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A QUICK NOTE PRIOR TO READING TIMELINED ARTICLES: Philip Zelikow actually created the 911 Commission Report Outline and Chapter Titles (ie “There Were Some Planes”) and Investigative Team Names and Taskings (ie Saudi Connection Investigators) in secrecy before the 911 Commission began to investigate anything and before Zelikow even personally chose its investigators!! So, any reference to any foreign country by name is completely his creation and was done prior to the initiation of any formal 911 Commission investigative process….ie The Saudi Connection Investigators Team should not be taken to imply anything except what one Phillip Zelikow wanted future investigators and report readers to frame their perceptions through!! The depth and intricacies of his deception are nothing short of well seasoned actions of a highly trained specialist! An Excerpt From: “The Commission” By Philip Shenon pages 388-389 (complete excerpt at end of this document) By March 2003, with the commission’s staff barely in place the two men had already prepared a detailed outline, complete with “chapter headings, subheadings, and sub-subheadings.”

Context of 'April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators' item=a0403zelikowblocksredacted&scale=1#a0403zelikowblocksredacted

April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Refuses to Approve Half of Interview Requests for ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators

Two investigators on the 9/11 Commission, Mike Jacobson and Dana Leseman, compile a list of interviews they want to do to investigate leads indicating that two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, were linked to elements of the Saudi government. The list is submitted to Philip Zelikow, the commission’s executive director, for approval. However, a few days later Zelikow replies that the twenty interviews requested is too much, and they can only do half the interviews. Leseman, a former Justice Department lawyer, is unhappy with this, as it is traditional to demand the widest range of documents and interviews early on, so that reductions can be made later in negotiations if need be. 'We Need the Interviews' - Leseman tells Zelikow that his decision is “very arbitrary” and “crazy,” adding: “Philip, this is ridiculous. We need the interviews. We need these documents. Why are you trying to limit our investigation?” Zelikow says that he does not want to overwhelm federal agencies with document and interview requests at an early stage of the investigation, but, according to author Philip Shenon, after this, “Zelikow was done explaining. He was not in the business of negotiating with staff who worked for him.” More Conflicts - This is the first of several conflicts between Zelikow and Leseman, who, together with Jacobson, had been on the staff of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and had researched this issue there. Shenon will write: “Leseman was that rare thing on the commission: She was not afraid of Zelikow; she would not be intimidated by him. In fact, from the moment she arrived at the commission’s offices on K Street, she seemed to almost relish the daily combat with Zelikow, even if she wondered aloud to her colleagues why there had to be any combat at all.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 109-111] Later Fired, Evidence Deleted from Final Report - Zelikow will later fire Leseman from the commission for mishandling classified information (see April 2003 and (April 2003)) and will have the evidence of the Saudi connection gathered by Jacobson and Leseman’s successor, Raj De, deleted from the main text of the commission’s report (see June 2004).

April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow prevents two investigators, Mike Jacobson and Dana Leseman, from viewing a key document they need for their work. Jacobson and Leseman are working on the ‘Saudi Connection’ section of the commission’s investigation, researching leads that there may have been a link between two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, and elements of the government of Saudi Arabia. Zelikow is also involved in another, related dispute with Leseman at this time (see April 2003).

28 Pages - The classified document in question is part of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 28 pages that were redacted in the final report and concerned possible Saudi government support for two of the 9/11 hijackers (see August 1-3, 2003). The 28 pages were actually written by Jacobson and are obviously relevant to his and Leseman’s work at the 9/11 Commission, but Jacobson cannot remember every detail of what he wrote. Stalled - Leseman therefore asks Zelikow to get her a copy, but Zelikow fails to do so for weeks, instead concluding a deal with the Justice Department that bans even 9/11 commissioners from some access to the Congressional Inquiry’s files (see Before April 24, 2003). Leseman confronts Zelikow, demanding: “Philip, how are we supposed to do our work if you won’t provide us with basic research material?” Zelikow apparently does not answer, but storms away. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 110-112] Leseman Later Fired - Leseman later obtains the document through a channel other than Zelikow, and will be fired for this (see (April 2003)).

(April 2003): Zelikow Fires ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigator from 9/11 Commission in Dispute over 28 Redacted Pages from Congressional Inquiry
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow fires one of the commission’s investigators, Dana Leseman, with whom he has had a number of conflicts (see April 2003). Leseman and a colleague were researching a possible link between two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, and elements of the government of Saudi Arabia. Blocked - The firing stems from a dispute over the handling of classified information. Leseman asked Zelikow to provide her with a document she needed for her work, 28 redacted pages from the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report she had helped research herself, but Zelikow had failed to do so for some time (see April 2003 and August 1-3, 2003). Leseman then obtained a copy of the report through a channel other than Zelikow, which is a breach of the commission’s rules on handling classified information. Some colleagues will later say that this is just a minor infraction of the rules, as the document is relevant to Leseman’s work, she has the security clearance to see it, and she keeps it in a safe in the commission’s offices. However, she does not actually have authorisation to have the document at this point. 'Zero-Tolerance Policy' - Zelikow will later say she violated the commission’s “zerotolerance policy on the handling of classified information,” and that she “committed a set of very serious violations in the handling of the most highly classified information.” Zelikow is supported by the commission’s lawyer Daniel Marcus, as they are both worried that a scandal about the mishandling of classified information

could seriously damage the commission’s ability to obtain more classified information, and will be used as a stick to beat the commission by its opponents. Fired, Kept Secret - Zelikow is informed that Leseman has the document by a staffer on one of the commission’s other teams who has also had a conflict with Leseman, and fires her “only hours” after learning this. Luckily for the commission and Leseman, no word of the firing reaches the investigation’s critics in Congress. Author Philip Shenon will comment, “The fact that the news did not leak was proof of how tightly Zelikow was able to control the flow of information on the commission.” 'Do Not Cross Me' - Shenon will add: “To Leseman’s friends, it seemed that Zelikow had accomplished all of his goals with her departure. He had gotten rid of the one staff member who had emerged early on as his nemesis; he had managed to eject her without attracting the attention of the press corps or the White House. And he had found a way to send a message to the staff: ‘Do not cross me’.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 110-113] Zelikow will later be investigated for mishandling classified information himself, but will apparently be exonerated (see Summer 2004).

Before April 24, 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Cuts off Commissioners’ Access to Congressional Inquiry Files
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow strikes a deal with the Justice Department to cut the 9/11 Commission’s access to files compiled by the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (see July 24, 2003) until the White House is able to review them. However, he keeps the agreement secret from the commissioners and, when Commissioner Tim Roemer, who had actually sat on the Congressional Inquiry and already seen the material, goes to Capitol Hill to read the files on April 24, he is turned away. Roemer is furious and asks: “Why is our executive director making secret deals with the Justice Department and the White House? He is supposed to be working for us.” [Associated Press, 4/26/2003; Shenon, 2008, pp. 90] He adds, “No entity, individual, or organization should sift through or filter our access to material.” [Associated Press, 4/30/2003] Author Philip Shenon will comment, “Roemer believed, correctly, that it was a sign of much larger struggles to come with Zelikow.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 90]

August 1-3, 2003: Leaks Hint at Saudi Involvement in 9/11
In the wake of the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s full report, anonymous officials leak some details from a controversial, completely censored 28-page section that focuses on possible Saudi support for 9/11. According to leaks given to the New York Times, the section says that Omar al-Bayoumi and/or Osama

Basnan “had at least indirect links with two hijackers [who] were probably Saudi intelligence agents and may have reported to Saudi government officials.” It also says that Anwar Al Aulaqi “was a central figure in a support network that aided the same two hijackers.” Most connections drawn in the report between the men, Saudi intelligence, and 9/11 is said to be circumstantial. [New York Times, 8/2/2003] One key section is said to read, “On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA memorandum, ‘incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists… On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.’”(see August 2, 2002) Some of the most sensitive information involves what US agencies are doing currently to investigate Saudi business figures and organizations. [Associated Press, 8/2/2003] According to the New Republic, the section outlines “connections between the hijacking plot and the very top levels of the Saudi royal family.” An anonymous official is quoted as saying, “There’s a lot more in the 28 pages than money. Everyone’s chasing the charities. They should be chasing direct links to high levels of the Saudi government. We’re not talking about rogue elements. We’re talking about a coordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multiple places in the Saudi government.… If the people in the administration trying to link Iraq to al-Qaeda had one-one-thousandth of the stuff that the 28 pages has linking a foreign government to al-Qaeda, they would have been in good shape.… If the 28 pages were to be made public, I have no question that the entire relationship with Saudi Arabia would change overnight.” [New Republic, 8/1/2003] The section also is critical that the issue of foreign government support remains unresolved. One section reads, “In their testimony, neither CIA or FBI officials were able to address definitely the extent of such support for the hijackers, globally or within the United States, or the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. This gap in intelligence community coverage is unacceptable.” [Boston Globe, 8/3/2003]



