December 13, 1920

G.R. No. 15149[[1]]

DOLORES RUSTIA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MAXIMIANO FRANCO, ET AL., defendantsappellees.
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Dolores Rustia, brought this action in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga to
secure an injunction to restrain the defendants from
cutting bamboo from certain land alleged to belong to
the plaintiff and to recover damages for the plants
already cut. In accordance with the prayer of the
complaint, a preliminary injunction was issued ex parte
upon the giving of a bond. Some of the defendants
answered, denying participation in the alleged trespasses
and disclaiming all interest in the land from which the
bamboo in question had been cut, while three, to wit,
Cecilio Franco, Benito Laren, and Mariano Manalili,
admitted that bamboo had been cut by them from the
land described in the complaint or in that vicinity but
asserted that said land belonged to Benito Laren,
Mariano Manalili, and Gregoria Dizon, wife of the
defendant Cecilio Franco.
The plaintiff claims that the land of which she is the
owner comprises an area of nearly 24 hectares, lying on
the north side of the estero Macabucod, which said
estero forms the southern boundary of part of the
property.
ISSUE:
Whether the courts o Law or courts of equity apply?
HELD:
In applying the American authorities at this point, it is
desirable to bear in mind - in order not to be completely
misled - that in the past, under the American and English
system of law, courts of law and equity were entirely
separate; and it so happened that originally, while the
courts of law had jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of
title, only the courts of equity could administer
injunctive relief. The result was that the latter courts in
the beginning showed great diffidence in interfering by
the remedy of injunction whenever there appeared to be
a bona fide dispute over the ownership, which ought to
be determined in a court of law. It therefore came to be
accepted in common-law States that an injunction to
prevent interference with rights in real property should

not be granted until the plaintiff has fully established his

title or right by a proper action brought, for that purpose.
This meant, of course, that the plaintiff, in a State where
separate courts of law and equity existed, must, first,
resort to an independent action in the court of law. It
seems to have resulted, furthermore, that the rule was
accepted in some of these States that if, in an action for
injunction in a court of equity, the defendant claimed
ownership in himself, the preliminary injunction would
be dissolved and the plaintiff would be required to go
into the court of law.
The judgment must be reversed; and judgment will be
entered, declaring the plaintiff; Dolores Rustia, to be
entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for in
subsection (b) of the second paragraph of the petitory
part of the complaint; and the defendants will be
enjoined from hereafter molesting her by cutting bamboo
from the property described in the complaint, reserving
to the defendants or any of them the right to institute any
appropriate action, if so advised, to establish ownership
and recover the property. 2 For uncertainty of proof no
award for damages will be made. No special
pronouncement will be made as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 6287
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the
Insular Government, et al., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an
action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated
by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the
Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the
plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a railroad line
"from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it
is for the purpose of condemning lands for the
construction of such line that this action is brought. The
land sought to be condemned is 69,910 square meters in
area. The complaint states that before beginning the
action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough
search in the office of the registry of property and of the
tax where the lands sought to be condemned were
located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such
investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in
question were located in the Province of Tarlac.
On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion
would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon

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the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the

subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the
plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was
situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the
Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This
motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial
court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by
the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of
dismissal.
The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely
upon the proposition, already referred to, that in
condemnation proceedings, and in all other proceedings
affecting title to land, the Court of First Instance of a
given province has no jurisdiction, power or authority
where the land is located in another province, and that no
such power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by
the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of irst Insatance o Tarlac has
jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Held:
Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a
partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove
doubts from the title to real estate, or to obtain
possession of real estate, or to recover damages for
injuries to real estate, or to establish any interest, right,
or title in or to real estate, or actions for the
condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be
brought in the province were the lands, or some part
thereof, is situated; actions against executors,
administrators, and guardians touching the performance
of their official duties, and actions for account and
settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of
the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and
distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall
be brought in the province in which the will was
admitted to probate, or letters of administration were
granted, or the guardian was appointed.
In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides
within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to
seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within
the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize
or obtain title to property of the defendant within the
Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the
province where the property which the plaintiff seeks to
seize or to obtain title to is situated or is found.
The failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the
action at the time of entering his appearance in the action
shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to

