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G.R. No. 170054


REMANDABAN III, Respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in January 2004, petitioner Goya, Inc.

(Company) hired contractual employees from PESO Resources
Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and
occasional services in its factory. This prompted respondent Goya,
Inc. Employees UnionFFW (Union) to request for a grievance
conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong
to the categories of employees stipulated in the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

G.R. No. 175002

February 18, 2013

January 21, 2013

The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from

PESO is not a management prerogative and in gross violation of the
CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). It noted that the
contractual workers engaged have been assigned to work in
positions previously handled by regular workers and Union
members, in effect violating Section 4, Article I of the CBA, which
provides for three categories of employees in the Company.
ISSUE: Whether the CBA violation constitute a ULP.

FACTS: In 1999, Pepsi adopted a company-wide retrenchment

program denominated as Corporate Rightsizing Program. On July
13, 1999, Pepsi notified the DOLE of the initial batch of forty-seven
(47) workers to be retrenched.Among these employees were six (6)
elected officers and twenty-nine (29) active members of the
LEPCEU-ALU, including herein respondents.


On July 19, 1999, LEPCEU-ALU filed a Notice of Strike before the

National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to Pepsis
alleged acts of union busting/ULP. It claimed that Pepsis adoption
of the retrenchment program was designed solely to bust their union
so that come freedom period, Pepsis company union, the Leyte
Pepsi-Cola Employees Union-Union de Obreros de Filipinas would garner the majority vote to retain its exclusive bargaining

In this case, Section 4, Article I (on categories of employees) of the

CBA between the Company and the Union must be read in
conjunction with its Section 1, Article III (on union security). Both
are interconnected and must be given full force and effect. Also,
these provisions are clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit
and the language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other
interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning should prevail. As
repeatedly held, the exercise of management prerogative is not
unlimited; it is subject to the limitations found in law, collective
bargaining agreement or the general principles of fair play and
justice. To reiterate, the CBA is the norm of conduct between the
parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy
of the law.

ISSUE: Whether Pepsi committed ULP in the form of union busting

Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is union busting
when the existence of the union is threatened by the employers act
of dismissing the formers officers who have been duly-elected in
accordance with its constitution and by-laws.
On the other hand, the term unfair labor practice refers to that
gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Codewhich, at their core,
violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to selforganization, with the sole exception of Article 257(f) (previously
Article 248[f]).
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers'
right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers'
right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without
that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor
practices. The only exception is Article 257(f).
INC., Petitioner,

If the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt

upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
their stipulations shall control. x x x.24

However, while the engagement of PESO is in violation of Section

4, Article I of the CBA, it does not constitute unfair labor practice
as it (sic) not characterized under the law as a gross violation of the

CORPORATION, Petitioner,
GLEN VILLARASA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182018

October 10, 2012

The respondents were hired and worked by/for Norkis Trading as

skilled workers assigned in the operation of industrial and welding
machines owned and used by Norkis Trading for its business, they
were not treated as regular employees by Norkis Trading. Instead,
they were regarded by Norkis Trading as members of PASAKA, a
cooperative, and which was deemed an independent contractor that
merely deployed the respondents to render services for Norkis
Trading.The respondents,believing that they were regular
employees of Norkis Trading, filed on June 9, 1999 with the DOLE
a complaint against Norkis Trading and PASAKA for labor-only
contracting and non-payment of minimum wage and overtime
pay. The filing of the complaint for labor-only contracting allegedly
led to the suspension of the respondents membership with
PASAKA.On October 13, 1999, the respondents were to report back
to work but they were informed by PASAKA that they would be
transferred to Norkis Tradings sister company, Porta Coeli
Industrial Corporation (Porta Coeli).
The respondents opposed the transfer as it would allegedly result in
a change of employers, from Norkis Trading to Porta Coeli. The
respondents also believed that the transfer would result in a
demotion since from being skilled workers in Norkis Trading, they
would be reduced to being utility workers.These circumstances
made the respondents amend their complaint for illegal suspension,
to include the charges of unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
damages and attorneys fees.

filing the Unions Motion for Reconsideration but also to stage a

brief public demonstration. Other rank and file employees in the
provincial branches of Solidbank also absented themselves from
work that day.
Solidbank perceived, themass demonstration conducted by its
employees, to be an illegal strike, a deliberate abandonment of work
calculated to paralyze its operations.
ISSUE: Whether mass demonstration was a legitimate exercise of
the constitutional rights to freedom of expression, to peaceful
assembly and to petition the government for redress of wrong and
not a strike
This issue, however, had already been resolved and passed upon by
this Court in its November 15, 2010 Decision in G.R. Nos. 159460
and 159461,which reversed and set aside the March 10, 2003
Decision of the CAs Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67730
and 70820.
This Court ruled that complainants concerted mass action was
actually a strike and not a legitimate exercise of their right to
freedom of expression.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents were illegally dismissed by

Norkis Trading
Where an entity is declared to be a labor-only contractor, the
employees supplied by said contractor to the principal employer
become regular employees of the latter. Having gained regular
status, the employees are entitled to security of tenure and can only
be dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they had been
afforded due process. Termination of employment without just or
authorized cause and without observing procedural due process is
illegal.Considering, that Porta Coeli is an entity separate and
distinct from Norkis Trading, the respondents employment with
Norkis Trading was necessarily severed by the change in work
G.R. No. 153799
September 17, 2012
FACTS: Solidbank Union and Solidbank negotiated for a new
economic package for the remaining two years of the 1997-2001
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). However, the parties
reached an impasse. Thus, on January 18, 2000, then Secretary of
Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma (Secretary Laguesma) assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the parties from holding a
strike or lockout or any activity which might exacerbate the
Displeased with Secretary Laguesmas ruling, members and officers
skipped work in the morning of April 3, 2000 and trooped to his
office in Intramuros, Manila, not only to accompany their lawyer in

De La Salle University vs De La Salle University Employees

GR 169254
This petition involves one of the three notices of strike filed by
respondent De La Salle University Employees Association
(DLSUEANAFTEU) against petitioner De La Salle University due
to its refusal to bargain collectively with it in light of the intra-union
dispute between respondents two opposing factions.
On August 28, 2003, an election of Union officers under the
supervision of the DOLE was conducted. The Baez faction
emerged as the winner thereof.The Aliazas faction contested the
election results.
On March 20, 2001, despite the brewing conflict between the
Aliazas and Baez factions, petitioner entered into a five-year CBA
covering the period from June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2005.
The Aliazas faction wrote a letter to petitioner requesting it to place
in escrow the union dues and other fees deducted from the salaries
of employees pending the resolution of the intra-union conflict
which was granted.
Respondent union asserted that the creation of escrow accounts was
not an act of neutrality but was an act of interference with the
internal affairs of the union. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
for unfair labor practice for lack of merit. The labor arbiter upheld
the petitioner's view that there was a void in respondent's
On March 15, 2003, respondent sent a letter to petitioner requesting
for the renegotiation of the economic terms for the fourth and fifth
years of the then current CBA.

On March 20, 2003 petitioner denied respondents request saying

that No renegotiation can occur given the void in the leadership of
Respondent filed a second notice of strike on April 4 2003.
Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and upheld the decision of
Labor Arbiter, but finding petitioner guilty of refusing to bargain
amounting to unfair labor practice in violation of Article 248(g) in
relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. The issue of union
leadership is distinct and separate from the duty to bargain. There is
no void in the respondent's leadership. The petitioner is guilty of
Respondent reiterated its demand on petitioner to bargain
collectively pursuant to such decision to which petitioner did not
On August 27, 2003, respondent filed the third notice of strike
citing among others petitioners alleged violation of the CBA and
continuing refusal to bargain in good faith. The Secretary of Labor
again cited the petitioner committed an unfair labor practice.
[E]vents have lately turned out in favor of [respondent], thereby
obliterating any further justification on the part of [petitioner] not to
bargain. On October 29, 2003, the new Regional Director of
DOLENCR, Ciriaco E. Lagunzad III, issued a resolution declaring
the Baez group as the duly elected officers of the Union
In accordance with the decision, etitioner turned over to respondent
the collected union dues and agency fees from employees which
were previously placed in escrow. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of Court with the CA alleging that
the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion by
holding that
it (petitioner) was liable for unfair labor practice. CA affirmed
decision of Ses of Labor saying that The non-proclamation of the
newly elected union officers cannot be used as an excuse to fulfill
the duty to bargain collectively
ISSUE: Whether of not the petitioner is guilty of Unfair Labor

objectives. However, the CA ruled that the petitioners unjustified

refusal to render overtime work, unexplained failure to observe
prescribed work standards, habitual tardiness and chronic
absenteeism despite warning and non-compliance with the directive
for him to explain his numerous unauthorized absences constitute
sufficient grounds for his termination.
Nonetheless, while the CA recognized the existence of just causes
for petitioners dismissal, it found the petitioner entitled to nominal
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 due to Graphics, Inc.s failure
to observe the procedural requirements of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the employee was proper
and based on just cause
This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the assailed issuances
of the CA.
First, the petitioners arbitrary defiance to Graphics, Inc.s order
for him to render overtime work constitutes willful
disobedience. Second, the petitioners failure to observe Graphics,
Inc.s work standards constitutes inefficiency that is a valid cause
for dismissal. As the operator of Graphics, Inc.s printer, he is
mandated to check whether the colors that would be printed are in
accordance with the clients specifications and for him to do so, he
must consult the General Manager and the color guide used by
Graphics, Inc. before making a full run. Unfortunately, he failed to
observe this simple procedure and proceeded to print without
making sure that the colors were at par with the clients demands
The procedure laid down by Graphics, Inc. which the petitioner was
bound to observe does not appear to be unreasonable or
unnecessarily difficult.

G.R. No. 192190

Undoubtedly, Graphics, Inc. complied with the substantive

requirements of due process in effecting employee
dismissal. However, the same cannot be said insofar as the
procedural requirements are concerned. As correctly observed by
the CA, Graphics, Inc. failed to afford the petitioner with a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and defend itself. An
administrative hearing set on the same day that the petitioner
received the memorandum and the twenty-four (24) hour period
for him to submit a written explanation are far from being
reasonable. there is no indication that Graphics, Inc. issued a second
notice, informing the petitioner of his dismissal. Nonetheless, while
the CA finding that the petitioner is entitled to nominal damages as
his right to procedural due process was not respected despite the
presence of just causes for his dismissal is affirmed, this Court finds
the CA to have erred in fixing the amount that the Company is
liable to pay. The CA should have taken cognizance of the
numerous cases decided by this Court where the amount of nominal
damages was fixed at P30,000.00 if the dismissal was for a just



The CA exonerated the petitioner from the charges of destroying

Graphics, Inc.s property and disloyalty to Graphics, Inc. and its

C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, et al.

the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its assailed
Decision. The unfair labor practice complaint dismissed by Labor
Arbiter Pati questioned petitioners actions immediately after the
March 19, 2001 Decision of BLR Regional Director Maraan,
finding that the reason for the hold-over [of the previously elected
union officers] is already extinguished. Neither can petitioner seek
refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already
released the escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized
relations with the latter. The fact remains that from its receipt of the
July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-00152003 until its receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the
Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty
to collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason.