Congressional Record: October 28, 2003 (Senate)
Page S13349-S13372

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004--Continued The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada. Mr. REID. Mr. President, Senator Leahy asked that I fill in for him for the next little bit. We have an amendment to offer. We have no one here from the majority, but I am very confident there is no problem with the Senator from North Dakota offering an amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so the Senator from North Dakota can offer his amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from North Dakota. Amendment No. 1994 Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The assistant clerk read as follows: The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself and Mr. Schumer, proposes an amendment numbered 1994. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [[Page S13350]] The amendment is as follows: (Purpose: To urge the President to release information regarding sources of foreign support for the 9-11 hijackers)

At the appropriate place, insert the following: Sec. . Sense of the Senate on declassifying portions of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 2001. (a) Findings.--The Senate finds that-(1) The President has prevented the release to the American public of 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 2001. (2) The contents of the redacted pages discuss sources of foreign support for some of the September 11th hijackers while they were in the United States. (3) The Administration's decision to classify this information prevents the American people from having access to information about the involvement of certain foreign governments in the terrorist attacks of September 2001. (4) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested that the President release the 28 pages. (5) The Senate respects the need to keep information regarding intelligence sources and methods classified, but the Senate also recognizes that such purposes can be accomplished through careful selective redaction of specific words and passages, rather than effacing the section's contents entirely. (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that in light of these findings the President should declassify the 28-page section of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 2001 that deals with foreign sources of support for the 9-11 hijackers, and that only those portions of the report that would directly compromise ongoing investigations or reveal intelligence sources and methods should remain classified. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this amendment is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment. I note there are other sense-of-the-Senate amendments in this legislation. I will at the end of my statement ask consent that we consider waiving points of order. Let me describe what the amendment is and why I have offered the amendment. I offer this amendment on behalf of myself and Senator Schumer from New York. The Congressional Joint Intelligence Committee inquiry into the intelligence community activities before and after the terrorist attacks of September 2001 finished its work. This past summer, when the report was finally authorized for release by the administration, we discovered that the report, which took 9 months to write and 7 months to declassify, contained 28 pages that had been redacted by White House lawyers. I will quote a couple of people, one who is in the Chamber now. I will quote Senator Shelby and Senator Graham, the chair and ranking

member of the Intelligence Committee while this inquiry was underway. As I indicated, 28 pages of this report were redacted by White House lawyers. That means the American public cannot see what was in that report. We will have no knowledge and no information about what was contained in that rather exhaustive report. The Bush administration has refused to declassify these pages, citing concern for intelligence-gathering "sources and methods." I don't think that is an insignificant issue, by the way. I think intelligence gathering and the sources and methods for doing so are important. But it is also important, it seems to me, to ask the question, Should these 28 pages have been redacted? Should the 28 pages have been outside the view of the American people, given the fact that this report was done in order to evaluate what happened leading up to 2001, what was happening with respect to our intelligence community, what was happening with respect to other countries? There has been a great deal of speculation about Saudi Arabia. It is assumed that somehow in these pages there is discussion about the Saudis. The Saudi Government is implicated by some because 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Even the leaders of the Saudi Government, who some have said are the object of the redacted pages, want it declassified. They are angry and embarrassed at being singled out and want to defend themselves, and therefore they want this declassified. How much of the 28 pages could be declassified? Senators Graham and Shelby, the former chair and cochair of the Intelligence Committee who directed the report are quoted saying the following: "I think they are classified for the wrong reason," the former vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee told NBC's "Meet the Press." "I went back and read every one of those pages thoroughly. My judgment is 95 percent of that information should be declassified and become uncensored so the American people would know." Asked why the section was blacked out, Shelby said: "I think it might be embarrassing to international relations." Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who was the chairman of the committee investigating this, also called for declassification. He said releasing the report would permit "the Saudi Government to deal with any questions which may be raised in the currently censored pages and allow the American people to make their own judgment about who are our true friends and allies in the war on terrorism." Senator Graham made that request in a letter to President Bush. This is a very important issue and it has gone on for months and months and months. This report was developed after an extensive amount of study and investigation. The report was then published after being edited by the Bush administration and the White House. And a rather substantial portion of that report--most speculate dealing with the Saudis--was censored, classified, or redacted. That is, the American people are not permitted to see that which is included in the report on those 28 pages. Again, the chairman and vice chairman of the committee that led or that directed the preparation of this report say most of that

information of the 28 pages should be declassified, implying, I believe, since they are not quoted directly, that declassifying that would not compromise sources and methods and not compromise our intelligence community. My hope is that the Senate, with a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, will weigh in on this in a very significant way and say to the administration these 28 pages should be made available. Now, in the sense-of-the-Senate resolution, I point out that it is the sense of the Senate that in light of the findings--and I have a series of findings--the President should declassify the 28-page section of the joint inquiry into intelligence community activities before and after the terrorist attacks of 2001 that deal with the foreign sources of support for the 9/11 hijackers and that only those portions of the report that would directly compromise ongoing investigations or reveal intelligence sources or methods should remain classified. In point of fact, those whose expert opinions I respect have said they have read the redacted or the censored or classified portions very carefully and believe most of it should not have been classified; most of it should have been made available to the American people. If that is the case, and if the Saudi Government itself has said this information ought to be declassified, let us deal with it on the public record. Then I believe the American people ought to expect a right to see this information. My hope is we will have a vote on this amendment, a sense-of-theSenate amendment that will allow the Senate in this forum to send a message to the President and to the White House that we believe the bulk of this 28-page redaction should be made available to the American people posthaste. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida. Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I commend my colleague, the Senator from North Dakota, for having offered this sense of the Senate. The sense of the Senate has an additional significance as we face some fundamental issues in the closing days of this session. First, I will talk about the base concerns. As the Senator from North Dakota said, the principal purpose of the joint inquiry was to determine what had been the role of the intelligence community in the events leading up to September 11. In many instances in the course of that pursuit, the committee staff came to unearth FBI reports, CIA reports, and other intelligence community reports. We were not in a position, either in terms of our staff capabilities or our jurisdiction, to then go behind those reports to attempt to validate them. These were reports written by [[Page S13351]] agents of these appropriate intelligence agencies, but we could not, from primary sources, validate them. The FBI, primarily--and some other intelligence agencies, as well--were tasked to do exactly that, to find out if their own documents in many cases could be substantiated.