the place or tribunal in which the action is brought,

except in the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines
of this section relating to real estate, and actions against
executors, administrators, and guardians, and for the
distribution of estates and payment of legacies.
The Court hold that the terms of section 377 providing
that actions affecting real property shall be brought in
the province where the land involved in the suit, or some
part thereof, is located, do not affect the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relate
simply to the personal rights of parties as to the place of
trial.
The Court so hold it can not affect the decision in the
case for the reason that the defendants are not objecting
to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof.
They have not only expressly submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that
jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the
plaintiff to remove it.
G.R. No. L-25795
LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PARAS,

October 29, 1966

FACTS:
In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P.
Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate of the
spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin (Special
Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia
Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad
T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three
parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate.
Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the
contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months
later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the rescission
of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation of
its terms.
Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal
of Angeles reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to
give them an opportunity to present exculpatory
evidence, and after the conclusion of the reinvestigation
the parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case
mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had
no jurisdiction over the offense because the private
document that contained the alleged false statement of

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fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of

said city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was
delayed and in the meantime the City Court had set
Criminal Case No. C-2268 for arraignment, the
defendants secured from said court several
postponements of the arraignment.
Finally, in view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to
act on the motion to dismiss the case, petitioners filed on
November 26, 1965 with the City Court a motion to
quash upon the ground that said court had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged. The complainants in the case
with the conformity of the City Fiscal filed an
opposition thereto, and on February 3, 1966 the
respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset
the arraignment of all the defendants on March 5 of the
same year. In view thereof, petitioners filed the present
action for certiorariand prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether the City Court of Angeles has jurisdiction to try
and decide the case
HELD:
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where
the criminal offense was committed not only determines
the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.
Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of
Angeles over the criminal offense charged being patent,
it would be highly unfair to compel the parties charged
to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the
embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.

OVER THE ISSUES OF THE CASE

LAZO, ET AL. V. REPUBLIC SURETY AND INS.
CO., INC.,
GR NO. L-23765, JANUARY 30, 1970
FACTS
The plaintiffs spouses Lazo filed a complaint against
Republic Surety and Insurance co., and its general
manager Antonio Koh, the sheriff of Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The spouses Lazo alleged
that they guaranteed a loan between Jose Robles and the
Philippine Bank of Commerce amounting to P12,
000.00. The loan is executed with a real estate mortgage
which was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958
and sold to the mortgagee. Antonio Koh pursuant to the

mortgage right, executed a deed of absolute sale of the

foreclosed property. Because of which, the certificate of
title of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one
was issued in the name of the company.
The principal prayer of the plaintiffs was for the
defendant company to render an accounting of the
payments thus made, so that if it should appear that the
original loan of P12,000.00, together with the stipulated
interest, had been paid in full then the real estate
mortgage should be cancelled; otherwise the plaintiffs
should be allowed to pay, by way of legal redemption,
whatever Balance still remained. An additional prayer
was for compensatory and moral damages as well as for
attorney's fees.
In a motion to dismiss filed by all the defendants with
respect to the original complaint, they raised two issues,
namely: that the complaint did not state a cause of action
and that the claim or demand set forth therein had
already prescribed.
The trial court, however, went entirely out of the issues
submitted to it and chose to decide the case on a point
which was not at all litigated. It said: "The key, as it
appears to this Court, lies in the validity or invalidity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure over the real estate
mortgage. If valid, then in the ordinary course of things,
all subsequent transactions by defendants dependent
thereon can be taken to be valid also. If not, then they of
necessity must fall as a nullity."
In this connection it should be stated that the loan with
the Philippine Bank of Commerce was on a sixty-day
note, which was renewed several times, until the said
bank refused to grant any further renewal. To
accommodate the plaintiffs, on August 14, 1954 the loan
was transferred to the Republic Investment Co., as the
new creditor, on a note payable on December 12, 1954;
and when after three renewals the plaintiffs, again
defaulted the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. paid the account, and thereafter foreclosed the
mortgage in its favor on July 1, 1958. The trial court,
after having stated what it believed to be the "key" to the
problem, ruled that the transfer of the loan to the
Republic Investment Co., Inc. constituted a novation of
the obligation, and that the defendant company was
released from its liability as co-debtor because it does
not appear to have signed the new promissory note
executed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court
concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said
defendant was extinguished, and the foreclosure thereof
was a nullity.

