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TRAINING IN UN OPERATING TECHNIQUES

PKOs differ from one another and the operational techniques required will also differ. In designing the correct training module an
assessment of the needs of the particular mission will be necessary. This is
relatively easy in dealing with a PKO which has been ongoing for several
years. It is more difficult when training for a new mission. In training for a
new mission the training module will have to concentrate on the elements
common to most, if not all, PKOs in the hope that techniques covered may
be utilized once the PKO is deployed. This Part will cover some of these
techniques and is laid out as follows:
Section 1 - Introduction
Section 2 - Positions and Observation Posts
Section 3 - Checkpoints, Road-blocks, Searches
Section 4 - Patrolling
Section 5 - Investigations
Section 6 - Negotiations/Liaison
Section 7 - Use of Force
Section 8 - Leadership
The level of training required will vary from one contributing
country to another. Full-time professional soldiers will require less
grounding than reserves. Full-time professionals with experience in aid to
the civil power or internal security will have encountered the techniques
before but will be required to direct them towards peace-keeping, which
may involve a less aggres-sive mode.

Positions and observation posts


Position (Posn) A Posn is a tactically sited location permanently
occupied by military members of a PKO from where they carry out various
operational tasks such as check points, road-blocks, observation, patrols. A
Posn is normally occupied by armed troops
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Observation Post. An OP is a permanently occupied location from


where UN peace-keepers carry out observe and report missions. In
locating OPs one may often have to sacrifice good tactical siting for good
observation. An OP can be occupied by armed troops or unarmed
observers. It is not current practice to man OPs with a mixture of armed
troops and unarmed observers.
Temporary Posns/OPs.
These are manned as required on a temporary basis, for a limited
period of time, for an observation or control task. They are not
administratively selfcontained but may be located in old permanent
positions or OPs, in which case they will contain some of the features from
their previous status.
Marking and protection
All Posns/OPs must be well delineated, distinctively marked and
provide protection for the occupants.
They should be surrounded by a protective wall (earth mound, rock
construction wall, gabions, T-walls, etc.). Outside the perimeter wall
should be extensive wire entanglements and the entrance gate should be
zigzagged.
The Posn/OP should be painted white with UN markings in black or
blue. The Posn/OP number should also be prominently displayed. These
markings should be visible from the air. The UN flag should be flown at all
times from a prominently placed flagpole. The Posn/OP and flag should be
well lit at night.
The Posn/OP should incorporate a shelter capable of with standing
the type of fire which is likely in the area. With scarce resources a
categorization and priority programme may be necessary.
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Posns/OPs should have:


a. line and radio communications to next higher HQ;
b. specific written orders;
c. a specified minimum strength
Training aid
The ideal training aid would be an actual Posn/OP constructed in the
concentration area of the contributing country, where economically
feasible, or perhaps under a regional training arrangement. Other training,
covered below, such as checkpoints, searches and shelters, could also be
carried out in the location.
If such a fully developed training aid is not possible, a less
sophisticated mock-up may suffice. As a last resort, use can be made of
detailed audiovisual training aids (e.g. diagrams, slides, VCRs,
etc.). A diagrammatic plan for a position is attached as Annex B.
The training periods should cover:
Daily routine
Observing techniques.
Daily routine
This can be covered initially by briefing and lectures. Where a properly
constructed location as described above is available, the briefing can be
followed up by actually having trainees live there while doing other
aspects of training, although it is recognized that this may not always be
possible. The following areas should be covered

a. hygiene and cleaning programmes;


b. minor maintenance tasks;
c. generator operation and care;
d. cooking (UNMOs).
Observing techniques.
Training in observation should include:
a. technique for searching ground;
b. use of binoculars;
c. use of Night Vision Equipment.
The climax to training should be a training exercise involving day and
night observation where troops/observers would be tested on their ability
to observe and report on some contrived incidents.
Checkpoints, road-blocks, searches
A checkpoint is a manned point used as a means of controlling
movement and checking vehicles and pedestrians, in order to enforce
control measures, orders and regulations. Although used widely by some
PKOs, the nature and frequency of their use would depend on the mandate
and concept of operation as well as the status of forces agreement, which
may limit UN powers of search. Closed checkpoints are called roadblocks. They can also form the basis of blocking positions if these are
required because of developments on the ground (e.g. incursions by the
parties).
Checkpoints as outlined here are relevant only in a situation where
the PKOs mandate requires it to maintain a high profile in circumstances
of actual or potential conflict. The training will require adjustment for
missions where such conditions do not exist.
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Checkpoints (CHPs) can be classified as:


a. static;
b. mobile.
Static CHPs are deployed permanently at fixed locations. Normally a
position adjoins the installation. Troops who man the CHP will live at the
position. CHPs are deployed on a road or major track, normally at a
crossroads or junction or at the entrance to a controlled area. Annex C
gives suggested layouts for CHPs.
All CHPs will have a method of slowing traffic (ramps and/or a zigzag
device) and a search bay for the more thorough searches.
The CHP is manned on a 7-day week/24-hour day basis, but it can be
closed and converted to a road-block where movement is forbidden during
given hours. The blocking of the road/track does not relieve the position of
its normal security/observation mission. CHPs sometimes vary in the
degree of search they are required to carry out (e.g. military vehicles only,
all vehicles, random proportion of vehicle). Depending on local circumstances, searches may also include the searching of individuals or at least
males.
Mobile CHPs are deployed where the PKO has difficulties covering
all roads and tracks with static CHPs.
Mobile CHPs will be composed of a minimum of one section in two
armoured vehicles. This group will leave base, operate over a given roadtrack network and set up snap CHPs en route for short periods. Annex D
covers the operation of mobile CHPs.
Training in the operation of CHPs, road-blocks and searches is best
conducted in sequence as follows:
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a. introductory lecture/discussion;
b. practical application;
c. exercise.
The lecture/discussion and practical application should cover the theory,
layout, siting and operation of CHPs, road-blocks and searches. While the
initial part can be done in a classroom/lecture hall, the practical application
can only be attempted on the ground. If a training position/OP has been
constructed, it would be useful to incorporate a static CHP into the training
area. This would be ideal for training in all three areas. Otherwise a simple
mock-up should be used. For training in mobile CHPs the necessary
equipment can usually be easily provided from local resources. Thereafter
a training circuit can be laid out and the operation of mobile CHPs
practised. Annex D is the operations Directive from UNIFIL on mobile
CHPs. It may prove beneficial when constructing a training period in this
area.
The final phase of training in this area should be an exercise
involving the operation of static and mobile CHPs, the conversion of CHPs
to road-blocks and the actual searching of personnel and vehicles where
Some will actually be carrying contraband goods.
The normal subsidiary problems encountered at CHPs should also be
included in exercises (e.g. build-up of traffic and consequent loss of
tempers, truculent subjects of search, crash through incidents and followup action, etc.).
The exercise and training leading towards it should include the following
areas:
a. security and deployment of personnel;
b. method of search;
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c. what to do when people:


