IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
CHRISTOPHER KING, d/b/a KingCast/Mortgage Movies,

)

) CASE NO. K15C-03-028
Plaintiff,
v.

) JUDGE YOUNG

BETTY LOU MCKENNA, HOLLY MALONE
and JOHN PARADEE, ESQ.

)

Defendants.

)

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RULE 59(d) RELIEF
AS JUDGE ROBERT B. YOUNG’S CONTINUED LIES
AND LEGAL MISREPRESENTATIONS BESMIRCH THE LEGAL COMMUNITY
I.

Judge Young Should Have Recused Himself Prior to Issuing a Ruling.

A.

The Pending Unanswered Final Motion to Recuse Filed 21 August, 2015.
In the first instance, Judge Young ruled on all pending Motions on 24

August even though a well-tendered Motion to Recuse had been filed on 21
August. Said Motion is repeated in its entirety below as it provides sufficient
reason for the Court to Alter or to Amend the Judgment. 1

B.The Court Employed the Wrong Analysis After Unlawfully Truncating
Discovery.
In said Motion Plaintiff highlighted how the Court ignored law and made
up facts not in the Record to help Defendants, all the while ignoring the fact
that the case should have been heard on a Summary Judgment basis. The
Court noted in its 24 August Judgment that there had been "minimal
discovery" but that is not Plaintiff's fault, no Sir. That is because this Court, by

1 Moreover, as of 2 September 2015 there is still no ruling on the Motion to Recuse.

1

and through Judge Young and/or Commissioner Freud truncated discovery
without Plaintiff even being allowed to determine what policy or authority
Defendants relied on to determine he was not permitted to run video
anywhere in the public areas.
Again, such public areas DID NOT include "interior offices" or
"employee cubicles as provided by the Court. 2
C.The Court’s Willful Misreading of Relevant Case Law is Astounding.
Next, the Court’s continued willful ignorance of the fact that Whiteland
Woods is inapplicable is astounding. As noted on several recent occasions,
including the Motion to Recuse, even the Defendants acknowledge that the
public meeting analysis is not proper because Plaintiff was not at a public
meeting before a public body. He was instead engaged in conduct most
similar to the Pomykacz Plaintiff, who cleary WAS engaged in Protected First
Amendment Conduct, so Judge Young who stated otherwise in the 24 August
ruling is a complete liar who should be DISBARRED:
Here it is again, as Judge Young and the Defendants seem incapable of
digesting that which they don’t like:
**********
Moreover, also out of unlawful bias and hegemony, Judge Young
ignored Pomykacz v. Village of West Wildwood as well, a case in which a
citizen journalist was protected by the First Amendment after shooting police
personnel at the police station at all hours of the day.
Pomykacz was a self-described “citizen activist” who expressed concern
that a suspected romance between the town’s mayor and a police officer
were leading to nepotism, conflicts of interest and preferential
treatment. These suspicions led Pomykacz to

“monitor” the two, which included taking
photographs. Eventually she was arrested on charges of stalking,
though the charges were downgraded to harassment.
Pomykacz ended up filing suit asserting, among other things, that she
was arrested in violation of the First Amendment retaliation for her
monitoring activities

2 The reason why Judge Young lied about this is set forth below, and Plaintiff provided
an uncontroverted drawing to buttress his argument.

2

On the night of October 7, 2002, on her way to Wildwood,
Pomykacz drove past the borough municipal building and observed
Officer Ferentz working on renovations while she was on duty. Later
that night, after Pomykacz had returned from Wildwood, she

