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City of Baguio v.

G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of the cadastral
proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the
land here involved was amongst those declared public lands
by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to
reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of
land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G.
Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J.
Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The
petitioners questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the
petition to reopen.
Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40
year period preceding the approval of Republic Act 931.
Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were
instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on
November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July
25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes
"the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared
public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body
of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of
land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the
public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within
the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There
thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is
adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act
itself. R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should
receive blessings of liberal construction. The court says that
lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never
be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent,
which can otherwise be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims
of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of
land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25,
1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the
cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered
on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
Central Capiz v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 16197. March 12, 1920
The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about
July 1, 1919, the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply
to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation. Said contract was recorded in the Registry of
Property. In the interim the execution of said contract,Act No.
2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land
Act," became effective. The respondent, while admitting said
contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed
pursuant thereto, bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that
more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is
held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States.

(1) Whether or not RA 2874 applies to agricultural lands held

in private ownership.
(2) Whether or not complies with the constitutional
requirement "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."
(1) No. It is held that Act No. 2874 was intended to apply to
and regulate the sale, lease and other disposition of public
lands only. The title of the Act, always indicative of legislative
intent, reads: "an Act to amend and compile the laws relating
to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes. Said
act, by express provisions of Sections 4, 5, 67 and 105, does
not apply to lands privately owned by the government. The Act
nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its
terms to privately owned lands. The court holds, therefore, that
the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was
and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and
that lands held in private ownership are not included therein
and are not affected in any manner whatsoever.
(2) No. The objects of the constitutional requirement under
Section 3 of the Jones Law are first, to prevent hodge-podge or
log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and , third, to fairly
apprise the people of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.'
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.) This constitutional
requirement is mandatory and not directory. In the said Act, the
words "and for other purposes" contained in its title, must be
treated as non-existent, held to be without force or effect
whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing
the Act. That the use of the words "other purposes," can no
longer be of any avail as they express nothing and amount to
nothing as a compliance with this constitutional
requirement. The phrase expresses no specific purpose and
imports indefinitely something different from that which
precedes it in the title.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito,
G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur
and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971,
seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin
further proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos.
1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent
Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions
for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure of the
respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING
GUIDED," preliminary
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has
exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints.
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While
"crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could
have very well referred to the more specific term had it

intended to make itself applicable thereto. Clearly, the

Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and
streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of
complaints against public officials. It is moreover significant
that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference
to "erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise
vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions,
it would have employed such technical terms as "accused",
"convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in
construing the intent of the measure.
People v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the
People of the Philippines charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the
accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are
sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of
illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD No.
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be
alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute
a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is
determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts
are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime,
the quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute,
and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would
result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D.
9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of
the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
People v. Echaves
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980
On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower
court separate information against sixteen persons charging
them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No.
772. The information provides that sometime in the year 1974
continuously up to the present, the above-named accused,
with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a
portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and
claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, accused's entrance into
the area has been and is still against the win of the offended
party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said

cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the

pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land
applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's
cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty.
Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
Five of the information were raffled to Judge Vicente B.
Echaves, Jr. who dismissed the five information on the grounds
(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land
through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the
entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the
decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Aboitiz Shipping v. City of Cebu
G.R. No. L-14526. March 31, 1965
Ordinance No. 207 was purportedly enacted by the Municipal
Board on August 14, 1956 and approved by the City Mayor on
the following August 27 where plaintiffs were made to pa
wharfage charges under protest since September 1, 1956 and
on May 8, 1957. The plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to have the said void, its enforcement
enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and ordinance
declared other landing places belonging to the National
Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far
collected by defendants refunded to them. Appellees allege
that the Municipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance is
claimed by them under section 17 (w) of the charter of the City
of Cebu, which grants them the legislative power To fix the
charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public
wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.
Whether or not the City of Cebu, under its charter, may provide
by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from vessels that
dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but
owned by the National Government.
No. The right to collect the wharfage belongs to the National
Government. It is unreasonable to conclude that the
legislature, simply because it employed the term "public
wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu,
thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of
the ownership of the wharves involved. The National
Government did not surrender such ownership to the city; and
there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an
intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the
obligation of paying twice for the same purpose.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of
the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.
For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey
a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision
may have a limited application if viewed together with other
provisions. Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is
declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to
appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from
making such collection.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947
Alenxander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration
of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to
accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of
deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot

acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case

to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the
register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new
circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of
deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots
to aliens.
Whether or not the phrase pubic agricultural land in Section 1
of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to
include residential lands for purposes of their disposition.
No. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional embraces all
lands of any kind of the public. Therefore this provision means
that all lands of the public domain are classified into three
groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. With respect
to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither
mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified
as agricultural. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical
meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed
to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Filipino citizens
who alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens is
prevented under section 5, Article XIII. Both sections must,
therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose
and the same subject matter namely, the non-transferability of
"agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under
section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. The
only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is
that the former is public and the latter private. But such
difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The
lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation
of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or
class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the
State or by its citizens.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales
G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income
tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of
P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon
of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent
quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that
when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for
the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income
of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net
loss of P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with
the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a
claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing
overpaid income tax. This claim was not acted upon by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that
"granting, without admitting, the amount in question is
refundable, the petitioner is already barred from claiming the
same considering that more than two years had already
elapsed between the payment and the filing of the claim in
Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously
collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the National
Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the
quarterly income tax was paid or from the date the filing of the
Final Adjustment Return?

Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time
of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return
and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect
to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained
from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to
the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to
legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which
may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by
private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment
Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid
during the first quarter. A literal application of Section 292
would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive
period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was
paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which
the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal
application of Section 292 would lead to absurdity and
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would
be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of
filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax
Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has
still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund
of overpaid income tax.
Florentino v. PNB
G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus
against Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the
backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay
an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate
mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953,
which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of
Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in
the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897
approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their
loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate,
but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to
accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of
Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the
qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the
appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
Whether or not the clause who may be willing to accept the
same for settlement refers to all antecedents mentioned in the
last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879.
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last
antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before
the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase
from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the
grammatical construction, to make the acceptance of the
backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or
controlled by the government, would render section 2 of
Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an
impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private
creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten
years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current

or even the legal one. It was also found out in the

Congressional Record that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was
made which permits the use of backpay certificates as
payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the
government. Another reason is that it is matter of general
knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine
Government, who had served during the Japanese
Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates
and used them for the payment of the obligations to the
Government and its entities for debts incurred before the
approval of Republic Act No. 304.

pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson,

in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The
use of a comma in the part of the sentence is to make "the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to
non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the
retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused
person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to
pay his civil liability.

Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953.

Hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act
No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls
squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory
Act No. 897.

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes

are to be strictly construed against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused. In the interpretation of a penal
statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to
construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the
defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the
same should be made applicable to him. Thus applying Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the accusedappellant, he cannot also be required to serve his civil liability
to the offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency because this is no longer required by the
aforesaid article.

People v. Subido
G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion
praying that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his
appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that
although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could
not be required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in
the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment
did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve
the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its
opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of
appeal bond and asked the lower court to require accusedappellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of
P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The lower court issued an order denying the accusedappellant's motion and declared in accordance with the terms
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the accusedappellant has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he
could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision.
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve
the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel
committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving,
cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that
the court is given the discretion to impose the penalty of
imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be
noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused:
three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00;
indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00;
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the
payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
in the exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty
of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity
of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that
the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency"
is separated by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby
sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the accessory
penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00)

US v. Hart
G.R. No. L-8848, November 21, 1913
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty
on a charge of vagrancy under theprovisions of Act No. 519. All
three appealed and presented evidence showing that each of
thedefendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business sufficient enough to supportthemselves. However, the
Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing that in
Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase no visible means of
support only applies to the clause tramping or straying
through the country and not thefirst clause which states that
every person foundloitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, thus making the 3 appellants guiltyof
vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for without
visible means of support to qualify the first part of the clause,
either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after country would have been
WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under
the Attorney-Generals argument based on a mere grammatical
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive
and the effect intended by the Legislature should be the
relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the
meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty
of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will
give iteffect. Moreover, ascertaining the consequences flowing
from such a construction of the law is also helpful in
determining the soundness of the reasoning. Considering that
the argument of the Attorney-General would suggest a lack of
logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various
classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the
defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at a level
of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad were
acquitted, with the costs
de oficio.

Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez

[G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961]

Fule v. CA


Gregorio Fule, a banker and a jeweller, offered to sell his

parcel of land to Dr. Cruz in exchange for P40,000 and a
diamond earring owned by the latter. A deed of absolute sale
was prepared by Atty. Belarmino, and on the same day Fule
went to the bank with Dichoso and Mendoza, and Dr. Cruz
arrived shortly thereafter. Dr. Cruz got the earrings from her
safety deposit box and handed it to Fule who, when asked if
those were alright, nodded and took the earrings. Two hours
after, Fule complained that the earrings were fake. He files a
complaint to declare the sale null and void on the ground of
fraud and deceit.

