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G.R. No.

L-18924

October 19, 1922

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General
Villa-Real
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

for

appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores
of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so
held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or
has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored
in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is
the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws
to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals
or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the
headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs.
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such
limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which
disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which
disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy
at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of
disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious
homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no
right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such
vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands,
is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open
violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime,

no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the
offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1,
page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all
the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of
commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have
liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners
are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in
any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses
and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most
complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to
the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce
and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at
anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires
no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may
come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke
opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
THE
UNITED
STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
CHIU),Defendant-Appellant.
Thos.
D.
Aitken
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

vs. LOOK

for

CHAW

( alias LUK

appellant.

ARELLANO, C.J. :chanrobles virtual law library
This case is a separate part of Case No. 5887 and bears No. 5889 on the general
docket of this court, and No. 377 on the docket of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The complaint in this case states:
That, on or about the 18th of August, 1909, within the boundaries of the
municipality of Cebu of this province and judicial district, the said Look Chaw
(alias Luk Chiu) did, without having obtained authorization from the Collector of
Internal Revenue and without being authorized in any manner and traffic in the
same.
C.J. Milliron, an internal-revenue agent, testified that Vicente Base took to the
governor of Cebu a can of opium containing 200 grammes of the said drug, in order
to show him that the accused had sold opium to Base, and the governor called the
witness in order that he might take part in this case. After the accused was arrested,
he confessed before the witness and the provincial fiscal that he had sold to Vicente
Base thirty cans of opium on the 15th of August, 1909, but that he had received the
price thereof, and that the money which was found in a box of his on board the
British steamship Erroll, P1,500 in amount, was obtained in Manila and was seized
by the captain of the vessel. According to the accused, he had purchased in
Hongkong 137 cans of opium for the purpose of introducing it as contraband into
Mexico, the destination of the vessel, but that as the latter changed its route
touching
first
at
Manila,
the
opium
arrived
at
Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Vicente Base testified that he had negotiated with the accused with respect to the
sale of the three sacks of opium which were seized while in the latter's possession
an were the subject matter of the previous cause; that these three sacks were not
taken ashore, because the accused would not permit this to be done without

previous delivery of the whole price of P1,000, of which witness had only paid P533;
that
he
therefore
only
took
one
can
from
one
of
the
said
sacks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of First Instance of Cebu sentenced the accused to one year's
imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P2,000, with additional subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
and to the payment of the costs of the trial. It was ordered in the judgment that the
exhibits connected with the case should be confiscated, and that, in case of an
appeal, and even after the sentence had been served, the defendant should not be
released from custody, but delivered to the customs authorities for the purpose of
the
enforcement
of
the
existing
immigration
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The defendant appealed and has alleged before this court that he can not punished
in accordance with section 15 of Act No. 1761, under which the complaint was
drawn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This said section 15 reads thus:
( a) No person shall import, cook, or prepare opium, or engage in the business of
purchasing or selling opium or of dealing or trafficking therein, unless he shall first
have secured from the Collector of Internal Revenue a license to transact such
business and shall have paid the license tax prescribed by this Act. . . .
To make an isolated sale, says the appellant, is not to engage in the business of
selling. To negotiate the sale of opium does not mean clandestinely to sell opium
once.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In our opinion, the act defined in section 15 is distinct from that penalized in section
5; the act referred to in the latter is any act of sale, while that concerned in the
former relates to the business of selling, in an habitual, professional manner, as one
of an undertaking or occupation, without license.
SEC. 5. ( a) It shall be unlawful to sell, transfer, give, or deliver opium to any person
except to a duly licensed and practicing physician, pharmacist, or second-class
pharmacist, or a duly licensed dispensator of opium, or duly registered confirmed
user of opium in a licensed opium dispensary for consumption therein only, and in
accordance with the provisions of this Act: . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
( b) Any person violating the provisions of the preceding subsection shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for a

period not exceeding one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court: . . .
The crime concerned in this case, according to this section 5, is compromised within
the language of the complaint which charges the act of selling opium without the
authorization
of
the
Collector
of
Internal
Revenue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The other ground of the appeal is that the confession of the accused were taken into
account for the purpose of his conviction. The trial court pronounced its sentence
after considering that "sufficient proof has been furnished by the evidence,' and the
evidence did not consist solely in the confession that the accused, on the day and at
the place mentioned in the complaint, contracted with Vicente Base for the sale of
the opium, the subject matter of the present prosecution; and as this finding does
not appear to be erroneous nor contrary to the conclusions reached from the
evidence, it is accepted by this court in order that thereby the judgment appealed
from
may
be
dully
affirmed,
as
we
do
affirm
the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This disposes of the appeal; but, in the opinion of this court, the defense of double
jeopardy alleged by the accused in first instance, with exception to the order
disallowing it, can not but be taken into consideration, although in this instance, on
appeal, that defense was not reproduced with the allegation that its disallowance
was an error committed by the lower court in its judgment. This point appears to
involve a question of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Before separating the two causes, as related at the beginning of this decision, there
was but one single complaint and there would have been only one trial for the
possession of opium and for the sale of opium. But the defendant's counsel set up a
demurrer, arguing that the complaint was defective inasmuch as it charged two
distinct crimes, for according to the defense, it was alleged to be one crime to
possess opium and another different crime to sell opium; and the court deferred to
this pretension and ordered the filing of two complaints, one for the possession of
opium and another for the sale of opium; that for the possession of opium was the
one first tried by the lower court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In answering the second complaint for the sale of opium, the defendant alleged that
he had already been in jeopardy.
The defendant was convicted yesterday," said his attorney, "for the violation of law
committed, of possessing opium, and has already been sentenced by this court to
five year's imprisonment and in addition to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos.

According to the principles of penal law, when a crime has been committed which is
necessary in order to commit another, the delinquent, of course, can not be
punished for the two crimes, but must suffer for the crime for which the greater
penalty was provided.
The court rejected this allegation: first, because the prosecution of two crimes
instead of one was brought about by the defense itself; and second, because, in the
opinion of the trial judge, if the defendant had first been convicted for selling opium,
he certainly would have been in jeopardy in the cause prosecuted for possessing
opium, for the reason that really one can not sell opium without possessing it, while,
if the terms are inverted, the same result does not follow, because one may posses
opium without selling it, and consequently in the present cause the allegation of
double jeopardy is an admissible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
True it is, we assert, that it is one crime to possess opium, punished by section 31 of
the Act, and another, to sell opium, penalized by section 5 of the same Act before
cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And it is also true that when one single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when
one of them is a necessary means for the commission of the other, only the penalty
corresponding to the more serious crime shall be imposed, in its maximum degree,
and thus, he who smokes opium in a pipe, by one single act lays himself liable to
three penalties of the law, one of them, merely for the fact of possessing opium,
another, for the mere possession of a pipe in which opium is smoked, and the other,
for the act of smoking opium; but the penalties corresponding to these three crimes
ought not to be imposed upon the defendant in this case, and only the penalty for
the most serious of these crimes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
But the illegal possession of 137 cans of opium and the illegal sale of 30 cans of
opium, which are two acts confessed by the accused, are not one act which
constitutes two crimes, nor a crime which is a necessary means for the commission
of another. They are two isolated acts, punishable, each of them, in themselves.
Only in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its
totality the same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being
delivered as the matter or subject of a sale previously agree upon, could it be said,
in the opinion of this court, that the possession of the opium was a necessary
means to effect the delivery by reason of the sale, and that the sale agreed upon
was the sole reason for the possession of the opium seized. The possession of the
quantity contained in the pipe can not be considered as a different crime from that
of smoking opium in a pipe, nor the possession of the pipe, as a crime different from
that of smoking opium in a pipe. But if the person surprised in smoking opium in a
pipe was also surprised in the possession of the thirty cans sold by the accused, it

could not properly be inferred that the possession of these thirty cans, which in
itself is a crime, was a necessary means for the commission of the other crime of
smoking opium in a pipe, and that the person in whose possession the thirty cans
were seized, possessed the same solely and exclusively for the purpose of smoking
opium in a pipe. It might very well have been that he had acquired the drug for the
purpose of inhaling, injecting, chewing, swallowing, or other uses, and that only by
chance did it occur to him to try to smoke it in a pipe, on the very occasion when he
was surprised, this being the evident fact of the commission of the crime which can
not, in its essence, include the existence of thirty cans, not then contained in the
pipe, each can certainly being susceptible of other various uses, every one of which
might
by
its
nature
constitute
a
different
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We consider this doctrine equally applicable to crimes which are evils by their very
nature, as well as to those which are merely malum quia prohibitum; because it not
only aims at a more or less strict application of a penal precept which, undoubtedly,
in the practice of this court, usually tends toward the lesser severity and,
occasionally, the greatest benignity when the second class, or conventional crimes,
are concerned, but also because that doctrine is the logical result of the process of
the intelligence in the derivation of consequences from the principles constitute of
the nature of things.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Thus it is that we find the institution of this cause, and its separation from the
previous one, to be founded on law and juridical principles, and the judgment
appealed from, to be in accordance with right and equity, except with regard to the
amount of the penalty, which we reduce, in harmony with the provisions of section 5
aforementioned, to six months' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 Philippine
currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, with the understanding that the imprisonment and the fine imposed shall
be, respectively, six months and P1,000 Philippine Currency, we affirm, as to all the
rest, the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. L-13005

October 10, 1917

THE
UNITED
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio
Sanz
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

for

appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and
sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed
as a fireman on the steamshipShun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer
which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the
port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them
on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip
from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above
mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of
the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was
introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been
proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the
intimation that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the
two cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion
handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium,
is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open
violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the
court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net

A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the
present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the
illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal
importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in
the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the
opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of
United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which
resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal importation of
opium or other prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence
sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is discharged
came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In the
Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium
was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no question but
what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose
case, we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is
interesting as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it
anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or that
it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into
the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port
and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with
intent to discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we
return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted
that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are
synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere
act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is
not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them
into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U.
S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.)
As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports
or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a
person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances
exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be
absurb to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between
Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible
to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal
use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the

defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We
accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country
into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be
said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not
present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
as charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by
law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988
ALEXANDER
PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City Branch 113,respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon,
RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision
due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in
Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai",
acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency
out of the country.
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an
Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a fearless
prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4,
1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in
the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was
reappointed to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and
judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should
be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only
known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by
respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on
August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject
respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of
which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental
principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or

errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly,
respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A
judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively,
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist,
Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport
while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out
of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM
officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines
bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was found carrying with
him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to
US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss
Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar,
English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong
Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was
apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he was
supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely,
CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and
Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29,
1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines
through the Manila International Airport the following foreign
currencies in cash and in checks:

Japanese Yen

Y 32,800,000.00

Swiss Franc

SW. FR 6,9000.00

Australian Dollar

A$ 17,425.00

Singapore Dollar

S$ 9,945.00

Deutsche Marck

DM 18,595.00

Canadian Dollar

CS 13,330.00

Hongkong Dollar

HK$ 15,630.00

HFL Guilder

HFL 430.00

French Franc

F/6,860.00

US Dollar

US$ 73,950.00

English Pound

5,318.00

Malaysian Dollar

M$. 14,760.00

(in checks)

Australian Dollar

A$ 7,750.00

British Pound

700.00

US Dollar

US$ 17,630.00

Canadian Dollar

C$ 990.00

without authority from the Central Bank.
Contrary to Law.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently
raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person
shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign
exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other
persons, through the mails or through international carriers except
when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under
existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the
amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines,
tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall
declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central
Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .— That any person
who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign
currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign
exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum
of 12 years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less
than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon,
Hongkong, engaged in the garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5
million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times,
although the only dates he could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June
28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to

invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that he had a
group of business associates who decided to invest in business with him, namely:
Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan,
who had their own businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the
Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese
Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept
his declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for
which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on
April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00
Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he
declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He
also testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some
business with him in the Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in
a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the Philippines, they
would declare the money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed to
and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits
for the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all of these
declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his answer was that he was
not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does
not understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on crossexamination that the reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with him all
the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the fear of his
group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was
because of this fear that he was urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8,
1986 to bring the money out of the Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:
The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the
accused wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the
accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was
about to depart from the Philippines did not by that act alone make
him liable for Violation of Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign
currencies out of the country was done the very intention. It is that
which qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that clear
intention to violate and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental
state, the existence of which is shown by overt acts of a person.
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended
to show that the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the
respondent in his decision:
... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that
the currencies confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to
him and his business associates abovenamed. And from the
unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of
currencies in question came from abroad and not from the local source
which is what is being prohibited by the government. Yes, simply

reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that the
currency declaration is required for the purpose of establishing the
amount of currency being brought by tourist or temporary non-resident
visitors into the country. The currency declarations, therefore, is
already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs
authorities to determine the amounts actually brought in by them to
correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out.
Indeed, this Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the
manner currency declarations were made as testified to by the Central
Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs representative never
took part in all these declarations testified to by no less than five (5)
Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these employees are the
favorites of these travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the
authorities must do something to remedy the evident flaw in the
system for effective implementation of the questioned Central Bank
Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin
criminal responsibility on the accused. This is due to its steadfast
adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the
almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the
administration of justice. Courts of Justice are guided only by the rule
of evidence.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law
in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate
the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent
(mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance
allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at
the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57
in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces),
without any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time
of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in
his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his
previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate
the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing out of
the country at the time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were
brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on several
previous occasions when they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be used for
the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business ventures;
that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines
to take the money out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that
the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986 might spread. Such
fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the
accused under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line

960 merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines. CB Circular No. This. which according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people. as well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all). the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice. Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior.000. These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession. in spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information. under Central Bank Circular No. for the purpose of establishing such amount. 960." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith. In other words. tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3. He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai. Currency to the accused.00. the respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose of investing in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in which they were going to invest. that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. allowed.S.000. According to the above-cited CB Circular. tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U. according to respondent.and sinker.000. in effect. 960 to justify the release of US$ 3. if the same exceeds the amount of .00 to the accused. It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted. but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of US$3. a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival. which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in some business ventures.

for appellant. STREET.R. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least US$3. SO ORDERED. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service.000. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI. acting as helmsman. saying that it would be better. Valenzuela.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor.US$3. L-16486 March 22.00. gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency. Venancio Gargantel. Accordingly.: The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is under discussion in the present appeal are these: At about noon. if he would not insult them. 1921 THE UNITED vs. if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank. 135 SCRA 712). G. 1919. and they would work better. This resolution is immediately executory. J. it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. plaintiff-appelle. Baltazar R. while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow. defendant-appellant. Angel Roco Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee. Calixto Valdez y Quiri. while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into the Manila Bay. Upon this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated. and six others among whom was the deceased. Dizon.000. the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge. and he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. STATES. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused. guilty of gross incompetence. and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations. on November 29. The accused took this remonstrance . No. The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused.

The possibility that he might have swum ashore. Two scows were moored to the shore. and his personal belongings have been delivered to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives. and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene. . The fact that the accused at his juncture threatened the crew with violence is. threatening to stab him. At it was full midday. the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila. we consider too remote to be entertained for a moment. after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions. efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. owing to his possible inability to swim or the strength of the current. and rising in rage he moved towards Venancio. and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived. threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more. Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it. with a big knife in hand. he was borne down into the water and was drowned. For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue. say. coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under water. therefore. of no moment except tho show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring.as a display of insubordination. but between these and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio. The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was distant. The proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river. 10 paces from the Vigan. the latter. and this circumstance. evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril. where he lived as a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance. is conclusive of his death. On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to watch for the body. Two witnesses who were on the boat state that. immediately after Venancio leaped into the water. but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio did not again come to the surface. so far as the observers could see. the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively shows that. take it for granted that he is dead. it is needless to say. in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered.

is cited in the brief of The Attorney-General. T. an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day. Codigo Penal. p. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. 701. nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary. reclusion temporal. "If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape. after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide." (II Hidalgo. [N. as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual. and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. to leap into the river.) The accused must. In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain. As was once said by a British court. Halliday. for it is obvious that the deceased. be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel. in order to escape the attack. (Par. 61 L. to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of . art. by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from. 183. therefore. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils. to suffer the corresponding accessories. in throwing himself in the river. and in so doing he injuries himself. and any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the same." (Reg. as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused. did not commit any error of law.As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the likewise can be no doubt.]. the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result. Rep. enunciated the following doctrine: "That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery. 9 Penal Code. in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide. the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries. a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased. and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. 3. or at most of frustrated homicide. acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. The Supreme Court. disallowing the appeal. occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed. the trial court. of July 13. vs.S. pointed a shotgun at the injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning. supposing that he had received no succour. 1882. among others.

.appellant. Sorsogon. J. People v. the information reading as follows: The undersigned provincial fiscal charges Purificacion Almonte with the crime of homicide. So ordered. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. committed as follows: That on or about October 1. in the municipality of Sorsogon. and assault one Felix Te Sue with a knife. the same is affirmed. . 35006. vs.R. Sorsogon. Philippine Islands. JJ.P500. producing a wound in the abdomen which was the immediate cause of the death of the said Felix Te Sue. Avanceña and Villamor. 1930. Contrary to law.J.R. PURIFICACION ALMONTE. 56 Phil. which she carried. and within the jurisdiction of this court. G.: Purificacion Almonte is charged with the crime of homicide. C. Mapa. Province of Sorsogon. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE 35006 ISLANDS. November 7. and to pay the costs. No. 1930. with costs against the appellant. Said sentenced is in accordance with law. 1931 G. Malcolm. defendant.. unlawfully. plaintiff-appellee. Teodosio R. attack. Diño for appellant. the aforementioned accused did willfully. concur. IMPERIAL. and feloniously beat. and it being understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code. 54 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC September 7. THE No. Almonte.

together with the said Miguela Dawal. The defendant appealed. taking the first bus that chanced to pass. the accused lived maritally with the Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a married man. with whom he had also lived maritally. she was convicted of the said crime of homicide. Province of Sorsogon.000. II. The facts which have been proved beyond question are as follows: Until a week before the crime. perhaps. found him with Miguela. Horrified. The trial court erred in holding that the unnecessary movements of the deceased while in the provincial hospital of Sorsogon for medical treatment were caused by the pain of the wound inflicted by the accused. It was not serious. When Te Sue saw her. leaving the blade sticking in her victim's abdomen. The injured man was at once taken to the provincial hospital where he was given first aid treatment. In this instance the defense assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment: I. . The accused insisted upon remaining. took hold of a small penknife she carried and stabbed the man in the abdomen. and on being pushed by Te Sue and Miguela.) JACINTO YAMZON Provincial Fiscal The accused pleaded not guilty. according to the doctor. The trial court erred in holding the accused criminally responsible for the secondary hemorrhage which caused the death of the deceased. threatened to bring suit against him unless he rejoined her. From that time on Te Sue lived in the barrio of Guinlajon. at which she was represented by counsel. municipality of Sorsogon. at her deed. the Chinaman and the accused voluntarily agreed to separate. the accused visited her former paramour and on entering the house. 1930. finally went home. The relatives of the deceased paid a little over P200 for the hospital treatment and the expenses of his last illness. he approached and told her to go away at once because her new paramour might get jealous and do her harm. and Doctor Ortega performed a slight operation upon him. and to pay the costs. cleaning and sewing up his wound. and after the trial. Because one Miguela Dawal. feeling that she was being unjustly treated. eight months. and might be healed in a week. and sentenced to fourteen years. On the morning of October 1.(Sgd. but on the sixth day the patient succumbed to complications which we shall treat of later on. and. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1. she fled to the street. and one day of reclusion temporal.

What caused the death of Felix Te Sue? — A. but it passed through the muscle tissue. It is strongly argued that the judgment appealed from is erroneous in finding that the deceased's movements. on the left side near the umbilical region. which Doctor Ortega declares were the cause of the secondary hemorrhage that produced his death. The trial court erred in holding the accused responsible for the death of the offended party as the direct and immediate consequence of the wound inflicted by the accused. Q. The trial court erred in holding the accused of the crime of homicide as charged in the information instead of lesiones leves as supported by the evidence in this case. To ascertain this important point requires a careful examination of the evidence upon this particular. The wound was caused by a certain blow.III. I found a wound in the abdomen. the excessive warmth of the bed and the fact that he was unaccustomed to such a bed. because the penknife was not very sharp. testified as follows: Q. Doctor Eduardo Ortega. the real cause of the movements was. the force of the blow which introduced the knife into the flesh produced a secondary congestion of the internal organ so that any unnecessary movement on the patient's part would cause congestion of the veins. IV. it was not deep and did not penetrate very far. What was the result of your examination? — A. He died of a secondary internal hemmorhage. were due to the pain felt after the operation and during his illness. so the deceased himself declared. How? — A. or would make them more congested and cause them to bleed. The first three assignments of error raise questions of fact and what really caused the death of the deceased. in charge of the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital. . speaking of the patient's physical condition when he entered the hospital. Q. a physician of admitted ability and skill. It is contended that according to the record.

Q. And he died because of that secondary internal hemmorhage? — A. Q. Yes.Q. and perhaps jump out of bed. there would have been no secondary hemorrhage. but twenty-four hours later. sufficient to cause the death of Felix Te Sue? — A. Was the wound alone. as treated by you. but there was no immediate hemorrhage after the wound was inflicted. Can you tell the court what were those unnecessary movements? — A. when asked why he did that. Yes. There are many kinds of hemorrhages: Primary. then he would sit up at night. and that he was not used to lying to bed. sir. You also said that Felix Te Sue had made an unnecessary movement? — A. they produced the secondary internal hemorrhage. if the wound had reached the internal organs and severed the veins of those organs it would be called a primary hemorrhage because it was directly caused by the wound. Those movements were the following: The patient began by moving from side to side. and begin walking about. Why do you call it a secondary hemorrhage? — A. . Do you mean to say that the patient's movements brought on the secondary internal hemorrhage? — A. Q. Q. there was what is called a secondary hemorrhage. If the patient had lain in bed quietly. in other words. in order to avoid increasing the congestion of the internal veins. Q. sir. did they bleed? — A. And in the case of Felix Te Sue. contrary to medical instructions. He began to bleed after he had been twenty-four hours in the hospital. Q. sir. in this particular case. Yes. he explained that he could not lie down because the bed was to warm.

he was examined. sir. doctor. Medical treatment was then administered. if the patient Felix Te Sue had not moved about. and that what he needed was complete rest. Q. but even in the presence of the doctor and the hospital attendants. sir. That wound. Yes. and after we had put the patient to bed. besides the physician's visits to him. in this case? — A. Q. although those veins contained more blood than usual. . Q. why strangers who know nothing about the care of the sick are placed in charge of a patient so delicate that his moving may cause his death. do you think death would have ensued? — A.Q. if there had been no secondary infection. as you have said? — A. because as a matter of fact. and then made to lie in bed. Can you tell us. As soon as he had been admitted into the hospital. the veins would not have burst. Q. as indeed it did. I am very sure he would not have had that secondary hemorrhage. Yes. But the wound you treated could have been healed? — A. and he was given to understand that he should remain in bed. If he had not made those movements. what instructions did you give him? — A. he continued to struggle with us. it could have been. And that internal congestion of the veins. would have healed up in a week. Q. In how many days could it have been healed? — A. that internal congestion would have not burst if the patient had not moved about. You said that Felix Te Sue had been asked why he moved about contrary to the physician's instructions. during the first twenty-four hours he had no symptoms of having an internal hemorrhage. we have nurses to attend and see to the patient as often as it is needed. The patient was not placed in the care of strangers. would not have caused the hemorrhage? That is to say. for any unnecessary movement might aggravate his condition.

when he was not fastened in because he did not seem to be violent. We agree with both parties that according to Doctor Ortega. that immediately after the operation Doctor Ortega admonished him to keep quiet because any movement he might make would change his pathological state for the worse and bring about dangerous complication. The defense contends. or would make them more congested. and suturing the wound. He left his bed the first day after the operation. he was submitted to a minor operation which consisted in cleaning. that during the operation they tied down the patient. (Pages 16-22. with which the Attorney-General agrees. that the wound did not involve any internal organ. but we cannot agree. and in spite of that he was able to leave it a walk about? — A. and that what really impelled the patient to violate the doctor's orders. but . the patient was in a nervous state.) From the foregoing testimony it may be inferred: That the deceased was stabbed on the left side of the abdominal region. that according to Doctor Ortega's testimony the determining cause of Te Sue's death was not he wound inflicted by the accused. transcript of the stenographic notes. because the penknife was not very sharp. the immediate and determining cause of the death was none other than the internal hemmorhage produced by the rupture of the abdominal blood vessels. and the hemorrhage thus produced caused his death. that because of this. getting up and pacing about the room.Q. we reach the inevitable conclusion that the internal veins were congested from the beginning because of the force of the blow which produced the wound. that in spite of this admonition the deceased moved about. that Felix Te Sue was fastened in his bed. bled. causing them to bleed". that the real cause of said death was not the wound inflicted upon the victim. that upon his arrival. but his own carelessness in moving about against the doctor's orders. which produced the internal hemorrhage. already congested because of the wound. a desire to aggravate the criminal liability of the accused. near the navel. for that is what the doctor means when he says that "the wound was caused by a certain blow. medicating. Do you mean to say. in view of the evidence. the internal vessels. was not. Carefully analyzing Doctor Ortega's testimony. by sitting up in bed and pacing about the room. sitting up in bed. the force of the blow which introduced the knife into the flesh produced a secondary congestion of the internal organ so that an unnecessary movement on the patient's part would cause congestion of the veins. then. and immediately after it. that upon arriving at the hospital. as the defense insinuates.

The point raised by Viada in volume 3 of his work. which was noted from the moment he entered the provincial hospital. but the pathological state created by the illness brought on by the wound from which he was suffering. We are convinced that under normal conditions. published in the Gazette on the 16th of June. peculiar to his physical constitution. We hold. not by the violence of the means employed. if the patient had not been ill. . 1879. without his being able to counteract its effects. etc. which in a better constituted person would have healed in thirty or forty days. all of which depend upon his physical constitution: — should such a death be qualified as HOMICIDE? The Supreme Court has ruled affirmatively: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act — and in this case the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil. but the patient's movements. involves facts similar to those established in this case. It was not the warmth of the bed or his not being used to it that made the patient act as he did.simply his nervous condition. as he did. knowing. and that this state of nervousness could only be the result of the wound inflicted by the appellant. not to the wound or injury. and we believe the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain is perfectly applicable to this case: Even when the doctors say that the death was due not so much to the wound. it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide. pages 41 and 42. his irritability and other causes. In the case in question. the seriousness whereof is to be judged. his irritability and other causes." (Decision of April 3. but the congestion of the internal veins produced beforehand by the force of the blow which caused the wound and the nervous condition of the deceased. it is sought to attribute the internal hemorrhage that directly caused death. but was rather due to the victim's purely nervous temperament. overlooking the fact that they were due to his nervous condition. that the slightest movement might occasion a complication or internal hemorrhage capable of causing death. but by the result actually produced and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death.) In the case cited the doctors were of the opinion that death was not an immediate consequence of the wound received. therefore. he would not have violated the doctor's orders. that the real cause of death in this case was not the bodily movements referred to. as to the patient's purely nervous temperament.

.. Sornito (4 Phil. he shall be held responsible for the consequences of his criminal action. whether the death be the precise and necessary consequence of the injuries or wounds. was an inherent physiological condition produced by the wound in the abdomen. the patient's nervous condition when the complication or internal hemorrhage which caused death set in. 1892. Here it was held among other things. we held that "In crimes against the life of a human being the results and effects of the criminal acts must necessarily be taken into consideration in order to establish the seriousness and extent of the evil or injury produced and to define the crime in accordance with the law. 443). 713).In United States vs. May 8. we also held that "Where a person voluntarily and with intent of injuring another commits an act which is notoriously unlawful. 357). or which originate through the fault or carelessness of the injured person. nor have had to leave his bed during the critical stage of his illness.)" The same doctrine was laid down in United States vs. or whether death resulted from accidents caused or brought on by reason of such wounds or injuries received by the patient. "persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are also liable for all the consequences arising therefrom and inherent therein. as the result of a wound inflicted by another.) `It is the firm and unalterable doctrine." In United States vs. which are exceptions to the rule not arising in the present case. other than those due to incidents entirely foreign to the act executed. . 391). It goes without saying that if he had not been wounded he would not have undergone that extraordinary state and condition. we reaffirmed the same principle holding that "`the firm and unalterable jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (interpreting the Penal Code now in force and effect) is that the crime of homicide is committed when death ensues or follows.' (Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain." At this juncture it is well to remember that..' (Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain. It must also be taken into consideration that the guilty parties are responsible under the law for all the unlawful acts executed by them in violation of its principles and for all the consequences of those acts. Montes (6 Phil. May 30. 1890." In United States vs. that the aggressor is responsible for all the natural consequences of the aggression when these consequences do not owe their origin to acts or malicious omissions imputable to the assaulted party. Monasterial (14 Phil.. as we stated in the beginning. Navarro (7 Phil. even though when such wrongful act constitutes the crime of homicide it appears that he had no intention of killing the deceased. and so held by the Court of Cassation.

At any rate. Zamora (32 Phil. 218). were the direct consequence of the patient's pathological condition or nervousness. in United States vs. malicious and imprudent. we held that "One who performs a criminal act should be held to liability for the act and for all of its consequences. if they were the immediate cause of his death. which have just been refuted. as we have shown.. The first is shown by the fact that she made use of a small penknife. they are both traceable to the wound inflicted by the accused. and Villamor. by the fact that before the attack she had been pushed out of the room where the victim was. and of having acted with passion and obfuscation. dissenting: It appears from the testimony of Dr. which had already been congested by the wound produced and the patient's nervous condition. and the second. instead of the serious crime of homicide. and to pay the costs of both instances. Felix Te Sue went to the hospital of Sorsogon where he was examined by said doctor. and that she considered such treatment as an offense or abuse. JJ. We have shown that in the case at bar the real and actual cause of death of the deceased was the hemorrhage of the internal veins.. Avanceña. Johnson. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500. The last assignment of error is but a corollary to the first three." The cases which the Attorney-General cites in his brief are not applicable. the judgment appealed from is modified and the appellant is sentenced to eight years and one day of prision mayor. for the reason that in them all the deaths were due to alien acts. Street. So ordered. The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of not having intended to commit so serious a crime as that committed. performed by the injured persons themselves. concur. and that these.Lastly. to suffer the accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code. who found that he had a wound on the left side of the abdomen near the umbilical region.. If the appellant must answer for all the consequences of her acts voluntarily performed.J. which while it penetrated the muscle tissue. it necessarily and logically follows that she must be convicted of the graver offense. . The penalty must therefore be reduced one degree or to prision mayor. Eduardo Ortega that immediately after being wounded by the accused.. although both were inflicted upon a person other than the one whom the felon intended to injure. J. C. Separate Opinions VILLA-REAL. and it is contended that the accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries. Wherefore. rather than the so-called bodily movements.

The doctor said quite plainly — and we have no reason to doubt him — that the patient's restlessness was due to the fact that the bed was to warm for him.was not deep and did not produce a primary hemorrhage. One need not have a nervous temperament in order to look for coolness and comfort in sleeping. moved from side to side. nor has the latter said he was so. wished to risk his life — by a purely conscious and voluntary act — violating the doctor's instructions and refusing to listen to his warnings and those of the persons attending him. were due to his nervous condition and not to the excessive warmth he felt or to his not being used to sleeping in a bed. and to told to keep quiet because he needed complete rest and any unnecessary movement might have aggravate his condition. and such death cannot be attributed to the person who wounded him . In finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the crime of homicide and not merely of slight physical injuries. and paced about the room. and that he was not used to it. for it did not reach the internal organs. the force of the blow by which it was introduced into the flesh produced a secondary congestion in the internal organ. he had to be tied down. which resulted from his carelessness. it set in with the bursting of the congested veins. Besides the hospital nurses and attendants. After twenty four hours had passed without any indication if an internal hemorrhage. and upon whose testimony the majority base their conclusion. sat up in a bed at night. saying that he could not remain lying down because the bed was too warm for him. As the penknife was not sharp. said nothing about the victim's nervous temperament. and that he was not used to that kind of furniture. notwithstanding the warnings of the nurses and relatives. he alone must be held responsible for his own death. given medical treatment. because the patient. In the opinion of the physician. through any unnecessary movement on the patients part might cause congestion of the veins. but in order to do so. which. The doctor who examined the deceased. if he had not moved about. got up. and might be healed in seven days. because he was afraid. who attended him. the patient would not have suffered a secondary hemorrhage and death would not have occurred. disobeying the doctor's orders. If the injured man. the majority rely upon the holding that the movements made by the patient against the doctor's orders. for the sake of a cooler and more comfortable bed. which caused the rupture of the veins already congested by the impact of the blow. A minor operation was performed upon him. two relatives to the injured person watched him night and day. After the operation he was put to bed.

and not to the defendant. there is some doubt. and which in all justice and reason can only be imputed to the latter. arguing to make the special circumstances stated above qualify the act prosecuted as consequences of grossly imprudent acts and omissions of the injured person. When a wound in the head. it is probable the accident would have been avoided and the wound healed in thirty days. because the crime of less serious physical injuries was penalized as if it were homicide. who had no share in them and could not have prevented them. and who is. gives rise to traumatic erysipelas. but upon appeal on the ground that articles 419 and 433 of the Code had been violated. Very similar to this are the cases cited by Viada in volume V of the fifth edition of his commentaries. indeed. but not for the death. 5th edition. which in turn produces cerebral meningitis from which the person injured dies in eleven days. which is essential a less serious physical injuries. had not gone out in the open. was not a natural and logical consequence of the wound. which unfortunately brought on his death. the Supreme Court held that the appeal had been well taken. the erysipelas which preceded the meningitis that produced death may have been due to the patient's carelessness in constantly exposing himself to a draft. responsible for the natural and logical consequences of such a voluntary act. contrary to said doctors' orders. 1874. because according to the opinion of the doctors.) 5 Viada. and the doctors declare that the erysipelas may have been due to the patient's carelessness in constantly exposing himself to a draft: Is the act homicide or merely less serious physical injuries? The Audiencia of Granada held in favor of the former. and if this be so. and as it is not alleged that the other causes which might have contributed to it actually occasioned the death. for a crime is determined by the act wherein it consists. and the remote and original cause of the latter was the wound inflicted by the defendant on the upper part of the offended party's left parietal bone.slightly. and had been given proper medicine. although if the victim were not predisposed to erysipelas. Gazette for August 26th. where the Supreme Court of Spain laid down the following doctrines: QUESTION 22. page 80. If the immediate cause of death was traumatic erysipelas complicated with meningoencephalitis arising form the erysipelas itself. which as we have seen. (Decision of June 15. Is the person who inflicted the wound guilty of homicide or of physical injuries? The Supreme Court has held in favor of the latter and lighter offense. the crime in question is none other than less . QUESTION 23.

" (Decision of April 2. and of serious physical injuries in the third. although as this court has repeatedly held. Gazette of February 7.. upon the strength of the evidence before it. the proper jury having been found. with the loss of an arm. i. because it is a more and equitable principle universally recognized and constantly applied. from which or from whose direct or immediate consequences death results. 1879. the deceased had been seriously injured. but would have healed in so many days. e. If the verdict it is stated that the wounds inflicted upon the deceased by the defendant would have healed. it is obvious that following the doctrine set forth in the foregoing reasonings. 1878. — yet this principle is not applicable where it clearly appears that the injury would not have caused death. a person is liable for all justiciable acts contrary to law and for all the consequences thereof. either incidentally or accidentally. The Supreme Court of Spain held them criminally liable for the crime of less serious physical injuries in the first two. fault. 5th edition page 81. etc. QUESTION 24. the appellant should not have been convicted of the crime of homicide. the Supreme Court only found him guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries : "Whereas. that the wounds inflicted by the appellant Jeronimo Navarro upon Bartolome Martinez would have healed. but died as a result of the mistakes of the doctor in the surgical operation and treatment of the injuries. had it not been for certain complications due to the mistakes committed by the doctor in the surgical operations and treatment thereof. because these. inasmuch as the death was due wholly to another person's carelessness or lack of skill. and not homicide were the natural . In the third case. and not for those which bear no relation to the initial cause and are due to the carelessness. that one is accountable for his own acts and their natural or logical consequences. but merely of serious physical injuries with the loss of a principal member.) In the first two cases cited.serious physical injuries.) 5 Viada. this being the only consequence imputable to him in view of his act. had it not been for complications due to make mistakes committed by the doctor in the surgical operation and treatment: Is the crime homicide? It was so held by theAudiencia of Jaen. having inflicted physical injuries. (Decision of December 17. but upon appeal taken by the accused. for the death resulting from the injury he inflicted.) 5 Viuda. page 81. whether it be the injured man himself or a third person: Whereas. with the loss of the arm. and where it is shown beyond all doubt that the death is due to the malicious or careless acts of the injured person or a third person. Gazette of May 23rd. in the ordinary course of events. 1903. 5th edition. the offender must answer for the ultimate result of his act. it will be observed that the deceased received less serious physical injuries and that death was due to their own carelessness or abuses committed by them. or lack of skill of another.

For all the foregoing. but might have contributed to accelerate the fatal result of that illness. and in the second its surrounding circumstances. held: All the witnesses attribute the death of the child to the illness it was suffering. inasmuch as the wound inflicted by her might have been healed in seven days. G. in his testimony states that the body showed unequivocal signs of a serious disease of the heart. No. who did nothing more than to examine the body and gives his certificate as to certain bruises on the thighs. 640). the penalty fixed being arresto menor. Being asked by the judge whether the gravity of the child's illness. through Chief Justice Arellano. where the real cause of death could not be determined. Malcolm and Romualdez. he replied that "as no other approximate cause is known than the great excitement produced by those blows. I am of the opinion that the defendant. was such that it might have died without the blows which were inflicted upon him. concur. but the doctor. .. Embate (3 Phil.consequences of their unlawful acts. and of the mistakes of the doctor in the surgical operation and treatment of the wounds. 58. this court.. it may be inferred that they were the sole cause which precipitated the fatal result of the illness of the child. sufficient evidence as to the true cause of the death of the child. and which can be punished in this same cause under the provisions of section 29 of General Orders. But it is true that the accused did strike him for the purpose of inflicting punishment. In United States vs. given solely upon the result of the examination of the body. its condition was such as to lead one to expect a fatal result. and that the bruises could not have caused the death of the child. No. and as by this he committed a misdemeanor which should not go unpunished. .R. inasmuch as death was the result of carelessness and abuses committed by the injured persons themselves. JJ. . owing to the affection of the heart." We do not find in this testimony. the witness replied that "if in the first place the age of the child is taken into consideration. L-27097 January 17." Upon being further questioned as to whether he believed that the blows inflicted upon the child and which produced the bruises were the cause of its death. no physician being in attendance.appellant can only be made to answer for the misdemeanor of slight physical injuries as defined and penalized in article 587 of the Penal Code. which was a serious affection of the heart. 1975 .

had stayed in Manila also since 1964. From Matnog. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. AQUINO. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. 1965. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. On January 6.: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling. Jose's three children one girl and two boys. are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon. the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. Mabisa. Santiago F. defendantsappellants. ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO. and from Daraga. J. Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. To have money for his expenses. (2) Antonio B. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. Albay on board an Alatco bus. Sorsogon. 14. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants. SC966). Antonio is one hour older than Jose. (4) Elena B. . they look alike very much. However. 1966). Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. Dando. Antonio's daughter. they rode on the train. Leonora. was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September. 1964. Erminio (5) Modesta R. both married. sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. Escanan. appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. Bautista in the sum of P6. twins. brothers. Being twins. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses. finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder. The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands.000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. (3) Isabelo S. plaintiff-appellee. with a bayong containing their pants and shirts. From there. vs. Northern Samar. they went to Daraga. they took a launch to Matnog. It was their first trip to the big city.

Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson. who was near the window. Accompanied by Juan. facing the back door. That woman was Corazon Bernal. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat. It was around eight o'clock in the evening. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Antonio's daughter was working in that store. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear. Some passengers were standing on the aisle. The brothers bought some chicos which they put aside. and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. An aisle separated the two rows. Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day. Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. From the agency. The twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. and a three-year old boy. . Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. for their homeward trip. Laguna. Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. gave him thirty pesos. They were in front of Reganet. Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. there were seated a fat woman. On the opposite seat were seated a woman. After buying their tickets. January 8th. who was near the window. The twins were in coach No. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. had given them.At the Paco station. Jose was seated between Antonio. they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. 2). on the twopassenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting. Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao. It was then noontime. they were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. an employee of the agency. they proceeded to her employer's establishment. There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. The train left at six o'clock that evening. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. Each seat faced an opposite seat.passenger seats. her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby.

He was taking his wife and children to Calauag. attempted to leave her seat. Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death. 2 Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. hitting her on her right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him. 9. Upon reaching coach 8. A) upon the count of three. Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. he met Mrs. with its blade pointed outward. She was not able to get up anymore. or he would be shot. while at the rear of the coach. He was in the dining car when he received the information that there were killings in the third coach. Instead of obeying. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. B). Quezon. When Antonio was about to stab another person. Escanan (Exh. on that occasion. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. He immediately went there and. 1 Upon seeing what was happening. Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol. The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm. he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. the child was not injured. Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle. D-2). who had run amuck. Mapa who was wounded. was not on duty. I to I-3). 8 and 9. knocking him down. Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors.For his part. stabbed himself on his left breast. He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. He retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol. the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and. Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. Fortunately. Near the platform where he had fallen. he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. a train escort who. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins. Amanda Mapa. in a suicidal impulse. Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. but before she could escape Jose stabbed her. with her baby. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B. At a distance of around nine meters. holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the . Rayel.

Manila. C-11. 45. housekeeper. Paracale. (6) Modesta R. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to him. Guinayangan. married. Hernandez. whose bodies were found in the train. (5) Teodoro F. Erminio 10. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. Pasay City (Exh. 66 Menlo Street. . Apparently. G to I-2. 46. laborer. died from stab wounds. (4) Susana C. Sampaloc. C-9. the official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila. . Of the twelve persons who perished. Quezon. C to C-3. married. Miguelin. P to P-2. 28. The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS). R to R-2 and T to T-2) Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. married. Legaspi City. Jose Panganiban. 53 married. Camarines Norte. Dando. Dimaano.scissors away from him. 60. housewife. Dalagan. When the train arrived at the Calamba station. Brondial 58. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue. 72. Q to Q-2. married. (2) Antonio B. eight. C to C-11). They were: (1) Timoteo U. Sorsogon. (3) Isabelo S. Escanan. housemaid. they jumped from the moving train to avoid being killed. Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Cubao. Camarines Norte. (2) Miguel C. J-1 and J-2). carpenter. namely: (1) Isabel Felices. C-8. 45. housekeeper. Quezon City and (8) Teresita B. Oriarte. 0 to 0-2. L to L-2. four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. 12 Liberty Avenue. Nawasa employee. San Juan. Bautista. Rizal. married. Mabisa. student. N to N-2. Ginlajon. married. A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. (7) Elena B. Quezon. Lopez. 25. C-7.

He said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars. "It was a hold-up". He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him. Mrs. she was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later. Pasay City (Exh. He stabbed one of them. K to K-2. said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who was taking his money. C-10. M to M-3 and S to S-2). Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14. . 3. in his statement.(3) Salvador A. I-A). farmer. When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing. C-5. J-1. Armanda Mapa-Dizon. X or 8. When she ran for safety with her child. Jose Toling. Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. D to D-5). 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Maqueda 52. Valenciano. The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim. 657-D Jorge Street. Brigida Sarmiento-Palma. X. As a result of her injury. He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him. Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to get his money. housekeeper. 1966). Corazon Bernal. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement. Mrs. Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. J-2. Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja. Mrs. Quezon and (4) Shirley A. he stabbed other persons because. J. C-6. C-4. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. 27. Cipriano Reganet. married. MapaDizon. she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost. Laguna. Canlubang. Mrs. married. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. On that date. 1965). Lopez. 49 tsn Sept. inasmuch as he "was already bound to die". Baby X. On January 9. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that might not". thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. he commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month. the statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General Hospital.

Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt him. They were facing the twins. that their criminal liability was only for two homicides and for physical injuries. After trial. They were talking in a low voice. The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.According to Jose Toling. In this appeal. in the alternative. sat on the seat facing them. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back. when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach. the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up. Some old women were near them. According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements. while the other two seated themselves behind them. Two of the four men. whispering among themselves and making signs. 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims). 1965. assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. the four men followed them. On January 20. multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed). gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors. The Toling brothers appealed. When the train was already running. Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. At the arraignment. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10. the accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. Through counsel. To pay for the tickets. approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket. whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them. Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. Exhibits 1 and 8). he took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket. 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were allegedly observing them. two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then escaped. argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends. When the twins boarded the train. . appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money. adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far. the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. the accused.

He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. The trial court. He fell down and became unconscious. Seeing his brother in a serious condition.When Antonio felt some pain in his throat. However. and on Jose Toling a stab wound. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen. 3/4 inch. one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left. stabbed. Dando (Exh. 10). inflicting a deep wound. in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior. 1965 and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling: Wound. The twins were discharged from the hospital on January 17th. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm. 1-1/4 inches (sutured). 85. The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario. right. which resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons. The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second man. a physician of the North General Hospital who treated them during the early hours of January 9. mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and Wound. Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. 11). another person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead. His money was gone. incised. he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it. frontal. penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. Mabisa (Exh. 87 tsn). causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train. made the following observations: . He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and 5-B) and Isabelo S. 3-1/2 inches each.

refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. who are twins. it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck. In their parochial minds. in the limited space of the coach. even to the extent of foregoing their breakfast. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. the reliable guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose.What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering privations. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins. are queerly alike. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at. We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. They confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3. 10 and 11). Such a confusion was unavoidable because the twins. the accused. A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. In our opinion. To the mind of the Court. a fact which could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete. Hence. executed one day after the killing. It also appears that the accused. 1965). Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury. however. 32 tsn November 5. their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at. they might have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male companions. according to a Constabulary investigator. might victimize them by stealing their little money. they became hostile to their co-passengers. immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused). only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in Manila. whom. was a novelty. Thus. when stared at by the persons in front of them. are "very identical". 1 and 8). on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. 1965. their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. therefore. Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio and the . 9 the spectacle of middleaged rustic twins.

Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other twin. December 26. L-23234. The main point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's decision. That assumption is erroneous. In his statement and testimony. Resayaga. 54 SCRA 350). The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility. as in this case. 139140. 9. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. As thus clarified. Where. People vs. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. 1965 (p. . Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. Record). They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes. Exhibit 11. before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. 1970 Ed. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. disabled him and prevented him from committing other killings. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers. Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the train. 1963. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed contradictions. That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate. the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime. The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9. the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. while Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station. There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception and recollection are not the same. A).one who was armed with the scissors was Jose.

it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the other passengers. Mapa and the CIS investigators. which they sustained. Apparently. other than the twins. four persons. Mapa. And there can be no doubt that the twins. namely. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons. Maqueda. from their own admissions (Exh. On the other hand. On the other hand. and for physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Dando. 9. the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. Oriarte and Timoteo U. because they admittedly killed Antonio B. The truth is that Mrs. . In that crowded coach No. according to the trial court. which was lighted. Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides. P. could have inflicted the stab wounds. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. Dimaano. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings. P-1 and P-2). since they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No. we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. Salvador A. To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified. Mabisa and Isabelo S. The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to inadvertence. not to mention the testimonies of Rayel. According to the necropsy reports. Shirley A. Valenciano. because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability. Hernandez (Exh. because they died due to stab wounds. could be attributed to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage. He contends that no one corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. Mrs. Mapa. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. Aldea. We have to reject that view. were the authors of the killings. 1 and 8) and their testimonies. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life.Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions. We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings. 9. the defense failed to prove that persons. Miguel C. The injuries. should be added the name of Susana C.

The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. impelled by the instinct of selfpreservation. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja. 371). lacerations and fractures on the head. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". Halliday 61 L.S. vs. supra. D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Rep.] 701. Rule 131. 4911. 5[c]. cited in U. . The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths. is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water. Dinna Nosal. [N. vs. 500). U. K to K-2. The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. 41 Phil. T. vs. body and extremities (Exh. Unlike Mrs. J to J2. No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. D.S. and in so doing he injures himself. 79 Phil. The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape.S. the information charges that the accused committed homicide. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins. Valdez. Rules of Court). the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus. then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.contusions. Valdez. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. See People vs. Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. 14[16]. the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them. Following that rule. M to M-2 and S to S-2). Mapa. The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims. the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. As to three of them. Buhay. The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.

esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid. Revised Penal Code. they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies. 682. who did not anticipate that the twins would act likejuramentados and who were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. 102-103. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted. 1044. the rule. People vs. 64[l] and 248. the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 652. The unexpected. 831. The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. People vs. 236. 66 Phil. Mori. 61 Phil. People vs. the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto). Mortero. involving eleven murders. 27. 271. Beecham. People vs. 31. 15 Phil. People vs. 185. U. (See People vs. January 31. As noted by Cuello Calon. 607. S. Contra: People vs. Sakam. The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. when there is "acumulacion material de las penas". 96 Phil.Revised Penal Code). People vs. 43 Phil. (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo). 85 Phil. 55 SCRA 382. People vs. Cabrera. 109 Phil. where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders. 37 Phil. 305. Cu Unjiengi. 82. . where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides. si son varias las acciones. where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or intent). 1974. People vs. vs. Salazar. 37 Phil. People vs. As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case. Macaso. 49 Phil. 437. vs. U. one frustrated murder and two attempted murders. 1058 where the accused Moro. Remollino. was convicted of sixteen separate murders. 61 Phil.S. Umali. On the other hand. 97 Phil. Manantan. "en al concurso real de delitos".S. Lawas. People vs. Floresca. killed sixteen persons and wounded others. surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers. the Panampunan massacre case. People vs. U. Penas. De Leon. 12th Ed. 828. 819. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design. 94 Phil. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other". L-23511. Balaba." (1 Derecho Penal. Hence. 272. p. 108 Phil. 650). Jamad. 260. 105 Phil. involving four murders. is that "si son varios los resultados. who ran amuck. 99 Phil. 975. 403). People vs.

Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12.000 to each set of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Costs against the appellants. WHEREFORE. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty. of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder. the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. URBANO.: This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. petitioner. JR. Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. SO ORDERED.000. 1988 FILOMENO vs. Susana C. respondents. No modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case. San Fabian. J. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE PHILIPPINES. No. At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23. as co-principals.R.A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. The records disclose the following facts of the case. HON. or a total indemnity of P96. petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang. Urbano then got angry and demanded that . Hernandez. COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE GUTIERREZ. 1980. In the service of the penalties. the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence. 72964 January 7. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa.. G.

The group went to Dr. Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. residing at Barangay Anonang. Pangasinan on October 23. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Meneses. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine. rural health physician of San Fabian. Upon the advice of Solis. 20 years of age. as it was already treated by the other doctor. and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination. As suggested by Corporal Torio. Dr. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long. his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier. As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand. After Javier was treated by Dr. Immediately thereafter. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A). (p. married. right. the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. he and his companions returned to Dr. causing a swelling on said leg. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there. including the handle. which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier was brought to a physician. on October 27. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28. Urbano promised to pay P700.Javier pay for his soaked palay.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Guillermo Padilla. San Fabian. 1980. Hence. 88. A quarrel between them ensued. 1980 and found the following: 1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence. Emilio Erfe. who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury. Original Records) Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis. Antonio Erfe. to wit: xxx xxx xxx . 1981) which reads: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier.

IM.m. on November 14. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment. inj. Dr. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows: Date Diagnosis 11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus adm. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven. 1980 at exactly 4:18 p. (p. 02 inhalation administered. Restless at times. for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. 1980. Original Records.. the additional P300. at DX TETANUS 1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail. Novaldin 1 amp.) Urbano advanced P400.Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. .m. When admitted to the hospital.00 to Javier at the police station. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably. and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. At about 1:30 a. On November 3. Javier died in the hospital. 87. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. Febrile 11-15-80 Referred. 1980. With diffi#35. 421 culty opening his mouth. On November 15.

Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. That sometime in the first week of November. 1980. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. 1981. Upon arraignment. 1982. San Fabian.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. a town of said province. as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years. Dra." After trial. together with the accessories of the law. Original Records) In an information dated April 10. Rizal upon finality of the decision. in view of the nature of his penalty. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison. Pangasinan. I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang. Marcelo Javier. (p. there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian. as maximum. Third Judicial District. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states: That in 1980.Pronounced dead by Cabugao at 4:18 P.000. the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. to indemnify the heirs of the victim. in Muntinlupa. FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal. and to pay the costs. 100. That during the typhoon.00 with costs against the appellant. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor.000.M. The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30. Urbano pleaded "not guilty. PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. . and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17. the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced. in the amount of P12.

" (People v. which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. l980. 1980. 1986. that on November 14. Cardenas.. In a resolution dated July 16. Thus. I conducted a personal survey in the area affected. I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. the appellate court said: The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death. 1981. That after the storm. this petition. That few days there after..That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields. he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day. The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm.or on November l5. we gave due course to the petition. the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence. 33. I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions. he died from tetanus. The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . Under these circumstances. Rollo) The motion was denied." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. November 15. while I was conducting survey. with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death. Hence. 56 SCRA 631). but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes. That on November 5. . True. 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident. that the deceased did not die right away from his wound. (p.

it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. People v.Dr. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. In Vda. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn. ..."And more comprehensively. 5. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. 20-21. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. produces the injury. and without which the result would not have occurred. Oct. the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus.G. CA 43 O. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief.C. Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. v. Rollo) The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. that Dr.. R. is an afterthought. It is as follows: . (Article 4. and lately.. somehow got infected with tetanus However. Red. People v. 1981). in natural and continuous sequence. The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury.. If the wound had not yet healed. de Bataclan. which. 1. Cornel 78 Phil. we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: xxx xxx xxx . 1980. et al. Medina (102 Phil. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. 1181). p. The evidence merely confirms that the wound. 78. 418). that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. (pp. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.P. 5072. par. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. "that cause. Consequently.

" (at pp. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. As in the case of the incubation period. most muscles are involved to some degree. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their . i.. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery. In the vast majority. and headache are encountered occasionally. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. 185-186) The issue. irritability. We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus. or back and difficulty swallowing. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. therefore.e. rigidity becomes generalized.either immediately or by setting other events in motion. However. a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. however. only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. stiffness gives way to rigidity. Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. abdomen. an interval referred to as the onset time. As the progresses. As more muscles are involved. In a small proportion of patients. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death. In fact. ranges from 2 to 56 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease.

or on November 14. Therefore. Consequently. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. he died. Emphasis supplied) Therefore. 1980. the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. After 22 days. or less. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. therefore. trismus is marked. the onset time should have been more than six days. died on the second day from the onset time. Javier. Cardenas. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. (People v. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. and an onset time of 72 hrs. November 15. Trismus is usually present. generalized convulsive spasms. natural. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. medically speaking.antagonists. 1980. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond . dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. In the case at bar. 1004-1005. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. severe trismus. If. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. The following day. This incident took place on October 23. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. As the disease progresses. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. however. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time. 1983 Edition. pp. 1980.

The infection was. and efficient cause of the injury. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. We must stress. may still be civilly liable. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. 1038). July 29. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. however. (Article 29. (People v. (99 Phil.reasonable doubt. while not criminally liable. (See also People v. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. such condition was not the proximate cause. 77 Phil. 127 SCRA 16). "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible." (45 C. the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. After the hacking incident. v. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co..R. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. (at p. The medical findings. therefore. The well-settled doctrine is that a person. Caruncho. the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. The judgment the accused in a criminal prosecution must be reasonable doubt. however. 1987).J. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. we said: xxx xxx xxx . No. in the recent case of People v. Section 2(3). et al. Thus.. unrelated. et al. 74041. for failure to take necessary precautions. Rellin. While the guilt of established beyond evidence is required Code). (G. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. Rogelio Ligon y Tria. successive. 118). that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. 1508.R. Remoquillo. 125) It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. Doubts are present. pp. However. 931-932). No. Civil of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the . only a preponderance of in a civil action for damages. Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G. distinct and foreign to the crime. At the very least.

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code.accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense. which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission. for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. civil liability cannot be demanded. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It is just and proper that. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? . This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party. 129 SCRA 559). Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. Court of Appeals. when the latter is not proved. has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. private rights. One affects the social order and the other. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. (Padilla v.

abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment. G.000. he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal. No. Leyte. J. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. WHEREFORE. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged. The information (amended) in this case reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx . since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case. now Court of Appeals. SARMIENTO. FRANCISCO ABARCA.00."For these reasons.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30. 74433 September 14.R. we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. It will correct a serious defect in our law. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court. plaintiff-appellee. accused-appellant. In compliance therewith." The respondent court increased the P12. However. sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. 1987 PEOPLE OF THE vs. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. PHILIPPINES. the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. Costs de oficio. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed.000. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo. SO ORDERED. the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. With the approval of the new Constitution.

However. 24. 5-8. On July 15. he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). The Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows: Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca. then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. the accused was in his residence in Tacloban. the above-named accused. M-16 rifle. Nov. Leyte. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban.The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder. unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body. He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Leyte (pp. Id. tsn. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9. 1 xxx xxx xxx On arraignment. armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite). 28. 4547. . 65. in the City of Tacloban. and with treachery. The accused. with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation. thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence. tsn. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. 1985). that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. 1984). tsn. Sept. Jenny. did then and there wilfully.). committed as follows: That on or about the 15th day of July. Eastern Samar. 1984. had illicit relationship. to fetch his daughter. thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado. 1984. the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.

Jenny. Sept. Koh was hit. he is hereby sentenced to death.). 24. He got Talbo's firearm. arriving there at around 6:30 p.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. 1986. tsn. 17-23. He spent P15. the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE. and to pay the costs. see also exh. 1984. ). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head. trunk and abdomen (pp.000. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp.00). an M-16 rifle. and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision.000. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. finding the accused. 9-13. His wife. see also exh. the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. Id. C2C Arturo Talbo.000. 1984). 24.Upon reaching home. Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended information. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 1984. complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20. tsn. Id. the trial court rendered the appealed judgment. Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1. and pursuant to Art. Oct. Id. tsn.). to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30. 2 On March 17. the accused found his wife. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 34-49. 23. 28-29. Sept. The accused found Koh playing mahjong.000. 24-25. C). Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. tsn. 17. tsn. 48. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. .).00 for the same purpose (pp.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. tsn.m. and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. tsn. Id. 13-19. He went to the house of a PC soldier. Lina Amparado. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp.000. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila. 3 xxx xxx xxx The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo: I. complexed with double frustrated murder. not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence. SO ORDERED. — Any legally married person who. disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts. Manila. II. that the accused had been deceived. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. shall suffer the penalty of destierro. 4 The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Article 247 reads in full: ART. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind. Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency. IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency. shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. the President of the Philippines. betrayed. or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. . he shall be exempt from punishment. thru the Ministry of Justice.

Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. in the act of illicit copulation. in case of death or serious physical injuries.These rules shall be applicable. . . supra. under the same circumstances. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour. the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. about one hour. . 6 we said: xxx xxx xxx As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code. Though quite a length of time. therefore erred. the above-quoted article. and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. as a result of which. and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. the victim in this case. The trial court. while the daughters are living with their parents. he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. These elements are present in this case. had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot. Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter. to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age. Araque. Thus. It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247. far from defining a felony. The Revised Penal Code. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse. does not define an offense. or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. 5 In People v. in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another. and their seducers. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage. and must not have been influenced by external factors. does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. in convicting the accusedappellant of murder. immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse.

constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information. the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide.. for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted. 368. it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime. Article 247. 23 Phil. vs. (Sec. we think. but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein 7 mentioned.) That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. Only "acts or omissons . incidentally.e. Rule 106. or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein.. . i. 672. that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime. conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime. as held in a case.. amount to an exempting circumstance. in the information. and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead. Campo. the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. and. therefore. is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. Rules of Court. 79 Phil. not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the courtneed not be pleaded. There can. as the case may be — is punished only withdestierro.. xxx xxx xxx We. or serious physical injury.) And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted. murder.. admit them. since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. therefore. parricide. This penalty is mere banishment and.considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation. . (People vs. Coricor. In effect. U.S. A different interpretation. . would make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense. 5. the offender is exempted from punishment. xxx xxx xxx . hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd. and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom.

that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Here. is not inflicted upon the accused. Although as a rule. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period. 9 But the case at bar requires distinctions. one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act. we therefore impose upon the accused-appellantarresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period. second paragraph. 8 It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim. the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. 13 WHEREFORE. that is. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. This is where we disagree. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant. The accusedappellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor.Punishment.) 12 For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. we hold him liable under the first part. cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances. but that is intended for his protection. consequently. however. he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service . The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. of Article 365. 11 there is no showing. with respect to Lina Amparado. the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. as to the extent of her injuries. This does not mean. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). not being a punishable act.") 10that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case. and being the more severe offense. He is banished. less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. While it appears that before firing at the deceased.

And the law imposes the supreme penalty when in the process he kills her. No. Ulep. Macario. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No special pronouncement as to costs. G.000. The facts are undisputed. plaintiff-appellee. Castor Naval for accused-appellant. ULEP. was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. GANCAYCO. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives. Ilocos Norte. one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband. the daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference. he ceases to be a man. PHILIPPINES.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. in San Nicolas. . However. at nine o'clock in the evening. accused-appellant.: A man must love his wife. 1970. and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12. He becomes a beast.000. Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16. MACARIO A. L-36858 June 20. The following day. friends. When against this unwritten rule he beats her. It is parricide pure and simple. This is what Macario A. Indeed he must be her protector. 1988 PEOPLE OF THE vs. and the husband of the deceased. the Chief of Police of San Nicolas. 1973. IT IS SO ORDERED. Second Judicial District. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. J. He must not lift a finger to hurt her.R. On May 21.of these penalties.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1.500.00 and to pay the costs in a decision of March 20. accused Macario Ulep.

right side. 5th. left. Presence of extravascated blood and injuries of the surrounding tissues of the broken ribs areas. 24. THORACIC CAVITY: . The 4th and 5th ribs fractured along the midolavicular line. caught up with the funeral Procession at the Catholic cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased. left. SKELETAL SYSTEM: Complete fracture of the 4th. San Nicolas. the police chief and Dr. left. anterior aspect of the arm. Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the juncture of the rib and external cartillages with concomitant injury to its sounding tissues and extravascated blood.At the behest of the daughter. 1970 PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS SKIN: A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in color was noted on the upper half. 6th and 7th ribs. Accordingly. a physician. The 6th and 7th ribs fractured along the anterior auxillary line. Ilocos Norte Date: May 25. left. The autopsy reports read as follows: POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP Age: 42 Nationality: Filipino Address: No. left. Eliseo Bonoan. the request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial.

p. His statement was reduced to writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. PC sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan. Coronary vessels congested. Laoag City conducted another investigation of accused Macario Ulep. She vomitted and then went to bed. of a serous fluid found within the cavity. he admitted that he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent words. DIGESTIVE SYSTEM: Apparently normal CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM: The meningeal vessels were congested. Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. The following day. marked as Exhibit "A". CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC ARREST PRIMARY SHOCK. He reiterated that the cause of death of his wife. CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: Heart with small amount of clotted blood. The big blood vessels contained small amount of clotted blood. Asuncion Pablo.Presence of about 200 cc. rec. 16.). was his elbowing her on her breast. D. of serous fluid within the cavity. 1 Two weeks after the burial. ABDOMINAL CAVITY: Presence of about 500 cc. A statement was prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos Norte. two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. (Exh. The accused then left for the fields . This statement was marked Exhibit "B". In this statement. Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures.

and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. Ilocos Norte. In the necropsy report of Dr. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO A LONG STANDING PROCESS OR CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM. (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt. Bonoan who conducted an autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile deceased by a previous marriage. WHEN SUCH ADMISSION IS BUT A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART. PEDRO BLANCO FOR THE DEFENSE. AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS AFFIDAVITS. With the pain in her chest. EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1. Bonoan. the cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary shock. Bonoan. Ulep retracted his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before that. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE. Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock due to fractured ribs? The appellant alleges that the gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing illness of the body system caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo." ENGLISH TRANSLATION. their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast. AS TESTIFIED TO BY DR. . Despite these statements. the wife. Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo. We agree and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr." The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE ELBOW BLOWS BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ON HER BREAST. Eliseo V. and while his wife went to have their palay milled. of the accused. The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. The husband who previously denied permission to conduct an autopsy was present when the autopsy was performed shortly before the body was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas. she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo. He reported this death to their barrio captain.

even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr. because the fractures. 2 Dr. the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and primary shock. there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. so as to injure the heart and impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. no matter how pliant it could be. to the fact that the fracture conditions Were of long standing. still the fractures could not have injured the heart or impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. Bonoan that the chest is pliant and is like an accordion which can be compressed is puerile to say the least. some repairs has happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling to disappear (t. the defense assails this theory of the prosecution in the following manner: First. The fractures merely caused the extravasation of blood within the fractured areas. This means that the fractures were not depressed or that the fractured ends did not cave-in. the elbow blows of the accused could not have caused a compression of the chest wall. were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. where the fractures were found. Even so. because it does not tend to compress the heart. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the chest could have been caused by blows or physical pressure. Second. while the victim was lying on her back.. This is so because only extravasated blood was present around the immediate area of the fractures. This indicates that the elbow blows were not of sufficient force to fracture the ribs. Blanco attributes the absence of swelling or contusion on the chest.The defense took exception to Dr. Bonoan were present. And neither would the fractures cause primary shock because they were merely complete fractures. This is so because a fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and it is the extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion.s. which means a mere breakage that would not cause the stoppage of the heart. The claim of Dr. And even on the theory that the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a piece of wood placed on the chest. p.n. Could such injuries not have been inflicted by elbow blows when the victim was standing or by knee or feet blows when the victim was lying on her back or was sitting with her back against the wall? While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest of his wife immediately before her death and the prosecution attributed these blows as the proximate cause of the cardiac arrest and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death. that is. 3 . 180).

such as a fracture of the ribs. may be due to the chronic condition of the kidney like nephritis and edema or the hardening of the liver or a long progressively weakening of the heart. 1970. 7 There is an admission by Dr." He says that such stoppage could be due to trauma. Blanco. Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there were no signs of circulatory weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the heart and such being the condition there could be no abnormality and thus he further declares that such clots are normally found in the heart of a dead person or in any part of the circulatory system. The presence of 500 cc. the same could not have caused cardiac arrest or primary shock because the lacerations were limited to the pleura. Blanco. On the contrary. the appellant's witness. witness for the appellant. the . both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. 9 A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death of Asuncion Pablo on May 21. Neither did the lacerations of the pleura cause primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura. Thus the theory of the defense is strengthened by the very evidence of the prosecution.And third. the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased died of cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the heart due to a long standing process or condition in her body system. 4 Furthermore. The appellant claims that it is not normal whereas the prosecution says that the pleura normally contains 100 to 200 cc. according to Dr. the physician. of serous fluid and that this is normal. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which. She was legally married to Macario Ulep. Bonoan did not concur in this view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a result of the diffusion of the medicine used in the embalming. of serous fluid in the pleura. although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points of fracture. that he has not "attended a case of fractured ribs" 8and that he explains cardiac failure as a "failing of the heart" and his further concept is that it is "the stopping of the heart. The appellant bares that this is a sign of the hardening of the heart. Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted blood in the heart and blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal vessels. The points of fracture did not cave-in or were not depressed and they did not injure or impede the heart to cause cardiac arrest. Bonoan. Anyway both agree that there should be enough serous fluid to lubricate the tissues. Dr. which indicates that the hemorrhage was nil. 6 We find cogent basis in the explanation given by Dr. 5 Dr. This is so because the serous fluid in the pleura -as not reddish.

. by itself appears to be unimportant is attested by experience. findings.. 1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a bullcart and was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. The death. This attack caused the complete fracture of the 4th. but there were no marks of bruises present. as. Death however. or tuberculosis. or anything to show the cause of death. for instance. The possibility of a person dying from the shock attendant upon an injury which. v.appellant herein. 1970. without stating which particular ribs were so affected.. liver or heart disease." to wit: Sec. Medical Jurisprudence under the title of "SHOCK. 11 the deceased had received injuries to the abdomen by kick and blows. We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book. Slane. Shock from an injury may be fatal even when the blow leaves no trace behind it. the appellant presented a witness to prove that sometime in February or March. — Death may also be due to the shock associated with the injury. et al. In the case of Reg. if the blow delivered by the accused — ." was caused by said accused. . 6th and 7th ribs on her left chest and the 3rd. The trial judge observed: "There was never any attempt on the part of the accused to repudiate the sworn statements wherein he admitted that the cause of death of his wife was his having elbowed her many times on her breast. the appellant admitted that he elbowed and attacked his wife. 12 We have previously stated that: Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment. or behind the ear." 10 Having realized the gravity of his act. This happens when one steps. Shock. and 4th ribs. The prisoners were convicted of murder. established in two affidavits. right chest of Asuncion Pablo on the same evening of May 21. In these affidavits. the cause of death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by the strong pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. No satisfactory explanation of the cause of the shock seems to have been found. From all these observations. 5th. Exhibits "A" and "B. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal results. had followed twenty minutes after the maltreatment and was evidently due to the shock. 225. This witness said that two (2) ribs on each side of the chest were fractured. though it is due in some way to the upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of the body. and an incisive study of the necropsy report. or to the larynx. when a person receives a violent blow upon the pit of the stomach. kneels or presses the body of a victim against a wall.

plaintiff-appellee. No. Narvasa. with the above modification as to indemnity. defendant-appellant.000. and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady. convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the life of the victim. 1931 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. therefore." Again.(a) is the efficient cause of death. ISLANDS. 13 Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. ." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 14 We are. then there is criminal liability. Florentino Saguin Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in human acts on his wife. or (b) accelerated his death. Asuncion Pablo. Cruz. yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death. WHEREFORE. JJ. he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted.R. it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause death. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea.. G. or (c) is the proximate cause of death. concur. He should answer for her tragic death. DONATO BINDOY. We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external wound. L-34665 August 28. for appellant. SO ORDERED. The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30.00.

while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy. . J.: The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death. and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam. unlawfully. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening. started by some of the tubadrinkers. with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest. and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife. according to the testimony of the witnesses. and instead of wounding him. One Donato Bindoy.VILLAMOR. who.000. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. Province of Occidental Misamis. he was only defending his possession of the bolo. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1. it appears they were nephew and uncle. on the contrary. Province of Occidental Misamis. municipality of Baliangao. offered some tuba to Pacas' wife. attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. who was then behind Bindoy. and his conduct was perfectly lawful. and to pay the costs. respectively. and in convicting him of the crime of homicide. for. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. and his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. according to the following information: That on or about the 6th of May. with the accessories of law. Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6. a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod. and as she refused to drink having already done so. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place. he hit Omamdam. municipality of Baliangao. who was also there. which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. The crime charged against the accused is homicide. the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. 1930. in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton). wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused. lived near the market. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam. and his wife called Tibay. the accused Donato Bindoy willfully. with his family. In the course of this struggle. in the barrio of Calunod. Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas. and were on good terms with each other. 1930. The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court.

without Donato's seeing him. and that when the latter let go. hit Omamdam in the chest. (Art. We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind. Gaudencio Cenas. had wounded Omamdam. he would have had to answer for his act. Carmen Angot.. The witness for the defense. to wit: The attention of prosecuting officers. Donato did not aim at me. would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. as we have stated. although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve. since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability." adding further: "This wound was an accident. in his effort to free himself of Pacas. The defendant. testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. when . and instead of doing so. Pacas and the widow of the deceased. tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo. because Emigdio had passed behind him. but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent. judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. this is not the case. had it existed. there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. 47). but. corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death. Carlos (15 Phil. the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent. If. 1 of the Penal Code.The wound which Omamdam received in the chest." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up. nor I at him: It was a mishap. directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving. which. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later. and especially of provincial fiscals.) But. and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound. who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him. in his struggle with Pacas. as we have said. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused. the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side. indeed. There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death. who was therefore hit in the chest.

In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act. Jose Ma. GONA (Mansaca). the judgment appealed from is reversed.: The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with the crime of homicide. No. L-32066 March 15. the said Mapudul died. From this sentenced the defendant appealed. There seems to have been liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became . J. illegally. as within the jurisdiction of the court. 1928. 1903 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. plaintiff vs. 8. and to the costs. Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and taking into consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication. Wherefore. in the municipal district of Pantukan. causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that as a consequence of said wound. It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26. the information reading as follows: That on or about October 26. assaulted the Mansaca Mapudul. defendant and appellant. 1928. Province of Davao. for and appellee. Penal Code. OSTRAND. No.R. the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.000.possible. appellant. In view of the evidence before us. sentenced him to suffer twelve years and one ofreclusion temporal with the accessory penalties prosecuted by law to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1. a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. the said accused voluntarily. and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried. we are of opinion and so hold. that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8. Capili Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. Philippine Islands. and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So order G.

R.. Johnson. Vicente Sotto Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. This contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. 1926 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. with the accessories of the law. L-25459 August 10. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of assaulting Dunca. There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime charged. ROMUALDEZ. but his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake. Romualdez and Villa-Real. G.intoxicated. in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter.: The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal. That he made a mistake in killing one man instead of another. Malcolm. for the crime of frustrated murder. RAMON MABUG-AT. So ordered. The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant. but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant. No. to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700 and to pay the costs. Johns.. defendant-appellant. . In these case of United State vs. for appellant. Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating circumstances. when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one Award. he should have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide. J. the court said: Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto. Villamor. with the result that a quarrel took the place between the MansacaDunca and the defendant. in no way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. plaintiff-appellee. the mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal wound with a bolo. ISLANDS. concur. cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. JJ. Mendieta(34 Phil. 242). even that.

it was held: . permit of no other conclusion than that. Montenegro (15 Phil. went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion was being held.The appellant appealed from this judgment. The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. the fact that the accused. contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder. followed them without saying a word. fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo. 1925. without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime. Juana refused him. I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the latter having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. the accused." The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs. with injuries. which was completely destroyed. who was seen by the two girls. in our opinion. and especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which. The accused. On the third day. the accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs. it was the accused's intention to kill. when they went in the direction of their house. 1). Due to proper medical attention. making two assignments of error as committed by the trial court. his disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk. the houses being adjacent. finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion. in firing the shot. In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. while standing at the foot of the stairway. and 2. to wit: 1. It is only a short distance from the house where the devotion took place to that of the offended party. having entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through the left eye. or the night of August 11th. The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo. As the two girls were going upstairs.. revolver in hand. requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so. later sending him a note of excuse. The defense. the bullet passing through a part of her neck. Perfecta Buralo did not die and is on e of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case. revolver in hand. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense. it not having been proven that it was the accused's intention to kill. There the accused. later following her to her house. Their relations were such that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9.

p. par. a revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of another. 1885 (Viada. at whom the shot was aimed in order to kill him so that he might not testify as to the assault committed upon him shortly before.) But. stated the following: Considering that. because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo. 28. he employed means which tended to insure the commission of the crime without any risk to himself arising from any defense that might be made by the offended party. in holding a crime to be murder and not homicide. it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case. and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body. according to the evidence. as held by .) The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are evidence premeditation and treachery. the acts should be held to be frustrated homicide and punished with the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law. Even when there is sufficient proof of premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established). does not alter his criminal liability. 3. Viada's Penal Code. it is evident that in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the death of Nazario Iñigo.. pp. do.We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itselfsufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill. and there being no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated murder present in this case. employing means which tended to insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. but her aunt Juana Buralo. The treachery which. (Art. (Question 2. yet. for neither the wounded party Bartolome Lobejano. as in the case at bar. in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is committed. and where.. in a decision of May 7. Penal Code. would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver. who was hit by the bullet. it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. 29. 30). and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was not in fact animated by the intent to kill. The Supreme Court of Spain. Had evident premeditation been proven. 1. it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence. the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case. according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in article 10 of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance. 1890 ed. because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo. But. The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another.

nor could Nazario Iñigo become aware of any attack so unjustified. Caldwell and Sotto and Office of the Solicitor-General Bengzon for appellee. The crime now before us is frustrated murder. FRANCISCO CAGOCO CAGURO. for which reason the rules of article 65 are not applicable herein. in fact. 3. the accused having intended to kill and performed all the acts of execution. the doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar so far as the concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned.A. taking into consideration the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof. the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the appellant. alias FRANCISCO GUY). which would have produced the crime of murder but which. was not in a position to defend himself in any way. No.) We find no merit in the first assignment of error. PHILIPPINE Y ISLANDS. alias FRISCO W. Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated murder. in the instant case. committed a crime different from that which he intended. L-38511 October 6. did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. the culprit not having. that the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than the one intended was killed. nevertheless. G. aliasBUCOY. etc.the trial court. plaintiff-appellee. RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO ADMONES. considering. defendant-appellant. So ordered. the elements constituting the crime of murder qualified by the treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted. Astilla for appellant. With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Penal Code. it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder. does not modify. rapid and unforeseen. The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts proven. 1933 THE PEOPLE OF THE vs. In regard to the second. we find no other aggravating circumstance. .R. further. (Art. whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the deceased Nazario Iñigo.

Appellant's attorney de oficio makes the following assignments of error: 1. J. Philippine Islands. which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon.VICKERS. assault and attack one Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head. The trial court erred in finding that the appellant the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon. 4. committed as follows: That on or about the 24th day of July. 5. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu Lon in the sum of P1. the trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed victim. and to pay the costs. instead of convicting him of the crime of maltreatment. the said accused did then and there willfully. The trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellant was fully established. without any just cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery. Torres found the defendant guilty as charged. After hearing the evidence.: The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of asesinato. with the accessory penalties of the law. the victim to the crime charged in the information. Assuming that the four preceding errors assigned are without merit. unlawfully and feloniously. thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region. and that the appellant did strike his supposed victim (facts which we specifically deny) the trial court erred in finding that the blow was dealt from the victim's rear. under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.000. Judge Luis P. under conditions which intended directly and especially to insure. 1932. . without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. in the City of Manila. the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make. and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. 3. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon. under article 266 of the said Code. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon (a fact which we specifically deny). the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of murder. 2.

after considering the evidence and arguments of counsel. His assailants immediately ran away. father and son. saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. accompanied by Yu Yee. who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region. with his back to the street. Yu Yee was immediately called to the police station. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital. went to the scene of the crime and found blood stains in the street. and although Yu Yee may have overstated at the trial some of the facial peculiarities in the defendant that he claimed to have observed at the time of the incident. to doubt the correctness of the findings of the trial judge. and about 3 o'clock the next morning Sergeant Sol Cruz and other detectives. Chin Sam and Yee Fung. and whether or not be struck the deceased. the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. and a tumor in the left kidney. though not in an advanced stage. who were walking along Calle Mestizos. it must be remembered that Yu Yee without hesitation . the man that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Camba. They were wearing different kinds of clothes. 25 or 30 years old. He was wearing a dark wool suit. Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police. and then lost sight of him. which raise questions of fact as to the identification of the accused. that he had tuberculosis. With respect to the first four assignment of error. Yu Yee without hesitation pointed out the defendant as the person that had assaulted Yu Lon. The accused was identified by Yu Yee and two other Chinese. While they were talking. His head struck the asphalt pavement. Two other Chinese. and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father. The defendant was identified at the trial not only by Yu Yee.It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July 24. we see no sufficient reason. Yu Yee pursued him through San Fernando. After Sergeant Sol Cruz had been working on the case for three or four days he received information that the accused might be the person that had assaulted Yu Lon. but also by his high cheekbones and the fact that his ears have no lobes. and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage. and on August 4th the accused was arrested by detectives Manrique and Bustamante. stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk. but also by Chin Sam and Yee Fung. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee. and described him as being about five feet in height. He identified him not only by his long hair combed towards the back and worn long on the sides in the form of side-whiskers (patillas). with long hair and wearing a suit of dark clothes. The accused was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven persons that had been detained for investigation. were he died about midnight. a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice. and Jaboneros Streets. A post-mortem examination was made the next day by Dr. whether he did so in a treacherous manner. Anastacia Villegas. Yu Yee said that he could recognize his father's assailant. and if he did assault the deceased.

to wit: (a) That a felony was committed. We find the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses as to the whereabouts of the defendant on the night in question unworthy of credit. but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to commit. No.. Since the accused struck the deceased from behind and without warning.) . 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. of the Revised Penal Code. vs. Brobst. Paragraph No. Dominador Sales.. and that as result thereof the deceased may have fallen backwards. 16. vs. Yu Yee was facing the assailant. U.." (Article 14. and that he had exceptional opportunities for observing his father's assailant. because while that person was walking back and forth behind Yu Lon. he acted with treachery.net The testimony of the three Chinese that a man struck the deceased and then ran away is corroborated by the testimony of a 15-year old boy.) The fourth assignment of error is a repetition of the first. The evidence leaves no room for doubt that the accused struck the deceased on the back of the head. 14 U. 344. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person. methods. he naturally tended to fall backwards. U. the expert testimony shows that in such a case a person instinctively makes an effort to preserve or regain his balance.S. without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. facing each other. vs. when the deceased straightened up.S. it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present.1awphil. it would have been necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee. and this being true. or for slight physical injuries instead of murder. As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been struck on the back of the head. Diana. or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution. Mallari.S. In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all.picked the defendant out of a group of eleven persons as his father's assailant. 14 Phil. and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. 29 Phil. and if the accused had not struck the deceased on the back of the head. Another consideration is that sidewalks almost invariably slope towards the pavement. because when the deceased was assaulted he and Yu Yee were standing on the sidewalk. employing means. should be punished in accordance with article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. 32 Phil. 310.

and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery.S.. to the appreciation of the first of said circumstances and simultaneously of the second if the injury produced exceeds the limits intended by the accused. moral or legal. because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. that one is not relieved. being chargeable with the death of the offended party. There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. in case treacherous means. the lack of intention. that where death result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence. it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region. is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. but that in such cases.. vs. Rodriguez. he is guilty of murder. The next question is whether the crime committed by the defendant should be classified as homicide or murder. modes or forms are employed. merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences. between alevosia and the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to cause so great an injury: Considering that there is no moral or legal incompatibility between treachery and the mitigating circumstance No. The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no incompatibility. (U. Can the defendant be convicted of murder when he did not intend to kill the deceased? We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon. although he did not intend to kill the deceased. and for that reason it cannot be held in the instant case that this mitigating circumstances excludes treachery. supra. and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act.In the Brobst case. or that the accused.) The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar. should not be liable due to the voluntary . because the former depends upon the manner of execution of the crime and the latter upon the tendency of the will towards a definite purpose. 23 Phil. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. but is merely a mitigating circumstance (U. he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide. 22). 96. because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. while it does not exempt from criminal liability. from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one's illegal acts. and therefore there is no obstacle. 2 Phil. notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence. vs. does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious act. under the law in these Islands. 3 of article 9 of the Penal Code. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner. the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death. Luciano.S.

in whatever sense this be taken.) In the case of the United States vs. 2. 104). As thus modified. because if there was no alevosia for the purpose of killing there was alevosia for the purpose of the illtreating. the decision appealed from is affirmed. Abad Santos. JR. Gazette of April 20. whether it was to torture him for the purpose of making him give information. respondents. No. 1905. (Decision of May 10. 103119 October 21. although with mitigation corresponding to the disparity between the act intended and the act consummated. Vol. CAMPOS. Street. We are of opinion that they had no intention to cause so great an evil as that which resulted. JJ.R. Candelaria (2 Phil. this court speaking through Chief Justice Arellano said: In trying Jacinto to a tree the three defendants acted treacherously (alevosamente).J. APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE . G. but it was a condition of the criminal act itself. 906. Whether it was to prevent him from making resistance. but this does not neutralize that other qualifying circumstance of the resulting death. the fact is that by this means the defendants secured themselves against any risk which might have arisen from an attempt at self-defense on the part of the victim. C..: INTOD. J. four months. The means employed were not made use of for the precise purpose of making certain the death of Jacinto de Jesus but as a safe means of illtreating him without risk to the persons who were doing so. It was not a condition of the purpose. 1992 SULPICIO vs. 156. p.. and there being present in this case one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to seventeen years. or whether it was for the purpose of inflicting further punishment. concur.. it follows that it is a qualifying circumstances in the death which resulted. The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Avanceña. with the costs against the appellant. Viada: 5th edition. If by this means the ill treatment was aggravated. HONORABLE COURT OF PHILIPPINES. etc.presence of treachery in the act perpetrated. petitioner.. and one day of reclusion temporal. and Butte.

holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. In the morning of February 4. otherwise. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men. Thereafter. At the instance of his companions. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises. Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan. the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. From the records. Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property. that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her sonin-law and his family. we gathered the following facts. citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. Lopez Jaena. however. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan. Misamis Occidental. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. he would also be killed. Thereafter. Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. Tubio and Daligdig. 2 After trial. 1979. Oroquieta City. Lopez Jaena. Pangasian. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred: xxx xxx xxx 2. Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Petitioner. Pangasian. No one was hit by the gun fire. . as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. Jorge Pangasian. finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder. Sulpicio Intod. Petitioner. Pangasian. Mandaya and Intod. Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. Branch XIV.Petitioner. they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". all armed with firearms. Sulpicio Intod. It turned out. The court (RTC). 4(2). Mandaya.

Ibid. 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate. So long as these conditions were not present. Instead. Respondent alleged that there was intent. 3. that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9 Under this article. . in its Comment to the Petition. To be impossible under this clause. employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality. the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. On the other hand. the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. Further. it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced. . not impossible.. . 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. would constitute a felony against person or against property. but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. Revised Penal Code). 10 That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. The crime of murder was not consummated. recognizes in the offender his formidability. 6 The Revised Penal Code. . Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. and finally. not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. the crime is possible. Had it not been for this fact. the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 5 This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: . 4(2). paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. respondent pointed out that: . . 3 Article 4. the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. inspired by the Positivist School.Petitioner contends that. that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible.

renders it no less an attempt to kill. . One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. although in reality. State. and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. that the latter was in a different place. (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act. the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way.Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts. In the case of Strokes vs. 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait. and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time. even if completed. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. the court held him liable for attempted murder. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon. however. In People vs. The court explained that: It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. 13 Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive. . the victim was not present in said place and thus. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It held that: The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was. On the other hand. that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. (2) there is intention to perform the physical act. desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law. 14 The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be. would not amount to a crime. . 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. and further. the criminal attempt is committed. 17 The case at bar belongs to this category. and where the bullet pierced the roof. aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. Lee Kong. It turned out. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the . factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 18 the accused. with intent to kill.

S. with intent to kill. fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. the Revised Penal Code. The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party. in other words. . Wilson 23 the Court held that: . Mitchell. 21 defendant. the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In the Philippines. In State vs.. . Whereas. However. vs. in said jurisdiction. commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be. equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket. the court quoted Mr. State. at that moment. excite apprehension that the evil. the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. etc. In disposing of the case. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm. Furthermore. In the case of Clark vs. in the United States. 22 In U. the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed. either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize. However. 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. . intention will be carried out. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder. no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered.crime to be committed. In this regard. in Article 4(2). the victim was in another part of the house. expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission. to wit: It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Justice Bishop. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes. factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. what was supposed to exist was really present or not.

It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt. but as an attempt to commit a crime. no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. therefore. following the principle of legality. is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". This is not true in the Philippines. where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment. Further. unknown to him. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed.Legal impossibility. the offender cannot escape criminal liability. it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is. the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt. . but an act penalized by itself. it said: Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place.S. And under Article 4. On the other hand. there is no such thing as an impossible crime. In our jurisdiction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. In disposing of this contention. that the act is penalized. 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case. as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation. The only reason for this is that in American law. not as an impossible crime. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. To restate. vs. impossible crimes are recognized. Berrigan. Instead. is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. It appears. Furthermore. However. where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense. In U. on the other hand. the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision. the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. in the United States. attempt. and thus. paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. respectively. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian. J. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4. 1 The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra. G." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. Silvestre L. They were represented by separate lawyers at the trial and filed separate briefs in this appeal.R. vs. this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. No. who was 8 years old at the time of the incident in question. . will render useless the provision in Article 4. accused-appellant. Lino M. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused. Regalado and Nocon. Patajo for appellant Dr. Feliciano. together with the accessory penalties provided by the law. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan. the latter then a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's parents. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. and 59 of the Revised Penal Code. and to pay the costs. . Samson Tan.. paragraph 2. SO ORDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED. WHEREFORE. 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. JJ.To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will.: The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even before his parents received the ransom note. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property. SAMSON TAN. plaintiff-appellee. concur. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner. PREMISES CONSIDERED. 95322 March 1. . CRUZ.

2 At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father.The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11. Somehow. When they alighted at Gumaca. which referred it to the NBI for examination. Samson Tan. with the man still firmly holding Enrico. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. This aroused the suspicion of the driver. where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Alexander Grate. 8 . Tan for his part said he was in Manila. Domasian claimed that at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses. Enrique Agra. after Enrico's return. while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez. 7 Dr. holding him firmly all the while. this time bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. leaving Enrico behind. they took another tricycle. who continued crying. 5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon. the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. 1982. who asked the man about his relationship with the boy. After comparing it with some records in the hospital. the man managed to escape. he gave the note to the police. 3 The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical differences between the two and the wide gap between their ages. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. Noticing that they were being pursued. Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. 6 The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Quezon. who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. the boy's father. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan. The man said he and the boy were brothers. the man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead them. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents. Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had detained him. instead of taking him to the hospital. Grate immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. 4 On the other hand. he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian.

Finally. whose finding in this regard is received with much respect by the appellate court because of his opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand. Enrique Agra as actual and moral damages and attorney's fees. both Domasian and Tan insist that there is no basis for the finding of a conspiracy between them to make them criminally liable in equal degree. Lanzanas found both accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties. But he was soon disabused. pointed to Domasian with equal certainty. on the credibility of the witnesses. The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several public places if the intention was to kidnap and detain him. In the present appeal. Enrico's classmate and also his age. He maintains that in any case. was also positive in identifying Domasian. natural and consistent" in the narration of his detention. as we see it. In the case at bar. the crime alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was involved. By contrast. This is assessed in the first instance by the trial judge. the accused-appellants reiterate their denial of any participation in the incident in question.00 to Dr. The more important question. His initial confidence gave way to fear when Domasian. restrained and threatened him if he did not stop crying. The boy's naivete made him even more believable. That is also for Domasian to explain. If at all. it should be denominated and punished only as grave coercion. That is for Domasian himself to answer. Eugenia Agtay. First. The trial court observed that the boy was "straight-forward.000. 1982. As for Enrico's alleged willingness to go with Domasian. can hardly be considered a disinterested witness because she admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years. They belittle the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are more believable. and Mrs. when he believed the man sincerely needed his assistance. is why Domasian detained Enrico in the first place after pretending he needed the boy's help. Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and offers anew the opposite findings of the PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of the ransom note. the tricycle driver who suspected Enrico's companion and later chased him.After trial Judge Enrico A. Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the testimony of the victim himself. We do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational conduct of an accused. All these three witnesses did not know Domasian until that same morning and could have no ill motive in testifying against him. after taking him so far away from the hospital where he was going. as the man who approached Enrico when they were walking together that morning of March 11. Grate. They were also required to pay P200. . Tirso Ferreras. who positively identified Domasian as the person who detained him for three hours. who testified for the defense. this was manifested only at the beginning.

characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification by Enrico. and is. Rule 132. 10 who opined that the ransom note and the standard documents were written by one and the same person. not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing. and another from the PC/INP 11 who expressed a contrary conclusion. Significantly. therefore itself permanent. Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison. Concerning the note. Section 22. The trial court chose to believe the NBI expert because his examination and analysis "was more comprehensive than the one conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert. but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks. who believed that the ransom note was written by Tan. the Court feels that the scales should tilt in favor of the prosecution. one from the NBI. thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone feature but rather a combination of all the qualities that identify. who virtually limited his reliance on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities in the pattern and style of the writing. regarding the time he was in the optical clinic and the manner of his payment for the refraction. the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra. habit or other permanent course. 13 Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar. let alone the contradictions made by his corroborating witness. Grate and Ferreras. The circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the time of the incident does not prove that he could not have written the ransom note except at that time. of the Rules of Court provides as follows: The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person and has seen the person write. 12 The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance. 9 Tan's alibi is not convincing either. or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. with whose handwriting he was familiar because they had been . which is impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of constitution. Dr. made by the witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Irene Argosino." We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false.

The detention was committed by Domasian. 4 of the above-quoted article. 14 Cesar v. 2. The crime clearly comes under Par. Contrary to Tan's submission. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: Art. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because that case involved a forgery or the deliberate imitation of another person's signature. he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from going home and dragged him first into the minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca. who was a private individual. thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for San Vicente. 267.working in the hospital for four years and he had seen that handwriting every day in Tan's prescriptions and daily reports. shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. of if threats to kill him shall have been made. 3. it is noted that although the victim was not confined in an enclosure. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. this crime may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained. female or a public officer. 16 In the case at bar. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor. and Enrico was a minor at that time. 4. there was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note writer's penmanship to prevent his discovery. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days. Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the . If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. In the case before us. As for the nature of the crime committed. even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. or in any manner deprive him of his liberty.

xxx xxx xxx Even before the ransom note was received. the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.000. Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article. 18 In the instant case. which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense." As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but against liberty. According to Agra. Tan approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15. On the issue of conspiracy.second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property. whether they act through physical volition of one or all. the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. we note first that it exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective.00. which clearly applies to him. concerted action and community of interests.. The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life. the writing of the ransom note by Tan. 17 It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution. — Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. 4. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe . thus: Art. he argues that it is not covered by the said provision. proceeding severally or collectively. viz. Criminal liability.

committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court.. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. His claim that he was arrested without warrant and then tortured and held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does not vitiate his conviction. WHEREFORE. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation of the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of Pablito Domasian. and PERALTA. 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals. J. VELASCO. Chairperson. JACINTO. .versus - CHICO-NAZARIO. Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO. No. As for the allegation that the seizure of the documents used for comparison with the ransom note was made without a search warrant. We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian. JR.R. being directed only against the government and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on official action. The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in this case. He never gave any confession. it suffices to say that such documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI agents or other police authorities. 162540 Petitioner.. angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. SO ORDERED. with costs against the accusedappellants. JJ. Andre Marti. in conspiracy with each other. 19The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release. NACHURA. We held in the case of People vs. .him. G. GEMMA T.

herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO. 23761 dated December 16. Petitioner.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. J. allegedly committed as follows: That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997. was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCaloocan City. Branch 131. July 13. Metro Manila.R. Promulgated: Respondent.. being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC. conspiring together and mutually helping one another. the above-named accused. 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 2003. along with two other women. with the crime of Qualified Theft. in Kalookan City. namely. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to . affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft. and its Resolution [2] dated March 5. CR No. 2009 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION PERALTA. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle.

Valenzuela Branch.gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof. . reveals the events that transpired to be as follows. 1997 in the sum of P10.[3] The prosecution's evidence. Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank.00.00. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10. steal and deposited in their own account. Around that time. Meanwhile. merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. also known as Baby Aquino. and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Rowena Ricablanca. Jennifer Sanalila.000.00. Somehow. the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle. received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers.. In the month of June 1997. Inc. Inc. the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing. another employee of Mega Foam. 0132649 dated July 14.000. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam. representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored. handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14.. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l. the husband of Jacqueline Capitle. 1997 in the amount of P10. Isabelita Aquino Milabo.000. instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. did then and there willfully. Banco De Oro Check No. which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible. CONTRARY TO LAW. unlawfully and feloniously take.

but they could be reached through Valencia. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the . the bills were given to Ricablanca. asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino. sometime in July 1997.000. petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself.000. Thereafter. who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.[6] Generoso Capitle. However. Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house.000. and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam. upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. Joseph Dyhengco. handed over said check to Ricablanca. admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account. [5] Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. Ricablanca.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Petitioner. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced.Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia. Ten pieces of P1. [4] Baby Aquino further testified that. Thereafter. Ricablanca. but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia. who was then holding the bounced BDO check. On August 15. petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10. presented as a hostile witness. Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10. Meanwhile. a neighbor and former coemployee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam. because the Capitles did not have a phone. a former employee/collector of Mega Foam. 2007. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check. he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI.

00 each to Valencia and petitioner. where she was staying at that time. Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. . which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino.check replaced with cash. where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. they agreed to meet again on August 21.000. the wife of Generoso Capitle. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle. on the day of the arrest. Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino. the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the P10. and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. On the agreed date. who had been watching the whole time. and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them. Ricablanca again went to petitioners house. However. Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. She further testified that. 2007.000. on the other hand. but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company. However. It was only petitioner. gave P5. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital. The defense. but the plan did not push through. Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30. Ricablanca came to her mothers house. 1997. Thereafter. her husband. her husband. Petitioner. and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia. pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.

as minimum. the RTC rendered its Decision.[7] The three appealed to the CA and. Ricablanca came out and. 1997. The trial of the three accused went its usual course and. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so. What is this? Then. Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS. and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. 1997. Ricablanca called her up on the phone.According to her. 1999. FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS. SO ORDERED. to her surprise. a Decision was promulgated. Ricablanca alighted. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. as she had never been to said house. as maximum. 2003. court is MODIFIED. thus: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. After ten minutes. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother. in view of the foregoing. the NBI agents arrested them. on the morning of August 21. rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband. When they arrived at said place. to SIX (6) YEARS. Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked. EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS. despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided.Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30. the dispositive portion of which reads. in that: the decision of the trial . on October 4. asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa. on December 16.

2004. but the same was denied per Resolution datedMarch 5. SO ORDERED. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[8] . assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft. and 3. Hence. The issues raised in the petition are as follows: 1. is (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands. 2. the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information.

Intod v. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law. as it was subsequently dishonored. the accused. peppered the latters bedroom with bullets. intending to kill a person. In Intod. the personal property subject of the theft must have some value. instead. the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.The petition deserves considerable thought. as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons. where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this case. but the same was apparently without value. The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308.as shown by the fact that petitioner. did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and. as collector for Mega Foam. as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code. petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam. no harm came . Thus. This is further bolstered by Article 309. nor of force upon things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer. but since the intended victim was not home at the time. as it was her payment for purchases she made. and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers. as she was known to be a collector for the company. (2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino. both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property . appropriated it for herself. However. Court of Appeals [9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. in relation to Article 310. (4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company.

(2) that the act was done with evil intent. shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (emphasis supplied) Article 59.Criminal responsibility shall be incurred: xxxx 2. Criminal Responsibility. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows: Article 4(2). the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. Thus. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property. in relation to Article 59. both of the Revised Penal Code. . he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2. or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. But upon review by this Court. and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible. Article 4. When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him. having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod[10] in this wise: .to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. the court.

Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied. as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. To be impossible under this clause. which is a crime against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced. would not amount to a crime. the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment. Therefore. she would have received the face value thereof.e. petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime ofqualified theft. which was not rightfully hers. even if completed. the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility. or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. In this case. but gets nothing since the pocket is empty..Under this article. That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the . x x x [11] In Intod. or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. On the other hand. factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. There must be either (1) legal impossibility. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet. the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts. i. xxxx The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

Viewed from that perspective.check being unfunded. there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent. thus: x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308. that prevented the crime from being produced. x x x xxxx . xxxx x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. The Court held in Valenzuela v. Elucidating further. People[12] that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.00 marked money. is of no moment. a fact unknown to petitioner at the time. once having committed all the acts of execution for theft. which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check. is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless. The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5. it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender. the Court held. and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. because the check was eventually dishonored.000.

the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused. If at all. x x x x x x Unlawful taking. Unfortunately. she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft. it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. areMODIFIED. and to pay the costs. . is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing. and its Resolution dated March 5. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense. and 59 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover. the petition is GRANTED. 2003. had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. paragraph 2. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4. since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information. 2004. x x x [13] From the above discussion. the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain. dated December 16. petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor. which is the deprivation of ones personal property. even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. after all.x x x we have. or apoderamiento. otherwise. Petitioner Gemma T.000. Obviously. the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. The Decision of the Court of Appeals. there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. held that unlawful taking. that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability. respectively. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5. At most.

In Criminal Case No. Branch 15. to 12 years. Philippines. did then and there wilfully. Philippines. province of Bulacan. dela Torre. The Informations in both Criminal Case Nos. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1998 of the Regional Trial Court. the penalty of 10 years and 1 day. the trial court sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. the above-named accused. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 837-M-96 and 838-M-96 read: For Criminal Case No. against her will and without her consent. appellant. pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. against her will and without her consent. have carnal knowledge of said Michelle L. 11 years of age. unlawfully and feloniously. 838-M-96. unlawfully and feloniously. 838-M-96. by means of force. as minimum. MANOLITO PANCHO. Bulacan. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. 837-M-96.: This is an appeal from the Joint Decision [1] dated June 19. J. in the municipality of Malolos. province of Bulacan. . in the municipality of Malolos. 11 years of age. dela Torre. For Criminal Case No. threats and intimidation and with lewd designs. the above-named accused.while in Criminal Case No. have carnal knowledge of said Michelle L. was imposed upon him. appellant. 1995. 837-M-96 and attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Upon arraignment. finding appellant Manolito Pancho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in Criminal Case No. assisted by counsel. by means of force.SO ORDERED. did then and there wilfully. Contrary to law. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. appellee. Malolos. threats and intimidation and with lewd designs. 837-M-96 (For Rape): That in or about the month of August. 838-M-96 (For Attempted Rape): That in or about the month of December. Contrary to law. 1994. vs. as maximum of prision mayor.

went home after spending the night at her aunts house. she got scared.0 cms Normally developed. her mother contracted a second marriage with appellant. Then he dressed up. she struggled by kicking and boxing him. conscious. So. She tried to resist but he held her both arms. 1995 at the familys new residence at Bayugo. Bulacan. at around 6:00 oclock in the morning. appellant stopped. While she was about to undress. but he dragged her by her feet. She felt pain when he inserted his organ into her vagina which bled. Michelle and her two (2) brothers live with the couple at Look First. appellant arrived from work. Daniel. [3] Immediately. Then he took off his clothing. Ida P. Her findings. Michelle mustered enough courage to report the incidents to her mother. he forcibly removed her clothes and underwear. Appellant started kissing and holding her breast and eventually had carnal knowledge of her. Although frightened. After sometime. who brought her. she managed to hit him. At that instance. fairly nourished. trial ensued. Meycauayan. they proceeded to the Malolos Police Station where she executed a sworn statement. On August 1. . Sometime in December. He was on top of her making push and pull movements for four (4) minutes. 1994. Malolos. While he was approaching her. 1984[2] to spouses Exequiela Lacanilao and Eduardo dela Torre. are as follows: GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Height: 132. When Michelle opened the door and saw him.[6] which she confirmed on the witness stand. Bulacan. [4] Thereafter. her uncle (Tito Onio) suddenly arrived.0 cms Weight: 78. testified that she conducted a medico-genital examination of Michelle dela Torre. Michelle.[5] Dr. threatening to kill her should she complain or tell anyone about the incident. who was then only ten years old. Then she attempted to jump out of the window. coherent. she turned to her grandmother Natividad Lacanilao.Thereafter. 1996. The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Michelle dela Torre was born on April 2. to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination by a medico-legal officer. appellant suddenly dragged her and forced her to lie down on the floor. cooperative. ambulatory subject. sometime in February. thus thwarting his bestial desire. After Michelles father passed away. a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI. However. but the latter casually ignored her.