refuse to produce ID card,
refuse to open the boot of the car,
produce a weapon;
d. training in traffic control;
e. training for junior leaders in:
isolating problems quickly, preventing their escalation,scaling down and
defusing problems quickly
Patrolling
Patrolling is an essential part of UN peace-keeping. It is virtually
impossible to conceive of a mission in which there would be no patrolling.
This activity is conducted by PKOs whether they are observer groups,
peace-keeping Forces or a mixture of both.
Predeployment training on patrolling must cover the following areas:
a. types of patrol to be undertaken;
b. aims of patrolling in the PKO;
c. principles to be adhered to by patrols;
d. conduct of the patrolling.
These training guidelines deal with the subject in broad outline. In
designing its own training programme the relevant national authority will
have to bear in mind the particular PKO and its likely patrolling
requirements.

Types of patrolls
The types of patrolling utilized by PKOs, currently and in the past, have
been many and varied. Training should cover the type of pa- trolling to be
undertaken by the PKO in question. These patrols, which can be by day or
night, may be:
a. foot patrols;
b. vehicle patrols;
c. air patrols;
d. sea patrols;
e. special (river/marsh, ski, etc.) patrols.

Aims of patrolling
Training should specify the aims of patrolling for the PKO in ques tion.
These aims may be to:
a. confirm/supervise a cease-fire;
b. gain information;
c. check on areas which cannot be observed from OPs;
d. indicate a UN presence to parties;
e. reassure isolated communities;
f. carry out mobile CHPs;
g. inspect existing and empty positions of the parties;
h. insert ambush parties along infiltration lanes;
j. carry out observation from isolated and unoccupied OPs;
k. provide a physical link between adjoining but relatively isolated UN positions;

l. provide protection for parties or local population where travelling


without the UN might provoke an incident;
m. interpose standing patrols between parties during a period of tension.
Where patrolling is to be included in pre-deployment training the
suggested sequence is:
a. lecture/discussion including the stressing of UN patrolling
procedures;
b. practice;
c. exercise.
In preparing a training module covering patrolling, the lecture/discussion
sequence should cover the following:
a.Strength.
Minimum strengths for patrols should be laid down in SOPs to include use
of specialist vehicles and minimum number of vehicles if necessary.
b.Security.
Security measures should be covered. These could include:
safe (mine cleared) patrol routes/paths;
LOs/guides/interpreters;
no go area information;
night patrol restrictions/special procedures;
where necessary, overt measures to ensure patrol recognition by parties.
c.Communications.
Radio report lines system, etc.
d.Equipment Levels.
e.Reinforcement Plan.
f.Tactical Formations.
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g.Medevac Plans.
In the practice/exercise phase the following areas should be included:
a.Patrol Preparations
Briefing on mission, area, time in and out, routes in andout, etc.
Personal preparation;
Preparation and testing of equipment, vehicles, communications.
b.Patrol Execution
Maintenance of radio contact/reports;
Action on encounters;
Action on halts.
c. Debrief
Verbal to the patrol master (e.g. Coy Comd, Ops Offr, Info Offr,
etc.), followed by a written report/marked map to next higher headquarters.
The preparation and execution of an exercise on UN patrolling techniques
should be part of all pre-deployment training. The scenario should cover as
many of the aims of patrolling (see page 49) as possible. Depending on
available training time it may be necessary to concentrate on some areas
only.
The most important areaswould be:
a. information gathering patrol, including ground observation;
b. mobile CHP patrol (peace-keeping Force members only);
c. interposition patrols (more relevant to peace-keeping Forces than
Observers);
d. ambush patrols on infiltration lanes (peace-keeping Force members
only).

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Investigations
In the pre-deployment training of United Nations Military Observers, the whole area of operational investigations should be covered. It
does not have much pertinence for non-commissioned officers or privates
destined to be members of a peace-keeping Force, although officers of a
Force may be involved in such investigations.
An operational investigation is one carried out by the UN into any
special operational occurrence. It will normally evolve from:
a. a particularly serious operational incident requiring further detailed
appraisal;
b. a request by one of the parties after an alleged incident involving the
other party;
c. a complaint from one of the parties about the operational
behaviour/reaction of UN military personnel.
Operational investigations are normally held against the background of a
serious or potentially serious incident. As such they are very important
and, properly handled, can be a definite contributing factor towards
keeping potentially explosive situations in check.
To ensure that they are properly carried out the procedures should be
covered in the training of officers. A request for an operational
investigation can be initiated at headquarters or local level. An
investigation can be offered by the PKO without a request from the
party/parties if it is felt that it will defuse a potentially serious situation. If
one is requested at the unit level and involves a purely local incident, it
may be investigated at that level but only after seeking and being granted
the approval of the PKO HQ. At HQ level, depending on the seriousness of

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the incident an investigation can be instituted by the FC/CMO or one of his


senior staff officers, most probably the Chief Operations Officer.
An operational investigation should be carried out by at least two
officers who are suitably qualified. They must be properly briefed and if
possible be given written terms of reference. The parties may be asked to
provide LCs, documentary or material evidence and witnesses. The team
will carry out the investigation with efficiency, discretion and courtesy.
They will be strictly impartial and will not accept any pressure from the
parties. They will not express personal opinions, although professional
opinions will be part of their report.
The investigation will be carried out at the scene of the incident or as close
to it as possible. The team will take notes, make sketches, mark maps, take
photographs, tag material evidence items with serial number/date-time
group/map reference. The team will maintain communication with the
headquarters throughout.
Report
At the conclusion of the investigation, a written report will be submitted to
the convening authority. This report will form the basis of reports to the
parties, UN New York, etc. The report will include:
terms of reference;
broad description of background to investigation;
actions of investigation team;
statements;
maps, physical evidence, sketches, photographs, etc.;
conclusions.