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ISSUE

PEOPLE V. PADERNA
GR NO. L-28518, JANUARY 29, 1968

Whether the trial court erred in its decision that the

transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc.
constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the
defendant company was released from its liability as codebtor because it does not appear to have signed the new
promissory note executed by the plaintiffs?

FACTS
Lorenzo Paderna y Gamboa was prosecuted in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental for unlawful
possession of four packs of untaxed imported cigarettes
known locally as "blue seal" cigarettes.

HELD
The actuation of the trial court was not legally
permissible especially because the theory on which it
proceeded involved factual considerations neither
touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of
evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit
in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of
the parties of their respective claims and defenses
submitted to the court for trial and judgment." This rule
has been consistently applied and adhered to by the
courts.
The subject matter of any given case is
determined ... by the nature and
character of the pleadings submitted by
the parties to the court for trial and
judgment. Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar
Central Mill Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100, 103.
It is a fundamental principle that
judgments must conform to both the
pleadings and the proof, and must be in
accordance with the theory of the action
upon which the pleadings were framed
and the case was tried; that a party can
no more succeed upon a case proved.
but not alleged, than upon one alleged
but not proved." (Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 730, 742)
It is a well-known principle in procedure
that courts of justice have no jurisdiction
or power to decide a question not in
issue." (Lim Toco vs. Go Pay, 80 Phil.
166)
A judgment going outside the issues and
purporting to adjudicate something upon
which the parties were not heard, is not
merely irregular, but extrajudicial and
invalid." (Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236,
244.)

After trial, the court found Paderna "guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act 4097" and
sentenced him to pay a fine of P200 and suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day.
He then appealed to the Court of Appeals where he
moved to quash the information on the ground that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the case. He
contended that Republic Act 4097, which punished the
unlawful possession of untaxed article with a "fine of not
less than ten times the amount of the specific tax due on
the articles found but not less than two hundred pesos
nor more than five thousand pesos and . . . imprisonment
of from four months and one day to four years and two
months, had been amended by Republic Act 4713,
effective on June 18, 1966, and that the penalty for the
same offense was reduced to a fine of not less than fifty
pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and
imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than
thirty-days, if the appraised value . . . of the article does
not exceed five hundred pesos." The result is that the
case was now cognizable only by the city court of La
Carlota City, this, according to the appellant, for the
reason that criminal statutes should be given retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the accused.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contended
that the CFI of Negros Occidental, having validly
acquired jurisdiction under Republic Act 4097, could not
thereafter be divested of it.
ISSUE
Whether the CFI of Negros Occidental validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case?
HELD
In our view both the appellant and the Solicitor General
are in error.
Nor is it correct to say that since the amendment of
section 174 of the Tax Code by Republic Act 4713, as

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applied to the facts of this case, is favorable to the

