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2.
3.
Whether or not the respondent is estopped from questioning her nonpayment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it
filed its first motion.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
of the petitioner.
Whether or not the counterclaim was permissive or compulsory
Held:
1.
3.
a.
b.
c.
Issues:
1.
2.
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar,
respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial
courts jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaim since this issue was raised
by respondent with the trial court itself the body where the action is pending
- even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and definitely,
way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.
This objection to the CAs jurisdiction is raised for the first time before this
Court. Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has
actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent
actively took part in the proceedings before the CA by filing its appellees
brief with the same. Its participation, when taken together with its failure to
object to the jurisdiction during the entire duration of the proceedings before
such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly
estopped.
BOTH. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing parties claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this
Court set the criteria to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive,
d.
Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
claim as well as defendants counterclaim?
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim?chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
b.
c.
In Suson v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that although the payment
of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment
does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket
fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and
there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to
evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive
counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss
petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner
immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her
counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket
fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure
to answer her counterclaim. The trial court should have instead given
petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive
counterclaim.
and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be
any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of
appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent
judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action
resolution except by the court where the main case pends. The appealed decision was
of certiorari. This rule, however, is not a rigid and inflexible technicality. This Court has
modified and the claim for moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees of petitioner
not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari even when the proper
remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations could
warrant such a recourse. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in
SYLLABUS
order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of
relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.
final judgment or order. distinguished from an interlocutory issuance, is that the former
decisively puts to a close, or disposes of, a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing
else to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment or order is
rendered, the adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended on the particular matter
involved. An order is interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be
provisional in character and would still leave substantial proceedings to be further had
by the issuing court in order to put the controversy to rest.
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The
neither relating to the jurisdiction of the court nor involving grave abuse of discretion,
are not reviewable by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. As long as a court acts
within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof,
circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim
which, but its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as
"counterclaim" of petitioner really consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid
deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately
hospital bills of respondents' son, Emmanuel Surla, in the total amount of P82,632.10;
pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except
and (2) for damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees by reason of the
by the court where the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso
alleged malicious and unfounded suit filed against it. It is the second, not the first,
in the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
claim that the Court here refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not
i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall not be curable by mere
amendment . . . but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,"
||| (Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Spouses Surla, G.R. No. 129718, [August 17,
1998], 355 PHIL 804-815)
being predicated on the applicability of the need for a certification against forum
shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set up.