Those requests were made approximately a year ago. Still, today, many of those requests have not been answered. The administration has said, either directly or in some cases through intermediaries, that our report is deficient in that there is not second- and third-party confirmation of the statements we include. We included exactly what the FBI or CIA or other agencies had written. We asked the appropriate agencies, primarily FBI, to pursue these to determine if they were substantiated, and in many instances that has not occurred. There is also an issue not of micro but of macro importance: This report makes a very compelling case, based on the information submitted by the agencies themselves, that there was a foreign government which was complicitous in the actions leading up to September 11, at least as it relates to some of the terrorists who were present in one part of the United States. There are two big questions yet to be answered. Why would this government have provided the level of assistance--financial, logistical, housing, support service--to some of the terrorists and not to all of the terrorists? We asked that question. There has been no response. My own hypothesis--and I will describe it as that--is that in fact similar assistance was being provided to all or at least most of the terrorists. The difference is that we happened, because of a set of circumstances which are contained in these 28 censored pages, to have an unusual window on a few of the terrorists. We did not have a similar window on others. Therefore, it will take more effort to determine if they were, in fact, receiving that assistance. That effort has, in my judgment, been grossly insufficiently pursued. An even more serious question is what would lead us to believe that if there was this infrastructure of a foreign government supporting some of the 19 terrorists, that as soon as September 11 concluded, as soon as the last flames were put out at the Pentagon, the World Trade Center and on the field in Pennsylvania, all that infrastructure was immediately taken down? Again, this is my hypothesis: I don't believe it was taken down. I believe that infrastructure is likely to still be in place assisting the next generation of terrorists who are in the United States. Those are very fundamental questions, and if the public had access to these 28 pages, they would be demanding answers. As I mentioned in the beginning of my remarks, there is another issue which is going to emerge in the next few days. We had a long debate in this Chamber on the supplemental appropriations bill, the bill providing $87 billion for the reconstruction and occupation of Iraq. We had a long debate as to whether some of that reconstruction money should be in the form of loans rather than, as the President has insisted, all of it being in grants. What is one of the practical effects of making all of the U.S. money which will go into the reconstruction of Iraq a grant? The answer to that question is that one of the consequences, ironically, will be that we will make all of the countries which currently have loans to Iraq that much more solvent because we will have, without any request for

repayment, made a significant investment in enhancing the economic viability of Iraq and, therefore, the ability of whatever government is placed in ultimate control of Iraq more capable of repaying those loans. There is a further irony that some of those countries, which are disclosed in the 28 censored pages as having been complicitous with the terrorists, are among the list of those creditors of Iraq that are going to get this indirect economic benefit. I believe the Members of Congress, who are going to be called upon to vote on whether we should grant this indirect benefit to a country that has been less than supportive of our Nation's war on terror, ought to know that before we vote and then find out later the full consequences of what we have done. So there was an issue as to why these 28 pages should have been released when the report was initially completed in December of 2002. Those issues remain today. And there is the additional issue of whether we are going to inadvertently grant a significant financial benefit to a country that has been to say less than our ally in the war on terror would be a gross understatement. I commend the Senator from North Dakota for having offered this sense of the Senate. It is a very important issue. I hope this Senate will adopt the sense of the Senate. If not, if the President continues to refuse to allow the American people to have access to this information, then I hope the Congress will be willing to use some of the authorities that it has to declassify information. Because the higher interest is not in placating this administration's unwillingness to be forthcoming on the issue. The higher interest in this democracy is that the people have access to relevant information which is not an issue of national security but which is a significant issue in terms of understanding the consequences of decisions that we have and will soon be making. I urge adoption of the sense of the Senate and again express my admiration to the Senator from North Dakota for having presented it this afternoon. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota. Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me make a few additional comments. My colleague from Florida is in a very unique position. Having worked with his colleague from Alabama, Senator Graham and Senator Shelby provided a great public service as they initiated this inquiry. The inquiry, as described by my colleague in part, is an evaluation of whether there were other governments that participated in supporting groups of terrorists who committed acts of terror against this country. The answer to that question is very important. My colleague indicates that if such a program were in place or had been in place by another government to support groups of terrorists, what leads us to believe that parts of that program are not continuing to still operate and, therefore, continue to threaten our country? The very important question with this sense-of-the-Senate resolution is: Should we not have the ability to know, should full disclosure not be the routine rather than the exception? Should the 28 pages that have been withheld from the American people be made available to them so we

all are able to evaluate exactly the same set of information? My conclusion is, yes, absolutely. It ought to be done sooner rather than later. I have been intending to offer two amendments to this appropriations bill. One dealt with this sense of the Senate which I have just offered. The second dealt with a sense of the Senate with respect to the cooperation that is now being received or lack of cooperation by the 9/11 Commission, the other commission that is headed by former Governor Kean that is looking into 9/11 and the relationship of a series of issues, both prior to 9/11 and following, by our intelligence community and others. One of my great concerns is reading in the newspapers just in recent days about the 9/11 Commission. This is a blue-ribbon commission. One of our former colleagues, Senator Cleland, is on the Commission. It is a commission that has to finish its work by May of next year. It has a relatively short timeframe. Now we hear that they have had to issue a subpoena to one of the Federal agencies to get them to cooperate giving information to them. There were other stories yesterday and the day before. They are concerned about not getting information from the White House. We are not going to be satisfied until we have everything we need to do our job. Governor Kean says--he is a former Republican Governor from New Jersey--this is not about politics. It is about a blue-ribbon commission having access to all of the information so it can do its job. I find it unbelievable that any agency or crevice or any corner of this Government would not open its records and provide full and immediate cooperation with the 9/11 Commission. That is the least we should expect of every single [[Page S13352]] agency. They have had to subpoena information from the FAA and yet they are not getting information from the White House that they are requesting. Kean said in an interview that he will resume negotiations with the White House this week and hopes to reach a resolution one way or the other on documents the panel is seeking. The Commission has the power to issue subpoenas and Kean says he does not rule out sending one to the White House. Why should we read this in the papers? I don't understand it. There ought not be any agency, including the White House, that does not fully cooperate in every respect immediately with the request for information from this 9/11 Commission. We have had two studies, one initiated by the Senate Intelligence Committee. That is the one that was the focus of my first amendment. The second was to have been the focus of the second amendment. Both were sense of the Senate--first, to declassify the information so that the American people will be able to see what was there. Don't censor this material; give the American people information. The second is to say to all Federal agencies, cooperate with the 9/11 Commission fully,

completely, and immediately. Now, my understanding is, having consulted with the majority, they will raise a point of order against the amendment I have offered just moments ago because it is "legislating on an appropriations bill." My second amendment would be the same. They would make a point of order against them, and the point of order would stand, I expect. So when such a point of order is made, I will regret it. I understand those are the rules of the Senate. But on the very next piece of legislation that comes to the floor--and I believe one is coming later this week that is an amendable vehicle and is a nonappropriations bill--we will vote on both of these sense-of-the-Senate amendments. I might also say that while a point of order will be raised on these, there are sense-of-the-Senate provisions, I believe, in the underlying bill, or sense-of-the-Senate provisions to be added to it. I will not raise similar points of order. My hope is that all Senators will join me in understanding that this is not partisan or political, it is about this country's interests--our interests in preventing future acts of terrorism, our interests in finding out what happened, what went wrong, and how we can improve the intelligence-gathering system in this country. Who did what? Were foreign governments involved? If so, which ones and to what extent? These questions need to be answered. Both of my resolutions are designed to do one thing--provide more information to the American people, No. 1; No. 2, to ask every corner of our Government in every official working of this Government to decide that they will completely, cooperatively, and immediately work with the 9/11 Commission to provide the requested information. We ought not to have to come to the Senate floor to ask why the White House, the FAA, or this or that agency has not already fully cooperated with the 9/11 Commission. It is in this country's interest to see that happen. Mr. President, I ask for consideration of my amendment. Mr. McCONNELL. Was consent requested, Mr. President? I am sorry, I didn't hear. Mr. DORGAN. I asked for consideration of my amendment. I ask unanimous consent that we waive points of order and have my amendment be considered. Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, in accordance with the precedent of May 17, 2000, I raise a point of order that the amendment is not germane. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is sustained. The amendment falls. Mr. McCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. President.

The following are excerpts from pages 388-389 of Philip Shenon's latest book, "The Commission": After he was approached by Kean and Hamilton in January 2003 about running the investigation, Zelikow immediately telephoned May to discuss whether he should take the job. May was at home in Cambridge, Massachussetts, not far from his office on the Harvard campus, and he remembered that the call lasted more than an hour, with two men agreeing that it was an extraordinary opportunity to try to produce a "professional-quality narrative history" of a watershed moment in American history, "on par at least with Pearl Harbor."

After Pearl Harbor, both men knew, there had been no similar effort to explain the disaster to the public. There was an effort at accountability in the Pearl Harbor investigations--the navy's fleet commander in the Pacific and his army counterpart were both relieved of their commands in disgrace--but there had been no effort to put the 1941 attacks in historical context and explain the forces that had led the Japanese to launch a surprise attack and why the military had left itself so vulnerable. As a historian, it was exciting, May remembered, to think of producing a report that would remain the reference volume on the September 11 attacks and that would be "sitting on the shelves of high school and college teachers a generation hence."