3. Areolae. scanty. brown. the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape. Vaginal walls. 837-M-96. moderately thick. appellant strongly denied the charges. contending that it was impossible for him to commit the crimes considering that during the incidents. tense. annular. the lower court rendered a Joint Decision dated June 19. brown.5 cms in diameter.5 cm in diameter. 1998. With respect to Criminal Case No. admits a tube 2. . his wife and her two sons were also inside the house. To indemnify the victim Michelle dela Torre the amount of P20. the dispositive portion of which reads: In view of all the foregoing and by proof beyond reasonable doubt. tight.Breasts. Labia majora and minora. intact. [7] Moreover. No sign of extragenital physical injury noted. coaptated. intact and its orifice small (2. Rugosities.0 cms in diameter with moderate resistance. 838-M-96. pinkish. the charge of rape is totally belied by the finding of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer that Michelles hymen has remained intact with no sign of extra-genital or genital injuries. 2. the Court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1.0 cms in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. 2. and hereby sentences accused MANOLITO PANCHO to suffer an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS. After trial. 2. Nipples. prominent. GENETAL EXAMINATION: Pubic hair. developing. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination. moderately tall. conical. fine. Hymenal orifice. Vestibular mucosa.000. With respect to Criminal Case No. For his part. firm.00 each case. Fourchette. the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences accused MANOLITO PANCHO to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. 0. Hymen. CONCLUSIONS: 1. protruding. Hymen.

relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law). G. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent. ascendant. 1994 and December. step-parent. xxx. guardian.[9] provides: ART. as amended by Republic Act No. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. SO ORDERED. 2. 335. the governing law is Article 335[8] of the Revised Penal Code which. When and how rape is committed.The period of the accuseds detention is credited in his favor. By using force or intimidation. 2. DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. 1995. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. As alleged in the Informations. and 3. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE PUT UP BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT. In this appeal. appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE. the crimes charged were committed sometime in August. Thus. A.R. 136592 for rape: . xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime or rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. No.

Malolos. Simple rape is committed under any of the following circumstances: 1. Michelle identified appellant in open court as the culprit who raped her. she was only 10 years and 3 months old. 2. [11] In statutory rape.[14] Michelle was born on April 2. Bulacan? . It is qualified when the age of the victim (below 18) and her relationship with the appellant are both alleged in the Information and proved. 1994 when the incident took place. She testified as follows: FISCAL: Q: Ms. In the Information. Bulacan. Q: And what happened when you went home at Look. Thus. you claim in your testimony that you were raped by your step father Manolito Pancho last August 1. violence or intimidation is not required. the prosecution failed to allege in the Information the qualifying circumstance that appellant is the victims step-parent. and 3. sir. and the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place.[13] As shown by her Certificate of Live Birth. intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immaterial. will you please tell this Honorable Court how Manolito Pancho raped you? A: About 6:00 oclock in the morning I went home. Q: And where is your home located? A: I went home at Look First. 1984. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Witness. Thus. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.[10] In this case. By using force or intimidation.Rape under the above provisions is either simple or qualified. [12] Where the girl is below 12 years of age. force. When the woman is under twelve years of age (statutory rape) or is demented. Malolos. 1994. appellant is being charged of statutory rape considering that Michelle was then below 12 years old. on August 1. he may only be convicted of simple rape.

Q: What happened when he inserted his organ on your vagina? A: He was kissing me and touching my body. Ms. short and panty. sir. Q: And what was your appearance after these clothes were removed by Manolito Pancho? A: I was naked. sir. Q: And what happened when after Manolito Pancho lay you on the floor? A: He took off all my clothes. sir. Q: How about Manolito Pancho. Q: Were you able to see his organ when he inserted it on your vagina? A: Yes. brief and t-shirt. short and brief. witness? A: I was wearing a t-shirt and short. . what did he do? A: He placed himself on top of me. sir. Q: What else Manolito Pancho removed? A: My clothes. what did he do after he removed your dress? A: He also took-off his clothes. sir.A: Manolito Pancho dragged me and forced me to lie on the floor. sir. Q: And what clothes you are wearing at that time. Q: After Manolito removed all these: his short. Q: What clothes did he remove? A: His t-shirt. sir. Q: And what happened after he placed himself on top of you? A: He inserted his penis on my vagina.

Q: And what happened to your vagina after he inserted his penis? A: It bled. Q: And what did Manolito Pancho tell you. do not complain because if you do so. sir. sir. witness? A: My step father. sir. what did Manolito Pancho do? A: I already dressed up because he already dressed-up. sir. Q: How are you related with Manolito Pancho. will you please tell this Honorable Court. Q: And after four (4) minutes. . Q: At the time you claimed that you were raped by Manolito Pancho. Q: How long did Manolito Pancho stay on top of you? A: Four (4) minutes. witness that you are ten (10) years old at that time? A: My birth certificate. Q: What motion did he do if you can still remember when Manolito Pancho was on top of you? A: He was kissing me. sir. Ms. sir.Q: What particular parts of your body did Manolito Pancho kiss and touch. I am going to kill you. how young were you then? A: Ten (10) years old. Ms. sir. touching me and then I tried to struggle against him but he was holding my both hands so that I could not struggle. if any? A: He said. Q: And what did you feel when Manolito Pancho inserted his organ on your vagina? A: It hurts. sir. Q: Do you have evidence to show Ms. witness? A: My both breasts.

[19] He disregards Dr. sir. and convincing. unflawed by significant inconsistency. and unshaken by rigid cross-examination.[24] Its absence does not negate a finding of forced sexual coitus.[26] Indeed. Michelles hymen has remained intact.[15] Michelles testimony is straightforward. Ms. Q: And you claimed that you were 10 years old when you were raped by Manolito Pancho? A: Yes. Appellant vigorously denied the charge. natural. as well as the . sir.[25] For the rule is well settled that rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. the evidentiary weight of the medical examination of the victim. [22] Moreover. she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been committed. xxx. the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. Ida Daniel. cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to her step-father if it were not true. contending that per the Medical Report of Dr. [20] We have ruled that in rape cases the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding of rape. In rape cases. [16] When a woman says she was raped. innocent and guileless. a girl of tender years. [23] Hymenal rupture or any indication of vaginal laceration or genital injury is not necessary for the consummation of rape. Appellant heavily relies on the virgo intacta theory. It deserves full faith and credence. [17] It bears stressing that Michelle.[21] especially when the victim is of tender age. Daniels testimony that there are two types of hymen: (1) one that remains intact even though there is penetration. 1984. [18] We are not persuaded.) Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court what is your date of birth. laceration of the hymen is not an element of the crime of rape. the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the rape victim if her testimony is credible. (2) the other is lacerated after penetration. and if her testimony meets the test of credibility.Q: Do you have with you your birth certificate? A: Yes. (The grandmother is producing the Live Birth Certificate of the complainant Michelle dela Torre. witness? A: April 2.

[28] Inherently weak. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.R.medical certificate. I tried to jump and that was the time he dragged and he held my feet. Michelle testified that when appellant was coming near me. 136593 for attempted rape: Appellant also contends that his conviction of attempted rape in Criminal Case No.[30] B. sir. denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused. G. Bulacan? A: When the door opened I thought it was my mother and when I saw him I was scared. is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction for rape. I tried to jump and that was the time he dragged and he held my feet.[29] Verily. No. 838-M-96 is not supported by evidence.[31]Appellant and Michelle were in this snap situation when his Tito Onio arrived. mere denial. unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. I hit him and I saw that our door was opened.[32] Her testimony regarding this incident is quoted as follows: FISCAL: xxx Q: And what happened in that place at Bayugo. as in this case.[27] Appellants denial is an inherently weak defense. Q: And what happened when you saw Manolito Pancho? A: I closed the door. It has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. I hit him and I saw that our door was opened. what happened? A: When he was coming near me. sir. is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters. Q: Thereafter. Meycauayan. Q: And what happened after Manolito Pancho held your feet? .

. we observed that the trial court only awarded the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P20. In the instant case. No. the indemnity ex delicto should be P75. as here.00. At this juncture. the victim should be entitled to P50.[35] we held that the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape is the entrance of the male organ into the labial threshold of the female genitalia. Campuhan. 136592. rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts. Where. We held that he could not be convicted of statutory rape but only attempted rape. we can not safely conclude that he was attempting to rape her. xxx.000. the death penalty is not decreed.R.[36] In line with current jurisprudence. the award of civil indemnity is mandatory. In People vs.[33] Under Art. in relation to Art.[34] In this second case. of the Revised Penal Code.00 only. What he did was to drag her and hold her feet.00 without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof. In short. [37] The anguish and pain she has endured are evident. The victim testified that the accuseds organ merely touched but did not penetrate her vagina. If the death penalty is imposed. Anent the award of damages in G. This must be corrected. the prosecution failed to prove that appellant started to rape the victim and had commenced the performance of acts of carnal knowledge. 335.A: When he was holding my feet I was not able to jump from the window and thats the time the door opened and then I saw my uncle that is why the rape was not committed. In that case.000. Thus. the accused was caught by the mother of the victim kneeling on top of her. 6. He did not force her to lie down or remove her garment. we also award the victim moral damages in the amount of P50. We have consistently ruled that upon a finding of the fact of rape.000.000. it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape. there was no showing that he did commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. appellant was merely holding complainants feet when her Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.00.

No. convicting appellant Manolito Pancho of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo. G. and to pay the costs of the proceeding.R. Bausa Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. Bulacan. Malolos. Tan Yu. . 1935. the Decision dated June 19. defendant-appellant.R. At that time the owner of the store. Branch 15. J. ISLANDS. with the accessory penalties of the law. 837-M-96.WHEREFORE. The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo. In Criminal Case No.: The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.00 as moral damages.000. 838-M-96. policeman Jose Tomambing. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall.00 as civil indemnity. SO ORDERED. who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C. 1998 of the Regional Trial Court. caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.000. Costs de oficio. plaintiff-appellee. as constituting attempted robbery. finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual delinquent. Michelle dela Torre. the trial courts judgment convicting the appellant of attempted rape is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. At early dawn on March 2. when the policeman showed up. for appellant. who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody. with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim. AURELIO LAMAHANG. which we think is erroneous. in Criminal Case No. 1935 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. Honesto K. L-43530 August 3. the trial judge and the Solicitor-General. was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. and P50. RECTO. P50.

with the deed which. upon its consummation. there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution. Acts susceptible of double interpretation . it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator. leading directly to its realization and consummation. From the fact established and stated in the decision. In the instant case. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense . that. and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act. 99) that in offenses not consummated. that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution. that is. of some personal property belonging to another.ñet It must be borne in mind (I Groizard. once he succeeded in entering the store. inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous. they must show without any doubt. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense. if carried to its complete termination following its natural course. without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator. Thus. passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall. the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained. by the circumstances of the persons performing the same. p. that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store. Hence. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence. in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense. concrete offense.1avvphil. in favor as well as against the culprit.It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular. will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. for the purpose of imposing penal sanction. was to rob. to cause physical injury to the inmates. is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature. it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection. in case of robbery. in order to commit an offense which. for the purpose of gain. there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding. it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession. but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). That his final objective. But it is not sufficient. by the facts to which they are related. like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect. will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code. and by the things connected therewith. as the material damage is wanting. due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing. did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. or to commit any other offense.

or that said acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the commission of the offense.. that is to say. Villanueva. vs.. Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code." Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. Ostrea.S. 25 Phil. 606. and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. 31 Phil. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation contained in the information: ".. . U. Silvano.. that the acts performed must be such that. 25 Phil. The breaking of the wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling. (U." Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21. 93. and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). vs.. U.S. without the intent to commit an offense. Viada (Vol.. . they would be meaningless. we are of the opinion. 2 Phil..S. are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution.) Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions. U. .S... that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. and that the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing. In view of the foregoing. the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. Mesina. p. promptly approached the accused ..vs. I.. 18 Phil.S. vs. vs.S. Panes. 509' U.. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist. and so hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. 59 Phil. 615. who upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall. 292. vs. . the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary. 21 Phil. 67..which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct. this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will. 1892 — that in order to declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective be known and established. . U. in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice. Ticson. said objective and finality to serve as ground for the designation of the offense: . — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor. the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store . 215. the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts. Tayag and Morales.

Petitioner. is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1.J.000 (art. GARCIA. Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. QUISUMBING. 280. CORONA. par. the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment. ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y G. TINGA. and . the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. AZCUNA. 160188 NATIVIDAD. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code. 2). No. SANTIAGO. or. - versus . C. committed by means of force. 51). Wherefore. Present: PUNO. CARPIO. therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. VELASCO. with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs. MARTINEZ. with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to dwelling. R.GUTIERREZ.. CARPIO MORALES. arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. if committed with force. CHICO-NAZARIO.

Respondents. JJ. upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty. and HON.[2] the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or consummated theft was in 1918.: This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. COURT OF APPEALS.[3] A more cursory . The proposition rests on a common theory expounded in two well-known decisions[1] rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him. he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only. However. in People v. As far as can be told.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA. not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. 2007 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION TINGA. but instead insists that as a result. J. Adiao. the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court. Promulgated: June 21.

[9] . but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. All these acts were eyed by Lago. and after five (5) minutes. petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club. Lago saw petitioner. who was wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU). When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space. in People v. who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. The case stems from an Information[6] charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft.[4] and in 1984. in Empelis v. On 19 May 1994. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting.. [8] The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases ofTide Ultramatic. The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. where Calderon was waiting. at around 4:30 p. hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the wellknown Tide brand. [7] Thereafter. one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams. Sobrevilla. and three (3) additional cases of detergent.[5] This petition now gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the Revised Penal Code. IAC. I. a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket.00. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi. by Lorenzo Lago (Lago). petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. the goods with an aggregate value of P12. a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA.090. and the stolen merchandise recovered. emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramaticand again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. then boarded the vehicle.treatment of the question was followed in 1929. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket.m. petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi.

Quezon City. at the trial. However.Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police.[10] After pleading not guilty on arraignment. Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. the day after the incident. he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account. It was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago. Leoncio Rosulada. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident. petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident. It appears from the police investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon. only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor. in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994. [11] As the queue for the ATM was long. leading them to head out ofthe building to check what was . accompanied by his neighbor. after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor. for investigation.

[21] the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners conviction. petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of detergent. at which time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police Station. they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard. [18] but only petitioner filed a brief[19] with the Court of Appeals. Branch 90. At the station. when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the security office until around 9:00 p. in its Decision dated 19 June 2003. Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running. [15] In a Decision[16] promulgated on 1 February 2000. and eventually brought to the prosecutors office where he was charged with theft. petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin.[24] Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals. [14]During petitioners crossexamination. convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.[17] The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime. thus commencing their detention. at which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. a Gregorio Valenzuela. he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. causing the appellate court to deem Calderons appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed.[20] However. As they were outside. walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa. but he was detained overnight. petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended. he admitted that he had been employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing. [12] Meanwhile. Before the Court of Appeals.m. assigned at the supermarket though not at SM.transpiring. petitioner effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of several cases of . [13] had been at the parking lot.. [22] Hence the present Petition for Review.[23] which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be modified to only of Frustrated Theft.

II.090. [25] As such. yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.[28] Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court.detergent with a total value of P12. as they modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case. For whatever reasons. It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Dio and Flores rulings since they have not yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.00 of which he was charged. as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. petitioner cites[26] two decisions rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the prosecution. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals. In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft. . Dio[27] and People v. Flores. The only question to consider is whether under the given facts.

may easily call for the application of Dio and Flores. including commonplace shoplifting. Yet despite the silence on our part. Any scenario that involves the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress. such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth. They are comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law annotations. if we finally say that Dio and Flores are doctrinal. such conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions.the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and should continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future. [29] and studied in criminal law classes as textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft. . Indeed. Dio and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Dio and Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law exams more than they actually occur in real life. More critically.

the subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Finally. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony. it is necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code. Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase. and attempted felonies on the other. [32] It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. . the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. To delve into any extended analysis of Dio and Flores. [31] After that point has been breached. do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. should result in the consummated crime. as well as the specific issues relative to frustrated theft. an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand. and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself. frustrated and attempted felonies. namely the consummated. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which. the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins. [30] Article 6 defines those three stages. for in such instances. [s]ubjectively the crime is complete.[33] On the other hand.III.[34] Truly. or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which. it is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. with prior acts. the task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code. nevertheless. the crime is merely attempted.

the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. thus . that the felony is produced.[36] mens reahas been defined before as a guilty mind. [38] It follows that the statutory definition of ourmala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is. Fortunately. Supreme Court has comfortably held that a criminal law that contains no mens rearequirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights. thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. nisi mens sit rea supplies an important characteristic of a crime. while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. there must also be an actus reus. our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum. as they find expression in the criminal statute. it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. [35] Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se. a decisive passage or term is embeddedwhich attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution. that ordinarily. The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. Without such provision. disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed. and indeed the U. there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime.S.In contrast. [37] and essential for criminal liability. For example. [39] The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. From the statutory definition of any felony. and accordingly. For a crime to exist in our legal law. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code. the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase shall kill another.[40] It is from the actus reus and the mens rea. it is not enough that mens rea be shown.

there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner. 308. Theft is committed by any person who. shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. Any person who. without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons. It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft. we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. and it was without the consent of the owner of the property. with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things. and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. 2. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Theft is likewise committed by: 1. . Any person who. On the face of the definition. shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him. its elements are spelled out as follows: Art. or other forest or farm products. there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain. shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner. and conversely. after having maliciously damaged the property of another. Who are liable for theft. having found lost property. and 3. shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals. it is not produced if the victim survives. We next turn to the statutory definition of theft.making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim. [41] In the present discussion. Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft.

with the Institutes of Justinian. or unlawful taking. that there must be permanency in the taking[48] or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property. thus: [f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa.[46] In Spanish law. or intent to gain. [47] However.[45] This requirement of animo lucrandi. we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. moves) the property of another. (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner. was so broad enough as to encompass any kind of physical handling of property belonging to another against the will of the owner. to characterize theft. a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled. even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain. as Justice Regalado notes. lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei.[43] a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief handles (touches. [49] or that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent. animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento. finding that it had to be coupled with the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento.[50] Ultimately. was maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws. there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object.Indeed. the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical handling. as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. [51] . which under early Roman law as defined by Gaius. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento. (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain. (2) that said property belongs to another. Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamientoonce had a controversial interpretation and application. the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve. and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. [42] In his commentaries. Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft. namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property. alternatively. [44] However.

including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento. relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code [52] as to when a particular felony is not produced. do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. the theft would have been frustrated only. So. the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart. the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes. There are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not produced. in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft. we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. Adiao[53] apparently supports that notion. and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things. such seizure motivated by intent to gain. The first. U. petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him. it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308. there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent. however.S. As applied to the present case. Therein. and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club. despite the commission of all the acts of execution. once the acts committed by petitioner.So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present. v. at least. a customs inspector was charged with theft after he abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign . if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence. Following that provision.

the trial court had found him guilty. and from the case took a small box. and holding instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft. October 14. The court said that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated. Subsequently. of frustrated theft. the offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court . [54] Based apparently on those two circumstances." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. which was also opened with a key. As he was in the act of taking the fruit[. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time. although noticing the theft. just at this moment he was caught by two guards who were stationed in another room near-by. 1897.] he was seen by a policeman. [55] In support of its conclusion that the theft was consummated. the discussion of which we replicate below: The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. December 1. and it appears that he was under observation during the entire transaction.national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom House. instead. At no time was the accused able to get the merchandise out of the Custom House. saying that neither circumstance was decisive. The latter on account of the solemnity of the act.) The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case. did not do anything to prevent it. however. while the defendant was still inside the church. and then he placed the money over the cover of the case. finding that all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but sometime later.) Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20 centimos. the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. The Court reversed. 1898.

from sometime later in the 1898 decision. which. he executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced. that the criminal actors in all these cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter. such intervals proved of no consequence in those cases. Still. and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building where the theft took place. [58] In rejecting the contention that only frustrated theft was established. at the same time shouting for a policeman. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered. The case is People v. the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than consummated theft. and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same. does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime. the Court simply said. June 13. In 1929. and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein. while in the midst of a crowd in a public market.considered this as consummated robbery. only the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated. to the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision. and that determines the crime of theft. perceiving the theft. and said: "[x x x] The accused [x x x] having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where it had been. 1882. however. without further comment or elaboration: We believe that such a contention is groundless.[59] . he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. who was afterwards caught by a policeman.)[56] It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book. caught hold of the [accused]s shirt-front. after a struggle. such recovery does not affect the [accuseds] criminal liability. The interval between the commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary. which arose from the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocketbook. [57] where the accused. Sobrevilla. as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. as it was ruled that the thefts in each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession of the property belonging to another.

The trial court convicted accused of consummated theft. In doing so. but the Court of Appeals modified the conviction. but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police. to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U. it would be allowed to pass through the check point without further investigation or checking.P. as reflected in the Dio and Flores decisions. was able to consummate the theft. a driver employed by the United States Army. Yet to simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous. [61] Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888 decision). After he had finished unloading. Army personnel. perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot. no matter how momentary. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. [60] This point was deemed material and indicative that the theft had not been fully produced. holding instead that only frustrated theft had been committed. Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter.If anything. which was quoted as follows: Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de hurto es preciso que so . he was stopped by an M. some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. as there is another school of thought on when theft is consummated. had driven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor.S. Adiao. Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner in this case. The accused later contended that he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had passed the checkpoint. The accused therein. accused drove away his truck from the Port. for the Court of Appeals pronounced that the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen. the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles pass through the checkpoint. even if it were more or less momentary. in that the fact that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of the stolen item. Dio was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949.

The accused therein. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. in order to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of the culprits. the articles stolen must first be passed through the M. is that of frustrated theft. accused argued in the alternative that he was guilty only of . as it was frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard. The offense committed. the offense can not be said to have been fully consummated. and found himself convicted of the consummated crime.[65] The accused was prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of confidence. but since the offense was opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all the acts of execution had been performed. bore no substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and in [Dio]. no puede decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su extension. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals some 15 years later. [63] Dio thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company. pues de otra suerte.P. However. the guards insisted on inspecting the van. Before the Court of Appeals. check point.[64] Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. a case which according to the division of the court that decided it. issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. and discovered that the empty sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well. sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa ajena. dado el concepto del delito de hurto. in Flores. the Court of Appeals then concluded: This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar. [62] Integrating these considerations. therefore.haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella. siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente. but before the loot came under the final control and disposal of the looters.

even if it were only momentary. siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente. The prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that case from Dio. the appellate court admitted it found no substantial variance between Dio and Flores then before it. as the stolen items in both cases were retrieved from the actor before they could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were filched. At the same time. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen. as it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before apprehension.attempted theft. Synthesis of the Dio and Flores rulings is in order. Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether theft had been consummated. did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated. explicitly relying on Dio. es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella. However. the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said traditional ruling was qualified by the words is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its contents at once. However. [66] Pouncing on this qualification. the appellate court noted that [o]bviously. while the truck and the van were still within the compound. However.[67] though no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative circumstance been present instead. Such circumstance was not present in either Dio or Flores. then the theft could be deemed consummated. theft. the Court of Appeals conceded that [t]his is entirely different from the case where a much less bulk and more common thing as money was the object of the crime. citing a traditional ruling which unfortunately was not identified in the decision itself. as implied inFlores. As noted earlier. where freedom to dispose of or make use of it is palpably less restricted. the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there . the Court of Appeals. The qualifier siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente proves another important consideration. and not consummated. the petitioner could not have disposed of the goods at once. but the appellate court pointed out that there was no intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the part of the accused that literally frustrated the theft.

[68] In his commentaries. v. People v.could have been free disposition. theft is consummated upon the voluntary and malicious taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. Or as stated in another case[[69]]. This ruling seems to have been based on Viadas opinion that in order the theft may be consummated. [such] as money x x x. [v. Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the import of the Dio ruling: There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of the stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary. as in the case where the chattel involved was ofmuch less bulk and more common x x x. also states that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same. finding that [t]he facts of the cases ofU. Chief Justice Aquino.[74] . concluding from Adiao and other cases. although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. While the trial court found the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft. es preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x x [[70]][71] In the same commentaries.S.] Adiao x x x and U. Sobrevilla x x x indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft. the Court of Appeals held that the accused was guilty of consummated qualified theft. who followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. Batoon[73] involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police detective.S. [72] There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Dio and Flores rulings.

As we undertake this inquiry. the accused were convicted of qualified theft. [77] Indeed. we have to reckon with the import of this Courts 1984 decision in Empelis v.[76] In pointing out the distinction between Dio and Espiritu. we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified. as the accused were able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Dio. is the use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense. dropping the coconuts they had seized. the Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft. as the truck passed through the checkpoint. IAC. the question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in the first place. following Article 310 .[75] the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck.[78] As narrated in Empelis. there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that felony. in the act of gathering and tying some coconuts. Reyes wryly observes that [w]hen the meaning of an element of a felony is controversial. given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself. After trial. IV. Espiritu. and not consummated. which does not constitute any element of theft. and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only of simple theft. the stolen items were discovered by the Military Police running the checkpoint.In People v. theft. It fact. The accused fled the scene. However. The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated. The accused were surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his plantation. and were subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the police.

If the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution. which we reproduce in full: However. Empelis concludes that the crime was . They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.[79] but further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft. the crime is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution. the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. What does appear. the crime is attempted. provided that the nonperformance was by reason of some cause or accident otherthan spontaneous desistance. It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was raised by any of the parties. whether Dio. is that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences. Flores or the Spanish authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion. Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a consequence.of the Revised Penal Code. though not producing the felony as a result. though. There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.[80] No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment.[81] However.

Instead. that decision is subject to reassessment. it cannot present any efficacious argument to persuade us in this case. and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance. Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction. Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court. except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Indeed. or even cited as authority on theft. . these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only attempted.frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the owner. Even if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated theft. the passage is offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it required no further explication. Even if the two sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Notably. Thus. especially given that the acts were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner. and not because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders. following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. However. Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft. we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition. we cannot see how Empelis can contribute to our present debate. its doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it. Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction. such passage bears no reflection that it is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential thought. For these reasons.

Los que con nimo de lucrarse. 608. nms. toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo.0. . The definition of the crime of theft. In fact. At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930. Segundo prrafo del 617 y 618. 1.0. 1.V. Los daadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del dao causado. nm. 2. 2. the said code would be revised again in 1932. 611. the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa was then in place. as provided then. 3. the crime of theft is now simply defined as [e]l que. 607. y sin volencia o intimidacin en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas. read as follows: Son reos de hurto: 1. con nimo de lucro. However. under the Codigo Penal Espaol de 1995.0 y 3. salvo los casos previstos en los artίculos 606. Los que encontrndose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quin es su dueo se la apropriaren co intencin de lucro. 613.0. 1. It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed down.0. nm. and several times thereafter.

Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft. the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Caln pointed out the inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo ser castigado [82] Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain. 30 de octubre 1950. The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa.[85] A few decades later.[83] Even as the answer was as stated in Dio. 22 febrero 1913. The passage cited in Dio was actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether frustrated or consummated theft was committed [e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa ajena. Hay frustracin cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro que los conducia a otro que tenan preparado. for it appears that the 1888 decision involved an accused who was surprised by the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a mannequin. Hay "por lo menos" frustracin. pero el culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa. It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence. vindose sorprendido. la arroja al suelo. cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la intervencin de la policia situada en el local donde se realiz la sustraccin que impidi pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustrado. [84] Nonetheless. that decisions factual predicate occasioning the statement was apparently very different from Dio. 12 abril 1930. and who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled. hay frustracin "muy prxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la . si existe apoderamiento. he raised at least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred. and was indeed derived from the 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. la libre disposicion of the property is not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain that have held to that effect. Therein.

El hecho de que ste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es indiferente. muy vacilante. This divergence of opinion convinces us. [87] (Emphasis supplied) Cuello Calns submissions cannot be lightly ignored. declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos consumados. El delito no pierde su carcter de consumado aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere recuperada. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated theft . 22 febrero 1913. esta doctrina no es admissible. that there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges us to accept frustrated theft. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada ltimamente porla jurisprudencia espaola que generalmente considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y sta quede por tiempo ms o menos duradero bajo su poder. Unlike Viada. 29 mayo 1889. Cuello Caln attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible: La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la disposicin del agente. who was content with replicating the Spanish Supreme Court decisions on the matter. Otherwise put. perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar los efectos hurtados. since pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin delhurto no lo consume efectivamente. Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de frustracin cuando. 28 febrero 1931.sustraccin. los raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia. los abandona. No se concibe la frustracin. pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin del hurto no lo consume efectivamente. 11 marzo 1921. Cuello Caln actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be frustrated. [86] Ultimately. stos. son hurtos consumados. as proposed in Dio andFlores. it would be difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of theft. at least. conforme a lo antes expuesto.

conflicting as they are. or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the statutory language. (2) that said property belongs to another. the answer has to be in the negative. The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a narrow interpretation is appropriate. V. legislative history and purpose.in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah. through statute. if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt the Dio and Flores doctrines. Further. To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property. to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It finds no support or extension in Article 308. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident legislative intent. If we did so.[88] The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by the legislature. but from the exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of judicial review. as expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime. which is to define a crime. which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature. It is the legislature. it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective. (3) that . It is Congress. for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calns position. not the courts. and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until one is ultimately adopted by this Court. in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids. as representatives of the sovereign people. to accept that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. The Court must take heed of language. [89] With that in mind. a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. and ordain its punishment. it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command. Accordingly. as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators.

the taking not having been accomplished. is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender. of personal property of another without the latters consent. [91] It might be argued. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion. Viewed from that perspective. when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of taking itself. once having committed all the acts of execution for theft. for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed. he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot. But even if this were correct. and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted. which is the taking. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner. but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft.the taking be done with intent to gain. it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender. With intent to gain. and long enough to load these onto a taxicab. and not frustrated stage. Moreover. although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. . such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries. the question is again. that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same. with intent to gain. For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage. While theDio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender. compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim. as earlier cited. and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. [90] Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft.

At the same time. [92] And long ago.Indeed. we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. after all. the offense could only be attempted theft. Avila:[93] x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief. held that unlawful taking. a distinction of no slight importance. as is evident in this case. without unlawful taking as an act of execution. [94] Insofar as we consider the present question. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items. the adoption of the rule that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any . The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking. is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Neither Dio nor Flores can convince us otherwise. which idea is qualified by other conditions. unlawful taking is most material in this respect. we have. the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. or apoderamiento. we asserted in People v. With these considerations. Unlawful taking. even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. which is the deprivation of ones personal property. Moreover. and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent. if at all. such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner. theft cannot have a frustrated stage.

more likely. and ultimately the consummation of the theft. relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free disposal at any stage. But once all these acts have been executed. the number and identity of people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property. the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime. there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the free disposition of the items stolen is in any way . the manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage. including the taking. as not all of the acts of execution have been performed. For such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized. the taking has been completed.[95] since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances. All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail. Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account. the location of the property.legislated intent. causing the unlawful deprivation of property. the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. Again. a whole lot more. have been completed. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. all of the acts of execution. in some degree. for therein. grounded in common sense. as implied in Dio? Or. Yet they do not align with the legislated framework of the crime of theft. the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the property. and quite frankly. Maybe the Dio/Flores rulings are. even after the taking has been consummated.

plaintiff-appellee. The same holds true of Empilis. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Dioand Flores rulings. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent. We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code. the petition is DENIED. for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. No. there is no crime of frustrated theft. Hermogenes Caluag Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. for appellant. SO ORDERED. G. with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this Court. . WHEREFORE. OSTRAND. JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. four months and one day of reclusion temporal. 1927 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. Dio itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis.: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the defendant guilty of the crime of consummated rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen years. ISLANDS. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion.determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. L-26298 January 20. their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Dio alone for legal support. and even if they did. Costs against petitioner. defendant-appellant. J.R. his petition must be denied.

it is sufficient if there is a penetration of the labia. There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. No. 65 L. W.. Villamor. The physician who examined the genital organ of the child a few hours after the commission of the crime found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ..The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the evidence is conclusive that the defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her. 79 S. App. but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention of the mother and the sister of the child. It is probably true that a complete penetration was impossible. We do not think so. but that cannot be considered conclusive evidence of penetration.R. with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. So ordered. indicating that an effort had been made to enter the vagina. R. State ([Tex. but in testifying before the court he expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been effected. In the case of Kenny vs. Johnson. The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-appellant is hereby found guilty of the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor. Street. and that. 1990 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. JJ. plaintiff-appellee. Romualdez and Villa-Real. and with the costs in both instances. 88724 April 3. concur." defendant-appellant. 817. The Office of the Solicitor C. therefore. Crim. It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age that penetration was impossible. G. General for plaintiff-appellee. A. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito. vs. 316) where the offended party was a child of the age of 3 years and 8 months the testimony of several physicians was to the effect that her labia of the privates of a child of that age can be entered by a man's male organ to the hymen and the defendant was found guilty of the consummated crime rape. but such penetration is not essential to the commission of the crime. the offense committed should be treated only as abusos deshonestos. but in view of the fact that he was living in the house of the parents of the child as their guest.. the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape.]. that the crime of rape consequently was impossible of consummation. The mother of the child testified that she found its genital organ covered with a sticky substance. Manalo for defendant-appellant. . the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be imposed in its maximum degree.

the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Not satisfied with the decision. 102. the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged.. 59-60. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. beyond reasonable doubt. Borongan. the prosecution rested its case. Ceilito Orita alias Lito.: The accused. 1983. at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St. above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation. Branch II. the amount of Four Thousand (P4. Eastern Samar. of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. did. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO. and to pay costs. 1988. Poblacion. to indemnify CRISTINA S. Rollo): .000. Upon being arraigned. with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same. Philippines. the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. ABAYAN. CONTRARY TO LAW. 335. Thereafter. Rollo): The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the offended party. was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. maximum.MEDIALDEA. J.00) Pesos. the trial court rendered its decision. imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY. Abayan against her will and without her consent. accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows: That on March 20. RPC). as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR. SO ORDERED. PRISION MAYOR. unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 47. then and there wilfully. On December 29. Rollo): WHEREFORE. The information filed in the said case reads as follows (p. Borongan. 1985. 83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court. the dispositive portion of which reads (p. After the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted. Eastern Samar. On August 5.

and the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape. On January 11. she took off her Tshirt. 23. Upon entering the room. paragraph 3. they entered complainant's room. ibid). Rollo): Complainant Cristina S. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him.00.ibid). 1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court. In the early morning of March 20. she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. appellant undressed himself. 5. the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. In this position. the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29. 14. only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30. Then he pulled off her bra. ibid). May 23. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. 1989.000. 129 in conjunction with Section 17. he commanded her to look for a room. 8-9. 1983. Scared. but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. When they reached the second floor. Shortly after her classmates had left. somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. Since the door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside. At said position. With one hand holding the knife. and consequently. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck. Her classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. considering the provision of Section 9. SO ORDERED. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. She pleaded with him to release her. ibid). subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. appellant forced complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. appellant could not fully penetrate her. The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 44.WHEREFORE. ibid). 1984). pants and panty (p. however. tsn. appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. . appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck. Joseph's College at Borongan. complainant arrived at her boarding house. 77. 20. All of a sudden. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier. Eastern Samar. 7175. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. ibid).

Dr. Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees. issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states: Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built. When she saw him inside the room. the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape. Pat.— Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. Complainant thought of escaping (p. ibid). When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When they discovered what happened. Neck. 20. came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes. ibid). per unambulatory. conical in shape with prominent nipples. appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva. and knocked on the door. When there was no answer. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw somebody running away. 27.At this stage. Pat. appears in state of shock. PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only. she darted to the municipal building. no laceration fresh and old noted. errythematous (sic)areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice. vaginal canal tight. took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. the first policeman to see her. Due to darkness. Ma. the accused assigns the following errors: . linear abrasions below (L) breast. In this appeal. hymen intact. Appellant again chased her. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Breast — Well developed. she ran to another room. the resident physician who examined complainant. which was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house. they failed to apprehend appellant. she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined. She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. Donceras. no discharges noted. As aforementioned. tender. Meanwhile. neck. examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty. Luisa Abude. Back — Multiple pinpoint marks. Still naked. Appellant pursued her and climbed the partition.

R.R. The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. 1988. L-41358. Rollo) A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. No. It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her. v. G. are plain and straightforward. 33. Bazar.. No.R. However. August 25." (p. Court of Appeals. this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act. 158 SCRA 695). there is not much to be desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. As a matter of fact. and 2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused. . complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. had traversed illegally her honor.1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses. We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. truth and validity. 1988. the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. L-37400. under all circumstances. The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended there. Her answer to every question profounded (sic).R. Rollo): As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People. No. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently deleted. 55520. G. April 15. Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. et al. Rollo). the testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. Far from being badges of fabrication. Cabato. L-41829. 160 SCRA 98). G. June 27. 1989). one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is. Samson. G." (p. 1988. According to the accused. March 16. To the Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. No. These little deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. We quote with favor the trial court's finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56. Donceras because they "show remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. 34. 162 SCRA 609).

linear abrasions below the left breast. 52-53. 66387-88. . many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being injured. The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings. 135 SCRA 280. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate. and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same. A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. the trial court added (p. September 30. Sadly. is enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged. . G. No. All these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.R. securedly nailed. she had to run away from the latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. February 28. In a similar case (People v. G. 153 SCRA 487. The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty. No. 140 SCRA 400).R. Sambili G. Soterol G. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees. Donceras.R. The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed.R. Nos. 126 SCRA 265). Torio. Thus.R. are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 1985. 72573. 1982. We ruled that: What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely naked by appellant and that even in her nudity. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. . 1983. 1987. free from suspicion (People v Alfonso. . Rollo): . she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity and candor. nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind. No. And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters. L-48731. G. 1985. will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened individual being pursued. The partitions of every room were of strong materials. The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. even in the manner as narrated. December 16. August 31. circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck. multiple pinpoint marks. 117 SCRA 312). December 21. erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva. L-44408. People v. as corroborated. Alcid. 55.. like the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides. et al. Rollo). Dr. People v. 53498.When a woman testifies that she has been raped. No. Rollo): . . How much more for a frightened barrio girl. the exposure of her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities. 54.

et al. Article 6 of the same Code provides: Art. merit consideration. — Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted. G.. Fifth Edition. is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. frustrated. June 29. the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat on its face. xxx xxx xxx Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and 3. and attempted felonies. therefore. Court of Appeals.R. The accused did not bother to contradict this statement. 193). A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim. By using force or intimidation. The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. We are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. 56679. However. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only. 65589. As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim. are punishable. When and how rape is committed. Consummated. No. 1989). On the other hand. Some were not even substantiated and do not. the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. G. 2. When the woman is under twelve years of age. Summing up. Somera. May 31. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. People v. even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. We believe the subject matter that really calls for discussion. p.R. No. 6. 1989. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape: Art. 335. The Solicitor General shares the same view. and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a .

the felony is consummated. do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. 48 Phil. People v. there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime. 980. to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender. it can not be an attempt. without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. 36 Phil. after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts. August 21.R. 58 SCRA 505). Hernandez. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance. No. . from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and. by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. 1974. Clearly. in the crime of rape. G. People v. . Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ. Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily understood even by law students: . 56 SCRA 666. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further. 1974. Oscar. 209. is prevented. because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. which acts it is his intention to perform. nevertheless. April 29. 49 Phil. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Correlating these two provisions. In other words. while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. G. and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Thus. from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.Nothing more is left to be done by the offender. People v. in the latter.1âwphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape. perfect penetration is not essential. against his will.R. No. In a long line of cases (People v. 527. there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. In the leading case of United States v. Amores. rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female . L-32996. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that. We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape. L-31886. Eduave. Necessarily.consequence but which. Royeras. 212.

But the citations the people relied upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim. the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. as in inflammation) and tender. 57. Rollo): . 302. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. 1965) which provides. Eriña 50 Phil. May 23. On the contrary. 1984): . 2632 (dated September 12. Anent this testimony. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. and the Court is not oblivious. 53 Phil. elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter. 559 People v. . We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v.s. for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted orfrustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. Zamoradid not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. Rollo) Furthermore. 1960) and Republic Act No. The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. the trial court stated (p. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. Tayaba. it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by Dr. As such. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. might have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws. Taking into account the nature. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Rabadan et al. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate. Orteza. Likewise. As a matter of fact. a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court..organ (People v. supra. it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. t. for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate. he tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration. Of course. Royeras People v." (p. 6 SCRA 109. 113). it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. However. 694. 53. that conviction for rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. It bears emphasis that Dr. the victim positively testified that there was penetration. even if only partially (pp. in its penultimate paragraph.. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. both should in all respect. 62 Phil. compliment each other. would be productive of mischievous results. as amended by Republic Act No. The Eriña case. It is true. 4111 (dated March 29.n. 304. . The testimony of the offended party is at variance with the medical certificate.

Revised Penal Code. No.R. et al. Nos. 1985. Q And was it inserted? A Yes only a little. November 8. being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335.00. paragraph 3. L-43752. Nos. November 25. is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63.R. G. Nos. Arizala. the Court has since February 2. 1990). 1987. May 31. G. We find the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. Although the second assignment of error is meritorious. G. February 14. September 19. Aragona. G. Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Taduyo. Thus. the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. People v. or what act do you referred (sic) to. paragraph 3. 138 SCRA 569. see People v. 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. March 15. 78732-33. Manzano. et al. 1989. Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Moreover. 167 SCRA 65. supra). 118 SCRA 705. The fact is that in a prosecution for rape.R. 136 SCRA 702).R. G. of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. 69778.Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina? A It entered but only a portion of it. .R. September 29.R. that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. the proper imposable penalty is death. People v. ACCORDINGLY. 1982. 154 SCRA 349). The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30. G. G.000. 70744. No. Tabago. Alfonso. L-38968-70. February 9.. L-37928-29. the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.. xxx xxx xxx Q What do you mean when you said comply. 1982. it will not tilt the scale in favor of the accused because after a thorough review of the records. Article 335. L38449. 1985. In view. Reclusion perpetua. Solis. 59713. however. when you said comply? A I inserted his penis into my vagina. Ramirez. the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible (People v.R. People v. Dr. 112 SCRA 615. No. No. 1988. People v. paragraph 1. No.R. Millora. G. of Article 111.

2892. 1881. No. 2859. 2858. 2840. 2860. 2924. 2915.. 2850. 2846. CARPIO. 2879. 1889. 2903. Chairperson. 2902. 1880. 2909. 2937. 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO. 2906. 2898. Promulgated: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1821. SIMON FERNAN. 1641. Jr. 2893. 2864. 2863. 2921. 2887. 1997 Decision[3] of the SB in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 2875. and Expedito Torrevillas seek the reversal of the December 4. 1818. 2920. 1823. 2866. 2891. 2855. 1884. 2868. 2842. 145927 EXPEDITO TORREVILAS. 2880. 2856. 1885.SO ORDERED. August 24. [4] all entitled People of the Philippines v. 2845. 2870.: The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases [2] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. 2925. JJ. et al. JR. J. 2867. 2877... 2849. this infamous 86 million highway scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the country. 1819. 2871. 2927. 2839. 1883. Respondent. 1642. 2843. Rocilo Neis. 2853. and G. and 2939. 2929. JR. and the ingenious scheme employed in defrauding the government. 2901. 2865. 2932. 2874. 2905. 2872. 2841. 2926. 1822. 2869. 2919. The Case Petitioners Simon Fernan. 2876. 2911. Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions. 2862. J. 2844. 2910. 2913.CARPIO MORALES. 2899. 2886. 2896. 2912. 2861. 2908. 2889. 2882. 2938. 2885. and VELASCO. 2854. 2917. 1888. 2904. 2922. 2936. 2883. 2888. 2873. 2852. 1887. 2847. 2848.[1] Petitioners..versus . 1882. JR. finding them guilty of multiple . 2878. 2884. 2918. 2890. 1640. 2923. 2895. 1643. 2907. Present: QUISUMBING. 2930. 1820. 2931. the number of people involved. 1886. 2897. 2894. 2900. 2881. 2851. TINGA.R. 2857. . 2928. 1879.

exculpation is in order. Jose Bagasao. 2885. The entries in the journal vouchers filed with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 8-81-400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation). 1978. [5] and the subsequent August 29. 2914. Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned. They could not be traced to the files and records of the Accounting. 2881. Petitioner Fernan. 2859. particularly. Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and. Quejada and Ruth I. Angelina Escao. The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790). These fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence. Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office. Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts. namely: 2855. 8-83-000 (liquidated or current year obligations) and . 2909. 2000 SB Resolution which denied their separate pleas for reconsideration. The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the Accounting. hence. One set consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices and were duly signed by Mrs. and 2918. COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. they conducted an investigation and in due course submitted their findings. and 2932. The Facts The SB culled the facts[6] this way: On June 21. 2856. they were mostly undated and were sometimes duplicated. while petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases. Nevertheless. 2914. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6) cases. instead of the Finance Officer. 2880. 7. 2919. 2910. Jr. Cebu 1st. Paredes to verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts in Cebu. 2858. directed auditors Victoria C.Complying with the directive. Budget and Finance Division. the expenditures were taken from obligations of the current year (1978) because all the supporting papers of the payment vouchers were dated in that year. They discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts.instances of estafa through falsification of public documents. The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr. namely: 2879. of COA Regional Office No. Budget and Finance Division. the Cebu City.

All of these were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. xxxx For a better understanding of these highways cases. . A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district level. how are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts and ultimately paid out to contractors. These are sent to the Regional Office. There were indications that the practice had been going on for years. the Bureau of Treasury and the Commission on Audit. Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district office authorized to incur obligations. The Advice of Allotment is an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a specified amount in accordance with approved programs and projects. the Central Office of the agency prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region. the Budget Officer of the region prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various districts of the region (The amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the Advice of Allotment). This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer. The mission of the task force was to conduct a wider and more extended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPH Region VII. the then Ministry of Budget released funds to the various agencies of the government by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). Mangubat. the 1977 questionable disbursements of which are the subject matter of these cases. the flow in the release of funds to the various agencies of the government and the control devices set up for disbursement and accounting of public funds should first be explained. then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet Committee on MPH Region VII Ghost Projects Anomalies which in turn organized a Special Task Force composed of representatives from the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB). Now.8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account). including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. however. he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). xxxx Due to these serious irregularities. Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling is an authority to pay. in accordance with the disbursement allotment. On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies. had no authority to approve them because since October 1977. the District Engineer submits to the Regional Director a request for allotment in accordance with the program of work prepared by the former. Upon receipt.

conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the payment of deliveries. [conducts] biddings. xxxx The elaborate accounting procedure described above with its system of controls was set up obviously to make sure that government funds are properly released. depending upon the volume of transactions. On the basis of the ROA. Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared. debiting the account obligation (liquidated or unliquidated obligation. Once it is approved. Upon receipt of the ROI. a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil Engineer.approved by the District Engineer. once or twice a month. who certifies as to the availability of funds. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the region. It is also recorded and posted to the general ledger. the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting the obligation incurred (0-82-000). the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared. At the end of the month. The RCIDDO is recorded in the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the end of each month. makes awards and prepares purchase orders which are served on the winning bidder. the corresponding check in the form of a Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing Officer and finally released to the contractor. The RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for approval. and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering District. The ROA signifies that a certain amount of district funds has been set aside or earmarked for the particular expenditures stated in the RSE. the balances of each account shown in the general ledger are summarized in a statement called the trial balance. The trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila where it is consolidated with other trial balances submitted by other regional offices.The journal voucher is prepared. At the end of every month. the Regional Office draws a journal voucher. Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO. This is recorded in the general voucher and posted to the general ledger at the end of each month. The District Office also prepares a summary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts and tally sheets. The ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office. closing the account 8-70-709 to 8-71-100-199 at the end of each month. whichever is applicable). disbursed and accounted for. listing all the checks issued during that period. Upon receipt of the RCIDDO. In the hands . and crediting the account Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA). the District Office puts up advertisements. the ROAs are summarized in the Reports of Obligations Incurred (ROI) in the District Office.

There were loopholes which an unscrupulous person adroit in government accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous sums of money from the government. adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. it proved to be inadequate. Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger. the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 . so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the Regional Office. To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments. vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees. Thus. i. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. all of MPH Region VII.. met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from government coffers. the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to provide the supposed source of funds. and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or adjustment. and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II). All three agreed to help him carry out his plan.of untrustworthy guardians of the public purse.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor. Thus. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400). 1977. Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake LAAs.000. although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81400) at the end of the preceding year. Delia Preagido (Accountant III). it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations: The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts. in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit D). These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs. Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.e. however. In fine. the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50. account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling. the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC). Mangubat enticed Preagido. accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant). Sometime in February. Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner). They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson to join him.

xxxx Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District.692. 1977. The checks.677. It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 8-81-400. 1977 to December 31. tempted by the prospect of earning big money.04 for the period January 1. the PNB and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. particularly their flaws and loopholes.694.680. and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake.812. Other government employees. the list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from February to May 1977. consequently.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs). as appearing in the trial balance would not show the irregularity. it did not know if the limit had already been exceeded. obviously because.and 8-70-790). amounting to P5. allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.734.160. Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978). This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures. On the other hand. and these were . But apart from this. The bank had also no way of knowing what amount was appropriated for the district. were actually issued. hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity. could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office.00. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4.Furthermore. The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. The reason for this is that. the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140. at that time. Only an insider steep in government accounting.76 which however. could have pulled off such an ingenious and audacious plan. they were not properly funded. Only CDCs were presented to it. however. the PNB and Bureau of Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch of the PNB did not receive independent advice from the PNB head office in Manila. There were no deposits of money made with the PNB from which withdrawals could be charged. the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4.(Some of the recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time).00. auditing and banking procedures. with expenditures amounting to P613.336. the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn against them. the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed.

all of MPH Region VII. However. Regional Highway Engineer. as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them. were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. 1977. became a state witness in the remainder. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. Jose Sayson.810. did not show any improvement. namely: Rolando Mangubat. On the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents. Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez.all completed within the period from November to December.839. Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3. petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. 2879. contractors. as found out by the NBI.810. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3. As testified to by several barangay captains. Fund releases were made to the suppliers. also of Region VII. The other conniver.839.504. 2881. and payees based on these general vouchers. These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754. and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials. Informations were filed. used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. 2880.810. The nuclei of this massive conspiracy.74.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH. the roads and bridges in the district.810. the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national highway. the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3. after being found guilty in some of the cases. Delia Preagido.74. and Edgardo Cruz. and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused. Jr. emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs. . an additional amount of P3.839. On the other hand. 2914. Petitioner Fernan.839.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED. were traced back to Rolando Mangubat. Obviously. 2885. xxxx A total of 132 General Vouchers. convictions were obtained. through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED.00.

unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents. Angelina Escao.The Information against Fernan. Property Custodian of Cebu I HED. Jose Sayson. Leonila del Rosario. Supervising Accounting Clerk. Chief Finance and Management Service. Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED and Juliana de los Angeles. Zosimo Mendez. Agripino Pagdanganan. Mariano Montera. Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED. Clerk in the Property Division of Cebu I HED. Central Office. Chief Accountant. Manuel de Veyra. Asterio Buqueron. MPH. Basilisa Galvan. Jose Sayson. Engracia Escobar. Region VII. Region VII. MPH. Ramon Quirante. Rolando Mangubat. Leonila del Rosario. MPH. MPH. MPH. to wit: . Jr. and Juliana de los Angeles for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents. Delia Preagido. Matilde Jabalde. MPH. Region VII. about and during the period from December 1. Simon Fernan. committed as follows: That on. MPH. MPH. Abelardo Cardona. Josefina Luna. conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escao. Ramon Quirante. Camilo de Letran. Engracia Escobar. Basilisa Galvan. Central Office. Leo Villagonzalo. Leo Villagonzalo. Regional Director. in SB Criminal Case No. 1977. 2879 reads as follows: The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis. Leonardo Tordecilla. Region VII. an alleged supplier. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Zosimo Mendez. Manuel de Veyra. Asterio Buqueron. the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez. both dates inclusive. Edgardo Cruz. Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I. Budget Examiner. Heracleo Faelnar. Central Office. Region VII. MPH. Central Office. Jr. the accused Rocilo Neis. Delia Preagido. with the exception of Juliana de los Angeles. Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office. Rolando Mangubat. Central Office. Mariano Jarina. Simon Fernan.. MPH. Accountant I. Camilo de Letran. Matilde Jabalde. in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province. Adventor Fernandez. Budget Officer. Budget Officer III. Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED. then Assistant Director MPH Region VII. Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED. mutually helping each other did then and there willfully. Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED. Accountant II. Edgardo Cruz. Auditor of Cebu I HED. Assistant Chief Accountant. 1976 up to January 31. Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways. MPH. all of whom took advantage of their official positions. Jr. Heracleo Faelnar. Leonardo Tordecilla. Josefina Luna. Supervising Accountant. Mariano Jarina. Agripino Pagdanganan. Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office. Abelardo Cardona. Mariano Montera. Region VII.

that the road construction materials were delivered. 50. Abstract of Bids 7. General Voucher No. Trial Balance by making it appear that Regional Office No. as all the accused know. m. inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact. as all the accused knew. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling 4. Report of Inspection 10. Check No.30 to Km. that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder. converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs. Philippine Currency.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher. B-15 5. that a regular bidding was held. that a requisition for said item was made and approved. and the accused. that the said amount ofP28. all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications.00. Letter of Advice of Allotment 3.000. once in possession of the said amount. 60. to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine . Request for Allocation of Allotment 2. as a designed means to cover-up the fraud. the same were not true and correct.400 cu.00). Purchase Order 8. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 1. 9933064 6. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment 11.1. the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28. Statement of Delivery 9. misappropriated.000. by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase. in payment of the non-existing deliveries. of item 108[7] for use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from Km. when in truth and in fact.