March 14, 2012

G.R. No. 155109
The negotiation between CASI and the Union on the economic
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) ended in
a deadlock prompting the Union to stage a strike,[7] but the strike
was later declared by the Labor Arbiter (LA) to be illegal having
been staged in violation of the CBAs no strike-no lockout
provision.[8] Consequently, the Union officers were deemed to have
forfeited their employment with the company and made them liable
for actual damages plus interest and attorneys fees, while the Union
members were ordered to be reinstated without backwages there
being no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during the
Notwithstanding the provision of the Labor Code mandating that
the reinstatement aspect of the decision be immediately executory,
the LA refused to reinstate the dismissed Union members. On
November 8, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision insofar as it
declared the strike illegal and ordered the Union officers dismissed
from employment and liable for damages but modified the same by
considering the Union members to have been validly dismissed
from employment for committing prohibited and illegal acts.[10]
On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals (CA)
annulled the NLRC decision and reinstated that of the LA.
Aggrieved, CASI, the Union and the Union officers and members
elevated the matter to this Court
The union members who were reinstated filed for the
computation of their back wages but the LA award only separation
pay. On appeal, the NLRC denied the union's claims. The CA held
that reinstatement pending appeal applies only to illegal dismissal
cases under Article 223 of the Labor Code and not to cases under
Article 263.
ISSUE: Whether or not the union members commission of
prohibited acts tantamounts to a valid dismissal
The Court agreed with the CA on the illegality of the strike as well
as the termination of the Union officers, but disagreed with the CA
insofar as it affirmed the reinstatement of the Union members. The
Court, instead, sustained the dismissal not only of the Union
officers but also the Union members who, during the illegal strike,
committed prohibited acts by threatening, coercing, and
intimidating non-striking employees, officers, suppliers and
customers; obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the
company premises; and resisting and defying the implementation of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the strikers. The
terminated employees who should have been reinstated immediately
should be awarded their accrued backwages from the date of the LA
decision until the eventual reversal by the NLRC of the order of
reinstatement plus separation pay.

Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code lays down the liabilities of the
Union officers and members participating in illegal strikes and/or
committing illegal acts, to wit:
(a) x x x
(b) Any worker whose employment has been terminated
as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any
Union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or Union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired
by the employer during such lawful strike.
Not only did the Court declare the strike illegal, rather, it also found
the Union officers to have knowingly participated in the illegal
strike. Worse, the Union members committed prohibited acts during
the strike
The award of separation pay as a form of financial assistance is

Eden Gladys Abaria,et al. vs NLRC, et al.
December 7, 2011
G.R. No. 15411
Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI), presently known
as the Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC). is owned by
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and Rev.
Gregorio P. Iyoy is the Hospital Administrator. The National
Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI.
On December 6, 1995, the union expressed desire to renew the
CBA. Atty. Alforque, NFLs Regional Director suspended union
membership of some for serious violation of the Constitution and
On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI
granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members.[5]
The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group
launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and
putting up placards, posters and streamers.

MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit within 48

hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for
having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike,
and placed them under immediate preventive suspension.
Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a
temporary stoppage of work, explaining only reiterating their
demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively.
Union officers were ordered to appear for investigation in
connection with the illegal strike wherein they reportedly uttered
slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the hospital,
threatening other workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said
union officers, however, invoked the grievance procedure provided
in the CBA
With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations
and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition for
injunction in the NLRC to which a TRO was issued.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice were filed by the terminated employees. The complaints for
ULP were dismissed. Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino found no
basis for the charge of unfair labor practice and declared the strike
and picketing activities illegal having been conducted by NAMAMCCH-NFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. The
termination of union leaders Nava, Alsado, Baez, Bongcaras,
Canen, Gerona and Remocaldo were upheld as valid but MCCHI
was directed to grant separation pay equivalent to one-half month
for every year of service
NLRC denied complainants motion for reconsideration. CA
reversed the assailed decision. In G.R. No. 187778, petitioners
Nava, et al. prayed that the CA decision be set aside and a new
judgment be entered by this Court (1) declaring private respondents
guilty of unfair labor practice and union busting; (2) directing
private respondents to cease and desist from further committing
unfair labor practices against the petitioners; (3) imposing upon
MCCH the proposed CBA or, in the alternative, directing the
hospital and its officers to bargain with the local union; (4)
declaring private respondents guilty of unlawfully suspending and
illegally dismissing the individual petitioners-employees; (5)
directing private respondents to reinstate petitioners-employees to
their former positions, or their equivalent, without loss of seniority
rights with full backwages and benefits until reinstatement; and (6)
ordering private respondents to pay the petitioners moral damages,
exemplary damages, legal interests, and attorneys fees
ISSUE: whether MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice;
MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor practice
Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer [t]o violate the duty to bargain
collectively as prescribed by the Code. The applicable provision
in this case is Art. 253 which provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there

is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain

collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a written
notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least
sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be
the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMAMCCH-NFL had not registered as a labor organization, having
submitted only its charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter
of NFL.[37] Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMAMCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate
labor organization under Art. 242, specifically:
(a) To act as the representative of its members for the
purpose of collective bargaining;
(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining;
Aside from the registration requirement, it is only the labor
organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit which is the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining, as provided in Art. 255.[38]
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or
designated by the majority of the rank-and-file hospital employees
to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the NFL, as
evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994. While it is
true that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from the national
federation, NAMA-MCCH-NFL has not done so as there was no
any effort on its part to comply with the legal requisites for a valid
disaffiliation during the freedom period[39] or the last 60 days of
the last year of the CBA, through a majority vote in a secret
balloting in accordance with Art. 241 (d).[40] Nava and her group
simply demanded that MCCHI directly negotiate with the local
union which has not even registered as one.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL at the time of submission of said proposals
was not a duly registered labor organization, hence it cannot legally
represent MCCHIs rank-and-file employees for purposes of
collective bargaining. Hence, even assuming that NAMA-MCCHNFL had validly disaffiliated from its mother union, NFL, it still did
not possess the legal personality to enter into CBA negotiations. A
local union which is not independently registered cannot, upon
disaffiliation from the federation, exercise the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations; thus, it cannot file
a petition for certification election
Not being a legitimate labor organization nor the certified exclusive
bargaining representative of MCCHIs rank-and-file employees,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot demand from MCCHI the right to
bargain collectively in their behalf.[45] Hence, MCCHIs refusal to

bargain then with NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot be considered an

unfair labor practice to justify the staging of the strike

BORELA, representing its members,- vs -MANILA WATER
G.R. No. 174179
November 16, 2011
The Union is the duly-recognized bargaining agent of the rankand-file employees of the respondent Manila Water Company, Inc.
(Company) while Borela is the Union President
On February 21, 1997, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) entered into a Concession Agreement (Agreement)
with the Company to privatize the operations of the MWSS. in
2001, the Union demanded from the Company the payment of the
AA and the COLA during the renegotiation of the parties
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).[10] The Company
initially turned down this demand, however, it subsequently agreed
to an amendment of the CBA on the matter. Commission on Audit
disapproved its payment because the Company had no funds to
cover this benefit causing a complaint against the Company for
LA ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the payment of
their AA and COLA. NLRC affirmed with modification the LAs
decision.[15] It set aside the award of the COLA benefits because
the claim was not proven and established, but ordered the Company
to pay the petitioners their accrued AA of aboutP107,300,000.00 in
lump sum and to continue paying the AA starting August 1, 2002.
The CA ruled that the facts of the case do not indicate any unlawful
withholding of wages or bad faith attributable to the Company. It
also held that the additional grant of 10% attorneys fees violates
Article 111 of the Labor Code considering that the MOA between
the parties already ensured the payment of 10% attorneys fees,
deductible from the AA and CBA receivables of the Unions
members. The CA thus adjudged the NLRC decision awarding
attorneys fees to have been rendered with grave abuse of
Company argues that the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the LAs award of
attorneys fees despite the absence of a finding of any unlawful
withholding of wages or bad faith on the part of the Company.
ISSUE: whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
awarding ten percent (10%) attorneys fees to the petitioners

Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs the grant of

attorneys fees in labor cases:
Art. 111. Attorneys fees.- (a) In cases of
unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party may be assessed attorneys
fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount
of wages recovered.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to

demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery
of wages, attorneys fees which exceed ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered.
Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its Implementing Rules also
provides, viz.:
Section 8. Attorneys fees.
Attorneys fees in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery
of wages shall not exceed 10% of the
amount awarded. The fees may be
deducted from the total amount due the
winning party.
In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services
the former renders; compensation is paid for the cost and/or results
of legal services per agreement or as may be assessed. In its
extraordinary concept, attorneys fees are deemed indemnity
for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party
to the winning party.
We also held in PCL Shipping that Article 111 of the Labor Code, as
amended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorneys
fees and that Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of
strict construction in the award of attorneys fees. Although an
express finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the
merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the
employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the
The award of attorneys fees is proper, and there need not be
any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith
when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that
the lawful wages were not paid accordingly
the CA erred in ruling that a finding of the employers malice or
bad faith in withholding wages must precede an award of attorneys
fees under Article 111 of the Labor Code. To reiterate, a plain
showing that the lawful wages were not paid without justification is
In the present case, we find it undisputed that the union members
are entitled to their AA benefits and that these benefits were not
paid by the Company. That the Company had no funds is not a
defense as this was not an insuperable cause that was cited and

properly invoked. As a consequence, the union members

represented by the Union were compelled to litigate and incur legal
expenses. On these bases, we find no difficulty in upholding the
NLRCs award of ten percent (10%) attorneys fees.
In the present case, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees awarded
by the NLRC on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code accrue
to the Unions members as indemnity for damages and not to the
Unions counsel as compensation for his legal services, unless, they
agreed that the award shall be given to their counsel as
additional or part of his compensation; in this case the Union
bound itself to pay 10% attorneys fees to its counsel under the
MOA and also gave up the attorneys fees awarded to the Unions
members in favor of their counsel. The limit to this agreement is
that the indemnity for damages imposed by the NLRC on the
losing party (i.e., the Company) cannot exceed ten percent
the attorneys fees contracted under the MOA do not refer to
the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC; the MOA
provision on attorneys fees does not have any bearing at all to
the attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC under Article 111 of
the Labor Code. Based on these considerations, it is clear that the
CA erred in ruling that the LAs award of attorneys fees violated
the maximum limit of ten percent (10%) fixed by Article 111 of the
Labor Code.

Union's comment on the Motion for Reconsideration states the

voluntary nature of the merger between BPI and FEBTC, the lack of
an express stipulation in the Articles of Merger regarding the
transfer of employment contracts to the surviving corporation, and
the consensual nature of employment contracts as valid bases for
the conclusion that former FEBTC employees should be deemed
new employees.The Union argues that the creation of employment
relations between former FEBTC employees and
BPI occurred after the merger, or to be more precise, after the SEC's
approval of the merger.
1. Whether or not the "absorbed" FEBTC employees fell within the
definition of "new employees" under the Union Shop Clause, such
that they may be required to join respondent union and if they fail to
do so, the Union may request BPI to terminate their employment.
2. Whether or not the affirmance of the ruling that former FEBTC
employees absorbed by BPI are covered by the Union Shop Clause
violate their right to security of tenure.
1. YES

G.R. No. 164301 October 19, 2011
Petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) moves for
reconsideration holding that former employees of the Far East Bank
and Trust Company (FEBTC) "absorbed" by BPI pursuant to the
two banks merger were covered by the Union Shop Clause in the
then existing collective bargaining agreement of BPI with
respondent union.
The Union Shop Clause:
Section 2. Union Shop - New employees falling within the
bargaining unit as defined in Article I of this Agreement, who may
hereafter be regularly employed by the Bank shall, within thirty
(30) days after they become regular employees, join the Union as a
condition of their continued employment. It is understood that
membership in good standing in the Union is a condition of their
continued employment with the Bank. BPI continues to protest the
inclusion of FEBTC employees in the Union Shop Clause.
BPI insists that the parties to the CBA clearly intended to limit the
application of the Union Shop Clause only to new employees who
were hired as non-regular employees but later attained regular status
at some point after hiring. FEBTC employees cannot be considered
new employees as BPI merely stepped into the shoes of FEBTC as
an employer purely as a consequence of the merger.