Zelikow initially wanted May's advice on how the final report should be structured, and they went to work, secretly, to prepare an outline. May was given a desk in Zelikow's office on K Street in Washington, which he used on his occasional visits from Harvard. By March 2003, with the commission's staff barely in place the two men had already prepared a detailed outline, complete with "chapter headings, subheadings, and sub-subheadings."

He and May proposed a sixteen-chapter report that would open with a history of alQaeda, beginning with bin Laden's fatwa against the United States in 1998. That would lead to chapters about the history of American counterterrorism policy. The White House response to the flood of terrorist threats in the spring and summer of 2001 were left to the sixth chapter; the events of September 11 were left to the seventh chapters. Zelikow and May proposed that the tenth chapter he entitled "Problems of Foresight--And Hindsight," with a subchapter on "the blinding effects of hindsight."

Zelikow shared the document with Kean and Hamilton, who were impressed by their executive director's early diligence but worried that the outline would be seen as evidence that they--and Zelikow--had predetermined the report's outcome. It should be kept secret from the rest of the staff, they all decided. May said that he and Zelikow agreed that the outline should be "treated as if it were the most classified document the commission possessed" Zelikow came up with his own internal classification system for the outline. He labeled it "Commission Sensitive," putting those words at the top and bottom of each page.

Kean and Hamilton were right to be wary. When it was later disclosed that Zelikow had prepared a detailed outline of the commission's final report at the very start of the investigation, many of the staff's investigators were alarmed. They were finally given copies of the outline in April 2004. They saw that Zelikow was proposing that the findings about the Bush Administration's actions before 9/11 would be pushed to the middle of the report, which meant that readers would have to go searching for them past long chapters of al-Qaeda history. Many assumed the worst when they saw that Zelikow had proposed a portion of the report entitled "The Blinding Effects of Hindsight." What "blinding hindsight"? They assumed Zelikow was trying to dismiss the value of hindsight regarding the Bush administration's pre-9/11 performance. A few staffers began circulating a two-page parody of Zelikow's effort entitled "The Warren Commission Report--Preemptive Outline." The parody's authorship was never determined conclusively. The chapter headings included "Single Bullet: We Haven't Seen The Evidence Yet. But Really. We're Sure."


Report on a Conversation with Philip Zelikow
by Thomas Hansen, Ph.D. Tuesday, Jun 7, 2005 Link to Original
It is nearly a year since the 9/11 Commission report was finished and the investigation of the events of 9/11 officially came to a close. But unofficially, many Americans have unanswered questions, and at least some of this hesitancy to close the book on 9/11 is because of the long-standing connection between the Bush Administration and the man who was the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, Dr. Philip Zelikow. In a new book by Professor Emeritus David Ray Griffin of the Claremont School of Theology (The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, Olive Branch Press, 2005), the case is made that the staff of the 9/11 Commission acted as gatekeepers who followed the official explanation of events of 9/11, rather than acting as true independent investigators. Griffin gives detailed and abundant evidence that he feels shows Philip Zelikow and his staff did not thoroughly investigate information that was contrary to what the Bush Administration had already accepted as the facts of 9/11. Last fall I had a conversation with Zelikow, which I feel supports the ideas and evidence of Professor Griffin’s book. But before I go into what Dr. Zelikow told me in person, let us look at the facts of Zelikow’s association with members of the Bush Administration over the past 15 years. The reason I present this “bio” of Dr. Zelikow is that, while we expect any person might receive a job offer based on whom they have worked with and have known in the past, this was not an ordinary job. This job was to oversee the official investigation of a most serious and consequential crime, and it occurred under the watch of President Bush’s Administration. Dr. Philip Zelikow, despite his fine record of integrity and scholarship, was clearly not independent from the Bush Administration. And since Bush, Cheney and Rice were three of the witnesses who testified before the Commission, their relationship with Zelikow is relevant. Dr. Zelikow was on the National Security Council of President George H.W. Bush in the 1980s, working as an aide to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Condoleeza Rice was also an aide, working with Zelikow. In 1997, Zelikow and Rice co-authored a book. Also in the 1990s, Zelikow directed the Aspen Strategy Group, which included Rice, Scowcroft, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz and others. Then after President George W. Bush was elected in 2000, Zelikow was appointed to the National Security Council transition team to provide recommendations to Rice as she accepted the position of National Security Advisor to Bush. Shortly after 9/11, Zelikow was appointed to President Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 2003, he was appointed Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, and took a leave from his position as Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

After the 9/11 Commission Report was finished in July 2004, and the Commission was dissolved, Zelikow returned to his previous Miller Center position for a few months. Recently he left the Miller Center job completely and became Counselor of the Department of State, as announced by new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on February 25, 2005. To quote Rice in the U.S. State Department press release of that day, “Philip and I have worked together for years, and I value his counsel and expertise. I appreciate his willingness to take on this assignment.” To quote the State Department press release, “Though the position has been vacant since 2001, the office of the Counselor is not new, having been part of the Department’s organization since 1909. The Counselor is a principal officer of the Department. As Counselor, Dr. Zelikow will serve as a senior policy advisor on a wide range of issues and will undertake special assignments as directed by the Secretary.” So we see from these facts that Philip Zelikow’s work with members of the Bush Administration preceded his 9/11 Commission work for 15 years, and it has now resumed again, fulltime. Apparently, we are supposed to assume that during 2003-2004, when he was Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he was NOT “associated with” members of the Bush Administration as he had been before, and is again now. He was somehow able to distance himself from his past relationship with them, oversee the interviews of many witnesses, thoroughly investigate all of the evidence, and supervise the writing of the final 9/11 Commission Report without being influenced by his past association with them. And now he has been able to re-associate with them in good stead and be re-hired by the Bush Administration fulltime in an important position. Dr. Zelikow gave a lecture at the Miller Center at UVA on September 10, 2004, titled, “The Road to 9/11,” and another on October 14, titled, “The Road From 9/11.” I attended the second of the two lectures and had an opportunity afterwards to have a conversation with him for several minutes. Among other things, I asked him why the Commission did not report more evidence that would answer the specific conspiracy concerns and questions that have been circulating regarding 9/11. I asked him why the Commission would let these concerns go unanswered and cause unnecessary doubt and dissent in the country. I pointed out to Dr. Zelikow that one of many reasons this conspiracy talk about 9/11 continues is that there have been no photos released of the Boeing 757 wreckage inside the Pentagon, or outside either, as we normally see after a civilian plane crash. I asked if he has seen photos that show the wreckage of the 757. He said, yes, they have photos, and that he has seen them, and he also said that there are eyewitness reports from a dozen or so rescue workers at the Pentagon who confirm seeing those airplane parts in the wreckage. Well, I asked, can I or some other ordinary person see these photos? He said no. I asked if I could see the rescue worker’s statements, and he said no. I told him I had seen photos of the exterior Pentagon wall before it collapsed, and the hole where the plane entered appeared to be only about 20 feet in diameter, with unbroken window frames on either side of it where the wings and engines would have hit. This hole was much too small for a 757 to enter, and no wreckage of the plane is shown on the ground outside. He said those photos might have been “adjusted” in scale by someone to give the wrong impression. I asked if I or anyone else could see the National Transportation Safety Board report about the crash, or even about the 757 being picked up by radar as it approached Washington, and he said no. He said that the air traffic controllers at Dulles saw on their radar that a plane was approaching, without its transponder turned on, but they could not identify it just by radar. It was not one scheduled to come into Dulles, so they assumed it was landing at Reagan National, and when it dropped off their radar at the Pentagon they knew something was wrong. This was 35 minutes after the second World Trade Center Tower had been hit. I told him this explanation defied reason, but he said it is proven in the NTSB Report, which I