000. m. m. 98 materials for use in the PhP repair and rehabilitation 30.30 to Km. 50. 9933294. of item 108 PhP for use in the repair of 28.00). General Voucher No. CONTRARY TO LAW. 3. The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan.00 of the Daan-Bantayan road from Km.500 cu. 3.000. B-55.400 cu. Request 1. Request 1977 up for toFebruary Allocation 28. Fernan. Jr. Jr.00 the CebuHagnaya Wharf r oad from Km. 60.s criminal cases are detailed below: Criminal Case No. 119. December 1.00 1. 2. B-15. 2.00 Bogo-Curva-Medellon road from Km. Check No.Government in the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28. General Voucher No. January 2. 127. of item 108 PhP for use in the repair of the 28. 1977 2. Check No. 9933104. Request 1977 up for toJanuary Allocation 31. General 1.00 to Km. 1976 up Voucher to January No. January 2.000. 92 to Km. 1977 of Items Purchased Allegedly Amount of Fraud 1. 1977 of Allotment 101-12105-76. 2879 2880 2881 2885 Dates of Main Commissi Documen on ts Falsified December 1.00 the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges by Typhoon Aring at the Tabogon-Bogo provincial road from Km. of item 108 for use in 31. Philippine Currency. 1. 1976 up for to January Allocation 31. 1977 of Allotment 101-2-5677. 110. B-245. PhP m.00 Approximately 1. were essentially identical save for the details as highlighted in boldface above.400 cu. 31. 1. For ease of reference. 9933064.000.00 to . Check No.000.

Manuel de Veyra. r 30. and 2932. 2855 reads as follows: The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis. 2. 71 to Km. January 2. 3. Rolando Mangubat. Abelardo Cardona. 2910. 1977 2. m. 1. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Basilisa Galvan. Leonila del Rosario. Adventor Fernandez.2914 2918 Allotment 101-12112-76. Check No. 2858. The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case No. 2909. 1977. 1977 up to June 30. of item 108 PhP for use in the 27. about and during the period from June 1. Leo Villagonzalo. Heracleo Faelnar. 2859. Check No. B-107. both dates inclusive. Check No. Angelina Escao. 2855. Jorge de la Pea. in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province. the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez. Expedito Torrevillas.200 cu. Rolando Mangubat. B-76. the accused Rocilo Neis. m. Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I. Matilde Jabalde. Barbon barangay road 1. 1977 2. B-927. Ramon Quirante. Engracia Escobar. 2856. committed as follows: That on. Edgardo Cruz. Nuez for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents. 136 1. petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. Delia Preagido. Jose Sayson.500 cu. Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office. 76 On the other hand.00 theCebu North HagnayaW harf road from Km. Agripino Pagdanganan. 9933157. General Voucher No.00 rehabilitation of the CajelLugo.000. 9403425. Mariano Montera and Rufino V. conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and . 28. 2919. Asterio Buqueron. Km. General 1977 up Voucher toNovembe No. 9933125. 2914. Camilo de Letran. October 1. General 1977 up Voucher toFebruary No.000. Leonardo Tordecilla. of item 108 PhP for the rehabilitation of 30. 1. Josefina Luna.

to wit: 1. Region VII. Statement of Delivery 9. Delia Preagido. Chief Finance and Management Service. 10-190-76. Central Office. Budget Officer III. MPH. Manuel de Veyra. Jorge de la Pea. MPH. Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-10-186-76. Expedito Torrevillas. Leo Villagonzalo. B-613 5. Matilde Jabalde. Report of Inspection 10. Cebu I HED. Ramon Quirante. Region VII. unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents. Region VII. an alleged supplier. Property Custodian of Cebu I HED. Leonardo Tordecilla. Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office. MPH.assistance of Angelina Escao. MPH. 9403099 6. then Assistant Director MPH Region VII. MPH. Supervising Accounting Clerk. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment 11. Nuez. Agripino Pagdanganan. Purchase Order 8. Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED. representative of the Engineers Office. Nuez. Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED. Edgardo Cruz. Region VII. MPH. Asterio Buqueron. all of whom took advantage of their official positions. MPH. 10-188-76. Budget Examiner. Auditor of Cebu I HED. Accountant II. Supervising Accountant. Engracia Escobar. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling 4. Mariano Montera. Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED. Trial Balance . Region VII. Abelardo Cardona. Jose Sayson. Budget Officer. MPH. Heracleo Faelnar. MPH. Central Office. mutually helping each other did then and there willfully. Leonila del Rosario. Regional Director. Central Office. 10-180-76 2. Region VII. and Rufino V. with the exception of Rufino V. MPH. Assistant Chief Accountant. Letter of Advice of Allotment 3. MPH. Central Office. 10-192-76. Central Office. Accountant I. Basilisa Galvan. Chief Accountant. Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways. Check No. General Voucher No. Josefina Luna. Camilo de Letran. Abstract of Bids 7.

CONTRARY TO LAW. once in possession of the said amount. 10-19076. by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase.85 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher. t.85). the same were not true and correct.63 m. as all the accused knew. that a requisition for said item was made and approved. t.431. as all the accused know.431. converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs. 1. when in truth and in fact. Philippine Currency. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. The Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details highlighted in the aforequoted typical accusatory pleading. 108. Amount Fraud PhP 48.34 to Km. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 153. of item 310[8] for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road at Km. to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48.431. misappropriated. that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder.431. in payment of the non-existing deliveries.63 m.85 of . Philippine Currency. Allotment 1977 101-10-18676. that the road construction materials were delivered. For ease of reference. Request for 1977 up Allocation of toJune 30. inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact. that the said amount of P48. 10-19276. the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48. 2855 Dates of Main Commission Documents Falsified June 1. that a regular bidding was held. Torrevillas criminal cases are particularized as follows: Criminal Case No. and the accused. 10-188- Items Allegedly Purchased 153. 109. as a designed means to cover-up the fraud. all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications.85).by making it appear that Regional Office No.52.

9184-76 2. Check No. General Voucher No. B-619. 109. 9403426. 8121-76 2. 2. 1.52 151.200 cu.09 for use in the asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km.680.52 110. 1977 up to November 30. 1.713. B-928. 9-201-76.00 for use in the rehabilitation of the .65 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km.84 for use in the asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km 108. 2. Request for Allocation Allotment 101-6-23476. B-613. 3. 108. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-10-1576. t. 1. 31. 9403115.76 m.34 to Km. General Voucher No. PhP of item 108 27.01 m. Check No. 3. 9403099.34 to Km. 10-18076. September 1. B-631. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-7-63-76. 6-237-76. 31. 8-102-76.34 to Km.900. 3.34 to Km. 6-239-76. General Voucher No. Check No. 109. 8-152-76. 8153-76. 108. 1977 76.m. General Voucher No.52 1. 6241-76.9181-76. B-629. 30. PhP of item 310 47. 1. Check No. t. PhP of item 310 34. 9403105.2856 2858 2859 2909 June 1977 up toJune 1977 June 1977 up toJuly 1977 June 1977 up toJune 1977 1. 109. PhP of item 310 48. 1. 108. 1. t.109.472. 6240-76 2.35 m. 3.52 153. General Voucher No. Check No. 9403117.

9403427. Barbon barangay road 1. 2914 October 1.200 cu. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the MagayCanamukan. 2932 June 1977 up toJuly 1977 1. 9933293.900. 8153-76. General Voucher No. m.2910 September 1. Request for Allocation of 31. 1977 up to November 30. 1. 1. Balaban barangay road 1. 3. B-929. B-927. 2919 January 2. 1977 2.00 PhP 27.550 cu. m. 2. 9403425. Compostela barangay road 1. 9403130. m. 2. 71 to Km. 1977 up toNovember 30.00 PhP 31. Check No. General 1977 up Voucher No.200 cu.58 . 1977 1. Allotment 101-7-83-76. toFebruary B-244.000. 83 250 gals of aluminum paint 324 gals of red lead paint for use in the maintenance of national roads and bridges PhP 27.000.00 PhP 44. BuanoyCantibas. 7124-76. 8170-76. 28. 7-84-76.762. Check No. Check No. 2. General Voucher B643. Check No. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the CajelLugo. of item 108 for use in the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges at the ToledoTabuelan national road from Km. 1977 1. General Voucher No.

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. 2881. and. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. and in its December 4. JOSE SAYSON. 2880. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.) In Criminal Case No.. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. to ten (10) years. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. Jr.000.00).. Jr. RAMON QUIRANTE. as maximum. MARIANO MONTERA. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. to indemnify.500. Jr.[9] (Emphasis supplied.000. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P .. the Court finds accused JOSE SAYSON. to indemnify. with the accessory penalties provided by law. to ten (10) years. MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28. as maximum. ZOSIMO MENDEZ. and. to pay their proportionate share of the costs.500. ZOSIMO MENDEZ. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. andSIMON FERNAN. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. as minimum. RAMON QUIRANTE. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years ofprision correccional. MARIANO MONTERA.00). 2879. thus: In Criminal Case No. JOSE SAYSON. 1997 Decision. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.) In Criminal Case No.00). with the accessory penalties provided by law. it found him criminally liable in the six (6) cases against him. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. as maximum. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to ten (10) years. with the accessory penalties provided by law. ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN.The Sandiganbayans Ruling The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner Fernan. RAMON QUIRANTE. Jr. as minimum. GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.[10] (Emphasis supplied. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.00). eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.. as minimum.

to ten (10) years. as minimum. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON. with the accessory penalties provided by law. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.00). RAMON QUIRANTE. ZOSIMO MENDEZ. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.00). GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. Jr. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years ofprision correccional. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. SIMON FERNAN.00). as maximum. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.) In Criminal Case No.00). in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.500. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN. RAMON QUIRANTE. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to indemnify. as maximum. to indemnify. 2914. [11] (Emphasis supplied. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. as maximum.500. Jr. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.000. Jr.000. and. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30. with the accessory penalties provided by law.. to indemnify. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN.500. JOSE SAYSON. [12](Emphasis supplied. 2918.3. as minimum. RAMON QUIRANTE. Jr.00). to ten (10) years. with the accessory penalties provided by law. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty . and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.500. 2885.. to pay their proportionate share of the costs.000. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. JOSE SAYSON. to indemnify. and ISMAEL SABIO.00).) In Criminal Case No. [13] (Emphasis supplied. as minimum.00). and.) In Criminal Case No. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. to ten (10) years. and. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.

RAMON QUIRANTE.[14] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to indemnify. as minimum. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN.Thousand Pesos (P 30. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.431. and. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. to pay a fine . the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. RAMON QUIRANTE. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.[16] (Emphasis supplied. to ten (10) years.00). to indemnify. JOSE SAYSON. JOSE SAYSON. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. as minimum.472. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.000. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.) In Criminal Case No. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100 (P 48. with the accessory penalties provided by law. and. MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS. 2855. as minimum. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional.[15] (Emphasis supplied. to wit: In Criminal Case No. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. as maximum. 2856.00).85). JOSE SAYSON.00). MARIANO MONTERA.84). in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. as maximum. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years ofprision correccional.) Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases.500. RAMON QUIRANTE. and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.500. to ten (10) years. with the accessory penalties provided by law. to ten (10) years. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TORREVILLASGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. as maximum. and. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100 (P 48. 2858. with the accessory penalties provided by law.

00).) In Criminal Case No. and. RAMON QUIRANTE. JOSE SAYSON. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27. as minimum. as maximum. to ten (10) years. [18] (Emphasis supplied. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred . in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.00). hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN.500. 2909. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. to indemnify. RAMON QUIRANTE.[17] In Criminal Case No.500.00). jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos and 9/100 (P47.500.680. to pay their proportionate share of the costs.900. RAMON QUIRANTE. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3. MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS. FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLASGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.500.00).65). JOSE SAYSON.713. to indemnify. In Criminal Case No. as maximum. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3. as minimum. 2859. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. as minimum. FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLASGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. to ten (10) years. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. with the accessory penalties provided by law. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100 (P34. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. to indemnify. and. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to ten (10) years.00).09). and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. as maximum. and . JOSE SAYSON. with the accessory penalties provided by law. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. to indemnify. with the accessory penalties provided by law. 2910.

[20] (Emphasis supplied. and.00)..) In Criminal Case No. to indemnify. Jr. to ten (10) years.EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to ten (10) years. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P .00). JOSE SAYSON.500. as maximum. and.00). the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to ten (10) years.500. MARIANO MONTERA. 2914. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. 2932. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional.00). to indemnify. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31. as maximum. (Emphasis supplied. RAMON QUIRANTE. RAMON QUIRANTE.500. with the accessory penalties provided by law.) In Criminal Case No. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. PEDRITO SEVILLE andEXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. as minimum. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. as minimum. ZOSIMO MENDEZ. and.Pesos (P 27. to indemnify. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN. Jr. JOSE SAYSON.) In Criminal Case No.00). RAMON QUIRANTE. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. 2919. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. with the accessory penalties provided by law. as minimum. as maximum. MARIANO MONTERA.000.900. with the accessory penalties provided by law. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. [19] (Emphasis supplied. JOSE SAYSON. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.000.00). to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.

COURT THAT THE DELIVERIES OF THE ROAD MATERIALS ATTESTED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THEM WERE NOT GHOST DELIVERIES RESTS WITH THE ACCUSED AND NOT WITH THE PROSECUTION. . The Issues Petitioners put forward two (2) issues. The Courts Ruling We are not persuaded to nullify the verdict. viz: I THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN TOTALLY IGNORED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE BURDEN OF CONVINCING THE HON. Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing. and. they now interpose the instant petition to clear their names. We are not convinced.58).762.) Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the adverse judgments against them which was declined by the August 29. Petitioners guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt Petitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown beyond a peradventure of doubt and the State was unable to show that government funds were illegally released based on alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 2000 SB Resolution.44. II THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS AS CO-CONSPIRATORS DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD IMPLICATE THEM AS COCONSPIRATORS AND JUSTIFY THEIR CONVICTION. [21] (Emphasis supplied.

but such uncertainty that a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence. [22] This sacred task unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. the same to be applied in its maximum period.000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer. leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction. Penalty for complex crimes. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. Definitely. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. employee. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter. employee. taking advantage of his official position. ART. Falsification by public officer. reasonable doubt is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty. Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. Jr. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. 171. or notary or ecclesiastical minister. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed. a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding. The complex crime is pruned into the following essential elements: For estafa . 48. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 318.Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions. to a moral certainty. shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: xxxx 4. or notary who. thus: ART. Other deceits.[23] A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused Fernan. Reasonable doubt is present when after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences. of the truth of the charge. ART. and Torrevillas.

Delia Preagido is presented to testify as a State witness in the instant cases without reproducing and adopting her previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED 78 and the Danao City HED 77 cases. to believe to be true what is really false. she identified twenty-six separate lists containing names of officials and employees . and consists in any false representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and misleads another. That he takes advantage of his official position. on May 18 and 19. either by guile or trickery or by other means. the prosecution and the accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of Preagido in the instant cases. (Mandaue City HED 78 cases).1. 2.[24] 2. It is actual fraud.[25] For falsification 1. the sale of such fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs in said engineering district in the said year and the participation of the accused thereon. or temporary prejudice. the sale of such fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs issued to Cebu I HED in 1977. 1988. which questions will only be limited to the fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs issued to Cebu I HED in 1977. Delia Preagido. [26] Before the SB. she will identify documents and exhibits which have been previously marked and identified by other prosecution witness x x x. Delia Preagido in the Mandaue City HED 78 and the Danao City HED 77 cases. 1982 and in Criminal Cases Nos. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. disturbance in property right. both on direct and cross examination x x x without prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross examination question. to his hurt. That the offender is a public officer. (2) That in the event Mrs. etc. 3. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. 1988 was entered into between the State and the accused with the following stipulations and admissions: (1) To expedite the early termination of the instant cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated September 1. etc. 1987 and March 14. 1446-1789. her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. or notary public. There is deceit when one is misled. 889. (3) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. (Danao City HED 77 cases) on November 10. employee. that may be propounded by the Prosecution and the accused on said State witness. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation.

delivery receipts. Preagidos previous testimony of these lists. which were attached as supporting documents to corresponding general vouchers. exhibits.of MPH.[28] general vouchers. and other pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal disbursement of funds are summarized as follows: Petitioner Fernan.e..400 cu. Preagidos vital testimony. the testimony of state witness Preagido on the modus operandi of the conspirators. to obviate Mrs. VII. of item 108 for Not Amoun t of Fraud PhP . dealt a major blow to the defenses raised by petitioners. Speci fic Exhib its Main Docume nts Falsified 2879 T-86-f- 1. the Prosecution hereby reproduces and adopts specifically such testimony and the markings of the lists. therefore. in turn. Crimi nal Case No. general vouchers. of the various Highways Engineering Districts in MPH. and other pertinent papers that were also falsified. or the unique and distinct method of procedure by which the malversation of public funds in Region VII of the MPH was perpetrated and accomplished. and the MPH Central Office who have allegedly received money or various sums from 1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or sales of fake LAAs in 1977 and 1978 and. was not even successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners. [27] As a result of this MOA. documents. LL-1 to LL-25 in the instant cases. Exhibits KKK. checks. substituted or re-marked accordingly as Exhibits LL. Regional Office No. and other documents. KKK-1 to KKK-25 in the Mandaue City HED 78 cases and Exhibits 0000. Jr. and the specific fake general vouchers. The fake tally sheets. Preagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal disbursement of public funds pertained to non-existent projects and was supported by fake LAAs. Region VII. wherein she identified the methods. Items Purchased Allegedly FAKE LAAs that authori zed purchas e 1. reports of inspection. i. requests for supplies and materials. the alleged amounts and quantities of road construction materials delivered. m. disbursement of funds for non-existent projects. and other related documents signed on separate occasions by petitioners. supported by signed tally sheets that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of road construction materials for non-existent or illegal projects. and other pertinent papers that led to the crafting of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs). The fake LAAs and general vouchers were. fake general vouchers. 0000-1 to 0000-25 in the Danao City HED 77 cases.

110. 1. Check No. 2. 3.1. Request repair and rehabilitation of numbere (Tally for the Daan-Bantayan road d Sheet Allocatio from Km. 28. 00 PhP 28. Approximately 1.500 cu. Request use in the repair of the numbere (Tally for Bogo-Curva-Medellon road d Sheet Allocatio from Km. Check No. Request of item 108 for use in the numbere etc. 136 contrary s) n of to Allotmen official t 101-12procedur 112-76. General Voucher No. (Tally Sheet s) 2880 2881 2885 General Voucher No.1. General Voucher No.road from Km. of item 108 for Not 1. B245. Check No. General Voucher No.000. 3.00 numbere d contrary to official procedur e T-87-f.00 to Allotmen official t 101-12procedur 105-76. 98 procedur 56-77. B-15. contrary s) n of 119. 9933104. B-76. 127. 92 to Km. use in the repair of theCebu HagnayaWharf roa d from Km. e 2. e 2. T-89-f. m.000.1. m.00 to Km. 00 PhP 30. 00 . etc. T-104. Materials for use in the Not 1. etc.000. 50.1. B-55.00 to Km. 9933064. etc. 00 PhP 31. 60.000.400 cu.30 to Km. for repair and rehabilitation of d (Tally Allocatio damaged roads and bridges contrary Sheet n of by Typhoon Aring at the to s) Allotmen Tabogon-Bogo provincial official t 101-2. 9933294. Not g-1. e 2.

Main Documents Falsified 1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-10-18676. 10-19076. 10-18876. 2855 2856 Specific Exhibits T-33-f (Delivery Receipt). B107.2914 T-115g-1. General Voucher No. 9403099. (Daily Tally 9-201-76. Request for (Delivery Allocation of Receipt).63 m. of item 310 for use in the asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan FAKE LAAs that authorized purchase Not numbered contrary to official procedure Amount of Fraud PhP 48.34 to Km. 1. of item 108 for the rehabilitation of the Cebu NorthHagnaya Wh arfroad from Km.431. 1. T-33-f-1 (Daily Tally Sheet). 00 Not numbere d contrary to official procedur e PhP 30. 9933125. 109. Allotment T-34-f-1 101-10-15-76. 10-18076. 00 Petitioner Torrevillas Crimi nal Case No.9-18176.472. Check No. Check No. 9933157. 9403425. 3.76 m. General Voucher No. 10-19276. T-34-f 1. 2. 1. Check No. 152-76. m.52 153.500 cu. 9-184-76 Items Allegedly Purchased 153. General Voucher No. t. etc. 8Sheet). etc. Check No.000.000.84 contrary to official procedure . of item 310 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108. 2. (Tally Sheet s) 2918 T-116f-1. 71 to Km. 76 PhP 27. (Tally Sheet s) 3. t. 2. m. B-613. B927.85 Not PhP numbered 48.200 cu. 8153-76. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo. Barbon barangay road 1.

6Sheet). T-35-f 1.35 m.01 m. Check No. 3. Check No. Check No. Allotment T-36-f-1 101-7-63-76. Request for (Delivery Allocation of Receipt). 8Sheet). (Daily Tally 6-237-76.34 to Km. 9403115. General (Request Voucher No.00 contrary to official procedure . 121-76 2.34 to Km.34 to Km. 109. T-113-c (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-114-c 1.09 contrary to official procedure 110. 108. of item 310 for use in the asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. General Voucher No. T-114-e (Report of road from Km 108. and 9403426. B-619. t. Check No.65 contrary to official procedure 1. Supplies 2.m.900. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 3. 9403117. Request for (Delivery Allocation Receipt).52 151.900. and 9403427. Equipment ). of item 108 for use in the rehabilitatio n of the BuanoyCantibas. t. (Daily Tally 8-102-76. for B-929.52 Not PhP numbered 47.52 1. 9403105. T-36-f 1. General Voucher No. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitatio n of the MagayCanamukan Not PhP numbered 27.2858 2859 2909 2910 2. 239-76. Check No. m.109. General (Request Voucher No.200 cu.680. 6240-76 2. for B-928.00 contrary to official procedure Not PhP numbered 27. 109. Balaban barangay road Not PhP numbered 34. Equipment ).713. B-631. 3. 108. General Voucher No. 6241-76.200 cu. Supplies 2. B-629. T-113-b 1. T-113-d (Report of Inspection) . Allotment T-35-f-1 101-6-234-76.

Check No. T-117-g-1. of item 108 for use in the repair and rehabilitatio n of damaged roads and bridges at the ToledoTabuelan national road from Km.762. 2.2914 2919 2932 Inspection) . 1. 9933293. 7124-76. m. 8170-76. Check No. 3. B-244. General Voucher No.200 cu.58 contrary to official procedure . m. T-115-f (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-117-g (Delivery Receipt). (Daily Tally Sheets) .00 contrary to official procedure 1. Check No. 8153-76. 7-84-76.550 cu. 9403425. General Voucher No. 2. T-114-f (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-115-c (Request for Supplies and Equipment ). 9403130. 1. 2. 71 to Km. General Voucher B643. T-115-e (Report of Inspection) .00 contrary to official procedure 1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-7-83-76.000. Not PhP numbered 44. Barbon barangay road Not PhP numbered 27. 83 250 gals of aluminum paint 324 gals of red lead paint for use in the maintenanc e of national roads and bridges Not PhP numbered 31.000. B-927. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitatio n of the Cajel-Lugo. Compostela barangay road 1. etc.

requests for supplies and materials. from 1972 to 1982. The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and maintenance materials in support of projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of the various barangay captains and residents of the barangay who were supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.9. The road remained in bad shape. no major repairs were undertaken on the said road in 1978 or in previous years. [29]The tally sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at specific places. Barangay Captain of Barangay Antipolo. pp. TIMOTEO ANCAJAS. 132 to Km. testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway. with numerous potholes which the camineros merely filled up with limestone.. June 5. FELOMINO ORBISO. Daan Bantayan. testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750 meters (Km. No improvement was ever made on this road whether during the year when he gave his statement to the NBI (1978) or in previous years. The testimonies of these barangay captains and residents are summarized as follows: [30] 1. (TSN. He described the road as full of potholes. [31] 2. [32] 3. 122. testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway. June 5. reports of inspection. 123 to 125). 134 . from 1972 to 1981. stretching from Km. stretching from Km. Cebu.14-19.. or a distance of 2 kilometers. MACARIO LIMALIMA. Km. Medellin. reports of inspection. 125 to Km. (TSN. and other supporting documentswhich became the basis for payment to supplierspublic funds were released via general vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs. 6-14. 1986). He described the road as a rough or dirt road.On the part of petitioners. and other related documents which became part of the supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public funds. 127. Cebu. requests for supplies and materials. He described the portion of the highway . 1986). As a result of petitioners signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts. they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts. Barangay Captain of Paypay. Cebu. Barangay Captain of Cawit. Except for filling up these potholes with anapog or crushed limestone. pp. Medellin.

58). ALBERTO BRANSUELA. except for the time when the potholes were filled up with crushed limestones. from 1966 to 1982. the road was maintained by filling up the potholes with crushed limestone or anapog. from 1977 to 1982. 48-56. as alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. the real problem was the uneven . In 1977.. (TSN. June 5. CARIDAD PUNLA. testified that her barangay is traversed by the national highway. 1986). testified that the Poblacion of Catmon is traversed by the national highway. Acting Barangay Captain of Barangay Corazon. LUCIA PEAFLOR. San Remigio. there were potholes which the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the roadside. Prior to that.as a rough road with potholes. Barangay Captain of Tapilon. a distance of more than 3 kilometers. Barangay Captain of Don Pedro. REMEDIOS FELICANO. 103 to Km. These potholes started to appear between January and June of 1977. pp. 105 . She described said portion of the national highway as stoney.. It even took the camineros three months from the time the limestones were delivered to start working on the road. 28-46. Cebu.57-67. 130 to Km. testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway.However. these potholes were filled up only from January to June. (TSN. or a distance of 4 kilometers. 1978. 1986).. 109 to Km. MARCELO CONEJOS. 1986). 1986). stretching from Km. 57 to Km. stretching from Km. Catmon. (TSN. testified that barangay San Jose is traversed by the national highway (Km. (TSN. said portion of the national highway was in bad condition and that nothing was done to improve it until 1982. It was only in 1984 or 1985 when this portion of the national highway was asphalted. Bogo. [33] 4. [36] 7. II-1-d). and from the boundary to Daan Bantayan. pp. [35] 6. stretching from Km. 69-80). pp. a resident of Barangay San Jose. 58. from 1974 to 1978.. Cebu. He stated that while this portion of the national highway was already asphalted as of 1977. June 5. 134. covering a distance of kilometer more or less. June 5. While said portion of the national highway already had cracks and potholes as of 1977. June 5.. June 5. He stated that the only improvement done on this road was the filling up of the potholes with anapog or crushed limestone and this was done only once in 1977. Daan Bantayan. 20-26. Catmon. In 1977. stretching form Km. from 1972 to 1982. Cebu from 1977 to 1982. testified that her barangay is traversed by the national highway. only more than of this portion of the national highway was cemented while the remaining portion was asphalted. (TSN. Barangay Captain of Looc. Cebu. pp. 110.[34] 5. The only maintenance work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside.[37] 8. pp. up to the boundary of San Remigio. 1986).

107 to Km. the potholes were filled up by camineros with gravel delivered by dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. FELIPE MOLIT.[39] 10.. camineros worked on the road. 90-99. 108 was a gravel road.[40] 11. the said road already had potholes which maintenance men filled up with anapog beginning in March. 81-89. In 1977. but with potholes. Cebu. except for the work done by the camineros who covered up the potholes. Cebu. this portion of the national highway was a rough road with potholes. Sugud. testified that barangay Bao was traversed by the national highway. pp. 1977. x x x (TSN. San Remigio. 60 1/2. In 1977. In 1977. He described said portion of the national highway as a gravel road surfaced with anapog. from Km. It was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. pp. and every time potholes appeared on the road. Cebu. the road from Km. who testified that he saw the asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from . they would be filled-up with anapog. pp. Barangay Captain of Barangay Argawanon. 110. PEDRO ORSAL.elevation of the surface of the shoulder of the road. the road leading to the heart of the poblacion was asphalted. 1986). 1986). The anapog was hauled in from Km.. pp. June 6. Clearly. June 5. using wheelbarrows. from 1972 to 1980. LEONARDO PINOTE. or a distance of three kilometers more or less. No general repair was undertaken by the authorities to correct the uneven elevation.. testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway. [38] 9. Barangay Captain of Poblacion. stretching from Km. 1986).36-45. 64. In 1977. pitching up the potholes with anapog. While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio Tudlasan of Tabuclan. It was properly maintained by the highways people. 59 to Km. 107 to Km. On the other hand. there were no deliveries of supplies and materials for asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets and other supporting documents signed by petitioners. This material was dumped along the road by trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. Barangay Captain of Bao. 29-35. June 6. the usual excavation place of anapog. 1986). (TSN. (TSN. June 5. testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway covering a distance of kilometers more or less. Cebu. (TSN. San Remigio. In the same year. It took only 3 truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length of the 1 kilometers traversing their barangay. from 1975 to 1982. from January 1972 to 1980.[41] The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of Cebu whose respective barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual major repair works undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by crushed limestone (anapog). shovels and rakes..

Moreover. that her barangay is traversed by the national highway. On the other hand. from km. hence.kilometers 18 to 19. and Delia Comahig Preagido. 110.924. Cebu and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion. which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos. Senior National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of the COA NBI team assigned to investigate the anomalies. and that it was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. as Tudlasan was not present at the time of alleged delivery.150. [42] The Cebu First Highway Engineering District had also issued checks per unrecorded reports in . Mamaril. 107 to km. Undeniably.Cebu. San Remigio. they would be filled-up with anapog. Orsal testified that he was Barangay Captain of Poblacion. and that the only work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. said testimony is not conclusive on the actual delivery of the supplies indicated in the tally sheets. Cebu. 2856. and 2859. 109 to km. The testimonies of Feliciano and Orsal are further buttressed by the findings and statements of government witnesses. and every time potholes appeared on the road.50. Malvar. MPH. Supervising Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor assigned to Region VII. Region VIIto the effect that the general vouchers and LAAs that corresponded to the aforementioned tally sheets signed by petitioner Torrevillas were fake or falsified. that his barangay is traversed by the national highway. from January 1972 to 1980. Accountant III. namelyRuth Inting Paredes. Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. Feliciano testified that she was Barangay Captain of Looc. and are more credible considering the fact that they are residents of the area where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that they saw only limestone. Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the main COA office. 107 to km. stretching from km. 2855. 2858. the testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are entitled to more weight and credit. Rogelio C. Cebu from 1977 to 1982. that was used in the repair of the road in 1977. the government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against petitioner Torrevillas and. Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud and Action Section. which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of Public Highways. had fake LAAs totaling to PhP 4. his testimony runs counter to the testimonies of Barangay Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc.271. San Remigio. Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan. Felicitas Cruz Ona. credible. San Remigio. San Remigio. not asphalt. We conclude that there were no actual deliveries of supplies for asphalting of road and repair on kilometers 108 and 109. 108 was a gravel road maintained by the highways people.366. that in 1977. while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings issued amounted to PhP 6. 110. the road from km. to which petitioners were assigned. Federico A.

These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. at the time of the commission of the crime.693. Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2932). 2879. 2919).the total sum of PhP 1. Nuez (Criminal Case Nos.000.82. 2855. and 2914) and Ismael Sabio.[48] These documents signed by petitioner Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers. 2885. Jr.[49] These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine LAAs.01. which were the subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners were charged. [45] These tally sheets were attached as the supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers. Jr.861. and other pertinent documents totaling an even greater amount of PhP 337.There is no question that petitioners. requisitions of supplies and equipment. 2914 where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused.[43] Therefore. the total illegal disbursements in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District alone were a staggering PhP 12. there were no actual deliveries of supplies and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII. and 2914). (Criminal Case No. These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V.000 in Criminal Case No. 2858. petitioner Fernan.[46] On his part. Of this total. 2914 where petitioner Fernan. were public officerscivil engineersassigned to the MPH. reports of inspection. [47] including PhP 27. freely admitted signing tally sheets which pertained to non-existent deliveries of road construction supplies and materials totaling PhP 146. Jr.000 in Criminal Case No. was among the coaccused. . 2918).32 circa 1977. 2880.330. 2856. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents were present. and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No. especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements contained in them.[44] including PhP 27. Their signing of tally sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions. petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing tally sheets. 2909. 2910. Ismael Sabio. and 2859). Ergo. Jr. (Criminal Case No.135.176. 2881.

Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146. 1. petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which the court a quocould have readily granted. there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners guilt.The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the petitioners had the duty to verify and confirm.1. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers. Jr. as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. and PhP 337. then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the production of said documents. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact. These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the government. By way of defense.000 in the case of Fernan. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses. In doing so. We hesitate to give much weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear. Indubitably. However. It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove it. as follows: 1. 2. these genuine LAAs were not introduced in evidence. Petitioners assertion that the documents they signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies. petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI. The inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of evidence proved disastrous to petitioners . The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are present in the cases against petitioners.01 in the case of Torrevillas. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan. convincing. and 1. Jr. and they firmly believed that the documents were indeed in the custody of the NBI.3. If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense. and hard evidence adduced by the State. Unfortunately. overwhelming. petitioners: 1.861.2.

[50] In Estrada v. the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Pagalasan. however. though apparently independent of each other. showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). Indeed. the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy. namely: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy. Sandiganbayan. indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to .[51] We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the wheel conspiracy. connected and cooperative. In People v. secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when it made the finding that they were co-conspirators with the other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity. in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler. the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary: After all. and (2) the chain conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.cause. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object. and then retailer and consumer. settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. during and after the commission of the crime. we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies. usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before. We are not convinced by petitioners postulation. each doing a part so that their combined acts. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. Their conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense evidence. then wholesaler and retailer. were in fact. he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Considering.

thus: Mangubat enticed Preagido. Delia Preagido (Accountant III). journal vouchers and general journal through negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. Thus the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790). To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments. as appearing in the trial balance. In the initial report of COA auditors Victoria C. would not show the irregularity. adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. however. who controlled the separate spokes of the conspiracy. account 8-81-400 (sic) and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling. [52] The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. were actually issued. in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused. the Court finds that the same pattern of . These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of fake LAAs. We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A. They typed fake LAAs during Saturdays. Del Rosario. Preagido manipulated the general ledger. Paredes it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations: The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic) recorded in the books of accounts. Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner). Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel. hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity. allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents. Quejada and Ruth I. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant). The checks. xxxx 3. Cebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated obligations (Account 881-400). and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II). Chairperson of the Third Division.defraud the government were controlled by a single hub. Other government employees. although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81400) at the end of the preceding year. Cruz and Sayson to join him. tempted by the prospect of earning big money.

FBS Marketing 3 Lumber Cebu Hollow 2 Hollow Amount P1. 1977.692. Iluminada 11 Item 108 8.160.00 433.fraud employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed.00. an additional amount of P3. It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 81-400.839.275 mt J.Furthermore.694.677. This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs).00 123. the list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from February to May. 1977. of Kind of Measure Vouch Materials ment ers Rufino Nuez 29 Item 310 4.00.325 Vega cu. But apart from this. the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4.04 for the period January 1. amounting to P5.960.m.500.680. Ismael Sabio. they were not properly funded.610.812.00 70.290 Angeles cu. These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754.m.000.640.76 which however. with expenditures amounting to P613. 6 Item 108 6.00 191. However. 1977. 1977 to December 31. delos 21 Item 108 22. was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH. Florencio 10 Item 108 7.800 Gacayan cu.00 156.m. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4.504.00. could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO THE Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office.198 Jr.374. and these were all completed within the period from November to December. cu.74. The following payments for materials purchased for the year 1977 were made to appear as payment for prior years obligation and were paid out of fake LAAs: Supplier No.135 .300. obviously because.336. the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140.810.880.00 .m.734.00 19. On the other hand.

P529.00 128.m.392. also of Region VII. Paints Office Supplies 40. Santrade Mktg.90 8.66 3. 5. 4 1 1 1 1 1 Blocks Equip.00 The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of materials in 1977 that were charged to current obligations but paid out of spurious LAAs.80 Total P1. emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs. 3 Measure ment Amount 162.505.339. Rental Office Supplies Johnson Products Item 108 29.000 cu.00 cu.810. 5 Jr.736.m.m.764. 307 cu.0 0 24.00 49. Regional Highway Engineer. 3.00 48.m.74 Grand Total . Pelagia Gomez M & M Ent.580.000. to wit: Supplier Rufino Nuez No.0 0 P276.20 Total P2.00 7. Eustaquio Ent.549 m.00 7.950 cu.000. 1.m.475.t.090. P3.600 cu.400.400.14 7.839.461.74 A total of 132 General Vouchers.74 6.00 72.90 2. were traced back to Rolando Mangubat.R.m. of Kind of Vouch Materials ers 11 Item 310 Item 108 Juliana delos 16 Angeles Item 108 Item 111 Item 200 Iluminada Vega Florencio Gacayan Vicon Ent.000 cu.280 cu.Blocks Bienvenido Presillas T. Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez. 2.982.m. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the . 3 Item 108 2 Item 108 1 Steel Frame Item 108 Ismael Sabio.00 19.20 590.000. Jabcyl Mktg.00 cu.042. 13.m.000. Freent Ind. Bridge Materials 139.

810. Supervising COA Auditor. the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks. Without such fabricated documents. the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused. Once the Request for Supplies and Equipment is approved by the Regional Office. would border on near impossibility. the Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is signed by the District Engineer pursuant to the approved plans and budget and signed by the district accountant as to availability of funds. State witness Ruth Paredes. The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them. did not show any improvement (Exhibit II).839. reports of inspection. .810. who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. it will accord finality to the findings of facts of the SB.839. headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. in many cases. The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration. Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications. [53] After a close re-examination of the records.839.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED.74. In the case at bench. The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other accused. as found out by the NBI. and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. As testified to by several barangay captains.810. through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED. Obviously. for such requirement. elaborated on the procedure regarding the award of the contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier. the roads and bridges in the district.74. the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national Highway. the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3. Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3.disbursement of funds amounting to P3. the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts.

b.The check is countersigned by an officer of the district office and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the check. e.Upon delivery of the supplies and materials. Jr. Thus. the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon which check payments were made to the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the fraud. As a result. he signed tally sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio. After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the supporting documents.Surely. With respect to petitioner Fernan.. if there were actual deliveries of materials made.The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the lowest bidder. it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts. and The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier. The ROA. petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Moreover. Without the general voucher. officials. Jr. there is nothing or not much to share with the more than 30 or so co-conspirators. Juliana de los Angeles. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets. Without the check payment. the checks issued to these suppliers based on general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general vouchers signed by petitioners . The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations. the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be accompanied by the following documents: a. and residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly used. Nuez. he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V. c. the supplier bills the district office for payment. the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Consequently. and Manuel Mascardo. Jr. On the part of petitioner Torrevillas. the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Ismael Sabio. d. More importantly. then there would be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit. Thus. there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay captains. Lastly. The Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. the disbursing officer shall prepare and draw a check based on said voucher. for the suppliers would not be too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly supplied. the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated.. The PO.

G. resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs were unauthorized. NACHURA. TAN YNARES-SANTIAGO.versus - SPOUSES PERFECTO C.cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs. and REYES. the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the offense. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. fake or fabricated. which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents. the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the accused including petitioners. hence. we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4. Mangubat. No costs. No. But when each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy. JJ. SO ORDERED. .R. by individually performing essential overt acts. so much so that the common objective is attained. SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN Petitioner. 168852 Present: . These are undisputed telltale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.. CHICO-NAZARIO. 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated criminal cases subject of this petition. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained. WHEREFORE. the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant manner: Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one of them would prevent the chain from being completed. Chairperson. J. [54] In sum. once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven. In People v. then no conspiracy could result as its consummation would then be impossible or aborted. then each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as coprincipals under the well-established and universally-accepted principle that.

being the parents-in-law of the petitioner. paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4). 9262 under the well-known rule of law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.Quezon City in Civil Case No. No. were causing verbal.[13] . On February 7. 2005.A. psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5. 2005. in conspiracy with respondents.A. On February 28. J.[8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. Tan and Juanita L.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7. the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.* September 30. (h)(5). TAN. The factual background of the case: On April 18. as parents-in-law of the petitioner.[10] contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. they were not included/covered as respondents under R. the RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that. respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition. 2008 x----------------------------------------------------------x DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) [6] against Steven and her parents-in-law. they were not covered by R. Tan (Steven) were married. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence. 2005. She alleged that Steven.and JUANITA L. barely six years into the marriage. two female children were born. 2005. Branch 94.A. and (i) [7] of Republic Act (R.) No. 9262. 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen Denise.A. 9262. On March 7. 2005. On January 25. 1999.[3] Out of this union. No. Promulgated: Respondents. petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution[2] dated July 11.[5]On January 12. 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. Spouses Perfecto C. Sharica Mari L.

and in repeatedly abusing her verbally. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law. PARENTSIN-LAW OF SHARICA. emotionally. The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. to wit: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA.A. Hence. 2005. MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER. harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home.A. No. No.[17] Petitioner contends that R. that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review. the present petition on a pure question of law. accordingly. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R. that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case. 9262. No. the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage. or a dating or sexual relationship.A. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R. 2005. No. 9262. a former marriage. 9262. that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support.A. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and.A. respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R. No. the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. . 2005. mentally and physically. 9262. No. petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration [14] contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process. On the other hand.A. since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal.A. No.A. respondents submit that they are not covered by R. that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties.On March 16. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R. No. On April 8. On July 11. considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.

Indeed.A. because said words were . In People v. noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws. Chowdury. shall have suppletory application.For purposes of this Act. unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. Section 47 of R. While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage. battery.[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. former marriage. accomplices and accessories under R. assault. (Emphasis supplied) Parenthetically. No. . within or without the family abode. considering the lack of similar rules under the special law. No. harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. former wife. 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words principal. or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.A.A. thus: SEC. in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. psychological harm or suffering.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife. No. 9262. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Suppletory Application. or economic abuse including threats of such acts. No. which result in or is likely to result in physical.Section 3 of R. or a sexual or dating relationship. it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. sexual. 6425. 8042. in People v. Moreno. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws. Li Wai Cheung. such as R. 10.A. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. In People v. coercion. legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17. (Emphasis supplied) Hence. Article 10 of the RPC provides: ART. or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate. 47. 3992.[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. Thus. or with whom he has a common child.

) Blg. but not be limited to. therefore. With more reason. 5. Blg. (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child. (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will.A. Thus. No. No. general provisions of the RPC. Thus. since all the conspirators are principals.[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B. knowing. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.P. .[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B. may be applied suppletorily. In Yu v. . 9262. People. People. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: xxx (h) Engaging in purposeful. the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.not defined therein. are necessarily applicable. and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. which by their nature. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R. otherwise known as the BouncingChecks Law. the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R. the following acts: (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown. No. thus: SEC. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another. 22.P.A. personally or through another. Most recently.A. noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law. in Ladonga v.[23] It must be further noted that Section 5 of R. although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. This shall include. that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. or reckless conduct.

It must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law.A. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. . contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner. directly or indirectly. 8. annoying. No. (Emphasis supplied) In addition. Protection Orders. thus: SEC. In the present case.A. and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent. (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing. some or all of the following reliefs: of (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing.(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child. No.[25] The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal. However. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Finally. (Emphasis supplied) It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law [24] and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. Construction.[26] It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition . 4. contrary to the RTC's pronouncement. x x x.This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. Neither is it conclusive. Thus. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any.the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children. psychological and economic abuses upon her. Section 4 of R. personally or through another. It is not of universal application. thus: SEC. meaning and spirit . the express language of R. conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. telephoning. the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. the protection order that may be issued for the purpose preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband. any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act.

CONTRARY to Art. 7659. the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. vs. 1995 of the Regional Trial Court. Branch 44. 9262. Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R. accused-appellant.00 as actual damages. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity. SO ORDERED. Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 2005 of the Regional Trial Court. with intent to kill. treachery and evident premeditation. FEDERICO ABRAZALDO @ PEDING. 9262.000. No. Quezon City in Civil Case No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 248.000. province of Pangasinan. the instant petition is GRANTED. unlawfully and feloniously stabbed DELFIN GUBAN Y GUINTO inflicting upon him a stab wound which caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned. plus costs. 1995 in the evening at barangay Pogo.00 as indemnity and P27. 1995 filed with the trial court. accusedappellant was charged with the crime of murder committed as follows: That on or about July 15. 2005 and July 11. as amended by R. [2] . WHEREFORE.A. then and there wilfully. J. plaintiff-appellee. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the above-named accused armed with a bolo. Revised Penal Code.A. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits. 95-01052-D.under R. Branch 94. Municipality of Mangaldan.A. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7. finding accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the amount of P50. In the Information dated August 3. did.: For automatic review is the Decision [1] dated November 15. No. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.

On July 16.[11] for the 9th day novena. Fajardo learned that the knife used by accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in Salay. For the burial. Marites Abrazaldo. Get out Feding I will kill you! [16] When accused-appellant went out. [9] Gregorio Guban. In the course thereof. rushed Guban to the Gov. stabbed Guban at the abdomen [7] and ran away. accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled face to face. now armed with a knife. SPO1 Ramie Petrache. but instead. he spent P10. 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening. at Barangay Pogo.000.000. I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo. Fajardo went to the house of Francisca Velasquez. P4. 1995. When Fajardo got hold of Guban. Mangaldan. accused-appellant.000. trial on the merits ensued. Sr.00. then intoxicated. [15] His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane. [4] attempted to hack his uncle. prompting Delfin Guban. Together with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez. the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp.[12] and for the hospitalization. epigastrium.[13] or a total of P27. Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod). Guban tried to assist accused-appellant. a Medical Officer III.000. 1995. The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution witnesses are as follows: On July 15. However. Guban hit him with an iron pipe.. the victims father. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Rosendo Fajardo. I will kill you! Thereafter. Guban died.00. Guban. But after a few hours. he saw accusedappellant coming out of Quintos house with blood oozing from his forehead.[8] Fajardo. Upon reaching the place. Pangasinan. Accused-appellant and his sister. and recovered the knife. took the witness stand for the defense. saying. Accused-appellant ran towards his house and got his two children. the latter said. Alberto Gonzales and Gregorio Guban.Upon arraignment. Dr. Mangaldan. testified that he was the one who spent for his sons funeral expenses. went to his house and shouted at him. Pangasinan. together with the other barangay tanod. On July 15.00. [6] At that time. accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.00. Dr. and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene.00. Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his uncle. Melvin and Christelle were with him. who was then drunk.[10] for the 10-day funeral wake. Pangasinan. [3] Forthwith. he was making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo. [14] Invoking self-defense. hit the post of the latters house. Accused-appellant pulled out his knife. SP02 Roberto Fernandez. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was stab wound. massive hemothorax right. both fell . at about 10:00 oclock in the evening. Rosendo Fajardo. P3. Alberto Gonzales. accused-appellant presented a different version. Suddenly. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated by Dr.000. for unknown reason. Bernabe Quinto.P10. Delfin Guban. [5] The incident was reported to the barangay authorities. followed him and they grappled for its possession. accused-appellants aunt.

The prosecutions evidence is wanting on this point.00 as actual expenses. Accused is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the total sum ofP27.[20] At about 10:00 oclock in that evening. [21] He attempted to hack his uncle. accused Federico Abrazaldo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death. there is no question that there was treachery as the accused embraced Delfin Guban and suddenly stabbed him with a knife. he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police. namely: . 1995.down. Bernabe Quinto. 1992.[23] Afterwards.[25] Revised Penal Code. Accused Federico Abrazaldo is ordered to pay an indemnity of P50. the Court finds accused Federico Abrazaldo @ Peding guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. which aggravating circumstances are not offset by any mitigating circumstance. as amended by Republic 7659. Treachery.000. the trial court rendered a Decision. Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a drinking spree. The victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack. the members of the barangay tanod. premises considered. accused-appellant. 1995. He was given no chance to defend himself.00 to the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban. Thereafter. SO ORDERED. [22] While running away from his uncles place. Accusedappellant did not know which part of Gubans body was hit. but instead hit the post of the latters house. However. In appreciating treachery and the aggravating circumstances under paragraphs (5) and (6) of Article 14. [19] On July 15. he bumped an artesian well. and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed while the public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties and that the crime was committed at nighttime. causing a wound on his forehead. therefore. the trial court held: We now come to the issue of whether or not evident premeditation was present. qualifies the killing of the victim and raises it to the category of murder.[17] It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit him. The prosecution has established thru the testimony of Gregorio Guban that at the time of the incident on July 15. accusedappellant caused trouble at the house of his uncle. at about 6:00 in the evening.000. plus costs. The deceased was stabbed without any warning. [18] Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his brother. the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. accused-appellant killed Guban. [24] On November 15.

. This is an aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5. in his Appellants Brief. III THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY EXTRACTED BY THE PROSECUTION FROM DEFENSE WITNESS MARITESS ABRAZALDO WHICH HAD NO SUFFICIENT BASIS AT ALL. Besides. (See p. that was 10:00 in the evening. Accused took advantage of the darkness of the night for the successful consummation of his plan to kill Delfin Guban. 1995). Sr. II THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RECOVERY OF THE ALLEGED WEAPON USED IN STABBING VICTIM AT THE HOUSE OF THE AUNT OF ACCUSED BOLSTERED THE CASE AGAINST HIM DESPITE LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS VERACITY. VI . 6 tsn September 18. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.Rosendo Fajardo. The members of the barangay tanod who are public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties at the time of the stabbing incident. ascribes to the trial court the following errors: I THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF SELFDEFENSE BY THE ACCUSED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE. IV THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE STABBING OF THE VICTIM WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS TO PROVE THE SAME. the incident was committed during nighttime. Accused-appellant. Delfin Guban and Alfredo Laceste were performing their duties as members of the barangay tanod. V THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF NIGHTTIME IN CONSUMING THE ACT.

under par. therefore. he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. To show that he was not the unlawful aggressor. was clearly established because during the incident. Revised Penal Code. Likewise. Guban. thus: ATTY. CAMPOS: xxxxxx Q You said a while ago that on July 15. was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order. 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening you were in your house engaging in fan making. he testified that it was Guban who went to his house. threatened to kill him. [26] Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. accused-appellants version of the incident is completely contradicted by the testimony of his sister. accused-appellant admitted he killed the victim and. and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression. On appeal. Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked. in the Appellees Brief. Thus. the Solicitor General is convinced that accused-appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the crime. asserts that in pleading selfdefense.[28] and attacked him with a knife. the assault was not sudden. the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must show that the court below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence. The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant that there was no treachery. Q And what did Delfin Guban shout at you? . Also.[29] We quote accused-appellants testimony. it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor. (5) of Article 14. Evidence shows that he and Guban shouted at each other and struggled face to face before the stabbing incident. sir. [27] hit him with an iron pipe.THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY. Moreover.(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. do you know of any unusual incident that happened during that time? A Delfin Guban came to my house and he was under the influence of liquor and he shouted at me. the aggravating circumstance. as the Assistant Chief Tanod. The Solicitor General.