The Union Shop Clause in the CBA simply states that "new
employees" who during the effectivity of the CBA "may be
regularly employed" by the Bank must join the union within thirty
(30) days from their regularization. There is nothing in the said
clause that limits its application to only new employees who
possess non-regular status, meaning probationary status, at the start
of their employment. Petitioner likewise failed to point to any
provision in the CBA expressly excluding from the Union Shop
Clause new employees who are "absorbed" as regular employees
from the beginning of their employment. What is indubitable from
the Union Shop Clause is that upon the effectivity of the CBA,
petitioner's new regular employees, regardless of the manner by
which they became employees of BPI, are required to join the
Union as a condition of their continued employment.
Ordinary meaning of the terms of the Union Shop Clause, it covers
employees who (a) enter the employ of BPI during the term of the
CBA; (b) are part of the bargaining unit defined in the CBA as
comprised of BPIs rank and file employees; and (c) become regular
employees without distinguishing as to the manner theyacquire their
regular status.
2. No.
It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to security
of tenure. The guarantee is an act of social justice. Article 280 of the
Labor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause or when authorized by the Code.

It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers

to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with
more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately
bargain with the employer. The law has allowed stipulations for
'union shop' and 'closed shop' as means of encouraging workers to
join and support the union of their choice in the protection of
their rights and interests vis-a-vis the employer.
The dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby
eroding the employees' right to due process, self-organization
and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is
authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized
by arbitrariness, and always with due process.

(KMLMS) and
G.R. Nos. 191138-39 October 19, 2011
KMLMS filed a notice of strike on March 5, 2002 and conducted its
strike-vote on April 8, 2002. However, KMLMS only acquired legal
personality when its registration as an independent labor
organization was granted on April 9, 2002 by the Department of
Labor and Employment. On April 19, 2002, it became officially
affiliated as a local chapter of the Pambansang Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino when its application was granted by the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
On May 6, 2002, KMLMS, now a legitimate labor organization
(LLO), staged a strike where several prohibited and illegal acts
were committed by its participating members.
On the ground of lack of valid notice of strike, ineffective conduct
of a strike-vote and commission of prohibited and illegal acts,
petitioners filed their Petition to Declare the Strike of May 6, 2002
Illegal before the NLRC. Petitioners prayed, inter alia, that the
officers and members of respondent KMLMS who participated in
the illegal strike and who knowingly committed prohibited and
illegal activities, respectively, be declared to have lost or forfeited
their employment status.
On the ground of non-compliance with the strict and mandatory
requirements for a valid conduct of a strike under Article 263(c), (d)
and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, LA Aglibut found the May 6,
2002 strike illegal and accordingly dismissed all the 14 union
officers of KMLMS. LA Aglibut likewise found 27 identified
members of KMLMS to have committed prohibited and illegal acts
proscribed under Art. 264 of the Labor Code and accordingly
declared them to have forfeited their employment.

Both parties appealed the Decision of LA Aglibut before the NLRC

NLRC affirmed with modification LA Aglibuts Decision by
declaring an additional seven (7) union members to have forfeited
their employment status.
Both parties again filed their respective appeals before the CA. CA
affirmed the NLRC decision.
Petitioners prayed to SC for a partial modification of the assailed
CA Decision by declaring additional 72 similarly erring KMLMS
members to have lost their employment.
Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to similarly declare as
having lost their employment status the rest of the union strikers
who have participated in the illegal strike and commited prohibited /
illegal acts, to the prejudice of petitioner's business operations.

There is no question that the May 6, 2002 strike was illegal, first,
because when KMLMS filed the notice of strike, it had not yet
acquired legal personality and, thus, could not legally represent the
eventual union and its members. And second, similarly when
KMLMS conducted the strike-vote, there was still no union to
speak of, since KMLMS only acquired legal personality as an
independent LLO only on the day after it conducted the strike-vote.
These factual findings are undisputed and borne out by the
records. Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the
conduct of the strike-vote report were ineffective for having been
filed and conducted before KMLMS acquired legal personality as
an LLO, violating Art. 263(c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and
Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
When the May 6, 2002 illegal strike was conducted, the members of
respondent KMLMS committed prohibited and illegal acts which
doubly constituted the strike illegal. Proper sanctions for the
conduct of union officers in an illegal strike and for union members
who committed illegal acts during a strike. Art. 264 of the Code
presents a substantial distinction of the consequences of an illegal
strike between union officers and mere members of the union. For
union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid
ground for termination of their employment. But for union members
who participated in a strike, their employment may be terminated
only if they committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike
and there is substantial evidence or proof of their participation, that
they are clearly identified to have committed such prohibited and
illegal acts.
The petitioners have substantially proved the identity of 72 other
union members who committed prohibited and illegal acts
during the May 6, 2002 illegal strike. Thus, the 72 union members
who committed prohibited and illegal acts during the May 6, 2002
strike are also declared to have forfeited their employment.

G.R. No. 146206 August 1, 2011
DOLE-NCR conducted pre-election conferences. However, there
was a discrepancy in the list of eligible voters. Petitioner submitted
a list of 23 employees for the San Fernando plant and 33 for the
Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and 82, respectively.
The Med-Arbiter issued an order directing the Election Officer to
proceed with the conduct of Certification Election.
On the date of the election, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections
and Challenge to Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some
of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong
to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that
there is no existence of employer-employee relationship with
petitioner. Specifically, it argued that certain employees should not
be allowed to vote as they are: (1) confidential employees; (2)
employees assigned to the live chicken operations, which are not
covered by the bargaining unit; (3) employees whose job grade is
level 4, but are performing managerial work and scheduled to
be promoted; (4) employees who belong to the Barrio Ugong plant;
(5) non-SMFI employees; and (6) employees who are members of
other unions.
The CE was conducted. Based on the results, Med-Arbiter issued an
order stating respondent is certified to be the exclusive bargaining
agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of petitioner's
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and
Petitioner contends that identifying the specific employees who
can participate in the certification election, the supervisors (levels 1
to 4) and exempt employees of San Miguel Poultry Products Plants
in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, the CA erred in expanding the
scope of the bargaining unit so as to include employees who do not
belong to or who are not based in its Cabuyao or San Fernando
plants. It also alleges that the employees of the Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis plants of petitioners predecessor, San Miguel
Corporation, were engaged in "dressed" chicken processing, like
handling and packaging of chicken meat, while the new bargaining
unit, includes employees engaged in "live" chicken operations, such
as those who breed chicks and grow chickens.
Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct.

Employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products

Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single
bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, oneunion policy.
An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees
of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
Under the "community or mutuality of interests" test, It held that
while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be
reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the
same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be
considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of
interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining
units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights. There may be differences as to the
nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not
enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
Applying the ruling to the present case, SC affirms the finding of
the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the
employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia Poultry
Products Plant involved in "dressed" chicken processing and
Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in "live" chicken operations.
Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions,
location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant
conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest.
Although they seem separate and distinct from each other,
the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there
exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a
single bargaining unit.

G.R. No. 172699 July 27, 2011
The private respondent Nagkakaisang Samahan ng Manggagawa ng
Electromat-Wasto (union), a charter affiliate of the Workers
Advocates for Struggle, Transformation and Organization
(WASTO), applied for registration with the BLR. Supporting the
application were the following documents: (1) copies of its
ratified constitution and by-laws (CBL); (2) minutes of the CBLs
organizational meetings; (4) names and addresses of the union
officers; (5) list of union members; (6) list of rank-andfile employees in the company; (7) certification of non-existence of

a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the company; (8)

resolution of affiliation with WASTO, a labor federation; (9)
WASTOs resolution of acceptance; (10) Charter Certificate; and
(11) Verification under oath.

unions; local chapters seemingly have lesser requirements because

they and their members are deemed to be direct members of the
federation to which they are affiliated, which federations are the
ones subject to the strict registration requirements of the law.

The BLR thereafter issued the union a Certification of Creation of

Local Chapter, equivalent to the certificate of registration of an
independent union, pursuant to Department Order No. (D.O.) 40-03.


Petitioner Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation

(company) filed a petition for cancellation of the unions
registration certificate, for the unions failure to comply with Article
234 of the Labor Code. It argued that D.O. 40-03 is an
unconstitutional diminution of the Labor Codes union
registration requirements under Article 234.
DOLE-NCR dismissed the petition. BLR affirmed the dismissal.
Company sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari,
contending that the BLR committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the unions registration despite its non-compliance with
the requirements for registration under
Article 234 of the Labor Code. It assailed the validity of D.O. 40-03
which amended the rules of Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor
Code. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of BLR.
Whether or not therespondent union was validly registered in
accordance with the Labor Code.
The local union in the present case has more than satisfied the
requirements the petitioner complains about; specifically, the union
has submitted: (1) copies of the ratified CBL; (2) the minutes of the
CBLs adoption and ratification; (3) the minutes of the
organizational meetings; (4) the names and addresses of the union
officers; (5) the list of union members; (6) the list of rank-and-file
employees in the company; (7) a certification of non-existence of
aCBA in the company; (8) the resolution of affiliation with WASTO
and the latters acceptance; and (9) their Charter Certificate. These
submissions were properly verified as required by the rules. In sum,
the petitioner has no factual basis for questioning the unions
registration, as even the requirements for registration as an
independent local have been substantially complied with.

D.O. 40-03 represents an expression of the governments

implementing policy on trade unionism. SC finds nothing contrary
to the law or the Constitution in the adoption by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment of D.O. 40-03 as this department order is
consistent with the intent of the government to encourage the
affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union to
enhance the locals bargaining power. If changes were made at all,
these were those made to recognize the distinctions made in the law
itself between federations and their local chapters, and independent

Automotive Engine Rebuilders, Inc. (AER), et al. Vs. Progresibong

Unyon Ng Mga Manggagawa sa AER, et al.
G.R. No. 160138 July 13, 2011
According to the Union, when the management learned that the
workers began organizing themselves into a union and received
summons regarding the petition for certification election filed by
the employees, they retaliated by causing the employees to submit
themselves to drug test, and when the results were positive, they
were suspended. When the Union sensed that management was
going to engage in a runaway shop, it tried to prevent the transfer of
the machines which prompted AER to issue a memorandum
accusing those involved of gross insubordination, work stoppage
and other offenses. After being denied entry into the premises, the
affected workers staged a picket in front of company premises
hoping that management would accept them back to work. When
their picket proved futile, they filed a complaint for ULP, illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal.
The LA that both parties were in pari delicto and, therefore, must
suffer the consequences of the wrong they committed. On appeal by
both parties to NLRC, it found that there was no illegal dismissal.
On petition, both parties were found by the CA to be in pari delicto
and must bear the consequences of their own wrongdoing. On
reconsideration, the CA ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners
without back wages. Botheparties filed the consolidated petition
with the SC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling for the reinstatement of the
complaining employees but without grant of backwages.
This Court likewise affirms the ruling of the CA favoring the
reinstatement of all the complaining employees including those who
tested positive for illegal drugs, without backwages. The Court is in
accord with the ruling of the LA and the CA that neither party came
to court with clean hands. Both were in pari delicto.
It cannot be disputed that both parties filed charges against each
other, blaming the other party for violating labor laws. AER filed a
complaint against Unyon and its 18 members for illegal concerted
activities. It likewise suspended 7 union members who tested
positive for illegal drugs. On the other hand, Unyon filed a
countercharge accusing AER of unfair labor practice, illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal. In other words, AER claims that
Unyon was guilty of staging an illegal strike while Unyon claims
that AER committed an illegal lockout.