can’t see. I told Dr. Zelikow that this secrecy of the 9/11 Commission is still fueling conspiracy theories and distrust throughout the country and around the world. Then I asked him why he and the Commission and the staff don’t simply release photos and other information to the public so that we can rest assured that the Commission has fully investigated and answered these and other persistent questions. His answer was that the staff, including himself of course as Executive Director, made a conscious decision not to dignify these “outrageous conspiracy theories” by investigating them or reporting on them. In my opinion, this statement by Dr. Zelikow lends credence to Professor Griffin’s charge that Zelikow’s staff acted as a filter of what would be investigated and reported. Dr. Zelikow then told me he could see my point about the public wanting to know more, and he said he would go back to the Commission staff and re-visit the question of what to release. We’re still waiting. Americans are concerned about the unanswered questions of 9/11. The reputable polling firm, Zogby International, conducted a poll of State of New York citizens in August 2004. Results showed that 49.3% of New York City residents and 41% of New York citizens overall said that some of our leaders “Knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they consciously failed to act.” Nearly 30% of registered Republicans agreed with this statement, despite the serious legal and political implications. Only 36% of the total respondents believed that the 9/11 Commission had “answered all the important questions about what actually happened on September 11th,” and 66% want another full investigation of the “still unanswered questions.” CSPAN2 recently broadcast, and rebroadcast, the speech Professor Griffin gave about his book to a standing-room-only crowd at the University of Wisconsin. People are paying attention and learning and speaking up. As the 9/11 Commission Report approaches its 1year anniversary, many Americans are not celebrating, nor are they letting it all just fade away. We pay the salaries of those who have made conscious decisions to investigate and report only what fits their own version of 9/11 events, and their own vision of what the world should be like for them. It seems that “we the people” are considered by some officials to be just bystanders, without the right to see the evidence that our leaders have seen, and to decide for ourselves what is true. The Bush Administration has demonstrated a pervasive pattern of secrecy, deception, and arrogance, not just related to the 9/11 investigation. They have left the rest of us in the dark, but we can see well enough to fear that the Emperor has no clothes.

The truth about Zelikow and the Sept. 11 cover-up commission
by Carol Brouillet Stanford Daily Wednesday, Oct 20, 2004 Link to Original
Philip Zelikow will speak at Kresge Auditorium, today, from 4:15 to 5:30 p.m. We plan to protest the Sept. 11 cover-up and to raise questions about his role as executive director of the 9-11 Commission and the Commission’s report.

Zelikow, a national security adviser to both Bush administrations and a principal author of the official 9-11 Commission Report, was part of Bush’s transition team for the National Security Council after the 2000 election. He was appointed to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board a month after the Sept. 11 2001 attacks. The Family Steering Committee called for his resignation because of his obvious conflicts of interests. While Sept. 11 has been used to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, shred the Constitution and Bill of Rights, construct a global police state, enrich weapons manufacturers and seize oil assets, there have been no convictions in any courts of law supporting the government conspiracy theory, particularly the Saddam Hussein / Al Qaeda link. The 9-11 Commission failed to mention or address the multiple war games / exercises that were being conducted that day, out of the White House. As many as five war game drills were in process, some involving hijacked airliners, a plane crashing into a building, some involving false blips deliberately inserted onto FAA and military radar screens. One exercise pulled significant fighter resources away from the Northeastern United States on Sept. 11. These exercises involved North American Air Defense Command, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Canadian Air Force, the CIA and the National Reconnaissance Office. Coincidentally, in New York City, massive preparations were underway for a biochemical attack drill involving FEMA, the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, the FBI, the U.S. Department of Justice, Weill Medical College, the N.Y. Deptartment of Health, the N.Y. Fire Department, the N.Y. Police Department, the American Red Cross and the Port Authority. The Secret Service and Cheney’s overseeing role during the events of Sept. 11 were overlooked. This was documented in Michael Ruppert’s new book “Crossing the Rubicon – The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil.” The Commissioners and Zelikow had deep conflicts of interest and many reasons to cover up the truth about Sept. 11. They are now engaged in a public relations effort to sell the official narrative and the war on terrorism. Both the official inquiry and the Commission’s parameters were to support the official story and justify the creation of Homeland Security Department. The Stanford Institute for International Studies is sponsoring Zelikow’s talk, but the Department of Homeland Security has awarded a 15-month $1.65-million contract to CISAC and the Stanford Institute for International Studies to conduct research on how national and local agencies improve the design and evaluation of future terrorist exercises of national and local response systems. The DHS research contract resulted from CISAC’s observation of last year’s spring State Department-DHS-sponsored, full-scale exercise called TOPOFF2, designed to prepare national, state and local officials to respond to potential terrorist attacks within the United States. The United States has a long history of training terrorists and launching covert operations throughout the world.

Terrorism allows states to declare emergencies, label all opposition as terrorists and reduce civil rights. Carol Brouillet is an organizer for the International Inquiry into 9-11, a group that is responsible for exposing information about Sept. 11.

Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger
Ashton B. Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow From Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998

Article preview: first 500 of 4,428 words total.

Summary: The specter of weapons of mass destruction being used against America looms larger cs: today than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. The World Trade Center bombing scarcely hints Arm at the enormity of the danger. America is prepared only for conventional terrorism, not a nuclear, s Cont chemical, or biological weapons catastrophe. With the right approach and organization, however, the rol, United States can be ready. Herewith a plan to reorganize the U.S. government to ensure that it can Nucl handle the threats of the next century. How
ear The to Wea New Cou pon Thre nter s at of WM and Mas D Disa s By rma Dest Asht men ructi on t on B. Terr By Cart oris Rich er m ard For Nati K. eign onal Bett Affai Sec s rs, urity For Sept and eign emb Defe Affai er/O nse rs, ctob U.S. Jan er Poli IMAGINING THE TRANSFORMING EVENT uary 200 cy / 4 and Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. But today's terrorists, be they international cults like Aum Febr Polit uary Shinrikyo or individual nihilists like the Unabomber, act on a greater variety of motives than ever ics 199 8


Ashton Carter is Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense. John Deutch is Institute Professor of Chemistry at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Philip Zelikow, a former member of the National Security Council staff, is White Burkett Miller Professor of History and Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

before. More ominously, terrorists may gain access to weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas weapons, and even computer viruses. Also new is the world's dependence on a nearly invisible and fragile network for distributing energy and information. Long part of the Hollywood and Tom Clancy repertory of nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism has moved from far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen next month. Although the United States still takes conventional terrorism seriously, as demonstrated by the response to the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, it is not yet prepared for the new threat of catastrophic terrorism. American military superiority on the conventional battlefield pushes its adversaries toward unconventional alternatives. The United States has already destroyed one facility in Sudan in its attempt to target chemical weapons. Russia, storehouse of tens of thousands of weapons and material to make tens of thousands more, may be descending into turmoil. Meanwhile, the combination of new technology and lethal force has made biological weapons at least as deadly as chemical and nuclear alternatives. Technology is more accessible, and society is more vulnerable. Elaborate international networks have developed among organized criminals, drug traffickers, arms dealers, and money launderers, creating an infrastructure for catastrophic terrorism around the world. The bombings in East Africa killed hundreds. A successful attack with weapons of mass destruction could certainly take thousands, or tens of thousands, of lives. If the device that exploded in 1993 under the World Trade Center had been nuclear, or had effectively dispersed a deadly pathogen, the resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it. Such an act of

catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history. It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented in peacetime and undermine America's fundamental sense of security, as did the Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949. Like Pearl Harbor, this event would divide our past and future into a before and after. The United States might respond with draconian measures, scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects, and use of deadly force. More violence could follow, either further terrorist attacks or U.S. counterattacks. Belatedly, Americans
would judge their leaders negligent for not addressing terrorism more urgently. The danger of weapons of mass destruction being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It is a national security problem that deserves the kind of attention the Defense Department devotes to threats of military nuclear attack or regional aggression. The first obstacle to imagination is resignation. The prospects may seem so dreadful that some officials despair of doing anything useful. Some are fatalistic, as if contemplating the possibility of a supernova. Many thinkers reacted the same ...
End of preview: first 500 of 4,428 words total.