Q When Delfin Guban followed you inside your house. who was holding a knife. accused-appellants own sister and lone witness. [32] In the present . x x x. attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and killed Guban. Get out Feding I will kill you. I was already there infront of the house then he hit me. what happened next? A I ran towards my house inside. she virtually affirmed the prosecutions story by testifying that he created trouble in their compound. Q After this Delfin Guban shouted at you. sir. sir.[30] (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but also isolation. sir. Instead of fortifying her brothers defense. what happened next? A When I went out of the house. Marites declared that accused-appellant sustained the wound on his forehead when he accidentally bumped an artesian well. Q When you grappled with Delfin Guban.A He said. It is uncorroborated and even opposed by Marites. Contrary to his testimony that Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe. then got my two children while Delfin Guban followed me inside my house. what happened again? A He was holding a knife and we grappled and during that time both of us fell down. what again happened? A We grappled for the possession of the knife then we fell down and the knife he was then holding pointed towards him and hit him. sir. [31] Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful. xxxxxx Q After Delfin Guban hit you with that pipe. what instrument did he use in hitting you? A He hit me with a pipe . Q You said Delfin Guban hit you.

Standing alone against the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. [35] In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself. We hold that his guilt has been established to a degree of moral certainty.case. induced only by necessity. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means. we cannot but cast a quizzical glance on accusedappellants uncorroborated testimony. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. [33] Indeed. It bears emphasis that Fajardos testimony clearly points to him as the culprit. without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended party might make.. This shows ambivalence. The trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of Fajardo. the justifying circumstance of self-defense[34] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. Treachery cannot be presumed. methods or forms in the execution thereof. [38] As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to divulge the truth on his demise had been lost. his natural course of action was to assist the victim. while self-defense presumes voluntariness. an eyewitness. we find that the trial court erred in concluding that treachery attended the commission of the crime. [39] However.e. Time and again. instead. or at the very least. it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as . Accused-appellant cannot invoke these alleged weaknesses in view of the principle that one who pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life. I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo. that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and. accused-appellant assails Fajardos testimony as tainted with inconsistencies and is contrary to the normal course.[37] Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him. indicates his culpability of the crime charged. Certainly. when such testimony was contradicted by his own witness who happened to be his sister. stabbed Guban [36] and ran away. it is still credible considering accused-appellants admission that he killed the victim. accused-appellants own account of the killing must necessarily fail. report the incident to the authorities. if there is truth to either of his claim. we have said that we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.Even if the prosecutions evidence is weak. Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim. Not only did he pull out his knife. he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. i. accused-appellants tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony dubious. More so. Furthermore.

Q What were they shouting against another? A I could no longer understand because it was already night. We quote in verbatim the testimony of Fajardo. In this scenario. CAMPOS: Q They were not then fighting? A They were grappling with each other and then he stabbed Delfin Guban. they were shouting each other? A Yes.conclusively as the killing itself. xxxxxx Q In fact. is present. [43] In this case. Revised Penal Code. it cannot be said that Guban was unprepared to put up a defense.[40] (Emphasis supplied) The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. or that the latters assault was sudden. they were shouting at each other. It must be pointed out that this aggravating circumstance is based on the greater perversity of the offender. i. such as hitting accused-appellant. as shown by the place of the commission of the crime.. the crime was committed at the compound of the accused-appellant where no public function was being held. which must be respected. Q But they were shouting loudly. [41] In the instant case.e. By and itself. thus: ATTY. no sufficient evidence was offered to prove that accused-appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal design. The arrival of the barangay authorities was precisely due to . am I correct? A Yes and there were many people. it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the offender. sir. that the crime was committed in a place where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties. For nocturnity to be properly appreciated. Fajardo testified that there was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminating the scene of the crime. In fact. Fajardo testified that accused-appellant and Guban were grappling with each other and that prior to the stabbing. nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance.[42] Neither can we sustain the trial courts finding that the aggravating circumstance under paragraph (5) of Article 14.

This makes temperate damages equal to the award of exemplary damages. In the absence of any circumstance that would qualify the crime at bar to murder.00. [50] Thus. Considering that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period. who shouldered the expenses for the wake and burial failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such expenses. the other aggravating circumstances mentioned have not been alleged in the Information. WHEREFORE. Being favorable to the accused. but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto. we now hold that where the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same. the minimum of which is within the range of prision mayor. but by way of temperate damages. Accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and 1 day of prision mayor. the said aggravating circumstance cannot be considered.[45] Except treachery. or P25. temperate damages may be awarded.[48] Gregorio Guban. premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. as minimum. Moreover. [44] aggravating circumstances must be alleged. they cannot be appreciated. as the heirs of Guban did actually incur funeral expenses.00. ranging from 14 years.000.[49] However. [47] In the case at bar.000.00. 95-01052-D is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. as . should be one-half thereof. or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. To be entitled to such damages. accused-appellant can only be held liable for homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.000. taking into account the current jurisprudence fixing the indemnity for death at P 50.the trouble that had commenced prior to the stabbing incident. we find the same to be unsubstantiated. the father of the victim. the penalty has to be imposed in its medium period. he should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty. not for purposes of indemnification. which is 14 years. [46] On the trial courts award of actual damages in the amount of P27. The maximum thereof is within the range ofreclusion temporal in its medium period. this new procedure may be given retroactive effect. the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for expenses incurred. 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.00. we are justified in awarding P25.000. under the present Rules.00 in cases where its award is justified. 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Such temperate damages. otherwise. Clearly.000. it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty. the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. which is likewise fixed at P25. to fourteen (14) years. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal.

4 According to the prosecution.000. G. who.00 as indemnity and P25. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face. with intent to kill and with the use of an unlicensed firearm. DECISION PERALTA. petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head.R. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 2014 SHERWIN DELA CRUZ. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L.Ayala Avenue.000. 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals. At the last second. Costs de oficio. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center. by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch. When petitioner was already inside the building. 189405 November 19. with his back towards the aisle. unlawfully and feloniously attack. Petitioner. at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. 89257.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back. CV No. Respondents. in behalf of his deceased brother. the abovenamed accused. JEFFREY WERNHER L. pulled the trigger four (4) times. and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. in the City of Makati.maximum. which alleged: That on or about the 1st day of January 2005. he went to the work station of the deceased victim. GONZALES. assault and shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head. No. petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. J. CONTRARY TO LAW. in CA-G. was seated fronting his computer terminal. Makati City.R. the fourth shot finally . seeking to annul and set aside the May 7. did then and there wilfully. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Delfin Guban P50. thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death. 2005. Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun. on January 1. Jeffrey Wernher L. SO ORDERED. 2005. 2009 Resolution 2 denying his motion for reconsideration. Gonzales (Jeffrey). vs. and its August 19.00 as temperate damages. GONZALES. finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information 3 dated March 2.

the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin. hence. aimed and was about to smash the same on petitioner’s head. petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. after shooting Jeffrey. petitioner underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the deceased-victim. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his wife’s table. a security guard manning the entrance once again frisked petitioner and. more or less. likewise. "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered. Finally. Again.While grappling. However. 2005. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene.However. Jeffrey. to fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. he was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. petitioner fled the office. Then. The gun. however. Seeing imminent danger to his life. as Darlene was then not on her table. The defense recounted a different version of the facts. Acting instinctively. Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher. the gun did not fire. did not fire. the workplace of his wife. found no gun in his possession. Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further confrontation with the latter. . eventually killing him. the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey. petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was."The response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!" Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey. Before entering the Robinson’s Summit Building. Jeffrey curtly told him.D. While in the act of parrying. at around 2:30 in the afternoon.petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun. Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building. which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die. went to Sykes Asia. Petitioner claimed that on January1. petitioner. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his possession. together with his children. Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and shouted. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. petitioner approached a certain man and asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene.discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead. "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then. Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I. Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene).

and to pay the costs. the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag). 2007. his brother. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gonzales). After said incident. 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded. Branch 147. 2007. respectively. pretrial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter. petitioner. Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. During his arraignment. "Sherwin anong nangyari?". The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads: WHEREFORE. dated January 30. On February 26. petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). 2005. Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag. Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant . petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. he heard Darlene shout. but he was not able to answer.00 plus moral damages in the amount of P1 Million. pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the elevator. SO ORDERED. who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the defense. sent by his friend. the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City. to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of P50. Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children. the defense presented aswitnesses. while private respondent. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary evidence to support its claim. On his way to the elevator. Simeon Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz). filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11. we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. with the assistance of counsel. rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). petitioner himself. Thereafter. However.6 On March 28. on August 22.000. the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the civil liability of petitioner. During the trial of the case. through the private prosecutor. For its part. After the denial of their motion for reconsideration. and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum. the fallo thereof reads: WHEREFORE. 2005.

71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.00 as temperate damages. (3) the amount of P25.022. ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.641. (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression. the present petition. (2) the amount of P50. 3. and (3) lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 4. The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE.8 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 9 There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE. (5) to pay the costs of the litigation.00 as civil indemnity. Raised are the following issues for resolution: 1.000. 10 In other words. (4) the amount of P3. 5. Jeffrey. SO ORDERED.000. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED. 2.Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50. Hence. What is leftfor determination by this Court is whether the elements of selfdefenseexist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide. who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.000. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED VICTIM. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.11 . there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused.00 as moral damages.

Hence. both gave the . he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it.15 There is aggression. Pateo. it is well settled thatwhen he invokes the same. wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. After petitioner had successfully seized it. that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life. thus: In this case. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim. Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut he parried it with his hand holding the gun. It presupposes actual. retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs. the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident. other than petitioner’s testimony. the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore. against him. 13 As such. otherwise. As aptly observed by the RTC. First. there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.17 In the case at bar.14 Measured against this criteria. it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.1avvphi1 Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. Tagana. the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached. only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. 424 SCRA 620). the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor. the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard. Jeffrey. danger may have in fact existed. 430 SCRA 609). petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so. sudden. his petition must be denied.12 The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.In contrast. 16 The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual. not merely speculative. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases. there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. even if the prosecution evidence is weak.Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability. guard". and therefore. even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim. then took the fire extinguisher.

when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril. what happened after that. Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it? A: Probably 10 to 12 feet. Q: Going back to your story. the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down. 19 To be sure. Q: And then what happened? A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun. they started to struggle. Ms. Agoot: Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side? Atty. a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness. Ms.impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the accused who was then already in possession of the gun. we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the head of Jeff. pp. will show that if there was unlawful aggression in the instant case. 17. witness already answered that. 12-14) CROSSEXAMINATION: Atty.20 Undoubtedly. Mariano: Q: Can you relate to the Court. (TSN. More. 18 Thus. the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists. atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey. Oct. Mariano: Objection. Pelaez. Witness. . your Honor. there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender. if any? A: After they struggled. thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION Atty. Witness. 2005. even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased. you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun. how did this incident happen? A: We were still at work. the same rather emanated from petitioner. Q: And who was holding the gun? A: Sherwin was holding the gun. petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive.

on more thanone occasion. ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself. COURT You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No. 22 In addition.Atty. 17. Atty. Sir. We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioner’s head. 26-27)21 Clearly. to wit: Atty. petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey. Oct. it pales incomparison and loses probative value. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that. pp. the question is. your Honor. other than petitioner’s testimony. Agoot He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him? A: Yes. the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun. Managbanag and Pelaez. You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey? A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey. Agoot Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was holding the gun already? Witness: A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this. . (TSN. Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses. the latter pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot him. I saw him point the gun at the back of Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means… COURT No. Agoot: I am on cross examination. there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We have. as I said. Alternatively. is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. a deadly weapon. 2005.

sir. Atty. Mariano: Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire extinguisher. They were pushing each other. Agoot Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you affirmand confirm this statement? Witness A: Yes. Agoot Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who was in possession of the gun? Witness A: Yes. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher. how many times did the gun click without firing? Witness . Witness: The left hand would support the weight basically. Atty. Atty. sir. Agoot Q: You said that the gun clicked. Atty. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time. Agoot Q: And then after that there was again a grappling? Witness A: No more grappling for possession. Atty.COURT For the record.

sir. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim. the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack. 12-17. Obordo: 24 Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. which he sought to avert. cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence. accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. therefore. devoid of merit. TSN dated 04 September 2006. Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case. therefore. Atty. Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying . pp.A: Three (3) times. As held by the Court in People v. emphasis supplied) 23 Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is. Agoot Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher? Witness A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. Atty. Jeffrey. So I clearly saw what was going on at that time. heused that to push against the person… Witness A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at him. Agoot Q: Using the fire extinguisher. (Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Atty. the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and. Second. Agoot Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire? Witness A: They were still pushing each other at that time.

as alleged by accused-appellant himself. but four times. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that. specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. 440 SCRA 695). with a fire extinguisher. 2005). and inthe end. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. The opposite was. accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. 12. He could have also immediately sought help from the people around him. 26 If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him. if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. not merely imaginary (Senoja v.. despite any obstruction. Thus: Moreover. he could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so. employed by petitioner. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th . so to speak. The gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. and the accused were pushing each other. 2005). The discharge of the gun which led to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the possession of the gun. It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression. October 17. petitioner never did any of that. thus: The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual. Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey). p. considering that he was already in possession of the gun. 30. 14. p. if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey.to get something from his waist. October 10. Peo. Obordo. it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN. the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior struggle for the possession of the gun. p. Under the circumstances. 429 SCRA 628). The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. which is not a deadly weapon. Gonzales-Decano. Yet.27 . Under the circumstances. who was in possession of the fire extinguisher. 382 SCRA 98). In fact. the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his lifeand limb. he should have just run. however. shooting the latter on the forehead. as correctly pointed out by the RTC. the last shot finally killing him. TSN. the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun. We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey. 2005. the gun fired (TSN. as against the victim who was armed. accused pointed the gun at the victim. so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25 Indeed. not only once. October 10.

We concur with the decision of the CA on this point. While petitioner may nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset. petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense. 30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel. at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively. because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other. The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the security guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.29 In view of the foregoing. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. even if the latter were weak. there can be no self-defense. to wit: Having admitted the killing of the victim. 31 Hence. the same fails to persuade. demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim. complete or incomplete.33 . on the part of the latter. Besides. there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case. 28 Thus. We have held in the pastthat the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. thus. we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence. There could nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the security guards from testifying. shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously occurred while hewas in the act of selfdefense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. a vital part of the body and. 32 Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence the prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at the time of the shooting incident. It could have compelled the security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx. the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis. his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. for.The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense.

x x x x. 1866. All told. to wit: xxxx If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. There being an aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. as the minimum penalty. dated November 11.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating petitioner with such a serious crime. and they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt. such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P. this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense. we deviate from the findings of the CA.D. 2005. the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period. the findings of the RTC and the CA that the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses. 36 In this regard. Ascorrectly pointed out by respondent. four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum. the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. A perusal of the Information will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. the petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum. 38Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. much less overturn.) No. we find no basis to doubt ordispute. and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey. as the maximum penalty. per verification from the records of the said Division. . certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited petitioner's acquittal.A. under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R. there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner.It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Accordingly. This allegation was further proved during trial by the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Nevertheless. such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. to seventeen (17) years. with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. 8294. Under Article 249 of the RPC. especially since they are testifying under oath.) No. we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident transpired in Jeffrey’s office.

71 as damages for loss of earning capacity. c. pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v.R. SO ORDERED.000.00 as temperate damages. the costs of the litigation. and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor ofprivate respondent. the award of exemplary damages for homicide is P30. G. since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been established. b. we find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in order. the amount of P25. moral damages. 89257.00 as exemplary damages. to seventeen (17) years.000.000. f. the amount of P50.00 as civil indemnity.39 Based on current jurisprudence. CV No. four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum. the petition is DENIED. 2009 Decision and August 19.000. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity.00. computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof. and g.000.As to the award of civil indemnity. 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.40 Finally. The May 7. 1983 . Gallery Frames. Nos. are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. (2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following: a. computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.641. as the minimum penalty.022. the amount of P50.00 as moral damages. as the maximum penalty. 41 an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed. WHEREFORE. to wit: (1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum. the amount of P30. L-33466-67 April 20.R. finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. an interest of six percent (6%) per annum. e. the amount of P3. we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition. d.

MAKASIAR. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12. Accordingly. after a joint trial. Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. (b) In Criminal Case No. MAMERTO NARVAEZ. J.000. he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. therefore. with the following pronouncement: Thus. the offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor. 1970. the offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor. Gonzalo B. 248 and 64. and to pay the costs (p.PEOPLE OF THE vs. in Criminal Cases Nos. Graciano Juan.00 as moral damages.000. PHILIPPINES. is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts. P 2.00 as moral damages. we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. 1815. 1968. Fleischer in the sum of P 12.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato. 48. rec. resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8.00 as compensatory damages.00 as compensatory damages. The facts are summarized in the People's brief. The proper penalty imposable.000. were fencing the land of George .00 as attorney's fees. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.00 as attorney's fees. Revised Penal Code).). as follows: At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22.000. (a) In Criminal Case No. he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. P2.000. finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. 1816. defendant-appellant. P10.000. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant. and to pay the costs. P 10. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. 1815 and 1816 for murder which. Branch I. plaintiff-appellee.

gademit. So he addressed the group. filed sales application No. L-26757 and L-45504).R. Nos. As Fleischer fell down. Inc. and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L..2234 hectares. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2. appellant was taking his rest. 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company. however... From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. answered: 'No. proceed. p. covering 1. Fleischer and Company. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. t. t. on the one hand. Pieza I. he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. among whom was appellant.161. 21983 on June 3.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer. saying 'Pare. a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. rec. hitting him. an American landowner in Negros Oriental. the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the . and knowing there is a gun on the jeep. likewise hitting him (pp. appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. South Cotabato. Rubia ran towards the jeep. built his house. pp. Pieza II). for distribution among the settlers. Fleischer. who is appellant's compadre.000 hectares. It appears. 179-182. Defense transcript). headed by George W.n. go ahead. No. 8-9. Meanwhile. 127133. that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co.).n. Shortly thereafter.s.R.' addressing the deceased Rubia. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14. but when he heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled. father of deceased Davis Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum. WE take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts: Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum. t. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G. He established his residence therein. If the fencing would go on. At that time. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager.s.s. Appellant's Brief.Fleischer. cultivated the area. appellant fired at Rubia.. however. if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good.017.n. The deceased Fleischer. and the land settlers of Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp.

1950. 176 Kiamba. 1966. Jose T.R. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. however. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Gozon Atty. No. misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of the company. acting upon the report of Atty. which is used for drying grains and copra. On May 29. appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Ps. 22.R. appraised and advertised for public auction. he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house. G. and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway.00. Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. who. On November 14. During the pendency of this case. but the Director of Lands. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction. 21983. 32-33. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala. to avoid trouble.000. from the land which they had been occupying for about 30 years. The second house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.00. were set aside for Sales Application No.000. built in 1947 at a cost of around P20. approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. According to the survey. 755 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. But because of protests from the settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance. for the purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to the company. Branch I. voluntarily dismantled his house. L-45504). This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24. lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation. 1948.outbreak of the second world war. the settlers filed Civil Case No. Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6. Gozon. deceit. He also transferred his store from his former residence to the house near the highway. At the public auction held in Manila on August 14. only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 26 and 38. while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be distributed among the settlers (pp. appellant on . This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the settlers. 1966. while an investigator was sent by the Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. No. The settlers as plaintiffs. Aside from the store. The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for disposition. affirmed the decision in favor of the company. Among those ejected was the appellant who. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of the settlers.

with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts. Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16. when finished. with the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. Vol.month period. appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning. supra).. In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six. p. He never paid the agreed rental. 227-228. and water pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co. thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. supra).n. 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No.. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway. 1967.month period shall expire on December 31. 1968. 2). 1966. would have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway. I have no alternative but to terminate our agreement on this date. while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers.s. At about 2:30 p. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr. I am giving you six months to remove your house.s. ricemill. deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor: You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co.n. 6). Inc. p. together with their laborers. for that portion of land in which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on February 21. until the question of ownership could be decided. According to him. he signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22. t. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above- . bodega. he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar (p. t. was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. 9. Getting up and looking out of the window.s. Vol.February 21. 38 from the company (Exh.. 1. This six. Some posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant. 231. on the said day. 2. the company shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10.n. both deceased. On June 25.m. 129. 1968. The fence.. In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement. although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment. Flaviano Rubia and myself. since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway.00 monthly.. On August 21. in order to avoid trouble. 1968. t. Inc.

appellant testified: . Fleischer. hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp.n. 11. 20 of Appellant's Brief. Unlawful aggression. the deceased Rubia. He claims. without realizing it. but in order for it to be appreciated. According to appellant. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Second.. gademit. p. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. par. 225-227. Defense Exhibits). when he said. avante". supra). Fleischer" (p. Appellant admitted having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction. in answer to his request addressed to his compadre. I shot Mr. the following requisites must occur: First. Pp. 1. as amended). Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter. bringing with him shotgun No. Third. "Pare. t.quoted. and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability. assigning the following errors: First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person. sigue. 227-229. 6). par. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp.). Vol. 132. 31. Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. Revised Penal Code. that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights. 145. rec. This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being chiselled. however. The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following words: "Hindi. supra). As for the shooting of Rubia. I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if.s. and Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights (p. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed.

however. Fleischer and when Mr. it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just a few steps away. crowbar. and other necessary gadgets. supra. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers.When I shot Davis Fleischer. The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. Then he saw the damage being done to his house. that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering. not on the person of appellant. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls. but on his property rights. at the time of the incident on August 22. pliers. the deceased Rubia. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing. consisting of the deceased and their three laborers. they were using tools which could be lethal weapons. This was indeed aggression. was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property. They claim. There is no question. when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway. Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot. However. I shot at him (p. and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him. 132. bolo or bamboo cutter. Mr. to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway? Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements. compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. his first reaction was to look out of the window. therefore. A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons. Mr. The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in progress. Rubia looked at Mr. that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question. Obviously. were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The question is. 1968. He therefore appealed to hiscompadre. Besides. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me. Fleischer fell down. such as nail and hammer. Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the . Emphasis supplied).

1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title issued to the company. 2. 1970 on ground of res judicata. that we better rent the place because even though we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. Fleischer had given him up to December 31. p. 1968. This was explained by him during cross-examination on January 21. it was not known who is the right owner of the place. in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 536. 1970. nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs. Hence. 1968 (Exh. 1967 was just to avoid trouble. So we decided until things will clear up and determine who is really the owner.. Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. 755 filed on November 14. and that such 1970 dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28. t.10.s. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time. Vol. on the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. as it was dismissed on January 23. which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement.Court of First Instance of Cotabato. 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21. between the same parties. The parties could not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22. . we decided to pay rentals (p.6). The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28. To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that time. if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing. In any case. thus: It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. 1968. it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No.n. instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company. 169. The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point: Art.

. 429. therefore. Conformably to the foregoing provisions. 46 SCRA 522). amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. since not all the elements for justification are present. 539. nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. WE find. and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims. there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to resist. since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. Revised Penal Code. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all. pursuant to Art. In the case at bar. his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. . the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house. however. pursuant to paragraph 6.e. Be that as it may. For this purpose. i. but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind (People vs. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession. he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied). Encomiendas. that the third element of defense of property is present. Civil Code of the Philippines). The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. there was no provocation at all on his part. As a matter of fact. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Art. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable.Art. The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11. killing his two victims. The assault on appellant's property. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window.

Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be the one. "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs. WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently established.. there is a head that will be broken. married. and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. 2). As WE have consistently held.. This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.M.. Moreover. She further told him that if they fenced their house. This cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted instantaneously . The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. and a laborer of Fleischer and Company. it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised. there must be a "showing" that the accused premeditated the killing. as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer. South Cotabato. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing. As WE held earlier in People vs. Mrs. 37 years old. there must be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim. which may be summarized as follows: On August 20. Cañete. he was drying corn near the house of Mr.. Maitum. the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez. that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act. . 297-303.n. Moreover. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy. it is better that you will tell Mr.. in order to appreciate alevosia. 102 SCRA 70). Ordioles. neutralizes his credibility.. resident of Maitum. and Mrs. Narvaez asked him to help them. Besides. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez.. as he was working in the hacienda. 44 Phil. 42 SCRA 238).' He relayed this to Mr. Gida. South Cotabato. 481). Vol. t. when the accused and his wife talked to him. but the latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598).The crime committed is homicide on two counts. the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking." (People vs. Flaviano Rubia. .s. 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.

the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same. must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights.. his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should be credited with this mitigating circumstance. Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present. the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance.e. the same may further be reduced by one degree. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting. Pursuant to Article 69. We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime.. the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed. Considering the antecedent facts of this case. These circumstances. . only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased. arresto mayor. because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated. but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation. Likewise. thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house. i. Consequently. coming so near to the time when his first house was dismantled. to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64. Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting. and clung to his premeditated act. But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility. supra.Since in the case at bar. the penalty may be lowered by two degrees. appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only.e. there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing. i. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway.

were the ones prejudiced. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31. despite its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent. Case No. 14. MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION. who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take advantage of the government's resettlement program. The records disclose that his wife.00) PESOS. 1969 made the provisions of Art. 1968 (p. the victims not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. the award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. 1815). it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore. the moral and material suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability. councilor Feliza Narvaez. Moreover. In the case at bar. Considering appellant's standing in the community. 1816). indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings.The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of the damage caused. WHEREFORE. 5465 on April 21. WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4. these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company. In the case of Zulueta vs. 58. of Criminal Case No. the lowly settlers. FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES. but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners. CFI rec.000. Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2. the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to the killings. of Crim. .50. but acted upon on November 4. being married to a municipal councilor. to extend its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Thus. However. the victims' actuations were apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. CFI rec. Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land accumulation scheme. 1968. (p. APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR. Pan American World Airways (43 SCRA 397).

however.CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22. because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case. appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child. appellant. Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS. finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -. NO COSTS. complete or incomplete. Under the proven facts. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse. which allegedly constitutes self-defense. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Absent unlawful aggression. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. 1998 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. The decretal portion of the Decision reads: . MARIVIC GENOSA. The Case For automatic review before this Court is the September 25. DECISION PANGANIBAN. thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole.the battered woman syndrome (BWS). appellee. But all is not lost. which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs. she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -.no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him. overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state.: Admitting she killed her husband. This psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power.1968. In addition. vs. SO ORDERED. 50160. as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. J. there can be no self-defense.

her legitimate husband. assault. hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH. circular located at the occipital bone of the head. Blisters at both extrem[i]ties. Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50.00). anterior chest. with intent to kill. with the use of a hard deadly weapon. posterior chest. Marivic Genosa y Isidro. blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. unlawfully and feloniously attack. hit and wound one BEN GENOSA. 5. the Court finds the accused. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth. 1997.000. black.[6] In due course. The Facts Version of the Prosecution .[4] With the assistance of her counsel. [2] The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows: That on or about the 15 th day of November 1995. [5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3. which caused his death. [causing] the following wounds. spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain. depressed. open. to wit: Cadaveric spasm. Trunk bloated. RA No. Abdomen distended w/ gas. Municipality of Isabel. did then and there wilfully. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. with treachery and evident premeditation. The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50. Face. Fracture. Province of Leyte. and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance. trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.000. resulting [in] laceration of the brain. Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition. laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.WHEREFORE. 7659. she was tried for and convicted of parricide.00). Philippine currency as moral damages. at Barangay Bilwang. the above-named accused. after all the foregoing being duly considered. which the accused had provided herself for the purpose.

1995. identified the dead body as that of [her] son. he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts in this wise: Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19. Refelina . Leyte where they lived with their two children. Isabel. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas rented house. Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. SPO1 Colon. the Genosas rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed. her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house. On November 18. Together with SPO1 Millares. Meanwhile. There. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented house. the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Later that day. Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. and his wife lived with them too. Arturo also noticed that since then. On November 16. Bens younger brother. waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Alone. the mother of Ben. Ben went inside his house. Thereafter. SPO3 Leo Acodesin. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him. each one carrying a bag. while Arturo went to a store across it. appellant asked Erlinda Paderog. Alex. On November 15. Leyte. 1995. Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow. 1995. Leyte to look for him. Sometime in 1995. Leyte. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Joseph. For a time. When they arrived at the house of Ben. That same day. about 12:15 in the afternoon. however. namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel. and Dr. appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang. 1983 in Ormoc City. locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Iluminada Genosa. he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. in the morning of the same day. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. then assigned at the police station at Isabel. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. Seeing this.

Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Ben left. but in the bedroom. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. With her cousin Ecel Arao. About 10:00 that same morning. At this point. Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases. Ben switched off the light and. Appellant. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was. SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. Ben allegedly flew into a rage. Apparently disappointed with her reaction. leaning against a wall. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. She testified that going home after work on November 15. She however. cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. A municipal health officer at Isabel. According to appellant. [7] (Citations omitted) Version of the Defense . She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].Cerillo. though. he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom. Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Appellant admitted killing Ben. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe. Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it. the cadaver of Ben. but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house. insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck. appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel. causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Then. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. with the use of a chopping knife. because of its stench. she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. He did not die on the spot. The postmortem examination of Dr. appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. 1995. even challenging her to a fight. The bedroom was not in disarray. Leyte but did not find him there. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. however.

but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Arturo Basobas. and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked. 4. they were classmates. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help. a co-worker of Ben. Cebu City. Marivic and Ben lived happily. after which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After their marriage. In another incident in May 22. Prior to her marriage. She said as the marriage went along. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas. Marivic would inflict injuries on him. Alex. 5. generally when Ben would come home drunk. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. 1994. Iluminada Genosa. they lived first in the home of Bens parents. 2. In the first year of marriage. testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. But apparently. Bens brother. Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca. 1983. 3. the second incident was on November 15. Mrs. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled. Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention. as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. Marivic left the house but after a week. Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben. and was working. and they were third degree cousins. after . at the time of her husbands death. They stayed there for three (3) hours. testified that on November 15. Marivics mother-in-law. Leyte. we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic became already very demanding. there were three (3) misunderstandings. saying that Ben and Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima. together with Bens brother. 1994. in Isabel. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness. obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration.Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner: 1. she returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. Marivic was not there. Both sets of parents were against their relationship. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19. testified too. Mrs. He stayed a while talking with Ben. early morning. when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school. 1995 After we collected our salary. Marivic had graduated from San Carlos. soon thereafter. Ormoc City. Alex. they were neighbors in Bilwang.

testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben. testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15.2. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos. Dr.[8]) 7. he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. They were quarreling loudly. at least three times a week.1. He claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so many times. Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben. Cerillo. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. She said after she would be beaten. Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. testified that on November 15. (Again. She said he provoked her. 1995. Junnie Barrientos. a fisherman. Dino Caing. Mr. 7. the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. he saw the spouses grappling with each other. who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas. she would seek medical help from Dr. 7. Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. After that. and sometimes beat her. please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas). also a fisherman. Lucero and Dra. Outside their house was one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent. witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. but it was a long time that they had been quarreling. sometimes he would pin her down on the bed. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel. but had come voluntarily to testify. and the brother of Mr.which he went across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. but Ben would follow her and seek her out. Mr. He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. . He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused. In her defense. 1995. He had known the couple for only one (1) year. Marivic Genosa. He did not do anything. he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. he would slap her. 6. He said after a while. Joe Barrientos. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents. On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening. conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you. he heard the Genosas arguing. Basobas thought they were joking. Joe Barrientos. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk.

I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Ben was so angry. (Again. which means lets go and look for a whore. Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. Dr. who is a cousin of Marivic. Isabel. Miss Arano said that her husband was already there and was drunk. Mr. He said the couple was always quarreling. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel. she said that when she left Marivics house on November 15. . His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Dr. 1995. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. He testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk.3. Leyte.4. Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. Mr. She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. Sarabia further testified that Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me. On cross-examination. They searched in the market place. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband. mokimas ta. there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. but no one came. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. xxxxxxxxx Dr.5. When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3. she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. Miss Ecel Arano. 7. the couple were still quarreling. he went to their house and they were quarreling. 1995. 1995. At one time when she did sleep over. She accompanied Marivic home. Teody because that was what he used to call me. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received treatment from other doctors. an 18-year old student. Dino Caing.7. several taverns and some other places. but would be pacified if somebody would come. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. Caing and considered him an expert witness. Leyte. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us. 1989 until November 9. One time. Mr. but could not find him. testified that in the afternoon of November 15. he would go to our house and he will say. She said that Marivic shouted for help. 7. Caing testified that from July 6.

xxxxxxxxx Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist. testified that about two (2) months before Ben died. Refelina Y. was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel.On cross-examination. such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers.6 Mr. the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided. She merely took the . rented herself a room. November 16. 1995. Answering questions from the Court. but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other. Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension. Dr. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend. Marivic said that she threw the gun away. and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro. He told Marivic to return in the morning. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. he could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. 10. but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Laguna. Panfilo Tero. and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben. that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo. Cerillo. Dra. On cross-examination. Dra. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial. and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases. 9. he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things. Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. and that she was arrested in San Pablo. that Basobas lied in his testimony. 1995. In fact. a physician. 7. that she left for Manila the next day. that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18. that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once. she said that he died in the bedroom. that she did not bother anyone in Manila. Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun. Leyte at the time of the incident. and the baby was born prematurely on December 1. she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. Lulu x x x Rubillos. Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby. 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.

or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date. Madrona. Marivics trial lawyer. thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH. coursing the same through Atty. 11. unlawfully and feloniously attack. Dra. On 23 September 1998. 1996. rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Ormoc City.medical board exams and passed in 1986. In the meantime. Dra. She saw Ben Genosa. under date of 17 February 2000. with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death. 17. Presiding Judge. 14. and 5 and 6 August 1998. and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance. 22 and 23 September 1997. were not conformed to by her. Gil Marvel P. the Hon. The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. 12. xxxxxxxxx Dra. 22 May 1998. The Information. RTC-Branch 35. Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000. Dimaisip. Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office. 12 November 1997. assault. covered by a blanket. 14 May 1997. 21 July 1997. Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Teresita G. 13. undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben . to the Chief Justice. 16. she saw some police officer and neighbor around. 15 and 16 December 1997. Fortunito L. for reasons of her own. dated November 14. Tabucanon. 15. This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997. He was wearing only a brief. Atty. and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000. x x x wilfully. with treachery and evidence premeditation. as a precautionary measure. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there. And that based on her examination. two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death. wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court. filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the head which she described as a fracture. filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel. Without the knowledge of counsel. lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband. attaching thereto. under date of 24 January 2000.

Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband.P. Immediately before Dra. Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe. On 15 January 2001. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999. she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College. Fortunito L. on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence. she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts. but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic. Psychology from the Ateneo. Dayan was sworn.Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death. then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries. Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings. a member of the Forensic Psychology Association. Madrona. Raquel Fortun. Natividad A. if any. thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken. together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence. and a PhD from the U. 18. Josephs College. the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. submitted. Dra. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. Ormoc City. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines. a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. to psychiatric disorder. Before this. and. Dra. and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. and finally. the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy. a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling]. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000. RTC-Branch 35. Dra. within ninety (90) days from notice. The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature. from domestic violence to infidelity. 17. and nullity cases. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. . She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo).

abuses also happen. or lock themselves in another room. Dayan said that the batterer. xxxxxxxxx Dra. that they were the one who precipitated the violence. And they become violent. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. xxxxxxxxx Dra. they see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family. the abuse occurs day in and day out. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past. is long lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken homes. She said that in a normal marital relationship. Dra. very aggressive and very angry. but these are not consistent. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological abuse. or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of them. xxxxxxxxx Dra. self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen. the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change. they usually think that they provoke it. drinking and drugs. and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse. they provoke their spouse to be physically. Also. such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. In an abnormal marital relationship. just like the battered woman. verbally and even sexually abusive to them. xxxxxxxxx . A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss. also has a very low opinion of himself. not chronic.Dra. the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children. Dayan testified that in her studies. Dra. very hostile. are not happening day in [and] day out. verbal abuse. Dra. The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything.

which was likewise published internationally and locally. and testified in a case in 1964. He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international congresses. Squibb grant. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Dr. He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000. Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. In those days. violent family disputes abound. Dr. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. assigned to the V. pushing. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Alfredo Pajarillo. on the other hand.Dra. he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. Prior to his retirement from government service. verbal abuse. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Luna Medical Centre. and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy. and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons. Nenita Deproza. on an E. where there is physical abuse: such as slapping.R. After that. and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86. appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35. the Quezon City Medical Society. As such consultant. Prior to being in private practice. if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger. a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. xxxxxxxxx 19. while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry. Psychology. Dr. a physician. On 9 February 2001. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry. was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline). It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases. Ormoc City. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. it will take . the Cagayan Medical Society. the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. who has since passed away. is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree. Dr. he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence. perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder.

and she is irritable and restless. he normally internalizes what is around him within the environment. and primarily with knives. he is aiming high all the time. her emotional tone is unstable. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household. xxxxxxxxx Dr. xxxxxxxxx Dr. he is so macho. the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. And it becomes his own personality. xxxxxxxxx Dr. She has higher sensitivity and her self-world is damaged. although she is not actually being beaten at that time. xxxxxxxxx A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic. In psychiatry. the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. trauma. xxxxxxxxx . Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes.more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous. dated 22 January 2001. He came out with a Psychiatric Report. He is very competitive. It is produced by overwhelming brutality. such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. Dr. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively. As to the batterer. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves. xxxxxxxxx Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety. he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.

and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or. Drs. xxxxxxxxx 20. because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -. the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.[9] Ruling of the Trial Court Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable. 2000. Supervening Circumstances On February 19. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. if any. 2000. On September 29. in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court. in the alternative. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that the reexperiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts testimonies. were then presented to and admitted by the lower court . appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death. Thus. Further. Acting on the Courts Resolution. the records of the partially re-opened trial aquo were elevated. the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery. she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued. this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion. Natividad Dayan [10] and Alfredo Pajarillo. Dr. The capital penalty having been imposed. (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse. [11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies. remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. along with their documentary evidence. and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence.On cross-examination by the private prosecutor.

The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case. 5. the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus. [13] In the main. 6. a gambler. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa. 2. [12] The Issues Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration: 1. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery. thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death. and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband. 4. . The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk.before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide. and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa. The Courts Ruling The appeal is partly meritorious. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt. a womanizer and wife-beater. 8. 3. 7.

made his evaluation. if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues.on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -. may not agree with the trial judges conclusions. While she. As consistently held by this Court. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14. we find no grave abuse of discretion. much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court. the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. First. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him. the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked. despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. the mother and the brother of appellants deceased spouse -. In the absence of a marriage certificate.Collateral Factual Issues The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it. we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. Thereafter. Two of the prosecution witnesses -. we cannot peremptorily conclude. we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. or (2) no admission was in fact made. oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to. Judge Fortunito L. the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. however.namely. In any event. during her direct examination. In the case of parricide of a spouse. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married. 1996. In any case. [15] Second. trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case. If at all. appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben. We note that in his 17-page Decision. or even this Court. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the selfdefense theory of the accused. except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake.attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.[16] this Court held: The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. [14] In appellants first six assigned items. misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the case. Moreover. Malabago. In People v. [19] Other than . that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented. Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -. findings and conclusions. absent substantial evidence.

Fourth.has no legal consequence. did not constitute vital evidence at the time. invokes selfdefense and/or defense of her unborn child. all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.[20] As the former further points out. the defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake. [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head. under the circumstances of this case. merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. When the accused admits killing the victim. As will be discussed shortly. appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant. womanizer and wife-beater. we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk. Hence. in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present. [21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases. Finally.merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract. Any reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case. Fifth. she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court.whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -. Thus. for which such evidence may have been relevant. 2000 Resolution. if not immaterial. to avoid criminal liability. defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. the specific or direct cause of Bens death -. the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general. his personal character. gambler. neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses.[22] The Battered Woman Syndrome . the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. First Legal Issue: Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but. the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants children. to determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death. selfdefense (and similarly. Third. Until this case came to us for automatic review. As the Court elucidated in its September 29. especially his past behavior.

and false hopes that the relationship will improve. incomplete self-defense. [29] The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality. minor battering occurs -. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions. to her. and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition. destructiveness and. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that. nurturing behavior. emotional dependence upon the dominant male. in order to be classified as a battered woman. If it occurs a second time. foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time. at least. nonviolent) phase. the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him. loving (or. . and she remains in the situation. at the least. or by simply staying out of his way. Exhausted from the persistent stress. (2) the acute battering incident. because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place. death.[24] A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. she is defined as a battered woman. appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. This wish.In claiming self-defense. however. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. the family and the female sex role.it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful. sometimes. the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident. the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or.[28] During the tension-building phase. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion. and so are his reasons for ending it. the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the socalled cycle of violence. such as low self-esteem. yet also inevitable. are comparatively minor. While new in Philippine jurisprudence. proves to be double-edged. and (3) the tranquil. she has no control.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome. [26] More graphically. the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. [25] Battered women exhibit common personality traits. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. During this phase. only the batterer may put an end to the violence. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable.[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase. Furthermore. the more the batterer becomes angry. However. oppressive and abusive. traditional beliefs about the home. Often. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable. at some unpredictable point. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind.

are very slim. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows: ATTY. Generally. [30] The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends.she for his nurturant behavior. especially if she remains with him. The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. is that the chances of his reforming. and that this good. On the one hand. . [31] History of Abuse in the Present Case To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant. During this tranquil period. I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker. and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. though. Sensing his isolation and despair. the defense presented several witnesses. he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me. gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves. In this phase. your husband was abusive to you and cruel. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically. TABUCANON Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa? A In the first year. violence and forgiveness. she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain. begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it. he for her forgiveness. she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -.At this stage. the couple experience profound relief. capable of functioning without the other. A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. although she may later clearly remember every detail. that her partner will change for the better. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension. Neither one may really feel independent. The truth. she feels responsible for his well-being. only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. or seeking or receiving professional help. each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically. such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you? A He always provoke me in everything. Yet. On the other hand. Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage. Q How many times did this happen? A Several times already. the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again.

Dino Caing. Dr. were you able to see a doctor? A Yes. Q Who are these doctors? A The company physician. sir. Q No. from that time on. after that he sought after me. xxxxxxxxx [Court] /to the witness Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said? A Everytime he got drunk. Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you? A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me. [32] . Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband. sir. Q You mean Ben Genosa? A Yes. he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he said sorry. after your marriage. Lucero and Dra. xxxxxxxxx Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries? A Yes. weekly. Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home? A He is following me. how frequent was the occurrence? A Everytime he got drunk. from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred. Q Is it daily. monthly or how many times in a month or in a week? A Three times a week. Q What will happen when he follow you? A He said he changed. sir. Dr.Q What did you do when these things happen to you? A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other. Cerillo. Q Who inflicted these injuries? A Of course my husband.

going to your finding no. Canora. [pain] meaning there is tenderness. Attending physician: Dr.Trauma. Q Among the findings. in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. Dr. Attending physician: Dr. Attending physician: Dr. 1992 . Caing. sir. Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record. March 10. there is tenderness pain. sir. August 1. Q So. there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician. March 26. 1994 . Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner: Q So. sir. 5.Abrasion. So. Dino D. Doctor? A I did. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused? A Yes. Lucero. 1993 .Referring to his Out-Patient Chart [33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital. Furuncle (L) Axilla. 3. tenderness (R) Shoulder. May 12. Q What is meant by furuncle axilla? A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion. these are objective physical injuries. Attending physician: Dr. Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents. Canora. Q Now. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla? A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is applied.Swelling Abrasion (L) leg. June 5. multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. 1995 . 2  to trauma. When your breast is traumatized. mastitis (L) breast.Pain. do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic? A Yes. Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma? A So. A 1. 4.Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area. is that correct? A Yes. and 6. Canora. 1995 . 1990 . 3 where you were the one who attended the patient.physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. pain and contusion (R) breast. 2. Doctor? . April 17.

can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she? A Eight (8) months pregnant. 1995 examination. Q So. did you actually see the accused physically? A Yes. Q What was your November 6. 1995 when this incident happened? A As per record. sir. she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy. were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of November. was the patient pregnant? A Yes. TABUCANON: Q By the way Doctor. Q What was the date? A It was on November 6. meaning she was confined? A Yes. sir. Q You mean. Q For how many days? A One day. Q So in other words. 1995. sir. will you please tell this Honorable Court. xxxxxxxxx ATTY. sir. we need to know the cause of these injuries. 1995.xxxxxxxxx Q Were you able to talk with the patient? A Yes. Q What did she tell you? A As a doctor-patient relationship. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband. Q Being a doctor. was it an examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings? A No. it was an advance stage of pregnancy? A Yes. . Ben Genosa? A Yes. Q When you said admitted. sir. Q On November 6. sir. yes.

1995. Q You mean problem in her household? A Probably. Q Is this considered hypertension? A Yes. 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant. Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation.Q Where? A At PHILPHOS Hospital. Doctor? A Yes. also the same period from 1989 to 1995. Q In November 6. It was refractory to our treatment. the blood pressure was 180/120. Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure. Q For what? A Tension headache. You said that you were able to examine her personally on November 6. you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure? . So. because tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature. severe. Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant. She does not response when the medication was given to her. that the patient had hypertension? A The patient definitely had hypertension. sir. xxxxxxxxx Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times. did you take the blood pressure of the accused? A On November 6. 1995 consultation. Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature? A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. What is this all about? A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record here. if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication. the date of the incident. from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.

can you recall the incident in November 15.this time to find Ben -. and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises. I was in the office working then after office hours.but they were unable to. 1995. [37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him. I was anticipating that he was gambling. Seeing his state of drunkenness. confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben. scaring them with a knife. testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times. I prepared dinner for my children. and when she heard the couple start arguing. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair. They returned to the Genosa home. at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling. she was awakened about ten oclock at night. Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him? A Yes. sir. where they found him already drunk. On the afternoon of November 15. Then Marivic came running into Ecels room and locked the door. 1995? A Yes. Ecel hesitated. because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. Leyte. he was not home yet. Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive? A When he arrived. sir. When I reached Bilwang. because the couple were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. I was in Isabel looking for him. I was not there. Marivic again asked her help -. where was his father. . So while waiting for him. my eldest son arrived from school. I immediately asked my son. sir. On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa. then my second child said. Q This is evening of November 15. she decided to leave. Q By the way. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over. 1995 in the evening? A Whole morning and in the afternoon. Again afraid that he might hurt her. Q Did you come back to your house? A Yes. I was worried because that was payday. [35] Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house. Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. where was your conjugal residence situated this time? A Bilwang.A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. TABUCANON: Q Please tell this Court. a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel. showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her: ATTY. [34] Another defense witness. Teodoro Sarabia.

Q What time? A When I arrived home. Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition? A He was drunk again. Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband? A Yes. 8 months. sir. Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang? A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock. he was there already in his usual behavior. . she said her father would not allow her because of Ben. Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening? A No. Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you? A Ecel Arao. Q What was he yelling all about? A His usual attitude when he got drunk. but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year. sir. Q How advance was your pregnancy? A Eight (8) months. were you pregnant? A Yes. he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any? A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him. Q What happened when you arrived in your residence? A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me. the one who testified. Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time? A Marie Bianca.Q Is this your house or you are renting? A Renting. Q Was the baby subsequently born? A Yes. he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. 1995. Q During this period November 15. because she expressed fears. Q You said that when you arrived.

Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him. Q You said the children were scared. Q You said that he was yelling at you. do you know where he was going? A Outside perhaps to drink more. what else. Q What did he do with the bolo? A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V. why did you switch off the light when the children were there. so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television. what happened to you? A I screamed for help and then he left. did he do to you if any? A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo? A He was about to attack me so I run to the room. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again. sir. At that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. Q You screamed for help and he left. Q So when he whirled you. Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside? A Yes. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge. Q What was your reason in packing his clothes? . Q How do you described this bolo? A 1 1/2 feet. Q When he left what did you do in that particular time? A I packed all his clothes. looking for him.Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know? A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him. Q What else happened after he cut the wire? A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already holding the bolo. Q What was the bolo used for usually? A For chopping meat. Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you? A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

I smashed him then I ran to the other room. sir. it was a pipe about that long. TABUCANON: Q Where did he bring you? A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me. he dragged you? How did he drag you? COURT INTERPRETER: The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck) A And he dragged me towards the door backward. Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer? A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell.A I wanted him to leave us. he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes. then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic. COURT INTERPRETER: (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). Q During this time. The one he used to open the drawer I saw. and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade. ATTY. Q You said that when Ben came back to your house. Q What is there in the drawer? A I was aware that it was a gun. sir. COURT INTERPRETER: (At this juncture the witness started crying). then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck. Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer? A Yes. . what were their reactions? A After a couple of hours. and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself. where were your children. ATTY. I was about to vomit. TABUCANON: Q Were you actually brought to the drawer? A Yes.

for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long. sir. is this drawer outside your room? A Outside. Q You said that he dropped the blade. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. that was the object used when he intimidate me. Q Where were the children during that time? A My children were already asleep. Q You mean they were inside the room? A Yes. Q In what part of the house? A Dining. There were a lot of instances of abuses. going out with barkadas. [38] In addition. Dra. Based on their talks. even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. Q How do you describe the blade. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. how does it look like? A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide. The husband had a very meager income. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of . sir. Q With the same blade? A Yes. that she was suffering emotional anguish. Q Is it a flexible blade? A Its a cutter.xxxxxxxxx ATTY. to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows: Q: What can you say. drinking. because he once used it to me. The husband was involved in a lot of vices. is it sharp both edges? A Yes. that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you? A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years. TABUCANON: Q Talking of drawer. to emotional abuse. Q How did he do it? A He wanted to cut my throat.

The most important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life. almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out. the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room? A She told me about that. the public prosecutor not merely elicited. Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours. xxxxxxxxx Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of battering their wives? A I also heard that from her? Q You heard that from her? A Yes. additional supporting evidence as shown below: Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999. it really happened. Dayan. I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room. So she was very angry. but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial. where you talked to her about three hours.infidelity. she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware. what was the most relevant information did you gather? A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. we presume that you already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case? A I believe I had an idea of the case. sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered. . but wittingly or unwittingly put forward. [39] In cross-examining Dra. Q Several times in that room? A Yes. sir. Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering their wives? A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives. Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc? A Sir.

At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees. Alfredo Pajarillo. am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth. Yes. she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened. x x x. all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband. what x x x [is this] all about? A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk. The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person. Dr.] especially cockfighting. what is your opinion? A Sir.[42] which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. it is an extreme form of battering. The Report continued: At first.until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[. the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows: Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test. it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed. everything looked good -. [40] Parenthetically. emotional battering. testified on his Psychiatric Report. Meaning she is a person that I can trust.Q Being an expert witness. That the data that Im gathering from her are the truth. They had been married for twelve years[. he became physically abusive. Further quoting from the Report. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person. it was really a self-defense. or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?] Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test? A She was a person who passed the honesty test. The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family. Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. my opinion is. normal and happy -. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering. Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law.the atmosphere was fine. but her efforts were in vain.] and practically more than eight years. [s]he also sought the advice and help of close . I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines. Was she extremely battered? A Sir. [41] The other expert witness presented by the defense. particularly to his wife. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben. Q What do you mean by that? A Meaning.