photographed Officer Ferentz in the police
headquarters. 7 Another police officer and [*508] Mayor Fox
were also present in the police station at the time. According to
Pomykacz, Mayor Fox came out of the building and began yelling at
her. Pomykacz walked home without responding (emphasis added so
the Defendants, Court and Reviewing Court can see where they have
been completely disingenuous to date).
U.S. District Judge Joseph E. Irenas noted,
Pomykacz has put forth sufficient evidence that she was a concerned
citizen who at times spoke her mind to Borough [*513] officials and
other citizens about her concerns regarding the official conduct of the
police department and the mayor. Such speech is clearly protected by
the First Amendment. 14 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.
Ct. 1434, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1966) HN15 ("a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L.
Ed. 2d 1498 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.").
Additionally, Pomykacz has put forth sufficient evidence to defeat
summary judgment with respect to the second and third prongs of her
First Amendment retaliation claim. She has put forth sufficient
evidence that Officer Ferentz and Mayor Fox intentionally
misrepresented the facts of the case in order to effectuate Pomykacz's
arrest. The facts surrounding the incident, viewed in a light favorable
to Pomykacz, give rise to a reasonable inference of causation.
Officer Ferentz and Mayor Fox are also not entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim. A
reasonable official would know that arresting someone in retaliation for
engaging in protected speech violates clearly established rights.
Read more: http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=900005463350/Pomykaczv-Borough-of-West-Wildwood-et-al#ixzz3kc9CD85a
Again, more of the same with regard to Iacobucci and Judge Young lying
about that case:
From Iacobucci itself:

3

Boulter's repeated demands that Iacobucci cease recording do not
change the disorderly conduct calculus. A police officer is not a law
unto himself; he cannot give an order that has no colorable legal basis
and then arrest a person who defies it. So it is here: because
Iacobucci's activities were peaceful, not performed in derogation of any
law, and done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights
(emphasis added lest the Court and Defendants miss it again)
Boulter lacked the authority to stop them. Id at 678.
From Montgomery v. Killingsworth, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7152 (January 22,
2015).
In so holding, the First Circuit found that "Iacobucci's activities were
peaceful, not performed in derogation of any law, and done in the
exercise of his First Amendment rights." Id. at 25.
Killingsworth was decided by a Federal District Court Judge with at
least a shred of integrity, and the last time Plaintiff checked a Federal District
Judge outranks Judge Young in the Superior Court.
But that’s not all. Yet another East Coast Federal District Court Judge
offers stern rebuke of Judge Young’s “analysis.” See Higginbotham v. City of
New York, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62227 (May 12 2015).
By November 2011, the First, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had all
concluded that the right exists. So had a number of district
courts. See Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F. Supp.
2d 504, 512-13 (D.N.J. 2006) (denying summary judgment in
a First Amendment retaliation claim involving a plaintiff who was
arrested for repeatedly photographing a police officer)……..
D.

Conclusion and Prayer for Relief.
This Court is going to do whatever it wants to do in order to satisfy the

corporate and State interests at stake here, let that be clear: Mere words
cannot convey the realm of injustice set forth by Judge Young and
Commissioner Freud. All of Plaintiff’s Claims should proceed toward trial, and
all of his First Amended Complaint should have been considered but was not,
because of unlawful bias. Plaintiff was unlawfully denied by a rogue Judge
with a mission to suppress any and all relevant facts and law. It doesn’t get
any clearer than this. Whatever happens or does not happen in the future
history of this case, anyone reading this Motion and Memorandum will see
the Truth about the racist, culturally hegemonic and oppressive bench and

4

general aura of racism that taints the entire state, as noted in Plaintiff’s most
recent video,

Markell & Biden DE Legacy Marked by Racism, Police
Abuse, Stolen Election & First Amendment Contempt3
http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2015/08/kingcast-and-mortgagemovies-see-jack.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CN36FEO1U_c

II.Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse in its Entirety.
I.

The August 5 2015 Payment of Trial Fees for a Trial Scheduled
November 14, 2016 Should Not Result in a Draconian Bar to
Filing Further Memoranda in this Case; Judge Young was
deceitfully Wrong on the Key Case of Iacobucci v. Boulter and
Ignored Pomykacz v. Village of West Wildwood out of Unlawful
Bias Against Plaintiff.