The Zelikow Plan

"The Bush administration is deliberating whether to abandon U.S. reconciliation efforts with Sunni insurgents and instead give priority to Shiites and Kurds, who won elections and now dominate the government, according to U.S. officials." Wright -------------------------------------------------------------------The WAPO correctly "paired" these two articles on its website. They are examples of the closely integrated fabric of goofiness that characterizes the administration's policy in the Middle East. The Zellikow notion of "sponsoring" Shia and Kurdish subjugation of the Sunni Arabs is breathtaking. It is so grotesque that it is virtually certain to be the policy choice of the moment. Is this the Bush/Maliki deal? The idea seems to be that we would concentrate on arming the already mostly Shia army and police while participating with them in an attempt to completely subjugate the Sunni Arabs. 1- This proves that the neocons are still in charge of this administration's policy. An effort to hand Iraq over to the Shia lay at the heart of neocon ambitions in Iraq. Evidently, it still does. 2- Does the Zellikow plan take into account what the reaction of the Sunni countries will be to an American/Shia alliance against their co-religionists? Obeid, the Saudi government adviser, warned last week in the WAPO that if the United States abandoned Iraq's Sunnis, then the Sunni countries would feel it necessary to increase assistance to the Sunni Arabs of Iraq (read insurgents). Gasoline on the fire, that is what the Zellikow plan amount to. Answer me this: Why is it that Shia "opposition" in Lebanon is a bad thing but the Shia government in Iraq is a good thing. Why is that? pl "The official purpose of the third annual session of the U.S.-backed Forum for the Future was to promote democracy around the world. But there were no plans for a joint statement on universal freedoms, since efforts to compose such a missive at last year's forum meeting dissolved into bickering." Kessler ------------------------------------------------------------------Let's see how this was supposed to "go down." First we get the governments to the meeting, then we get them to sign some sort of "universal" declaration on human rights, then in a year or so we declare them to be in "violation" of their own undertakings about "democracy," and therefore rightly subject to sanctions or worse as "law breakers" of some sort. Does this sound familiar? pl

"The Creation and Maintenance of Public Myths" (Who is Philip Zelikow?)
He was. of course, co-author of a book with 'Condi' Rice; and, five years later, (despite the vehement protests of the bereaved families) executive director of the 9-11 Commission.

But there's more to him than that. Another of his literary collaborators was a former CIA chief, and their article, published in 1998, was just as remarkably prescient as the PNAC team's premonition of a New Pearl Harbor. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From an article by Mike Whitney, in the Online Journal, Oct 25, 2006:

"Stealing the midterm elections and the power of myth"
[...] In researching the Bush administration’s manipulation of public perceptions, I came across an interesting summary of the State Department’s Philip Zelikow, who was executive director of the 9-11 Commission, that greatest of all charades. According to Wikipedia: “Prof. Zelikow’s area of academic expertise is the creation and maintenance of, in his words, ‘public myths’ or ‘public presumptions’ which he defines as ‘beliefs (1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known with certainty) and (2) shared in common within the relevant political community.’ In his academic work and elsewhere he has taken a special interest in what he has called ‘searing’ or ‘molding’ events (that) take on 'transcendent’ importance and therefore retain their power even as the experiencing generation passes from the scene. . . . He has noted that ‘a history’s narrative power is typically linked to how readers relate to the actions of individuals in the history; if readers cannot make the connection to their own lives, then a history may fail to engage them at all.” (“Thinking about Political History”, Miller Center Report, Winter 1999, pp. 5-7)

Isn’t that the same as saying there is neither history nor truth; that what is really important is the manipulation of epochal events so they serve the interests of society’s managers? Thus, it follows that if the government can create their own “galvanizing events,” then they can write history any way they choose.

If that’s the case, then perhaps the entire war on terror is cut from whole cloth; a garish public relations maneuver devoid of meaning. Wikipedia helps to clarify this point by adding: “In the Nov-Dec 1998 issue of Foreign Affairs he (Zelikow) co-authored with the former head of the CIA) an article entitled 'Catastrophic Terrorism' in which he speculated that if the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had succeeded, ‘the resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it. Such an act of catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history. It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented in peacetime and undermine America’s fundamental sense of security, as did the Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949. Like Pearl Harbor, the event would divide our past and future into a before and after. The United States might respond with draconian measures scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects and use of deadly force.” (Philip Zelikow, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia) That was written in 1998! Amazing. It is almost like Zelikow knew what was going to happen on 9-11 and was drawing attention to the “draconian measures” (scaling back civil liberties) which may seem attractive to ruling elites in the policy establishment. Now, (coincidentally) everything has evolved almost exactly as Zelikow predicted. Just like Pearl Harbor, 9-11 has “divided our past and future into a before and after.” The post-9-11 world relates to a world in which personal liberty is no longer protected, and where surveillance, detention and the use of deadly force are all permitted. It is a world in which “America’s fundamental sense of security” has been shattered and will continue to be shattered as a way of managing public opinion. As Zelikow presciently implies, the post 9-11 world depends entirely on “public myths”; fairy tales invented by society’s supervisors which perpetuate the illusion of democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

So, how does this apply to Karl Rove? There are only two weapons in the imperial tool chest; force and deception. I expect that the anticipated Democratic landslide will be preempted by massive voter fraud accompanied by some type of “searing event”; that way the fantastical outcome of a GOP victory can be neatly folded into a larger and all-pervasive "myth." As we have been reminded many times: Reality no longer matters; only the perception of reality. The power of myth reigns supreme. - Full article here.

Sunday, October 29, 2006
For Lenin's Tomb and Alexander Cockburn
A 16-minute extract from a film. They know why.

"We [the CIA] threatened grievous injury to his children"
From the former news-magazine Der Spiegel (affectionately known as "the house journal of the CIA in Germany") comes the following pseudo-critical interview, in which we learn that: - "The President likes to talk to operators" [i.e. torturers]. - There is such a thing as "hot waterboarding". - When the CIA's secret prisoners refuse to talk even under torture, then "the operators" threaten to torture the prisoners' kidnapped children. - The CIA has considered using misinformation. (Don't laugh.)

- All of this torture has brought as good as no information at all from Ramzi Binalshibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. - These two men are alleged to have been the two head honchoes in the September 11th attacks, yet they will never be brought to trial. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"The President Knows more than He Lets on"
One hundred suspected terrorists from all over the world are still being held in secret American prisons. In an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE, CIA expert [sic] Ron Suskind accuses Washington of "running like a headless chicken" in its war against al-Qaida. He reserves special criticism for the CIA's torture methods, which he argues are unproductive [sic]. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Mr. Suskind, the Red Cross recently visited all of the prisoners at Guantanamo who had been transferred from secret CIA prisons, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh. Do we know more about these CIA prisons, or "Black Sites" as a result of this visit? Suskind: We know that almost everything from the tool kit was tried: extraordinary techniques that included hot and cold water-boarding and threats of various kinds. We tried virtually everything with Binalshibh. But he was resistant, and my understanding of that interrogation is that we got very, very little from it. At one point, there was some thinking that we should put out misinformation that Binalshihb had been cooperative, he had received money and he was living in luxury. So that would mean that his friends and family, who obviously are known to al-Qaida, might face retribuition, and we ended up not doing that. SPIEGEL ONLINE: And what happened to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed? Suskind: He was really the prize. He is the 9/11 operational planner [in the same way that SpongeBob is the Pope - Q.], a kind of general in the al-Qaida firmament. He was water-

boarded, hot and cold, all matter of deprivations, beatings, threats. He told us some things, but frankly things that professional interrogators say could have been gotten otherwise. SPIEGEL ONLINE: With waterboarding, the prisoner is made to feel as though he is drowing, even if he isn't really at risk of dying. There are reports that Mohammed was a kind of unoffical record-holder when it came to waterboarding. Suskind: With extraordinary minutes passing he earned a sort of grudging respect from interrogators. The thing they did with Mohammed is that we had captured his children, a boy and a girl, age 7 and 9. And at the darkest moment we threatened grievous injury to his children if he did not cooperate. His response was quite clear: "That's fine. You can do what you want to my children, and they will find a better place with Allah." ... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------The interview continues at this bloody site. Caveat lector.

