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Syquia vs.

Board of Power and Waterworks


74 SCRA 212

FACTS:
Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and
Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments
with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging
that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco
rates.
In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is
not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment
tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with
their lease contracts.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

HELD:
Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents
against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations
with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged
in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity
for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their
respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in
character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board
which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring

her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common
areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year
arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must
be set aside as null and void.

Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,


and Dionisio Mayor
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et
al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was
proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled,
passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935,
Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by
virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance
of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition
from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of
conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no
one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with


specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code


Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure
Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil
139Facts:
That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angarawon. The
provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
National Assembly for the said district, for having received the mostnumber of
votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsuafiled before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election ofthe herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that saidrespondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the firstdistrict of Tayabas, or
that the election of said position be nullified.Issue: WON the said Electoral
Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance
of the
protest
filed
against
theelection of the herein petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation ofsuch election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contestsrelating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NationalAssembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remainedoriginally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the ElectoralCommission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the NationalAssembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as anexpress prohibition in the
Constitution. If we concede the power claimed inbehalf of the National Assembly
that said body may regulate the proceedings ofthe Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the commission to lay downthe period within which protests should be
filed, the grant of power to thecommission would be ineffective.The creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei thepower regulative in
character to limit the time within which protests intrusted toits cognizance should
be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where ageneral power is conferred
or duty enjoined, every particular power necessaryfor the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also included. Theincidental power to promulgate such

rules necessary for the proper exercise of itsexclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose
A.Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
theElectoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
ofthe protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of
saidpetitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district
ofthe Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
ElectoralCommission.Issue :
WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdictionin assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of theherein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election byresolution of the
National Assembly?
Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate reithe
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protestsintrusted to its
cognizance should be filed.It is a settled rule of construction thatwhere a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular powernecessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is alsoconferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). Inthe absence of
any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to befollowed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, theincidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of itsexclusive powers to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed bynecessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27


Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged
withseveral others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxeswithout
the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution.After
appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished forcontempt, the
COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposinga fine. Masangcay
filed a petition for review with the SC.Issue :
WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercisethe
power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial innature.In
proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it didnot exercise

any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise thepower to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power isinherently judicial in
nature. The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer alllaws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear anddecide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with
theelections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be
classifiedas a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30,
ArticleVIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise
quasi- judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law
comeunder its jurisdiction.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence isessential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to theenforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, inthe, administration
of justice.The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident andattribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariablylimited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise
of thatpower by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative
functionhas been held invalid
Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757
Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the
defunctCourt of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared
null andvoid its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private
respondent SimplicioC. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto.
Domingo of San Juan,Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as
policeman of the samemunicipality with back salaries from the date of his
suspension up to the date of his actualreinstatement.
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio
C.Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission
decidedAdministrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the
proceedings of the case.
Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the
legalrequirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative
case withoutstenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of
Investigators) of theproceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does
not provide that the Boardof Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such
it does not provide for officepersonnel such as clerks and stenographers who may
be employed to take note of theproceedings of the board. The proceeding provided

for is merely administrative andsummary in character, in line with the principle that
"administrative rules of procedureshould be construed liberally in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties inobtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims anddefenses." The formalities usually
attendant in court hearings need not be present in anadministrative investigation,
provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunityto adduce their
respective evidence.

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations


TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of
members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it
is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and
National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it
over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were
inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled
that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is
a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but
the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil 635
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, CIR)
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the
layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios act is
not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
motion.
Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR
is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a
part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between,
and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants
or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.
Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
(Administrative Law, Contempt Power, Quasi-Judicial Power)
Facts: Private respondent Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then
NLRC charging petitioner Arcadio Tolentino with violating the Constitution of the
Batangas Labor Union (BLU) by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of
officers. NLRC issued an order directing the BLU to hold its election of officers within
20 days from receipt. BLU filed a petition with the CFI for prohibition with a writ of
preliminary injunction against private respondent Cinco, NLRC and the Sec. Of
Labor, seeking to annul and to prohibit NLRC and the Sec. of Labor from enforcing it.
Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime delos Angeles afterwards
reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions
raised therein. Private and judge then was served a copy of a subpoena issued
by respondent Inciong requiring them to appear at the NLRC to explain why they
should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a
union election duly ordered by the commission.
Issue: WON a labor officials power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to
comply with its order can be extended to trial court judges.

Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law,
which is the essence of judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies,
must observe the limits of its jurisdiction, thus said judge reserved his resolution in
view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised after hearing the arguments on
the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case
before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the
domain of the powers conferred on it. Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to
reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules.

Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs Court of Appeals


Due Process Administrative Due Process
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them
be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in
Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez
and Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case
before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon
was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself
from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he
was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The
CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to
review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case
which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily
and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to
the CA. The CA reversed Gozons finding and declared that ZCM had the rights
earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that
the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision to be reaffirmed
while Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied
both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing
due process.

HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice.


Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the
decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it
would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2 nd decision of the CA.

Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo Clave


Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and
Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate
IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was
approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who
recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr
Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment was
approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and
66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by
Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or
the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding
the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the
contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that
resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of
the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his
decision as the CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he
was inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission,
what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation:
he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of
law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the
recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due
process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave
should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who
between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II,
should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
American Tobacco Com vs Director of Patents

G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975


ANTONIO, J.:
In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners challenge the
validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to
designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said
Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall
be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These
proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade
name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or servicemark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the
Patent Office.
Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference and
cancellation proceedings in said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282,
247, 354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267, 111, 400, 324, 114, 159,
346, and 404.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested
with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in
Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:
168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. the Director of Patents
shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the event that the
Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner
shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the
case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction
over inter partes proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal to the Director of
Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall
be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the
appeal fee shall be P25.00.
The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the
Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce.. 1
Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:
168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. The Director of Patents
shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, [In the event that the
Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then

have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case
that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of
Patents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be
governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the
appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partesproceedings in the Philippine Patent
Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing
officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing
of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo
Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their
cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under
the law the Director must personally hear and decideinter partes cases. Said
objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition
formandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents
under the general law 2 and Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 3* to sustain the
contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is
"empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified
officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or
operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any
matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said
Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the
approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent
Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the
administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).
It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the
administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may
be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions
maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by
express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4 There is no
provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such
authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the

absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent


Executive interpretation of the Act.
The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests
that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165)
should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility
necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to
determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, 5 decide
applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, 6 cancellations of patents under
Republic Act No. 165, 7 inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, 8 claims of
interference, 9 cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law 10 and other matters in
connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected,
in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each
and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to
his other duties. 11 For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the
discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would
not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The
reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of
needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far
too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full
and expeditious consideration of the more important issues. the remedy is a far
wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has
been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the
top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important
questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the
consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." 12
Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the
power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative
agency will be
made. 13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioners.
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. et al.vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS et al.
G.R. No. L-26803; Oct. 14, 1975; Antonio. Digest by Ian.
Facts:
This case involves the validity of the amendment made by the Director of Patents to
Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademarks. 1. The Trademark Law (RA 166) vested the Director of Patents with

jurisdiction over inter partes


proceedings (
i.e.
hearing of opposition of registration of mark or tradename, interference proceeding
instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and
use of a trademark, tradename or servicemark, and cancellation of registration of
trademark and tradename pending at the Patent Office). 2. The Director of Patents
drafted and promulgated the Rules of Practice and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. Rule 168 of the Rules embodies the jurisdiction provided
under the Trademark Law. Subsequently, the Director with the approval of the
Secretary amended Rule 168:
2. Petitioners in this case are parties in
inter partes
proceedings. Due to the amendment, the Director of Patents
delegated the hearing of petitioners cases to hearings officers Attys. Marquez,
Velasco, C
asia, and Buenaluz. Petitioners claim that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and
void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide the cases.
Issue:
WON it is within the powers of the Director of Patents to delegate the hearing of the
cases.
Held:
Yes. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him
the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. 14 It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by
law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require
that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the
decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by
the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due
process and fair trial are fully met.15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility
on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made
by said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing,
which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who

makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies
them." 17
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the
myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on
the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.
Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not
jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been
prejudiced by the proceedings.
Moreover, as the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this Court
has correctly pointed out, the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing
officers of the Philippine Patent Office form 1963 to 1968 18 not only confirms the
departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the
act of the Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the
administration of the law. 19
Petition dismissed.
SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Padilla, J. | June 29, 1957

FACTS:
-

In 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubal, father of Alicia Nubal (16 year old minor), filed
a complaint against Emilio Suntay. The complained alleged that Suntay
took Alicia from her school in St. Paul Pasig, and took her to UP Diliman,
and there had carnal knowledge of her.

In 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the


Department of Foreign Affairs. Suntay left the Philippines and went to San
Francisco.

The private prosecutor filed a motion praying that the Court issue and
order directing the concerned government agencies (i.e. DFA, NBI) to,
essentially, bring the accused back to the Philippines so that he can be
made to answer for the charges against him. This motion was granted.

The Secretary then cabled the Ambassador to the US instructing him to


order the Counsel General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued
to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines.

However, this order was not carried out in view of the present petition
filed by Suntay. Suntays complain alleged that:

While the court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the
Secretarys discretion is abused, the court cannot take the
discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a
passport to be cancelled.

And while the Secretary had discretion in the cancellation of


passports, such discretion cannot be exercised until after
hearing, because the right to travel or stay abroad is a
personal liberty protected by the Constitution.

ISSUE and HOLDING:


-

WON the court acted within its jurisdiction YES

WON hearing is required NO

Suntay in this case is charged with seduction. The order of the court
directing the DFA to take proper steps in order that Suntay may be
brought back to the Philippines is not beyond or in excess of its
jurisdiction.

When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or juridical officer, all


auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry in to effect
may be employed by such court or officer.

In issuing the order, the Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of


justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of
his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.

RATIO:

On the issue on the necessity of a hearing:


-

Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful.

But where the holder of a passport is facing criminal charges in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport
already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically in cancelling
such passport.

When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact,


hearing may be dispensed with by such