3 And with respect to the man who was arrested in said video for questioning why
Dover DE police shot at Terrence Fletcher in a school zone:
http://www.delawarepolitics.net/the-shooting-of-terrance-fletcher-by-dover-policejustified/
Plaintiff will be producing another video for him encouraging him to seek counsel who
is not afraid of the Delaware Juggernaut in light of the law set forth Killingsworth and
Gaymon v. Borough of Collingdale, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93014 (July 17, 2015), infra,
noting that it is clearly lawful to video and to criticize public officials, just as in Glik,
which Judge Young also ignored. The gravamen is simply whether or not the
videographer is unreasonably interfering with official business, period.

5

Plaintiff has via overnight courier retendered the $150 Trial Fee along
with a copy of all documents heretofore rejected by this Court: Plaintiff paid
his Trial Fee on or about 5 August, 2015. Prior to that time, he never received
any notice from Judge Robert B. Young that the Trial Fee must be paid on or
before 23 July 2015. In point of fact, that Court never took adverse action
until a full week later, and only after Plaintiff filed his Waiver of Jury Trial,
noting that he feels particularly unsafe in Delaware given the five (5)
mysterious lynching deaths/murders of black males that AG Denn claims
were “suicides.” Appendix A.
Meanwhile after mentioning these lynchings in a global email to
supporters, State employees, First Amendment attorneys and several highpowered area attorneys Plaintiff received an email from Detective Hill in
which he declined to provide safety for Plaintiff if he came to the Forum State
whilst simultaneously threatening Plaintiff that he could be subject to
prosecution for the content of the emails that was “alarming.” Plaintiff, with
notice, taped the entire conversation and put it out for the World to hear on 6
August, 2015.

6

First Amendment Lawsuits Show Markell, AG Biden, AG Denn Coverup of Black Lynchings

http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2015/08/caught-on-tape-kingcast-andmortgage.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QibeMFiaxgM

Only AFTER production of this video did the Court determine that
Plaintiff’s filings were allegedly Out of Rule. These filings mentioned the
lynchings, the lies by Judge Young about a major case (Iacobucci) and the
fundamental flaw of logic by the Court and Defendants in that they used
public meeting law to strike Plaintiff’s Constitutional claims, only now to turn
around and claim that Tisdale is completely irrelevant because it is based on
public meeting law.
This unlawful pattern trails back to the Court twice returning the SD
video card Offer of Proof previously submitted, showing Plaintiff’s true modus
operandi when shooting video in a County Recorder’s Office, which is NOT to
go into private areas and such. But Judge Young, in light of his bias, simply
MUST whitewash the Record to make Plaintiff’s position appear completely
untenable, when the Plain Trust is that his conduct is commonplace in every
other Jurisdiction in the Country. In. The. Country.

7

Only Dirty Deeds Recorders Like Kent County DE's Betty
Lou McKenna Restrict Media Access and Cameras
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uPuF-Z_Ft4

Moreover, also out of unlawful bias and hegemony, Judge Young
ignored Pomykacz v. Village of West Wildwood as well, a case in which a
citizen journalist was protected by the First Amendment after shooting police
personnel at the police station at all hours of the day.
Pomykacz was a self-described “citizen activist” who expressed concern
that a suspected romance between the town’s mayor and a police officer
were leading to nepotism, conflicts of interest and preferential
treatment. These suspicions led Pomykacz to

“monitor” the two, which included taking
photographs. Eventually she was arrested on charges of stalking,
though the charges were downgraded to harassment.
Pomykacz ended up filing suit asserting, among other things, that she
was arrested in violation of the First Amendment retaliation for her
monitoring activities (emphasis added so the Defendants, Court and