A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. She has x x x self-defeating and selfsacrificing characteristics. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe.relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. however. that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically.nay. In determining her state of mind. Dra. has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases. Dayan.poverty.those who have not been through a similar experience. x x x.[44] To understand the syndrome properly. they usually think that they provoke[d] it. How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[45] The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker. ones viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary. reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. reasonable person. as well as her research on domestic violence. severe beatings may not be consistent with -. comprehensible to -. making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape. there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.[43] From the totality of evidence presented. her state of mind metamorphoses. that she has an obligation to keep the .[47] Corroborating these research findings. Walker found that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then. that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[. self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the violence. Dr. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife syndrome. there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen. Effect of Battery on Appellant Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman.[48] According to Dra. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own interests. [46] In her years of research. in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women. we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated.

he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. She was able to explain in adequate detail the . not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support.[54] Thus. having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. because they cannot predict their own safety.[55] Battered women feel unsafe. and usually fail to leave the relationship. a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism. and that there is no escape. however. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases.[50] Dr. due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time. We. we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant. trauma could result in posttraumatic stress disorder.the individuals thoughts -. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. More specifically. lacking power to change their situation. wherein such cases abounded. but believes that she does not. He had previously testified in suits involving violent family relations. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -.family intact at all cost for the sake of their children. battered persons may believe that they are essentially helpless. x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect. he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. [52] A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman. He referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. As such. and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change. [51] After being repeatedly and severely abused. Furthermore. they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality.[49] The testimony of another expert witness.that proved all-important. a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania. suffer from pervasive anxiety. we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS. found that even if a person has control over a situation. even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible. in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness. [56] Unless a shelter is available. Battered women dont attempt to leave the battering situation. is also helpful. she stays with her husband. she also believes that he is capable of killing her. failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started. Pajarillo. Dr.[57] In the instant case. but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more. just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage? Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. and that believing his words. We emphasize that in criminal cases. Indeed. To repeat.[58] that Ben would seek her out. they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -. Settled in our jurisprudence. she would return to their common abode. how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation? In sum. albeit merely theoretically and scientifically. that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. and the peril sought to be avoided . the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house. is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life. the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas. Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely. However.if at all -. she had gone through a similar pattern. The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -. she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past.based on which they concluded that she had BWS. ask for her forgiveness and promise to change. In other words. [59] From the expert opinions discussed earlier. They corroborated each others testimonies. how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life. BWS as Self-Defense In any event. However.typical characteristics of this stage. they were able to explain fully. however.

not merely imaginary.then. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue. the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. including that which has not been raised by the parties. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Third. First. selfdefense may be appreciated. there can be no self-defense -complete or incomplete -. Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.on the part of the victim. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment. there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.must be imminent and actual. he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. sudden and unexpected attack -. To require the battered person to await an obvious. [69] .The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1.or an imminent danger thereof -. according to the testimony of Marivic herself. Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.[65] Still. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. provided that the following circumstances concur. we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. [64] In the present case. the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense: [62] Art. 11. Mitigating Circumstances Present In any event. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights. further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. does not warrant self-defense. Unlawful aggression. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. -. Justifying circumstances. if not continuous. all is not lost for appellant.[61] Thus. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom.and based on past violent incidents. there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -.on the life or safety of a person. During that time. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS. [63] It presupposes actual. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. [68] Thus. however.[67] In the absence of such aggression. impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Second. We reiterate the principle that aggression.

Dayan. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder. Mr. Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]? A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability. [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. Witness? A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. suffocating the individual. banging of the head like that. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Dayan. Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available to the victim..From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic. Witness. If nobody is interceding. she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself. opined as follows: This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. Dr. Second. how do you classify? A We classify the disorder as [acute]. the victim is heightened to painful stimulus. in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29. In this situation therefore. strangulating the individual. the more she will go to that disorder. and fear and probably in most [acute] . Third.. higher irritability remorse. and boxing the individual. Dra. she is also to protect the fetus. restlessness. or chronic or delayed or [a]typical. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control.[71] Expounding thereon. he said: Q What causes the trauma. Mr. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. repetitious battering. like for example she is pregnant. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.. [70] Dr. xxxxxxxxx Q You referred a while ago to severity. Pajarillo? A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head. He explained that the effect of repetitious pain taking. the severity of the battering. 2000.

] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity? A Yes. however. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room. Mr. There was. [76] In addition. [78] Here. and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory. and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time. your Honor. [72] Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge. After this six (6) months you become chronic. any prolonged. naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. [77] To appreciate this circumstance. during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. her emotional and mental state . the expert witness clarified further: Q But just the same[. [79]His abusive and violent acts. repetitious maltreatment. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. psychological paralysis. an acute battering incident. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without. Q And in chronic cases. it is longer than six (6) months. intelligence or intent. Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses. a resulting diminution of her freedom of action. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Witness? A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering. this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.] it x x x obfuscated her rationality? A Of course obfuscated. wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor. Q As you were saying[. an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child. depriving her of consciousness of her acts.[73] In sum. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind. the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act. thus. preceded his being killed by Marivic.cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.

she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing. The second circumstance. on the other hand. must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open. she felt her blood pressure rise. [82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense. methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. Pajarillos testimony [80] that with neurotic anxiety -. or conjectures. which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.did not arise from the same set of facts. however. the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. although she is not actually being beaten at the time. she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun. circular fracture located at the back of his head. [81] In order to qualify an act as treacherous. they cannot be deduced from mere inferences. which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. but likewise on that of their unborn child. According to her. Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances.the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real. resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life.a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -. Second Legal Issue: Treachery There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means. she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is. the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked. then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him. In a fit of indignation. the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death: .continued. depressed. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -. The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity.psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -. [83] Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case. On the one hand. Accordingly. Helpful is Dr.

I smashed him then I ran to the other room. COURT INTERPRETER (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). I was about to vomit. then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic.Q You said that when Ben came back to your house. sir. Q What is there in the drawer? A I was aware that it was a gun. for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long. TABUCANON: Q Where did he bring you? A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer? A Yes. how does it look like? A Three (3) inches long and inch wide. . Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer? A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. ATTY. sir. COURT INTERPRETER (At this juncture the witness started crying) ATTY. and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade. it was a pipe about that long. The one he used to open the drawer I saw. TABUCANON: Q Were you actually brought to the drawer? A Yes. he dragged you? How did he drag you? COURT: The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck) A And he dragged me towards the door backward. xxxxxxxxx Q You said that he dropped the blade. and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself.

Q It is a flexible blade? A Its a cutter. so I got that gun and I shot him. I distorted the drawer. TABUCANON: Q You said that this blade fell from his grip. Q With the same blade? A Yes. Q What else happened? A When I was in the other room. because he once used it to me.[84] The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. xxxxxxxxx ATTY. Besides. is it sharp both edges? A Yes. Q How do you describe the blade. because I smashed him. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure. COURT INTERPRETER: (Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him. the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape). There is no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting. I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room. I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic. I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. COURT /to Atty. sir. what else happened? A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him. that was the object used when he intimidate me. equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an . Q What happened? A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade. Tabucanon Q You shot him? A Yes. ATTY. Q How did he do it? A He wanted to cut my throat. TABUCANON: Q You said you went to the room. is it correct? A Yes. I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby.

and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. Certainly. the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense.[87] Proper Penalty The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.argument or a quarrel. because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. To the contrary.[91] Epilogue Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence. [90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Considering all the circumstances of the instant case.prision mayor -. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period. she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole. To give a just and proper resolution of the case. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution. we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. though. or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code. [85] Moreover. to reclusion temporal in its medium period. the Court . The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. [86] There is no showing. or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum.[89] The penalty ofreclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable. in order to appreciate alevosia. the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree. considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -. it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.

the batterer must have posed probable -. And definitely. is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B. CR No. there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense. Katrina Legarda. J. Branch 19. not all of these elements were duly established.not necessarily immediate and actual -. VICKY C. the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole. at the time of the killing. While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons. each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Atty. WHEREFORE. We now sum up our main points. Taken altogether. the solicitor general and appellants counsel. Costs de oficio. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her. petitioner. the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. however. may do so. in its wisdom. unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. 20995. TY.R. have helped it in such learning process. We cannot make or invent them. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45. The Court. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Second. we can only work within the limits of law.has learned much. based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. Third.grave harm to the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.P. vs. her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum.P.: Petitioner Vicky C. however. 22). The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. respondent. 22[2] (B. Only Congress. SO ORDERED. DECISION TINGA. these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. jurisprudence and given facts. to 14 years. promulgated on 31 July 2001. dated 21 April 1997. Under the existing facts of the present case. However. The Informations were docketed as Criminal . seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G. First. otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

Being the patients daughter. 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30.000. said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.000. Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[3] The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue.000. The accusatory the Information in Criminal Case No.00 93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30. Ty pleaded not guilty.00. said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment. Check No. Vecino Check No. unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. The data are hereunder itemized as follows: Criminal Case No.00 93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30.[5] The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992.00 93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30.[6] As of 4 June .000. Philippines.000. Contrary to law. 1993.Cases No.000. Postdated Amount 93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30.000.00[4] The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof. 93-130465 reads as follows: portion of That on or about May 30. At her arraignment.000. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor.00 93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30. in the City of Manila.00 93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30.00 93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30. the said accused did then and there willfully.

592.[8] The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1. and to comply with the demands of the hospital.182. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418. she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets.075.P. Soon thereafter. 22. The dispositive part of the Decision reads: CONSEQUENTLY. the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B. [9] To assure payment of the obligation. the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail.[10] For her defense. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. SO ORDERED. Fearing the worst for her mother. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds. the Statement of Account[7]shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657. On 5 June 1992.1992. As the demand letters were not heeded. The debasing treatment. which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity. complainant filed the seven (7)Informations subject of the instant case.[11] Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution.410.000. for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation. Judy Chua. were all deposited on their due dates. [12] Thus. Tys sister.[13] . so affected her mothers mental. with the Account Closed advice.55. The seven (7) checks. and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line. refrigerator and television set. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. each covering the amount of P30. Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note. open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge.95. Ty. was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992. she pointed out. such as the air-condition unit. on 21 April 1997. Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.40. the trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense. the accused Vicky C.00.

the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed. [14] In its Decision dated 31 July 2001.[17] In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term. the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. without due regard to the principles of justice and equity. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.P. 22. She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. .e. it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. i. with due regard to the protection of the social order. in each case. More specifically. B.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check. [16] Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense. [15] In its assailed Decision. redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness. Court of Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.000. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY. Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. [19] Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals.It held that B. the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. She protested that the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically.Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds. she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds: A.. Before the Court of Appeals.P.

She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).P. claims that the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. though not intended to be presented for payment.[22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive. and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. She. In its Memorandum. contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.[21] We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction. and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court. has the same effect as an ordinary check. citing jurisprudence. E. 22. AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. [23] In the instant case.C. D. hence. the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect. absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check. regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. And when a check is presented for payment. not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. the drawee bank will generally accept the same. it falls within the ambit of B. . however.] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY. Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case.

[27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.However. This is speculative fear. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse. Secondly. and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. It should not be speculative.[24] It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. . moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands. In other words. the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will. fanciful. if any. there was no showing that the mothers illness was so lifethreatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or injury. as previously intimated. And. it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide.[29] In this case. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below. Moreover. her mother might commit suicide. [28] It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. To begin with. it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. far from it. the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear. the fear. rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition. imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. (2) the fear must be real and imminent. [26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. [25] It should be based on a real. or remote. the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully. these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands. the willful inaction of the actor. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future. . By her own admission. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. [33] Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. 22. she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. [34] In this case. apart from petitioners bare assertion. for the defense of state of necessity to be availing. she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement. The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. We do not agree. Moreover. the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills. (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. By her very own words. more so. 4. petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of B. the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. Art. Moreover. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case. the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem. Under the circumstances. Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation. this defense is not applicable. [32] In the instant case. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists. (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it. however.P.Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks. [31] Besides. [30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks.

for that of appellants meets the requirement.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration[38] or for value. such as the maker or indorser. [40] In this case. At any rate. suffered or undertaken by the other aide. upon issuance of the checks. subsisting obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This. need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence. or some forbearance. the case of Bridges v. the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check. interest. While the findings therein may establish a claim for damages which. not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its . Valuable consideration may in general terms. Sr. Vann.. or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract. Simply defined. to do. or service given.[41] tells us that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally. For the care given to her kin. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann. Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment. that the same was issued for valuable consideration. the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case[35] for damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption. Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she was not the patient. and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital. or a detriment suffered by the promisee. it is presumed. profit. detriment. at the instance of the promissor. of itself. to act. is sufficient consideration for the new notes.Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid. et al. it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person. Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without consideration. A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. we may add. loss or some responsibility. valuable consideration means an obligation to give. be said to consist either in some right. in the absence of evidence to the contrary. and therefore there was no consideration for the checks. or labor.Parenthetically. As to the issue of consideration. Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract.[39] In alleging otherwise. it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon. Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. to persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law. 22. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated.[46] If not rebutted. where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds.[42] B.issuance.[44] As this Court held in Lim v. it suffices to sustain a conviction. hence. People of the Philippines.P. 22. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. 22 provides: Section 2.[43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. a required element under B. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check. Section 2 of B. Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease contract. [48] In addition.P. when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. [47] Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.  The making. Blg. The . Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused. or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B. [45] what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance. malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.P. drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank. In the 1992 case.

Ty GUILTY of . determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice. as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals. the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance. work violence on the social order. However.Administrative Circular 12-2000. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty. It is stated therein: The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. has established that the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother. in the exercise of sound discretion. [50] adopting the rulings in Vaca v. absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. People.P. In the case at bar.P.[54] WHEREFORE. the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 132001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value. (2) the judges concerned may. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence. 22. and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case. the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit. the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty. Finally. Administrative Circular No. Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B. Needless to say. or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice. 22. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. dated 31 July 2001. the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for value. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine.P.maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B. but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Thus. Blg. finding petitioner Vicky C. Substantial evidence. Blg. or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

.. Petitioner Vicky C.. OF THE G..*** CHICO-NAZARIO... Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. No. J.. JESUS DOMINGO......violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.. and Acting Chairperson... Promulgated: March 2. She is also ordered to pay private complainant..versus - CARPIO. Manila Doctors Hospital...** CARPIO MORALES. Costs against the petitioner..* ....... the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210. Present: QUISUMBING....R.. JJ... PERALTA. 2009 x....-x . SO ORDERED.. PEOPLE PHILIPPINES... Accused-Appellant...000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks......... 184343 Plaintiff-Appellee..

the above-named accused. On 7 March 2003. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. with evident premeditation. 1499-M-2000. Province of Bulacan.: Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G. 1498-M-2000 and No. frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. six Informations[3] were filed before the RTC charging appellant with the following offenses: Criminal Case No. the above-named accused. treachery and taking advantage of superior strength. Indon. J. Philippines. treachery and taking advantage . Philippines. 1496-M-2000 and No. CR No.DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO. armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver and with intent to kill one Marvin G. 1500-M-2000. 1497-M-2000 for Murder That on or about the 29 th day of March 2000. 30511. modifying the Decision [2] dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos. attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. Bulacan. unlawfully and feloniously attack. armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver and with intent to kill one Melissa G. did then and there willfully.R. Province of Bulacan. Indon. 1497-M-2000. Criminal Case No. in the municipality of San Rafael. hitting him on his body thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused his death. assault. in the municipality of San Rafael. with evident premeditation. and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1496-M-2000 for Murder That on or about the 29 th day of March 2000. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. Indon. stab and hit with the kitchen knife and screw driver said Marvin G. 1501-M-2000.

stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw driver one Ronaldo Galvez. thereby inflicting on him serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of Ronaldo Galvez. 1498-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder That on or about the 29 th day of March 2000. Indon. hitting her on different parts of her body thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused her death. armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver. Indon. assault and hit with the said screw driver one Michelle G. Province of Bulacan. Criminal Case No. in the municipality of San Rafael. unlawfully and feloniously. by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Michelle G. this is. thereby inflicting on her serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Michelle G. thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence. armed with kitchen knife and screw driver. assault. hitting her on her back and buttocks. by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ronaldo Galvez. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Indon. with evident premeditation and treachery. with evident premeditation and treachery attack. did then and there willfully. attack. 1500-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder . and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Philippines. hitting him on different part of his body. thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence. 1499-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder That on or about the 29 th day of March 2000. did then and there willfully. Province of Bulacan. that is. stab and hit with the kitchen knife and screw driver said Melissa G. Criminal Case No. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. the above-named accused. Criminal Case No. assault. Philippines. Indon.of superior strength. did then and there willfully. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. a minor of 9 years old. in the municipality of San Rafael. unlawfully and feloniously. the above-named accused. unlawfully and feloniously attack.

armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. Indon. with the assistance of counsel. that is by attacking. Jacinto Caluag. pre-trial conference was held. appellant. the above-named accused. and hitting the said Jeffer G. thereby inflicting on her serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Raquel Gatpandan Indon. with the kettle. the above-named accused. Province of Bulacan. assaulting. Indon. stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw driver one Raquel Gatpandan Indon. [4] Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of complainants Raquel Indon. it was not because of his voluntary desistance but due to the timely intervention of third persons. by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Raquel Gatpandan Indon. Police Officer (PO) 3 Asher Villegas and PO2 Rogelio Santos. thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries and if the accused was not able to accomplish his purpose. and Michelle Indon. . thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. did then and there willfully. attack. did then and there willfully. hitting the latter on his head. On 7 September 2000. that is. Criminal Case No. with evident premeditation and treachery. 1501-M-2000 for Attempted Murder That on or about the 29th day of March 2000. unlawfully and feloniously. commence the commission of murder directly by overt acts. unlawfully and feloniously. Indon. in the municipality of San Rafael. and trial ensued accordingly. Province of Bulacan. Philippines. Philippines.That on or about the 29 th day of March 2000. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. that is to kill the said Jeffer G. with evident premeditation and treachery. hitting her on the different parts of her body. in the municipality of San Rafael. was arraigned and he entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes charged. armed with a kettle and with intent to kill one Jeffer G. Jeffer Indon. Thereafter. Dr. a 2 year old boy. assault.

and 2:00 a. she immediately identified herein appellant as Doser. and hit her right arm three times.000. which rendered the latter unconscious. She also relayed that she was later informed that a struggle ensued between appellant and Galvez. thereafter. Michelle. She then grabbed him and ran towards the gate.00 for hospitalization expenses and medicines. towards Raquels two daughters Michelle and Melissa. Raquel. but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquels sisterin-law. he retorted: Ngayon pa. the receipts were lost except those issued by Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital. Raquel narrated that she immediately recognized the accused. The appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the screwdriver. she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg. she and her minor children Melissa. When Raquel pleaded that the appellant spare her daughters lives. lost consciousness. came to their rescue and tried to subdue the appellant. However. Galvez and the appellant were taken to the hospital. When she tried to escape from the room. before reaching the gate. she spent P90.00 for the food served during their wake. and approximatelyP30.00 for the casket of Melissa Indon. appellant returned back to the house. after which Galvez was able to hit appellant with a piece of wood. After stabbing Marvin. Appellant inflicted wounds on Galvezs upper left chest and arms.000. Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her. Raquel. She also stated that because of her stab wounds. but the appellant followed her. However.00 for the burial expenses of Melissa Indon and Marvin Indon. while Michelle. hitting the latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest. [6] . Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a result of these injuries. a name by which he is known in the community. Their neighbor.m. Armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. Ronaldo Galvez. four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She screamed and was heard by her sister-in-law. Jeffer.000. since the kitchen light illuminated his face. Appellant was angered by her reply and said. San Rafael. using the six-inch screwdriver. Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house in Caingin. whose house was contiguous to theirs. when she was awakened by the sound of appellant kicking their door open. who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious physical injuries. P27.m.Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a. Bulacan. of 29 March 2000. Melissa. When her sister-in-law asked her for the identity of the assailant.[5] Raquel also testified that she spent P15. Raquel got up and ran for help. The appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin.000. nagawa ko na. appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her. Anong Doser? and thereafter pulled a kitchen knife from his right side and stabbed her on the stomach. Marvin.

She testified that the appellant stabbed in the back once.Jeffer Indon. while the kitchen knife and the screwdriver allegedly used by the appellant were turned over to Police Officer Villegas. he was brought to the police station and detained. and Ronaldo Galvez marked as Exhibits E. (2) the Death Certificate of Marvin Indon marked as Exhibit D. to prove that the light from the kitchen allowed her to identify the appellant. he admitted that he did not know who stabbed him. He testified that he also assisted in the operation on Raquel to repair her liver and gallbladder. who was five years old at the time he testified. on cross-examination. After the accused was treated for injuries. stated that the scar on his forehead was the result of the stab wound inflicted by Doser. When they arrived at the crime scene. He also disclosed that Raquel would have gone into shock and died had she not been given medical attention. because a certain Nanang Ella had already seen to stab wound. The complainants and the appellant were then brought to the hospital. They took pictures of the victims. [11] The documentary evidence offered by the prosecution included the following: (1) the sketches of Raquel Indons house. (3) the Medico-Legal Certificates of Raquel Indon. [9] Police officers Asher Villegas and Rogelio Santos testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime after the neighbors of the complainant reported the incident. [7] her her not her Michelle Indon identified the appellant as the man who stabbed her mother.[8] Dr. Thereafter. Jeffer Indon. accused denied knowledge of what happened. They recorded the incident in the Police Blotter and prepared the statements of the witnesses. brother Marvin and her sister Melissa. However. which were damaged. the trial court ordered that Ronaldo Galvezs testimony during his direct examination be stricken off the records due to his absences on the days he was scheduled to be cross-examined. appellant was already tied up. marked as Exhibits A to A-6. She related that she did go to the hospital anymore. [10] In an Order dated 10 July 2003. Marvin Indon. When asked why he committed the crime. Jacinto Caluag stated under oath that he treated Raquel Indon for multiple stab wounds. she hid under the papag. .

appellant testified that prior to the incident. 1499-M-00 and No. 1496-M-00 and No. Regienald Afroilan. On cross-examination he admitted that when he regained his memory. in the amount of P7. and attempted homicide in Criminal Cases No. poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. and (8) Statement of Account of the Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon. he clarified that the evaluation finding that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia covered the period when the appellant submitted himself to examination. (6) Sworn Statements of Ronaldo Galvez and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits K and M. 1500-M-00. and he was advised to have an operation. disorganized speech and behavior. Dr.843. a mental disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations. issued by Sagrada Familia Hospital in the amount of P38. he did not even ask the police officers why he was incarcerated. He only came to know of the incidents from his sister and his children who visited him.F. a witness for the defense.500. 1498-M-00 and No. appellant suffered from Schizophrenia.[13] Dr. He averred that when he regained his memory. a voice would tell him to kill. The RTC gave credence to the principal eyewitness. However on 20 March 2000. (4) the Birth Certificates of Marvin Indon and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits B and N.Occasionally. respectively. one week had already passed since the incidents. issued by the Bulacan Provincial Hospital. marked as Exhibit I. whose testimony was corroborated by Michelle Indon. Afroilan stated that based on his evaluation. and L.[12] In his defense. and nervousness.00. the RTC decreed that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Cases No. regarding appellants attack on 29 .00. psychological examination and final testing to determine if he could stand trial. marked as Exhibit J. also testified that appellant was first brought to the National Center for Mental Health (Center) in August 2004 for a psychiatric evaluation. he was in good terms with the Indon family and that he had no record of mental illness. and he was already detained. 1501M-00. [14] In a Decision dated 13 November 2006. (7) Statement of Account of the Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon. (5) pictures of Melissa Indons lifeless body marked as Exhibits G and O. He suffered from sleeplessness. lack of appetite. but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. frustrated homicide in Criminal Cases No. Raquel Indon. 1497-M-00. he went to East Avenue Medical Center for a medical check-up. On cross-examination. H. He could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness.

Homicide. The trial court found the appellants defense of insanity unmeritorious. the trial court declared that there were no qualifying circumstances to support the charges of Murder. 1499-M-00.000. and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75. and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years of prision correccional as maximum.00. and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years ofprision . 1497-M-00. Attempted Homicide.000. c) In Crim. for the death of Marvin G. b) In Crim. but not at the time the crimes were committed. Case No.00. since what was presented was proof of appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident. Homicide.000. Frustrated Homicide. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying. d) In Crim. and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P10.March 2000. Case No.00. Case No. However. 1496-M-00. minor and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Ngayon pa. Case No. premises considered. the appellant was competent to stand trial. 1498-M-00. and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Indon. and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75. nagawa ko na. the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of: a) In Crim. for the death of Melissa Indon. Frustrated Murder or Attempted Murder. It also noted that based on the psychiatrists findings.[15] The dispositive part of the Decision dated 13 November 2006reads: WHEREFORE.

Frustrated Homicide.00. This was not the case when appellant was first medically examined more than four years after the commission of the crimes.000. all by way of actual damages. and to indemnify the private complainant Ronaldo Galvez in the amount of P30.000.000. insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the crime. and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P10. 1501-M-00. e) In Crim. wherein he faulted the RTC for not taking note of the inconsistencies in Raquel Indons testimony and for not giving due weight to his defense of insanity. and that the inconsistency pointed out by appellantwhether or not Raquel was standing up or lying down when appellant stabbed her legsreferred to minor details.[18] The Court of Appeals nevertheless modified the RTCs Decision dated 13 November 2006 and declared that the qualifying circumstance of treachery. the appellate court adjudged that Raquel Indons testimony was credible. 1500-M-00. Case No.00.000. and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years ofprision correccional as maximum.00. and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years ofprision correccional as maximum. Attempted Homicide. and P30. Appellants response to Raquel Indons pleas also proved that his faculties of reasoning were unimpaired at the time of the attack against Raquels children.00 for food expenses.[16] The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CAG. CR No. f) In Crim. Likewise.00 to cover the casket and burial expenses for Melissa and Marvin.000. accused is further directed to pay to the private complainant herein the sum of P90.[17] In a Decision dated 30 April 2008. Moreover.correccional as maximum.000. 30511. P42. Case No. and to indemnify the private complainant Raquel Gatpandan Indon in the amount of P30.00 to cover hospitalization and medical expenses. which .R.

00.000. The awards for funeral expenses ofP42. and would sustain a conviction for murder.00 awarded by the RTC to P46.000.000.000.000. accused-appellant Jesus Domingo is convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marvin Indon the amounts of P50.343. in accordance with the Statement of Accounts from Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital.000.00 in favor of Michelle Indon and P10. 2006 of the trial court is modified as follows: 1) In Criminal Case No.000. the appealed Decision dated November 13. Furthermore.00 in favor of Jeffer Indon. both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves against an adult.00 as moral damages. [20] In the Decision dated 30 April 2008.00. 1499-M-2000 was affirmed.was alleged in the six Informations along with evident pre-meditation. Melissa Indon.00 as civil indemnity and P50. and Jeffer Indon were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the slightest provocation when appellant attacked them without warning.000.000. since prosecution failed to prove appellants treachery or evident premeditation in his assault against Rolando Galvez.00 and awarded the heirs of each murder victim moral damages in the amount of P50. who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the appellant. occasioned by the deaths of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon. to P50. 1496-M-2000. was adequately proven by the prosecution. the killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon. but reduced the actual damages of P90.00.00 and moral damages of P25.000. [19] The Court of Appeals also modified the trial courts award of damages.00 were also awarded by the appellate court in favor of Ronaldo Galvez.000.00 awarded by the trial court. Moral damages of P25. Michelle Indon. The trial courts award of funeral . Appellants conviction for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No.The penalties imposed were adjusted accordingly. Marvin Indon.00 were deleted by the appellate court for lack of sufficient evidence to support the same.000. It affirmed the trial courts award for moral damages of P10.000. was considered treacherous.00 and food expenses of P30. the fallo reads: WHEREFORE. The appellate court awarded Raquel Indon civil indemnity of P30. Raquel Indon. It reduced the civil indemnity of P75.

as the minimum penalty.000.00 as moral damages. to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium. 343. 1499-M-2000. to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium. accused-appellant Jesus Domingo is convicted of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Melissa Indon the amounts of P50.000.00 as actual damages and P25. accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of frustrated murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum. accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years ofprision correccional maximum. 1497-M-2000. as the maximum penalty and to pay Jefferson (sic) Indon P10.00 as moral damages.and food expenses of P42.00 respectively.00 as moral damages. accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years ofprision correccional maximum. 1498-M-2000.[21] .000. accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years ofprision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum and to pay Ronaldo Galvez P25.00 as moral damages. 1501-M-2000. 6) In Criminal Case No. as the minimum penalty.000. as the maximum penalty and to pay Raquel Indon the amount of P30.000. 1500-M-2000. as the minimum penalty.000. to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium. as the maximum penalty and to pay Michelle Indon P10. 4) In Criminal Case No.00 andP30. 5) In Criminal Case No. 2) In Criminal Case No. 3) In Criminal Case No.000. P46.000.00 as civil indemnity.00 as moral damages.000. are hereby deleted.00 as civil indemnity and P50.

. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT EXEMPTING HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN VIEW OF HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME. and II ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED.Hence.[22] This Court affirms the judgment of conviction. the present petition where the appellant reiterates the assignment of errors that were raised before the Court of Appeals. is assailed by appellant for not being credible due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of conformity with the experience of ordinary men. Raquel Indon. to wit: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution.

had her legs been positioned sideways when she fell. Appellant claims that the conversation between Raquel and her sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary course of things. it would not even be accurate to refer to it as a conversation. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime.Appellant refers to Raquels testimony during cross-examination wherein she narrated that after the appellant entered her bedroom. It is also argued that the appellant could not have stabbed the front of her legs. Raquel also testified during cross-examination that the appellant stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. there was nothing out of the ordinary as regards Raquels testimony on these two matters. But more importantly. he suffered from lack of appetite. Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code. he allegedly heard voices ordering him to kill bad people. Secondly. and anxiety. this claim is not supported by evidence. Any inconsistencies in such peripheral details would not exculpate the appellant. and the appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter proceeded to stab Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. since she would be lying on front of her legs when she fell down. and the latter identified the appellant. Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the alleged crimes. In addition. Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the time he committed the crime. Raquel clearly and positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin when she rushed to the gate and fell down.[23] However. who lived next door. Her testimony was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports marked as Exhibits E and F. and that the initial reaction of people in such a situation would be to ask for help from other people in order to save those who are in danger. these are peripheral details that do not affect the substantial aspects of the incident. sleeplessness. He claims that he does not remember anything that happened on 29 March 2000. it was not impossible for the appellant to stab the front of Raquels legs. Secondly. responded by asking Raquel who her assailant was. First. Her sister-inlaw. there was nothing unusual about the sister-in-laws query as to who was attacking Raquel. To begin with. This Court finds no merit in these arguments. and therefore should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance with Article 12. when . she screamed. Considering that the exchange merely consisted of this question and the reply to it.

and that his reasoning faculties were unimpaired. when the accused is deprived of reason. and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Otherwise stated. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus. [25] Even assuming that appellants testimony is credible. Ngayon pa. lack of appetite. . Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. [26] Raquel Indons narration of the events presents evidence that is more revealing of appellants mental state at the time the crime was committed. and that he was already detained when he became conscious of his surroundings. The law presumes every man to be of sound mind.e. he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern. nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her absolution. while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition.. especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough.[24] Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act. was a positive sign that he was aware of what he was doing. a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed. nagawa ko na. The popular conception of the word crazy is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. i. or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will.the crimes were committed. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. his sleeplessness. the law presumes that all acts are voluntary. Appellants reply to her pleas that her daughters lives be spared.

conduct and appearance. Madarang. Afroilan admitted that his findings did not include the mental state of petitioner four years before. Appellant testified that he had been suffering from symptoms of insanity nine days before the incident. such as evidence of the allegedly deranged persons general conduct and appearance. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court. Medical findings of mental disorder.[30] this Court ruled that the fact that the accused had no quarrel with his victim prior to the killing does not prove the unstable mental condition of the accused. escaped the notice of his family and friends.In People v.[27] It is also remarkable that appellants testimony is not supported by his familys or intimate friends accounts of his purported insanity. Insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject. as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the stand. and its findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. not at any time thereafter. which would denote mental disturbance. unless he was totally deprived of reason. said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. referring to a period after the time the crime was committed. the findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and even accorded finality by this Court. [29] Appellant emphasizes the fact that he was a friend of the Indon family and would not have committed such atrocities against them.The trial court found the testimony of Raquel Indon more credible than that of the accused. showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. [28] It is difficult to believe that appellants behavior. This Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court because it is in a better position to examine real evidence. Regienald Afroilan in 2004. his irrational acts and beliefs. Appellant draws attention to the results of the medical examination conducted by Dr. and that Dr. . The alleged insanity of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. Jurisprudence is replete with cases in which lives have been terminated for the flimsiest reasons. It should be noted however that the examination was taken four years after the crimes were committed. will not exempt him from criminal liability. Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances that might alter the result of the case. as well as his improvident bargains. his conduct consistent with his previous character and habits.

00 in temperate damages for homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. 1496-M2000 and No. the award of P50.00 for each death.000. without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. the award of P25. [36] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code. for the murder of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon. temperate damages may be recovered. to justify an award therefor. such as receipts.000. (4) exemplary damages.00 to the heirs of Melissa Indon. P50. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.00 is awarded to the heirs of Marvin Indon and P50. the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim. The heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are not entitled to actual damages. Nevertheless.000. [32] Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.This Court will now discuss the imposition of penalties and modify those imposed by the Court of Appeals. the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period. [35] The funeral expenses. Appellant is guilty of Murder in Criminal Cases No. 1497-M-2000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is in order. (2) actual or compensatory damages. and (5) temperate damages. In cases of murder and homicide.[37] Thus. (3) moral damages.000. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. [38] The .000. [34] Thus.[31] Thus. to which Raquel Indon referred in her testimony. were not supported by receipts. the penalty imposed on appellant is two sentences ofreclusion perpetua.[33] Under prevailing jurisprudence. the award of moral damages is mandatory. the heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are entitled to temperate damages of P25. as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. because said damages were not adequately proved. or reclusion perpetua. When death occurs due to a crime. The party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.

1500-M2000. since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established.000. Thus.00.000. as maximum. as the maximum penalty. for the attempted murder of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. The killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous. The penalty for Frustrated Murder is reclusion temporal.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 1501-M-2000. and likewise for that of Melissa Indon. as minimum. This Court affirms the award by the Court of Appeals of (1) Civil Indemnity in the amount of P30. is five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty for frustrated homicide.00. awarded by the Court of Appeals.343. the victims in this case were asleep when appellant barged into their house and attacked their family. appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve years of prision mayor. which are supported by receipts .00 should also be awarded. to ten years of prision mayor medium.000. The attack was clearly unprovoked.[42] In Criminal Case No. The penalty for Attempted Murder is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.00[41] and exemplary damages of P25. [39] Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon were both minors when they were killed by the appellant. as minimum. Exemplary damages of P25. which the Court of Appeals imposed. Appellant is guilty of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. appellant is guilty of the Attempted Murder of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. In addition to the moral damages of P10. which must be imposed in its medium period. and they were defenseless against him. In Criminal Cases No.award of P50. appellant is convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide of Ronaldo Galvez.000.00 for medical expenses. there being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the same. [40] Moreover. 1498-M-2000 and No. to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium. appellant is also ordered to pay civil indemnity of P20. are affirmed.000.000.00 for each victim. considering that there were neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that were proven in this case.[43] (2) actual damages of P46. 1499-M-2000.00 as moral damages is in order for the death for Marvin Indon. Moral damages in the amount of P25.000. the penalty imposed on the appellant is two sentences of six years of prision correccional.

affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. WHEREFORE. In Criminal Case No.marked as Exhibits I and J. the appellant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 4. to wit: 1. In Criminal Case No.00. She was undoubtedly unprepared and defenseless to resist appellants attack on her and her young children. 1496-M-2000.[45] At the time Raquel was attacked.00 to Raquel Indon.00 to Michelle Indon. 30511 is MODIFIED in accordance with the hereinabove discussion on penalties and award of damages.000. 1499-M-2000.00 as 2. this awards P25. 5. done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution.000. [44] The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning. unarmed and sleeping with her children. 1500-M-2000.000. this Court additionally awards exemplary damages of P25. Appellant is also ordered to pay exemplary damages of P25. the Court additionally awards civil indemnity of P20. she was in her home. In Criminal Case No.000.R.000. 3.000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Melissa Indon. CR No. 1497-M-2000.00 and exemplary damages of P25. this Court additionally awards P25. All the sums of money awarded to the victims and their heirs will accrue a 6% interest from the time of this Decision until fully paid.000. In Criminal Case No. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G. Court additionally and P25. the instant appeal is DENIED.00 as temperate damages and P25. . 1498-M-2000.000. and (3) moral damages of P25.00 as temperate damages exemplary damages to the heirs of Marvin Indon.000.00 based on the finding that the assault against Raquel Indon was attended by treachery.

* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Respondent. In Criminal Case No. J.AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. in Pasay City. No. SR. 166040 Petitioner. 1501-M-2000. Chairperson. CALLEJO. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. a minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment. SO ORDERED. LLAVE. the above-named accused. CR No.000. 2002.00 to Jeffer Indon. J.. Llave of rape. aka NIEL F. NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES. 26962 affirming.R. C. did .: Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. Metro Manila. with modification. YNARES-SANTIAGO. On September 27. LLAVE. Branch 109.00 and exemplary damages of P25.. Promulgated: April 26. and CHICO-NAZARIO.versus . 2006 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION CALLEJO. Present: PANGANIBAN. SR. Philippines. JJ.. the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. by means of force threat and intimidation. G. an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. . this Court additionally awards civil indemnity of P20. in Criminal Case No. No costs. NIEL F.R.6. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads: That on or about the 24th day of September 2002.000.

[19] Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist. a minor. she complied. She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mothers store. Teofisto gave a written statement to the police investigator regarding the incident. naked from the waist down.[26] . [20] Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p. on top of Debbielyn. she saw petitioner.[21] He rushed to the place and saw petitioner. naked from waist down. There was a little light from the lamp post.[18] Her parents later reported what happened to the police authorities. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs.[5] In 2002. He got on top of her. making pumping motions on her anus.[4] One of their children. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn.m. He shouted at petitioner. feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant. [17] She told her father about the incident. Teofisto shouted at petitioner.then and there willfully.[8] Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud. As she neared the vacant house. unlawfully. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. was born on December 8. who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house. she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p. he went out of their house to get his barbecue grill. Petrified. It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girls cries.[25] Later.[10] Debbielyn testified that on September 24. [12] She resisted to no avail. [13] Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. [24] Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived. Hoy. [22] The girl was crying. DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES. Contrary to law. Debbielyn.m. on September 24. 2002. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.m. [14] She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her. [11] Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. 1994. while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church. against her will and consent.m. and the latter fled from the scene.[7] Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver. [15] She felt pain and cried. 2002.[16] She was sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time. she arrived home at past 6:00 p. a barbecue vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30 p.[3] The Case for the Prosecution The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City. seven (7) years of age. bakit ginawa mo yan?[23] Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.[9] Next to Teofistos residence was a vacant house.

[42] He also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of Completion from the Philippine Air Force Management Information Center. presented Dr.m. 2002. Dr. but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora. [43] He denied having raped the private complainant.[38] The Case for the Accused Petitioner. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the external genitalia. Ni-rape ako. He declared that at 6:30 p. He was also told that the victims father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him. Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez.[46] He did not ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. She declared that the abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of the victim. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into custody. [37] She concluded that her findings were consistent with the victims claim that she was sexually abused by petitioner. she replied that she had been abused. on September 24. he was inside their house. [40] The abrasion was located at of an inch from the anal orifice.[45] He also met his father. for his part. he brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue. who asked him what he had done to their neighbor. and found no injury on the hymen and perineum. 2002. He was also .[41] He had been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and received awards such as Best in Mathematics. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the child.m.[29]On September 25. that day. [28] He then looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmothers house. [39] She explained that the distance between the anus and the genital area is between 2. 2002. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. Manila where she was examined by Dr. 2002. [36] neither did she find any other injury or abrasion on the other parts of the victims body.[31] There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 oclock position near the anal opening. testified that on September 24.Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then left. or any other foreign body[33]) was applied to the perineal area [34] not more than six or seven days before. 2002.[30] Dr. Castillo as witness.[35] The abrasion could have been caused on September 24. Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been raped by petitioner who was then in his aunts house at Cadena de Amor Street. When he asked her what happened. he was outside of their house to buy rice in thecarinderia[44] and he saw her on his way back. Castillo. Mariella S. Kimberly Rose. through counsel. suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house by petitioner. finger. she interviewed the victim who told her Masakit ang pepe ko. and they did as they were told.[32] She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt force or penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis.5 to 3 centimeters. On September 25. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall. His daughter. [27] He rushed to the place and found her daughter crying. Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High School.

According to Marilyn. Moreover. Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunts house and brought him to the barangay hall.[53] The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her. and crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of minority. the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt.[49] While confined at the Pasay City Youth Home during trial. The decretal portion of the decision reads: FROM ALL THE FOREGOING. onSeptember 24.[51] She declared that at about 6:30 p. her son had raped the private complainant.m. he had a crush on Issa.told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunts house. the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged. he being a minor. Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. [47] Later. petitioner acted with discernment. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape. Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years. 1990. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunts house.00). and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50. he cannot be meted with the Death penalty. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while. the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant lot. he inscribed her name on his right thigh. in which it appears that he was born on March 6.[48] Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.[52] At the conclusion of the trial. laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic).Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long. this Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum. left leg and left arm. a young female inmate. 2000.[54] Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. where he averred the following in his Brief as appellant therein: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS . [50] Nida Llave testified and identified her sons Certificate of Live Birth. She went to their house to look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son. WHEREFORE. It also considered petitioners declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.000.

000 by way of moral damages and P20. the fact that forthrightly upon discovery. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution. hence. his conduct during and after the crime betrays the theory that as a minor. the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient of several academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to distinguish. he should be acquitted. [57]contending that the prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with discernment.[59] . which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution[58] dated November 12. SO ORDERED.[56] Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration. the accused-appellant does not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made. the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the maximum. the accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his grandmothers house intimates that he knew that he did something that merits punishment. WHEREFORE.[55] The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on him. Additionally.000 by way of exemplary damages. better at least than other minors his age could. the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness the amount of P50. Contrary to the urgings of the defense. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE. 2004 on the following finding: As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment.WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING. BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTERS FAMILY/RELATIVES.

IV THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY. (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant. II PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS. III WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT. ARGUMENTS I THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE. whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the crime.Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before this Court: ISSUES I WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. and if in the affirmative. (3) whether the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct. VI PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. III PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT. WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME. . petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation before the Information against him was filed. [60] The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1) whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. TO CONVICT II WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER. and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to the private complainant. V THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED. On the first issue.

He points out that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the point that she cried. had the house rented by Teofisto demolished. the latter should prevail. she was. there were passersby along the street. is negated by Dr. When the victim testified that she was raped. Petitioner maintains that as against the victims testimony and that of Dr. The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before. and after the rape based on the undisputed facts. this. As long as the testimony of the victim is credible.On the second issue. while she was being allegedly ravished by him. Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface. saying all that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated. petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. Petitioner stated. the victims testimony lacks credibility in view of her admission that. According to petitioner. as gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. Boy. mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual basis of conviction for consummated rape. as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros Carroso. Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn. For its part. during. he is presumed to have acted without . Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victims parents to complain against him. it is incredible that the victim and her parents would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofistos proddings. Petitioners evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy. on crossexamination. neither is it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim. however. and that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latters parents. It avers that the absence of external injuries does not negate rape. in effect. that his uncle. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material points. Corroborative evidence is not necessary to prove rape. Moreover. Besides. Castillos report. an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the body through the protective covering of the skin. hinalay. petitioner avers. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion. Moreover. Castillos report stating that there was no evidence of injury on the victims external genitalia. Dr. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected to an inquest investigation under Section 7. Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucuds testimony has no probative weight because and had an ill-motive to testify against him. The submission of the OSG follows: Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape incident. Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her testimony before the trial court. such testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated rape. the latter admitted to her that she did not understand the meaning of the word rape and its Filipino translation.

375. not only before and during the commission of the act. supra). Teofisto Bucud. Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. he would have immediately . his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. if he was indeed innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts. Doquena. Discernment. 4062]).R. Under said provision. it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act (People v. he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v. The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecutions witness.G. G. Otherwise. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmothers house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges against him. his attitude and his behavior and conduct. Shortly thereafter. is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong (People v. Navarro. but also after and even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v. 68 Phil. No.). petitioner went into hiding. Hence. 580 [1939]). 1989).discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. 75256. when his parents became aware of the charges against him and that private complainants father was looking for him. writes that discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows: the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9). His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong. petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. In the instant case. as well as his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment. For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age. In the instant case. Hence. Doquena. in judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment. Professor Ambrocio Padilla. in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. January 26. Almodova. his appearance. petitioner insists that there was no evidence presented by the prosecution to show that he acted with discernment. he should be exempt from criminal liability. Rather. the prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with discernment. which may be known and should be determined by considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case. 1998 Ed. [CA] [51 O. who commits an act prohibited by law. petitioners actuations during and after the rape incident.

It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with discernment but failed. or intent on the part of the accused. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not enough evidence to prove that he acted with discernment. [61] In reply. Castillo was on the peri-anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a consistent honor student and has. For a boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish. he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. during and after the rape incident. from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner was being held for trial. petitioners contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. the Supreme Court has stated: The second element of dolus is intelligence. He should not. petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his wrongful act. better than other minors of his age could. which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus. necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. He further insists that there can be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the female organ. 169 SCRA 476 [1989]. freedom of action. garnered several academic awards. The foregoing circumstances. In this case. On the first issue. the law exempts (him) from criminal liability (Guevarra v. Hence. with full knowledge and intelligence. no crime can exist. Aldomovar. sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment before. The record . This is important in cases where the accused is minor. at page 482). therefore. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment. be exempted from criminal liability. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence. During the trial.confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having sexually abused their daughter. in fact. without this power. although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age. This allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment. The petition is not meritorious. and because the infant has no intelligence.

ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule. the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing. petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the Information was filed. in the presence of his counsel. Before the complaint or information is filed. as amended. the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. and thereafter filed a petition for bail. constitutes carnal knowledge. Notwithstanding the waiver. In People v. Section 7. 2002.shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant. 7. the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule. the fact that the private complainant felt pains. a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private complainant as charged in the Information. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10. however. [66] From the victims testimony. She may not have had knowledge of the extent of the penetration. or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum. her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the stage of consummation. he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. He then removed her . After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation. it can be logically concluded that petitioners penis touched the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. the accused may. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Morata[65] the Court ruled that penetration. As gleaned from the Certification[62] of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the Information. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor.[63]Petitioners failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation. [64] On the second issue. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated. no matter how slight.[67] She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. Hence. When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation. even if the penetration is only slight.

Did you go to school from 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p. Q: September 24. it was Tuesday. .m.m. Sir. on the same date I went to school. Q: And what happened to you in going to your house? A: Totoy pulled me. Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home? A: The things she used in selling. Q: And that was past 6:00 p. Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went? A: It is near our house.. where were you? A: I went home. 2002 and going over the calendar. walking distance.shorts and panty and spread her legs. Sir. Q: At about 6:00 p. 2002.? A: My mother asked me to bring home something. 24. Q: And what did you do after you went home? A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.. Q: What is your mother selling in that store? A: She sells quail eggs. sir. Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St. sir. R. already? A: Yes.? A: Yes. Higgins.m. Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail eggs past 6:00 p. Sir. Pasay City? A: Yes. Sept. Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something? A: Yes. He then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina: Fiscal Barrera: Q: From what time up to what time? A: From 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.m. Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was selling quail eggs? A: Yes. Maricaban.

Q: After Totoy ran away. Q: Who heard you crying? A: Kuya Teofe. Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina? A: It was painful. what did you do? A: I cried. Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina. He also removed his shorts. Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips. What happened next? A: Somebody heard me crying. Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips. Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts. the victim was steadfast in her declarations: . what happened next? A: When Totoy ran away. I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my parents. Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house? A: He told me to lie down on the cement. Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying? A: Totoy ran away.[68] On cross-examination. Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement? A: He removed my shorts and panty. what else did you do to you? A: He kissed me on my lips. Sir. Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you? A: Yes.Q: Pulled you where? A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house. what happened next? A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina. Sir.

in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his penis inside your vagina? A: I was lying down.) Q: Where is your anus? A: (Witness pointing at her back.) Q: In your statement. Sir. do you recall that? A: Yes.ATTY. consummating the crime charged: Atty. your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part of your anus? . Q: Where is your pepe? A: (Witness pointing to her vagina. Sir. the victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. Sir. Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina? A: Yes. Baliad: Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused. am I correct to say that Neil. if any? A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina. at the anus. Q: So that. the accused in this case penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus? A: Yes. Q: After he placed on top of you.[69] When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an anus. Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina? A: Yes. you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina? A: Yes. Neil Llave or Totoy inserted his penis in your vagina. Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus? A: Yes. how was your body positioned at that time? A: He placed on top of me. thus. Sir. Q: Aside from lying down. Q: And likewise. BALIAD: Q: Again. Sir. what else did he do to you. She reiterated that the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina. Sir.

Sir.) Q: In your statement.) Q: Where is your anus? A: (Witness pointing at her back. you interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic) masakit ang pepe ko. September 25. the accused in this case penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus? A: Yes. she was sexually abused and that on the following day. especially when the victim is a young girl as in this case. Sir. [70] While it is true that Dr. Q: Where is your pepe? A: (Witness pointing to her vagina. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainants genitalia. the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and reverting to its original form. Baliad: Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused. Sir.? Atty. you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your vagina? A: Yes. Q: And likewise.[72] The doctor testified that her report is compatible with the victims testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner: Atty.m. Sir. am I correct to say that Neil. Q: So that. Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the evening of September 24. your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part of your anus? A: He did not insert anything on my anus. Sir. 2002 at around 6:00 p. do you recall that? A: Yes. such fact does not negate the latters testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus? A: Yes. Castillo. Baliad: . B and C be compatible with the allegation if the minor victim that she was sexually abused on September 24. ni-rape ako. and the medico genital examination propounded on the report that the victim here. 2002.[71] According to Dr. Neil Llave or Totoy inserted his penis in your vagina.A: He did not insert anything on my anus. Sir. xxxx Fiscal Barrera: Q: Based on your testimony doctor. would your findings as contained in this Exh. at the anus. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses.

Overruled. would it be possible that this abrasion could have been caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the anus where you find the abrasion? A: It is possible. Fiscal Barrera: Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents.Objection. M.. Court: What is your objection? Atty. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainants anal orifice could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged: Fiscal Barrera: Q: With your answer. sir. Court: The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint of the minor.[73] Dr. are you aware.D. Sir. the Provincial and Final Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C. Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his penis? A: Yes. Answer. Sir. Baliad: The objection. Mariella Castillo. when I testified. is the question propounded is that it was the minor who made the complaint regarding the allegation. in the process. The one who narrated the incident is the mother. Sir. Q: Now. .. whose signature is that doctor? A Both are my signatures. at the lower portion of these two exhibits there appears to be a signature above the typewritten word. Fiscal Barrera: The answer were provided. Witness: A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor. Your Honor. would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person inserting his erect penis inside the vagina. in the course of your examination. that the alleged perpetrator is a 12-year-old minor? A: I only fount it out. Your Honor.

considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true. Thus. if considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyns parents. misconstrued or misinterpreted. then only a seven.[75]The Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and found her testimony credible. are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances of substance were overlooked. Sir. Fiscal Barrera: That would be all. Your Honor. which. Neil testified as follows: Fiscal Barrera: Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn.[77] . as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said findings. It is inconceivable that the private complainant. Sir. petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had no ill-motive against him. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses. do you think of any reason as to why they would file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter? A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me. and Marilou Santos.[74] Petitioners contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into testifying is barren of merit. from the age of thirteen to sixteen. we. Jr. courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired. We have held that when the offended party is young and immature.year old Grade II pupil. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner and remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. could have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true. not being a physician. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the perpetrator. Do you know of any reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse? A: I dont know of any reason.Q: To enlight[en] us doctor. spouses Domingo Santos. Indeed.[76] Neither do we lend credence to petitioners claim that the charge against him is but a fabrication and concoction of the private complainants parents. at what age could a male person can have erection? A: Even infants have an erection.

the only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. when the parents learned that their daughter had been assaulted by petitioner. his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape. the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughters psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. he and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities.[82] In the absence of proof of improper motive. [81] Thus. paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability. petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by. her testimony. Even absent a medical certificate. but also after and during the trial. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence. even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial courts ruling. The crime may be committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises. unless he acted with discernment. Article 12. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.[79] The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the odious act.[80] In this case. freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. [84] On the other hand. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance. the presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify.[78] On the other hand. Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter before she testified. [83] The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had carnal knowledge of the offended party. This manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for his delictual acts. Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.[85] The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what . attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act. standing alone. Teofistos testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible. impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in their midst. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner. hence. hence. That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner.