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In many Defence Forces officers will have already been involved in


operational investigations of one kind or the other. They may not, however,
have experience in UN investigations. Some officers will have no
experience whatsoever in this area. In assessing the type of training to be
covered in this module, the experience of the potential students will have
to be considered. Based on this assessment the actual training can vary
from:
a. simple lecture/discussion, to
b. lecture/discussion followed by an exercise where students are asked to
investigate a contrived incident and produce a report, with subsequent
class criticism/discussion periods.
Negotiations/liaison
Liaison with the parties is an essential element of UN peace- keeping. All
PKOs will have a liaison system in place to provide a structured link
between the UN and the parties through which negotiation of mutual
problems can take place. The liaison system will embody:
a. a high-level link at FC/CMO levels;
b. a medium working level link between PKO HQ and the parties on a
continuing day-to-day basis;
c. unit ground-level link, organized at unit level and designed to defuse
problems at source.
In the area of liaison work, certain nominated officers at PKO HQ and unit
levels may be nominated to negotiate.
Other forms of negotiation outside this formalized system exist:
a. military observers may be called to negotiate on a problem which has
arisen on the ground;
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b. junior leaders at corporal or even private level may have to negotiate a


sudden problem which has arisen in their area(e.g. a CHP dispute).
The training for negotiation and liaison will of necessity be restricted. At
the formal end of the scale, the selection of personnel with negotiating
ability and experience is all-important. As far as informal negotiation by
UNMOs and junior leaders is concerned, some general training can be
carried out.
The best format is lecture/discussion followed by simple exercises:
a. lecture/discussion should cover such areas as diplomacy, tact, firmness,
fairness, friendliness and flexibility;
b. the exercises could be at low level involving junior leaders (e.g. an
imaginary CHP incident) and could be co-ordinated with other exercises
(e.g. CHP searching, etc.).
Use of force
Training/discussion on the use of force within a PKO forms a very
important part of the training programme. It must be included for all levels
in all modules.
This is necessary because:
a. the non-enforcement nature of peace-keeping has devel oped to such a
stage that it is now an integral part of PKOs;
b. soldiers from many contributing countries will have been conditioned to
an automatic return of fire philosophy;
c. soldiers with wide experience of aid to the civil power at home will still
find differences in the application of UN doctrine;
d. soldiers with previous UN experience may find the doctrine changed
slightly as part of the ongoing evolutionary process.
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The whole ethos of peace-keeping is that it be achieved without the use of


military force. As explained in Part 1, it is quite different from peace
enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
UN PKOs are carried out by unarmed observers, armed forces equipped
only for self-defence, or a combination of both. Where armed troops are
part of a UN PKO, the topic of Use of Force must be covered in predeployment training.
It is suggested that the subject be dealt with in the following order:
definition of force;
when force can be used;
principles in the application of force;
how force is to be applied;
authority for the use of force;
actions after force has been applied.
Definition
Force is the use of physical means to impose ones will.
The Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of UNIFIL
summed up the basic principle on the use of force by PKOs when it stated
inter alia that the Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive
character and shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence
would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from
discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.
Force can be used only in self-defence against direct attacks on, or threats
to the lives of UN personnel or when UN security in general is under
threat. This would include attempts at forceful entry into UN positions and

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their environs by one party for us as a fire base against the other and
attempts by force to disarm UN troops.
Principles in the application of force
Once a decision to use force is taken, certain principles will be adhered to
by the UN:
a. only the minimum force consistent with achieving the aim will be
employed;
b. if possible, prevention by negotiation or persuasion should precede
force. This escalatory process is, however, an ideal which it may not
always be possible to realize;
c. if a situation develops where firing for effect seems the only option, it
will be preceded by warnings. These can be oral, firing of flares which are
understood by the parties as being a warning, warning shots in the air,
firing short, etc.;
d. fire for effect will be initiated after the procedures above have been
exhausted. However, if there is an immediate threat to UN lives or if UN
casualties have already occurred, fire for effect may be initiated without
delay. Fire for effect is firing to hit;
e. in firing for effect there should be no escalations in type of fire. The idea
should be to return like with like;
f. fire should be controlled and should cease once the aim has been
achieved;
g. after the incident the UN Commander involved must immediately
transmit a full SITREP to HQ, including the type and number of rounds
fired by UN forces.
The Force Commander may wish to reserve to himself the
authorization to fire heavy support weapons (120 mm mortars) with
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authorization for the firing of other heavy weapons being reserved to the
Battalion CO.
A request in clear or radio for authorization to fire such weapons can
incidentally have a deterrent effect on its own. In the final analysis,
however, it is the commander on the spot who must assess his situation and
take what he sees as appropriate action.
During training the broad principles stated above should be
expanded on, especially for the junior soldier. Consideration should be
given to utilizing the medium of simple scenarios based on situations the
soldier is likely to encounter
Leadership
Peace-keeping places a large amount of responsibility on leaders, at
the junior officer and non-commissioned officer levels. Unlike
conventional operations where senior leaders will very often be near at
hand, peace-keeping is often carried out in isolated positions, scattered
checkpoints, small patrols, etc.
Leaders, senior and junior, officers and NCOs, are selected for their
innate or acquired abilities in this field. They will, in most cases, have
received adequate career training in leadership techniques as part of their professional education. It is not therefore necessary,
in most cases, to undertake separate instruction in leadership in the predeployment phase.
What is required is an emphasis on the exercise of responsibility and
command. To assist in the development of the leadership potential of the
section and sub-section commanders, their responsibilities should be

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emphasized from the commencement of training and their sections should


train as a team throughout.
Close supervision of junior leaders should be exercised by those
responsible for the training, with on-the-spot remedial action employed as
re quired.

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SAFETY MEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS


No commander at any level wishes his troops to sustain casualties. It
is therefore important that security measures at all levels be dealt with
during pre-deployment training. This part will look at troop safety under
the following headings:
Section 1 - Introduction
Section 2 - Shelters
Section 3 - Equipment
Section 4 - Travelling and Movement
Section 5 - Non-operational Safety Measures
It must be emphasized that maintenance of the security drills learned
in basic training will always be pertinent.
All UN positions and observation posts should include a shelter or
shelters large enough to accommodate the manning strength as well as
some extra personnel. Each shelter should be well stocked with sufficient
water and pack rations to allow personnel to survive without resupply for a
given number of days, as laid down by the commander in SOPs (ten days
is a suggested minimum). There will be a holdings chart and checks will be
carried out regular intervals (at least once a month). Proper paper stock
rotation should take place.
The construction of shelters will depend on:
a. how immediate a threat to UN personnel is perceived;
b. the resources available.
Where resources are not immediately available to achieve the standard laid
down in the preceding paragraph, the positions most likely to be involved
in observing and reporting a major outbreak of hostilities should have first