8

Reviewing Court can see where they have been completely disingenuous
to date).
On the night of October 7, 2002, on her way to Wildwood,
Pomykacz drove past the borough municipal building and observed
Officer Ferentz working on renovations while she was on duty. Later
that night, after Pomykacz had returned from Wildwood, she

photographed Officer Ferentz in the police
headquarters. 7 Another police officer and [*508] Mayor Fox
were also present in the police station at the time. According to
Pomykacz, Mayor Fox came out of the building and began yelling at
her. Pomykacz walked home without responding (emphasis added so
the Defendants, Court and Reviewing Court can see where they have
been completely disingenuous to date).
U.S. District Judge Joseph E. Irenas noted,
Pomykacz has put forth sufficient evidence that she was a concerned
citizen who at times spoke her mind to Borough [*513] officials and
other citizens about her concerns regarding the official conduct of the
police department and the mayor. Such speech is clearly protected by
the First Amendment. 14 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.
Ct. 1434, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1966) HN15 ("a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L.
Ed. 2d 1498 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.").
That is a virtually identical case from the Third Circuit but because of unlawful
bias Judge Young and the Defendants ignored it. It isn’t the first time that
First and Third Circuit judges – citing Iacobucci – have completely disagreed
with Judge Young’s findings, because his findings were clearly UNLAWFUL.
Here is the more of the substance of what Plaintiff stated, and it is all rock
solid and it is the real reason why Judge Young has resorted to striking all
Docket entries:
The point is, Defendants and the Court cannot have it both
ways: They claim that Tisdale is “not relevant” at para 6 of their
Memorandum because it involves a public meeting. But If public body/public
meeting analyses are inapplicable now, then they were inapplicable in the
first place -- and there’s yet another compelling reason for the Supreme Court

9

of the United States to give this case a prompt Remand in the name of
Justice. Gotcha.
So now Defendants claim that public meeting analysis is “not relevant
to Plaintiff’s claims” well then that conclusively provides proof that the
Court’s underlying rationale…. Is wrong and Plaintiff thanks Defendants for
pointing that out because they and the Court are so caught up in their lies
that they can’t keep them straight. In any event, recall that the Court
specifically cited to Whiteland woods as “particularly helpful and instructive.”

10

Well come to find out that Plaintiff said this was not a public meeting
case, ab initio, while the Court was busy giving him the bum’s rush earlier: It
is the Pomykacz, Cirelli, Iacobucci and Glik cases and their progeny, including
Third Circuit’s Montgomery v. Killingsworth, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7152 (January 22, 2015) that are most germane because they all involve
journalists filming public officials in and out of their offices.
There’s the a-ha moment of this entire case and Defendants offered it
up on a platter. That having been said, Plaintiff maintains his public
body/public meeting arguments in the alternative and points to the 11 th
Circuit Tisdale v. Gravitt, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1378 (N.D. Georgia 2014) case to
show that current Courts disagree with the ancient Whiteland Woods case.
Interestingly, in Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment para 8
they try to dismiss Peloquin, Tarus and Iacobucci by stating that the Court
already analyzed them in the prior order, but alas that analysis was
fundamentally wrong as proved by Iacobucci as well as the newly-discovered
Third Circuit and First Circuit (NY) 2015 First Amendment cases. As Plaintiff
stated in prior Memoranda:
Next, the Court’s Patent Misrepresentation (read: lie) -- about
Iacobucci v.
Boulter, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7010, No. CIV.A. 94-10531 (D.Mass,
Mar. 26, 1997) is startling. Iacobucci specifically found that an
independent reporter has a protected right under the First
Amendment and state law to videotape public meetings and the
events that occurred in the hallways of a public building.
But read p17 FN 47 of the courts’ Opinion where Judge Young tries to
limit the holding to Fourth Amendment Grounds he writes:
(holding rested upon whether Officer had probable cause to arrest
video reporter for recording public event, implicating the Fourth
Amendment)
…….. the problem is, one does not get to the Fourth without the First, as
noted by the Iacobucci Court, again, so simple as other courts concur: From
Iacobucci (cited in Glik, infra).
In the next decade, the SJC narrowed this definition of disorderly
conduct to encompass only activities not implicating the “lawful
exercise of a First Amendment right.” …. 
and