In the case at bar, since both AER and the union are at fault or in
pari delicto, they should be restored to their respective positions
prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout.

General Milling Corporation-Independent Labor Union (GMCILU), petitioner vs. General Milling Corporation, respondent

as well as separations from employment which may have, in the

meantime, occurred after the expiration of the remaining term of the
original CBA, the identity of the covered employees as well as the
extent of the benefits due to them should clearly be reckoned from
acquisition and until loss of their status as regular monthly paid
employees. Since the computation must likewise necessarily take
into consideration the increase in salaries and benefits that may
have been given in the intervening period, both GMC and the Union
are enjoined to make the pertinent employment and company
records available to each other, to facilitate the accurate
determination of said benefits.

GR. No. 183122, June 15, 2011

On April 28, 1989, GMC and the Union entered into a CBA which
provided the latters representation of the collective bargaining unit
for a 3-year term made to retroact to December 1, 1988. One day
before the expiration of the CBA, the Union sent a draft CBA
proposal to GMC with a request for counter-proposals for the
purpose of renegotiating the existing CBA between the parties. The
GMC failed to comply with the said request, the Union commenced
the complaint to the Regional Arbitration Branch- VII of the NLRC
for unfair labor practice but was dismissed for lack of merit. On
appeal, the dismissal was reversed and set aside by the 4 th Division
of the NLRC. Union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
which favoured the former. They held that GMCs refusal to make a
counter proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an
indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother
to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there
is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. With the
ensuing finality of the foregoing decision, the Union filed a motion
for issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the claims of the
covered employees. However, the Union was dissatisfied to the
computation of the Executive Labor Arbiter of the claims. Both
respondent filed a petitions for certiorari to the CA. Acknowledging
the difficulty of computing the benefits demanded by the Union in
the absence of evidence upon which to base the same, the CA
referred the case to the Grievance Machinery under the imposed
CBA. On the other hand, GMCs petition was dismissed for lack of
WON the grievance machinery of the imposed CBA is proper in
determining the benefits or claims of the Union.
The extent of the benefits after the expiration of the term of the
parties original CBA as well as the identity of the employees
entitled will be better and more thoroughly threshed out by the
parties themselves in accordance with the grievance procedure
outlined in Article XII of the imposed CBA. Aside from being
already beyond the scope of the decision sought to be enforced,
these matters will not be accurately ascertained from the summaries
of claims the parties have been wont to submit at the pre-execution
conference conducted a quo. Taking into consideration such factors
as hiring new employees, personnel movement and/or promotions

Yolito Fadriquelan, Arturo Eguna, Armando Malaluan, Danilo
Alonzo, Romulo Dimaano, Roel Mayuga, Wilfredo Rizaldo,
Romeo Suico, Domingo Escamillas and Domingo Bautro,
petitioners VS. Monterey Foods Corporation, respondents
GR No. 178409, June 8, 2011
On April 30, 2002, the CBA between the union Bukluran ng
Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa and
Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired. On March 28,
2003 after the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock, the
union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. On April 30, 2003,
the company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of
jurisdiction over the dispute to head off the strike. The DOLE
Secretary, in its May 12, 2003 order, assumed the jurisdiction over
the dispute and enjoined the union from holding any strike. On May
21, 2003, the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB
on the ground that the company committed unfair labor practices.
On June 10, 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers
charging them with intentional acts of slowdown. Six days later, the
company sent new notices to the union officers, informing them of
their termination from work for defying the DOLE Secretarys
assumption order. The Secretary included the unions second notice
of strike in his earlier assumption order but on the same day, the
union filed a third notice of strike on the ground that the company
had engaged in union busting and illegal dismissal of union officers.
The company then filed a petition for certification of the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration but the DOLE
Secretary denied the motion. He, however subsumed the third
notice of strike under the first and second notices. On November 20,
2003 the DOLE upheld the companys termination of the union
officers. The union and its officers appealed to the CA. The CA
rendered a decision upholding the validity of the termination of 10
union officers but declaring illegal that of the other 7. Hence this
WON the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at
the companys farms.

Yes. The law is explicit; no strike shall be declared after the

Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute. A
strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union
officer who knowingly participates in the same be declared as
having lost his employment. In this case, what is involved is a
slowdown strike. Unlike other forms of strike, the employees
involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs. They need
only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally
remaining in their assigned post. The evidence sufficiently shows
that the union officers and members simultaneously stopped work at
the companys farms. The unions contention that it merely held
assemblies to inform members of the developments in the CBA
negotiation and not protest demonstrations over it is unmeritorious.
As the CA correctly observed, if the meetings had already been for
the stated reason, why did the union members and officers from
separate company farms choose to start and end their meetings at
the same time and on the same day? And if they did not intend a
slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work.
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, petitioner vs.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., respondent
GR No. 168383, June 6, 2011
Petitioner ALPAP is a legitimate labor organization and exclusive
bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that
PAL committed unfair labor practice, the union filed a notice of
strike against PAL with the DOLE. Upon PALs petition and
considering that its continued operation is impressed with public
interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute per order dated December 23, 1997. The order provides
that all strikes and lockouts at the PAL, whether actual or
impending, are prohibited and the parties are enjoined from
committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. Despite such
order, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998 but the DOLE issue a
return-to-work order on June 7, 1998. However, it was only on June
26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work
as shown in a logbook signed by each of them. With this, PAL
refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply
immediately with the return-to-work order. ALPAP then filed a
complaint for illegal lockout against PAL to the Labor Arbiter. They
contended that their counsel received a copy of the return-to-work
order only on June 25, 1998. On PALs motion, the Labor Arbiter
consolidated the illegal lockout case pending before the DOLE
Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an
offshoot of the labor dispute over which the DOLE Secreatry has
assumed jurisdiction. In a resolution, the NLRC sustained the
consolidation of the illegal lockout case with the strike case,
opining that the DOLE Secretary has the authority to resolve all
incidents attendant to his return-to-work order. DOLE Secretary
then issued a resolution declaring the strike illegal and pronouncing
the loss of employment of its officers and members who
participated in the strike. ALPAP filed a motion for reconsideration
which was then denied. They appealed to the CA but the latter
upheld the DOLE Resolution. They elevated the matter to the SC
but their petition was dismissed on April 10, 2002 and attained
finality on August 29, 2002. On January 13, 2003, ALPAP filed
before the Office of the DOLE Secretary a motion requesting to
conduct a legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and
members should be reinstated or deemed to lost their employment
with PAL for their actual participation in the strike. PAL, in its
comment to ALPAPs motion, argued that the motions cannot
legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary has no authority to
reopen or review a final judgment of the SC and the requested

proceeding is no longer necessary as the CA or the SC did not order

the remand of the case to the DOLE Secretary for such
determination. The DOLE Secretary then ordered that their case has
indeed been resolved with finality by the highest tribunal of the
land. Being final and executory, the Office is bereft of authority to
reopen an issue that has been passed upon by the SC. Again, they
appealed to the CA but was later denied. Hence, this petition.
WON there is a need to conduct an appropriate proceeding to
determine the participants in the illegal strike and deemed to lost
their employment status.
There is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the
participants in the illegal strike or those who refused to heed the
return-to-work order because the ambiguity can be cured by
reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings filed. The
DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have
lost their employment status based on either of two grounds: (1)
their participation in the illegal strike or (2) their defiance of the
return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the
case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook
with the heading Return to Work Compliance/Returnees bears
their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were
among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998
or after the deadline imposed by the DOLE. From this crucial and
vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is
bound by the judgment.

Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers,
petitioner vs. Cirtek Electonics, Inc., respondent
GR. No. 190515, June 6, 2011
On August 24, 2005, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was
entered between the respondent and the petitioner. However, the
respondent subsequently question the validity of the MOA alleging
that as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed
with the DOLE a resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of
Free Workers resulting in the latters lack of personality to represent
the workers. Petitioner contended that the alleged disaffiliation from
the FFW was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23, 2010
and submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5, 2010
two months after the present petition was filed on December 22,
2009. However, the court ruled in favour of the petitioners in a
decision dated November 15, 2010. This opted the respondent to
file a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
WON there was a valid disaffiliation.
At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute
which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the

instance of either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor
organization, not the employer. An intra-union dispute refers to any
conflict between and among union members, including grievances
arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of
membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the
unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering
or disaffiliation of the union. Indeed, a local union may disaffiliate
at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the
same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however,
does not result in its losing its legal personality altogether. A local
labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to
secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the
employer and their employee-members. A local union does not owe
its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a
separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the
will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the
local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union.

Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union-ALUTUCP, petitioner vs. Philippine National Oil Company-Energy
Development Corporation, respondent
GR No. 170351, March 30, 2011
Respondent PNOC-EDC is a government-owned and controlled
corporation engaged in exploration, development, utilization,
generation and distribution of energy like geothermal energy while
petitioner is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the
DOLE Tacloban City. Leyte Geothermal Power Project is among
respondents geothermal project. The said project is composed of
the Tongonan 1 Geothermal Project (T1GP) and the Leyte
Geothermal Production Field Project (LGFP) which provide the
power and electricity needed in Central and Eastern Visayas and
Luzon. They employed hundreds of employees on a contractual
basis whereby their employment was only good up to the
completion or termination of the project and would automatically
expire upon the completion of such project. Majority of the
employees employed in the project had become members of
petitioner and with that, the petitioner demands from the respondent
for recognition of it as the collective bargaining agent and for a
CBA negotiation with it. However, respondent didnt heed such
demands. When the project was about to be completed, respondent
serve Notices of Termination of Employment upon the employees
who are members of the petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Notice of
Strike against the respondent of unfair labor practice for refusal to
bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination. On the
same day, the petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike.
Secretary of Labor intervened and issued an order directing all
striking workers to return to work with 12 hours from the receipt of
the order and the respondent to accept them back. However, the
petitioner remained adamant in its position. They did not abide by
the assumption order issued by the Secretary of Labor. The
respondent filed a complaint for strike illegality where the NLRC
4th Division favoured. Petitioner union filed a MR but was
subsequently denied. They appealed to the CA but the latter
likewise denied the petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition.

(1) WON the officers and members of the petitioner Union are
project employees of respondent; and
(2) WON the officers and members of the petitioner Union
engaged in illegal strike.
(1) Regular employees or those who have been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer while project
employees or those whose employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee. In the case at bar, the
records reveal that the officers and members of the
petitioner signed employment contracts indicating the
specific project or phase of work for which they were
hired, with a fixed period of employment. As clearly
shown by petitioners own admission, both parties had
executed the contracts freely and voluntarily without force,
duress etc. Plainly, the litmus test to determine whether an
individual is a project employee lies in settling a fixed
period of employment involving a specific undertaking
which completion or termination has been determined at
the time of the particular employees engagement.
(2) Petitioner engaged in illegal strike. It is quite evident from
the records that the petitioner filed a notice of strike with
the DOLE on December 28, 1998. On even date, the
petitioner declared and staged a strike. Attempts by the
NCMB to forge a mutually acceptable solution proved
futile. Moreover, the petitioner in its pleading used the
word strike.