CR No. Doquea. he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.R. he was a 7 th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. In the present case. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING. . In this case. The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even received awards. hence.00 as exemplary damages. respondent. the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest. There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him. he was the best in his class in his academic subjects.00 as moral damages and P20.000. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness. In People v. he finished a computer course. and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case. no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and proved by the People. dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. this court is convinced that the accused. Pangasinan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. and during the time he was studying therein he always obtain excellent marks. the award must be deleted. he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof. ALVIN JOSE. and as such pupil. [86] At his the age of 12. petitioner. acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act.he was doing and that it was wrong. exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. with methodical fashion. vs. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother. While in Grade I.[87] the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with discernment in raping the victim under the following facts: Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question. [88] The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50. SO ORDERED. of the New Civil Code. Under Article 2231. the petitioner. in committing the crime.000. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Calamba. convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b). Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. pp. in the municipality of Calamba.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe money bills supposedly amounting to P100. P/Supt. did then and there willfully. As culled by the trial court. 4-7). SR. the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about November 14. assisted by counsel. October 3. pp. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseurbuyer. Laguna. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba. the above-named accused. 6425. Castro.. 1996. 1995. J.R. SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van.00. as amended.[3] The accused. The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in an Information. confederating and mutually helping one another.000. Article IV in relation to Section 29. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. the evidence of the prosecution established the following: [O]n November 14. Province of Laguna. The information was that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Article IV of Republic Act No.40 grams. 2-8 and TSN.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. a regulated drug. not being licensed or authorized by law. Laguna. 1995. unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98. . conspiring. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and out (TSN. P/Supt. CONTRARY TO LAW. Acting on such report. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of a P1.DECISION CALLEJO. pleaded not guilty to the charge. 1996. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an information from an unnamed informant. Joseph R. and in violation of the aforestated law. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Branch 36. Joseph R. Real.000. July 11.

Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio Guevarra. 3-8). One of the men saw a substance inside the said compartment. SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. Mandaluyong. on November 13. in turn. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Guevarra scratched his head.5 Million peso (sic). SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra. to change money. They drove towards Greenhills. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1. 9-10 and TSN. Immediately thereafter. They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. 1996. Metro Manila.It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. The buy-bust bundle of money bills and the shabu were recovered. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. UBV-389 arrived. They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. handed the bundle of money bills. the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. Col. Col. the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was consummated (TSN. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. October 3. He showed the aforecited bundle of money bills. pp. They were later able to identify three of these people as Police Supt.[4] On the other hand. the accused therein were able to establish the following facts: Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that. While inside the said room. July 30. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1. 1996. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Suddenly. was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN. She reported and testified that the specimen. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. pp. They were eventually blindfolded. July 30. a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. 1995. 9-13). indeed. Then. It was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife.5 Million as ransom for the . they were at SM Mega Mall (sic). Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. one of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarragas car. pp. On the way to Greenhills. 1996. They were all in civilian clothes. July 30. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher. William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. pp. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN. 1996. He tasted it. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another car while another person drove Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. Joseph Roxas Castro. Sonny Zarragas cellular phone rung. 3136).

the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty.000.000. Serrano. Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit. is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board. In the service of sentence. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of P75. for violation of R. Christopher R. passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. Col. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank manager to call the police. Col. six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. There. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. 6425. Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col.00.00 in cash and Sonny Zarragas car spare tire. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the P2. the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be credited in their favor. SO ORDERED. . The agreement was that in the bank. The agreement did not materialize. P85. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. jack and accessories. [5] On June 10. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of. after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Castro left the bank in a hurry. the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.[6] On appeal to the CA.A. The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry.000. they were investigated. Atty. 1998.00 using Sonny Zarragas ATM card. Branch Clerk of Court.release of Sonny Zarraga. as amended. this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE. THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS. III EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST THEM: THE (a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST THEM. Appellant Jose. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration.[8] The petitioner asserts that. he was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime.II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND.[7] The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. now the petitioner. filed his petition for review on certiorari. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose. WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA. alleging that since the Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to prove the same. a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with . under paragraph 3. hence. WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY. AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT. ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT. ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. (b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT. The appellate court denied the motion. he should be acquitted. alleging that THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER.

his overt acts before. It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts. who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed. For its part. In such case. wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding. during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto. when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer. hence. the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin. [10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable. his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti. a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. that he acted with discernment. by direct or circumstantial evidence. as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. such presumption is rebuttable. the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner. 603. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code. if he could afford to buy shabu. meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. No. there was no need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. but that the prosecution failed to do so. it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability.discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra. The petition is meritorious. SPO1 .D. The petitioner insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under paragraph 1.D. he is entitled to an acquittal. [12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor. as amended by P. co-accused Sonny Zarraga. the prosecution is burdened [11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt.[9] However. In the present case. his attempt to silence a witness. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabusubject of the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment. 1179.) No. acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseurbuyer.

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative. Sir. Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car. what was his response? A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu. after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. Q Did his companion bring out the shabu? A Yes. Q What happened to the shabu? A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.Guevarra replied in the affirmative. Sir. Q Now. Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that question? A Sonny Zarraga. who handed the same to the poseur-buyer: Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu? A The two of them. . The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga. Sir. what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu? A He handed it to me. Sir. Q After that. Sir. Sir. I withdraw that. tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically. Sir. Sir. Q And what was your response? A I answer in (sic) affirmative. what did you tell them? A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams. Q And what happened next? A After that I showed my money.

Sir. Sir. Q Now. Sir. do you know. I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the money. [13] Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused? . Q And after that.Q After this shabu was handed to you. what happened? A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga. Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by these police officers? A Yes. tell us. Sir. Sir. in particular. Sir. Sir. Sir. Sir. Q Now. who arrested Sonny Zarraga? A Yes. what happened next? A I made signs to my companions. after you handed the money to the accused. Q What signs did you give? A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head. Q And how did your companions respond to your signal? A After scratching my head. A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives. what happened next? A After examining the shabu. which money are you referring to? A The P1.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money. Q When you say money. my companions approached us and arrested them.000. Q Tell us. A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna. Q Please tell us.

in what container was it contained? A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper. Alvin Yamson? A I dont know the exact age. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo. Sir. Q Who made the request for its examination? A SPO3 Edgar Groyon. may I remind you that.A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory. [14] It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. Guevarra. the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. what I know is that he is a minor. Sir. you stated the age of the boy? . Q Tell us. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buymoney from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga. Q Eventually. Indeed. in your affidavit. Sir. Sir. Sir. VERANO: Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant? A No. Q Earlier. Q Mr. the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. Sir. Sir. What did you do with the shabu? A While we were at the area. when this shabu was handed to you by the accused. We quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer: ATTY. you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)? A I dont know. you said that the shabu was handed to you.

Sir. May I proceed. 1995 and did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon? WITNESS: . [15] Even on cross-examination. VERANO: May I ask. Your Honor. were you not surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs? FISCAL: It calls for an opinion. FISCAL: Q Mr. We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioners answers thereto: FISCAL: Cross. ATTY. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age. WITNESS: A No more. because I know that young boys are being used by pushers. if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu. you started your narration that it started on November 13. Your Honor. Your Honor. Witness. Sir. the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. COURT: The witness may answer.A I cannot recall anymore. COURT: Please proceed.

on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the police. Sir. Sir. you said that at one occasion on that day. is that correct? A Yes. Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to anybody since the day that you were arrested? A He did not say anything. Sir. is that correct? . you came from Filinvest. that person did not have any knowledge where your car was? A No. Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car? A No. Q Now. at 12 oclock? A No. Q Now. this man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. At whose waist? A From my cousin. Q And at that time. Sir. you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car. Sir. Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area of SM Megamall. when you went to Manuela.A Yes. Q Now. Quezon City. Q What time did you leave? A After lunch. he just get (sic) the cellular phone. Quezon City? You left Filinvest. going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted by a male person at the workshop and then you went out of Megamall and when you went outside. Sir.

Sir. Your Honor. Sir. Sir. Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall. Sir. you claimed that there was already this group which met you? A Yes. Q And at that time. ATTY. Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time? A No. VERANO: No re-direct. Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person who arrested you? A Yes. FISCAL: No further question. that man did not make any radio call to anybody? A No. Sir. are you willing to submit yourself to an examination? WITNESS: . Your Honor. Sir. Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall. In support of your claim. earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen any shabu. Q These people do not know your car? A No. Sir.A Yes. he had not made any call? A No. COURT: Q Mr. Witness.

The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Plaintiff-Appellee. Your Honor. Accordingly. attempt to show his discernment. But. is SET ASIDE. even if he was. SO ORDERED. he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. the government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him. . [18] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment. the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court? A Yes. DefendantAppellant. Moreover. Recto for Appellant. its cross-examination of Rene did not. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba. in People v. Indeed. in this regard.[17] we held that: Clearly. MAXIMO MARALIT. v. [19] No costs. and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong. is untenable. indeed. Laguna. COURT: The witness is discharged.A Yes. Sir. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Branch 36. The crossexamination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. in any way. the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Estepano.R. a co-conspirator.[16] The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer. CR No. Claro M. THE UNITED STATES.

. 6. there appears to be a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. — In reviewing the facts in a criminal case the Supreme Court. he acted with discernment. ID. ID. 8. ID. on review of the facts... provided that the same shall always be less by two degrees. in determining the credibility of witnesses whose testimony is in conflict.. ID.. 4.. ID. and will not disturb its conclusions in that regard unless the record discloses some reason therefor. — The finding that such person acted with discernment must be based upon evidence found in the record.Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.. ID. in committing the crime. that a witness declare directly and in words that he acted with discernment... — The Supreme Court will not reverse a judgment of conviction in a criminal case unless.. J. — To establish the fact that such person acted with discernment it is not necessary. attitude and conduct of such person during the trial. ID. the trial court must make an express finding to the effect that. SYLLABUS 1. : . ID. FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT AS TO CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. DISCERNMENT.. — Where the accused is a minor of less than 15 and over 9 years of age. — In order to convict a person of that age and impose a criminal penalty upon him. in the commission of the crime. than that prescribed by the law for the offense committed. APPEAL. INFANTS. a discretionaly penalty should be imposed. or from facts of which the court may take judicial notice. it is a necessary inference that he so acted. ID. 5. ID. ID. — A person over 9 years of age and under 15 is exempt from criminal liability unless. EXEMPTION FROM RESPONSIBILITY. will be guided to some extent by the opinion of the trial court on that matter. ID. from the evidence as a whole.. ID. 3. 2. REVERSAL. ID. or upon the personal appearance and conduct of that person during the trial. DECISION MORELAND.. ID. at least. — In arriving at the conclusion that such person acted with discernment the trial court may take into consideration all the facts and circumstances presented by the record as well as the appearance. CRIMINAL LAW. DISCRETIONAL PENALTY. 7. ID. even if it were permissible. he acted with discernment. it is sufficient that.

when they met the defendant and a companion. in the commission of the crime.000. The paragraph of article 8 referred to provides that a person over 9 years of age and under 15 is exempt from criminal liability "unless he has acted with discernment. in self-defense. that is. Florentino bringing up the rear. the fact that he acted with discernment. the court shall make an express finding upon this fact. The accused and his witness tell a different story. fails to furnish sufficient reasons to reverse the trial court on the facts. the certificate of death stating that his age was fifteen. and struck him several times with a club. after some sharp words had passed between them. As they were passing each other they heard a sound similar to that made by the dropping of one of the bundles of zacate." That paragraph also provides that "in order to impose a penalty upon such a person. A careful examination of the evidence. acted with discernment. with the deceased Florentino. The defendant and his companion then ran away. however. The witnesses and Florentino went home. Counsel for appellant vigorously and ably attacks the findings of fact of the trial court and attempts to show that he should have accepted the testimony of the defense rather than that of the prosecution as a basis for his conclusions. Counsel for appellant strenuously contends that the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution did not prove that the accused. and to pay the costs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library We are satisfied that the defendant below. returning to his bundle of zacate. stabbed Florentino Luistro in the side with a knife and caused his death. whereupon the accused. They soon separated and Florentino. . The deceased was less than 16. Two witnesses testified to the occurrence on behalf of the prosecution and stated that they." that is. stooped to pick it up when the defendant ran to him quickly and stabbed him in the left side with a knife. They instantly turned and saw Florentino and the defendant fighting with their fist.The appellant was convicted of homicide and sentenced to five (5) years of prision correccional. to the accessories provided by law. in stabbing the deceased. with complete discernment. Florentino died a few days later as a result of the wound thus received. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1. In spite of the insistent argument of counsel for the appellant we must conclude on the record that there is no reason for a reversal of the trial court with regard to its findings of fact. . he contends that there is no evidence in the record upon which that finding can be based. he alleging that it was . While counsel admits that the trial court found that the accused acted. with a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his act. were walking along in single file each with a bundle of zacate on his head. made use of his dagger with the effect already noted. This argument is based upon the age of the accused and paragraph 3 of article 8 of the Penal Code. in which it is claimed that Florentino made an attack upon the accused. . without jurisdiction. Upon this evidence the trial court found with the witnesses for the prosecution. The accused was less than 15 years of age at the time the crime was committed.

: This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur. Article 85 of the Penal Code provides that — "In the case of a minor of less than fifteen and over nine years of age. together with the appearance of the accused as he stood and testified in court. at least than that prescribed by the law for the offense committed. who is found by the court to have acted with discernment. convicting appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano with four counts of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. the judgment is affirmed. concur. vs. in Criminal Cases Nos. as counsel asserts. The trial court taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances presented by the record."cralaw virtua1aw library Following the provisions of this article the penalty imposed should have been two (2) years of prision correccional instead of five years. therefore. it is a necessary inference that he so acted. Libmanan. not being exempt from criminal liability. drew the conclusion that he was of sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with judgment to know that the act which he committed was wrong and that it was likely to produce death. DECISION CALLEJO. but to establish that fact it is not necessary that some witness declare directly and in words that he acted with such knowledge.000 as exemplary damages in all the cases. that it must appear from the evidence that the accused acted with knowledge of the nature of his acts and of the results which would naturally follow therefrom. Branch 56.000 as moral damages and P200. J. and ordering each of them to pay damages to the victim as follows: P200. It is true.the duty of the prosecution to prove that fact by affirmative evidence. appellants. In pursuance of that conclusion the court made the finding that the accused in committing the act complained of acted with discernment. We are satisfied that the contention of counsel is not well grounded in this particular case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. and. from the evidence as a whole.. provided that the same shall always be less by two degrees. L-1679 and L-1680. appellee. JJ. As so modified.. It is sufficient that. SR. Trent and Araullo. a discretional penalty shall be imposed. So ordered. BERNARDO CORTEZANO and JOEL CORTEZANO. however. that the penalty imposed is not correct. We are of the opinion. The Indictments . Carson. Torres.

[2] The second Information docketed as Criminal Case No. intimidation and with grave abuse of confidence. feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge one after the other with Leah C. Philippines. with lewd design. Elmer. Cortizano (sic). taking advantage of their superior strength with force. the accused entered their plea of not guilty. the accused .On November 22. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. to spend her vacation with her three children: eight-year-old Leah. Camarines Sur. 1990. conspiring. The Cortezano residence was located at an isolated patch of land. in the afternoon at Bgy. confederating together and mutually helping one another. did then and there wilfully (sic).[3] On arraignment. three-year-old Leah Lou. 1990. conspiring. Philippines. against her will and the offended party suffered damages. (sic) Azucena. ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. Municipality of Sipocot. confederating together and mutually helping one another. A consolidated trial of the two criminal cases then ensued. L-1679 reads: That on or about the 6th day of May. 7 years old. L-1680 reads: That on or about the 10th day of June. minor. Cortezano. (sic) Azucena. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge one after the other with Leah C. Province of Camarines Sur. Province of Camarines Sur. minor. ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. who was barely a year old. 1994. Lourney Cortezano decided to take a leave of absence from her part-time job in Cubao. intimidation and with grave abuse of confidence. remained in their residence in Caloocan City. the above-named accused. two separate Informations for rape were filed against the appellants. located at Barangay Azucena. Santiago and Nita Cortezano. Lionel was also sick with asthma so Lourney could rely on her mother-in-law to take care of him while she was at work. did then and there wilfully (sic). Municipality of Sipocot. Quezon City. Nita and Santiago slept in a room separated from the sala by a curtain. The first Information docketed as Criminal Case No. and Lionel. The Case for the Prosecution Sometime in March 1990. 7 years old. the above-named accused. Sipocot. Lourneys husband. who was then twelve years old. the accused Bernardo (Butchoy) Cortezano. Lourney decided to stay in the house of her parents-in-law. taking advantage of their superior strength with force. with lewd design. in the afternoon at Bgy. Their children. against her will and the offended party suffered damages.

Joel and Bernardo would threaten to kill her and her family if she told anyone what they had been doing to her. 1990. Bernardo went on top of Leah and inserted his penis into her vagina. Leah felt something slippery inside her vagina. who was six years old. Leah suddenly awoke when she sensed pressure on her arms and legs. but she was told that nobody would hear her. After every sexual intercourse they had with Leah. Leah had no choice. Joel and Bernardo then called Leah Lou and Lionel into the room. as well as Joel. Joel and Bernardo again ordered Leah to go to her grandparents room. Leah tried to fight Joel. Early in the afternoon of May 6. Leah went out of the room and washed her vagina. Bernardo stood by the window as a lookout.Joel and Bernardo laughed as Boyet was having his turn with Leah. Momentarily. Leah struggled but was easily overpowered by her uncles. Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of the family if she told anyone about what happened to her. Joel. Joel and Bernardo ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their parents room. letting them see their sister naked. but the latter was enraged. while Bernardo stood by the window to serve as a lookout. It was Joels turn to stand by the window as a lookout. slept beside each other in a room near the kitchen. Joel and Bernardo undressed her.Joel Cortezano. 1990. When she opened her eyes. Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what Joel and Bernardo were doing to Leah. Joel and Bernardo ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened to box him if he refused. She did as she was told. and Joel and Bernardo again wet her vagina with their saliva. Leah once more felt something slippery in her vagina. Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what happened to her. Joel inserted his penis into her vagina. Bernardo then stood up. who was then only thirteen. After that first harrowing incident. Joel and Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily. leaving her children in the care of her parents-in-law. Leah was told to lie down. Joel and Bernardo wet her vagina with their saliva. beside the couples room. Bernardo and Tinggang. Lourney returned to Caloocan City. their six-year-old nephew. Joel then laid on top of her. Leah protested because it was hot in that room. By mid-April of 1990. but Joel told her that it would be futile to do so because their neighbors were far . She threatened to shout. On June 10. and Boyet Orcine. also lived with the couple. After Joel dismounted. she went to the room and slept. Tinggang. holding her hands and pinning her legs with his. they were holding her hands and feet as she was being undressed. she saw her uncles Joel and Bernardo. Petrified. Lourney and her children. Joel threatened to whip her if she refused. At night. as he inserted his penis into her vagina. Bernardo then held her hands as Joel mounted her. She was about to shout. Bernardo and Boyet left the room together.

Camarines Sur. When Lourney asked her daughter. Every now and then. Lourney did not hear from her husband and did not know where he was. Because of the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of her uncles. 1993. Dr. June 11. Elmer arrived in Sipocot and stayed with his parents. The next day. Azucena and brought her children to Pili. 1993. Mrs. Caloocan City. Azucena and brought her children back to Caloocan City. Quezon City. with the following findings: FINDINGS: GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL: Fairly developed. Monares advised Lourney to ask Leah herself. 1990. Lourney learned from Boyet Orcine that her daughter Leah had been sexually abused by Joel and Bernardo way back in 1990. Leah told her mother that Joel and Bernardo had whipped her and she did not want to return to Sipocot. with Joel standing by the window to see if anyone was coming. Breasts are conical with pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Her studies were financed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Freyra examined Leah and submitted Medico-Legal Report No. 1993. On May 27. Sometime in March 1993. Lourney arrived at Brgy. 1994. . Joel and Bernardo again threatened to kill Leah if she told anyone about the incident. She asked Leah if she recalled anything that happened to her while on vacation in Sipocot in 1990. [4] Lourney immediately contacted a certain Mrs. On September 20. Abdomen is flat and soft. M-0807-94. fairly nourished and coherent female child. 1993. Lourney left Pili and arrived in Caloocan City on June 1. and inquired whether the information relayed to her by Boyet Orcine could be true. Lionel and Leah Lou once again stayed with their grandparents in Brgy. On May 21. Silang. Since then. Lourney brought Leah to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. Monares. Leah felt pain in her lower abdomen (puson). 1994. Cristina B. a social worker at the DSWD of Pili. Camarines Sur. was Lionels birthday.Lourney followed her family to Sipocot on June 20. Ma. Joel dismounted and Bernardo had his turn. Elmer had a quarrel with his parents and left Brgy. Lourney left Brgy. the latter replied that Joel and Bernardo had raped her. Boyet told Lourney that Leah Lou had suffered the same fate as Leah. Leah remained in Caloocan City to continue her schooling. On August 23. Azucena. Azucena. in time for Leahs enrollment at the Kalayaan Elementary School in Brgy. she would feel numbness on the left side of her body.away.

when she charged him with the rape of Leah Lou. On May 9. He and his mother arrived in Manila on May 6. When asked about his medical certificate regarding his treatment at the PGH during the period stated. Thereafter. for about a month and helped the latter manage her store. however. Camarines Sur. to help his cousin. In August 1990. Manila. he returned to the hospital for check-ups. There were.[6] The Case for the Accused Bernardo was born on January 22. Manila. He met his sister-in-law Lourney only in 1994. 1994. 1990. He testified that on March 28. in San Andres. convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. 1994 in People v. had punished him for it. Camarines Sur. Alvin Reoval. to plow and harrow his rice field and plant palay. Joel was discharged from the hospital and stayed in the house of his aunt. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger. he returned to Sipocot. He received P3. 7 and 9 oclock. Joel testified that he lost the same during a typhoon.[7] filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pili. he was advised by the doctor not to leave the hospital. Lourney and Leah arrived in the Criminal Investigation Field Office in Naga City where they gave their respective sworn statements to PO3 Elmer V. Bernardo Cortezano. 1990 and stayed in the house of his aunt Concordia Hernandez in San Andres. and his father. Concordia Hernandez. Camarines Sur.[5] On June 16. Caceres. he went to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of leukemia and stayed there for three days.GENITAL: There is absence of pubic hair. When Bernardo thought that his parents were no longer mad at him. He denied the charges. he arrived in Bagadiong. Joel Cortezano testified that he was born on November 1. 1993. Santiago. 1990. Barangay Bagadiong was adjacent to Barangay Busak. as . 1976. Thereafter. He claimed that efforts to secure copies of the said medical certificates proved futile. and that he pleaded guilty on his arraignment. He had lost his school bag. Libmanan. and one would take four and half-hours by carabao to traverse Busak from Bagadiong. Labia majora are full. he returned to Sipocot on April 5. many passenger jeepneys and buses plying the Busak-Sipocot route. 1978. Every now and then. Joel stayed in the hospital for one week. Joels mother fetched him from San Andres and brought him to Novaliches for two days. as he needed blood transfusion. He admitted that he was charged with raping Leah Lou on April 21. He had nowhere to go except to his cousins house. fleshy-type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3. On separating the same disclosed an elastic.150 for his services.

Chief of the Medical Records Division of the PGH. but it was their father Elmer who was with the children at the time. respectively. He testified that he did nothing while he was away. Sancho returned to Manila and when he went to visit Elmer at his house. Fe B. were there. It would have thus been impossible for Leah to be in Sipocot on May 6. during that time. 1990. she and Joel went to Elmers house in Caloocan City where they saw Leah. whether or not he was hospitalized in this hospital way back 1989. 1990 to June 10. However. The second instance was in 1992. as the latter was suffering from leukemia and needed blood transfusion. and his grandson Boyet (Bulilit) stayed in his house. on the other hand. please be informed that as per hospital records. On rebuttal. Aside from this. Sancho left on May 11. 1989. 1990.the employees who released the certificates were busy. his daughters Melanie and Teresita. His son Elmer also arrived in Sipocot during this time. the prosecution presented two letters from Mrs. November 2. Nita Cortezano testified that she left Sipocot on May 6. 1990 for Manila to accompany her son Joel to the PGH. 1990 for Cebu where he got married seven days later. 1989 and April 6. He returned from the hills only in 1993. Boyet Orcine testified that on May 6. On May 28.They stayed in the hospital for about two weeks. only Lourney and the children were there. a certain Joel Cortezano consulted on an outpatient basis sometime on August 16. and that he was never confined at the PGH in 1990. which was very far from the house of the Cortezanos in Barangay Azucena. 1989 and April 6. Elmer was not in his house but Lourney and her children. On June 3. Joel consulted the hospital on August 16. he was in the hills with his mother Emerlina Cortezano in Barangay Tulay. Baes. 1990. Leah and her siblings indeed spent their vacation in Sipocot. Bernardo. Joel denied raping his niece Leah. The said letters read as follows: In connection with the letter received by this office requesting for a record of a certain Joel Cortezano. Nita further testified that it was only in 1991 when Leah and her siblings were first brought to Sipocot by Lourney. Sipocot. who were 16 years old and 10 years old. 1990 to inform the latter of his marriage. 1990.[8] . that as an outpatient. 1990. Joel was brought to Manila for a check-up at the PGH. 1989. November 2. He testified that between May 6 and June 10. They did not immediately return to Sipocot as they were ordered by the attending physician to stay in Manila. 1990. Sancho Cortezano testified that he went to the house of his older brother Elmer in Caloocan City on May 10. Santiago Cortezano corroborated in part his wifes testimony. including Leah. 1990. left the household in June 1990.

to disprove.00) each. and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.000. this appeal. in both criminal cases. Batis. as amended. may I inform you that he was never confined in this hospital anytime in 1990. Joel and Bernardo. (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved. it is difficult to prove. The appellants assert that Leahs testimony is incredible. In her sworn statement to the police authorities.[10] Hence. He only consulted on April 6.[11] that there are three (3) settled principles to warrant a conviction for rape. this Court finds the accused. note. the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with great caution. JOEL CORTEZANO and BERNARDO CORTEZANO. and to indemnify the offended party Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50. but her testimony in the trial court tends to show that she claimed to have been raped only on May 6 and June 10. and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50. Considering . GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two crimes of Rape as defined and punished under Article 335. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR RECLUSION PERPETUA each. the two would surely have immediately reported the matter to their parents. as moral damages in each criminal case. of the Revised Penal Code. in view of the aforecited considerations. and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. and to pay the costs of this suit. If Leahs claim that her sister Leah Lou and her brother Lionel saw her naked had any ring of truth to it. 1995 re: JOEL CORTEZANO. but more difficult for the person accused. now the appellants. it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt before a judgment of conviction could be rendered against them. the court rendered a decision convicting the appellants of four counts of rape. citing People v. though innocent. considering that they acted in conspiracy in the commission of the act. SO ORDERED. hence. The appellants also claim that although their defense of alibi is inherently weak.In reply to your letter dated August 15. she claimed that she was raped thirty-six times. 1990. namely: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. 1990 on an outpatient basis. Boyets denial that he had sexual intercourse with Leah belied the latters testimony that she was likewise raped by him.00) each in each case. The period of their respective preventive detention is considered in the service of their sentence. as exemplary damages.[9] After trial.000. barren of probative weight. The fact that they did not do so raises serious doubts as to the veracity of Leahs testimony.

(Pp. 215 SCRA 759) In fact. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who. emphatic. (Pp. GR 112529. firm and undisturbed. January 18. Cura. Leahs declarations remained consistent. Leahs categorical. the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of the victim. in tandem with those of the other witnesses of the prosecution: Whatever inconsistencies or lapses there were. the incident having happened three (3) years before the examination. accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. moreover. During the trial. 1995)[14] The bestial defloration was mirrored in Leahs being. though how lengthy and rigid the crossexamination was. corroborated Leahs testimony that she was indeed raped.the prosecutions evidence. the same relate to trivial matters and do not in any manner affect her credibility and the veracity of her statements. V. The medico-legal findings. as she was uncontrollably shaking and crying. appellate courts will not disturb the credence. V. Guanson. the Interpreter had to shield Leahs line of vision upon advice of the Presiding Judge. Furthermore. when the accused would come within her view. This Court in People v. or lack of it. yet there are healed lacerations evidencing the sexual attack. Olivar. such minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of humiliating experience which are painful to recall. conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate the truth against falsehood. their defense assumes importance and is even decisive of the outcome of the case. spontaneous. The Court finds the appeal without merit. Her tears and statements were not contrived but borne out of a genuine feeling of bitterness.[13] In this case. unlike appellate magistrates. and straightforward answers during the cross-examination strengthened and explained whatever missing facts there were on direct examination. as she cringed and trembled whenever she sees the accused. unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstance of significance. Thus. could weigh such testimony in light of the declarants demeanor. tattered as it is. She sobbed bitterly as she narrated her nauseating experience in the hands of her uncles and even eloquently declared in a loud voice: . Although there are no fresh hymenal lacerations. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.[12] ruled: Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts.

The next day. Q: What is the surname? A: Cortezano. TSN dated January 27. She told me. she recounted. 1990. 1995)[15] This Court ruled in People v. Sir. because she was to go back to work in Manila. that she is to leave on May 5. thus: Q: On May 6. the sordid details on how the appellants ravished her and satiated their bestial proclivities. Q: What specific occur[r]ence? A: The raped (sic) that they did to me. after lunch. Indeed. Sir.hindi ko kailangan ang pera. Q: Can you possibly tell the Honorable Court. Sir. Q: Tell the Honorable Court. (Pagsasamantala) Q: They. do you know any unusual incident that took place involving that person? A: Yes. Sir. Q: Feel free to tell the Court. how this raping incident was done to you? A: Yes. 1990 to June 10. as can be gleaned from Leahs testimony. with tears cascading from her eyes. 9. 1990. to whom are you referring to? A: My two uncles. A: (Witness crying) That vacation mama left us at Sipocot. Sir. ang kailangan ko ay katarungan! (p. Joel and Bernardo. Dy[16] that the victims act of crying during her testimony bolsters the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. Joel and Bernardo did something bad to . what is that all about? A: That occur[r]ence was done to me by my two Titos.

he held the broom attempting to whip me. I was about to relay to her the incident. (The witness showed the scratches that were already healed)When we reached Manila my father asked me about what happened and we told him. 1990 took place? A: After lunchtime. (The witness cried. that they were whipping us. when I refused. my two hands were being held and my legs pinned down. I was crying the (sic). what was the abrasions in my arms all about. They kicked me from where I was standing. I went inside the room. I told her that my arms was (sic) strucked (sic) by wire. but I just could not because the two of them were watching me. Because of fear. 1990. and I run (sic) and when they overtook me. and when I woke up I noticed that they were doing something bad to me. I could not move because they (sic) were two of them. Witness. 1990 until June 10.)[17] Q: Ms. They placed saliva in my vagina and inserted their penis in my vagina. when it is too hot in that room. . Q: What time did this incident on May 6. lets do it in the grass land. Our house is situated in a secluded place.When my mama asked me. They told me that if I shout it will be useless because no one will hear me because the house was really far from neighbors. he told me to go inside the room. and she asked if there was something bad happened. one was watching outside. while complaining to them why ask me to sleep in that room. and I was thrown with my bottoms (sic) hitting the mud first. after that my grandmother arrive (sic). Then. 1990. I was strangling (sic). I told them I dont like it anymore. They stopped doing this to me when my mother arrive[d] on June 10. I told her there was none. he will whip me. they stripped off my panties.me. I slept. He told me to obey otherwise. The first thing I saw was Tito Joel was (sic) doing to me. After lunch. They said. they were planning to do something bad to me. as far as you can recall when was (sic) this incident happened? A: On May 6. Q: How many times were you forced to lie with the accused in this case from that period? A: Thirty six times. When we were about to leave.

can you possibly explain further to the Honorable Court how was it done? A: When I woke up they were already undressing me. and I was ordered to get inside the room of my lola. Q: What is that bad you are referring to when you say that the accuseds (sic) in this case were doing bad things to you when you woke up? A: I was being raped. who was the first one to rape you? A: Joel Cortezano. (Witness is crying).Q: Tell the Honorable Court what was the participation of the accused Joel and Bernardo Cortezano in this incident of May 6. if any? . otherwise he will whip me with the broom (walis-tingting). Q: There are two accused in this case. Q: When you said they. what did you feel. Q: When you say rape. Q: And so. they held my hand and my legs and I could not move and Tito Joey[18] inserted his penis to my vagina and Tito Butchoy[19] was standing by the window and watching. Q: On the basis of that instruction. Q: And so what happened next? A: I slept and when I woke up they were doing something bad on (sic) me already. 1990? A: I was ordered to get inside the room together with my brother and sister. what did you do. Q: What was the answer of Joel in relation to your complain[t] that the room was hot? A: I better obey. just what do you mean. if any? A: I obeyed even if the room was hot. to whom are you referring to? A: Joel Cortezano and Bernardo Cortezano. they undress me.

what happened next? A: They left the house and were at the sampaloc tree. what happened next. Q: What is that same thing Boyet did to you. he also did the same thing to me. with regards to Bernardo Cortezano besides his watching in the window as you say? A: After Tito Joel did that to me. if any? A: He also held my arms and inserted his penis into my vagina. 1990? A: I was seven years old. after the accused Joel Cortezano did this to you. Q: What else happened.A: I felt something slippery was left inside my vagina. Q: You testify (sic) that one of the accuseds (sic). if any? A: Tito Joel went beside the window and watch while Bernardo Cortezano also inserted his penis to my vagina. if any? A: Boyet went inside the room followed by Tito Joel who went inside again and told Boyet to do what they were doing otherwise he will hurt Boyet and since Boyet was frightened. you also have to do what we are doing. Bernardo Cortezano. Q: And so. Q: And so. if any? A: I feel that there was something slippery again was left inside my vagina. after Bernardo Cortezano did this to you. Boyet. so Boyet did the same thing to me. otherwise we will hurt you. a cousin of mine when inside the room and ask what they were doing and Tito Joel answered. after Joel Cortezano did the same thing to (sic). . Q: When Bernardo Cortezano inserted his penis into your vagina. tell the Honorable Court what is this thing that Bernardo Cortezano did to you. Q: How old are (sic) you then during that incident as related on May 6. if any. what did you feel. Bernardo Cortezano also did it to me and after that.

did you not resist their advances? A: I fought back but they were too strong for me. what incident took place. if any? A: On June 10. A: I was at the house of my lola. to whom are you referring to? A: Joel and Bernardo Cortezano. Q: What time was that already? A: It was after lunchtime. one held my arms and the other was on top of me while he inserted his penis. Q: Please tell the Honorable Court what is that same thing you are referring to which was done to you by the accuseds in this case on June 10. will you please point to them? A: (Witness pointing to a man wearing stripe[d] polo who identify (sic) himself as Bernardo Cortezano and the man wearing a gray polo who identify (sic) himself as Joel Cortezano). Q: Who kissed you on the lips? . Q: At the time when these accused Joel and Bernardo Cortezano started making advances. 1990. I want to shout but Joel told me not to because nobody can hear me. 1990 it was the last time they did it to me. 1990? A: They remove (sic) my panty and they place saliva in my vagina and then they held my arms and pinned my legs and then kiss me on the lips. where were you on June 10. Q: When you say they. Q: If they are inside the courtroom. Q: Now we come to the incident of June 10. as far as you can recall. Q: While you were at the house of your Lola. what happened next? A: They laughed at me and then they called by brother and sister and told them to peep at me and they saw me naked. 1990.Q: And so after that. they warned me not to tell anybody otherwise they will kill me and my family.

[21] As emphasized by this Court in People v. if any? A: They left the room and went to the sampaloc tree and they laughed at me. Considering that the young victim had not been exposed to the ways of the world. her own uncles. but Leah. it is most improbable that she would impute a crime so serious as rape to any man. De Guzman. It bears emphasis that the victim was barely seven years old when she was raped. then I went out of the room and wash my lips. all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. she says. especially a minor particularly in cases of incestuous rape. in effect. if the charge were not true. stated that she had been raped by the appellants on a daily basis and testified thereon. does not render her testimony implausible. [23] In People v. because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame. especially one of tender age. Well-settled is the rule that the testimonies of young victims deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. says she has been raped. in her sworn statement to the police authorities.A: Joel Cortezano. humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished. it is clear that statutory rape was committed to victim Leah Cedilla Cortezano for thirty six (36) times by accused Joel Cortezano and Bernardo Cortezano. what happened next. [20] Leah was brought by her mother to Sipocot to spend her vacation with her grandparents. and the rapes were committed in the house of the .[24] we held: Well-established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims. Q: And after kissing you on the lips. 1990. Quezada:[22] No woman. In a litany of cases. allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial. we have applied the well settled rule that when a woman. especially child victims. would concoct a story of defloration. [25] The barefaced fact that the public prosecutor opted to charge the appellants with only four counts of rape on May 6 and June 10. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault. are given full weight and credit. Even the municipal trial court which conducted the preliminary investigation of the cases found probable cause against the appellants for thirty-six counts of rape: From the evidence of the prosecution. only to be waylaid and enslaved by the appellants. unless she is motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. more so if she is a minor.

[26] The provincial prosecutor may have opted to file only four counts of rape instead of thirty-six counts of rape for reasons other than the implausibility of Leahs testimony. Forward this case and its entire records to the Honorable Senen C. 1990.[28] Alibi cannot prevail over the positive. from May 6. clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. the defense must establish by positive. until June 10. In the present recourse. Bernardo even testified that it was possible for him to have returned to Sipocot if he wanted to. 1990. [27] For alibi to prosper. Camarines Sur Hall of Justice. The children were too young to realize the importance of reporting such an incident to their parents or grandparents. as there were passenger jeepneys and buses plying the route four times a day. Bernardo failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been in Sipocot on May 6 and June 10. As consistently held by this Court: [A]libi is the weakest of all defenses. Camarines Sur. and. Naga City. SO ORDERED. while Lionel was only a year old. the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur. it is respectfully recommended that THIRTY-SIX (36) complaints for rape should be filed in the Regional Trial Court against accused JOEL CORTEZANO and BERNARDO CORTEZANO. 1990.paternal grandparents of victim Leah Cedilla Cortezano located in Barangay Azucena. the following must be established with clear and convincing evidence: (a) the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense. for all the foregoing considerations. At the time. and not merely the accused was somewhere else. Leah Lou was barely three. [29] There is no evidence that his running away from their house was even reported to the police authorities. . for appropriate action. WHEREFORE. It is a settled rule that for an alibi to prevail. He even failed to present his cousin Alvin Reoval to corroborate his testimony. The appellant merely relied on his testimony and that of his father to prove his defense. Neither is Leahs testimony enfeebled by her siblings failure to report to their parents or grandparents that they saw her naked on May 6. Lirag. 1990. (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime. the appellants defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Sipocot. straightforward and spontaneous testimony of the victim identifying the appellants as the malefactors and how they consummated the crimes charged.

which we find to be implausible. No mother in her right mind would subject her child.[30] Boyet Orcines bare denial that he was forced by the appellants to have sexual intercourse with Leah cannot prevail over Leahs positive and categorical testimony. on his incredible claim that the person releasing the certification was very busy and could not issue a certification. he failed to produce any.Nevertheless. but was never confined in the said hospital. 1990. while Bernardo was 12 years and 4 months old. In this light. it would be contrary to human nature for a mother like Lucita to expose her daughter of six years to the rigors of a trial of rape which may leave her stigmatized for life. the revelation of an innocent girl not even into her teens whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit. just so she could exact her pound of flesh against accused-appellant. [31] This Court also held in People v. as the willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. November 2. 1989. this Court has uniformly rejected similar defenses on the ground that it is unbelievable. Joel was 13 years and 6 months old. to go through the rigors of undergoing a rape case just to exact revenge. He failed to prove that he was treated at the PGH and was confined thereat on May 6 and June 10. . it is accused-appellants claim that the rape charge against him was merely fabricated by complainants mother in order to get back at him. De Guzman[32] that: All told.Appellant Joel Cortezano likewise failed to substantiate his alibi. who is of tender age.This was belied by the certifications issued by the PGH that the appellant had consulted the PGH as an outpatient only on August 16. 1990. to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man. in addition. involve another daughter as corroborative witness. the proffered alibi of accused-appellant cannot stand against the positive identification by the complainant that he is the defiler of her womanhood. and. it is most improbable for an innocent and guileless girl of seven years as herein-offended party. let alone her uncle. if it were not true. In short. In several rape cases. they are not exempt from criminal liability. When asked to produce any certification to prove his claim. Indeed. As the trial court well-observed. The appellants failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that Leah had any ill motive to implicate her cousin Boyet. The appellants claim that the charges against them were instigated by Lourney to hit back at her husband and his family deserves scant consideration. 1989 and April 6.[33] The Court notes that the appellants were still minors when they committed the offense. this Court had the occasion to say: Indeed. At the time.

68. and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.[35] Since the appellants were both minors at the time they committed the offenses. but also after and even during the trial. not only before and during the commission of the act. A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes is exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor acted without discernment. who commits an act prohibited by law. thus: (a) they wetted the victims vagina before they raped her. is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. which exempt from liability.Article 12. the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the appellants acted with discernment when they raped the victim. In determining if such a minor acted with discernment. in which case. such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.The following are exempt from criminal liability: 3. the very appearance. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen. Duquea[34] is instructive: The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine. (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim. (b) one of them acted as a lookout while the other was raping the victim. The Proper Penalties The imposable penalty for rape committed by two or more persons under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to death. Circumstances. paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 12. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove that a minor acted with discernment when he committed the crime charged. the very comportment and behavior of said minor. (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping the victim. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. the very attitude. the Courts pronouncement in Valentin v.When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the . In this case. unless he acted with discernment. they are entitled to the benefits of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code which reads: Art. (c) they threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her parents what they did to her. (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked after the appellants had raped her.

it shall be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the appellants. Ignominy was attendant when the appellants forced Boyet Orcine to rape the victim. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the proper period of the said penalty. adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime. and laughed as the latter was being raped by Boyet. L-1679 was aggravated by the appellants. the crimes were not aggravated by abuse of superior strength because the said circumstance is already considered in the penalty imposed by the law for the crimes.However. The court did not award civil indemnity in both cases.[38] this Court ruled: Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. a discretionary penalty shall be imposed. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty. In these cases. [36] The appellants are the uncles of the victim.[37] In People v. the following rules shall be observed: 1. which has a range of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Fuertes. who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment. However. prision correccional. as amended. which has a range of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. depending upon the presence or absence of modifying circumstances.000 as moral damages and P50.provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code. Although the crimes were committed before the effectivity of the said Rule. Two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor.000 as exemplary damages to the victim in each case. . the aforementioned modifying circumstances cannot aggravate the crimes and the penalties therefor because the same were not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 9. and when they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their naked sister after the appellants had raped her. one degree lower than prision mayor. The decision of the trial court shall thus be modified. pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The clause Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age. the crimes were aggravated by relationship. The crime charged in Criminal Case No. [39] Civil Liabilities of the Appellants The trial court awarded P50. but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

L-1680.R.000 as moral damages.000 and moral damages of P50. the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment (two counts) of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period. No. the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence (two counts) of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period. In Criminal Case No.000.000 as civil indemnity. plaintiff-appellee. Camarines Sur. BIENVENIDO CAPISTRANO.000 as moral damages.000 as civil indemnity. to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period. vs. L-4549 October 22. L-1679. and P25. 1952 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. P100. defendant-appellant. Each of the appellants is ordered to pay the offended party Leah CortezanoP50. Trias for appellant. However. Thus. G. to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING. L-1679 and L-1680. and P50.000 as moral damages.000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.The trial court convicted the appellants of two counts of rape in each case. JUGO.000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.000 for every crime committed by the appellants. and P50. P50. P100. as minimum. in Criminal Cases Nos.000 as exemplary damages.000 as moral damages.000 as civil indemnity.: . the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan. Miguel F. Thus. P50. as maximum. J. Leah is entitled to civil indemnity of P50. [40] The appellants are also liable to the said victim for exemplary damages for each count of rape in the amount of P25. each of the appellants shall pay the offended party the total amount of P100.000 as civil indemnity. SO ORDERED. as minimum. Each of the appellants is ordered to pay the offended party Leah Cortezano P50. In Criminal Case No. and P25.000 as exemplary damages. as maximum. Branch 56. Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Esmeraldo Umali for appellee. each of the appellants shall pay the offended party the total amount of P100. finding the appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.

II At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8. Dolores Enriquez. the appellant attempted to sexually . all armed.000 and the costs.Bienvenido Capistrano was charged before the Court of First Instance of Quezon province with the crime of treason on four (4) counts. The defendant argued at the trial court that there was no evidence showing that he had been appointed a Yoin or that he was a Makapili.000. raised the mosquito nets and ordered the inmates to rise. Province of Tayabas (now Quezon). he finds no substantial error committed by the trial court and prays for the affirmance of the judgment. The attorney de oficio of the appellant states in a petition filed with this Court that after having read. The appellant and his companions entered the house. Remedios Anastacio. Philippine currency. was a guerrilla lieutenant in Lopez and Salvador Fortuna. U. and P4. Wearing a Japanese military uniform. The evidence of the record establishes the following: The accused Bienvenido Capistrano admitted being a Filipino citizen. the defendant with other Filipino members of the Yoin and several Japanese soldiers. Maria Canada. a brother of Placer. Municipality of Lopez. Teodora Zamora. They took Graciano Fortuna and other inmates to the Japanese garrison at Lopez. arrived near the house of Carmen Verdera in Barrio Malay. and ordered the inmates therein to open the door. which means an armed soldier of the Japanese. Count No. was a soldier in the said organization. Brisilio Canada. One night during the detention of Placer and her companions in the Yoin garrison. The appellant and his companions tied Graciano Fortuna. Presentacion Anastacio. reread. the witness Placer Canada testified. While no written formal appointment was introduced in evidence. Alejo Enriquez Wong. I Alejo Enriquez Wong and Carmen Verdera testified that the defendant was a socalled Yoin. Count No. yet it is clear that he was engaged in the work of guarding the Japanese garrison. Carmen Verdera. To the same effect. Rufino Rivera.000. armed with a gun and wearing a Japanese uniform and taking part in the military drills of the Japanese army. Tayabas (Quezon) and then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The intruders then searched the premises and seized from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1. son of Graciano. currency.S. The motive for the raid was that Pedro Canada. and studied the evidence. 1945. he rendered services to the Japanese army as a guard of a Japanese garrison. He was found guilty by said court and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10. and Placer Canada with a rope which was used as a clothesline.

and . with costs. 47 Off Gaz.500 Japanese war notes. the penalty imposed upon the accused is hereby modified by imposing upon him four (4) years of prision correccional. No. yet it may be considered as a special mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty by two (2) degrees. but when the women cried and the Japanese came.R. to pay a fine of P10. It is so ordered. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. It should be noted. Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the accused because he was over eighteen (18) years old at the time of the trial (People vs. 5652. J. VALCESAR yMACAMAY. Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO. that he appeared as the leader or commander of the raiding party. -versus CHICO-NAZARIO. Estefa. However. 173876 Petitioner. 104).abuse Placer and her companions. The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen (15) years of age at the time that he committed the crime. Although his minority does not exempt him from criminal responsibility for the reason that he acted with discernment. The charge was testified to by several victims. 86 Phil. 11. NACHURA. Chairperson. In view of the above special mitigating circumstances of minority. the defendant escaped. the court which had the opportunity to see and hear the accused at the trial found that he acted with discernment.000. Placer and her companions were released after one month when they paid to the chief of the Yoin and the appellant the sum of P2. ESTIOCA G.000 and to indemnify Alejo Enriquez Wong in the sum of P6. furthermore. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine and the indemnity. No.

.R. J... of theOzamiz City Regional Trial Court (RTC)...... CR No. subdivision (a)..REYES... respectively.... affirming with modification the Decision[3] and Order[4] dated 5 April 2004 and 17 August 2004.... Branch 35.. Respondent.... JJ. in Criminal Case No..... ...... June 27.........: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court..... number (2) of the Revised Penal Code... 00036 dated 30 June 2006. [1] petitioner Valcesar Estioca y Macamay prays for the reversal of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 3054.. finding him guilty of robbery under Article 299...-x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO.. 2008 x . Promulgated: PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES.

in the City of Ozamiz.00. stole and carried away the following: A.000. thus: That on July 28. and destroyed the padlock of the main door of the classroom of MS. When arraigned on separate dates with the assistance of their counsels de oficio. One (1) 3D Rota Aire Stand Fan color brown worth P3. One (1) Sharp Karaoke Tower Single Player color black worth P6. Panasonic Colored TV 14 B. willfully. belonging to the Ozamiz City Central School represented herein by MS. the accused took.00. petitioner. the RTC charging Kevin Boniao (Boniao) and Emiliano Handoc (Handoc) with robbery. One (1) worth P6.00.000. with intent of gain.[6] Thereafter. at about 8:00 oclock in the morning. . PANAL. Philippine Currency. Philippines. trial on the merits ensued. to the damage and prejudice of the said school thereof. in the aforementioned sum of P15.000. PANAL and once inside.00. destroy. 2001.000.00. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Bacus. unlawfully.000. and C. the above-named accused. and feloniously break. all valued at P15. Marksale Bacus (Bacus). Boniao and Handoc pleaded Not guilty to the charge.Culled from the records are the following facts: On 31 July 2001. did then and there helping one another. SELINA M. SELINA M. an Information[5] was filed before petitioner.

[9] The prosecution also submitted object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses. to wit: (1) a T-shaped slightly curved iron bar. Panal. Panal (Mrs. petitioner and Bacus walked out of the classroom carrying a television.The items were placed inside a tricycle. She proceeded to her classroom and discovered that it was forcibly opened. Bacus and Boniao boarded the tricycle. Panal). Petitioner andBacus then proceeded to the classroom of another teacher. Nico. Pactolin for the chore. then eleven years old and a Grade VI student of Ozamiz City Central School (OCCS). television and electric fan therein were missing.The prosecution presented as witnesses Nico Alforque (Nico) and Mrs. After petitioner. Pactolin requested him to get some waya- waya and dapna inside the OCCSs canal to be used as fish food. Afterwards. Thereafter. Nico saw by climbing over the OCCSs gate. Mark Alforque (Mark). She immediately reported the incident to the police. petitioner. at about 8:00 in the morning. petitioner and Bacus destroyed the padlock of the classrooms door using an iron bar and entered therein. a karaoke and an electric fan. Pactolin). Mark went home while Nico stayed inside the OCCS because Mrs. woven together. which is 10 mm. and his cousin. and that the karaoke. Mrs. Bacus. They received P30. went to the OCCS and cleaned the classroom of a teacher named Mrs. which was located near the OCCSs canal. Panal went to the OCCS for a dance practice with her students. The OCCS principal informed her thatNico witnessed the incident.00 each from Mrs. and thereafter brought them to the school gate. bear the following: On 28 July 2001 (Saturday). Thereupon. Handoc drove the same and they sped away.[7] While petitioner catching waya-waya and dapna inside and Bacus enter the OCCSs premises the OCCSs canal. They went over the gate with the items and handed them over to Boniao and Handoc who were positioned just outside the OCCSs gate. Mrs. Celina M. Subsequently. Myrna Pactolin (Mrs. by 12 . Boniao and Handoc were charged with robbery. 29 July 2001. [8] On the following day. Their testimonies.

and (2) a Yeti brand. Ozamiz City. An emergency hospital worker named Dennis Fuentes. came to his house and brought him to the City Hall Police Station for investigation as regards the incident. Afterwards. After cleaning the house. Later. colored yellow. told him that some people had gone to the house looking for him. marked as Exhibit B. the latter punched him in the stomach causing him to kneel down in pain. he went to the house of his neighbor/friend. Junjun Ho (Junjun). Junjuns father arrived. chest and palm with lighter. padlock used in Mrs. and since the father and son had to discuss important things. Upon approaching Colonel Bation. who was also present. Petitioner and his co-accused denied any involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. Myrna Macamay. two unidentified persons. Michael called Bacus and Boniao who were then standing nearby. Petitioner Estioca testified that on 28 July 2001. For its part. However. He told Michael not to accuse him of stealing as it is not a good joke. one of the police officers therein told him to approach a certain Colonel Bation who was also inside the police station. cigarette butts and matchsticks. Boniao and Handoc to testimonies of refute the foregoing accusations. Panals classroom and marked as Exhibit A. Rolly Agapay (Agapay). a certain Michael approached him and inquired as to where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS.inches in size. Colonel Bation asked him where he sold the television but he told him he had nothing to do with it. accompanied byBoniao. he decided to go home which was about past 3:00 in the afternoon. [10] During the interrogation inside the police station. Upon arriving home. he ate lunch and rested. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day. his aunt. Bacus. from 8:00 in the morning up to 10:00 in the morning. and the two pointed to him as the one who sold the television. he cleaned his house located at Laurel Street.[11] . to help the latter in cleaning his houseyard.Colonel Bation took a whip and smacked him with it several times on the body. the defense presented the petitioner. Panals classroom. he was jailed. Thereafter. used in destroying the padlock of Mrs. stripped him naked and burned his scrotum.