11

Boulter's repeated demands that Iacobucci cease recording do not
change the disorderly conduct calculus. A police officer is not a law
unto himself; he cannot give an order that has no colorable legal basis
and then arrest a person who defies it. So it is here: because
Iacobucci's activities were peaceful, not performed in derogation of any
law, and done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights
(emphasis added lest the Court and Defendants miss it again)
Boulter lacked the authority to stop them. Id at 678.
(emphasis added to protect against the sort of intellectual disingenuity
that has plagued this case, as noted in the following video on Plaintiff’s
YouTube channel, which is approaching 2,500 subscribers and 2M
views.
And quite frankly, for the coup de gras, the Third Circuit Federal Judges
who outrank Judge Young understand it as well so Judge Young should
recognize that the Third Circuit recetly cited Iacobucci and Glik just this year –
prior to Plaintiff filing suit. This Court ignored Glik when Plaintiff raised it.
The fact of the matter is, if a citizen in the Third Circuit is entitled to politely
criticize a police officer during the prosecution of his or her duties, then
Plaintiff had dang well better be permitted to ask a couple of polite questions
at the County Recorder’s Office. See Montgomery v. Killingsworth, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7152 (January 22, 2015).
In Iacobucci v. Boulter, the First Circuit concluded that the plaintiff,
Iacobucci, had a First Amendment right to film local government
officials who were conducting public business in a public building. 193
F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999). Iacobucci was arrested after he refused to
stop filming several town commissioners while they were discussing
the possible approval of an applicant's building permit. Id. at 18.
Charged with disorderly conduct and disrupting a public assembly,
Iacobucci spent four hours in custody, though the charges were later
dismissed. Id. Iacobucci initiated a § 1983 suit in which he claimed
false arrest and excessive force. Id. After losing in the trial court, the
arresting officer appealed, contending he was entitled to qualified
immunity on those claims. Id. at 21-22. Rejecting that argument, the
First Circuit held that Iacobucci's "right to act as he did without being
arrested for disorderly conduct" was clearly established at the time of
his arrest. Id. at 24. In so holding, the First Circuit found that
"Iacobucci's activities were peaceful, not performed in derogation of
any law, and done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights." Id. at
25.
Peaceful criticism of a police officer performing his duties in a public
place is a protected activity under the First Amendment. As the Court
established in City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, "the First

12

Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge directed at police officers." 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S. Ct.
2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987). This type of speech is necessary to
protect and preserve because "[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to
oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one
of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state." Id. at 462-63.

13

Accord Gaymon v. Borough of Collingdale, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93014 (July
17, 2015).
In contrast, qualified immunity was rejected for the remaining First
Amendment claim because "peaceful criticism of a police officer that
neither obstructs an investigation nor jeopardizes a police officer's
safety has strong social value, serving as a valuable check on state
power, and is therefore protected under the First
Amendment." Killingsworth, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7152, 2015
WL 289934, at *8 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030,
1034, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888 (1991) ("There is no question
that speech critical of the exercise of the State's power lies at the very
center of the First Amendment.").7
There is yet more 2015 Iacobucci Analysis, this time from New York. See
Higginbotham v. City of New York, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62227 (May 12 2015)
The Court concludes, however, that the right to record police activity in
public, at least in the case of a journalist who is otherwise unconnected
to the events recorded, was in fact "clearly established" at the time of
the events alleged in the complaint. When neither the Supreme Court
nor the Second Circuit has decided an issue, a court "may nonetheless
treat the law as clearly established if decisions from . . . other
circuits [*23] 'clearly foreshadow a particular ruling on the
issue.'" Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 231 (2d Cir.
2014) (quoting Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010)); see
also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149
(2011) (requiring, in the absence of controlling authority, "a robust
'consensus of cases of persuasive authority'" (quoting Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999))).
By November 2011, the First, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had all
concluded that the right exists. So had a number of district courts.
See Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 51213 (D.N.J. 2006) (denying summary judgment in
a First Amendment retaliation claim involving a plaintiff who was
arrested for repeatedly photographing a police officer);Robinson v.
Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that the
plaintiff's "recording the activities of Pennsylvania state troopers as
they went about their duties on a public highway" was protected by
the First Amendment);Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No.
74 C 3268, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6342, 2000 WL 562480, at *21 (N.D.
Ill. May 8, 2000) (holding that "taking photographs of the police" was
"First Amendment conduct"); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp.
465, 471 (D.N.H. 1990) (holding that the police's interest in securing an
accident scene did not outweigh the plaintiff's right to photograph the
scene, and rejecting the defendants' qualified immunity
argument); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D.
Minn. 1972) (recognizing the right of a newsman to film a crime scene