accused it should be given retroactive effect in
determining the jurisdiction of the trial court. It is now a
settled rule of law that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action, and that once acquired,
jurisdiction is retained until the case is finally
terminated. In this respect, the Solicitor General is
correct. But the Solicitor General nonetheless has
overlooked the important and cogent fact that both the
commission of the offense and the filing of the
information in this case took place after the enactment of
Republic Act 4713 on June l8, 1966. Thus, the offense is
alleged to have been committed on July 25, 1966; the
information was filed by the city attorney on August 8,
1966. Consequently, jurisdiction over this case should be
determined under the provisions of Republic Act 4713.
Since the penalty provided by this latter statute is a fine
of not less than P50 nor more than P200 and
imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days
because the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500,
this case falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the city court of La Carlota City. 4
Indeed, this case is in substance similar to People vs.
Pegarum 5 in which this Court made the following
findings and pronouncements:
Before the Revised Penal Code took effect, the
penalty provided by law for the offense alleged
to have been committed by the appellant
was arresto mayor in its medium degree
to presidio correccional in its minimum degree,
or from two months and one day of arresto
mayor to two years and four months of presidio
correccional. The penalty prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code for the same offense
is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, or from two months and one day to six
months of arresto mayor. This is the penalty
applicable in this case. (Revised Penal Code,
article 22)
It is, thus, clear that under the law in force at the
time the crime was committed, the Court of First
Instance had jurisdiction to try the case; while
under the law in force at the time the complaint
or information was filed, the case was originally
cognizable by the justice of the peace. The
specific question thus raised is whether the
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is
to be determined by the law in force at the time
of the commission of the crime, or by that in
force at the time of instituting the action. "As a

general rule the jurisdiction of a court depends

upon the state of the facts existing at the time it
is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches
to the person and subject matter of the litigation,
the subsequent happening of events, although
they are of character as would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance
will not operate to oust jurisdiction already
attached." (16 C.J., sec. 246, p. 181) In the
instant case, jurisdiction was invoked for the
first time when the complaint was filed in the
justice of the peace court on February 6, 1932.
That was after the Revised Penal Code took
effect. By reason of the penalty which might be
imposed, jurisdiction to try the case was already
vested in the justice of the peace. Hence, the
Court of First Instance acted beyond its
jurisdiction in trying the case.
4. Jurisdiction over this case therefore belongs
exclusively to the city court of La Carlota, pursuant to
section 81 of its charter 6 in relation to section 87(c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. But what of the jurisdiction of
the newly-created circuit criminal courts? Section 1 of
Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8,
1967, provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall
have limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the regular
court of first instance, to try and decide the following
criminal cases falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:
xxx

xxx

xxx

C. "Violations of sections 3601, 3602, and 3604

of the Tariff and Customs Code and sections
174, 175 and345 of the National Internal
Revenue Code." (emphasis supplied)
The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus
dependent not only on the type of cases but also on the
penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case
at bar falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the city court, it cannot, even if it involves a violation
of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of
by circuit criminal courts the jurisdiction of which is
concurrent with that of courts of first instance in criminal
cases where the latter's jurisdiction is original and
exclusive.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion is granted, and this case is
dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of another
information for the same offense in the city court of La
Carlota City.

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order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
reconsideration.
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY, et al.,
GR NO. L-21450, April 15, 1968
FACTS
The spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced filed a civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint until the whole
obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by
defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the
same month.
The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory,
upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ having been
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond,
against which the Surety filed a written opposition upon
two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2)
Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of
the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds
the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion
for execution against its counter-bond but also the
following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein
bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond
in question" The Court denied this motion on the ground
solely that no previous demand had been made on the
Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter
the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the
Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a
second motion for execution against the counterbond.
On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon
motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period
of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its
failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion
for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59
of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion,
the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such

ISSUE
Whether the Surety Company can still question the
jurisdiction of the trial court?
HELD
As already stated, the action was commenced in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is,
almostfifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to
dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack
of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action,
originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy
spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since
July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the
dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court
of origin. Since then, it acquired certain rights and
assumed specific obligations in connection with the
pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17,
Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil.
885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against
the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written
opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked
for an additional affirmative relief that it be relieved
of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds
relied upon in support of its opposition lack of
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead
of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption

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that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it

or declined to assert it.

Topic: Estoppel by laches

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based

upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of
time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted.

G.R. No. 147406

It has been held that a party can not invoke the

jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further
said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can
not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. RathbunJones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283;
St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).
And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said
that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three
cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we
frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction.