Saturday, October 28, 2006
"I didn't go to school until I was 12 or so."
I didn't go to school until I was 12 or so. My parents thought that traveling in a house trailer was as enlightening as sitting in a classroom, so I escaped being taught some of the typical lessons of my generation: for instance, that this country was "discovered" when the first white man set foot on it, that boys and girls were practically different species, that Europe deserved more textbook space than Africa and Asia combined. Instead, I grew up seeing with my own eyes, following my curiosity, falling in love with books, and growing up mostly around grown-ups -- which, except for the books, was the way kids were raised for most of human history.Needless to say, school hit me like a ton of bricks. I wasn't prepared for gender obsessions, race and class complexities, or the new-to-me idea that war and male leadership were part of human nature. Soon, I gave in and became an adolescent hoping

for approval and trying to conform. It was a stage that lasted through college. I owe the beginnings of re-birth to living in India for a couple of years where I fell in with a group of Gandhians, and then I came to the Kennedys, the civil rights movement and protests against the war in Vietnam. But most women, me included, stayed in our traditional places until we began to gather, listen to each other's stories and learn from shared experience. Soon, a national and international feminist movement was challenging the idea that what happened to men was political, but what happened to women was cultural -- that the first could be changed but the second could not. I had the feeling of coming home, of awakening from an inauthentic life. It wasn't as if I thought my self-authority was more important than external authority, but it wasn't less important either. We are both communal and uniquely ourselves, not either-or. Since then, I've spent decades listening to kids before and after social roles hit. Faced with some inequality, the younger ones say, "It's not fair!" It's as if there were some primordial expectation of empathy and cooperation that helps the species survive. But by the time kids are teenagers, social pressures have either nourished or starved this expectation. I suspect that their natural cry for fairness -- or any whisper of it that survives -- is the root from which social justice movements grow. So I no longer believe the conservative message that children are naturally selfish and destructive creatures who need civilizing by hierarchies or painful controls. On the contrary, I believe that hierarchy and painful controls create destructive people. And I no longer believe the liberal message that children are blank slates on which society can write anything. On the contrary, I believe that a unique core self is born into every human being -- the result of millennia of environment and heredity combined in an unpredictable way that could never happen before or again. - From here, via Dougald Hine.

Well, Hello Martial Law: Bush alters The Insurrection Act
Bush Moves Toward Martial Law Frank Morales October 26, 2006 In a stealth maneuver, President Bush has signed into law a provision which, according to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), will actually encourage the President to declare federal martial law (1). It does so by revising the Insurrection Act, a set of laws that limits the President's ability to deploy troops within the United States. The Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C.331 -335) has historically, along with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.1385), helped to enforce strict prohibitions on military involvement in domestic law enforcement. With one cloaked swipe of his pen, Bush is seeking to undo those prohibitions. Public Law 109-364, or the "John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007" (H.R.5122) (2), which was signed by the commander in chief on October 17th, 2006, in a private Oval Office ceremony, allows the President to declare a "public emergency" and station troops anywhere in America and take control of state-based National Guard units without the consent of the governor or local authorities, in order to "suppress public disorder." President Bush seized this unprecedented power on the very same day that he signed the equally odious Military Commissions Act of 2006. In a sense, the two laws complement one another. One allows for torture and detention abroad, while the other seeks to enforce acquiescence at home, preparing to order the military onto the streets of America. Remember, the term for putting an area under military law enforcement control is precise; the term is "martial law." Section 1076 of the massive Authorization Act, which grants the Pentagon another $500-plusbillion for its ill-advised adventures, is entitled, "Use of the Armed Forces in Major Public Emergencies." Section 333, "Major public emergencies; interference with State and Federal law" states that "the President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a

natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of ("refuse" or "fail" in) maintaining public order, "in order to suppress, in any State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy." ...


Flaws in the Commission's Investigation Conflicts of Interest in the Commission One important reason for asking for a new truly independent commission is because of the conflicts of interest of the 9/11 Commission members and staff, particularly Philip Zelikow, Executive Director of the Commission. The 9/11 Family Steering Committee came to the conclusion that each of the commission members was placed on the commission to protect specific interests. For example, Jim Thompson's and Slade Gorton's law firms represented the airlines. Jamie Gorelick was on the board of Schlumberger, a large defense contracting company and had also served on a CIA advisory panel. John Lehman owned several companies that provided military components to defense contractors or directly to the government. But the most profound conflict of interest, one that compromised the breadth and integrity of the commission's investigation, was in the executive staff director, Philip Zelikow. He was a close colleague of Condoleezza Rice, and at the specific request of Rice had served on the Bush administration's transition team. This meant that as the Clinton administration was leaving office and the Bush Administration was coming into office, it was Zelikow's job to facilitate that transition. Because two of Zelikow's specialties are national security and terrorism, he was briefed about al Qaeda and bin Laden by outgoing National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke, and CIA Director George Tenet. These briefings took place from late 2000 through early 2001. Zelikow's job was to take that information and convey it to the Bush national security team. How could Zelikow direct an investigation whose mandate was at least in part to investigate the role Zelikow himself played in the transition time between the Clinton and Bush administrations-a transition that went to the heart of why the Bush administration underestimated or ignored the threat posed by al Qaeda and bin Laden?

While the commissioners were the public face of the Commission, the real work was carried out behind the scenes by the staff-and there were about eighty staff members who were divided up into several key areas. Zelikow was in charge of those eighty staffers and the entire course of the investigation. He was the Commission's gatekeeper--all information that ended up in the final report was there only because Zelikow thought it should be there. In essence, the story told by the 9/11 Commission became the story that Zelikow wanted to tell. Zelikow, as Executive Director, was one of only two people from the Commission to be given primary access to the executive branch documents. As such, he received all the administration's documents relating to al Qaeda and 9/11. Zelikow provided a limited and censored group of documents to the commissioners, but only in a secure location. Commissioners could take handwritten notes about these documents, but these notes could not be removed from the classified location nor used in writing the Commission's final report. Zelikow designed the investigation so that staff was divided into individual teams, each team addressing one specific part of the investigation. Thus, no one segment of the staff was seeing the whole picture. The official excuse for 9/11 is that "nobody connected the dots," and yet Zelikow set up the Commission's own investigation so that no single investigator could feasibly "connect the dots" of the failure that occurred on 9/11. The other person given primary access to the administration's documents was Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, who ironically was also interviewed by the Commission as a witness regarding her former position as deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration. The Family Steering Committee issued a press release indicating their total dismay over the conflicts of interest exhibited by Zelikow and Gorelick. We should note here that Philip Zelikow was the primary author of the Administration's 2002 version of the National Security Strategy (generally known as NSS 2002), which turned the concept of 'preventive-preemptive warfare' into official American policy. The NSS 2000 said, among other things, "The events of September 11, 2001, . . .opened vast, new opportunities." Zelikow apparently believed that 9/11 had turned out to be a "good" thing. Then he wouldn't be inclined during the investigation to focus on any facts that would point the finger at specific federal officials, as this might spoil those "opportunities."

The Myth Maker As everyone knows, Philip Zelikow, the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, is an administration insider whose area of expertise is the creation and maintenance of "public myths" thought to be true, even if not actually true. We all know that he controlled what the Commission did and did not analyze, then limited the scope of the Commission's inquiry so that the overwhelming majority of questions about 9/11 remained unasked (see this article and this article). Zelikow is arguably the single most responsible person in covering up the truth about 9/11.

Well, it turns out that Zelikow also wrote a hit piece against Pearl Harbor truth for the Council on Foreign Relations. I guess with all of the false flags that the U.S. government carries out, there is alot of demand for a myth-maker like Zelikow. Here's Zelikow's essay in full: Stinnett revives another old argument: that Roosevelt knew about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and let it happen. (Even Buchanan did not stoop to this old saw.) A persistent digger, Stinnett has uncovered some nuggets of new evidence, but his most sensational items are premised on the false belief that American intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code before the attack. In fact, it was not decrypted until after Pearl Harbor. Aside from questioning the competence and honesty of two officers in U.S. naval intelligence (in a case concerning the Japanese fleet's radio silence and U.S. radio direction-finding), the book offers little new. Stinnett never fashions his nuggets of research into a coherent argument, much less a convincing portrait. It is odd that an otherwise respectable publisher did not insist on such coherence before peddling this book with its sensational press release. If Roosevelt was indeed maneuvering to have a war forced on the United States, his maneuvers were aimed at Germany rather than Japan, which he and Churchill simply hoped to deter. Pearl Harbor demonstrated their misjudgments, not their shrewdness. Using the tired old gatekeeper cliches of "nothing new, move along", "the authorities deny it" and "they were just incompetent", Zelikow's review is thoroughly dishonest. His argument that Roosevelt was really maneuvering to get us into war against Germany and not Japan is wholly deceitful. If America got into a war against Japan, it would also be at war again Japan's ally: Germany. Germany never threatened to attack the U.S. directly. So when Roosevelt learned of Japan's plans to attack Pearl Harbor ... voila, a perfect excuse to enter the war against Japan and Germany. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure that out. It is interesting to see a slightly younger "myth-maker" polishing his skills prior to landing the big role of whitewasher-in-chief concerning 9/11.