14

from any location to which the general public had access, unless he
unreasonably interfered with or endangered the police).

15

The Court is unaware of any decision holding that the recording of
police activity by a journalist otherwise [*24] unconnected to the
events recorded is categorically not protected (rather than holding
merely that the right to record was not "clearly established"). At the
time of Higginbotham's arrest, there was thus a "robust consensus of
persuasive authority" in favor of the right that "clearly foreshadowed"
an analogous ruling by the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court.
See Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615-17 (N.D. Ohio
2014) (holding that the right to openly film police officers was clearly
established by 2012, despite the absence of Sixth Circuit authority).
In sum, the point is that while a Judge could argue that Pomykacz shot pictures through a window,
while Plaintiff was in the building, an unbiased Judge could never just truncate Discovery and rule that 
there is clearly no possible way that Plaintiff’s Constitutional claims had any merit. That is why Judge 
Young put specific little items into the Record involving items that were not in the Record to start with, see
Section II, infra.

That is not just a simple case of a Court making an incorrect decision
on which a litigant cries sour grapes: No. Anyone with any Constitutional
integrity knows that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated in a case
involving a journalist unless she or he has First Amendment Rights, ab initio.
***********
II.

Judge Young’s Unlawful Bias: He Assumed Facts Not in the
Record and Intentionally Downplayed Plaintiff’s Professional
Acumen to Shade the Case in the Light Most Favorable to
Defendants in Violation of Several Judicial Canons.
As dictated by several cases set forth below – some of which were

ignored or misrepresented in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Original Complaint
(i.e. Pomykacz, Iacobucci and Glik) -- there is simply no plausible way that
this case can be decided on the Pleadings.
First of all it is pretty obvious as noted on prior occasion that Judge
Young ignored all of Plaintiff’s professional accomplishments and even the
description as set forth on the Pleadings to malign Plaintiff as a “guerrilla
journalist.” But that’s not in the Record. What is in the Record, is this:
THE PARTIES
2. Plaintiff is a former daily news reporter and escrow attorney
who has closed several dozen commercial real estate
purchases and refinances. He has successfully tried several
First Amendment Jury Trials and has operated several
politically and legally-charged online journals over the past

16

decade, most notably Chris King’s First Amendment Page and
Mortgage Movies Journal.
That is what Plaintiff holds himself out to be as noted in the Complaint
and that’s all the Court claimed to be reviewing, so the pejorative “guerrilla”
nomenclature is reflective of the short shrift that this Plaintiff ultimately
received from the Court. Further, Plaintiff did provide the Court with excerpts
and materials from his website and such description comports with the
information on his website -- which was not once mentioned by the Court.
The Mortgage Movies Journal description has read this way for several years
now:

Mortgage Movies Journal
Christopher King has worked in residential and corporate
real estate in various capacities for the past fifteen
years, clearing title, filing zoning applications and
reviewing wireless tower contracts. He and his
associates are now teaming to provide video coverage
of America's imploding Mortgage market. All images
video and text subject to copyright.
Mortgage Movies Journal
Christopher King has worked in residential and corporate real estate
in various capacities for the past fifteen years, clearing title, filing
zoning applications and reviewing wireless tower contracts. He and
his associates are now teaming to provide video coverage of
America's imploding Mortgage market. All images video and text
subject to copyright.
So in the first instance, Plaintiff is not a guerrilla; he is a professional
journalist as well as a mortgage industry professional who has made
hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars for the banking/mortgage
industry. Higginbotham v. City of New York, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62227 (May
12 2015) explains why Judge Young did what he did by
i.