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priority, followed by positions in the likely area of fighting, followed by


other positions. To meet relevant requirements, pre-deployment training
should cover:
a. the theory and practice of shelter construction;
b. the development of shelters;
c. the organization, daily routine and maintenance of established shelters.
Training is best implemented by lecture/discussions followed by practical
experience.
a. The theory and practice of shelter construction can focus on the
necessity for shelters, the high priority which should be given to the shelter
in the development of a position, materials used in the construction of
shelters (sandbags, T walls, earth mounds, concrete blocks, gabions,
Damascus shelters etc.).
The practical aspect should involve familiarization with materials
and some practical construction.
b. The topic of the development of shelters should cover the addition of
comfort and practical innovations in the shelter once the priority of
protection has been achieved (e.g. sleeping bunks, ration storage, radio
remotes, drainage, lighting, power, etc.).
c. Established shelter training is best done in a mock up or real training
shelter. Training can centre around the daily checks of foods, medical kit,
radio, etc. which should be undertaken. If it is felt necessary, troops can
experience living in a shelter while undertaking other training activities although this will be restricted by the number of personnel involved and the
number of shelters in the training area

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Equipment
The security of troops engaged in peace-keeping can be enhanced by the
issue and utilization of protective items of equipment.
Steel helmets
These are NOT a UN issued item but all personnel engaged in peacekeeping should be issued with them. The operational situation will dictate
when they should be worn
Fragmentation vests
These are NOT a UN issued but should be made available by the
contributing country. They can be issued as a personal item of kit to all
soldiers or a pre-designated quantity could be deployed with the unit to
enable an adequate pool system to be set up. They should be carried or
worn by all personnel when on exposed operational duty
NBC suits
There are NOT a UN issued item, nor is it normal for troops engaged in
peace-keeping to have them as a personal kit item or thatthey be available
from a unit pool. However, where the UN assesses that a nuclear,
biological or chemical threat exists, contributing countries may be asked to
make NBC suits available for issue to personnel on operational duty in risk
areas.
From a training viewpoint, it should be sufficient just to emphasize the
carrying of helmets and fragmentation vests by way of lecture. If it is felt
that additional emphasis is necessary, helmets and fragmentation vest can
be scheduled as dress for certain training periods (e.g. operational
training). It may also be necessary to include a period of familiarization
with, and wearing of, the NBC suit for all troops. Ideally all soldiers
should be obliged to wear and work in the suit for at least 30 minutes.
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Failing this they should at least know how to don the suit and be aware
how uncomfortable it can be to personnel who are not used to wearing it.
Travelling and movement
UN personnel, depending on the threat in their area of operations, can be at
special risk when travelling. Pre- deployment training must cover this area
with particular emphasis on convoy driving and hijack drills.
a. United Nations Military Observers are almost always un- armed. When
it is judged that there is a threat to their security, SOPs will probably
require

them

to travel

in two vehicle

convoys with reliable

communications. Consideration can also be given to supplying them with


arms and/or an armed escort, but studies of this question in the past have
almost in variably led to the conclusion that arming the observer would
compromise their ability to carry out their duties and would create a
potentially dangerous confusion between armed troops and unarmed
military observers, whose methods of operation are quite different and
must be so perceived by those with whom they deal.
b. A United Nations Force might be in a low-risk situation. It should
nevertheless employ security measures such as a minimum number of
armed personnel to travel in each vehicle.
c. In high risk situations, a UN Force should employ the convoy system
with:
two vehicles at least in each convoy;
four armed personnel in each convoy;
radio in at least one vehicle;
convoy procedures employed (e.g. keeping vehicle behind always in
view);
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no predictable travel patterns;


limited after-dark movement (e.g. operations only, armoured vehicles only,
etc.);
no progress reports in clear on radio (e.g. use report lines or brief HQ
before leaving, report by telephone on arrival, use radio in emergency
only).
Hijack
Where a danger of hijacking exists, SOPs will include an anti- hijack drill.
this should include:
a. an initial hijack message from vehicle under threat or OP/vehicle
observing incident, giving:
posn (e.g. 1 Km N of Posn 6-34);
who (e.g. 4 armed elements);
in what (e.g. Blue Volvo);
other details (e.g. going North)
b. hijack alert to all stations with resulting action:
closing of CHPs to create road-blocks;
alerting of mobile reserves (unit and force);
mobile patrol from nearest unit to location of incident;
helicopters on standby (if deployed with PKO); dog teams on standby (if
deployed with PKO);
liaison with local authorities and others in a position to help

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Non-operational safety measures


A high proportion of deaths and serious injuries in PKOs come not from
operational causes but from so-called natural causes and accidents. These
include:
a. health reasons;
b. traffic accidents;
c. fire;
d. suicide;
e. weapon handling accidents;
f. accidents while on leave.
Proper briefing and preventive measures prior to deployment can reduce
these unnecessary casualties:
a. The pre-UN service medical examination must be thorough and it must
pay particular attention to conditions which might be adversely affected by
stress, new climatic conditions etc.;
b. Great stress must be laid on briefing drivers on the different road and
track conditions they will meet (e.g. the treacherously slippery conditions
which come after the first rains in some areas) and the local driving
practices. Defensive driving must be emphasized;
c. training in fire prevention, fire precaution, fire fighting and rescue is
necessary.
Emphasis should be placed on:
identification of fire hazards;
the exercising of personnel in the use of fire fighting equipment;
first aid and general rescue measures;
evacuation of buildings;
safety measures in the handling of inflammable materials.
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d. Troops must be briefed on how to recognize and deal with depression in


themselves and in their companions; they must be pre-warned on the
dangers of loneliness and stress and on the effect these can have in overemphasizing reactions to such things as bad news for home;
e. Although a normal military attribute, care in weapon handling must also
be stressed during training. Troops serving in PKOs will probably handle
their personal weapons much more than in the home environment. Overfamiliarity and carelessness can prove a fatal combination and troops
should be aware of this. There are training films and videos widely
available on this subject;
f. Leave, after a prolonged period of tension and abstinence, can often lead
to over-indulgence, especially in alcohol, which in turn can create the
conditions for serious accidents while on leave. Troops should be briefed
on this prior to service with a PKO and again prior to taking leave in the
mission area.

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NATOs FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY TASKS


NATOs essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and
security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defence is
at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of solidarity and cohesion among
its members. NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on
common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of
law. Since the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond the borders of NATO
member countries can jeopardize this objective, the Alliance also contributes to
peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships.
Essentially, NATO not only helps to defend the territory of its members, but
engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield,
prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support
reconstruction.
NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North
America is tied to the security of Europe. It is an intergovernmental organization
which provides a forum where members can consult together on any issues they
may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters
affecting their security. No single member country is forced to rely soley on its
national capabilities to meet its essential national security objectives. The
resulting sense of shared security among members contributes to stability in the
Euro-Atlantic area.
NATOs fundamental security tasks are laid down in the Washington
Treaty. They are sufficiently general to withstand the test of time and are
translated into more detail in strategic concepts. Strategic concepts are the
authoritative statement of the Alliances objectives and provide the highest level
of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these

26

goals; they remain the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a
whole.
During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the
protection of its members from potential threats emanating from the Soviet
Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the rise of non-state
actors affecting international security, many new security threats emerged.
NATO now focuses on countering these threats by utilizing collective defence,
managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in
the 2010 Strategic Concept.