Philip D. Zelikow

Philip D. Zelikow

Philip D. Zelikow is best known as the executive director of the 9/11 Commission. He also acted as the director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia until February 2005 when he was appointed Counselor of the United States Department of State. Philip Zelikow was born in 1954. After study at the University of Houston, he completed a B.A. in History and Political Science at the University of Redlands, in southern California. He earned a law degree from the University of Houston Law Center, where he was an editor of the law review, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Zelikow practiced law in the early 1980s, but he turned toward the field of national security in the mid 1980s. He was adjunct professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California in 1984-1985, and served in three different offices of the U.S. Department of State in the second Reagan administration. Zelikow joined the National Security Council in the George Herbert Walker Bush administration, at the same time as Condoleezza Rice. Zelikow left the NSC in 1991 and went to Harvard, where from 1991 to 1998, he was Associate Professor of Public Policy and co-director of Harvard’s Intelligence and Policy Program. In 1998, Zelikow moved to the University of Virginia, where he directed, until February 2005, the nation’s largest center on the American presidency, served as director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs and, as White Burkett Miller Professor of History, held an endowed chair. Philip Zelikow has co-authored many books. He wrote a book with Ernest May on The Kennedy Tapes, and another with Joseph Nye and David C. King on Why People Don’t Trust Government. He wrote Germany Unified and Europe Transformed with Condoleezza Rice.

Professor Zelikow's area of academic expertise is the history and practice of public policy. In addition to the work on German unification, he has been significantly involved in contemporary scholarship on the Cuban missile crisis, including the relation between this crisis and the EastWest confrontation over Berlin. While at Harvard he worked with Ernest May and Richard Neustadt on the use, and misuse, of history in policymaking. They observed, as Zelikow noted in his own words, that "contemporary" history is "defined functionally by those critical people and events that go into forming the public's presumptions about its immediate past. The idea of 'public presumption'," he explained, "is akin to William McNeill's notion of 'public myth' but without the negative implication sometimes invoked by the word 'myth.' Such presumptions are beliefs (1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant political community."[1]" Zelikow and May have also authored and sponsored scholarship on the relationship between intelligence analysis and policy decisions. Zelikow later helped found a research project to prepare and publish annotated transcripts of presidential recordings made secretly during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations (see and another project to strengthen oral history work on more recent administrations, with both these projects based at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs. In writing about the importance of beliefs about history, Zelikow has called attention to what he has called "'searing' or 'molding' events [that] take on 'transcendent' importance and, therefore, retain their power even as the experiencing generation passes from the scene. In the United States, beliefs about the formation of the nation and the Constitution remain powerful today, as do beliefs about slavery and the Civil War. World War II, Vietnam, and the civil rights struggle are more recent examples." He has noted that "a history’s narrative power is typically linked to how readers relate to the actions of individuals in the history; if readers cannot make a connection to their own lives, then a history may fail to engage them at all."[1] Zelikow has also written about terrorism and national security, including a set of Harvard case studies on "Policing Northern Ireland." In the November-December 1998 issue of Foreign Affairs, he co-authored an article entitled "Catastrophic Terrorism," in which he speculated that if the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had succeeded, "the resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it. Such an act of catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history. It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented in peacetime and undermine America’s fundamental sense of security, as did the Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949. Like Pearl Harbor, the event would divide our past and future into a before and after. The United States might respond with draconian measures scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects and use of deadly force. More violence could follow, either future terrorist attacks or U.S. counterattacks. Belatedly, Americans would judge their leaders negligent for not addressing terrorism more urgently." Philip Zelikow served on President Bush's transition team in 2000-2001. After George W. Bush took office, Zelikow was named to a position on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [PFIAB], and worked on other task forces and commissions as well. He directed the bipartisan National Commission on Federal Election Reform, created after the 2000 election and chaired by former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, along with Lloyd Cutler and Bob Michel. This Commission's recommendations led directly to congressional consideration and enactment into law of the landmark Help America Vote Act of 2002.

In Rise of the Vulcans (Viking, 2004), James Mann reports that when Richard Haass, a senior aide to Secretary of State Colin Powell and the director of policy planning at the State Department, drafted for the administration an overview of America’s national security strategy following September 11, Dr. Rice, the national security advisor, "ordered that the document be completely rewritten. She thought the Bush administration needed something bolder, something that would represent a more dramatic break with the ideas of the past. Rice turned the writing over to her old colleague, University of Virginia Professor Philip Zelikow." This document, issued on September 17, 2002, is generally recognized as a watershed document in the War on Terrorism. Because Philip Zelikow's significant involvement with the administration of George W. Bush, some questioned the propriety of his position as executive director of the 9/11 Commission, which examined the conduct of George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice. Both the 9/11 Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demanded his resignation, due to this apparent conflict of interest. The Commission co-chairs, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, shrugged off these criticisms, as did other 9/11 family representatives. Based on speeches and internal memos, some political analysts believe that Zelikow disagreed with some aspects of the Bush administration's Middle Eastern policy.[2] In 2002 Zelikow made remarks interpreted as alleging that the United States entered the Iraq War to protect Israel, when he said:

"Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I'll tell you what I think the real threat (is) and actually has been since 1990 -it's the threat against Israel,"

"And this is the threat that dare not speak its name, because the Europeans don't care deeply about that threat, I will tell you frankly. And the American government doesn't want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell."[3]

Zelikow has called attention to various fallacies in this argument. In addition to observing that any use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would threaten U.S. and world interests, he noted that, though he publicly worried about the Iraq danger in 2002, he did not take sides in the debate at the time between whether to deal with this problem with war or with further inspections and other diplomatic measures. Nor did he think his views amounted to evidence one way or the other about the Bush administration's motives, since he had not participated in or been privy to the administration's deliberations on this problem.[4] Philip Zelikow, foreign policy consultant to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is known to play a leading role in conceptualizing a peace regime for the Korean peninsula.

Zelikow (a member of the Council on Foreign Relations), was appointed to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on October 8, 2001, by President George W. Bush. He was later appointed as the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. People have questioned his independence of mind, sighting the (co-authored) article "Catastrophic Terrorism" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77 no. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94 (see above). He has since stated that the 9/11 Commission investigated many 'multiple universe' events of the days around 9/11, the final report being "the best fit". The 9/11 Commission was set up "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks".

Works authored or co-authored by Philip Zelikow
Philip D. Zelikow • Philip D. Zelikow with Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft Harvard University Press, 1995, hardcover, 520 pages, ISBN 0-674-35324-2; trade paperback, 1997, 520 pages, ISBN 0-674-35325-0 Philip D. Zelikow with Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 2nd edition Longman, 1999. 440 pages, ISBN 0-32101349-2 Philip D. Zelikow with Ernest R. May, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis Harvard University Press, 1997, 728 pages, ISBN 0-674-17926-9 Philip D. Zelikow, American Military Strategy: Memos to a President (Aspen Policy Series) W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, 206 pages, ISBN 0-393-977110

1. ^ a b Philip Zelikow. Thinking About Political History. Miller Center Report, Winter 1999. 2. ^ Cooper, Helene and David E. Sanger. Rice’s Counselor Gives Advice Others May Not Want to Hear. The New York Times. 2006-10-28. 3. ^ Emad Mekay IRAQ: War Launched to Protect Israel Inter Press Service News Agency. 2006-12-28. 4. ^ The Israel Lobby

External links
• • • Biography from US Department of State "Miller Center chief irks widows" article Foreign Affairs article co-authored by Zelikow in 1998 on catastrophic terrorism and a hypothetical "transforming event" à la the attack on Pearl Harbor