Whitewashing the professional acumen.

17

ii.

Putting Plaintiff in an interior office near employee cubicles when he
was nowhere near either such place.

18

From Higginbotham (in addition to prior citation noting the proper analysis of
Pomykacz):
Certainly, the right to record police activity in a public space is not
without limits, and some uncertainty may exist on its outer bounds. For
instance, it may not apply in particularly dangerous situations, if the
recording interferes with the police activity, if it [*26] is surreptitious,
if it is done by the subject of the police activity, or if the police activity
is part of an undercover investigation. As alleged, however,
Higginbotham's conduct falls comfortably within the zone protected by
the First Amendment.
The complaint alleges that he was a professional journalist present to
record a public demonstration for broadcast and not a participant in
the events leading up to the arrest he was filming. There is nothing in
the complaint suggesting that his filming interfered with the arrest.
Accordingly, and in light of the case law consensus described above, a
reasonable police officer would have been on notice that retaliating
against a non-participant, professional journalist for filming an arrest
under the circumstances alleged would violate the First Amendment.
......This is why Judge Young had to fashion Plaintiff as a "guerrilla journalist"
and completely ignore the professional acumen specifically stated in the
complaint. And that is unlawful, hegemonic and potentially racist bias.
***********
But going into the substance, there is more. Much more. As dictated
by several cases set forth below – some of which were ignored or
misrepresented in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (i.e.
Pomykacz, Iacobucci and Glik) -- there is simply no plausible way that this
case can be decided on the Pleadings. This time around if the Court and
Defendants actually respond to what Plaintiff wrote, we may be able to create
a record that is actually usable by a reviewing Court. Let us commence then,
in light of the below drawing evincing the fact that Plaintiff’s attempted
conduct in no ways threatened employee privacy or the function of the office:
That is because the only items downstairs in the public area is a public
foyer, a guard desk, a service desk at which Defendant Malone stood alone,
and a public hallway leading to the back room where several public kiosks are
situated.

19

As such, if the Court is at all interested in Truth and Justice, it would
stop hiding behind facts not alluded to in the Pleadings. To wit: Plaintiff was
not seeking access to “Interior offices” or to “film employees of the Recorder
of Deeds in their cubicles.” SEE Plaintiff’s drawing on page 12.
The Review of Plaintiff’s initial and Amended Complaint will reveal that
Plaintiff never sought nor implied such access. (29 June Opinion pp. 14-15, Fn
42). The Court assumed facts not in the Record in order to help
Defendants squash this case, and Plaintiff is most certainly entitled
to point that out to this Court and to the Reviewing Courts.
At this point then it is incumbent of Defendants to use photographs,
video or blueprints to disprove Plaintiff on this point. That is how the burdens
of persuasion and proof work, the last time Plaintiff checked when he was
busy winning First Amendment trials and changing First Amendment Law and
receiving Mayoral Commendations in Senator Kelly Ayotte’s home state of
New Hampshire, where he routinely photographs Ayotte’s Office, which is not
a “public body” or “public meeting” either. See Plaintiff in the U.S. Senate
building below. And see Appendices B and C and a picture of Plaintiff in the
office of the elected official, just like Betty Lou McKenna except with a lot
more power, prestige, pomp and circumstance! 4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl4tS0W7RcQ

4 For the Record, Plaintiff reminds Defendants and the Court as to how Defendants
raised Kelly Ayotte in Defense until he published these video captures. Yep. The
World’s biggest backpedal.

