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Edmund Husserl,

The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,


trans. David
Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
II. CLARIFICATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN OPPOSITION BETWEEN
PHYSICALISTIC OBJECTIVISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVISM
10.
The origin of dualism from natural science / geometric rationality
mechanism: the idea that nature is a self-enclosed world of bodies . . . in which every occurrence is
determined unequivocally and in advance (60).
dualism: the idea that the natural and the psychic make up two self-enclosed worlds. (The in-itself and
the for-itself).
physicalistic rationalism: Husserls name for the modeling of reason on geometry/mathematics.
11.
Three problems with dualism
the separating off of the psychic caused greater and greater difficulties whenever problems of reason
made themselves felt (62).
confident rationalism led to specialization of the sciences
also prepared the way for a naturalized psychology, as in Hobbes, designed concretely as a
psychophysical anthropology in the rationalist spirit (62).
* an interesting remark: One should not be misled by the usual contrast between empiricism and
rationalism. The naturalism of Hobbes wants to be physicalism, and like all physicalism it follows the
model of physical rationality (62-63). Husserl is pointing to the fact that Hobbes is a
rationalist.
12.
Modern physicalistic rationalism
the ancients had conceived of philosophy as a move from to
. But now rationality is
conceived with the
telos
of
omniscience.
Omni-science: every detail of the world will be brought to
systematic rational unity [this seems to be the modern meaning of
metaphysics
].
Cognitive mastery gives way to practical mastery. Man as image of God and God as infinitely distant
man.
13.
The incomprehensibility of functioning subjectivity
Husserl gives a preview of what he will call Humes
fictionalism.
It seems to undermine the rationalizing
of the world: And yet this whole accomplishment, this very self-evidence, had becomes completely
incomprehensible through a
certain new way of looking at it, from the viewpoint of psychology,
in whose
domain the accomplishing activity took place (68).
We can characterize this move many ways: the epistemological turn, the radical world-enigma,
Kritk.
Husserl calls it the transformation of
scientific objectivism
into
transcendental subjectivism
.
14.
Premilinary characterization
objectivism: a method which takes the world as pregiven and from there seeks the unconditionally valid.
transcendentalism: a method which approaches the
Seinsinn
of
die Lebenswelt
as a
subjective Gebilde,
as an achievement of experiencing (69). Transcendentalism raises the problem of constitution, by
initiating an inquiry into the what and the how of the rational accomplishments (69).

Husserls claim is that we can clarify the sense of modern philosophy by understanding this split. Along
the way, he will motivate the need for his own transcendental phenomenology.
15.
Methodological reflections.
16.
Descartes
In trying to establish scientific objectivism, Descartes sows the seeds of transcendental subjectivism that
will undo it: It was Descartes, precisely in order to provide a radical foundation for the new rationalism
and then
eo ipso
for dualismwho accomplished the primal establishment of ideas which were destined,
through their own historical effects (as if following a hidden teleology of history), to explode this very
rationalism by uncovering its hidden absurdity (74).
17.
Epoche / Ego Cogito
If one carries out the epoche, the suspension of
every
ontic validity (77), the
ego
survives.
What sort of suspension is this? The world, as the
cogitatum
of my
cogitationes,
has ontic validity,
except that now,
as
one who is philosophizing, I may no longer straightforwardly effect these validities
and use them as knowledge in the natural way [i.e. I cannot conclude to metaphysical idealism]. Standing
above them all in my posture of epoch I may no longer take part in performing them (77).
* The most important thing about epoche is that the world retains validity
as
appearance.
18-20.
What Descartes overlooked / took for granted / did not develop
He did not question Galileos mechanism. His move to the
ego
is a means to secure that domain (79).
He remains nave in taking the
ego
as a thing. (He also seems to connect this to a
new
concept of
phenomenon
).
Remark against the Munich realists, et. al.: Whence also the nave objections of almost all my
philosophical contemporaries to my Cartesianism or to the phenomenological reduction for which I
have prepared the way through this presentation of the Cartesian epoche (80).
His commitment to objectivism led him to approach the I as a psychologist and not an egologist (81).
It leads to a circle: philosophy as founded on the subjective, which at the same time comes to be
legitimate subject matter within those sciences (81).
Descartes overlooks
intentionality,
the subject matter of egology. Here consciousness is always
consciousness-
of:
every
cogitatio
has a correlative
cogitatum.
22-23.
Locke (some Berkeley and Hume
)
Locke takes over
ego
as
soul,
investigates it as a slate on which are our ideas, which are immediately
certain. Thus, he is totally blind to intentionality: no consideration is given to the fact that in the
perceptions, in the experiences of consciousness themselves, that of which we are conscious is included
as
such
that the perception is
in itself
a perception
of
something . . . (85).
Thus, Locke secures that the genuine problems of reason cannot be investigated we are stuck with an
inner-outer dichotomy in which only our own representations are certain. [Is this the new meaning of
phenomenon
that Husserl hints at? . . . we could get at it this way: to whom/what do appearances belong?
The object or the subject? They belong to the object
as
brought to light/manifested
by
the subject. Locke

misses this important


as;
he turns the dative of manifestation (appearance as appearance to and of) into
the nominative of manifestation (appearance as internal representations). [cf. 87]
24.
Hume
Hume uncovers the fact that the life of consciousness is a life of
accomplishment
(90). In other
words, he raises the problem of constitution, which he solves through his
fictionalism:
every thing beyond
the strictly given in experience (sense-data) is a fiction or construction of the mind. Even the mind itself is
as a fiction.
25.
Kant
He was still too tied to dogmatic rationalism to be the proper transcendentalist. He accepted philosophy
as a universal science, the right of the knowing ego to let its rational constructs, in virtue of the
self-evidence occurring in its
mens,
count as nature with a meaning transcending this ego. This is a bad
sort or realism positing the in-itself, the noumenal realm.
Kants reflection on knowledge is a
praxis,
a technology of reason.
Kants Humean problem is not Humes Humean problem. Humes problem is not skepticism but
constitution. It is the
navet
of speaking about objectivity without ever considering subjectivity as
experiencing, knowing, and actually accomplishing, the
navet
of the scientist of nature or of the world in
general, who is blind to the fact that all the truths he attains as objective truths and the objective world
itself as the substratum of this formulae . . . are his own
life-construct
developed within himself (96).
Humes real problem? The enigma of a world whose being is being through subjective
accomplishment (960.
Closing remarks: Husserl speaks of a Cartesian turn, and a Kantian turn which will be preparing the way
for the final phenomenological turn, the Husserlian turn, which will finally grant access to the long-felt
but constantly concealed dimension of the transcendental (100).