Figueroa vs People
July 14, 2008

Facts:
On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Trial
on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial
court convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appeal
before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others,
for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.The
appellate court, however, in the challenged decision,
considered the petitioner to have actively participated in
the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of
the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from
asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no
other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the CA
affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the
penalty imposed and the damages awarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can still assail the issue of
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Yes, as Supreme Court noted; the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.The
general rule is that: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.
Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of
the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the
answer.
Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the
courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes
in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Applying the said doctrine to the
instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by
laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal
before the appellate court.

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At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for

laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable,
will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches"
unless it further appears that the party, knowing his
rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition
of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if
the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.
The doctrine must be applied with great care and the
equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the
doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for
the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for
remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or
tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned
cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is
null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Topic: Test whether the court modifies any
substantive right
Fabian vs Disierto
G.R. No. 129742

September 16, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder
and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondents Nestor V.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for
which he was administratively charged in the Office in
the office of the Ombudsman.Promat participated in the
bidding for government construction project including
those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their
affair lasted for some time, in the course of which
private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office.Later, misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship,
private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to
do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him.

Whether or not the Supreme Court modifies or enlarges

any substantive right in this case.
Ruling:
No. The test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. [ If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such
as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be
vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover,
relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the
right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by
the law. That right has been preserved. Only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided
has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant
has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be
changed by substitution without impairing vested rights,
hence he can have none in rules of procedure which
relate to the remedy.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act
of creating a new right of appeal because such power of
the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate
appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a
substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer
as impairing a vested right because the parties have still
a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that
remedy.
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
involving a transfer of cases from one court to another,
are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such,
they are applicable to actions pending at the time the
statute went into effector, in the case at bar, when its
invalidity was declared. Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section
7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), is declared
invalid.

Issue:

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Topic: Transitory action / Local action

Yu vs Pacleb
G.R. No. 172172

February 24, 2009

Facts:
Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife,
Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of an 18,000square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan,
Dasmarias, Cavite. In 1992, the Langcaan Property
became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to
transfer its ownership. On February 27, 1992, a Deed of
Absolute Sale5 was entered into between Spouses
Baltazar N. Pacleb and Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del
Rosario. On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale 6 was
entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and Ruperto
L. Javier (Javier). On November 10, 1992, a Contract to
Sell7 was entered into between Javier and petitioner
spouses Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. In their
contract, petitioner spouses Yu agreed to pay Javier a
total consideration of P900,000. Six hundred thousand
pesos (P600,000) (consisting ofP200,000 as previous
payment and P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the
contract) was acknowledged as received by Javier
and P300,000 remained as balance. Javier undertook to
deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign
a deed of absolute sale within thirty (30) days from
execution of the contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
On April 23, 1993, petitioner spouses Yu filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, a Complaint 8 for
specific performance and damages against Javier
Issue
Whether or not the said action is a quasi in rem.
Ruling:
No. The aim and object of an action determine its nature
and purpose. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding
to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with
the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court,
some responsibility or liability directly upon the person
of the defendant. It has been held that an action in

personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or

obligations; such action is brought against the person.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one
brought against persons seeking to subject the property
of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening
the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status,
ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as
between the particular parties to the proceedings and not
to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding
only upon the parties who joined in the action.
The case filed is an action for specific performance and
that an action for specific performance is an action in
personam.Being a judgment in personam, the said case is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein
and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard. Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was
not a party therein.
Topic: Jurisdiction of courts under B.P. 129
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC
G.R. No. 130866

September 16, 1998

Facts:
BienvenidoAricayos alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral
Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract of employment executed between him and
petitioner nor was his name included in the semimonthly payroll.
On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00
which was intended for payment by petitioner of its
value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of
AmelitaMalabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's
Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent,
who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of
Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private
respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
Amelita, after the death of her mother then made some
changes in the business operation and private respondent

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and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the

management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate jurisdiction is in the
Supreme Court
Ruling
No. B.P. 129 as amended by R.A. 7902 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals
over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts
and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, "those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ."
The purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of
review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals.
One of the reason is that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that
there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious
action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional
protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of
B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
The petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and
all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals.

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