NATOS CRISIS MANAGEMENT


Crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. It can
involve military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crises
before, during and after conflicts as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.
One of NATOs strengths is its crisis management capacity, based on
experience, tried and tested crisis management procedures and an integrated
military command structure. This enables it to deal with a wide range of crises
in an increasingly complex security environment, employing an appropriate mix
of political and military tools to help manage emerging crises, which could pose
a threat to the security of the Alliances territory and populations.
Within the framework of the Alliance, members work and train together in order
to be able to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations, often
at short notice. In this context, NATO is an enabler which helps members and
partners train and operate together, sometimes with other actors where
appropriate, for combined crisis management operations and missions.

27

NATOs role in crisis management goes beyond military operations aimed at


deterring and defending against threats to Alliance territory and the safety and
security of Allied populations. A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian
and can also arise from a natural disaster or as a consequence of technological
disruptions.
Allies decide on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to
effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management,
including non-Article 5 response operations. Some operations may also include
partners, non-NATO countries and other international actors. NATO recognises
that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict, and lessons learned
from previous operations make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian
and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.
Many crisis management operations have their own objectives and end-state
depending on the nature of the crisis, which will define the scope and scale of
the response. To ensure effectiveness and resilience, NATOs crisis management
instruments are continuously adapted to the evolving security context. Over
time, NATO has led and conducted a number of crisis management operations,
including beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

Highlights
Crisis management is one of NATOs essential core tasks.
NATOs robust crisis management capabilities allow it to deal
with a wide range of emerging crises in an increasingly complex
security environment.
It derives this capability from its experience, tried and tested
procedures and integrated military command structure.
NATO decides whether to engage in a crisis management
operation on a case-by-case basis and by consensus.

28

NATOS ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT


The manner of dealing with a crisis depends on its nature, scale and seriousness.
In some cases, crises can be prevented through diplomacy or other measures,
while other situations may require more robust measures, including the use of
military force. In this regard, NATO has a holistic approach to crisis
management, envisaging involvement at all stages of a crisis and considering a
broad range of tools to be effective across the crisis management spectrum. This
approach is clearly reflected in the Alliances 2010 Strategic Concept.
In effect, NATO has had the capacity to deal with crisis management and, more
specifically, collective defence and disaster relief operations for a long time.
Only at a later stage, during the 1990s, did it become involved in non-Article 5
operations, that is, those that are mainly conducted in non-NATO member
countries to prevent a conflict from spreading and destabilising the region.
Prepared for Article 5 operations
Since its creation in 1949, the primary role and the greatest responsibility of the
Alliance is to protect and defend Allied territory and populations against attack.
Collective defence is at the heart of the Washington Treaty and is enshrined in
Article 5. Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed
attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this as an
armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to
assist the Ally attacked.
NATO did not conduct any operations Article 5 or other - during the Cold War.
The Alliances focus during this time was ensuring the effective defence of
NATOs territory through readiness, planning, preparations, and conducting
exercises for possible Article 5 contingencies.

29

Invocation of Article 5
Article 5 was invoked for the very first time following the Al-Qaeda terrorist
attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. Once it had been proved that
the attack had come from abroad, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) considered
it to be an act covered by Article 5. Several measures were put into place by
NATO to help prevent further attacks, including Operation Active Endeavour in
the Mediterranean to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity in
the area.
Engaging in non-Article 5 crisis response operations
As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed and satellite countries regained
independence, past tensions resurfaced and conflicts started among ethnic
groups.
From the former Yugoslavia to todays operations and missions
One of the first major conflicts following the end of the Cold War broke out in
the former Yugoslavia in 1992. NATO initially provided air- and sea-based
support to the UN - enforcing economic sanctions, an arms embargo and a noflight zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina - and with detailed military contingency
planning concerning safe areas and the implementation of a peace plan.
The measures proved inadequate to bring an end to the war. In the summer of
1995, after violations of exclusion zones, the shelling of UN-designated safe
areas and the taking of UN hostages, NATO member countries agreed to take
military action in support of UN efforts to bring an end to the war in Bosnia.
NATO launched a two-week air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces and, over
the following months, a series of other military measures at the request of the
UN force commanders. This helped pave the way for the signing of the Dayton

30

Peace Accord on 14 December 1995. The Alliance immediately proceeded to


deploy peacekeeping forces to the country, in accordance with the terms of a
UN mandate, giving NATO responsibility for the implementation of the military
aspects of the peace accord.
This was the first time that NATO became involved in a non-Article 5 crisis
management operation. Other non-Article 5 crisis management operations have
followed - in Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*,
Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa, over Libya and in
support of the African Union.
NATOs Strategic Concepts
Provision for crisis management measures had already been made in the
Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept for "the management of crises affecting the
security of its members". It was reiterated in the 1999 Strategic Concept, which
states that NATO stands ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and
to engage actively in crisis management. In addition, the 1999 document states
that these crisis management operations would include non-Article 5 operations.
The 2010 Strategic Concept broadened NATOs thinking on crisis management,
envisaging NATOs involvement at all stages of a crisis: NATO will therefore
engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises,
stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction. It also recognised
the imperative for a greater number of actors to participate and coordinate their
efforts and considered a broader range of tools to be used. More generally, it
adopted a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crisis management that
goes hand-in-hand with greater emphasis on training, developing local forces,
enhancing civil-military planning and interaction, and greater interoperability
between NATO and partner forces.