Thereupon. he slept at the guardhouse of the Ozamiz City National High School (OCNHS) which is located in front of the OCCS. narrated that he knows Bacus because the latter resided in a house located just in front of the OCNHS. testified that on 28 July 2001. at 8:00 in the morning. he was taken to the Ozamiz City Hall for investigation. He was taken to a nearby port where he was asked to identify the persons involved in the robbery of the OCCS. Ozamiz City. he and Bacus went to the OCCS to pick up plastic bottles scattered therein. When he could not say anything about the incident. that he and Bacus usually slept at the guardhouse of the OCNHS. and that Bacuswoke up on the following day. At about 11:00 in the morning of the same day. an OCNHS working student and a resident of the said school. a certain Leoncio apprehended him and brought him to his parents house. Ozamiz City. to buy chicken feed. The two then brought him to the nearby seashore where they were met by a group of persons headed by a certain Maning. several persons went to his parents house and arrested him. On the following day. Ozamiz City. While on their way home. his mother beat him and forbade him to go out of the house. Upon arriving home. Subsequently. On 30 July 2001. a resident of Barangay Lam-an. at 7:00 in the morning.Bacus. he and Bacus left the OCCS. After gathering some plastic bottles. 28 July 2001. at about 8:30 in the morning. at about 7:00 in the morning. he was brought to the City Hall Police Station where he was jailed.[13] Boniao.[12] Agapay. they tortured and beat him for refusing to admit involvement in the incident. Subsequently. [14] . He told the two that he had nothing to do with the incident. he woke up and helped his mother in selling bananas beside their house which is situated in front of the OCNHS. he cleaned his parents house and thereafter watched television. 28 July 2001. while on his way to Barangay Tinago. that on the night of 27 July 2001. he and Bacus slept at the guardhouse of the OCNHS. a certain Michael Panal and an unidentified companion blocked his path and asked him if he was the one who robbed the OCCS. 14 years old and resident of Barangay Tinago. declared that on the night of 27 July 2001.

paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Emeliano Handoc to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day . paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and upon applying Art. Boniao and Handoc of robbery under Article 299. the sentence meted out to Boniao was suspended and his commitment to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) was ordered pursuant to Presidential Decree No. MisamisOccidental. finding accused Valcesar Estioca y Macamay alias Bango. Ozamiz City. 603. Clarin. arrested him and took him to the City Hall. 68. Ozamiz City. The trial court imposed on petitioner. a minor. this court hereby sentences them (a) Valcesar Estioca. Marksale Bacus. that he went back to Barangay Tinago. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and Indeterminate Sentence Law and Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for by law (Art. Marksale Bacus alias Macoy. [15] After trial. Since Boniao was a minor (14 years old) when he participated in the heist. who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. that he was repeatedly beaten by police officers for denying any involvement in the incident. the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 April 2004 convicting petitioner. the former barangay captain. Emeliano Handoc y Bullares alias Eming and minor Kevin Boniao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery defined and penalized under Article 299.000. a pedicab driver residing at Barangay Tinago. that Tomas Medina. and that he was detained at the City Hall Jail. 64. Nonetheless. stated that he helped his brother-in-law in quarrying gravel at Panay- ay Diot.Handoc. number (2). Bacus. he was sentenced to a lower prison term of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to payP15. Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum. at about 4:00 in the afternoon of 28 July 2001. subsection (a).00 as civil liability. 1) unto Kevin Boniao. that police officers in the City Hall inquired as to where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS but he replied that he had nothing to do with it. [16] The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. subdivision (a). par. eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. on the whole morning of 28 July 2001. to fourteen years.

The Order of this court dated August 20. The accused are entitled 4/5 of the time they were placed under preventive imprisonment. The cash bond in the amount of P24. otherwise if he is incorrigible. the sentence imposed upon him is hereby suspended pursuant to PD 603 as amended and he is therefore committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for reformation. then the sentence shall be imposed upon him by the court. the RTC issued an Order partially granting the motion. [17] Petitioner. With respect to Kevin Boniao.[19] The trial court lowered the penalty imposed on them but affirmed its earlier finding of conspiracy and conviction. It concluded: . Boniao and Handoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision arguing that there was no conspiracy among them and that the penalty imposed was erroneous. Bacus. It also ordered the DSWD to release and turn over Boniao to his parents.of Prision Mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years.00 and to pay the costs. to indemnify the civil liability of P15. [18] On 17 August 2004. eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and (b) KevinBoniao (minor) to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional as maximum and all of the accused to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law. 2001 is hereby cancelled and revoked.000 posted by accused Valcesar Estioca is hereby cancelled and the same is ordered released and returned to the bondsman concerned.000. The DSWD is hereby ordered to have close surveillance and supervision upon him and to constantly observe the development of his behavior and to submit to the court a report/recommendation on the matter as prescribed for by law.

The appellate court held that Boniao is exempt from criminal liability but his civil liability remains pursuant to Republic Act No. Marksale Bacus and Emeliano Handoc being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of he crime of Robbery. 64.[21] Bacus. 2006. defined and penalized under paragraph 4 of Art. the imposable indeterminate penalty meted to accused Valcesar Estioca. As aforestated. thus: . ranges from four (4) years. thus: On a final note.000. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code with Art. On 30 June 2006. All of the accused shall indemnify jointly the civil liability of P15. paragraph 1 of the same Code. 9344. otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. We hold that herein accused Kevin Boniao should be acquitted and his criminal liability extinguished pursuant to Republic Act No. considering that it is axiomatic that an appeal opens the entire case for review and considering further that any decision rendered in the appeal does not bind those who did not appeal except if beneficial to them. as herein modified. Boniao and Handoc did not appeal their conviction anymore. The pertinent provision thereof provides. which took effect on May 22. petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Order before the Court of Appeals. the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor upon applying the privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 9344 otherwise known as The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision and Order. 64. and for minor accused Kevin Boniao.WHEREFORE. two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum with accessory penalty provided for by law. Revised Penal Code. 68. 299 of the Revised Penal Code upon applying Indeterminate Sentence Law with paragraph 1 of Art. [20] Unsatisfied.00 and to pay the costs. minor accuser Kevin Boniao is hereby ordered released from DSWD and returned to the custody of his parents.

petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds: I. xxxx The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability. WHEREFORE. the child shall be subjected to Section 20 of this Act. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. II. without prejudice to his civil liability. WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ALLEGED ROBBERY WHICH HAPPENED ON BROAD DAY LIGHT AND IN THE PRESENCE OF ALLEGED TWO (2) EYEWITNESSES UNDER HUMAN EXPERIENCE CAN POSSIBLY BE PERPETUATED BY THE ACCUSED. the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and the August 17. 9344. 6. .However. premises foregoing.Sec.A. No. which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. [22] On 21 August 2006. 2004 Order are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that accused KEVIN BONIAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged pursuant to Section 6 of R.

Panals classroom because. this Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court. and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear. As an eyewitness to the . He asserts that no person would dare commit robbery in broad daylight and in the presence of other people because they would be easily identified. according to Nicos own Affidavit.[25] In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses.Nico was inside the classroom of Mrs. (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality. positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.[26] After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing parameters to this case. Pactolins classroom prevented Nico from witnessing the incident. the Court is called upon to determine whether the testimony of Nico is credible given the surrounding circumstances of the incident. we find no cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the RTC that Nicos testimony is credible. Petitioner maintains that the testimony of Nico regarding the fact that the robbery was committed in broad daylight (8:00 in the morning) and in full view of Nico is against human nature.WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGED LONE WITNESS NICO ALFORQUE COULD HAVE POSSIBLY WITNESS[ED] THE ALLEGED ROBBERY INCIDENT. as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand. He insists that the walls of Mrs. Pactolin during the incident. [23] Simply put. misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case.[24] Petitioner further claims that it was impossible for Nico to see petitioner and Bacus destroy the door of Mrs. unless there is a showing that it overlooked.

Q: What particular school are you referring to? A: At Ozamis Central School. sir. Pactolin. Boniao and Handoc helped one another in robbing the OCCS is candid and convincing. Q: Would you be able to tell us the name of the teacher of that particular classroom you were cleaning? A: The classroom of Mrs. Bacus. Boniao and Handoc as those who robbed the OCCS of an electric fan.00 sir. television and karaoke on the morning of 28 July 2001. Bacus. 2001 at about 8:00 oclock in the morning. Q: How much? A: P30. sir. could you be kind enough to tell us where were you at that time? A: We were cleaning the room of the school. were you being paid? A: Yes sir. Q: Why did you clean the classroom of Mrs.incident. Pactolin. Nico positively identified petitioner. . sir. thus: Q: Now. His direct account of how petitioner. on July 28.

Pactolin together with Mark Alforque. after cleaning the classroom of Mrs. Q: What fish food are you talking about Mr. did you observed (sic) anything unusual that happened? A: Yes. Witness? A: Wayawaya and Dapna sir. Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this Court now what did you observed (sic) that time when you were getting the fishfood? A: I saw somebody climbed the gate sir.Q: Were you alone in cleaning the classroom of Mts. . Q: While getting the fishfood for your teacher. what did you do next? A: My cousin went home and I was left in the classroom because I was requested by my teacher to get fish food. Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this honorable court who was your companion at that time? A: My cousin Mark Alforque sir. Q: Now. sir. Pactolin at that time? A: We were two sir.

xxxx

Q: Where were you at that time Mr. Nico Alforque?

A: I was inside the school sir.

Q: What particular place are you referring?

A: Near the canal sir.

Q: And would you be able to tell us also how far were you when you
saw these persons climbing the gate?

A: I was a little bit farther sir.

Q: After you saw the two persons climbing the gate, what happened
after that?

A: I saw that the padlock was opened.

Q: What particular padlock are you referring to?

A: I saw a padlock made of iron.

Q: And what particular classroom or place were these persons you saw
that they were opening the padlock?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal sir.

Q: Who is this Mrs. Celina Panal?

A: A teacher sir.

Q: Would you be able to tell us whose classroom these persons you
saw opening the padlock?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Panal sir.

Q: Would you be able to tell us how did they opened (sic) the
classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal?

A: The room was opened with the used (sic) of an iron bar sir.

Q: I am showing to you this iron bar, what relation has this iron bar to
the one you said a while ago?

A: That is the one used by the persons to open the classroom sir.

TO COURT:

We would like to request your honor that this iron bar be marked as
our Exh. A.

COURT:

Mark it.

TO WITNESS:

Q: And what about the padlock, would you be able to identify the
padlock that was used (sic) by these persons?

A: Yes sir.

Q: I am showing to you this padlock, would you kindly tell this Court
what relation this padlock to the one you stated a while ago?

A: That is the padlock used (sic) by them sir.

TO COURT:

For identification purposes your honor, May I respectfully request that
this padlock be marked as Exh. B.

COURT:

Mark it.

TO WITNESS:

Q: Now Mr. Nico Alforque, you said that there were two persons who
opened the classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal, would you kindly
identify these persons if you can see them now in court?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Would you kindly point to them if they are now here in court?

The witness is pointing to a person whom when asked of his name
declared that he is Valcesar Estioca.

A: And would you kindly tell us also the companion of Valcesar Estioca?

The witness is pointing to a person whose name is Marksale Bacus.

Q: These are the persons who destroyed the padlock of the classroom
of Mrs. Celina Panal?

A: Yes sir.

Q: After destroying the padlock Mr. Nico Alforque, what did you
observed?

A: I saw that they brought out the colored TV, the Karaoke and the
Electric Fan.

Q: You said that these persons after destroying the padlock, took the
colored TV, the Karaoke and the Electric Fan, where did they go?

A: After taking these things, they went out of the classroom sir.

Q: And after going out of the classroom where did they go?

A: They went to the gate sir.

Q: And at the gate, what did you observed (sic) if any?

A: I saw that there was another person sir.

Q: And what was this person doing at the gate?

A: They passed on the things through the person at the gate sir.

Q: To whom did these persons passed these things at the gate?

The witness is pointing to a man whose name is Kevin Boniao.

Q: What else did you observed (sic) at the gate?

A: I saw that there is another person.

Q: Who was that person?

The witness is pointing to accused Emeliano Handoc.

Q: And what was Emeliano Handoc doing at the gate Mr. Nico Alforque?

A: He was waiting at the gate sir.

Q: Now after you saw these persons, what were the two accused doing
at the gate when they passed the things to Kevin Boniao?

A: They were riding the tricycle sir.

Q: Could you be able to tell us who was driving the tricycle?

The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.

Q: And after seeing these persons what did you observed (sic) after
that?

A: I did not see anything because I went away sir.

Q: You mean to say that all those persons went away when you went
away?

A: Yes sir.

Q: They went together, is that what you mean?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Are they walking or riding?

A: They were riding in a tricycle sir.

COURT:

Q: Whose tricycle?

The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.[27]

Mrs. Panal corroborated the foregoing testimony of Nico on relevant points.[28]

The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the object evidence submitted
by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies
of Nico and Mrs.Panal to be truthful and unequivocal and, as such, prevailed over
the denial and alibi of petitioner and his cohorts. Both courts also found no ill motive
on the part of Nico and Mrs. Panal.

It is not incredible or against human nature for petitioner and his companions
to have committed the robbery in broad daylight and in full view of Nico. There is no
standard behavior of criminals before, during and after the commission of a crime.
[29]

Some may be so bold and daring in committing a crime in broad daylight and in

full view of other persons. Others may be so cunning such that they commit crime
in the darkness of the night to avoid detection and arrest by peace officers. [30]

In People v. Toledo, Sr.,[31] we sustained the credibility of the eyewitness and
upheld the conviction of the accused for homicide despite the circumstances
existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight, full view of many persons inside the
school compound, and presence of inhabited houses. It was also ruled that crimes
may be committed in broad daylight and that criminals are not expected to be

logical or to act normally in executing their felonious designs because committing a
crime itself is not logical or reasonable, viz:

Appellant [accused] also asserts that the testimony of Ronnie
[eyewitness]
was
inherently
improbable. He
insists
that
the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight,
full view of many persons inside the school compound,
presence of inhabited houses around the purok -- were such that a
crime could not be committed.

For a number of reasons, we find no merit in this
contention. First, appellants premise that there were many persons in
the school compound is not supported by the evidence on
record.Second, crimes are known to have been committed in
broad
daylight
within
the
vicinity
of
inhabited
houses. Third, although it would be illogical and unreasonable
for normal persons in full control of their faculties to commit a
crime under such circumstances, the same does not hold true
for all, especially those under the grip of criminal impulses. We
cannot expect the mind of such persons to work within the
parameters of what is normal, logical or reasonable, as the
commission
of
a
crime
is
not
normal,
logical
or
reasonable.Hence, the circumstances present in this case do
not rule out appellants commission of the crime. [32]

Besides, as aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, [33] it is not
improbable for petitioner and his cohorts to have committed the robbery as
narrated by Nicobecause it happened on a Saturday, a non-school day in the
OCCS. Apparently, petitioner and his companions expected that none or only few
persons would go to the OCCS on said date.

A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that Nico was in a
canal located inside the OCCS catching waya-waya and dapna when he saw the
incident, and was not inside the enclosed classroom of Mrs. Pactolin as alleged by
petitioner.[34] Nico declared that he clearly saw the incident and that nothing blocked

his vision.[35] Nicoremained steadfast and consistent in his foregoing testimony even
on cross examination, thus:

Q: From the place where you were gathering fishfood at that time you
cannot clearly see the room of Mrs. Panal, am I right?

A: I can see it clearly sir.

Q: You have not seen what were those persons doing inside the room
of Mrs. Panal?

A: I saw them sir.

Q: You saw them taking away the Colored TV, Karaoke and the Electric
Fan?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Who among them took with him the TV?

The witness is pointing to Valcesar Estioca.

Q: Aside from the TV he also carry away with him the Electric Fan and
Karaoke?

A: It was his companion sir.
xxxx

Q: Now at the gate you saw how many persons aside from that two
who entered the room of Mrs. Panal?

A: I saw three persons sir.

Q: Was these three persons outside the gate or inside the gate?

A: They were inside the gate sir.

Q: And that was the time you saw the TV, Karaoke and Electric Fan
turned over to those persons at the gate?

A: Yes sir.

Q: After that, those three persons left the place?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What about those two persons you saw entering the room of
Mrs. Panal where did they go?

A: They went out sir.[36]

The alleged inconsistency between the affidavit of Nico and his court
testimony is inconsequential. Inconsistencies between the sworn statement or
affidavit and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit the
witness since an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial

notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more
exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, usually being
incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons, at times because of partial and
innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial
statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement; hence,
omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the
prosecution witnesses direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are
superior to their extrajudicial statements.[37]

Since we find no error in the factual finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that the testimony of eyewitness Nico is credible, then the
judgment of conviction against petitioner, Bacus, Boniao, and Handoc should be
affirmed. The positive and credible testimony of a lone eyewitness, such as Nico, is
sufficient to support a conviction.[38]

We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties imposed on
petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc.

Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the penalty for robbery with use of force upon things where the
value of the property taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms,
as in this case, is prision mayor. Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
was alleged and proven in this case, the penalty becomes prision mayor in its
medium period in accordance with Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty now
is prision correccional in any of its periods as minimum to prision mayor medium as
its maximum. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in imposing on
petitioner, Bacus and Handoc, a prison term of four years, two months, and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum, because it is within the aforesaid range of penalty.

With regard to Boniao, who was a minor (14 years old) at the time he
committed the robbery, Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code instructs
that the penalty imposable on him, which is prision mayor, shall be lowered by two
degrees. The RTC, therefore, acted accordingly in sentencing him to four months
of arresto mayor.

Nonetheless, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Boniao, who was
barely 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from
criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian
pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as The
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, to wit:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.

xxxx

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.

Sec. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. If it has
been determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years
old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the
child has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of
his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the childs
nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social
welfare and development officer who will determine the appropriate
programs in consultation with the child and to the person having
custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives

cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be
released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or
religious
organization;
a barangay official
or
a
member
of
the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local
social welfare and development officer; or, when and where
appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found
by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned,
neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents
will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
603, otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code.

Although the crime was committed on 28 July 2001 and Republic Act No.
9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive
effect in favor ofBoniao who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. [39] This is
based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same.

However, as Boniaos civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344, Boniao should be held
jointly liable with petitioner, Bacus, and Handoc for the payment of civil liability in
the amount of P15,000.00 representing the stolen items.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036
isAFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 182941
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES
**

- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO,

***

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

July 3, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review
on certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA) that
affirmed with modification his conviction for the crime of qualified rape rendered by

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its decision of April 5,
2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA [5] was playing with her friend BBB in the
second floor of her familys house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a
knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then
undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA,
undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ
into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to
Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to
the barangayoffice. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a
laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of
the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under
the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd
designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latters will
and consent.

Contrary to law.[6]

The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of
denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged

rape. He also claimed that AAA only invented her story because she bore him a
grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties mother (CCC) supported the
petitioners story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son
testified that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident
happened.[7]
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her;
she confirmed the petitioners claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and
hereby sentences the said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the
victim the amount ofP75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAAs credibility. He
also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006)[9] to exempt him from criminal liability considering that he was only 15
years old at the time the crime was committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioners conviction with modification as to
penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in
convicting

Robert

Sierra,

the

assailed

Decision

is

hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has

clarified that: We note that. SO ORDERED. First. . the CA held: As to the penalty. It was incumbent for the defense to present Roberts birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. Neither is the suspension of sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court.to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. Rep. The award of damages are likewise affirmed. 2006. 38. in one case. the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. Section 38 of the law reads: SEC. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged. 9344.[10] In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability. it was not clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of the commission of the crime. We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt from liability. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. 9344 took effect on May 20. Act No. in the meantime.

603. the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction.D. 02-1-18- . No.M. No. No. as amended. however. as amended by A.D.M. No. 603. The law merely amended Article 192 of P. 603. Evidently. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P. and Section 32 of A. That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.M. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child. the intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P. as amended.However. without need of application: Provided.D. 02-1-18-SC. No. and Section 32 of A. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. No.

juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which isreclusion perpetua.A. THE ISSUES The petitioner no longer assails the prosecutions evidence on his guilt of the crime charged. Hon. 9344 on the petitioners exemption from criminal liability. and (3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. what he now assails is the failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1.A. 9344 under the following issues: (1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No. Section 6[12]of R. No. No.SC.A. No. 9344. [11] The CA denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration. Gubaton[13] thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal liability under R. Hence. are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.A. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R. (2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present the petitioners birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R. the present petition. No. 9344. The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden of proof for purposes of determining exemption from criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the time the crime was committed. The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as the party who stands to lose the case if no evidence is presented to show that the . life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death. hence.

and the findings of the RTC established that he was not more than 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The records show that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating evidence. We examine at the outset the prosecutions evidence and the findings of the lower courts on the petitioners guilt. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal. [14] He additionally claims that Sections 3. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi defenses that. sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information charged. after examination of the CA decision and the records of the case. [19] As against AAAs testimony.[18] THE COURTS RULING We grant the petition. not on the civil. The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record specifically: the allegation of the Information. liability.A. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is presumed to be a minor.[15] 7. Hon. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R. The Peoples Comment.A. he is disqualified to have his sentence suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. we have held to be inherently weak unless supported by . to deviate from the lower courts findings of guilt. since the petition opens the whole case for review and the issues before us are predicated on the petitioners guilt of the crime charged. so that any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor. the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never objected to. in a long line of cases. We see no compelling reason. No. 9344. No.petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled to the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R. [16] and 68[17] of the law also provide a presumption of minority in favor of a child in conflict with the law. Gubaton. counters that the burden belongs to the petitioner who should have presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence proving that his age was 15 years or below.

even inconsistent ones.clear and convincing evidence. by its nature.In admitting this type of defense on appeal. as the defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it. While the defense. No. but the accused is freed from criminal liability. exemption from criminal liability under R. if properly considered.A. in other words. raises a new ground i. Specifically. this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above. too. 9344 that implies an admission of guilt. the CAs findings of fact on the issues of age and minority. We note. we are bound to look into every circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the accused. the accused committed a crime. but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law.A. the petitioner failed to present this required evidentiary support. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition. denial and alibi cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of the complainant.[20] We have held. [23] By mandate of the Constitution. even on questions that the parties did not raise. as we see no compelling reason to doubt the validity of their conclusions in this regard. that the defenses claim of exemption from liability was made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. [22] no essential change is really involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the lower courts conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. [24] It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R. on appeal. [21] We sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility. would justify a different conclusion. An exempting circumstance. premised on the supposed absence of evidence. No. are contradicted by the evidence on record.e. it also manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties that. that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review. too. While this may initially imply an essential change of theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness. We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on exemption from liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA committed in these regards. [ 2 5 ] . too. admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist. we are not unmindful. no less. that as negative defenses..

The age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under R. In providing exemption.A. education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional care. No.In tackling the issues of age and minority. this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders. Minority as an Exempting Circumstance R. No. previously provided i. from under nine years of age and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability. [27] The current law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses. No. we stress at the outset that the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are at issue. 9344. counseling. [29] The CA also found him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua to death. 9344 does not remove. it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code ( RPC). so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held accountable. probation. .. as amended. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition measures such as care.[26] More importantly in the context of this case. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28. it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention measures.e. the new law as the old paragraphs 2 and 3. 9344.A. the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability because he was not more than 15 years old at the time the rape took place. foster care. No.A.A. 2006. while the age of the latter is material in characterizing the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that R. Article 12 of the RPC did presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong. 2006 and took effect on May 20.[28] In the present case. guidance and supervision orders. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioners failure to present his birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.

[30] This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape. To impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they are not. In the present case. or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. the prosecution completed its evidence and had done everything that the law requires it to do. the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be determined: . therefore. Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence. not the prosecution. even if guilty. should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the crime. the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence. the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which now claims. under Section 1. Section 7 of R.A. [31] If the prosecution has a burden related to age. No. At this point. this burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape. refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. [32] Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence to Prove the Accuseds Minority and Age The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime.Burden of Proof Burden of proof. that the accused. The defense. In a criminal case. by an affirmative defense. has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed the rape charged. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements.

. . (2) x x x (3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such documents. In the absence of these documents. date of birthday. baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. 7. or travel papers. (b) Childs baptismal certificate .x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate. [Emphasis supplied] Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R. Determination of Age. classmates). (b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.g. age may be based on information from the child himself/herself. relatives. teachers. it shall be resolved in his/her favor.A. testimonies of other persons. such as (a) Childs birth certificate. the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age by: (a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e. In case of doubt as to the age of the child. neighbors. No. 9344 provides the implementing details of this provision by enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain the childs age: (1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs age. dental records.or (c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the childs school records. grade level in school).SEC.

xxx Section 7. and (d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.g. Roxas[34] where the defendants statement about his age was considered sufficient. Villagracia. to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense charged.[33] we accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. Morial[37] and David v. In these cases. Bergantino. v.[38] and ruled that the allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecutions failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence. we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the accuseds minority and age upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate. R. (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the prosecution. Subsequently. even without corroborative evidence.A. and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accuseds and/or his relatives testimonies are untrue. baptismal certificate.[36] we found the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. Court of Appeals. does not depart from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accuseds minority and age. or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused. Then. in People v. . Tismo. In the 1903 case of U. in People v. while a relatively new law (having been passed only in 2006). 9344. v. This was followed by U. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. [35] the Court appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution.S. No.S.(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e. built) of the child. height.

In other words.A.A. the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. its implementing rules. We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R. 9344. any doubt in this case regarding the petitioners age at the time he committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. 9344 . And lastly. Retroactive Application of R. First. and established jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory developments.All these conditions are present in this case. No. No. the petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority and age when the rape was committed. the prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime was committed.A. 9344 directs. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in his favor. the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the petitioners and CCCs testimonies relating to the formers age. the records before us show that these pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by the prosecution. [40] Hence. No. [39] Second. Given the express mandate of R.

No.A.That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 grants. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual criminal. No. at the time of the commission of the crime. as amended. 9344 provides that the accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal liability.A. No. shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officers (LSWDO).A. by virtue of R. No. the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. What is controlling. In short. 9344[42] in the recent case of Ortega v. [Emphasis supplied] The retroactive application of R. No. .A. hence. 9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC.[41] As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68 of R. 9344. the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from criminal liability. Civil Liability The last paragraph of Section 6 of R. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would have been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal liability. is not the CICLs age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICLs age at the time of the commission of the offense. therefore. which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal. with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL. People:[43] Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below.A.

we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age. [44] Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding to qualified rape. as amended. though alleged in the Information. CCC. however. Their mother. The relationship between the petitioner and AAA. The prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship exists. 3. of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40. We find. 2. the testimony. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. if clear and credible. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: . that AAAs minority. does not appear to be a disputed matter. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 1. had not been sufficiently proven. [45] People v. similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. as siblings. Pruna[46] laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant: In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases.The RTC and CA found. that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the latters minority. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children. based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC.

neither can his failure to object to AAAs testimony be taken against him.00.a. The civil liability that can be imposed on the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the attendant circumstances. both pursuant to prevailing . b. not qualified rape. the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the crime to qualified rape i.e. They do not likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAAs age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna. Accordingly. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age. Article 266-A of the RPC. relationship within the third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim does not exist. 5. 1. Thus. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old. In the absence of a certificate of live birth.000. c.000.. authentic document. the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The crime for which the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should therefore only be simple rape pursuant to par. we uphold the grant of moral damages of P50. 4. [Emphasis supplied] The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA.00 but increase the awarded exemplary damages P30.

Pursuant to Section 64 of R. The Decision dated February 29. WHEREFORE. No. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED.R. . we see no need to discuss the petitions third assignment of error. Petitioner is ORDERED topay the victim. 02218 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.jurisprudence. P50.[50] While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the Information. P50. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. premises considered.00 as moral damages. 2008 and Resolution dated May 22.000. established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the award of exemplary damages. We appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on AAAs testimony that the rape was committed in their house. the relationship (between the parties) is not disputed.00 to P50.000. Unless there are other valid causes for petitioners continued detention.00.[47] Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof.[53] In light of the above discussion and our conclusions.-CR. Criminal Case No. the instant petition is GRANTED.000.00 as exemplary damages. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate implementation. 9344.A.00 as civil indemnity.000. [49] As discussed above. Petitioner isREFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of R. the law assumes that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award. [51] We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75.000.-H. we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms. and P30. No.[48] Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies the award of exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of relationship between AAA and petitioner and dwelling.C. AAA. the latter being the civil indemnity appropriate for simple rape [52] on the finding that rape had been committed. No. 9344.A.

Present: . J. [6] then about eight (8) years of age. Respondent. JJ. Chairperson. CORONA.* CHICO-NAZARIO.. 1998.versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO.R.: Before this Court is a Petition [1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [2] dated October 26. G. Branch 50. J. Promulgated: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. dated May 13. convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega[4] (petitioner) of the crime of Rape. 2008 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA.Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council. No. [5] was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20. August 20. and NACHURA. SO ORDERED. for allegedly raping AAA. 1999. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. JOEMAR ORTEGA. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state: . 151085 Petitioner. then about 14 years old. 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City. The Facts Petitioner.

for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions. Philippines. against her will. 98-19083 That sometime in August. then about 6 years old. then 10 years old. [10] Among her siblings CCC. in the Municipality of XXX. EEE and GGG. 1998.Criminal Case No. AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 98-19084 That on or about the 1st day of December. 1996. AAA is the only girl in the family. DDD. violence and intimidation. in the Municipality of XXX. BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. then 6 years old and son BBB. unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA. did then and there. CONTRARY TO LAW. CONTRARY TO LAW. [11] There. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. However. the above-named accused.[7] Criminal Case No. BBB. AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's family. unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA. Philippines. MMM left her daughter AAA. Province of YYY. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. (sic) willfully. In the course of the trial. a minor. against her will. Before these disturbing events. 1996. then about 6 years old. violence and intimidation. by means of force. aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. mother of petitioner. 1990. did then and there. trial on the merits ensued. a minor. in the care of Luzviminda Ortega [12] (Luzviminda). by means of force. two varying versions arose. [13] During the first night at .[9] Thus.[8] Upon arraignment on September 10. the above-named accused. Version of the Prosecution On February 27. Province of YYY. petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. (sic) willfully. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.

In all of these instances. otherwise. he would spank her. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. The second occasion occurred the following day. again at the petitioner's residence. . petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. There petitioner raped AAA. [14] AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal. petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents. Observing that nobody was around. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala.petitioner's residence. petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and raped her there.

Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. hurriedly left. AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested. together with Luzviminda. petitioner pulled AAA behind the door. MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house. Lucifree Katalbas [19] (Dr. 1996. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to her. at about four o'clock. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion. brought AAA to Dr. The following morning. with a heavy heart. [15] AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. At that time. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. likewise. Katalbas). and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA. While AAA's siblings were busy watching. Medical Officer IV of the . Jocson). When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen.[20] Refusing to accept such findings. examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. MMM. Thereafter. as he was passing by his room. BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. Immediately.The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1. BBB reported the incident to his mother. She. While inside the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp. Petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. MMM went to Dr. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her.[18] MMM. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter. 1996. on December 12. MMM. the latter. removed AAA's shorts and panty. removed his pants and brief. Luzviminda conversing with MMM. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. [17] MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw. BBB told petitioner to stop. petitioner was called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis. [16] This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination. and consequently. petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. AAA obeyed. in turn.

Bacolod City Health Office. an organization that helps abused women and children. However. Jocson made an unofficial written report [21] showing that there were abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. However. Subsequently. AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. a few months later. however. petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. Jocson.[23] As such. Dr. the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases. At the sight of petitioner. and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality. Dr. At this instance. petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Version of the Defense . She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh. an amicable settlement [22] was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation.

he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room.[28] Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse. petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister. but he merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl. at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM. CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her firstmarriage. upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her. petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance. in the process of washing.Petitioner was born on August 8. petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening. on December 1. petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act.[26] petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing. AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends. as they were together with her brothers.[24] He is the second child of three siblings ― an elderbrother and a younger sister. who at the time was with Luzviminda. when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother.[25] they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the time. and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house. petitioner together with his parents. and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing. he never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her. went to AAA's house. while AAA and the rest of her . 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. however. he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus. and he treated AAA like a younger sister. while they were dancing. at about four o'clock in the morning. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the incident. 1996. [27] BBB was lying. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him.

she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time. At the said Center. She also accompanied her to Dr. Thereafter. while they were conversing. the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner. upon hearing such statement. 1996. the parents of AAA. [29] The RTC's Ruling On May 13. did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them. including petitioner and AAA. Jocson. petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring hisdirty clothes for laundry. AAA's parents filed the instant cases. the RTC disposed of this case in this wise: . telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead. saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. Subsequently. she could clearly see all the children. considering the close relations of both families. to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda intervened. CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA. After getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area. At this instance. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. playing and dancing in the dining area. while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen. But almost every Saturday. and they peacefully left AAA's house. Every time petitioner came home. the following day. Thus. However. Jocson. at that time. Thus. she was at AAA's house watching television and conversing with MMM. Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested. petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. calling him a rapist. from where they were seated. they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. on December 1. both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Moreover. who testified with honesty and credibility. BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse.siblings were of the second marriage. 1999. MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek advice from the Women's Center. the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996. MMM woke Luzviminda up. FFF bad-mouthed petitioner. she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner. Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA.

as maximum. the sum of P100.[30] Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of P40.FOR ALL THE FOREGOING. the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.00. as minimum. to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal. he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period.000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic). petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.000. the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA. [31] . the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor. Aggrieved.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE. 2000.The CA's Ruling On October 26. The CA also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant. Finally. consistent and without any showing of ill motive. as it is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape. the CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses. III. which were categorical. Hence. 2001. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB. . Moreover. the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. this Petition based on the following grounds: I. LUCIFREE KATALBAS. II. thus. hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration [32] of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its Resolution[33] dated November 7. the CA accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC.

AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT. [34] . IV. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT. THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGEDRAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape. the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case. petitioner opines that like AAA. Moreover. taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA. while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court. it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB.year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA. respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are . Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. it can be deduced that penetration was achieved. thus. such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr.as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF. Katalbas who. one day after the alleged rape. [35] On the other hand. unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and.Petitioner argues that. Considering that Dr. and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year. AAA felt pain. 1996. conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12. consequently. thus. Finally. we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. As such. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories. petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent. at the age of six. whose reaction to pain. could not be controlled or subdued. it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. the prosecution failed to prove its case.

was enacted into law on April 28. Moreover. as affirmed by the CA. did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions. intervention. [37] or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. 9344. diversion. and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner.A.mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA. particularly Section 8[41] thereof. Lastly. 2006 and it took effect on May 20. rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time. 2006. as manifested in his covert acts. The law also . rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ. the RTC. In order to ensure its implementation. what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996. [36] However. the law.) No. the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime. as such. has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and functions [42] such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of theCICL. even in the absence of force. [38] The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and children at risk[40] with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention. Republic Act (R. rehabilitation.

In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction. determine appropriate alternatives for detention. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released. and who were below . the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC. if not. 65. Such officer. SECTION 67. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. SECTION 68. the Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and. Children Detained Pending Trial.provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act.A. as the case may be. [43] The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide: Title VIII Transitory Provisions SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. 9344's Transitory Provisions. 67 and 68 of R. The PNP. upon thorough assessment of the child. as provided under this Act. If the child is detained pending trial. cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. shall determine the appropriate disposition. or refer the child to prevention programs. No. SECTION 65. Upon effectivity of this Act. 66. within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act. shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her parents. SECTION 66. an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody. the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court. and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults. the child may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law. unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child. the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home. If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings. specifically Sections 64. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences.

9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court. No.A. with the advent of R. However. 9344 apply to petitioner's case. whether the pertinent provisions of R. he was merely 13 years old. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence. . a new issue arises. namely. considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape. No. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws. the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.A. Ostensibly.

the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. while there is a crime committed. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus. or intent. or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. Almodovar. by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration. [48] Therefore. Albert has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence. because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape. Thus. it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who wasonly 6 years old then. without this power. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA.[45] We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr.[49] we held: [I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime. we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. necessary to determine the morality of human . in Guevarra v. Lastly. no criminal liability arises.[47] However. In a prosecution for rape. total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required.In sum. as affirmed by the CA. [46] Therefore. highly incredible. did not doubt AAA's credibility. [44] The RTC. although he commits a crime. the complete absence of intelligence. the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. Thus. in order to extort money from petitioners parents. freedom of action. no criminal liability attaches. for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances.

the infant (has) no intelligence. . . the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. . therefore." It is for this reason.acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. no crime can exist. and because .

In its Comment[50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer
covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999,
petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in
2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No.
9344.

Moreover,

the

OSG

claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 isapplicable only if
the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68
thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of
Section 38[51] of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if
finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle
that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such
principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall
be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.

Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years
old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer (LSWDO). What iscontrolling, therefore, with respect to the
exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has
been raised from 9 to 15 years old.[52]
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord
retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to
the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.[53] This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded
application in certain instances involving special laws. [54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no
exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the
deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages
34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections
67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS
LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE
AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE

IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD
SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING
THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER
OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for
these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD
does not have the capability at the moment. It will take time to
develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred
whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we
speak here of children who do not have criminal liability under this
law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure,
will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to
their parents or through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my
understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a
process of sifting before that. That is why I was proposing that they
should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process,
except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no
argument. We will now have to just craft it to ensure that the input
raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of the
DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue
should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law
becomes effective, all those children in conflict with the law,
who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for example,
who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law,
will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will
happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet
been settled . . . . . provides, for example, for conferencing family
mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in
detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still
require some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The
personnel from the DSWD will have to address the counseling. So,
there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and
absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an
amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the Santiago amendment is accepted.[55]
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in
their application, I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could
incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would
make this law apply also to those who might already have been
convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their
penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision
under the Transitory Provisions wherein we address the issue
raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For
example, Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen
(15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the
crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be

referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been
prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders
erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an
additional amendment, subject to style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a
reality that we have to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a
separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the
offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of the
offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of
the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes,
amendment.[56]

Mr.

President. We accept that proposed

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in
interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases,
that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the
vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when
it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and
to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent
is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to
start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. [57]

Moreover,
[58]

penal

laws

are

construed

liberally

in

favor

of

the

accused.

In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language,

coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No
other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth,
by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore,
petitioners age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the
CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below
15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2)
counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that
there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court
sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his
parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the
nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for
rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from
the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact
of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.[59]
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law
intended to protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not
cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has
been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns
have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the
Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9
years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment
of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement
authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly,
complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug
trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them
ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are
proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who
openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit
drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability
under the new law. [60]

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively
exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was
only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and
one who deserves the laws greater protection. However, this consequence is
inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not
subject to review by this Court. [61] Any perception that the result reached herein
appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has
no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment
and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the
law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. [62]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084
filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is
hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for
the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby
ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.
ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN,

G.R. No. 184874

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*

- versus -

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

October 9, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[2] dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution [3] dated
October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29316
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Robert Remiendo y Siblawan.

The case arose from the filing of two criminal informations, both dated March 10,
2008, against petitioner Robert Remiendo y Siblawan (Remiendo), that read

Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999

That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000

That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled not guilty to both charges. After pretrial, a
joint trial ensued before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, La Trinidad,
Benguet.Both the prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence,
summarized by the CA in its Decision, to wit:

The prosecution presented the following version of facts:

The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986. At the
time of the commission of the offense, she was a minor below 12 years
of age. She knew accused-appellant Robert Remiendo as he was
residing near the house where her family used to stay. Sometime in
March 1997, she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant inside
said house. On that day, her parents and brother left for work after
breakfast, and she was left alone in the house. Accused-appellant
came in, pushed her into the room, and threatened to kill her if she
reported
what
happened. He
undressed
himself
and
the
complainant. The latter was standing and refused to remove her panty
but she obliged when accused-appellant insisted. Then he made her lie
on the bed and placed his penis in her vagina. The complainant
struggled, moved, and pushed accused-appellant. She felt pain when
accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried until
accused-appellant left, but she did not shout because accusedappellant warned her not to, or else he would kick her. She put on her
clothes after accused-appellant left. Her parents arrived in the
afternoon but she did not tell them what happened to her because her
mother might whip her.

Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually assaulted by
accused-appellant, which took place in the house of the latter. At that
time, she was on her way to see her mother at her workplace after she
had lunch. When she passed by the house of accused-appellant, the
latter pulled her into his house and brought her into his room. She
cried and shouted but accused-appellant told her to keep quiet. She
struggled but was helpless because accused-appellant was
stronger. They were alone in the room. Accused-appellant removed his
clothes and told her to remove her panty. Afraid, she removed her
panty and was made to lie on the bed. Accused-appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina and she felt pain. She kept on moving but she
could not push away accused-appellant. She moved her shoulders and

pushed
accused-appellant
with
both
hands
but
he
was
stronger. Afterwards, accused-appellant moved away and threatened
to kill her if she told anyone what happened. She responded that she
would not tell anyone. Later, she executed a sworn statement and
identified accused-appellant as the person who raped her.

Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera Administrative Region,
physically examined the complainant on 2 January 1998. Said medicolegal officer testified that [AAA] was thirteen (13) years old and a
Grade III pupil at Badiwan Tuba, Benguet at the time of the
examination. She was four feet and eleven inches (411) tall, weighed
78 pounds, fairly nourished, and fairly developed. She was conscious,
coherent, and cooperative. She was ambulatory and had no extragenital injuries. Upon examination of her genital area, he found old
lacerations of the hymen at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock positions, which
meant that her hymen was altered by a hard rigid instrument. The
lacerations were done more than three (3) months prior to the
examination. To determine the approximate size of the object that the
hymenal opening could accommodate, he inserted a test tube. The
2.5-centimeter diameter of said tube was admitted with ease by the
hymenal orifice. He noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the
ridges inside were smothered. The complainant told him that accusedappellant raped her. He presented a written report of his findings.

On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy conducted an
examination of the mental condition of the complainant. The latter was
also scheduled for psychological examination to be conducted by Elma
Buadken. The result of the examination showed that [AAA] is suffering
from psychosis and organicity. She has a below average intelligence
quotient of 88, but not on the level of mental retardation. She can
perform simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her studies, she can
hardly comprehend what is being taught to her. Having psychosis
means that her brain is afflicted with a disease. Her medical history
showed that she suffered head and body injuries brought about by
being sideswiped by a motor vehicle sometime in 1996. She was
confined in the hospital for twelve (12) days. Said injuries substantially
contributed to her present condition. Organicity, on the other hand,
means that the complainant suffers from a cloud of memory, upward
rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the extremities, loss of
consciousness, and epileptic seizures. Her psychosis occurs after

seizure. She is not, however, insane. During a seizure, she does not
know what is going on, but afterwards she returns to her level of
consciousness. With regular medication, her seizures will be greatly
minimized. During her interview, the complainant had a seizure and
the psychiatrist had to wait until her consciousness level returned. The
complainant then revealed that accused-appellant and a certain
Reynoso Cera raped her. The psychiatrist opined that during the rape,
she did not have a seizure because if she had, she would not have
remembered what had happened. The fact that she was able to narrate
what happened and who raped her suggested that she was on her
conscious level at such time. A written report of the foregoing findings
was submitted in court.

The defense presented the following version of facts:

Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that she was a
friend, playmate, and neighbor of the complainant. She testified that
she and [AAA] played together and talked about their crushes. The
complainant told Lea Chiwayan that she had a crush on accusedappellant. Sometime in April or May 1997, the complainant said that
her brother had molested her, and that he and his father had sexual
intercourse with her in their house in Poyopoy, Tuba. Sometime in
August 1997, the complainant confided that Reynoso Cera raped her in
his house. She told Lea Chiwayan that she did not feel anything
because she was used to having sexual intercourse with brother and
father. One Saturday afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the complainant
were playing when they saw accused-appellant going to the basketball
court near the church. They followed him and watched a basketball
game. After the game, Lea Chiwayan went home with the others while
the complainant stayed behind. A few seconds after they left, the
complainant ran after them and told them that something happened
between her and accused-appellant. She said that accused-appellant
pulled her towards the back of the church and had sexual intercourse
with her. The complainant later took back what she said because she
was only joking. She then asked Lea Chiwayan not to tell the accusedappellant. However, Lea Chiwayan told accused-appellant what the
complainant
told
them. Accused-appellant
confronted
the
complainant. He flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked
her. He said, what are you saying, why did I do that, if I like and I do it,
Ill not do it with you, you should be ashamed of yourself. He then
borrowed the vehicle of a certain Junie, started the engine, and

stepped on the gas such that the fumes from the exhaust pipe were
directed at the complainant. Later, Lea Chiwayan learned that [AAA]
filed a case against accused-appellant.

Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the school year
1997-1998, testified that the latter was unruly and a liar. The
complainant would pick fights and steal money from her
classmates. However, the witness admitted that there was no written
record in school that she reprimanded complainant for her
behavior. She knew that the complainant had an accident before.

Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-appellant
was one of his drivers. He described accused-appellant as a
hardworking and industrious person. When he learned that Robert
Remiendo was accused of rape, he was outraged because he knew the
daily activities of accused-appellant. The latter could not have done
such act under his strict supervision.

Accused-appellant testified that he knew the complainant, as
she was a townmate of his mother. In September 1996, he and his
parents were then residing in Badiwan. When the complainant figured
in an accident at that time, he was the one who informed her
parents. The first time he saw the complainant was during the time
when he was doing some repairs on his jitney. He saw the complainant
and her playmates go inside the jitney. He told them to alight from the
vehicle. Sometime in June 1997, he again saw the complainant and her
sister playing inside the jitney. He told them to alight as they were
disturbing him. On the day he was playing basketball at the church
grounds in Badiwan, Lea and Emma Chiwayan approached him and
asked him if it was true that he raped [AAA]. He asked where the latter
was and went to see her. Out of anger, he borrowed the vehicle of
Junie, started the engine, directed the exhaust pipe at the complainant,
and revved the engine so the smoke would go straight to her. He
slapped her and said if I would like someone, it would not be you
because there are a lot of girls better than you. During the Christmas
party in Badiwan, he again saw the complainant roaming around the
dance area. He told her to get out as she irritated the people
dancing. The complainant said nothing and left the dance
floor. Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and smiling. He
learned that he was charged with two (2) counts of rape when he

received a subpoena issued by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
January 1998.[6]

In its Joint Judgment[7] dated October 27, 2004, the RTC found Remiendo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape. The RTC
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds ROBERT
REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of rape as charged in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
98-CR-2999 and in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98CR-3000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum for each
count of rape.

He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity, the sum
of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) by way of moral damages, and
the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of exemplary
damages.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court
Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province is
directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Robert Remiendo, to
the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila
after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation
unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail
Warden of Benguet Province for his information, guidance and
compliance.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the CA. In its assailed
Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC, modifying only the civil liability imposed upon
Remiendo.The fallo of the CA Decision reads

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment dated 27 October 2004 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the civil liability of accusedappellant. He is ordered to pay the complainant, for each count of
rape, the sum of (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007 Decision, but the CA
denied the motion in its October 3, 2008 Resolution; hence, this petition alleging
that

(a)

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO CONVICTING PETITIONER OF
STATUTORY RAPE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
PETITIONER THE BENEFIT ACCORDED TO HIM BY REPUBLIC ACT
9344 KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006
INCREASING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.[10]

Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape despite the purported
absence of competent proof that AAA was below 12 years old at the time of the

the Court. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.alleged commission of the crimes. nor marked as exhibit during the trial though reserved for marking during the pretrial. 1999 because it was neither identified by any witness. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. [12] AAA was more than 12 years old in March and May 1997. belies her charges of statutory rape against him. laid down the following guidelines: [14] 1. 2. and that her failure to flee from the situation. even taking off her panties herself. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. in People v. similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. on the basis of the testimonies of the defense witnesses and the Elementary School Permanent Record. As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. We disagree.[13] As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim. Pruna. Remiendo then questions her credibility as a witness. Its two elements are: (1) that the accused has carnal knowledge of a woman. . sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age. He further posits that. and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA offered by the prosecution during its formal offer of exhibits was not admitted by the RTC in its Order[11] dated September 14. According to him. claiming that she was smiling during her testimony.

It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. the testimony. b. the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. c. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.3. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable.[15] . If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old. authentic document. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40. or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age. if clear and credible.

[20] and it does not need authentication. 1998[.In this case. the prosecution offered in evidence a certified true copy of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth[16] as part of the testimonies of AAA and her mother that AAA was born on February 21. Nevertheless. During the trial. Dave Alunan. That on January 5. despite the September 14. specifically on the following facts: 1. 98-CR-2999 and 98-CR-3000. as shown in the Pretrial Order [17] dated November 16. in order to abbreviate the proceedings.] she executed an affidavit-complaint for and on behalf of her daughter which she subscribed before NBI agent Atty. That she is [BBB]. the prosecution was able to establish that AAA was below 12 years old during the two occasions of rape per the guidelines laid down in Pruna. That the subject matter of her sworn statement against Reynoso Cera and Robert Remiendo is the alleged statutory rape against [AAA]. 2. the victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases Nos. As such. 1998. It is significant to note that both AAA and BBB testified that AAA was born on February . 1986. and 3. the natural mother of [AAA]. [18] And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the statement that AAA was born on February 21. It was reserved for marking as part of the exhibits for the prosecution. 1999 Order. it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child.[19] A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimony of AAAs mother. Thus. the RTC correctly appreciated the same in its Joint Judgment. 1986. It can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. even assuming that the Certificate of Live Birth was not appreciated by the RTC.

the latter must prevail. A judicial admission is an admission. We agree. 1983. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. As to the credibility of AAA as a witness. The reason is obvious. This fact was neither denied nor objected to by the defense.21. Suanding: Yes. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case and it dispenses with proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. your honor. your honor. it is stated in that document that the birth date of [AAA] was February 21. 1983. The argument of Remiendo that the prosecution admitted in the course of trial that AAAs birthday was February 21. what was only admitted was that the entry of AAAs date of birth appearing in her school record is February 21. [23] . if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. jurisprudence instructs us that the trial courts assessment deserves great weight. And as between the school record and the testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB. the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly. and is even conclusive and binding. 1986.[21] This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on the birth date of AAA. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying. As quoted by Remiendo in