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from
abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium
benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate
and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of
the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made
of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of
the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and
other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No.
601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of
the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund
fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and
flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter
affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank,
maintaining that the term stabilizer and flavors mentioned in
section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in
the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not
satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court
thru the present petition for review.
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the
importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax
Law (Republic Act No. 601).
YES. The decision under review was reversed.
General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General
that the term stabilizer and flavors as used in the law refers
only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently,
on the principle of statutory construction that general terms
may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which
indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rule, however,
is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term,
all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true
that the term stabilizer and flavors is preceded by a number
of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it
is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do
not belong to the same classification.
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in
connection with them, does not require the rejection of general
terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection
with other rules of construction.

Whether the sale should be nullified on the ground of fraud
A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price. Being consensual, a contract of
sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and
they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective
contractual commitments. It is evident from the facts of the
case that there was a meeting of the minds between petitioner
and Dr. Cruz. As such, they are bound by the contract unless
there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its
Contracts that are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties are: (1)
those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to
a contract; and (2) those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. The
records, however, are bare of any evidence manifesting that
private respondents employed such insidious words or
machinations to entice petitioner into entering the contract of
barter. It was in fact petitioner who resorted to machinations to
convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay
Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable
opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code within
which to examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when
asked by Dr. Cruz if he was satisfied with the same. By taking
the jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which
was more consistent with his exercise of ownership over it.
This gains credence when it is borne in mind that he himself
had earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr. Cruz by affixing
his signature to the contract of sale. That after two hours he
later claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in
exchange for his Tanay property, could not sever the juridical
tie that now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The nature and value of
the thing he had taken preclude its return after that
supervening period within which anything could have
happened, not excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its
being switched with an inferior kind.
Ownership over the parcel of land and the pair of emerald-cut
diamond earrings had been transferred to Dr. Cruz and
petitioner, respectively, upon the actual and constructive
delivery thereof. Said contract of sale being absolute in nature,
title passed to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold since
there was no stipulation in the contract that title to the property
sold has been reserved in the seller until full payment of the
price or that the vendor has the right to unilaterally resolve the
contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed
While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of
the consideration was still payable to petitioner, its nonpayment
by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or
bar the transfer of ownership and possession of the things

exchanged considering the fact that their contract is silent as to

when it becomes due and demandable.
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred
due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No.
7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date
of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May
2006, no recall may be instituted.
W/N the SK election is a local election.
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to its context, and it must be considered together and kept
subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74
is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather
than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus,
interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK
election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never
be a recall election rendering inutile the provision.
interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
People v. Yabut
G.R. No. 39085. September 27, 1933.
On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, the accused Antonio
Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat
and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another
prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there
hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from
behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby
causing the death of the latter. Yabut was a recidivist, he
having previously been convicted twice of the crime of
homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final
sentences rendered by competent tribunals.
Whether or not Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
the case at bar.
Yes. Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, translated in English,
provides that:
Commission of another crime during service of penalty
imposed for another previous offense Penalty. Besides
the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the
same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
The appellant places much stress upon the word "another"
appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article
160 and would have us accept his deduction from the
headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new
crime which is committed by a person already serving
sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving
sentence. The language is plain and unambiguous. There is
not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said

article applies only in cases where the new offense is different

in character from the former offense for which the defendant is
serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty
is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor
propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs
of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such
epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or
reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that
follows. A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised
Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the
Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords
conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of
each article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the
contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event
have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words
of the text.
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically
considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato
C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18,
2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or
limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment

of the JBC, the specified period within which the President

shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether
the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the
Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.

every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to

the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect
of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
US v. Go Chico
A law punishes the display of flags used during the
insurrection against the US may not be so construed as to
exempt from criminal liability a person who displays a replica of
said flag because said replica is not the one used during the
rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the statute together
Go Chico is liable though flags displayed were just replica of
the flags used during insurrection against US
Case of Regalado vs. Yulo
No. 42935 15February1935

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed
of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the
same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only
to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that