31

NATO and disaster relief operations


Crisis management is a broad concept that goes beyond military operations to
include, for instance, the protection of populations. NATO began developing
civil protection measures in the event of a nuclear attack as early as the 1950s.
NATO member countries soon realised that these capabilities could be used
effectively against the effects of disasters induced by floods, earthquakes or
technological incidents, and against humanitarian disasters.
In 1953, the first disaster assistance scheme was implemented following
devastating flooding in northern Europe and, in 1958, NATO established
detailed procedures for the co-ordination of assistance between NATO member
countries in case of disasters. These procedures remained in place and provided
the basis for NATO to conduct work in the field of civil emergency planning in
subsequent years. They were comprehensively reviewed in 1995 when they
became applicable to partner countries in addition to NATO member countries.
In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC)
was established to co-ordinate aid provided by different member and partner
countries to a disaster-stricken area in a member or partner country. NATO also
established a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, which is a non-standing,
multinational mix of national civil and military elements that have been
volunteered by member or partner countries for deployment to the area of
concern.
Civil emergency planning has become a key facet of NATO involvement in
crisis management. In recent years, NATO has provided support for many
countries. In May 2014, for instance, it provided support to Ukraine through a
team of experts who advised on the protection of critical infrastructure in the
context of the crisis with Russia. The EADRCC has coordinated assistance in
flood-devastated countries including Albania, Bosnia-and-Herzegovina, Czech
32

Republic, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine. It supported the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in Kosovo; helped coordinate aid which was sent to
earthquake-stricken Turkey and Pakistan; helped to fight fires in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and in Portugal; and supported Ukraine and
Moldova after extreme weather conditions had destroyed power transmission
capabilities. The EADRCC also conducts consequence management field
exercises on an annual basis, bringing together civil and military first response
teams to practice interoperability.

WHO DECIDES AND HOW?


Crisis decision-making at NATO
When a crisis occurs, no decisions on planning, deployment or employment of
military forces are taken without political authorisation. Decisions are taken by
the governments of each NATO member country collectively and may include
political, military or civil emergency measures, depending on the nature of the
crisis.
In addition to the regular consultations that take place to move ongoing
activities forward, at any given time, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty gives
each Ally the right to bring issues to the table for consultation and discussion
with other fellow members: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of any of the Parties is threatened. Article 4 is critical to NATOs
crisis management process, since consultation is at the basis of collective action.
NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises. The principal
political decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which
exchanges intelligence, information and other data, compares different
33

perceptions and approaches, harmonises its views and takes decisions by


consensus, as do all NATO committees.
In the field of crisis management, the Council is supported by the Operations
Policy Committee, the Political Committee, the Military Committee and the
Civil Emergency Planning Committee.
Additionally, NATO communication systems, including a "Situation Centre"
(SITCEN), receive, exchange and disseminate political, economic and military
intelligence and information around the clock, every single day of the year.
The overarching NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) is a process within
which a number of elements are geared to addressing different aspects of
NATOs response to crises in a complementary manner. These include: the
NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), the NATO Intelligence and
Warning System (NIWS), NATOs Operational Planning Process and NATO
Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements, which together
underpin NATOs crisis management role and its ability to respond to crises.
Internal co-ordination
NATO is one of few international organisations that have the experience as well
as the tools to conduct crisis management operations.

The NCRS is effectively a guide to aid decision-making within the field


of crisis management. Its role is to coordinate efforts between the national
representatives at NATO Headquarters, capitals and the strategic
commands. It does this by providing the Alliance with a comprehensive
set of options and measures to prepare for, manage and respond to crises.
It complements other processes such as operations planning, civil

34

emergency planning and others, which exist within the Organization to


address crises. It was first approved in 2005 and is revised annually.

One of the core components of the NCRS is the NCMP. The NCMP
breaks down a crisis situation into six different phases, providing a
structure against which military and non-military crisis response planning
processes should be designed. It is flexible and adaptable to different
crisis situations.

NATO periodically exercises procedures through scheduled crisis


management exercises (CMX) in which the Headquarters (civilian and
military) and capitals, including partners and other bodies who may be
involved in a real-life crisis participate.

Standardization: countries need to share a common set of standards,


especially among military forces, to carry out multinational operations.
By helping to achieve interoperability the ability of diverse systems and
organisations to work together among NATOs forces, as well as with
those of its partners, standardization allows for more efficient use of
resources. It therefore greatly increases the effectiveness of the Alliances
defence

capabilities.

Through its standardization bodies, NATO develops and implements


concepts, doctrines and procedures to achieve and maintain the required
levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality needed to
achieve interoperability. For instance, in the field, standard procedures
allow for the transfer of supplies between ships at sea and interoperable
material such as fuel connections at airfields. It enables the many NATO
and partner countries to work together, preventing duplication and
promoting better use of economic resources.

Logistics: this is the bridge between the deployed forces and the industrial
base that produces the material and weapons that forces need to
accomplish their mission. It comprises the identification of requirements
35

as well as both the building up of stocks and capabilities, and the


sustainment of weapons and forces. As such, the scope of logistics is
huge. Among the core functions conducted by NATO are: supply,
maintenance,
infrastructure

movement

and

transportation,

and

petroleum

medical

support,
support.

The Alliances overarching function is to coordinate national efforts and


encourage the highest degree possible of multinational responses to
operational needs, therefore reducing the number of individual supply
chains. While NATO has this responsibility, each state is responsible for
ensuring that - individually or through cooperative arrangements their
own forces receive the required logistic resources.
Coordinating with other international players
The North Atlantic Council decides on a case-by-case basis and by consensus
whether to engage in a crisis response operation. Increasingly, NATO
contributes to efforts by the wider international community to preserve or
restore peace and prevent conflict. It is committed to a comprehensive political,
civilian and military approach to crisis management. As a consequence, it is
building closer partnerships with civilian actors including non-governmental
organisations and local authorities and is focusing on several key areas of
work including cooperation with external actors; planning and conduct of
operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; cooperation; and
public messaging. In this context, the record of NATOs sustained cooperation
with the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
and the European Union (EU) in the Balkans stands as a precedent.
NATOs partnerships are and will continue to be essential to the way NATO
works. Partners have served with NATO in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other
operations, as well as in combating terrorism and piracy. NATO has built a

36

broad and cooperative security network that involves countries participating in


Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, as well as with partners across the globe and troop-contributing
countries, which do not work with NATO through a formal partnership
framework. These partnerships with relevant countries and other international
organisations are developed in accordance with NATOs Berlin Partnership
Policy. Additionally, at the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders
adopted a comprehensive Partnership Interoperability Initiative to enhance the
Alliances ability to tackle security challenges together with partners that have
demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability with NATO.
A WIDE RANGE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS DEFINITIONS

Depending on the nature of a crisis, different types of crisis management


operations may be required.
Article 5 - Collective defence
Referred to as "Article 5 operations", collective defence implies that the
decision has been taken collectively by NATO members to consider an attack or
act of aggression against one or more members as an attack against all. NATO
invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history in September 2001 following
the terrorist attacks against the United States.
Non-Article 5 crisis response operations
Crisis response operations cover all military operations conducted by NATO in a
non-Article 5 situation.

37

A crisis response or peace-support operation are generic terms that may


include conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, peace
enforcement and humanitarian operations. These are multi-functional operations
conducted in support of a UN/OSCE mandate or at the invitation of a sovereign
government involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies
and are designed to achieve long-term political settlement or other conditions
specified in the mandate.