Case # 30
No. 165381;February 9, 2011 FIRST DIVISION; LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.
Facts: Respondent Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI) is a telecommunications company engaged mainly in the
business of establishing commercial telecommunications systems
and leasing of international datalines or circuits that pass through
the international gateway facility (IGF).7 The other respondents are
ETPIs officers: Salvador Hizon, President and Chief Executive
Officer; Emiliano Jurado, Chairman of the Board; Virgilio Garcia,
Vice President; and Stella Garcia, Assistant Vice President.
Petitioner Nelson A. Culili (Culili) was employed by ETPI as a
Technician in its Field Operations Department on January 27, 1981.
On December 12, 1996, Culili was promoted to Senior Technician
in the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit of the
Service Quality Department and his basic salary was increased.8
In 1998, due to business troubles and losses, ETPI was compelled to
implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases.
Among the departments abolished was the Service Quality
Department. The abolition of the Service Quality Department
rendered the specialized functions of a Senior Technician
unnecessary. As a result, Culilis position was abolished due to
redundancy and his functions were absorbed by Andre Andrada,
another employee already with the Business and Consumer
Accounts Department

On February 8, 2000, Culili filed a complaint against ETPI and its

officers for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money
claims before the Labor Arbiter.
On April 30, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding
ETPI guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision but
modified the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded.
The Court of Appeals, on February 5, 2004, partially granted ETPIs
Issue: 1) W/n the Right-Sizing Program initiated by herein company
is valid;
2) W/n petitioners position had become redundant.
Held: Among the requisites of a valid redundancy program are:
(1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant
position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what
positions are to be declared redundant,39 such as but not limited to:
preferred status, efficiency, and seniority.
In the case at bar, ETPI was upfront with its employees
about its plan to implement a Right-Sizing Program. Even in the
face of initial opposition from and rejection of the said program by
ETEU, ETPI patiently negotiated with ETEUs officers to make
them understand ETPIs business dilemma and its need to reduce its
workforce and streamline its organization. This evidently rules out
bad faith on the part of ETPI.
There is redundancy when the service capability of the
workforce is greater than what is reasonably required to meet the
demands of the business enterprise. A position becomes redundant
when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors such as
over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping
a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured
or undertaken by the enterprise.
In deciding which positions to retain and which to abolish,
ETPI chose on the basis of efficiency, economy, versatility and
flexibility. It needed to reduce its workforce to a sustainable level
while maintaining functions necessary to keep it operating. The
records show that ETPI had sufficiently established not only its
need to reduce its workforce and streamline its organization, but
also the existence of redundancy in the position of a Senior
Technician. ETPI explained how it failed to meet its business targets
and the factors that caused this, and how this necessitated it to
reduce its workforce and streamline its organization. ETPI also
submitted its old and new tables of organization and sufficiently
described how limited the functions of the abolished position of a
Senior Technician were and how it decided on whom to absorb
these functions

Case # 31
Facts: Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup, Norberto Nigos
and Godofredo Magnaye were drivers while respondents Ronnie
Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye and
Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand
business owned and operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu.
Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a
Complaint3 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay,

holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against
petitioner on August 9, 2000 before the Labor Arbiter. On his part,
petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents.
On December 21, 2001, Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson R.
Gan (Gan) declared that petitioner illegally dismissed said
respondents and ordered reinstatement w/o loss of seniority rights
and payment of full backwages from date of dismissal to actual
The NLRC set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gan in
a Resolution7 dated September 5, 2002. Finding that respondents
failure to continue working for petitioner was neither caused by
termination nor abandonment of work, the NLRC ordered
respondents reinstatement but without backwages.
On December 9, 2003, however, respondents filed with the
Labor Arbiter an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Conference with
Motion.12 They averred therein that since the Decision of Labor
Arbiter Gan ordered their reinstatement, a Writ of
Execution13 dated April 22, 2002 was already issued for the
enforcement of its reinstatement aspect as same is immediately
executory even pending appeal. But this notwithstanding and
despite the issuance and subsequent finality of the NLRC
Resolution which likewise ordered respondents reinstatement,
petitioner still refused to reinstate them. Thus, respondents prayed
that in view of the orders of reinstatement, a computation of the
award of backwages be made and that an Alias Writ of Execution
for its enforcement be issued.
Nevertheless, Labor Arbiter Danna M. Castillon (Castillon)
still issued a Writ of Execution16 dated March 9, 2004 to enforce
the monetary award in accordance with the abovementioned
computation. Accordingly, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale/Levy
on Execution of Personal Property17 by virtue of which petitioners
properties were levied and set for auction sale on March 29, 2004.
In an effort to forestall this impending execution, petitioner then
filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with Prayer to Hold in
Abeyance of Auction Sale18 and a Supplemental Motion to
Quash/Stop Auction Sale.19 He also served upon the Sheriff a letter
of protest.20 All of these protest actions proved futile as the Sheriff
later submitted his Report dated March 30, 2004 informing the
Labor Arbiter that he had levied some of petitioners personal
properties and sold them in an auction sale where respondents were
the only bidders. After each of the respondents entered a bid equal
to their individual shares in the judgment award, the levied
properties were awarded to them.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but the latter dismissed said motion.
Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N respondents have the right to collect their accrued
salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiters Decision
ordering their reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC
Resolution overturning the same.
Held: Yes, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court or tribunal. It
likewise settled the view that the Labor Arbiters order of
reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to
either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the
payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative,
employer must pay the employees salaries.
In determining whether an employee is barred from
recovering his accrued wages the two-fold test must be applied to
wit: 1) there must be actual delay or that the order of reinstatement
pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the

delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission.

If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the
employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding
the reversal of the Labor Arbiters Decision.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the Labor

Arbiter and the NLRC. In its 13 December 2007 Decision, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the universitys petition.
Issue: 1) W/N the voluntary arbitrator had jurisdiction over the
labor dispute;
(2) whether Axalan was constructively dismissed;

Case# 32
TEODORA AXALAN; G.R. No. 181146; January 26, 2011;
Facts: Petitioner University of the Immaculate Conception is a
private educational institution located in Davao City. Private
respondent Teodora C. Axalan is a regular faculty member in the
university holding the position of Associate Professor II. Aside from
being a regular faculty member, Axalan is the elected president of
the employees union.
From 18 November to 22 November 2002, Axalan
attended a seminar in Quezon City on website development. Axalan
then received a memorandum6 from Dean Maria Rosa Celestial
asking her to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for
having been absent without official leave.
In her letter, Axalan claimed that she held online classes
while attending the seminar. She explained that she was under the
impression that faculty members would not be marked absent even
if they were not physically present in the classroom as long as they
conducted online classes. In reply, Dean Celestial relayed to Axalan
the message of the university president that no administrative
charge would be filed if Axalan would admit having been absent
without official leave and write a letter of apology seeking
forgiveness. Convinced that she could not be deemed absent since
she held online classes, Axalan opted not to write the letter of
admission and contrition the university president requested. The
Dean wrote Axalan that the university president had created an ad
hoc grievance committee to investigate the AWOL charge.
From 28 January to 3 February 2003, Axalan attended a
seminar in Baguio City on advanced paralegal training. Dean
Celestial wrote Axalan informing her that her participation in the
paralegal seminar in Baguio City was the subject of a second
AWOL charge.11 The dean asked Axalan to explain in writing why
no disciplinary action should be taken against her.
After conducting hearings and receiving evidence, the ad
hoc grievance committee found Axalan to have incurred AWOL on
both instances and recommended that Axalan be suspended without
pay for six months on each AWOL charge. The university president
approved the committees recommendation.On 1 December 2003,
Axalan filed a complaint against the university for illegal
suspension, constructive dismissal, reinstatement with backwages,
and unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and attorneys
The university moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint. The university maintained that jurisdiction
lay in the voluntary arbitrator. On 11 October 2004, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that the suspension of Axalan
amounted to constructive dismissal entitling her to reinstatement
and payment of backwages, salary differentials, damages, and
attorneys fees,
The NLRC held that the Labor Arbiter, not the voluntary
arbitrator, had jurisdiction as the controversy did not pertain to a
dispute involving the union and the university.

Held: The University contends that based on the transcript of

stenographic notes from the ad hoc grievance committee hearing
held on 20 February 2003, the parties agreed that the voluntary
arbitrator would have jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
In San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC,26 the Court ruled that for
the exception to apply, there must be agreement between the parties
clearly conferring jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such
agreement may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement.
However, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, it is
enough that there is evidence on record showing the parties have
agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.27
As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes of the
administrative hearing held on 20 February 2003, the parties in this
case clearly agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter should have immediately disposed of the
complaint and referred the same to the voluntary arbitrator when the
university moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in
a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors
of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not
supported by the evidence on record or the impugned judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts. Patently erroneous findings of
the Labor Arbiter, even when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals, are not binding on this Court.
As to the second issue, constructive dismissal occurs when
there is cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a
demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option
but to quit.
In this case however, there was no cessation of
employment relations between the parties.It is unrefuted that Axalan
promptly resumed teaching at the university right after the
expiration of the suspension period. In other words, Axalan never
quit. Hence, Axalan cannot claim that she was left with no choice
but to quit, a crucial element in a finding of constructive dismissal.
Thus, Axalan cannot be deemed to have been constructively
Significantly, at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on
11 October 2004, Axalan had already returned to her teaching job at
the university on 1 October 2004. The Labor Arbiters Decision
ordering the reinstatement of Axalan, who at the time had already
returned to work, is thus absurd.
There being no constructive dismissal, there is no legal
basis for the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement as well as
payment of backwages, salary differentials, damages, and attorneys
fees.30 Thus, the third issue raised in the petition is now moot

Case # 33
DIOSDADO GARCIA; G.R. No. 167291; January 12,

Facts: Respondents were employees of herein petitioner company.

The latter is engaged in the business of transporting of passengers
by land. The controversy begun when the company reduced the
commissions of the respondents, this led the latter to hold meetings
to discuss the protection of their interests as employees. The
company learned about this meetings and suspected that his
employees were about to form a union. They made known to its
employees his objection in the formation of a union. Later on, the
employees requested for a cash advance and the company denied it
but allowed some to the employees.
Because of this the respondents formed a union, the
company then transferred the members of the union and its
sympathizers to one of its sub-companies Lubas Transport Inc. The
respondents then filed a complaint in the LA against the company.
The LA dismissed the same. Respondents appealed to the
NLRC, and the latter partially granted that same. The company
appealed to the CA and the latter dismissed said petition.
Issue: W/N the Company is guilty of ULP in transferring its
employees who formed a Union and its sympathizers to its subcompany Lubas.
Held: The respondents transfer of work assignments to Lubas was
designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the formers right to
organize themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of
the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it
interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.
Indeed, evidence of petitioners' unfair labor practice is
shown by the established fact that, after respondents' transfer to
Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations
of Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings
and conclusion of the CA that petitioners "withheld the necessary
financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and
maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained
in running condition." This left respondents virtually jobless.
Case# 34
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, acting through its owner,
Facts: On October 11, 1995, respondent filed with the Department
of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a
petition for certification election.2 The Med-Arbiter granted the
petition on February 14, 1996 and ordered the holding of a
certification election.3 On appeal, the DOLE Secretary, in a
Resolution dated August 15, 1996, affirmed the Med-Arbiters order
and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a
preelection conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23,
The preelection conference was not held as initially
scheduled; it was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998.
Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged
repeated non-appearance of respondent. The latter agreed to

