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The Constitution
A. Definition, nature and concepts
Constitution, what it is
Republic vs Sandigan En Banc G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the
actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following
the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration)
remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
B. Parts
Vidal vs COMELEC En Banc G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where
the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
Sovereignt, Government & Liberty
C. Amendments and revisions
D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, GR 122156, Feb. 3, 1997
Province of Cotabato v Government EN BANC G.R. No. 183591
October 14,
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed
to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-inhand, it is absurd to say that the broader130 right to information on matters of public
concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling
law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation
as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
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The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article
III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of
the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
E. General provisions
II. General Considerations
A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine
B. State immunity
Department of Health vs Phil Pharma G.R. No. 182358 February 20, 2013
The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be
sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope
of their authority.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that (t)he State may not be sued
without its consent, reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of
sovereignty. x x x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called the royal
prerogative of dishonesty because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency
and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far
greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if
such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may
not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States consent may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. x x x Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or
when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of
its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification.
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contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;

distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for
acts done in the performance of their official functions.
the rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state
Deutsche Gessel vs CA G.R. No. 152318 April 16, 2009
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate juridical
personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The
simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the
functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and
cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions
and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they
are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter
provides that they can sue and be sued.
In SSS v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court through Justice Melencio-Herrera explained
that by virtue of an express provision in its charter allowing it to sue and be sued,
the Social Security System did not enjoy immunity from suit:
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondentemployer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the
U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General
to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo
City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied
the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most
important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit
should apply. from the more common methodology employed in ascertaining
whether a party enjoys State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the
particular functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are
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proprietary or sovereign in nature. The nature of the acts performed by the entity
invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing whether the
privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our
Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its
withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the
creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity
remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred
by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency.
C. General Principles and
Parens Patriae
Province of Cotabato v Government EN BANC G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893
and 183951 October 14, 2008
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the
intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context
of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the
nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, not
even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take
effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral
nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made....
D. Separation of powers
Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19
November 2013
E. Checks and balances
Araullo v Aquino En Banc G.R. 209287 July 1, 2014
Anent the petitioners theory that the DAP violated the system ofchecks and
balances, Luna submits that the grant of the funds under the DAP to some
legislators forced their silence about the issues and anomalies surrounding the DAP.
Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by allowing the legislators to identify
PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and execution of the
GAAs, a function that exclusively belonged to the Executive; that such situation
constituted undue and unjustified legislative encroachment in the functions of the
Executive; and that the President arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation
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vested in Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the use of the funds under the
DAP for PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget.
F. Delegation of powers
Gancayco v City Government EN BANC G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city
council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the
Revised Charter of Quezon City,24 which states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties
as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative
All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in
the charter itself
In its Answer,34 the city government stated that "the demolition was undertaken by
the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City." Therefore,
the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of
the portion of Justice Gancaycos building.
Vivas vs The Monetary Board G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013
The rationale for the constitutional proscription is that "legislative discretion as to
the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is
the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
G. Forms of government
De jure
De facto
III. Legislative Department

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A. Who may exercise legislative power
1. Congress
2. Regional/Local legislative power
3. Peoples initiative on statutes
a) Initiative and referendum
Lambino v COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
Essence of people's initiative: (1) people must author; (2) they must sign the
proposal; (3) proposal is embodied in petition
4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary
B. Houses of Congress
1. Senate
2. House of Representatives
a) District representatives and questions of
b) Party-list system
C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications
D. Quorum and voting majorities
E. Discipline of members
F. Electoral tribunals and the commission on appointments
1. Nature
2. Powers
Rules of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal Republic Act No 6
G. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative
Legislative Process (How a bill becomes a law)
a) Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions
Gudani v Senga Aug 15, 2006
Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19
November 2013
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post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14,

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013
PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are
deemed as unconstitutional.
Romero vs Estrada En Banc G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different
purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to
settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in
aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to
gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; 17 and to determine
whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial
legislation,18 albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going
judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the
following reason:
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation.1
b) Bicameral conference committee
The Legislative Process
c) Limitations on legislative power
(i) Limitations on revenue, appropriations and
tarif measures
The budgetary proposal of the President can only be decreased but not increased
by Congress.
Garcia v Executive Secretary EN BANC G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government. (Emphasis
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There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the

President "subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to
fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."
The DAP decision By Artemio V. Panganiban |Philippine Daily Inquirer
(ii) Presidential veto and Congressional override