Conflict prevention: activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally


conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from
diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to
prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading.
Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations,
warnings, inspections and monitoring. NATO makes full use of
partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations
to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at
an early stage.

A preventive deployment within the framework of conflict prevention is


the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrent
capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

Peacekeeping: peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under


Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all
Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace
agreement.

Peacemaking: this covers diplomatic activities conducted after the


commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid
peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices,
mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation
or sanction.

38

Peace building: peace building covers actions which support political,


economic, social, and military measures and structures aiming to
strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes
of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures
which can play a role in consolidating peace, advance a sense of
confidence and well-being and supporting economic reconstruction.

Peace enforcement: these operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of


the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the
consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be
uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce
the terms specified in the mandate.

Humanitarian operations: these operations are conducted to alleviate


human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany
humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations.

Natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations


Operations to assist member and partner countries that are affected by disasters
also fall under the scope of crisis management. In 2005, NATO assisted Pakistan
when it was hit by a devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of an
estimated 80,000 people. NATO also regularly responds to requests for
assistance following natural disasters such as heavy flooding and forest fires.

39

NATO LED OPERATIONS IN BALKANS


NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the
international stage. It promotes democratic values and is committed to the
peaceful resolution of disputes. However, if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the
military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations, alone or in
cooperation with other countries and international organisations. Through its
crisis-management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to
act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges
of the 21st century.
Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early
1990s, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have increased. NATO has
been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis-management
operations from deterrence and peacekeeping, to training and logistics
support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief. Today, approximately 18,000
military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, managing
often complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment.
They are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and off
the Horn of Africa. NATO is also assisting the African Union, conducting air
policing missions on the request of NATO member countries and supporting
Turkeys air defence system with the deployment of Patriot missiles.

Highlights
NATO is a crisis-management organisation that has the capacity to
undertake a wide range of military operations and missions.
The tempo and diversity of operations and missions in which NATO is
involved have increased since the early 1990s.
Currently, NATO is operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean
and off the Horn of Africa.

40

NATO is also supporting the African Union and conducting air policing
missions on the request of its Allies; it also has Patriot missiles deployed
in Turkey.
NATO carries out disaster-relief operations and missions to protect
populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disasters.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan


Established under the request of the Afghan authorities and a UN mandate in 2001, the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was led by NATO from August 2003 to
December 2014.
Its mission was to develop new Afghan security forces and enable Afghan authorities to
provide effective security across the country in order to create an environment conducive to
the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law, with the
aim to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.
ISAF also contributed to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. This was done
primarily through multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) - led by individual
ISAF countries - securing areas in which reconstruction work could be conducted by national
and international actors. PRTs also helped the Afghan authorities progressively strengthen the
institutions required to fully establish good governance and the rule of law, as well as to
promote human rights. The principal role of the PRTs in this respect was to build capacity,
support the growth of governance structures and promote an environment in which
governance can improve.
ISAF was one of the largest international crisis-management operations ever, bringing
together contributions from up to 51 different countries. By end 2014, the process of
transitioning full security responsibility from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police
forces was completed and the ISAF mission came to a close. On 1 January 2015, a new
NATO-led non-combat mission called Resolute Support to train, advise and assist the
Afghan security forces and institutions was launched.

41

NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina


With the break-up of Yugoslavia, violent conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April
1992. The Alliance responded as early as summer 1992 when it enforced the UN arms
embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the Western European Union
from 1993) and enforced a no-fly-zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during
the monitoring of the no-fly-zone that NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its
history by shooting down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission
on 28 February 1994.
In August 1995, to compel an end to Serb-led violence in the country, UN peacekeepers
requested NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air
forces, but failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UNs demands to withdraw.
This led to Operation Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control
installations and ammunition facilities. This NATO air campaign was a key factor in bringing
the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia.
With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, NATO immediately
deployed a UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. This
operation (Operation Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the deployment of
a 32,000-strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace-support operation to a
conclusion in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation
Althea. The Alliance has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a
number of specific tasks related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its
defence structures.

NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia


Responding to a request from the Government in Skopje to help mitigate rising ethnic
tension, NATO implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March
2003.
First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the
country.
42

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors
overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.
Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory
elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout the country.
These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrated the strong
inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe. NATO remains committed to helping the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, NATO
Headquarters Skopje was created in April 2002 to advise on military aspects of security sector
reform; it still operates today.

NATOs first counter-terrorism operation


On 4 October 2001, once it had been determined that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington D.C. had come from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures
to support the United States. On the request of the United States, the Alliance launched its
first-ever counter-terrorism operation Operation Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to
mid-May 2002.
It consisted of seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the United
States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was
the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

The second Gulf Conflict


During the second Gulf Conflict, NATO deployed NATO AWACS radar aircraft and air
defence batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey. The operation started on 20 February,
lasted until 16 April 2003 and was called Operation Display Deterrence. The AWACS aircraft
flew 100 missions with a total of 950 flying hours.

Protecting public events


In response to a request by the Greek government, NATO provided assistance to the Olympic
and Paralympic Games held in Athens with Operation Distinguished Games on 18 June 29

43

September 2004. NATO provided intelligence support, provision of Chemical, Biological


Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft. This was the
first operation in which non-Article 4 or 5 NATO assistance was provided within the borders
of a member country.
In the same vein, NATO responded to a request made by the Latvian government for
assistance in assuring the security of the Riga Summit in November 2006. NATO provided
technical security, CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive
device (IED) detections, communications and information systems and medical evacuation
support.

NATO and Iraq


NATO conducted a relatively small but important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to 2011
that consisted of training, mentoring and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces. At the Istanbul
Summit in June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part of the
international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The
outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The NTM-I
delivered its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All
NATO member countries contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through
financial contributions or donations of equipment. In parallel and reinforcing this initiative,
NATO also worked with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation framework to
develop the Alliances long-term relationship with Iraq.

Hurricane Katrina
After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the United States on 29 August 2005, causing
many fatalities and widespread damage and flooding, the US government requested food,
medical and logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to stricken areas. On 9
September 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved a military plan to assist the United
States, which consisted of helping to coordinate the movement of urgently needed material
and supporting humanitarian relief operations. During the operation (9 September-2 October),
nine member countries provided 189 tons of material to the United States.