suspend proceedings until further notice. The preelection

conference resumed on January 29, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had
failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual
financial report for several years and the list of its members since it
filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, on May 19,
2000, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of
respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said
documents. Petitioner prayed that respondents Certificate of
Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted
from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further requested
the suspension of the certification election proceedings.
On June 1, 2000, petitioner reiterated its request by filing a
Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the [Certification Election]
Proceedings,5 arguing that the dismissal or suspension of the
proceedings is warranted, considering that the legitimacy of
respondent is seriously being challenged in the petition for
cancellation of registration. Petitioner maintained that the resolution
of the issue of whether respondent is a legitimate labor organization
is crucial to the issue of whether it may exercise rights of a
legitimate labor organization, which include the right to be certified
as the bargaining agent of the covered employees.
Nevertheless, the certification election pushed through on June 23,
2000. Respondent emerged as the winner.
On June 28, 2000, petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to
Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner,7 stating that the
certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise in
futility because, once respondents registration is cancelled, it
would no longer be entitled to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. Petitioner also
claimed that some of respondents members were not qualified to
join the union because they were either confidential employees or
managerial employees
Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for
cancellation of registration is not a bar to the holding of a
certification election. Thus, in an Order11 dated January 26, 2001,
the Med-Arbiter dismissed petitioners protest, and certified
respondent as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
supervisory employees.
Petitioner subsequently appealed the said Order to the DOLE
Secretary.12 The appeal was later dismissed by DOLE Secretary
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas) in the
Resolution of August 21, 2002.13 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was also denied.
In the meantime, Regional Director Alex E. Maraan
(Regional Director Maraan) of DOLE-NCR finally resolved the
petition for cancellation of registration. While finding that
respondent had indeed failed to file financial reports and the list of
its members for several years, he, nonetheless, denied the petition,
ratiocinating that freedom of association and the employees right to
self-organization are more substantive considerations. He took into
account the fact that respondent won the certification election and
that it had already been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the supervisory employees. In view of the foregoing, Regional
Director Maraanwhile emphasizing that the non-compliance with
the law is not viewed with favorconsidered the belated
submission of the annual financial reports and the list of members
as sufficient compliance thereof and considered them as having
been submitted on time. The dispositive portion of the
decision15 dated December 29, 2001 reads:
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision to the
BLR.17 BLR Director Hans Leo Cacdac inhibited himself from the
case because he had been a former counsel of respondent.
In view of Director Cacdacs inhibition, DOLE Secretary Sto.
Tomas took cognizance of the appeal. In a resolution18 dated
February 21, 2003, she dismissed the appeal, holding that the

constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of

noncompliance with the statutory requirements to maintain its status
as a legitimate labor organization.
In a Decision dated May 30, 2005, the CA denied the
petition. The CA opined that the DOLE Secretary may legally
assume jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Director in the event that the Director of the BLR inhibits
himself from the case. According to the CA, in the absence of the
BLR Director, there is no person more competent to resolve the
appeal than the DOLE Secretary. The CA brushed aside the
allegation of bias and partiality on the part of the DOLE Secretary,
considering that such allegation was not supported by any evidence.
Issue: W/N failure to submit reportorial requirements to the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR) is a ground for cancellation of
Held: No. Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not
be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject
the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from
membership, or any appropriate penalty.
It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual
financial reports and list of individual members in accordance with
Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this
ground should not necessarily lead to the cancellation of union
registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the
State to exact compliance with reporting requirements. Yet there is
more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities
and requiring periodic documentation thereof.
The more substantive considerations involve the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of
workers to self-organization. Also involved is the public policy to
promote free trade unionism and collective bargaining as
instruments of industrial peace and democracy. An overly stringent
interpretation of the statute governing cancellation of union
registration without regard to surrounding circumstances cannot be

Case# 35
[CAB], represented by its President, ANTONIO STEVEN L.
CHAN; G.R. No. 186605; November 17, 2010; SECOND
FACTS: Respondent Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc. (CAB) is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It is represented by its President, Antonio Steven L.
Chan (Chan), in this proceeding. CABEU-NFL is a duly registered
labor union and a certified bargaining agent of the CAB rank-andfile employees, represented by its President, Pablito
Saguran (Saguran).
On January 19, 2004, CABEU-NFL sent CAB a
proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)6 seeking
increases in the daily wage and vacation and sick leave benefits of
the monthly employees and the grant of leave benefits and 13th
month pay to seasonal workers. On March 27, 2004, CAB
responded with a counter-proposal to the effect that the production
bonus incentive and special production bonus and incentives be
maintained. In addition, respondent CAB agreed to execute a pro-

rated increase of wages every time the government would mandate

an increase in the minimum wage. CAB, however, did not agree to
grant additional and separate Christmas bonuses. On May 21, 2004,
CAB received an Amended Union Proposal sent by CABEU-NFL
reducing its previous demand regarding wages and bonuses. CAB,
however, maintained its position on the matter. Thus, the collective
bargaining negotiations resulted in a deadlock. On account of the
impasse, "CABEU-NFL filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board(NCMB). The NCMB then
assumed conciliatory-mediation jurisdiction and summoned the
parties to conciliation conferences."
In its June 2, 2005 Letter sent to CAB (letter-request),
CABEU-NFL requested copies of CABs annual financial
statements from 2001 to 2004 and asked for the resumption of
conciliation meetings. CAB replied through its June 14, 2005
Letter (letter-response) to NCMB Regional Director of Dumaguete
City Isidro Cepeda, which reads: Mr. Pablito Saguran who is no
longer an employee of the Central for he was one of those lawfully
terminated due to an authorized cause and the Union which Mr.
Saguran purportedly represents has already lost its majority status
by reason of the disauthorization and withdrawal of support thereto
by more than 90% of the rank and file employees in the bargaining
unit of Central sometime in January, 2005, and the workers
themselves, acting as principal, after disauthorizing the previous
agent CABEU-NFL have organized themselves into a new Union
known as Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Labor Association
(CABELA) and after obtaining their registration certificate and
making due representation that it is a duly organized union
representing almost all the rank and file workers in the Central, had
concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the Central
on April 21, 2005 in Dumaguete City
It appears that the NCMB failed to act on the letterresponse of CAB. Neither did it convene CAB and CABEU-NFL to
continue the negotiations between them. Reacting from the letterresponse of CAB, CABEU-NFL filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor
Practice for the formers refusal to bargain with it.
On July 13, 2006, the LA dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the NLRC in its July 18, 2007 Decision reversed the LAs
decision and found CAB guilty of unfair labor practice. Unsatisfied,
CAB elevated the matter to the CA by way of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in reversing the LA decision and issuing the
questioned resolution.
On September 26, 2008, the CA found CABs petition
meritorious and reversed the NLRC decision and resolution.
Issue: W/the company is guilty of ULP
HELD: No, for a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must
be shown that CAB was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud,
or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted x x x" in
suspending negotiations with CABEU-NFL. Notably, CAB believed
that CABEU-NFL was no longer the representative of the workers.
It just wanted to foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of
the overwhelming majority of its rank and file workers and by
negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with
CABELA." Such actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to antiunionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor

Case # 36
No. 190515; November 15, 2010; THIRD DIVISION; CARPIO
Facts: Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent), an electronics and
semi-conductor firm situated inside the Laguna Technopark, had an
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Cirtek
Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) for
the period January 1, 2001 up to December 31, 2005. Prior to the
3rd year of the CBA, the parties renegotiated its economic
provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on the issue
of wage increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining
deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board-Regional Office No. IV (NCMB-RO IV) on
April 26, 2004. Respondent, upon the other hand, filed a Notice of
Lockout on June 16, 2004.
While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing,
respondent placed seven union officers including the President, a
Vice President, the Secretary and the Chairman of the Board of
Directors under preventive suspension for allegedly spearheading a
boycott of overtime work. The officers were eventually dismissed
from employment, prompting petitioner to file another Notice of
Strike which was, after conciliation meetings, converted to a
voluntary arbitration case. The dismissal of the officers was later
found to be legal, hence, petitioner appealed.
In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was
deadlocked, petitioner went on strike on June 20, 2005. By Order
dated June 23, 2005, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction
over the controversy and issued a Return to Work Order which was
complied with. Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the
controversy, respondent created a Labor Management Council
(LMC) through which it concluded with the remaining officers of
petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing for daily
wage increases of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004
and P9.00 per day effective January 1, 2005.
Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and
Manifestation to the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the remaining
officers signed the MOA under respondents assurance that should
the Secretary order a higher award of wage increase, respondent
would comply. By Order dated March 16, 2006, the Secretary of
Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase of
fromP6.00 to P10.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and
from P9.00 to P15.00 per day effective January 1, 2005, and
adopting all other benefits as embodied in the MOA.
By Decision of September 24, 2009, the appellate court
ruled in favor of respondent and accordingly set aside the Decision
of the Secretary of Labor.
Issue: 1) W/N the Secretary of Labor is authorized to give an award
higher than that agreed upon in the MOA;
2) W/N the MOA was entered into and ratified by the
remaining officers of petitioner under the condition, which was not
incorporated in the MOA, that respondent would honor the
Secretary of Labors award in the event that it is higher.
Held: It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the exercise
of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor
Code, may resolve all issues involved in the controversy including
the award of wage increases and benefits. While an arbitral award
cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered
into by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing
power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes
jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be considered an approximation

of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have

been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of
a valid contract obligation.
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the
law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to
which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary
contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of
Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the
relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in
nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the
common good. As such, it must beconstrued liberally rather than
narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and
realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the
context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to
serve. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case # 37
No. 159460; November 15, 2010; THIRD DIVISION;
Facts: Sometime in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and
respondent Solidbank Employees were set to negotiate the
economic provisions of their CBA. Negotiations commenced but
seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the union declared a
deadlock and filed a notice of strike. During the CBA negotiations,
some unioin members staged mass actions. Secretary Laguesmma
directed the parties to cease and desists from committing all acts
that might exacerbate the situation. On april2, 2003 petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. in view of
the illegal strike conducted in violation of the secretarys
assumption order, petitioners maintain that the dismissal of
respondents was not illegal. Also m, the CA erred in not finding that
respondents were guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners maintained
that respondents are not entitled to separation pay even if the
dismissal was valid because they committed serious misconduct and
for illegal act in defying the Secretarys assumption order.
Issue: W/N the protest rally and concerted work
abandonment/boycott staged by the respondents violated the order.
Held: The SC held that the Ca erred in concluding that the
concerted mass actions staged by the respondents cannot be
considered a strike but a legitimate exercise of the respondents right
to express their dissatisfaction. It must be stressed that the concerted
action of the respondents was not limited to the protests rally infront
of the DOLE office. Considering that these mass actions stemmed
from a bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of
jurisdiction had already been issued, there is no doubt that the
concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor

Case # 38
C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,; G.R. No. 155109; September 29, 2010; SECOND

Facts: C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., (the Company) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of plywood.
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the
exclusive bargaining agent of the Companys rank and file
employees. The other parties to these cases are the Union
officers1 and their striking members.
The Company and the Union entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to hold no strike and
no lockout in the course of its life. At some point the parties began
negotiating the economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in
a deadlock, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike. After
efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) failed, the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an
overwhelming majority of its members favoring it. The Union
reported the strike vote to the DOLE and, after the observance of
the mandatory cooling-off period, went on strike.
During the strike, the Company filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) Ex Parte with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin the
strikers from intimidating, threatening, molesting, and impeding by
barricade the entry of non-striking employees at the Companys
premises. The NLRC first issued a 20-day but several attempts to
implement the writ failed. Only the intervention of law enforcement
units made such implementation possible. Meantime, the Union
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the
preliminary injunction order. On February 8, 1999 the latter court
dismissed the petition. The Union did not appeal from such
The Company, on the other hand, filed a petition with the Regional
Arbitration Board to declare the Unions strike illegal, citing its
violation of the no strike, no lockout, provision of their CBA.
On June 29, 1999 the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision, declaring the Unions strike illegal for violating the CBAs
no strike, no lockout, provision. On June 29, 1999 the terminated
Union members promptly filed a motion for their immediate
reinstatement but the Labor Arbiter did not act on the same. At any
rate, the Company did not reinstate them. Both parties appealed the
Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC.
On November 8, 1999 the NLRC affirmed the decision of
the LA.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
questioning the NLRC decision. The CA rendered a decision on
March 20, 2002,10 annulling the NLRC decision.
During the pendency of these cases, the affected Union
members filed with the Labor Arbiter a motion for reinstatement
pending appeal by the parties and the computation of their
backwages based on the CA decision. After hearing, the Labor
Arbiter issued a resolution approving the computation and payment
of their separation pay and denied all their other claims.
Both parties appealed the Labor Arbiters resolution to the
Upon the Unions petition for certiorari with the CA, the
CA ruled that the reinstatement pending appeal provided under
Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplated illegal dismissal or
termination cases and not cases under Article 263.