20

While playing lip service to deciding the case on the Pleadings let’s
review what the Court actually did:
First he put the Plaintiff physically in an “interior office” near
employees “cubicles” in order to make it appear that Plaintiff’s case and
arguments are unreasonable.
That is because – in reality -- the only items downstairs in the public
area is a public foyer, a guard desk, a service desk at which Defendant
Malone stood alone, and a public hallway leading to the back room where
several public kiosks are situated. As such, if the Court is at all interested in
Truth and Justice, it would stop hiding behind facts not alluded to in the
Pleadings. To wit: Plaintiff was not seeking access to “Interior offices” or to
“film employees of the Recorder of Deeds in their cubicles.” SEE Plaintiff’s
drawing, supra. The Review of Plaintiff’s initial and Amended Complaint will

21

reveal that Plaintiff never sought nor implied such access. (29 June Opinion
pp. 14-15, Fn 42).

III.

Judge Young’s Latest Maneuver of Blocking Filings Results in
Part from Plaintiff’s Constitutionally-Protected Online Activity.
Plaintiff has been quite vocal in pointing out facts relating to Judge
Young’s

handling of this case. A reasonable person could conclude that Judge Young’s
latest attack is because of videos such as this one:
Former Trial Attorney Rips Judge Robert B. Young
in Delaware Free Press First Amendment case.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Emq8pn6O34w

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Even if Judge Young claims that this particular decision was not of his
making, there is enough before us to clearly demonstrate that he has not
maintained any air of neutrality in this case, and as such, he must recuse
himself.IV.

Summary and Conclusion.

The Delaware Supreme Court has established the following two-part
test for determining whether a judge should recuse himself or herself where a
party has alleged personal bias or prejudice under Del. Judges' Code Jud.
Conduct Canon 2.11(A)(1): First, the judge must, as a matter of subjective
belief, be satisfied that she or he can proceed to hear the cause free of bias
or prejudice concerning the party. Second, even if the judge believes that she
or he has no bias, situations may arise where, actual bias aside, there is the
appearance of bias sufficient to cast doubt as to the judge's impartiality. BAC
Home Loans Servicing v. Brooks, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 51 (Newcastle
Superior 2012).
In this case it is not merely the remarks, it is the willful ignorance of
the law, the falsification of the Record and assuming facts not in the Record,
while erasing facts that should have been in the record, even going down to
Plaintiff’s identification of himself vis a vis what the Court said about a black
journalist, i.e. “guerrilla.” An extremely poor choice of words from a racist,
hegemonic judge, and conduct clearly evincing unlawful bias when viewed by
any objective person. The Truth hurs, but we have to call a spade, a spade.
There is a whole New World beyond Delaware, whether Judge Young
and the Defendants appreciate it or not. And it is Plaintiff’s Job to expose it,
which he will be doing with alacrity in the coming days, months and years.
And in Sum, Thomas Paine is still rolling in his grave, abated ever so slightly
with the promise that Plaintiff will stir some Common Sense into the Delaware
Way.

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Respectfully Submitted,
_____________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D.
kingcast955@icloud.com
mortgagemovies007@gmail.com
http://affordablevideodepo.com
http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com
617.543.8085m
206.299.9333f

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, swear that a true and accurate Courtesy copy of
this document was sent via email and via Tracked U.S. Mail to:
Joseph Scott Shannon, Esq.
Art C. Arnilla, Esq.
1220 North Market Street
5th Floor
P.O. Box 8888
Wilmington, DE 19899-8888
and to:
John A. Elzufon, Esq.
24

Peter McGivney, Esq.
300 Delaware Avenue,
Suite 1700
P.O. Box 1630
Wilmington, DE 19899
This 2nd day of September, 2015
________________________________
CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D.

25

APPENDIX A

26

27

APPENDIX B

28

29

A

30

31

32

APPENDIX C
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl4tS0W7RcQ

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLS0N_hH-cc
Here one of her constituents said that Ayotte “Is pleasant and sweet and full

of shit.”

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXlHu2002Vc

APPENDIX D

34

35