44

Pakistan earthquake relief assistance


Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on
8 October 2005, killing an estimated 53,000 people, injuring 75,000 and making at least four
million homeless. On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO assisted in
the urgent relief effort, airlifting close to 3,500 tons of supplies and deploying engineers,
medical units and specialist equipment. This was one of NATOs largest humanitarian relief
initiatives, which came to an end on 1 February 2006.
Over time, the Alliance has helped to coordinate assistance to other countries hit by natural
disasters, including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal. It does this through its Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan


The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the
humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. From June
2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel,
as well as trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While NATOs support to this
mission ended when AMIS was succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the
Alliance immediately expressed its readiness to consider any request for support to the new
peacekeeping mission.

Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa


From October to December 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider, which involved
counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Responding to a request from UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided escorts to UN World Food
Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden,
where growing piracy has threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in
Africa.
Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union, these same NATO
naval forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundi
contingent deployed to AMISOM.

45

From March to August 2009, NATO launched Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy
operation, to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation
off the Horn of Africa. The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to
deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of
communication and economic interests.

NATO and Libya


Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, in February
2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in support of the Libyan
people, condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights. The resolutions
introduced active measures including a no-fly-zone, an arms embargo and the authorisation
for member countries, acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to take all
necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians.
Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly-zone and then, on 31 March, NATO took over sole
command and control of all military operations for Libya. The NATO-led Operation Unified
Protector had three distinct components:

the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent
the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya;

the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing


civilian targets; and

air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to
attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October
2011 after having fulfilled its objectives.

THE WIDER INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK


COOPERATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

46

NATO is keen to deepen its relations with other international


organisations to share information and promote appropriate and effective action
in areas of common interest. The primary focus of its relations with other
international organisations concerns cooperation with the European Union, the
United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
as described in the previous chapters. NATO also holds consultations and
engages in differing forms of cooperation with a number of other important
international institutions.
The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was established on 5 May 1949, to achieve a
greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising
the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their
social and economic progress. The Councils overall aim is to maintain the
basic principles of humanitarian rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law,
and to enhance the quality of life of European citizens.
NATO regularly receives documents, reports and records from the
Council of Europe and is kept informed of different parliamentary sessions or
upcoming events. The outcome of various sessions and reports on issues of
common

interest is monitored by NATOs International Staff and this

information is distributed to relevant divisions within the organisation.


The International Organisation for Migration
The International Organisation for Migration is the leading international
organisation working with migrant populations and governments on issues
relating to migration challenges. It is committed to the principle that humane
and orderly migration benefits both migrants and the societies in which they
live. Established in 1951 and tasked with the resettlement of European displaced persons, refugees and migrants, the organisation now encompasses a
variety of migration-management issues and other activities throughout the
world.
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With offices and operations on every continent, the organisation helps


governments and civil societies, for example, in responding to sudden migration
lows, post-emergency returns and reintegration programmes, and providing
assistance to migrants on their way to new homes. It also promotes the training
of officials and measures to counter trafficking in human beings. Cooperation
with NATO takes place in several fields such as combating trafficking in human
beings, border security and reconstruction in post-conflict regions. Regions
where there is great potential for cooperation include the Caucasus and Central
Asia. The first formal and structured contacts between the two organisations
took place in staff-level meetings in September 2004.
The Assembly of the Western European Union
NATO also has contacts with the Assembly of the Western European Union
(WEU). Although not an international organisation in the strict sense of the
term, the Assembly was created in 1954 under the modified Brussels Treaty of
1948, which is the founding document of the Western European Union. Called
upon in 1984 to contribute to the process of establishing a stronger European
security and defence identity, the Western European Union was later relieved of
these responsibilities, which were transferred to the European Union at the end
of 1999 in the context of the latters evolving European Security and Defence
Policy (see Part VIII). The Western European Union itself remains extant with a
small secretariat located in Brussels with residual responsibilities.
The WEU Assembly remains active as an interparliamentary forum for general
strategic reflection and contributes to intergovernmental and public debate on
security and defence matters. National parliamentarians from 28 European
countries send delegations to the Assembly, which currently has 370 members.
Its work is allocated to four principal committees dealing respectively with
defence matters, political issues, matters relating to technology and aero-space,
and parliamentary and public relations. The WEU Assembly meets at least twice

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a year for plenary sessions and throughout the year in committee meetings,
conferences and colloquia.
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Another of the organisations with which NATO cooperates in the field of civil
emergency planning is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. The Organisation, established in 1997 by the countries that joined the
Chemical Weapons Convention, seeks to ensure that the Convention
workseffectively and achieves its purpose. All NATO Allies are members of the
Organisation, which currently totals 174 member states. One of the
Organisations responsibilities is to provide assistance and protection to
countries if they are attacked or threatened with chemical weapons, including by
terrorists. It is in this area in particular that the Organisation can be helpful to
NATOs civil protection efforts which, following the September 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States, have increasingly focused on protecting
populations against the potential consequences of attacks using chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear agents.
NATO cooperates with parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations,
which contributes to understanding and support for NATOs policies and
objectives beyond the arena of international organisations
The International Committee of the Red Cross
One of the most significant non-governmental organisations with which NATO
cooperates is the International Committee of the Red Cross an impartial,
neutral and independent organisation exclusively concerned with humanitarian
action to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence
and to provide them with necessary assistance.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly


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The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) is an interparliamentary


organisation which, since its creation in 1955, has acted as a forum for
legislators from the North American and western European member countries of
the Alliance to meet together to consider issues of common interest and concern.
While its principal objective is to foster mutual understanding among Alliance
parliamentarians of the key security challenges facing the transatlantic
partnership, its discussions also contribute to the development of the consensus
among member countries that underpins the decision-making process in the
Alliance.
The specific aims of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly include the
following:
to foster dialogue among parliamentarians on major security issues;
to facilitate parliamentary awareness and understanding of key security issues and Alliance policies;
to provide NATO and its member governments with an indication of
collective parliamentary opinion;
to provide greater transparency in NATO policies as well as collective
accountability;
to strengthen the transatlantic relationship.
The Atlantic Treaty Association
The Atlantic Treaty Association, created on 18 June 1954, brings together,
as members, national voluntary and non-governmental organisations in Alliance
member states to support the activities of NATO and promote the objectives of
the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the ATA has
regularly admitted as associate members national voluntary and nongovernmental organisations established in NATOs Partner countries. There are
currently 18 associations which are associate members. In accordance with the
constitution of the ATA, associate members may become full members of the
Association when their countries become members of NATO and when their
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new position has been recognised by the ATA Assembly upon the proposal of
the ATA Council.
Since 1999, following the amendment of the constitution, the ATA
Assembly may also, on proposal by the Council, grant observer member status
to non-governmental organisations created in the countries participating in
NATOs Mediterranean Dialogue or in those which are directly or
geographically concerned with Euro-Atlantic security problems, even if they
have not signed Partnership for Peace agreements.

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