1. W/N the Union staged an illegal strike;

2. W/N the terminated Union members are entitled to the
payment of backwages on account of the Companys
refusal to reinstate them, pending appeal by the parties,
from the Labor Arbiters decision of June 29, 1999; and
3. W/Nthe terminated Union members are entitled to
accrued backwages and separation pay.

Held: 1) A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor

union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as
provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is held
contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or
conclusive arbitration clause. Here, the CBA between the parties
contained a "no strike, no lockout" provision that enjoined both the
Union and the Company from resorting to the use of economic
weapons available to them under the law and to instead take
recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes.
No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the
Company from mutually waiving the strike and lockout maces
available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration. Indeed, no
less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes in Section 3, Article
XIII, preferential use of voluntary means to settle disputes. The
State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes
in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their
mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.The Court
finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike.
Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot be used as a badge for not
complying with a lawful agreement.
2)Here, although the Labor Arbiter failed to act on the
terminated Union members motion for reinstatement pending
appeal, the Company had the duty under Article 223 to immediately
reinstate the affected employees even if it intended to appeal from
the decision ordaining such reinstatement. The Companys failure to
do so makes it liable for accrued backwages until the eventual
reversal of the order of reinstatement by the NLRC on November 8,
1999, a period of four months and nine days.
3) While it is true that generally the grant of separation pay
is not available to employees who are validly dismissed, there are,
in furtherance of the laws policy of compassionate justice, certain
circumstances that warrant the grant of some relief in favor of the
terminated Union members based on equity. Bitter labor disputes,
especially strikes, always generate a throng of odium and
abhorrence that sometimes result in unpleasant, although unwanted,
consequences. Considering this, the striking employees breach of
certain restrictions imposed on their concerted actions at their
employers doorsteps cannot be regarded as so inherently wicked
that the employer can totally disregard their long years of service
prior to such breach.26 The records also fail to disclose any past
infractions committed by the dismissed Union members. Taking
these circumstances in consideration, the Court regards the award of
financial assistance to these Union members in the form of one-half
month salary for every year of service to the company up to the date
of their termination as equitable and reasonable.
Case # 39
MANILA MINING CORP.; G.R. Nos. 178222-23;
September 29, 2010; FIRST DIVISION; PEREZ, J.
Facts: Respondent Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a
publicly-listed corporation engaged in large-scale mining for gold
and copper ore. MMC is required by law to maintain a tailings
containment facility to store the waste material generated by its
mining operations. Consequently, MMC constructed several tailings
dams to treat and store its waste materials. One of these dams was
Tailings Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), which was constructed in 1993 and
was operated under a permit issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its

Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) in Butuan City, Agusan

del Norte.
On 3 March 2000, the Union filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) all the requirements for its registration.
The Union acquired its legitimate registration status on 30 March
2000. Subsequently, it submitted letters to MMC relating its
intention to bargain collectively. On 11 July 2001, the Union
submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) proposal to
Upon expiration of the tailings permit on 25 July 2001, DENREMB did not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC
to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Hence,
it was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations,
resulting in the temporary lay-off of more than 400 employees in
the mine site.
On 30 July 2001, MMC called for the suspension of negotiations on
the CBA with the Union until resumption of mining operations.
The Petitioners together with the Union filed a complaint before the
labor arbiter on even date praying for reinstatement, recognition of
the Union as the sole and exclusive representative of its rank-andfile employees, and payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees
In their Position Paper, complainants challenged the validity of their
lay-off on the averment that MMC was not suffering from business
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of MMC and held that the
temporary shutdown of the mining operation, as well as the
temporary lay-off of the employees, is valid.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) modified the judgment of the labor arbiter and ordered the
payment of separation pay.
the Court of Appeals modified the NLRC ruling insofar as
it holds MMC liable to pay the Union attorneys fees equivalent to
10% of the award.
The Union claims that the temporary lay-off was effected
without any proper notice to the DOLE as mandated by Article 283
of the Labor Code. It further maintains that MMC did not observe
the jurisprudential criteria in the selection of the employees to be
Issue: W/N the Lay-off implemented by the company is illegal and
may considered as a unfair labor practice.
Held: The Supreme Court said lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be
considered as unfair labor practice. Despite all efforts exerted by
MMC, it did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the residents of
the community where the tailings pond would operate, one of the
conditions imposed by DENR-EMB in granting its application for a
permanent permit. It is precisely MMCs faultless failure to secure a
permit which caused the temporary shutdown of its mining
operations.Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the call of MMC for a suspension
of the CBA negotiations cannot be equated to "refusal to bargain."
Even as we declare the validity of the lay-off, we cannot say that
MMC has no obligation at all to the laid-off employees. The
validity of its act of suspending its operations does not excuse it
from paying separation pay.
Article 283, the employer can lawfully close shop anytime
as long as cessation of or withdrawal from business operations
is bona fide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or
circumvent the tenurial rights of employees, and as long as he pays
his employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to
their length of service. The cessation of operations, in the case at
bar is of such nature. It was proven that MMC stopped its
operations precisely due to failure to secure permit to operate a
tailings pond. Separation pay must nonetheless be given to the

separated employees.

Case # 40
Facts: The petitioners were among the regular employees of
respondent Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a corporation
engaged in manufacturing and selling food seasoning. They were
members of petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Balanced Foods (Union).
At 8:30 in the morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers
and some 200 members of the Union walked out of PINAs
premises and proceeded to the barangay office to show support for
Juanito Caete, an officer of the Union charged with oral
defamation by Aurora Manor, PINAs personnel manager, and
Yolanda Fabella, Manors secretary.3 It appears that the proceedings
in the barangay resulted in a settlement, and the officers and
members of the Union all returned to work thereafter.
As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers
of the Union because of the March 13, 1993 incident. PINA
terminated the officers of the Union after a month.
On April 14, 1993, PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice (ULP) and damages. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment
in favour of PINA. On April 28, 1993, the Union filed a notice of
strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the
constructive dismissal of its officers. On May 9, 1993, the Union
held a strike vote, at which a majority of 190 members of the Union
voted to strike.6 The strike was held in the afternoon of June 15,
On September 30, 1994, the Third Division of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining the Unions officers and
members to cease and desist from barricading and obstructing the
entrance to and exit from PINAs premises, to refrain from
committing any and all forms of violence, and to remove all forms
of obstructions such as streamers, placards, or human barricade.
On November 29, 1994, the NLRC granted the writ of preliminary
injunction. On August 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera (LA)
rendered a decision declaring the subject strike to be illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding that the strike
was illegal. On August 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the NLRC.
Issue: W/N petitioners are entitled to Backwages.
Held: As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a
dismissed employee for his loss of earnings during the whole period
that he is out of his job. Considering that an illegally dismissed
employee is not deemed to have left his employment, he is entitled
to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him from the
employment. The grant of backwages to him is in furtherance and
effectuation of the public objectives of the Labor Code, and is in the
nature of a command to the employer to make a public reparation
for his illegal dismissal of the employee in violation of the Labor
That backwages are not granted to employees participating
in an illegal strike simply accords with the reality that they do not
render work for the employer during the period of the illegal strike.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair days
wage for a fair days labor" remains as the basic factor in
determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the

employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer

was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from
Under the principle of a fair days wage for a fair days
labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during the
period of the strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they
performed no work during the strike. Verily, it was neither fair nor
just that the dismissed employees should litigate against their
employer on the latters time. Here, we note that this case has
dragged for almost 17 years from the time of the illegal strike.
Bearing in mind PINAs manifestation that the positions that the
petitioners used to hold had ceased to exist for various reasons, we
hold that separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service
in lieu of reinstatement fully aligns with the aforecited rulings of the
Court on the matter.
Insular hotel vs. Waterfront insular hotel davao
On Nov. 6 2000, respondent waterfront Insular Hotel Davao sent
DOLE Region XI, Davao City, a notice of suspension of operation
notifying that it will susoend its operations for a period of 6 months
due to severe and serious business losses. In said notice,
respondents assured the DOLE that if the company could not
resume its operation within six months period, the company would
pay the affected employees all benefits legally due to them. During
the period of the suspension, Rojas, the President of Davai Insular
Hotel FRee Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL), the recognized
labor organizatiin in waterfront Davao, sent respkndent a number of
letters asking management to reconsider its decision.
After a series of negotiations, respondent and DIHFEU-NFL signed
a memorandum of agreement (MOA) wherein respondent agreed to
re-open the hitel subject to certain concessions offered by DIHFEUNFL in its manifest. Accordingly, respondent downsized uts
manpower structure to 100 rank and file employees as set forth in
the terms of the MOA. Moreover, as agreed upon in MO, as new
pay scale was also prepared by respondent. The retained employees
individually signed a "Reconfirmation of Employment" which
embodied the new terms and conditions of their continued
employment. Each employees was assisted by Rojas who also
signed the document. On June 15, 2001, respondent resumed its
business operations.
Whether or not a union is prohibited from offering and agreeing to
reduce wages and benefits of the employees.
Article 100 of the labor code provides the prohibition against
elimination or dimunitoon of benefits. This prohibition is

specifically concerned with benefits already enjoyed at the time of

the promulgation of the Labor code. It does not purport to apply the
situation arising after the promulgation date of the labor code.
The SC agrees with respondent that the same does not prohibit a
union from offering and agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of
the employees.

Phimco industries inc. Vs. Phimco industries labor assoc
When the last collective bargaining was about to expire, PHIMCO
and PILA negotiated for its removal. The negotiation resulted in a
deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to disagreements on
salary increases and benefits. On march 9, 1995, PILA filed with
NCMB a notice of strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock.
PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction
and TRO in response. The NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO for 20
On july, 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
and illegal dismissal with the NLRC. the labor arbiter found the
strike illegal; PILA committed prohibited acts during the strike. La
Mayor observed that it was not enough that the picket of the strikers
was a moving picket since the strikers should allow the passage to
the entrance and exit points of the company premises. Thus, La
Mayor declared that the respondent employees, PILA officers and
members, have lost their employment status.
The NLRC set aside La Mayor's decision and subsequently, the CA
denied the appeal of PHIMCO.
Whether the CA correctly determined that the NLRC did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the union's strike was
The SC ruled that the strike was illegal because it failed to follow
the requisites provided by law.
A strike, being the most powerful weapon of workers in their
struggle with the management in the course of setting their terms
and conditions of employment, must be exercised respinsibly and
must always rest on rational basis, free from emotionalism, and
unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hotheads. It must focus
on legitimate union interacts. To be legitimate, a strike should not
be antithetical to public welfare; and must be pursued within legal

bounds. The right to strike is never meant to oppress or destroy

anyone. The requirements must be followed strictly and the unions
failure to comply renders the strike illegal.


merger and alleged automatically deemed regukar employees of

bpi. However, the cba does not make a distinction as to how a
regular employees attains such a status. Moreover, there is nothing
in the corporation lawand the merger agreement mandating the
automatic employment as regular employees by the surviving
corporation in the merger.
In the former FEBTC employees who initially joined the union but
later withdrew their membership, there is even greater reason for
the union to regret their dismissal from the employer since the CBA
also contained a maintenance of membership clause.