PCA v Enriquez EN BANC G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI,
Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be
ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing
line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative
jurisdiction begin.
2. Non-legislative
a) Informing function
b) Power of Impeachment
c) Other non-legislative powers
Chavez vs JBC En Banc G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
IV. Executive Department
A. Privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications
1. Presidential immunity
Executive immunity By Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. |Philippine Daily Inquirer
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts
and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.
2. Presidential privilege
Senate vs Ermita En Banc G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
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B. Powers
1. Executive and administrative powers in general
2. Power of appointment
a) In general
b) Commission on appointments
c) Midnight appointments
De Castro v JBC
d) Power of removal
3. Power of control and supervision
a) Doctrine of qualified political
Alter ego doctrine
ABAKADA vs Purisima, En Banc G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as
the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not
subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the
agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which
its expressed will is to take effect. 56 The Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that
he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in
reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and
not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the
findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
b) Executive departments and ofices
c) Local government units
Power of supervision only on LGUs
4. Military powers
5. Pardoning power
a) Nature and limitations
Garcia vs COA
President's grant of executive clemency to a person dismissed from his
office pursuant to an administrative case (but where the latter has been acquitted
in a criminal case based on the same facts alleged in the criminal case) entitles the
latter to automatic reinstatement and backwages.
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Vidal vs COMELEC En Banc G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015

Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
c) Forms of executive clemency
6. Diplomatic power
7. Powers relative to appropriation measures
PCA v Enriquez En Banc G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994,
the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the
members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the
Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with
other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify
for funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short,
the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely

Araullo v Aquino En Banc G.R. 209287 July 1, 2014

Section 38, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 allows the
President "to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure" of appropriated funds
but this must be for a legitimate purpose, like when there are anomalies in the
implementation of a project or in the disbursement of funds.
8. Delegated powers
Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19
November 2013
above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable,
all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
9. Veto powers
10. Residual powers
11. Executive privilege
Neri vs Senate, En Banc G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of
the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public
official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the
benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping
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forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the
Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents
conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of
judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all
citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally
ordained separation of governmental powers.
C. Rules on Succession
V. Judicial Department
Supreme Court of the Philippines wiki
Origins of Philippine Judicial Review
A. Concepts
1. Judicial power
2. Judicial review
Araullo v Aquino En Banc G.R. 209287 July 1, 2014
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the
remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Biraogo v PTC En Banc G.R. 192935 December 7, 2010
the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
Oposa vs Factoran En Banc G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Transcendent- PHILOSOPHY beyond limits of experience: in Kant's philosophical

system, exceeding the limits of experience and therefore unknowable except
a) Operative fact doctrine

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Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19

November 2013
the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with.
What is the operative fact doctrine? wiki
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
Republic v CA GR#79732 Nov 8, 1993
DAP and good faith By Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. |Philippine Daily Inquirer
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes that a law or executive act, before it is
declared unconstitutional, is an operative fact which produces consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. The law is nullified, but its effect
is sustained. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser
and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario
would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such

b) Moot questions
Republic of the Philippines vs Manalo, et al G.R. No. 192302 June 4, 2014
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of
the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such
instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to,
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a
judgment in a case which presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.
by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of
the government, are supervening events which have effectively rendered the
essential issue in this case moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents
should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they
have a legal interest in the forfeited assets. As the proceedings in the civil forfeiture
cases from which the issue of intervention is merely an incident have already been
duly concluded, no substantial relief can be granted to the Republic by resolving the
instant petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and
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1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved.
3. When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar and the public.
4. The case is capable of repetition but evading review.
c) Political question doctrine
B. Safeguards of Judicial independence
C. Judicial restraint
D. Appointments to the Judiciary
Francis H. Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, En Banc G.R. No.
213181, August 19, 2014
Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. In
every case when the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for
nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the members ofthe
Council must be obtained for the favourable consideration of his nomination.
E. Supreme Court
1. En banc and division cases
In Re Letters of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza re G.R. No. 178083
No Division of the Court is a body inferior to the Court En Banc; and each Division
sits veritably as the Court En Banc itself. The Court En Banc is not an appellate
Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. Before a
judgment or resolution on a case becomes final and executory, the Court En Banc
may accept a referral by the Division for sufficiently important reasons. Otherwise,
the case would be returned to the Division for decision or resolution. The proposal
to refer the case to the Court En Banc must first be agreed upon and made by the
Division and formal notice thereof should then be sent to the Clerk of Court. The
Clerk of Court would then calendar the referral in the Agenda for consideration of
the Court En Banc. In this case, no such formal notice of a referral was made by the
regular Second Division or sent to the Clerk of Court En Banc to elevate the main
FASAP case for the consideration of the Court En Banc.
2. Procedural rule-making
3. Administrative supervision over lower courts
4. Original and appellate jurisdiction
F. Judicial Privilege (new on the 2015 syllabus)
VI. Constitutional Commissions
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Constitutional Commissions ppt

A. Constitutional safeguards to ensure independence of
B. Powers and functions of each commission
C. Prohibited offices and interests
D. Jurisdiction of each constitutional commission
E. Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions
1. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
2. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions

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