This case was brought about by the action quo warranto to

determine the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe
Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the
office of Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay.
Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace
of Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934
Regalado became 65 yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the
judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/
instructions from the Sec of Justice, designated Esteban T.
Villar, Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado
surrendered the office to Villar under protest.
Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by the Act No. 3899, the
Justices and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval
of the Act No. 3899 who reached the age of 65 yrs after said
Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age
of 65 yrs.
No, Because justices appointed prior to the approval of the act
and who completed 65 yrs of age on September 13 1934,
subsequent to the approval of the Act which was on November
16 1931 and who by law is required to cease to hold office on
January 1, 1933 is not affected by the said act.
The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the words used
in its construction. (If legislative intent is not expressed in some
appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation
speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in
the phraseology of the law.)
People v. Lidres (108 Phil. 995)
FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their
applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez. The
Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an agreement,

wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to take over

Echavez position on a 50-50 basis, e.i that is the period from
January to March 1954, would be equally divided between
them. Diotay then took over and began teaching.
However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the
school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it,
the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it or
not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954. True
to his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to take
over. He held class with the half of the class and erased
Diotays name from the attendance chart and place his own.
Diotay informed the principal and the following day they were
summoned by the supervising teacher, ordered Diotay to
continue her teaching and advised Lidres not to go back to the
school. Without heeding the said instruction Lidres without any
authority whatsoever, again took over Diotays class against
the latters will.
Lidres was charged and prosecuted with the crime of
Usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in
R.A. No. 10.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of
subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities.
HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion of
House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses
indisputably that said Act was really intended as an emergency
measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the
subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its
passage in September 1946. Hence, the elimination of the
element of pretense of official position required under Article
177 of the RPC. And since it is neither alleged in the
information nor proved during the trial that defendant is a
member of a seditious organization engaged in subversive
activities, he could not be liable or found guilty under said
provision of R.A. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that R.A. No. 10
is an amendment to Art. 177, and not merely an
implementation thereof, the subsequent enactment of R.A.
379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute an amendment
thereof restoring the element of pretense of official position in
the offense of usurpation of official functions. Under R.A. 379,
the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, pretense of official position is an essential element of
the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the information
specifically charges that defendant committed the offense
without pretense of official position. Under the circumstances,
the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense.
RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 1.Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. (1a, 2a)
Section 2.Conclusive presumptions. The following are
instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. (3a)
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;

(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a
receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the
payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the
money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly
appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were
laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner
that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a
sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made
before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the
instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed
hostilities, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and whose existence has not been known for
four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive
years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where
there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for
the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in
any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family
Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a
contract of copartneship;

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband

and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire
properly through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding
shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit are equal.
(dd)That if the marriage is terminated and the mother
contracted another marriage within three hundred days after
such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall
govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to
have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be
born within the three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is
usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed
or published by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain
reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the
book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey
real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to
him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of
such person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons
perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are
no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from
the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is
deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to
have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is
deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be
different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be
the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between
those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be
considered to have died at the same time. (5a)
Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy.
There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child born after
three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or
the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for theexpropriation of
some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangay Alubog

and Babag, Cebu City, under PTAsexpress authority to

acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land withinand without the tourist
zones for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2),
of its Revised Charter (PD564). The heirs of Juancho Ardona
et. Al, ) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in
that the taking isallegedly not impressed with public use under
the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism
purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power,the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a
land reform area; that limiting the amountof compensation by
legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the
land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of
Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI),
that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The
Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the
Philippine National Bank, CebuCity Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1533,the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. then filed a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the
purpose of constructing a sports complex by thePhilippine
Tourism Authority be considered taking for public use.
Held: The states power of eminent domain extends to the
expropriation of land for tourism purposes although thisspecific
objective is not expressed in the constitution. The policy
objectives of the framers can be expressed only ingeneral
terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony publicinterest, and
general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these
objectives vary from time to time andaccording to place. To
freeze specific programs like tourism into express provisions
would make the constitutionmore prolix than bulky code and
require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic
proportions. The particular mention in the constitution of
agrarian reform and transfer of utilities and other private
enterprises to publicownership merely underscores the
magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by this
programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the
power of eminent domain for the purposes like tourism and
other development program
Humberto Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD
1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed
which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs
charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter
provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games
of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of
chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the
validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869
is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection
clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection

clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling,
while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that
P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive its right to impose
taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as
the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the
local autonomy principle.
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by
PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly
explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA
306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races
(RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate
in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection
clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local
autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly
stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation
has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City
of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National
Government over local governments.
Doctrine of Implications. That which is plainly implied in the
language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understand by implication to
contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to
its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in
the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of
the law.