On march 23, 2000, the bangko sentral ng pilipinas approved the
articles of merger executed on jan. 20, 2000, by and between bpi
and FEBTC. All the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were
transferred to absorbed by the BPI. FEBTC employees were hired
by petitioner as its employees, with their status and tenure
recognized and salaries and benefits mainatained.
Respndent BPI employees union is the exclusive bargaining of the
bpi's rank and file employees in davao city. The former FEBTC
employees did not belong to any labor union at the time of the
merger. Prior ti the effectivity of the merger, the respondent union
united those employees to a meeting regarding the hnion shop
clause of the existing CBA between bpi and respondent.
After 2 months of management inaction of the request, respondent
union informed BPI of its decision to refer the issue on
implementation of the union shop clause. However, the issue
remained unresolved at this level so it was subsequently submitted
for voluntary arbitration by the parties. The voluntary arbitrator
ruled in favor of bpi's interpretation tha the former. FEBTC
employees were not covered by the union security clause on the
ground that the said employees were not new employees who were
hired and subsequently regularized, but were absorbed employees
by operation of law. The former FEBTC employees could notbe
compelled to join the union.

Asia Brewery Inc (ABI) entered into a CBA for five years with
BLMA-INDEPENDENT, the exclusive bargajning representative of
ABI's rank and fike employees. On oct 3, 2000, ABI AND BLMA
INDEPENDENT signed a re-negotiated CBA effective from aug 1
2000 to july 31, 2003.
A dispute arose when ABI's management stopped deducting union
dues from bpi employees, believing that their membership in
INDEPENDENT lodged a complaint before the NCMB. The parties
eventually agreed to submit the case for abitratiin to resolve the
issue of whether or not there is restraint to employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization.
In his decision, voluntary arbiter de vera sustained the BLMA
INDEPENDENT after finding that the positions of the subject
employees qualify under the rank and file category because their
functions and merely routinary and clerical. On appeal, the CA
reversed the voluntary arbitrators decision.

Whether the former FEBTC employees should be considered
employees of bpi for purposes of applying the union shop clause
offhe CBA.
THE SC denied the petition. Petitioner insists that the term "new
employees" as the same is used in the union shop clause of the CBA
at issue, refers knly to employees hired by bpi as non regular
employees who later qualify for regular employment and become
regular employees, not those who, as a legal consequence of a

Whether the 81 employees should be excluded from and are not
eligible for inclusion in the bargaining unit.

The SC held that the checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent
company are declared rank and file employees who are eligible to

join the union of rank and file employees. The job descriptions of
these employees plainly showed that they perform routinary works.
Not being confidential employees, the secretaries/clerks and
checkers are not disqualified from membership in the union of
respondenta rank and file.

the illegal acts allegedly committed by rosalinda onlangar, who is a

shop steward but not a union officer the SC find her dismissal
without a valid cause.

However, the SC ruled that the respondent company cannot be said
to have committed unfair labor oractices becausethe dispute are
from a single disagreement in the interpretation of the CBA
provision. It was not shown that ABI was motivated by ill will, bad
faith or fraud.


UNION-FFW, Respondent.

The union and the company had a CBA that expired On july 18,
1999. The union seasonably submitted proposals to the company for
its negotiation. The negotiations reached a deadlock leading to a
notice of strike. NCMB exerted efforts but failed to resolve the
deadlock. Consequently, the company filed a notice of lockout for
unfair labor practice due to unions alleged work slowdown. The
union went on strike 3 days later.


After a few months, several employees attempted to report for

work, but the striking employees prevented them from entering the
company premises.
On june 8 2000, the union and the officers filed a petition to cite the
company and its responsible officer for contempt, and moved that a
reinstatement order be issued. They claimed that: 1.) the company
officials violated the secretary's return to work order; 2.) the
company also violated the march 9 2000 order of the labor
secretary; and 3.) the company commjtted unfair labor practice and
dismissed them without basis.


By practice established since 1998, the petitioner contracts

out some of the work in the warehouse department,
specifically those in the receiving and finished goods
sections to 3 independent service providers or forwarders.
These forwarders also have their own employees who hold
the positions of clerk, material handler, system encoder
and general clerk. The regular employees of the petitioner
and those of the forwarders share the same work area and
use the same equipment, tools and computers all belonging
to the petitioner.
This outsourcing arrangement gave rise to a union
grievance on the issue of the scope and coverage of the
collective bargaining unit, specifically to the question of
"whether or not the functions of the forwarders employees
are functions being performed by the regular rank-and-file
employees covered by the bargaining unit." The union thus
demanded that the forwarders' employees be absorbed into
the petitioner's regular employee force and be given
positions within the bargaining unit.
The union and the petitioner failed to resolve the dispute at
the grievance machinery level, thus necessitating recourse
to voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator favored
the union in its decision. CA, likewise, affirmed the
voluntary arbitrators decision and denied the motion for
reconsideration later filed. Thus, it gave way to this instant

Whether or not the dismissal is illegal.
The SC affirmed the CA's conclusion that the labor secretary erred
when he did not resolve the dismissal issue on the mistaken reading
thatthis issue falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
For having participated in a prohibited activity not once, but twice,
the union officers, except the decision can no longer reached
because of the amicable settlement they entered into with the
company, legally deserve to be dismissed from the service. For
failure of the company, however, to prove by substantial evidence

Issue: Whether or not the forwarders employees serving as clerks,

material handlers, system encoders, and general clerks are to be
considered employees of the company who are entitled to all the
rights and privileges of regular employees including security of
Held: No, they should not be considered as such. When the
forwarding agreements were already in place when the current CBA
was signed. In this sense, the union accepted the forwarding
arrangement, albeit implicitly, when it signed the CBA with the
company. Thereby, the union agreed, again implicitly by its silence
and acceptance, that jobs related to the contracted forwarding
activities are not regular company activities and are not to be
undertaken by regular employees falling within the scope of the
bargaining unit but by the forwarders employees. Thus, the skills

requirements and job content between forwarders jobs and

bargaining unit jobs may be the same, and they may even work on
the same company products, but their work for different purposes
and for different entities completely distinguish and separate
forwarder and company employees from one another. A clerical job,
therefore, if undertaken by a forwarders employee in support of
forwarding activities, is not a CBA-covered undertaking or a
regular company activity.

# 47
MADICLUM, Petitioners,


The NCMB Director did not grant the voluntary

arbitration. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
and assailed the NCMB Directors decision via petition for
review before CA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may, individually and without

authority from the union, represent the latter in voluntary
Held: No, the petitioners may not do so. Petitioners have not been
duly authorized to represent the union. Since the union is an
indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration and no authority was
vested upon the petitioners by the former, the voluntary arbitration
will not prosper. The right of any employee or group of employees
to, at any time, present grievances to the employer, as stated in Art.
255of the Labor Code, does not imply the right to submit the same
to voluntary arbitration.

# 48
LESLIE OKOL, Petitioner,

(INTERCO), Respondent.






Petitioners, all employees of respondent International

Copra Export Corp-oration (INTERCO), filed a Notice of
Preventive Mediation with the Department of Labor and
Employment National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), against respondent for violation of Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the
grievance conference/meeting. As the parties failed to
reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested
to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration.
Before the parties could finally meet, respondent presented
before the NCMB a letter of Genaro Tan (Tan), president
of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union (the union)
of which petitioners are members, addressed to
respondents plant manager Engr. Paterno C. Tangente
(Tangente), stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized
by [the] board or the officers to represent the union,
[hence] . . . all actions, representations or agreements made
by these people with the management will not be honored
or recognized by the union." Respondent thus moved to
dismiss petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction.3
The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement, NCMB
Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat
and respondents plant manager Tangente of the lack of
willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary
arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit
the case thereto; and that under the CBA forged by the
parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary
arbitration but that since Tan informed respondent that the
union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it
would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration.




Respondent corporation hired petitioner Leslie Okol as a

management trainee on 15 June 1992. She rose up the
ranks to become Head Office Manager and then Director
and Vice President from 1996 until her dismissal on 22
September 1999.
On 28 July 1999, prior to Okols dismissal, Slimmers
World preventively suspended Okol. The suspension arose
from the seizure by the Bureau of Customs of seven Precor
elliptical machines and seven Precor treadmills belonging
to or consigned to Slimmers World. The shipment of the
equipment was placed under the names of Okol and two
customs brokers for a value less than US$500. For being
undervalued, the equipment were seized.
Upon failure of parties to settle the issue, petitioner filed a
complaint with Arbitration branch of NLRC against the
respondents. The labor arbiter granted the motion to
dismiss filed by respondent for lack of jurisdiction on the
matter. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC upon reversal of the latter of the labor
arbiters decision. Thus, respondent appealed to CA which
reversed the previous decision. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant

Issues: Whether or not the petitioner should be considered a

corporate officer and the dismissal considered an intra-corporate

dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not by

Held: The petitioner should be considered as a corporate officer.
Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers
as the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may
be provided for in the by-laws. The GIS and minutes of the meeting
of the board of directors indicated that petitioner was a member of
the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital
stock, and an elected corporate officer.
In Tabang v. NLRC,12 the Court held that an "office" is created by
the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the
directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually
occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the
directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the
corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to
such employee.
Thus, the determination of the rights of a director and corporate
officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding
liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject
to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, the appellate court
correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which
have jurisdiction over the present case.

DOLE Secretary. CA found the petition meritorious.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the amended or extended term of the CBA

has an effect on the exclusive representation status of the CB agent
and the right of another union to ask for certification election as
exclusive bargaining agent.
Held: No. The negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal
effect on the FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining
representation status which remained effective only for five years
ending on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty
days prior to this date, or starting December 2, 2002, SANAMASIGLO could properly file a petition for certification election. Its
petition, filed on January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the
expiration of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive
bargaining status, was seasonably filed.
While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year
term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment
or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the
unions exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision
of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status
cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal
matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words,
despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years,
either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining
unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years
and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration
of the CBAs first five years.
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Dec. 22, 1997 petitioner the recognized bargaining agent

of the rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines,
Incorporated (company) signed a five-year collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company. At the end
of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the
CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the
renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among other
provisions, the CBAs duration, extending the original 5year period of the CBA by 4 months.
Jan. 21, 2003 the respondent filed before the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
certification election for the same rank-and-file unit
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
certification election petition was filed outside the freedom
period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the
expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
The case reached the CA when the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent was denied by the


COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent

corporation on the Courts decision rendering PAL guilty
of illegal dismissal and ordered to reinstate cabin crew
personnel retrenched and demoted without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, and to pay them full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other monetary
benefits computed from the time of their separation up to
the time of their actual reinstatement.

Issue: Whether or not the award of attorneys fees and expenses

equivalent to 10% of all monetary awards to be received by each
individual flight attendant is reasonable.
Held: No. In the case at bar, the Court found that the flight
attendants were represented by respondent union which, in turn,

engaged the services of its own counsel. The flight attendants had a
common cause of action. While the work performed by
respondents counsel was by no means simple, seeing as it spanned
the whole litigation from the Labor Arbiter stage all the way to this
Court, nevertheless, the issues involved in this case are simple, and
the legal strategies, theories and arguments advanced were common
for all the affected crew members. Hence, it may not be reasonable

to award said counsel an amount equivalent to 10% of all monetary

awards to be received by each individual flight attendant. Based on
the length of time that this case has been litigated, however, we find
that the amount of P2,000,000.00 is reasonable as attorneys fees.
This amount should include all expenses of litigation that were
incurred by respondent union.