer to litigate together,given the commonalityof issuesamongthem and the potentialeconomicbenefitsof litigating together,but would be deniedthat choice. Finally, the Court would facethe additionalburdenof numerousidentical

statewherethe infringer resides. Second WhiteheadDecl. ~ 9. As evenamicithemselves are forcedto concede, they canonly determine that the Defendants "appear" to be located"in or near" certaincities. SchoenDecl. ~ 10. 19 II j I


, "..


lawsuits,involving many similar factual andlegal issues,aswell as the exactsamethreshold


issue- discoveryto identify the allegedinfringers.12 In any event,joinder is proper in this case. The FederalRules direct "the broadest possiblescopeof action consistent with fairnessto the parties[because] joinder of claims, parties andremedies strongly encouraged."UnitedMine Workersof Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 is (1966). "Rule 20 is to promotetrial convenience to expeditethe resolutionof disputes, and therebypreventingmultiple lawsuits." Blesedellv. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408, 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The Court thushaswide discretionin determiningwhetherjoinder is appropriate and,if it is not, at what stageof the proceedings severance shouldbe compelled. See Mosley v. GeneralMotors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330,1332(8th Cir. 1974). Amici's sole argumentis that Plaintiffs do not meetthe secondof two prerequisites for joinder: that the Complaint allegesa right to relief relating to or arising out of the same transactionor occurrence seriesof transactions occurrences. As the Supreme or or 13 Court has explained,the terms "transaction"and "occurrence"are "word[s] of flexible meaning. It may comprehend seriesof many occurrences, a depending so much upon the immediateness not of

12Amici cite one casein which a district court in Pennsylvania requiredseverance a parallel in caseand anothercasein which a magistrate judge hasrecommended severance. Amici Mem. at 13-14. They ignore,however,the 25 othercourtsthat haveauthorizedPlaintiffs to take expediteddiscoverywithout requiring severance.Severalof thosecourts haveexpressly addressed arguments the madeby amici andhave found that consideration issuesrelatedto of joinder is premature.See,e.g., UMGRecordingsv. Does 1-199 at 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 10,2004) ("[i]t is clearto the Court that Defendants must be identified before this suit canprogress further" andruling that it is "premature"to consider joinder); Motown Record Co.,L.P. v. Does 1-252at 3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1,2004) (concludingthatjoinder and other issuesshouldbe deferredso that they "can be resolvedin the ordinary courseof this litigation at the appropriate time") (availablefor review in the appendixfiled in conjunctionwith this Memorandum). 13Amici's attemptto createa third requisitefor joinder, seeAmici Br. at 13-14& n.4, conflicts squarelywith the law in this Circuit. See,e.g.,Abrahamv. Volkwagen of America,Inc., 795 F .2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986). Amici appearto concede, they must, that Plaintiffs' claims satisfy the as first requisitefor joinder - they sharecommon(indeedalmostidentical) issuesof law and fact. 20 f , . ,I


their connectionasupon their logical relationship." Moore v. New York CottonExch., 270 U.S. 593,610 (1926);Blesedell,708 F. Supp.at 1422. Rule 20 thuspennits all "'logically relatedclaims' by or againstdifferent partiesto be tried in the sameproceeding." Blesedell,708 F. Supp.at 1421;Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333;7 CharlesAlan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane,Federal Practice & Procedure3d § 1653,at 410 (2003) (Rule 20 ensures "all reasonably that relatedclaims for relief by or against different parties"may bejoined). The fact that claims againsteachDefendantmay involve "different factualunderpinnings" providesno basis,without more, for severingclaims. Puricelli v. CAN Insur. Co., 185F.R.D. 139, 142(N.D.N.Y 1999). If the Court determinesthat it is preferableto hold separate trials for eachDefendant,the FederalRules expresslyprovide the Court with suchpower, ensuringthat claims canbe litigated efficiently, but tried separately. Fed.R. Civ. P. 42. Plaintiffs' claims in this casesatisfy the requirements Rule 20 because of they ariseout of a logically relatedseriesof transactions occurrences. All of Plaintiffs' claims againstthe or 14 Defendants involve commonquestions copyright law and commonfactual questions of concerningthe operationof Cablevision's network andthe FastTrack P2Pnetwork. Each Defendantin this casewas usingthe sameinstrumentalities commit the exact sameviolation to of law. Moreover,the crux of Plaintiffs' Complaintis that Defendants and othershave participatedin a commonscheme patternof behavior,without which no individual Defendant or 14 The two courtscited by amici that haveorderedor recommended severance Plaintiffs' of claims eacherredby effectively requiring Plaintiffs to allegethat all of Plaintiffs' claim arose from the sametransactionor occurrence, ratherthan a logically relatedseriesof transactions or occurrences, Rule 20 pennits. SeeAmici Mem. Ex. 1 (decisionof judge in EasternDistrict of as Pennsylvania severingcases because claims "did not result of the sameincident or the incidents");Amici Mem. Ex. 3 (recommendation magistrate the Middle District of Florida of in because Fed.R. Civ. P. "refers to the sametransactionandor occurrence to similar not transactions occurrences"). or 21





would havebeenable to commit much (if any) of the infringing activity that underliesPlaintiffs'

Complaint. Plaintiffs' Complaint allegesexplicitly that eachDefendantusesan online media distribution system(the P2Pnetwork) to distribute to and to download/rom other usersof the samesystem- including the otherDefendants computerfiles that contain copyrightedsound recordings. Compl.' 24. Seealso WhiteheadDecl. " 7, 16. Thus,amici arewrong to assert that Defendants connected are only by their commonuseof the Internet. Defendants' concerted actionsasusersof the FastTrack network provide the "logical relationship" that clearly distinguishes casefrom the hypotheticalsand the misjoindercases this upon which amici rely. CONCLUSION For the foregoingreasons, Court shoulddeny JaneDoe'sletter motion to quashand the reject the arguments raisedby amici. Respectfullysubmitted,

Dated: New York, New York



:;;J) ~

Attorneys-wrA-dntiffs By: - U~\?(""


( ~.( L.~ J




J. Christopher Jensen (JJ-1864)
JasonD. Sanders (JS-2219) COWAN, LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN, P.C. 1133Avenueof the Americas New York, New York 10036-6799 Phone:(212) 790-9200 Fax: (212) 575-0671 ThomasJ. Perrelli (admittedpro hac vice) JENNER & BLOCK LLP 601 ThirteenthStreet,WN Suite 1200South Washington,DC 20005 Phone:(202) 639-6000 Fax: (202) 639-6066